PSF Russia 1944

Ambassador Harriman's telegram of Dec. 14

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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
Eu 861.9111/457

January 1, 1944

~~Confidential~~

My dear Admiral Leahy:

I am enclosing for your information a paraphrased copy of Ambassador Harriman's comments dated December 14 on developments in and respecting the Soviet Union as interpreted through articles appearing in the Soviet press.

Ambassador Harriman is inaugurating with this cable a monthly report interpreting and commenting on the more important developments in Soviet policy as reflected by editorials and leading articles in the Soviet press. As the Ambassador remarks, Government opinions and policies in the Soviet Union are developed and explained to the people principally through the medium of the press.

I believe that these monthly reports will provide valuable confidential information on the Soviet Union. In the future I will send them to you periodically under cover of a simple memorandum.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosure:

Paraphrase of telegram
no. 2214, December 14,
1943, from Moscow.

Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Department of State

BUREAU / DIVISION: EU

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 12-29-43

ADDRESSED TO

Admiral William D. Leahy.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1023

Confidential

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: AMERICAN EMBASSY, MOSCOW.

TO: Secretary of State, Washington.

DATED: December 14, 1 p.m., 1943.

NO. 2214

Paraphrase of Telegram From Moscow Containing Ambassador Harriman's Interpretative Comment Upon Developments In and Respecting the Soviet Union as Reflected in the Soviet Press

The revolutionary change in attitude of the Soviet Government toward the United States and Great Britain is revealed in the Soviet press.

The favorite headline on Tehran was "Historic decisions". Stalin, in effect, has proclaimed that the Soviet Union has strong fast allies; that the three nations accept one another in war and in the peace to follow as equal partners.

Although this was not put in so many words, it was clear by implication.

General satisfaction, even enthusiasm, followed the Moscow Conference. However, there was also a note of caution. The authoritative "War and the Working Class" of November 15 stated in blunt words that the significance of the conference would depend on the speed and tempo with which Russia's allies carried out the military decisions. The allied air offensive against Germany and the allied military effort in general were given unusual credit, but the fact was well stressed that Russia was bearing the brunt of the war.

However, the press reaction to the Tehran Conference contained no reservations and no note of caution.

The fact that steps had been taken to shorten the war was taken for granted. After the Moscow Conference this was a hope. It has become a certainty now.

Editorial

Editorial approval, which was wholehearted, was embroidered with accounts of meetings at collective farms and in factories at which Stalin was hailed as the one who, having left the country for the first time since the revolution, had brought home to the people great benefits--recognition of the Soviet Union as a world power of first importance, the new understanding with the United States and Great Britain to end the war quickly, and above all assurance of a secure future in a world friendly to the Soviet Union. Party members, in return, exhorted workers and peasants at organized meetings to give Stalin more production from factory and farm. The new association with the United States and Great Britain has thus been woven into the fabric of people's consciousness as one of the Soviet Government's basic policies.

As evidence of the importance the Soviet Government attaches to the job of selling its people this policy is the fact that these meetings were organized. The highest official seal of approval is given this policy by the fact that Stalin is hailed publicly as the father of it. The Soviet attitude towards individual European problems, on the other hand, has not up to the present been modified by the genuine enthusiasm for the new unity between the Allies.

Other principal points of Soviet Government policy stressed in the press during the month of November are as follows:

One. "Izvestia" bluntly stated the Soviet opposition to federations in eastern Europe.

Two. The frontiers of 1941 continue to regarded by the Soviet Government as a closed issue which the Red Army alone guarantees.

Three. Emphasis was placed on the implementation of the Moscow Declaration on Italy as the most important immediate political task, thus justifying the appointment on the Advisory Council on Italy of Vyshinski, senior Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, as the Soviet representative. The fact that the Soviet Government considers the right of the communist parties to function freely an integral part of the establishment of democracy in postwar Europe was shown by articles in the press.

Four.

Four. Neutral states were reminded by the press of the service their neutrality was rendering to the enemy, but during the latter part of November the strong emphasis which had been placed on Turkey's entry into the war after the Moscow Conference was not followed up.

Five. In the press and in special lectures Finland was treated as a full fledged vassal of Germany whose rulers should share equally with the Nazis the fate which was impending.

Six. The Polish divisions operating with the Red Army received much favorable publicity, but the criticism of the Polish Government in exile continued.

Seven. As a follow up to the inclusion of China in the Four Nation Declaration, events in the Far East have been given more attention by the press than in previous months and the conviction that Japan was doomed to overwhelming defeat has been revealed more clearly than heretofore with thinly disguised satisfaction.

Eight. Evidences of German atrocities against inhabitants of liberated areas were widely publicized in the Soviet press, but no comment was given to the Free German Committee.

Nine. Greater attention was given than previously to the role of the party in the war effort. The press revealed that of the total 4,600,000 members 1,200,000 members had been added to the party since 1940.

Ten. The intention of the Soviet Government to recognize religion as a factor in national life is demonstrated further by the publicity given to letters to Stalin on his anniversary speech from leaders of all religions.

Eleven. Patriotism and the development of national spirit in which socialism has become merely one aspect of Soviet life continued to be the dominating theme on the home front. In his November six speech on the anniversary of the revolution Stalin warned that despite victories, complacency or slackening of effort would be a crime against the country. This warning was used to arouse all people to greater effort and as a spur to production in industry and agriculture.

HARRIMAN

Russia folder
1-4-44
file
personal

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL KING

I think this is a matter which should be handled through Mr. Harriman, the American Ambassador in Moscow. Somebody's toes have been stepped on and it is better to let the thing be handled through diplomatic circles.

F. D. R.

Navy Dept. communication from Moscow complaining about restrictions placed on Consular Staff in re social and most official contact with Vladivostok officials or civilians, etc.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 11, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I wish to refer to telegram no. 9050 of December 29 from Ambassador Winant which reads in part as follows:

> "The Department will be familiar with the Soviet accusations against the Polish resistance groups in Poland which were lodged at Teheran to the effect that these resistance groups were actually cooperating with the Germans in that they were fighting the so-called partisans which were really Russians dropped by parachute."

It would be helpful to me and to the senior members of the Department who are handling Soviet-Polish matters if the pertinent sections of the report on the Tehran Conference with regard to the aforementioned Soviet accusations might be made available to the Department.

C H

Russia folder
1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H.L.H.

The President would like you to read and let him know what you think.

G.G.T.

Secret Memorandum for the President, 1-19-44, from Dr. Lubin, attaching cable addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by General Deane, in Moscow, who recommends that the Military Mission in Moscow be given authority to insist that Russians submit to our mission justifications for their requests for certain types of material, in view of Soviet Military successes. Lubin suggests that Adm. Leahy be told to direct Jt. Chiefs of Staff to retain existing policy re assignments to Russia for

(7791)
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Carbon of this memorandum & enclosure sent to the Sec. State. 2/7/44 hmo

PSF: Russia Foderm 1-44

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

C.H. OK! What will be the personnel?

February 7, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You are no doubt aware that Ambassador Harriman has been carrying on informal talks with Soviet officials in a preliminary effort to obtain from them information on the needs of Soviet economy for post-war construction and the best means by which we could be of assistance to them.

This is of such political importance as an indication of our sincere desire to be of assistance to them that it is felt it would be desirable more or less to formalize these preliminary steps. Moreover, the increased Soviet requests for capital goods which cannot easily be justified under Lend-Lease makes it imperative to study ways and means of satisfying this demand and making appropriate temporary financial arrangements to assist the Soviets in getting these goods.

Apart from this immediate problem Ambassador Harriman has suggested that we endeavor to obtain as accurate information as possible from the Soviet authorities regarding their longer term needs.

In order to study and handle this problem here it is felt that it would be advisable to set up an Interdepartmental Committee for this purpose.

As you will note from the attached draft telegram to Ambassador Harriman, it is suggested that this Committee be set up under a State Department chairman and that the Department of Commerce, the Treasury Department, the Tariff Commission, the Foreign Economic Administration and perhaps the War and Navy Departments should be asked to nominate representatives to the Committee.

Please indicate if you approve of this suggestion.

C.H.

Attachment:
Draft telegram

~~Secret~~

NO DISTRIBUTION

AMERICAN EMBASSY

MOSCOW

As a result of preliminary discussions which have taken place regarding postwar trade and reconstruction with the Soviet Union (Department's _____, _____, _____), the following procedure has been approved by the President:

1. You should continue to make clear to the Soviet Government the desire of the United States Government to assist, as far as it may be possible, in the post-war reconstruction of the Soviet Union. In order that plans may be made as soon as possible and in order that there shall be no delay in the delivery of such goods as the United States may be in a position to furnish to the Soviet Union, you should impress upon the appropriate Soviet authorities the desirability of obtaining as soon as practicable, accurate information regarding the amount and type of post-war reconstruction goods which they feel may be purchased in the United States.

In discussing this question you should request the Soviet authorities to furnish detailed information regarding

immediate needs which cannot legally be furnished under Lend-Lease and as full information as possible regarding longer term needs.

2. As indicated in my _____, _____, _____ Hopkins is studying the question of the three hundred million dollars worth of goods under Lend-Lease and will communicate with you on this question. In regard to long-term financial arrangements you should make it plain to the Soviet authorities that while we are disposed to assist them in every way possible in this matter we cannot at this time indicate either the amount or the exact nature of these long-term financial arrangements.

For your background information, the only agency of this Government having authority to extend credits for developmental purposes and the export of capital goods is the Export-Import Bank. Legal limitations now exist on the extension of credit by the Bank to countries such as the U.S.S.R. in which there are outstanding unsettled intergovernmental

intergovernmental obligations. Moreover the total lending authority of the Export-Import Bank is limited and the ceiling has been virtually reached. Thus the Bank has no existing authority to make credits in anything like the amount suggested.

Careful study is being given to both of these problems as well as to the general question of methods of financing immediate trade which cannot be arranged under Lend-Lease, as well as long-term, post-war development credits.

3. In order to coordinate here the work of the interested governmental agencies, there will be set up under a State Department chairman, a committee composed of representatives of the following organizations: Commerce, Tariff Commission, Treasury Department, Foreign Economic Administration, and perhaps the War and Navy Departments, as well as the War Shipping Administration. The duties of this Committee will be to study and coordinate all matt ers related to this question resulting from negotiations in Moscow and to set appropriate machinery in motion in order to finance and expedite the delivery of goods to the Soviet Union.

FMA:EGC:EEC

EE:ED:LIS

1/27/44

(2557)

Russia folder 1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 19, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

What do we do next?

F.D.R.

Letter from the Attorney General, 2/18/44, to Miss Tully, attaching photostic copy of the letter written to Mr. A. A. Berle by the Acting Director of the Office of Strategic Services, Mr. G. Edward Buxton, 2/1/44, referring to a memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ~~12/8~~ 1/28/44, from Mr. Buston, covering the question of an exchange of missions between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., letter from the President from the Attorney General, 2/16/44, with attached memorandum from Hon. J. Edgar Hoover, stating that the O.S.S. has arranged with Russia to establish in Washington representatives of the NKVD (formerly OPGU).

February 18, 1944

Dear Miss Tully:

I think the President would be interested in the enclosed photostat copy of the letter written to Mr. Berle by the Acting Director of the Office of Strategic Services, referring to a memorandum, also enclosed, covering the question of an exchange of missions between the U.S.S.R. and the U. S., about which I recently sent you a memorandum.

Sincerely yours,

Francis Biddle

Francis Biddle
Attorney General

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

February 16, 1944

Miss Grace Tully

The White House

Dear Miss Tully:

Would you give this to the President today. I think it is important.

Sincerely yours,

Francis Biddle

February 16, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

Enclosed is a memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover stating that O.S.S. has arranged with Russia to establish in Washington representatives of the NKVD (formerly OGPU). Hoover considers this a serious threat to the internal security of the country. Under the statutes these Russian agents would probably have to register. Public knowledge of such an arrangement might have serious consequences.

I have been informed that you have approved the plan generally, but I do not know whether you have considered its implications. Hoover states that he was told there was no prior approval of the State Department or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You may wish to give further consideration to the arrangement before it is consummated.

Respectfully yours,

Francis Biddle

Francis Biddle
Attorney General

The President

The White House

IMPORTANT
AND URGENT

2/20/44

Russia folder 1-44

E.R.S. Jr.

O.K. - Notify the British also

F.D.R.

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AMEMBASSY,

MOSCOW.

US URGENT

[redacted] FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

At midnight February 19 the Soviet Ambassador handed me an additional memorandum (my 359 Feb 19, 10 PM) containing the Soviet conditions of peace to Finland of which the following is a paraphrase. BEGIN PARAPHRASE. CRS

1. Breaking off of relations with Germany and the internment by Finland's own forces of German troops or if necessary with the assistance of Soviet forces.

2. Withdrawal of Finnish troops to the frontiers of 1940 and the restoration of the Treaty of 1940.

3. Repatriation of interned Soviet citizens and prisoners of war.

4. The question of compensation for military damage, demobilization of the Finnish army and certain other questions to be left open pending negotiations in Moscow.

It is the hope of the Soviet Government that with reference to the above-mentioned conditions there will

be no objection on the part of the United States Government. END PARAPHRASE.

The Ambassador had no information as to when these conditions would be conveyed ~~through~~ to the Finnish Government nor any interpretation of the phrase QUOTE certain other questions UNQUOTE in numbered paragraph 4. Please seek an immediate interview with Molotov and convey to him the following reply of this Government which has been approved by the President.

QUOTE The Government of the United States desires to express its appreciation of the information conveyed to it by the Soviet Ambassador in regard to the proposed basis for peace negotiations with the Finnish Government. The Soviet Government will of course understand that since the United States is not in a state of war with Finland this Government has no comment to make with regard to the terms outlined in the Ambassador's aide-memoire. In view however of the important effect thereof upon the prosecution of the war against the common enemy the Government of the United States would appreciate being kept informed of the progress

of any negotiations which may take place between the Finnish and Soviet Governments on the basis of these conditions. UNQUOTE.

We are likewise conveying for his information the above reply to the Soviet Ambassador here.

(CODE ROOM: Please repeat to London for the Secret information of the Ambassador. Foreign & Repartiments 1277, February 19)

EE:CB:FHH:SS

E.R.S. Jr.

O.K. - Notify the
British also

F.D.R.

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MOSCOW.

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(CODE ROOM: Please repeat to London for the Secret information of the Ambassador. Defence & Departments (277, February 19)

EE:CB:FHH:SS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 20, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT *Urgent*

Last night the Soviet Ambassador called on me and handed me the attached aide-mémoire containing the Soviet conditions for peace with Finland and expressing the hope that this Government would have no objection to the terms as outlined therein. There is attached for your consideration and approval a draft telegram to Mr. Harriman transmitting to him the above information and instructing him to deliver the reply of this Government. If you approve the suggested reply which Mr. Harriman is to make to Mr. Molotov, I will convey it also to the Soviet Ambassador tomorrow.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
Acting Secretary

1. Aide-mémoire from Soviet Ambassador.
2. Draft telegram to Moscow.

AIDE-MEMOIRE

(Reference is made to Aide-Memoire handed by Ambassador Gromyko to Acting Secretary of State, Mr. E. Stettinius, Jr., on February 19, 1944)

1. Severence of relations with Germany and interning of German troops by Finland's own forces or, if it will be necessary, with the aid of the Soviet troops;

2. Reestablishment of the treaty of 1940 and withdrawal of the Finnish troops to the borders of 1940;

3. Return of Soviet prisoners of war and of interned Soviet citizens;

4. The question of demobilization of the Finnish army and compensation of military damages and certain other questions are being left open until negotiations in Moscow.

The Soviet Government hopes that there will be no objection on the part of the Government of the United States regarding the stated above terms.

February 19, 1944

A. G.

file personally

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 19, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Finnish Peace Conversations in Stockholm

The Soviet Ambassador left with me this afternoon an aide-memoire covering the conferences in Stockholm on February 16 between Paasikivi and Madame Kollontai regarding Finland getting out of the war.

Paasikivi said the Finns were ready to accept the 1940 border although they had certain wishes in connection with this question. He asked if the Russians would demand that the Finns join in the war against Germany.

Madame Kollontai simply listened but because Paasikivi stated he was an official representative of the Finnish Government, the Soviet Government will present its own conditions of peace. These will be communicated to us.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Russia foreign 1-44

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 February 1944

File Confidential

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I am attaching a memorandum for the President. Will you please see that he gets it? Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Following my memorandum of the other day relative to the proposed exchange of representatives between the Russians and our organization, it should be called to your attention that a similar exchange exists between the British and the Russians and has been in existence for over two years. A like exchange between the Russians and ourselves was suggested by the head of the British mission in Moscow.

William J. Donovan
Director

file Russia folder 1-44

Stalin Reaffirms Teheran Ties

Cables Roosevelt Allies Will Soon Strike Final Blow Decided On at Conference.

Washington, Feb. 29 (A. P.).—Marshal Stalin of Russia today underscored the Allied understandings reached at Moscow and Teheran late last year, and advised President Roosevelt that he was convinced the time is near when co-operating forces of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain will bring about "the final defeat of our common enemy, Hitlerite Germany."

A message made public by the White House, acknowledging the President's cable of February 22 congratulating the Red Army on its twenty-sixth anniversary, said:

"I ask you to accept my sincere thanks for your friendly congratulations on the occasion of the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Red Army and on the successes of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the struggle against the Hitlerite invaders.

"I am strongly convinced that the time is near when the successful struggle of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, together with the armies of the United States and Great Britain, on the basis of the agreements reached at Moscow and Teheran, will lead to the final defeat of our common enemy, Hitlerite Germany."

MARCH 1, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LATTA:

SUBJECT: WIRE FROM JOSEF STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT WHICH WAS NOT RECEIVED IN HYDE PARK - AN EXPLANATION IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY SECRETARY HASSETT AND MR. BLAKE.

1. THE MESSAGE IN THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE WAS RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE MONDAY NIGHT; MR. MCMULLIN CALLED MR. BLAKE WHO ARRANGED FOR THE TRANSLATION.

2. THE TRANSLATION WAS THEN PUT ON THE PRINTER CIRCUIT TO HYDE PARK. MR. ABBOTT, THE SENDING OPERATOR HERE, STATES THAT HE TESTED THE MACHINE IN THE USUAL MANNER AND THAT THE CIRCUIT SEEMED TO BE IN WORKING ORDER, WHEREUPON HE PROCEEDED TO TRANSMIT THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE.

3. THE INVESTIGATION BRINGS OUT THAT MR. ABBOTT DID NOT GET AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT FROM HYDE PARK THAT THE MESSAGE HAD BEEN RECEIVED; THAT ON THE SAME NIGHT THE WESTERN UNION ENGINEERS WERE REWIRING THE PRINTER AND MORSE CIRCUITS IN THIS OFFICE AND THAT THE CIRCUIT TO HYDE PARK WAS UNQUESTIONABLY CUT DURING THE VERY MOMENT THIS MESSAGE WAS BEING SENT.

4. MR. ABBOTT STATES THAT ON MONDAY NIGHT THIS OFFICE WAS RECEIVING THOUSANDS OF "JEWISH PALESTINE MESSAGES" WHICH HE HAD TO READ OVER, AND THAT THE OFFICE WAS BEING REWIRED AT THE TIME, ALL OF WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO HIS FAILURE TO GET AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT FROM THE RECEIVING OPERATOR AT HYDE PARK.

5. I HAVE TAKEN STEPS WHICH I AM CONFIDENT WILL PREVENT A RECURRENCE.

DEWEY E. LONG

ATTACHMENT

Russia folder 1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON:

Will you run up to the Russian Ambassador and ask him whether the two gentlemen we spoke of last week have applied for their passports and that I said I think it will be put through quickly, but that they have to apply in person?

F.D.R.

Russia folder 1-44

file Harriman

March 14, 1944.

TO: HARRIMAN
MOSCOW

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

We saw the film "Rainbow" Sunday night. Bohlen was present but the film is so beautifully and dramatically presented that we needed little translation. I hope the film can be shown to the public in this country with occasional comment by someone like Quentin Reynolds or Lowell Thomas.

ROOSEVELT

Nowlan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 25, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The film Rainbow sent by Ambassador Harriman "For your private film library" has been received and is now in the possession of Nowlan, White House motion picture operator.

It should be remembered that Ambassador Harriman suggested in his cablegram of February sixteenth "that you have Chip Bohlen (Chief, Division of Eastern European Affairs) present to translate the dialogue "whenever you screen the film at the White House."

Mr. Bohlen has the written dialogue that came with the picture.

S.T.E.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

STEVE:

Keep in touch with this. I want to see it just as soon as it comes. It might have gone to Bob Sherwood's office here or in New York.

F.D.R.

Miss Murphy

will call

Pres.

RCC-239
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow

Dated February 16, 1944

Rec'd 9:28 a.m., 17th.

Secretary of State

Washington

547, February 16, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Soviet Film Committee has delivered to me a print of the film Rainbow "For your private film library". I dispatched it some days ago by pouch to Bob Sherwood for delivery to the White House.

The film graphically depicts the story of Russian peasant resistance to German occupying forces. It is guresome in detail but shows interesting peasant characters and the attitude of the Russians towards the German invaders. The story is from a book by Wanda Waselewska, of the Polish group in Moscow. I hope you will find time to see the film and suggest that you have Chip Bohlen present to translate the dialogue.

As the Film Committee is expectantly anxious to get your reaction, I believe it would be useful if you would send me a short cable for transmission to them.

HARRIMAN

HPD

MEMORANDUM

In connection with the decision reached by the Soviet Government following the request of the Italian Government on the establishment of direct relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy and on the exchange or representatives, the Ambassador of Great Britain, Mr. Kerr, in a conversation with Mr. A. Y. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on March 13, 1944 stated, in passing, the following:

1) The British Government should like to stress, that the action of the Soviet Government, if it will be followed by other Allied Governments, would inevitably undermine the whole foundation of the Advisory Council and the Allied Control Commission;

2) Besides, this would not be in full accord with the articles 37 and 42 of the terms of armistice with Italy.

1. The Soviet Government considers that the stated above assertions are baseless and erroneous in essence.

It is impossible to agree with the statement that the establishment of direct relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy, as well as between other Allied nations and Italy could in any way affect negatively the activities of the Advisory Council and the Control Commission. It is sufficient to recall the tasks and competence of the Advisory Council, as they were determined at the Moscow Conference, in the proper provision, in order to convince oneself that the Advisory Council contrary to the above-mentioned assertions is not an official instrument of the Allied Governments for contact with the Italian Government.

The same has to be said about the Control Commission. It is known that the articles 37 and 42 of complete terms of armistice with Italy have determined the authority of the Allied Control Commission as an instrument established with the purpose to carry out the regulation and execution of terms of armistice and only in these limits to maintain the necessary contact with the Italian authorities. The establishment of direct relations between the Allied countries and Italy is

not

not in any discord with these provisions. The reference to these articles thus is groundless and, evidently, is a result of a misunderstanding.

As to the decision of the Soviet Government on the establishment of factual relations of the U.S.S.R. and Italy and on the exchange of representatives, it is necessary to keep in mind that up to the present time the Soviet Government having no direct contact with the Italian Government was in an inequal position as compared to its Allies who had established from the very beginning a direct contact with the Government of Badoglio through their numerous institutions and numerous representatives on the territory of liberated Italy. The establishment of a direct contact between the Soviet Government and the Government of Italy to a certain extent eliminates the above-mentioned inequality and provides a possibility of direct contact between them, which already exists for a long time in the relations between Italy and the governments of Great Britain and the United States.

It is also necessary to keep in mind that the establishment of a direct contact between the U.S.S.R. and Italy is an establishment of relations with the Government of Badoglio de facto. The decision adopted on this question by the Soviet Government does not go beyond the limits of factual relations between both governments and is just putting those factual relations into official form. In view of this a decision was made to establish not diplomatic relations between the two countries and exchange Ambassadors or Ministers but to establish only direct relations and exchange representatives between the governments.

2. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to dwell on the question regarding the political stituation which is at present in Italy. This is the more necessary since up to the present moment the governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America together have not yet considered the political situation in Italy and have not yet discussed together the question what kind of government should be in Italy in the period of armistice and what measures should be taken for its democratization.

It is impossible not to acknowledge that at the present time the situation in Italy is developing not in the direction of improvement in the desirable for the Allied countries. direction, but on the contrary in the direction of deterioration. The affairs in Italy have come at the present time to a dead end, and the economic and political collapse of Italy is growing. On the territory of liberated Italy there exists,

on

on one hand, the Government of Badoglio supported by certain groups of the population and expressing readiness to take part in the common struggle of democratic countries against the German-Fascist oppressors. Alongside with this on the territory of liberated Italy there exists a permanent executive Junta which is backed by anti-fascist parties and groups and striving to unite the Italian people for the fight against Hitlerite Germany and fascism and it is impossible not to see that on the side of the permanent executive Junta there is a considerably wide union of democratic elements expressing an inclination to active operations together with the Allied democratic countries against Hitlerite Germany and the fascist band of Mussolini. Thus, the Government of Badoglio as well as the permanent executive Junta are striving to take part on the side of the Allies in the struggle against the band of Hitler and Mussolini still controlling central and northern Italy, but in the course of all these months the Government of Badoglio and the permanent executive Junta not only were not united for combined actions against the common enemy but, on the contrary, were wasting strength fighting each other. Such a situation is, of course, only playing into the hands of the enemy of the Allies and is inevitably leading to the deterioration of the political and economic conditions of Italy. The experience of the recent months has shown to the full that the question regarding the uniting of democratic and anti-fascist forces in Italy for the speeding up of the destruction of Hitlerite bands of the fascist gang of Mussolini and, thus, the question of the establishment of such an Italian Government which would unite these forces and would facilitate the carrying out of the task of the Allies in Italy is an immediate task. Meanwhile the establishment of such a Government, if one judges from the statements of the British and American representatives, is being postponed until the capture of Rome and until the conclusion of military operations connected with this aim, and the existing split of forces in the anti-fascist democratic camp of Italy is increasing more and more.

From the statements of the British and American governments it is known that at the present time it is not considered expedient to change the government of Badoglio and to support the demand regarding the abdication of king Victor Emmanuel. the Soviet Government is ready to agree with the mentioned point of view, even in spite of the fact that the government of Badoglio has not proved to the proper extent its ability

to

to carry on the struggle against the fascist and pro-fascist elements. Besides, the Soviet Government has in view the fact that the question concerning one or another form of government in Italy will be solved later, when the Italian people itself will find it timely from the point of view of securing sufficient democratic conditions for the expression of its free will.

Since, thus at the present time, the governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union voice for the necessity to keep the government headed by Badoglio, in as much as the latter must secure the putting into practice the certain measures on uniting the democratic and anti-fascist forces of Italy in the interests of intensification of the struggle against our common enemy, and on the other hand, one cannot ignore the fact that the present negative attitude of the political groups and trends, united by the permanent executive Junta, toward the government of Badoglio, cannot be overcome, if a certain reorganization and improvement of the Italian government will not be carried out in accordance with the wishes of the Junta.

Proceeding from the desirability and necessity of the speediest liquidation of the split in the camp of the political groups and trends inclined to cooperate with the Allied democratic countries, the Soviet Government proposes to the governments of Great Britain and the United States to take steps toward the possible union of all democratic and anti-fascist forces of liberated Italy on the basis of appropriate improvement of the Government of Badoglio. The Soviet Government is bringing for the consideration of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States the above-mentioned proposals regarding the general situation of the affairs in liberated Italy, bearing in mind that this will assist the efforts of the Allies in the struggle against Hitler and Mussolini in Italy.

Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Washington, D. C. March 19, 1944

Russia folder 1-44

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1944.

[redacted]

file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet-Finnish Peace Negotiations.

I am enclosing a copy of an aide-memoire which was left with me last night by the Soviet Ambassador.

The Soviet reply is more encouraging than we had reason to expect since they are willing to have representatives of the Finnish Government come to Moscow to receive a fuller interpretation of the Soviet peace terms.

CH

Enclosure:

Aide-memoire from
Soviet Ambassador,
March 19, 1944.

Department of State

BUREAU / DIVISION: The EE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 3/20/44

ADDRESSED TO

The President

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—10813

(COPY:EE:LIS)
(COMP. EB)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Stated below is the answer of the Finnish Government to the notification of the Soviet Government of March 10 and the consequent reply of the Soviet Government.

"The Government of Finland has acquainted itself with the notification of the Soviet Government which was transmitted on March 10 by its Ambassador to Stockholm, Madame A.M. Kollontai, to Mr. Boheman.

"As the Government of Finland has informed on March 8, it was ready to state its opinion regarding various questions, touched in the peace terms put forward by the Soviet Government. Besides it wanted also to receive explanation regarding the formal interpretation as well as regarding the real contents of those points, in which the terms were formulated. Such an explanation would be necessary in order that the Diet of Finland could determine its attitude towards the terms which touch a number of complicated questions. The Government of finland regrets that the Soviet Government had not found it possible to give it the opportunity to state its point of view on these special questions and that the negotiations were announced possible only after the peace terms put forward by the Soviet Government are accepted by the Finnish Government. The Government of Finland which, as before, is seriously striving to establish peaceful relations and desires to start negotiations cannot, however, declare beforehand acceptance of the terms in question, which touch the existence of the whole nation, not having even a firm sureness regarding the interpretation of these terms and their meaning (totag leure Portee)."

On March 18 the Soviet Government has instructed Madame Kollontai to transmit to Mr. Boheman the following

reply

reply of the Soviet Government to the Finnish Government.

"The Soviet Government has received the reply of the Finnish Government transmitted on March 17 by Mr. Boheman to Madame A.M. Kollontai, where it expresses the desire to get the interpretation of the Soviet peace terms before it makes a decision to the point regarding these terms.

"First. The Soviet Government does not object against the sending by the Finnish Government one or several of its representatives to receive from the Soviet Government the interpretation of the Soviet peace terms.

"Second. The Soviet Government considers that Moscow would be the most suitable place where the representatives of the Finnish Government could receive the most complete interpretation."

March 19, 1944

A.G.

Russia folder 1-44

FILE MEMORANDUM:

Secret memorandum, 4-1-44 from Hon. Cordell Hull, re Soviet-Finnish Peace negotiations, with attached memorandum left with him by the Soviet Ambassador, setting forth results of meetings in Moscow between Finnish and Soviet representatives and the revised peace terms which the Soviet Government is proposing as result of these conversations - sent to Admiral Leahy to file, April 3, 1944.

Russia foreign 1-44

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 4, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ambassador Harriman's desire to visit London.

I have your note of April 3 inquiring if we answered Harriman's 871 (attached).

This was done after Mr. Stettinius and I discussed the matter with you and we informed Harriman that while we felt it would be unwise for him to meet Mr. Stettinius in London, he would be glad to go on to Cairo for this purpose. A copy of that telegram is attached for your information.

Mr. Harriman then replied urging Mr. Stettinius to continue from Cairo on to Moscow for a short visit. We replied noncommittally to this last communication stating that Mr. Stettinius and I would consider it further in the light of what might transpire in London.

Enclosures:
From Moscow, 871, March 15;
To Moscow, 613, March 17.

cH

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

The President

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1083

REASONS FOR PROPOSED TRIP TO LONDON.

RT-944
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated March 15, 1944

Rec'd 2:36 p.m., 16th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

871, March 15, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL AND [redacted] FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDERSECRETARY.

Reference your 557, March 11, 8 p.m.

I feel that I should explain to you in more detail what I had in mind in connection with my suggestion that I go to England for a few days while Ed is there during the latter part of his visit.

In the first place before making the suggestion I gave considerable thought to the possible Soviet reaction. I had in mind discussing it with Molotov and believe that he will recognize its importance and will in no way object to it. If I found any adverse reaction I would of course communicate this and possibly cancel the trip.

Your cable is not clear to me whether you fear adverse reaction here or at home. I would have thought that the importance of our discussions from the long range standpoint in our Soviet relations would more than offset any temporary

any temporary reaction in the United States and that a way could be found to make a satisfactory explanation. Whenever we have had a bilateral discussion with the British the question of why the Soviets were not present has always been raised in any event. It would seem to me that the people of the United States would recognize the importance of Ed's getting my information for his consideration and the reasonableness of my taking advantage of his presence in London to communicate it to him.

I perhaps should have emphasized that because of the character and importance of the military matters with which I am personally involved with the Soviets I do not see daylight ahead for the long trip home so that I look upon the talks with Ed in London as the only one I will have the opportunity to have for a considerable period.

We are in a critical moment in our relations with the Soviet Union and it is my feeling that mutual exchanges with Ed will help clarify the issues and contribute to their eventual solution.

Your cable however brings to mind another question.

From my

From my knowledge of the developments of our military relationships with the British I know that we have found it essential to have frequent meetings because of the differences that have arisen even with the British after a very few months. I have thought for several weeks that the first opportunity should be used to bring about triangular discussions with the Soviets and British again. It now occurs to me that Ed's trip to London might be used as an occasion to have perhaps very informal triangular discussions if an important Soviet official can be induced to meet him there. I doubt whether Molotov would come but it is not beyond the realm of possibility that Vyshinski would be sent if it were urged that he do so and a sufficiently clear reason put forward. I mentioned this yesterday to the British Ambassador. His preliminary reaction was most favorable. I can see no harm and some good in the extension of the invitation even if not accepted.

I believe also that I may not have made clear the importance I place on my contemplated talks with Ed. In the first place I have not been able and I doubt if it is ever possible to report by cable fully and

clearly

clearly the atmosphere and background in Moscow. This is partly due to the fact that I am increasingly out of touch with the thinking at home. In this connection I have in mind all of the political subjects which are causing difficulty. In addition we are about to negotiate the fourth protocol and plans for aid for reconstruction. I have certain ideas as to how this might be handled in such a way as to be helpful in our overall relations and to avoid pitfalls that I see ahead. I feel I can only put them forward in personal discussion. Here again so much depends upon what the thinking is at home to certain aspects which it is difficult to interchange by cable.

We are setting the foundations for our long term relationship with the Soviets and I can only say that I believe it would be a great mistake if I were not permitted to make this trip to London. I regret that the military considerations do not permit me to go to Washington when Ed returns as this would be much more satisfactory. I earnestly ask therefore that you reconsider your message to me.

I would appreciate also receiving your reaction to the idea of the invitation to a member of the Soviet

Government

Government possibly Vyshinski to come to London during the latter part of Ed's visit. I have not sufficient information on the plans for Ed's trip to make a recommendation. I do feel strongly however that the first occasion possible should be used for another tripartite discussion as I believe this is the only way we can keep from drifting apart during this formative period and when deep seated suspicions of long standing exist.

HARRIMAN

EJH

U

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

March 17, 1944

8 Pm

AMEMBASSY

MOSCOW

613

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

In response to your wire No. 871 Stettinius and I discussed matter thoroughly with the President at lunch today. We feel for reasons which Stettinius will explain to you when he sees you that it would be unwise for you and him to meet in London but Stettinius will meet you in Cairo if you feel it desirable at the close of the London conference. He will advise you from London the probable date he could meet you in Cairo. There is a possibility he might be going to Cairo in any event.

HULL

U:ES:RJL:mmcd

S:GWR:ARK

Russia folder
1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HONORABLE CORDELL HULL:

Have you answered this?

F.D.R.

Secret telegram to Secretary of State and the Under Secretary from Harriman, Moscow, March 15, 1944, giving his reasons for a proposed trip to London.

May 18, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I had luncheon with Joe Davies yesterday to find out what he wanted to tell you confidentially. He says it has to do with Captain Kravachenko, who gave an interview to the New York Times that caused quite a sensation. In this interview the Russian Government was accused of getting ready to double-cross her Allies, the United States and Great Britain. Kravachenko represented himself as being a member of a Russian mission.

Joe says he has talked twice with Ambassador Gromyko, at the Ambassador's request, and each time Gromyko stated how resentful his government was of this action on the part of Kravachenko, that Kravachenko was an unworthy officer and that they had asked for his extradition. This, in effect, would mean sending Captain Kravachenko back to Russia to be shot. Ambassador Gromyko said his government felt that their Ally, the United States, should stand by Russia in punishing unworthy officers. Gromyko said Kravachenko was not a member of any mission, but that he was a Captain in the Russian Army; that while he was here officially, he was only one of many technical assistants on a mission.

Joe Davies said he had also been to see Mr. Hull and the Secretary told him that he was not impressed with the Russian Government's request, and was going to recommend to the President that it be not granted. Joe said at this point that he believes Mr. Hull is being poisoned by some of the State Department "underlings" against Russia. Joe said his only interest in the world is his desire that the President not do anything to alienate the present fine understanding between Russia and the United States. He suggested that the extradition be granted in principle but that the actual date of extradition be postponed, he hoped, indefinitely. I stated at this point that this smacked of irregularity and, perhaps, of trickery, and Joe said he did not think so and really believed it could be done in principle but not actually effected.

This is all that Joe wanted you to know.

E. M. W.

No orig. found 4-24-90

Russia folder 1-44

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

AMT-117
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. ([redacted]T)

Moscow

Dated June 7, 1944

Rec'd 3:55 p.m.

file

Secretary of State,

Washington.

U.S. URGENT

2014, June 7, 2 p.m.

PERSONAL AND [redacted] FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

I called on Mr. Molotov on my return from meeting o first bomber mission in Russia and informed him that you and Mr. Hull were firm in your determination to carry out the understandings reached at Moscow and Tehran for solidarity in Soviet American relations and that no minor difficulties would affect this determination to work out agreements on all questions.

I informed him of Mikolajczyk's visit to Washington of the agreement that you had with him regarding no public speeches on his part, and what you intended to say to him. I said you had confidence that the Soviet Government would carry out the commitments taken by Molotov at Moscow and Stalin at Tehran for the true independence. At this point Molotov interrupted and asked

asked whether your attitude was still the same as expressed at Tehran, to which I replied "of course". He said that he would inform Marshal Stalin at once and that Marshal Stalin would be gratified. I continued that you hoped the Soviet Government would find it possible to work out their Polish relations in such a way that all Poles could unite to fight wholeheartedly the common enemy. I said you hoped that the Soviet Government and Soviet press comments on Poland would be confined to constructive statements and avoid acrimonious agruments with groups criticising Soviet policy, including those in the United States.

I asked about the Polish leaders who had recently come to Moscow out of Poland. Molotov explained that they were four in number representing different democratic parties including Mikolajczyk's Peasant Party and that they had reported the overwhelming majority of the Polish people were not in sympathy with the London Government.

When I saw Molotov the second time he mentioned that he had told Marshal Stalin of your attitude and that Marshal Stalin was greatly pleased.

HARRIMAN

WWC

Russia folder 1-44

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

file

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

NMC-777
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. ([redacted])

Moscow

Dated June 12, 1944

Rec'd 9:15 a.m., 13th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

US URGENT

2107, June 12, midnight

[redacted] FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

The four delegates from the Polish National Council who are now visiting the Soviet Union called on me at the Embassy last night at their request. The group were intensely earnest, of simple background, and anxious to persuade me that their Council was representative of the Polish people. I am satisfied they are not (repeat not) Soviet agents and are anxious to get assistance and backing of ourselves and the British as well as the Soviet Government. The group consisted of Morawski Vice President of the Council a zealous Polish patriot and bitter critic of Sosnkowski, who served as principal spokesman for the group; Colonel Turski of the staff of the Peoples Army, a professional soldier who said he was a Communist and gave the impression of being an opportunist;

Hagecki,

Hagecki, former director of a silk factory at Lodz who appeared to be the most balanced member of the delegation; and Hardy, a university graduate who has been an active partisan leader for the past four years.

During a conversation lasting more than three hours the delegation gave me a mass of interesting information concerning present conditions in Poland and the objectives of the National Council. The highlights of their statements are:

One. More than three million Jews and three million Poles have perished during the German occupation. Perhaps thirty thousand Jews remain in Poland, most of whom are underground.

Two. The principal aim of the National Council is to carry on resistance against the Germans.

Three. The delegates said that Sosnkowski's underground numbered about thirty thousand and was losing supporters. The National Council is strongly opposed to Sosnkowski and his supporters whom it accuses of having pursued a waiting policy in resistance and of opposing the active struggle of the Polish popular movement against the Germans. In so doing they have killed Soviet partisans and have collaborated with the German Gestapo.

German Gestapo. The delegates gave examples of action by Sosnkowski's forces in which members of the Peoples Army had been treacherously killed. They stated that there was no future for the Sanacja party in Poland and alleged that Sosnkowski's followers were saying that they were striving to build up a strong Poland to assist the United States and Britain in their future war against the Soviet Union.

Four. The National Council views the former democratic members of the London Government such as Mikolajczyk, Kwapinski, Stanczyk, Adamczyk and Koch as misguided and out of touch with conditions in Poland and believes that they could be persuaded to cooperate with the Council if contact could be established. The delegates would like to get in touch with these members of the London Government anywhere, suggesting either here or in Washington.

Five. The Council takes a realistic attitude toward the boundary dispute and believes that in view of the strength of the Soviet Union it can make a better deal by cooperation with the Soviets than by adopting an adamant position. It hopes to retain Lwow and the Galician oil fields and to expand

Polish territory

Polish territory to the Baltic in the west. It also desires to retain Wilno but fears that in view of its unfavorable geographical position there is little possibility of doing so.

Six. The Council at present consists of some sixty members representing several parties of the left and center. It hopes to expand to several hundred and become a general Polish Parliament representative of all democratic elements fighting against the Germans. Its presidium consists of five members including representatives of the peasants, democratic, socialist and labor parties and General Rolla in his capacity as commander of the Peoples Army.

Seven. The Council has devoted little attention to post war plans. As territory is liberated it envisages the election of town, district and provincial committees to exercise authority pending the establishment of a central government. It is expected that at the appropriate time a representative parliament will be elected which will develop a constitution and a permanent government. The Council expects to give leadership during the formative period. The delegates placed great stress on the desire of the Council to avoid at all costs civil strife in Poland.

Eight. The

Eight. The Council believes that Polish post war policy can only be formulated by a parliament chosen in a free election. The delegates agreed that the peasant party would be the dominant element. It advocates the grant of land to the peasants and government control over the principal branches of economy, but favors private ownership. It recognizes however that the state must be prepared to operate many enterprises which were confiscated or established by the Nazis during the period of occupation.

Nine. Cordial relations and agreement have been established with the union of Polish patriots and General Berling's army in the Soviet Union. The delegates asserted that there had been no previous contact between these organizations and the National Council.

Ten. The Council, on January one addressed a message by radio to the governments of the Soviet Union Great Britain and the United States requesting that arms be supplied to the Peoples Army to enable them to prosecute the struggle against the Germans.

Tommy guns, machine guns, anti-tank weapons, explosives and grenades are needed. The Council

hopes to equip

hopes to equip two hundred and fifty thousand men to go into action when the Russians cross the Bug. It desires financial assistance from the Allied powers to permit the acquisition of these arms. The delegates further suggest that an American military observer be sent to Poland to learn the facts first hand of the requirements and in order that the Allied powers may determine whether the London Government or the National Council actually enjoys the support of the Polish people.

Eleven. The delegates have been cordially received by Marshal Stalin and Molotov and have submitted a request for arms but have not as yet been given a definite reply. The delegates expressed their intention of remaining in Moscow until they received a favorable reply, and again stressed their hope for assistance also from the United States and Great Britain.

I informed the delegation that our conversation was entirely unofficial and requested that it be given no publicity, to which they agreed. I gave them no indication that I intended to report the conversation to you.

The Soviet

The Soviet Government appears to attach considerable weight to the reports brought by the delegates concerning the situation in Poland. The fact that they have extended an invitation to an American military observer to visit Poland to study the situation there appears to be an indication of their good faith.

Since it is likely that the delegation will approach me again before leaving Moscow I should appreciate any views or instructions which you may have concerning the attitude to be taken toward their request for military aid and for the despatch of an American observer to Poland. The Council that these men represent may well play an important role in the future of Poland, either because they do represent the feelings of the majority of the Poles or because of future support from the Soviet Government. They want our help now and I believe that serious consideration should be given to sending in a military observer if the Soviet Government agrees. If this is considered inadvisable, I recommend that we keep alive some contact with them.

HARRIMAN

CSB

Russia folder 1-44 file

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT.

It occurred to me that you might possibly like to give to the press the following comments from Marshal Stalin to Ambassador Harriman:

"The history of war has never witnessed such a grandiose operation. An operation Napoleon himself had never even attempted."

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN.

Ws
#2 List & Business
Burwell (4)

PSF: Russia 3-44

MOSCOW CABLE 248

From Richard Lauterbach to TIME - 6/18/44 - Received 6/19/44

Eric Johnston's inspection of Leningrad factories is comparable only to a French prefect of police whizzing through a red-light district in Paris, asking just two principle questions: how old are you and how many women do you employ?

After a conference Wednesday with Mikoyan Johnston held a full press conference at Spasso House on the results of these talks. Then, accompanied by assistant Joyce O'Hara, William L. White and five American correspondents who were guests of Mikoyan, Johnston left on the "Krasnaya Strela," famed Red Arrow train to Leningrad on the reopened October line at 5 p.m. Johnson and company in a special car with kitchen, observation and stateroom at the rear of the train were joined at Kalinin by anti-aircraft protection. Representing Mikoyan on the trip was his tall, pipe-smoking, gloomy protocol chief, Vladimir Kirillov, who is a graduate of the Colorado School of Mines.

The party arrived in Leningrad at 1 p.m. Thursday, where they were quartered at the Astoria Hotel. Johnston was given the old Grand Duke's suite of four rooms, including office, dining room, parlor, bedroom and huge bath combined (? Cable reads cumbidet.) The party plus the press ate lavish meals in the Johnston suite.

At Kalinin en route Johnston addressed a few halting words in Russian to a crowd of curious railroad workers, who laughed. He has been studying the War Department's phonetic Russian lessons. Later the same evening, in the best of spirits, he sang the Lady in the Dark song "Jenny" to his interpreter, whose name is Jenny.

In Leningrad he distributed lemon drops to the press which he carried in a business envelope. After dinner he toured the famous sites,

including the Admiralty, Peter ? and Paul, Fortress ? Kazansky, the Cathedral ? Winter Palace, etc., guided by head architect Nikolai Baranov, who then took Johnston to his office for a lecture on the future development of Leningrad. When he admired a beautifully produced monograph published last year for the 240th anniversary of the city's founding, Baranov offered him a copy. "I admired it, not to have it given to me as a present, but as a great work of art." He accepted it, asking Baranov to autograph the book, "to give it a personal touch." As he left the office Johnston saw a map of the new Leningrad. "It shows a well-conceived plan of a very artistic people," then, "We are two great building nations of the world."

Then I toured the newer districts of Leningrad. When he asked the style of architecture of the new apartment houses, Jenny translated they were in Leningrad style and "laconic."

The Johnston party then breezed into the faded blue and white Nikolsky Cathedral, where Acting Patriarch Alexei lived many months during the blockade. The Cathedral was built by Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the Great, and consecrated December 5, 1760. Johnston inspected the cathedral with great interest and (cable reads intouristic) curiosity. He made two brief speeches. The first was to a choir of women who had been practicing, telling them he was sorry to interrupt and hoped we will have a long peace in which the two great nations could build up. When they grinned and bowed, Johnston said in perfect Russian, "Spasibo." Leaving the Cathedral he shook hands with dear Father Vladimir Uspensky. Johnston: "Tell the priest that in the long peace that follows the war I hope all peoples of the world can worship in the religion they choose."

The next four hours were spent touring an exhibition on the defense of Leningrad, which opened April 30. Two floors and the huge basement

of a building that was formerly an agricultural museum. It tells in photographs, panoramas, paintings, leaflets, slogans, movies, trophies, maps, models, statues and busts the entire story of Leningrad's heroic fight for survival. The scope and skill of this spectacle is on the scale of the Soviet World's Fair exhibit. Johnston, immensely impressed, wrote a lyrical, glowing tribute in the spectacle's guest book.

The following morning Johnston began a tour of Leningrad factories, including the electric power station and the famed Kirov works. Here, as in Moscow at Zis Stormovik and other plants, his first and most consistent queries to the director were "How old are you?" and "How many women have you working for you?" After this Johnston got down to production figures and salaries.

During the afternoon he visited the German fortifications south of Leningrad, then the ruins of Peterhof.

In the evening he was entertained by the president of the Leningrad soviet Popkhov at his dacha, formerly the Grand Duke's residence. After supper Johnston and White argued with Popkhov over the role of the American press criticizing Roosevelt, Russia, etc.

During the trip Johnston was received as if he were President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, omitting the words Chamber of Commerce. Officials, intelligentsia, even hotel employees in Leningrad had heard his name, as his speech, published in the Leningrad Pravda, caused more than usual interest. The Russians liked the easy-going, gregarious manner of the "Clown Prince of American Business." His remarks were usually most friendly, and when on a political level, just a reworking of the original speech made to Mikoyan. Johnston admired Popkhov, who is a hard-headed, two-fisted realistic official ready to exchange forceful opinions.

On the train to Moscow which left Leningrad Saturday night after

Johnston's visit to the Finnish front along the Karelian Isthmus (we went separately as Pophkov impressed on Johnston that the area was extremely dangerous and an extra carload might attract Finnish attention) he prepared a written statement for the press, saying the three-day visit to Leningrad "has given me new admiration and respect for its great people. Everywhere I have seen visible evidence of incredible hardship and sacrifice endured in the twenty-nine months siege and blockade. It is impossible to defeat a people possessing such courage, fortitude and determination. It is these very characteristics which will enable them to rebuild their city, making it more beautiful than ever."

Johnston closed his statement with a paragraph in praise of Russia's women, who, on the fighting front, farms, roads, factories, and railroads are "doing more than their share to beat back the Nazi hordes. In the darkest days of Leningrad they worked in factories without water, light, and fuel, under constant bombardment and shell-fire, and lived on a ration of less than two slices of bread daily. The world owes them a great debt of gratitude. I salute the women of Russia."

* * *

Note: - I expect to leave for the Urals for ten days or two weeks with Johnston midweek. Regards to all and please recable what TIME and LIFE want on the Urals.

# # #

Published in

Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill,

Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman

Vol. 11

Page 208

7-15-66
CLS

P.P.F.

Tully File
Russia - 1944

TRANSLATION

PERSONAL TO PRESIDENT F.D. ROOSEVELT

~~Please accept~~ My warm congratulations go to you on the ~~occasion of~~ liberation of Cherbourg from the German usurpers. ~~I am greeting~~ The valiant American and British troops are greeted by me on the occasion of their brilliant success.

J. Stalin

June 27, 1944

Russia foreign 1-44

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

V file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 7, 1944

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In view of the fact that both the Polish and British Governments are aware of your message to Marshal Stalin concerning the possibility of a visit by Prime Minister Mikolajczyk to Moscow, do you perceive any objection to my conveying the substance of Marshal Stalin's reply to the Polish and British Ambassadors here for their strictly confidential information?

CH
OK
FDR

CH.

Published in

Stalin's Correspondence with Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman

Vol. 11

Pages 150-151

7-15-66
CLS

Russia folder
file Personal 1-44

July 21, 1944.

My dear Marshal:

Just as I was leaving on this trip to the Pacific, I received the very delightful framed photograph of you which I consider excellent. I am particularly happy to have it and very grateful to you.

The speed of the advance of your armies is amazing and I wish much that I could visit you to see how you are able to maintain your communications and supplies to the advancing troops.

We have taken the key island of Saipan after rather heavy losses and are at this moment engaged in the occupation of Guam. At the same time, we have just received news of the difficulties in Germany and especially at Hitler's headquarters. It is all to the good.

With my very warm regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

Marshal Joseph V. Stalin,

Moscow.

HOLD UNTIL I GET THE PHOTOGRAPH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Pres

VMT-630
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. ([redacted])

Moscow

Dated June 12, 1944

Rec'd 8 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2086, June 12, 2 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Molotov has asked me on behalf of Marshal Stalin to forward to you a silver framed photograph of an excellent portrait of the Marshall in his uniform with all decorations. The following is a translation of his inscription on the photograph.

"To President Franklin D. Roosevelt in memory of the day of the invasion of Northern France by the Allied American and British liberating armies. From his friend Joseph V. Stalin. June 6, 1944."

I am sending the photograph by the next diplomatic pouch.

HARRIMAN

EH
RR

DECLASSIFIED

Russia folder 1-44

(3335) Carbon of this memorandum returned to the Under Secretary of State as per the President's notation 8/18/44. (Mr. Miller has noted)

hmo

"ERS Jr
OK
FDR"

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1944

Memorandum for the President

I should like to present for your consideration my recommendation that Mr. George F. Kennan, now Counselor of Embassy at Moscow, be given the honorary rank of Minister at that post.

Similar action was taken with respect to the retiring Counselor, Mr. Maxwell Hamilton, who is returning to the Department of State, and it is believed to be equally desirable in the case of Mr. Kennan in view of the importance at this time of the work of the Moscow Embassy and the increased prestige which would thereby be given the Embassy. The possession of this rank by the Counselor would also greatly facilitate his approach to the higher Soviet officials when acting as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in the absence of the Ambassador. It is believed no further action is required than your approval.

Mr. Kennan is a Foreign Service Officer of Class II and first entered the Service in 1926. He has had wide experience as a Diplomatic Secretary at various posts and served previously at Moscow from 1933-35. He has discharged his duties in a highly satisfactory manner and is fully qualified to meet the responsibilities of the higher rank which it is proposed to give him.

Will you please let me know if this action meets with your approval, and if so, I shall see that the necessary steps are taken.

E R Stettinius Jr

Russia folder 1-44

C.H.
O.K.
F.D.R.

August 17, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will have seen Harriman's telegrams 3000 and 3002 of August 15 that the Soviet Government has apparently reversed its promise given by Stalin to Mikolajczyk to assist the Polish Underground in Warsaw and has even expressed its disapproval of any attempts by the British or ourselves to send such aid. The arguments advanced by Vyshinsky in his letter to Harriman and in a subsequent conversation with Harriman and the British Ambassador were of such a nature as to lead Harriman to the conclusion that the present Soviet attitude can only be explained on the grounds of ruthless political considerations.

I believe for a number of considerations that it is impossible for us or the British to abandon to their fate the Polish Underground forces which are actively fighting the Nazi invaders of their country simply because such action might not accord with Soviet political aims.

We have also received an urgent request from the British Government that Harriman be authorized to associate himself with the British Ambassador in making representations to Stalin or, if he cannot be seen, to Molotov urging the Soviet Government to reconsider its attitude on the question of using the shuttle bombing arrangements. There is attached for your approval draft telegraphic instructions to Harriman authorizing him to associate himself with the British Ambassador in this request and at the same time instructing him to inform Stalin or Molotov that even if the Soviet Government does not find it possible to cooperate in bringing aid to the Polish Underground that we and the British intend in so far as practicable to furnish such aid on the grounds of our clear obligation to aid any forces of the United Nations which are engaged in fighting the Germans.

Enclosure:

Draft telegram to Harriman.

"C. H."

XXXXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXXX

[redacted]

NO DISTRIBUTION - NO STENCIL

US URGENT

AMEMBASSY

MOSCOW

NIACT

[redacted] FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

The President has authorized you (your 3020, August 16, 11 p.m.) to make personal representations to Stalin, or if he is unavailable, to Molotov to urge the reconsideration of the Soviet attitude in regard to the use of the shuttle bombing arrangements to drop supplies to the Polish Underground forces in Warsaw. You should at the same time point out that, while we earnestly hope that the Soviet Government will cooperate with the British and American Governments in the matter of furnishing assistance to the Polish Underground forces and that the Soviet Government will for its part furnish such aid as may be practicable under the circumstances, even if such cooperation is not forthcoming, the United States military forces intend in so far as militarily feasible to continue to furnish aid to the

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xxxx
xxxxx

SECRET

Polish Underground forces inside German-occupied Poland since this Government perceives no grounds for departing from its consistent policy of furnishing all possible aid to any forces of the United Nations who are engaged in fighting our common enemy.

The Department desires to commend you for your representations made to Vyshinski on this subject (your 3000, August 15) and in discussing this matter with Stalin or Molotov you are authorized to present the position of this Government in such manner as you consider to be most effective.

EE:CEB:LIS
8/17/44

PSF

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Russia folder
1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 18, 1944

FILE MEMORANDUM:

The following messages received by the President were referred to Admiral Leahy by the President:

No. 758 P.M. to the President dated August 18, with Pres. message to P.M. 600
759 PM to the President
760 PM to the President with draft of proposed reply

Map Room message from Winant to the President, file number 1815502, dated Aug. 18.

Message to the President from Harriman, Aug. 18 in regard to Poles.

(Copy of this memo filed - Churchill folder, 1-44
and Winant folder, 1-44
and Poland folder, 1-44)

C
O
P
Y

Russia folder 1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you and the Secretary of State be good enough to prepare a joint reply to the enclosed for my signature?

Will you show the Secretary a copy of the joint message to Stalin from Churchill and me?

F. D. R.

Message to the President from Premier Mikolajczyk, dated August 18, 1944 - through State Department - re clearance of American crews for flights to Warsaw from Stalin.

(Copies of this memo filed - Poland folder dr. 1-44
Churchill folder dr. 1-44

Russia folder
1-44

C
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Y

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

FOR THE NECESSARY ACTION

OR FILE.

F. D. R.

Message from the Prime Minister to the President, No. 761, dated Aug. 19, 1944, re appeal from Soviet broadcasting stations to the Polish population to start a general rising against the Germans.

(Copies of this memo filed - Churchill folder, 1-44 and Poland folder, 1-44)

T-342

Russia folder 1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

I think this does not need an answer.

F.D.R.

(Original message & translation transmitted to Adm. Leahy. Copy of translation retained for file)

Published in

Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill,

Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman

Vol. 11

Page 157

O
P
Y

TRANSLATION

SECRET AND PERSONAL
FROM
PREMIER J.V. STALIN
TO
PRESIDENT F.D. ROOSEVELT

I have received your message on the Pacific Ocean matters.

I understand the significance you attach to these matters.

We also attach great importance to your successes there. I am confident at the same time that you are well aware to what an extent our forces are strained in order to secure success at the present time by way of struggle in Europe. All this allows to hope that the time is not far off when we shall attain a solution of our urgent task and will be able to take up other questions. I hope that General Dean will already now successfully cooperate with our staff.

August 22, 1944

Russia folder 1-44

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

[redacted]

August 28, 1944

files

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I do not believe that it is necessary to send the gist of your telegram to Marshal Stalin to the Polish Committee of National Liberation for the following reasons:

1. Marshal Stalin has undoubtedly conveyed your message to the Committee.

2. The recent developments in the Warsaw situation.

3. The recent attempt by the Soviet-controlled papers to infer that Ambassador Harriman might be dealing officially with the Polish Committee of National Liberation and had made certain promises to the members of that Committee.

CH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file

August 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I think the gist of our telegram to Stalin ought to be got in some way to the Polish Committee of National Liberation. How to do it, I don't know.

F. D. R.

This message went via Map Room

Pres

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

ERS

DMH-269
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. ([redacted])

Moscow

Dated August 10, 1944

Rec'd 11:15 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

PRIORITY

2922, August 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

SFSEC AND THE PRESIDENT

I received at midnight last night a note from the Polish Committee of National Liberation dated August 9 and signed by S. Verrlovski, delegate of the Committee, requesting me to transmit to the President a letter from the Committee. I am not acknowledging the Committee's note and shall not do so unless instructed to do so by the Department.

The letter to the President is dated August 8 and reads in paraphrased translation from the Russian as follows:

"To The President of The United States, Mr. Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Dear Mr. President:

Animated by a strong desire to strengthen unity and common understanding between the United Nations, the Polish Committee of National Liberation, which is directing the civil

the civil administration in the liberated regions of Poland, is organizing a section for Foreign Affairs from which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the future government of Poland will be formed. In view of the danger that the Polish situation may lead to discord and misunderstanding among the United Nations, we wish that the section of Foreign Affairs be headed by a man who enjoys the sympathy of all the United Nations and whose authority is recognized in the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States and Poland. Mr. Oscar Lange is such a man. He is a professor at the University of Chicago. He was a lecturer at one time at the Polish University at Cracow. He has a unique international position and his services are irreplaceable not only for Poland but for friendly relations between the United Nations.

Professor Lange, so far as we are aware, is a citizen of the United States at the present time. We, therefore, are of the opinion that we should not approach him directly until we have spoken to you in advance concerning our desires in this respect. We know that American citizens highly prize the great privilege of American citizenship. Professor Lange's participation in the Polish Committee of Liberation would therefore entail very heavy sacrifices for him.

for him. However, we believe that he would be prepared to undergo these sacrifices in the interests of United Nations unity.

HARRIMAN

WTD
LMS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

LC - 364
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. ([redacted])

Moscow

Dated August 10, 1944

Rec'd 3:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2922, August 10, 1 p.m., (SECTION TWO).

We would deeply appreciate it, in view of the present situation, if you would support us in our desires and help us dispel any doubts which might arise in Professor Lange's mind in connection with the compatability toward the United States his second fatherland. We would also be grateful if you would assist in facilitating Professor Lange's trip to Poland.

It is our opinion that the fact that the Foreign Affairs of the Polish Committee of National Liberation should be headed by a man who has lived in the United States for a long time and who has decided to take out American citizenship should be a guarantee of the permanent friendship between Poland and the United States and should make Poland a binding link in the

in the friendship among the United Nations.

Respectfully yours, the Polish Committee of National Liberation" (Signed by President Ebosubka-Morawski, Vice President W. Wasilewskaya, Vice President A. Witos).

True reading of Embassy's translation by airmail.

(END OF MESSAGE).

HARRIMAN

MJK RR

PSF: Russia folder 1-44

C
O
P
Y

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Do you think any of these need answers?

F. D. R.

Message No. 791 from the Prime Minister to the President, dated Oct. 5, 1944.

Two messages to the President from Ambassador Harriman, dated Oct. 5, 1944.

Copies of this memo filed: Churchill folder, 1-44

Russia folder 1-44

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your approval a draft message to Marshal Stalin regarding the question of Lwow which was raised in Premier Mikolajczyk's message to you of October 27.

The Department has given most careful consideration to the question of Lwow and feels that, from a long-range point of view, the city and the oil fields in Lwow Province should in all justice be included in Poland. In the first place, Eastern Galicia, in which Lwow is located, was never a part of Russia until it was absorbed under the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreements of 1939. Moreover, it has for centuries been an important center of Polish culture and from an economic point of view the inclusion of the oil fields within the Polish economy is of first rate importance.

Apart from these considerations, it is our firm belief that if Lwow and the oil fields are included in the future Poland, the Polish Government, the majority of Poles as well as the majority of American opinion would accept the rest of the Soviet territorial claims and the chances of friendly collaboration between Poland and the Soviet Union would be greatly enhanced.

It is with these considerations in mind that we have drafted the attached message to Marshal Stalin.

Enclosure:

Draft message to Marshal Stalin.

E. R. Stettinius Jr.

T-431

Russia folder 1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 18, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. AVERELL HARRIMAN:

Do you want to speak to me about this before you leave? Please return enclosures for my file.

F.D.R.

[redacted]

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Passage of Trucks through the Soviet Union en route to China.

The attached deals with the five hundred trucks a month for China that Don Nelson talked to you about before his departure.

I think after glancing at it you will probably wish to discuss this with Averell Harriman when you see him prior to his departure.

E. R. Stettinius Jr.

[redacted]

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

[redacted]

November 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Passage of Trucks through the Soviet Union en route to China

With regard to sending a message to Stalin to seek his permission to send five hundred trucks a month to China for the Chinese Government, I have discussed this question with Ambassador Harriman who feels it would be most inadvisable to make this request. He tells me that when he obtained permission from Stalin for the transit of the trucks Stalin was very reluctant to grant the permission until he was assured that they were urgently needed by our Air Force and would not be turned over to the Chinese. Moreover, Stalin consented to the diversion of these five hundred trucks which were earmarked for the Soviet Union in order to permit their delivery to our Air Force in China despite the fact that Lend-Lease has had to turn down a most urgent Soviet request for additional allotments of trucks.

Apart from these reasons, it is understood that the Army is so anxious to get the five hundred trucks to China as soon as possible that they do not want to risk a possible reversal of decision by the Soviet Government if permission is asked to send five hundred a month. Furthermore, in regard to the monthly quota proposal, the Army is not certain whether they have sufficient personnel to carry on the operation on a continuing basis.

Since Stalin gave his permission to Ambassador Harriman solely on the ground that the trucks were needed by the United States Air Force and since it is hoped that the Ledo-Burma Road will be opened shortly, it is felt that it would be inadvisable to send a message to Stalin now asking for permission to send a monthly quota of trucks to China.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Russia folder 1-44

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

file

November 25, 1944

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Passage of Trucks through the Soviet Union en route to China

Ambassador Harriman told me that he had talked with you on this subject, and that you agreed in accordance with the recommendation contained in the attached memorandum dated November 15, that it would be undesirable to send a message to Marshal Stalin at this time.

I shall, of course, in accordance with your instructions to Mr. Harriman, follow closely the progress being made on the Ledo-Burma Road.

As you requested, I am returning the memoranda of November 15.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosures:
File returned.

[redacted]

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

[redacted]

November 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Passage of Trucks through the Soviet Union en route to China

With regard to sending a message to Stalin to seek his permission to send five hundred trucks a month to China for the Chinese Government, I have discussed this question with Ambassador Harriman who feels it would be most inadvisable to make this request. He tells me that when he obtained permission from Stalin for the transit of the trucks Stalin was very reluctant to grant the permission until he was assured that they were urgently needed by our Air Force and would not be turned over to the Chinese. Moreover, Stalin consented to the diversion of these five hundred trucks which were earmarked for the Soviet Union in order to permit their delivery to our Air Force in China despite the fact that Lend-Lease has had to turn down a most urgent Soviet request for additional allotments of trucks.

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Since Stalin gave his permission to Ambassador Harriman solely on the ground that the trucks were needed by the United States Air Force and since it is hoped that the Ledo-Burma Road will be opened shortly, it is felt that it would be inadvisable to send a message to Stalin now asking for permission to send a monthly quota of trucks to China.

[redacted]

November 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Passage of Trucks through the Soviet Union en route to China.

The attached deals with the five hundred trucks a month for China that Don Nelson talked to you about before his departure.

I think after glancing at it you will probably wish to discuss this with Averell Harriman when you see him prior to his departure.

Russia folder 1-44

SECRET

file

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 2, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Policies in Rumania

I believe that you will be interested in reading the enclosed telegrams from our representative in Bucharest in regard to internal developments and Soviet policies in Rumania.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosures:

1. Copy of telegram no. 40 from Bucharest, November 30, 1944.
2. Copy of telegram no. 42 from Bucharest, November 30, 1944.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DMH-29
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. ([redacted]

Bucharest via Caserta

Dated November 30, 1944

Rec'd 4:40 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

40, November 30, 10 a.m.

The Marshal of the Court called on me late last night to say that the King had decided upon a new government and that it would likely be formed within the next twenty-four hours. Government would be a government of technicians. It would be formed to (one) maintain order, (two) discharge the ogligations assumed by the country under the terms of the armistice and (three) carry on the fight against the Hungarians and Nazis.

The Marshal said it was likely the local Communists would react violently to the formation of a government of technicians. They might even attempt a coup d'etat. If they had the cooperation of the Soviet authorities, a coup d'etat would succeed. In such a case, he asked, what would happen to the King? Would the Americans offer him hospitality? I turned off the question by saying that I felt the Marshall was thinking in a much too pessimistic vein and

vein and that tomorrow morning after a good night's sleep, he would likely laugh at his own question. I would appreciate, however, instructions upon the point he raised as the question may be asked again under more urgent circumstances when I could not turn it off without a definite reply.

BERRY

LMS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

JMM-414
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. ([redacted])

Bucharest via Caserta

Dated November 30, 1944

Rec'd 7:50 p.m., Dec. 1st.

Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT

42, November 30, 6 p.m.

My British colleague, Lerougetel now tells me that he reported to his government that unless the British and American Governments very soon persuade the Soviets to desist in their efforts to communize Rumania, we will be too late and the experiment now being worked out in Rumania will be repeated elswwhere in a more perfect form and on a larger scale.

Last evening Air Vice Marshal Stevenson, who some days ago said that he was about the only man in his mission who believed in the sincerity of the Soviet statement that they did not desire to intervene in Rumanian internal affairs, came around to Lerougetel's point of view.

The change was brought about by a conversation yesterday afternoon between Theavm and General Vinogradov who said

who said that he had received one, and Vyshinsky another, group of delegates from the large communist demonstration that took place earlier in the day.

The General, according to Theavm, pointed out to the delegates that in many factories workers had asked the dismissal of Chief of Police Asmegl as the Minister of Interior and he seemed to imply his approval of the action requested. He said too that the workers were in a better position than the government to know where the valuables were hidden that should be returned to the Soviet command under Article XII of the armistice. Here he seemed to imply that the workers should take appropriate action.

To Theavm this meant that Vinogradov was intervening in the internal political affairs of Rumania. He suggested to General Schuyler and me that the Soviets may have been playing a very skillful game telling that their only interest in Rumanians seeing the fulfillment of the terms of the armistice while all the time quietly preparing to sweep away the democratic government and install a puppet communist government with the aid of the Red Army.

The example given today by Theavm is the first indication I have had from a trustworthy source of contact

on a high

on a high level between the Soviets and the Rumanian communists. Of contact on a lower level, which may or may not have been directed by high authorities, there are several examples, as for instance, the deportment of the civil authorities in Constanza. But irrespective of the lack of evidence of correlation there undoubtedly is an impression that amounts to a conviction among Rumanians generally that the Soviets intend to bring about a dissolution of the Rumanian state.

It is possible that this impression unless checked will bring about the change for esxen by Theavm independently of any directing force from Moscow. As such an event would retard indefinitely the re-establishment of our former commercial and political interests in Rumania and cast doubt upon our sincerity as well as that of our Allies in signing the armistice, I suggest that it is desirable at the earliest possible moment to dissipate this impression. I am convinced that this can be done only on the highest levels by some form of joint declaration implemented by, one, returning to Rumania control of the communication system of the country, two, reestablishing of Rumanian civil authorities generally and (repeated to Moscow) three, regularizing the matter of requisitions.

BERRY

JMS

PSF: Russia folder 1-44

file / Confidential

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 8, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I think this Soviet-Iranian matter should be taken up by Harriman with Stalin in person. The Teheran agreement was pretty definite and my contribution was to suggest to Stalin and Churchill that three or four Trustees build a new port in Iran at the head of the Persian Gulf (free port), take over the whole railroad from there into Russia, and run the thing for the good of all. Stalin's comment was merely that it was an interesting idea and he offered no objection.

F. D. R.

PSF: Russia

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet-Iranian Relations

As agreed in our recent conversation, I present below for your convenience, a summary of the status of Soviet-Iranian relations and a recommendation as to this Government's attitude.

The British Government has taken up again with the Soviet Government the question of Soviet pressure on Iran which has resulted in the resignation of the Iranian Prime Minister and which, while it appeared to have relaxed for a brief time, is now apparently being renewed. The British are basing their plea for the respect of Iranian sovereignty on the Declaration of Iran of December 1, 1943 and on the tripartite British-Soviet-Iranian treaty. Mr. Eden hopes very much that the American Government will also press the Russians to respect Iranian sovereignty.

We are of course following the developments in Iran with the closest attention, and should be prepared to make representations to the Soviet Government if the situation appears to warrant such a step. I am not yet convinced that we should immediately take up the question with the Russians as the British request but would like to have your approval in advance in order that we may be able to take quick action if that appears necessary.

E R Stettinius Jr

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

HTC

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: Dec. 15, 1944

TO : S - Mr. Secretary:

FROM : NEA - Mr. Murray.

SUBJECT:

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR
DEC 16 1944
MR. DUNN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I am attaching for your approval a draft memorandum for the President summarizing Moscow's telegram no. 4812, December 13, 10 p.m. on the Soviet attitude toward Palestine and the Arab world.

5207

Wallace Murray

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
DEC 18 1944
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

NE:EMWilson:MW

NEA

Russia folder 1-44

SECRET

file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 19, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Attitude toward Palestine and the Near East

You will be interested in this telegram from Harriman on the Soviet attitude toward the Palestine question and the Near East in general. Harriman's views may be summarized as follows:

The reports the Department has had recently on the Soviet's opposition to a Jewish state are an accurate interpretation of the present policy of the Soviet Government. Such opposition would be entirely in line with the apparent Soviet desire to gain the friendship of the Arabs. The Soviets may make use of the Palestine question to increase their influence to the detriment of the United States and Great Britain, but their reluctance to come out into the open on this issue may be attributed to a desire not to injure their relations with their major Allies at present. They may also be awaiting more precise formulation of policy on Palestine by the United States and Great Britain.

Soviet activities in the Near East will expand, and the close affinity between certain peoples within the Soviet Union (notably the Moslems) and the Near Eastern peoples, as well as the link provided by the Orthodox Church, will prove most useful in this connection. All such contacts will be cultivated in order to create in the Near East a sympathetic attitude toward Soviet Russia.

Enclosure:

Telegram no. 4812,
December 13, 10 p.m.,
from Moscow.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Department of State

BUREAU / DIVISION: NE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

The President.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—5003

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

BAS-102
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. ([redacted])

Moscow via Army

Dated December 13, 1944

Rec'd 6:50 a.m. 14th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

4812, December 13, 10 p.m.

The Embassy has little direct information other than that already available to the Department of the Soviet attitude toward Palestine, Zionism, the Arab union movement, and Soviet policies generally on Near Eastern questions. (REDEPTEL 2757, November 30, 2 p.m.). We have however come to the following conclusions based on the information available and the general trends of Soviet policy;

Specifically regarding the conversation of Mr. Hirschmann with the Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Ankara covered by the Department's instruction to Moscow No. 346 of November 7 we have every reason to believe that the Soveit official correctly interpreted Soviet policy toward an independent Jewish state in Palestine and the Soviet attitude generally toward the Jewish question. The absence of editorial comment in the Soviet

the Soviet press on these questions leads to the conclusion that either the Soviet Government considers it premature to take a definite position or that a definite line has not yet been established on the highest (*). It may be assumed however that the newly established diplomatic missions in Arab countries are privately circulating the views expressed by the Soveit official. The aims would appear clear, namely to create an atmosphere of friendship for the Soviet Union in the Arab world, to break down existing suspicions of and hostility to Soviet Communist doctrine, and to obtain Arab support in furthering any specific Soviet objective which may develop. Mr. Shchiborin, recently appointed Soviet Minister to Egypt, has guardedly questioned me regarding the campaign statements of the President and Dewey in respect to Palestine and indicated that he was familiar with the adverse reaction among Arabs. I doubt whether the Soviet Government wishes to come out openly against American and British policies in this connection at this time. On the other hand we may be sure that the Soviets will use this issue to increase Soviet influence to the detriment of Great Britain and the United States among the Arab states. The reason for Soviet reluctance to come out in the open may be

their

their consistent desire not to weaken the relationships with their major Allies in the prosecution of the war and for the peace, and also the Soviets may wish to await a more precise formulation of American and British policy on Palestine. A step for increasing Soviet prestige in the Arab world has been the development of the recently established diplomatic missions in Arab states. The activities of these missions can best be reported by our own diplomatic missions in these localities. It may be expected however that the size and competence of these missions will expand and the penetration of Soviet concepts and accomplishments increase. The affinity with the Moslems in the Soviet Union will be emphasized and Soviet success in improving the economic situation of these people will undoubtedly be effectively used. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Soviets appear to be using the close affinity of the various peoples within the Soviet Union with those of the Near and Middle East to provide convenient channels of contact. These include the Armenian, Azerbaijanian, and Turko--Tartar peoples, as well as in the religious field the Orthodox Christians. The Patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch; Alexandria, and Jerusalem have recently been invited to attend the

forthcoming

forthcoming election of the new Russian Patriarch. Although the Soviets may find it difficult to support all of these conflicting groups it is in accordance with Soviet tactics to cultivate them all in order to break down the prejudices of a generation and to create sympathetic interest in the Soviet Union.

On the Arab union movement there has been only one brief item in the press reporting the establishment of the league of independent Arab countries at the Alexandria conference last October. The Soviet attitude probably conforms to the general Soviet view on the subject of international blocs: favorable if the Soviet Union can dominate the bloc, strongly opposed if it is outside the orbit of Soviet influence or potentially directed against the Soviet Union. The absence of Soviet editorial comment on the Arab union movement accordingly indicates that the Soviet Union either feels that the league will not operate in such a manner as to affect Soviet interests adversely or that through increasing Soviet influence in the Arab world it may be useful in the furtherance of Soviet interests.

A fuller report discussing Soviet policy toward the individual countries of the Near and Middle East follows

by air.

by air. Since this message was called for by the Department, I have not repeated it to other missions and leave it to the Department to make such distribution of it as it sees fit.

HARRIMAN

RR

(*) apparent omission

Trip File file confidential

Russia folder 1-44

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 18, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet-Iranian Relations

Your memorandum of December 8, 1944 suggested that Harriman take up with Stalin the question of difficulties between the Soviet Union and Iran. Fortunately, a telegram from Ambassador Morris in Tehran dated December 8, reports that since the Iranian Government resigned last month, Morris has heard of no action by the Russians which could clearly be construed as further undue interference in internal Iranian affairs.

An approach by us to the Russians at this moment might aggravate the situation, causing the Russians to flare up with a harder policy against Iran than ever. I believe it would be a mistake for Harriman to approach Stalin at the moment, as long as there is a possibility that the tension in Iran is easing. We are following the developments minutely, and are keeping Harriman posted. If you concur, we will instruct him to stand by, to be ready to act when the proper moment comes.

I should like to talk with you about the free port-railway trusteeship plan at one of our early meetings.

E. R. Stettinius Jr.

Russia foreign 1-44

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DGS-900
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. ([redacted])

Moscow

Dated December 23, 1944

Rec'd 8:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

4973, December 23, 4 p.m.

SFSEC

The military mission was requested last night to obtain immediate approval for the clearance of a Soviet transport plane to Paris via Italy in order to take Mr. Jedrychowsky official of the Polish National Committee, his wife, daughter, and Mr. Kolilie, secretary. Previously the Lublin Committee representative in Moscow, Jedrychowsky, is to be the agent of the Committee whom General de Gaulle agreed the French Government would receive (REEMBS 4777, December 11, 10 p.m.) and in exchange for whom would send a major, now second secretary of the French mission in Moscow, to Lublin. I understand from other sources than CPS sources that the Polish Committee will proclaim itself the Provisional Government of Poland before the end of the year, probably December ~~28~~ 31. The Soviets are evidently anxious to have

Jedrychowsky

DECLASSIFIED

Jedrychowsky arrive in Paris at the time of the above action. I understand further that the Soviets plan to induce the Bulgarian and Rumanian Governments to recognize the Polish Provisional Government and pressure will be put on other small countries to do likewise.

HARRIMAN

MRM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Russia folder 1-44

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

R

RA-1390
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C[redacted])

Moscow

Dated December 26, 1944

Rec'd 4:30 a.m., 27th

Secretary of State

Washington

5009, December 26, 8 p.m.

[redacted] FOR THE SECRETARY.

Supplementing Embassy's 5010, 9 p.m.

Litauer reports in strict confidence that he had been informed by an important member of the Polish Committee that Stalin had told Bierut he was through with Mikolajczyk and would never allow him to return to Poland. It seems that when the NKVD apprehanded the London Government's agent near Lublin a radio was found from the London Government sent just prior to Mikolajczyk's resignation to the effect that mass terrorism should end and that subversive activity should concentrate on the killing of individuals of high importance. Stalin evidently is satisfied as to the accuracy of this information and holds Mikolajczyk responsible. Litauer personally is not sure whether Mikolajczyk knew of these instructions. When I saw

Mikolajczyk

Mikolajczyk in London, however, he seemed to be familiar to some extent at least with the underground activities of former members of the home army in liberated Poland. (Sent to Department as 5009, repeated to London as 332, secret for the Ambassador.)

HARRIMAN

RR

Russia foreign 1944

file

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 27, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Codes

You will recall our conversation on the Soviet codes. I have informed General Donovan that he should send through General Deane in Moscow to General Fetin, the Soviet General with whom Donovan deals on all matters connected with the exchange of information in his field, a message informing the Soviet Government that in dealing with other matters one of our agencies had run across certain material which purported to be related to Russian messages sent in code. He was also asked to explain that we had taken advantage of the opportunity to prevent this material from falling into the hands of the enemy and that we would immediately make it available to the Soviet Government if they so desired.

I feel sure that this will take care of the matter, as the Soviet Government will be informed and will see that we are fully disposed to cooperate with them and not retain any material which they themselves might desire to have.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

file under Stalin [c. 1944]

CLOSE-UP

STALIN AT 65

THE WORLD'S LEAST-KNOWN GREAT MAN HAS BECOME SAVIOR, SYMBOL AND LIVING LEGEND TO RUSSIANS

by RICHARD E. LAUTERBACH

The author, an associate editor of LIFE, recently returned from the Soviet Union where he spent ten months as *Time* and LIFE correspondent. During his stay in Moscow and in his travels around the country he collected the current legends and stories about Marshal Stalin. Interviewing Stalin's ever larger number of foreign visitors, he has found out details of the Marshal's life which most Americans—and most Russians do not know.

On Dec. 21 Joseph Stalin was 65 years old. The Russians realize that Stalin is not getting any younger. But they almost never discuss the possibility of his death. Once, while having a late supper at the home of a young partisan in Moscow, I broached the subject by asking, "Who will succeed Stalin?"

The reaction of this family, which had what we would call a "middle-class" background, is an interesting indication of the attitudes of different generations. The mother, a pretty but unsuccessful actress in her early 40s, replied in a tone of contempt, "He's a Georgian. *He* will *never* die. They live forever."

The aged, toothless grandmother, intensely religious and nationalistic, quickly crossed herself and mumbled, "May God will it!" Her grandson, a

Statue of Stalin makes him look much taller than he really is. Official pictures and portraits and thousands of statues like this one in Moscow are all that most Russian citizens see of Stalin.

Stalin as a schoolboy (*in forefront*) in the Georgian village of Gori, his birthplace, is already a leader according to this painting. It is one of an official series on his revolutionary activities.

Stalin meets Lenin for the first time at 1905 Bolshevik conference in Finland. The painting does not show Leon Trotsky, who lost out in the struggle for power with Stalin after Lenin's death.

Corporation – Plymouth, Dodge, DeSoto, Chrysler . . . Airtemp . Amplex

partisan recuperating from a serious shoulder wound, glared at his mother and then said, matter-of-factly, "I suppose the man, Stalin, may have to die someday. But Stalin, the ideal, is ours now forever."

For several years a foreign mission in Moscow has been quietly and unofficially surveying the public attitude toward Stalin. While the "poll" is hardly as exhaustive as one by Dr. Gallup or Elmo Roper, it does support the opinion of many other observers in Russia: that although there are still some anti-Stalinist Russians, they are no longer either potent or vocal. Three and a half years of what Stalin termed the "Great Patriotic War" has effectively united, as never before, most of the Soviet peoples behind the present dictatorship.

Even the acting Patriarch of the Russian Church recently addressed Stalin as "our dear supreme leader whom God has sent us." Americans may smile at this tribute, but Russians do not find it a cause for mirth, not even the Russian Communists who are still nonbelievers. Tens of millions of devout worshipers are convinced that the motherland has again been saved from destruction, as in the time of Napoleon and other invaders, by the emergence of a potent and sage leader who is able to unite the masses and vanquish the foe. Today Russians can no more imagine the Soviet Union without Stalin than Americans can imagine the U. S. without its constitution. They have built a legend around Stalin.

In it Stalin, the symbol or ideal, and Stalin, the man, are fused. His accomplishments, real and legendary, would make him a combination of Tom Paine, Horace Mann, Henry Kaiser and Jim Farley rolled together with Clifton Fadiman, George Washington, Henry Wallace and Paul Bunyan. In his latest official biography Stalin is hailed for achievements covering the fields of agriculture, education, military affairs, canal building, polar exploration and even the editing of Rules for Collective Farms. He is also referred to as the author of the 1936 Constitution. A prominent party leader once frankly admitted that "It is not easy to grasp the figure of Stalin in all its gigantic proportions." He stated that, in fact, "there has been no major development in our labors, no innovation, slogan or trend of policy of any importance of which Comrade Stalin was not the author."

That Stalin would have to perform six miracles at once to live up to this advertising does not worry the Russians. The things are done, and everything the Russian people read and hear says that Stalin did them.

How? First there is the legend of Stalin's wonderful storehouse of knowledge, both classical and practical. His speeches and his conversations are often studded with allusions to Greek mythology, to Aristotle, Plato, Hegel, Nietzsche and the Bible as well as Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. He is familiar with all the great Slav writers and supposedly knows more about Shakespeare, Dickens and Fenimore Cooper than an Oxford dean. Like Roosevelt and Churchill, Stalin of course has talented assistants helping him with his speeches, digesting foreign publications for him and probably polishing his *bon mots*. But the Russians do not know this and if they did they would probably not admit it into their conscious minds.

He knows U.S. production

The Russians think of Stalin's knowledge of politics, men, machines and even foreign industrial capacities as equally incalculable. And, in fact, he does appear to be extraordinarily well informed. Last summer he argued with Eric Johnston, president of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, about America's top prewar production of automobiles. The persuasive Johnston convinced Stalin to accept his estimate. But later Johnston found out that Stalin had been thinking of the total for both trucks and passenger cars—and that the figure he gave for this was right. Johnston willingly admitted that "Stalin knows American production figures better than 90% of American businessmen."

Perhaps one secret of "doing six things at once" is that Stalin never does them that way. He has the knack of pushing everything aside, however briefly, and concentrating on a new problem until it is solved. The Russians will tell you that when Sergei Iliushin was constructing his famous Stormovik plane, Stalin cleared all other work from his desk until he mastered the details of this ship. Then he made an important suggestion which simplified the construction and considerably reduced the building time. It is said that when Chkalov proposed his transpolar trip to America, Stalin was consulted on the type of plane. And when Papanin prepared his North Pole expedition, Stalin became an expert on Arctic meteorology and personally directed the efforts to rescue the group stranded on an ice floe. When Moscow's water system was being revised, Stalin plunged into the study of maps, blueprints and

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

Stalin's expulsion from a religious seminary in Tiflis in 1899, is shown in this painting. He was studying to become a Russian Orthodox priest but he found revolutionary ideas more exciting.

In Siberia during one of his periodic exiles, Stalin is portrayed as a militant agitator. Here he is haranguing a group of different nationalities, many of them from the Czar's Asiatic colonies.

From a prison window Stalin shouts a message to some political prisoners. Scene in this painting may have occurred early in the 1900s when Stalin was jailed eight times for political activities.

In a Red Army uniform about 1921 Stalin is depicted proclaiming the autonomy of Dagestan, now part of the Soviet Georgian Republic. He was the Commissar of Nationalities during that period.

Stalin's second wife, Nadya Alliluieva, died on Nov. 8, 1932. She was the mother of Vassily, who is now a Red air force colonel, and Svetlana, shown in a rare picture with her father (*below*).

Jacob Djugashvili (*below*), Stalin's eldest son, joined the Red Army and was captured by the Germans in July 1941. The Nazis claim this is a picture of Jacob at one of their prison camps.

costs. By analyzing the defects in the proposed schemes, so the story goes, he saved the state millions of rubles.

On the rare occasions when Stalin doesn't get his own way, he can supposedly accept the verdict with good grace. Last summer he had a series of conferences with plane designers on increasing the range of Soviet airships. Semyon Lavochkin, designer of the LAGG fighter, reported in *Pravda* that he listened to Stalin's ideas for some time and then told the Marshal that he could not increase the range of the LAGG. "You don't want to accept my changes for your plane?" asked Stalin. Lavochkin replied, "I can't Comrade Stalin." Stalin turned his back and consulted with other engineers for a few minutes. Then he turned to Lavochkin again and asked, "Now, what can I do with him? He doesn't want to. So we'll drop the matter there." The new model of the LAGG does *not* incorporate Stalin's ideas, and nothing dire has happened to Lavochkin. The Russians consider this an amazing demonstration of Stalin's goodness.

In military matters also Stalin has displayed an impressive fund of information, including some familiarity with U. S. military campaigns from Valley Forge to Vicksburg and St. Mihiel. This virtuosity dovetails nicely with the legend of Stalin as successor to Alexander Nevsky, Peter the Great, Suvorov and other pre-Revolutionary Russian military heroes. Soviet histories emphasize Stalin's role in the 1917 Revolution and the civil war which followed. In his book, Marshal Voroshilov gives Stalin complete credit as organizer and builder of the Red Army. The story is that Stalin saved Tsaritsyn (Stalingrad) during the civil war and then went from front to front reorganizing the Red Army and winning battles against superhuman odds. This aspect of the Stalin legend has been refurbished with dozens of anecdotes from the present war. For instance, on Nov. 25, during the first winter of the war, advance units of Guderian's tank forces had penetrated Moscow's outskirts. That night General, now Marshal, Rokossovsky, was fighting a losing battle on the road northwest of the capital. The phone rang in his dugout. Amid the roar of cannonfire he heard a calm voice. "*Govorit Stalin* . . . Stalin speaking. What's the situation?" Rokossovsky explained in detail. Then the quiet voice of Stalin said, "Hold even stronger. We will help you. That's all." Soon after that powerful reserves which had been training in the woods behind Moscow were rushed up. The German offensive was checked and then smashed.

Another part of the Stalin legend makes him out to be an infallible military prognosticator. While his record may be better than that of Major George Fielding Eliot, he is certainly not infallible. On Nov. 7, 1941 he stood atop Lenin's tomb in Red Square and assured the people that "Another few months, another half year, perhaps another brief year, and Hitlerite Germany is bound to burst beneath the weight of its crimes." A year later the Germans were at Stalingrad.

Such aberrations in Stalin's judgment do not distort the popular image of him as a symbol. The Russian "deification" process can not be shattered by minor mistakes as long as the war is won. And Americans must keep in mind that there are no opposition newspapers in the Soviet Union to remind people of the Nov. 7, 1941 speech or any other Stalin errors. Nor are there any columnists to poke into Stalin's private life.

The average Russian knows far less about Stalin, personally, than the average American. Muscovites have seen Stalin perhaps a half dozen times during his public appearances on Red Square for holidays. They have seen his picture in the newspapers, his portraits in every public building and office, his statue in every park. The people can tell you Stalin's approximate age, that he is quite short (5 ft., 5 in.), heavy (about 160 lb.), that his shoulders are not very broad but that his uniform makes them look that way; that his head and mustache are large and that he has a sallow, pocked complexion. They would not know that his lower teeth are rotten or that his uppers are black and brown. They know he smokes a pipe, but not that he prefers Edgeworth tobacco.

Most Russians know that Stalin has been married twice and some recall that he has three children. They know very little more than that about his family life. The kind of facts that people know are that Stalin has been jailed eight times, exiled to Siberia seven times, escaped six times; that his parents were poor Georgian peasants, that he was an only son and was educated for the priesthood. They will tell you that while Lenin and Trotsky lived abroad and planned and plotted the Revolution, Stalin stayed at home and lived the Revolution in every detail from printing newspapers to committing acts of sabotage. The Russian legend pictures him as a modest man, but there are no signs that he discourages the rabbitlike reproduction of big and little monuments in his name. The things in Stalin's name are legion; great parks, great factories, great railroads and at least five great cities (Stalingrad, Stalinabad, Stalino, Stalinsk and Stalinagorsk). Each musical season includes the premiere of some new oratorio like the *Ode to Stalin*. Last summer in the midst of a tremendous Red Army offensive, *Pravda* devoted one of its four pages to a poem from a North Caucasian in praise of Stalin. Soviet poets are constantly trying to get him down on paper in the measured pentameter of 125 different languages. The verse offerings vary in quality, but these lines by a Kazakh admirer are typical of the sentiments expressed in them all:

He is the strength of the poor
He took unto himself the tears of the ages.
He took into himself the joy of the ages,
He took into himself the wisdom of the ages,
He took into himself the strength of the ages,
He, like the morning, stands over the world.

Less eloquent Russians too like to lift their voices in praise of Stalin. Red Army men as they rush over the top to face Nazi bullets yell, "*Za Stalina!* . . . for Stalin!" Militia women, marching through Moscow's streets every night on their way to the bathhouse, sing about Stalin with towels slung over their broad shoulders.

The average Muscovite knows that Stalin lives in the Kremlin, which is not a building but a high-walled fortress containing about 40 buildings—palaces, churches, museums, barracks, gardens, meeting halls and offices. Stalin prefers to sleep at his *dacha*, which is a 40-minute drive from the Kremlin. This house once belonged to a millionaire gold-mine owner. It stands near the Moscow River and is surrounded by a red brick wall and N.K.V.D. sentries. Stalin's closest neighbor is his friend and fellow-Georgian, Lavrenty Beria, chief of the N.K.V.D., or internal police.

He eats a lot, drinks moderately

Behind the gray walls of the Kremlin and the red walls of the *dacha*, Stalin's activities are a mystery to the average Russian. All he sees or hears about are the results of these activities. Stalin rises at about 11 in the morning and after a light snack is driven in his big, black, bulletproof Zis to Red Army staff headquarters. He sits up front with the driver (a Red Army captain)

except when the car is crowded. Then he takes one of the folding jump seats. This custom is followed by so many Soviet big shots that Russians call the seats "politburos." Stalin spends a few hours studying reports radioed from the various fronts, then goes to his own office in the Kremlin. This large room, with its familiar portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, has had some recent additions to its *décor*. When Stalin became a marshal in 1943, paintings of Alexander Nevsky, Czarist Marshals Suvorov and Kutuzov were added, and last October U.S. Ambassador Harriman presented Stalin with a bust of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Stalin keeps a staff of secretaries busy taking dictation and making out reports. About three or four in the afternoon he lunches at his desk, often alone. Except for an occasional glass of cold tea this lasts him until 10 or 11 at night when he has supper in his Kremlin apartment. This meal takes from one to three hours, and over it he discusses party, governmental and military problems with members of the party's Politburo or the General Staff or both. Stalin eats heartily and drinks moderately, although at large state banquets he has been known to down as many as 30 *stakanchiki* of vodka without any apparent effects except increased jollity.

His private life is a mystery to Russians

No members of Stalin's immediate family have lived with him in the Kremlin for years. His first wife, the mother of his eldest son, Jacob, died in 1917 of pneumonia. In 1919 he married 17-year-old Nadya Alliluieva (which means Hallelujah). They had two children, Vassily and Svetlana. Nadya died on Nov. 8, 1932. Although the Trostkyists spread rumors that she had been poisoned, actually she died of peritonitis. Despite pains from an appendicitis attack, she was afraid to disturb her husband and tell him. By the time an appendectomy was performed, it was too late. Nadya was buried in the cemetery of the Convent of the New Virgins in Moscow. This convent is now the theological school of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The oldest son, Jacob, who has always used his father's family name, Djugashvili, was backward in school. After a period at a technical institute he became an engineer's assistant. Supposedly not in his father's favor, Jacob was working in the Soviet east when the war broke out. He volunteered in the Red Army and was captured by the Germans in July 1941. The Nazis have attempted to utilize him for propaganda purposes, but according to underground reports Jacob has remained loyal to father and fatherland.

While the tall, dark Jacob is said to look like his mother, his half-brother, Vassily, resembles his father. He has much of Stalin's onetime swagger and bounce. Before the war he had a reputation as a ladies' man and a heavy drinker, but he is married now and has made Stalin twice a grandfather. He is small and handsome with a swarthy complexion, black hair and a long nose. At school he was considered bright but headstrong and vain. He often got into fights which were suddenly broken up when a plain-clothes guard appeared and whispered his identity. An air-force colonel now, he commanded a fighter squadron which distinguished itself continually in the Byelorussian campaign. Several times Vassily was cited in Stalin's Order of the Day, but no official communique has mentioned the newsworthy fact that he is the Marshal's son.

The youngest Stalin offspring, Svetlana, is more fair than her brothers and also more diligent. A close friend of Molotov's daughter, she is an active member of the Young Communists and a good linguist. After passing extremely stiff competitive examinations, she was admitted to the new International Relations school at the First Moscow University last fall. When she enrolled, next to the space left for "FATHER'S TRADE" on the printed application, Svetlana wrote, "Professional revolutionary."

Although it has never been officially verified, announced or denied, Russians think Stalin is married for the third time. His wife is Rosa, younger sister of Lazar Kaganovitch, builder of the Moscow subway and now Commissar of Railways. Rosa has never appeared in public with Stalin, but it is said that he is devoted to her and telephones her every night at midnight from his office. He rarely finishes work until three or four in the morning. But since he has averaged not more than five hours sleep a day since the war's start, he still manages to spend a few hours with Rosa in the early mornings before retiring.

Stalin is not fond of children the way a good politician should be, probably because he has never had time for such a luxury. Occasionally he sends a car for his favorite niece and nephew, children of his second wife's sister. When he thinks of it, he gives them lavish presents. He prefers their company to that of his grandchildren, who are too young for reason.

Stalin's closest friends and associates these days are Molotov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Andreyev, Zhukov and Golikov. Golikov has been Stalin's personal aide-de-camp in his role as supreme commander in chief. He is 44, egg-bald, stocky, a graduate of Frunze Academy with a first-hand knowledge of Russia's allies. In the summer of 1941 he was sent to the U. S. and England for military staff talks and conferences on supplies.

Molotov and Mikoyan are closely consulted on their specialties, foreign relations and foreign trade. Marshal Voroshilov, who now has more political than military significance, is a very close personal friend. Marshal Zhukov is considered the real brains of the General Staff, aside from Stalin, and has the title of deputy supreme commander in chief. He is the personal link between Stalin and the armies at the front. Georgiy Malenkov, 43, is Stalin's former private secretary. He and Andrey Andreyev, 49, are two of the three alternates whom Stalin has trained in his role as general secretary of the party. The third alternate is chubby, handsome Andrey Zhdanov, 48, who is secretary of the Leningrad Party, president of the Russian Republic (largest of the 16 republics in the Soviet Union) and a colonel general in the Red Army. It was he who concluded the armistice with Finland last fall and who is now responsible for making sure that the terms are satisfactorily carried out. Of the three alternates, Zhdanov is the heir apparent. If any one man should succeed to Stalin's military-governmental-party leadership, Zhdanov would be the man.

Zhdanov is built like Stalin, has a mustache like Stalin's, acts like Stalin in public. The son of a priest (some clergy can marry in the Russian Church), he is well educated, cultured, extremely serious and an inspiring mass speaker. He fought in the first World War, became a Bolshevik during the Revolution, but only achieved important stature in the party in the last 10 years. In 1934 he was transferred from his post as party secretary in the industrial city of Gorki to a similar position in Leningrad, succeeding Sergei Kirov who had been assassinated. Since that time Zhdanov has been the most carefully guarded, the most inaccessible man in all Russia. Last summer the only request of Eric Johnston's which was denied was his wish to see Zhdanov.

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

Alexander Nevsky, 13th Century prince who was made a saint by the Orthodox Church, is one of the great Russian military leaders whose portraits now decorate Stalin's Kremlin office.

Czarist field marshals whose portraits also hang in Stalin's office are Suvorov (*above*) and Kutuzov (*below*). Suvorov took Warsaw in 1794. Kutuzov defeated Napoleon in 1812 at Smolensk.

Stalin's probable successor is Andrey Zhdanov. Little known outside of Russia and carefully guarded inside, he is one of Stalin's alternates as Communist Party secretary.

STALIN AT 65 (continued)

Two other key jobs have readied Zhdanov for dealing with future problems at home and abroad. He was at one time the chief of the party's Propaganda Bureau and for many years served as chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Committee on Foreign Affairs. He was so successful in this latter post that a prominent British statesman reported that "Zhdanov is the architect of Russian foreign policy while Molotov is only the builder." During the present war no political leader excepting Stalin has gained more military kudos than Zhdanov. For he is credited with organizing and directing the defense of Leningrad against the 29-month German and Finnish siege.

If Stalin should die before the war's conclusion, however, the reins would be taken over not by Zhdanov but by the State Defense Committee which includes (aside from Stalin) Molotov, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Malenkov, Beria, Kaganovitch and Voznesensky. Then after the war, unless Zhdanov assumes the entire burden, the Stalin part might be divided up among three lesser actors—Zhukov (military), Molotov (government) and Zhdanov (party).

After the war it is considered probable that Stalin will retire as premier in favor of Molotov and keep only one job, that of party secretary. Although his health is good he is feeling the strain of running the world's biggest army, the world's biggest country and the world's strongest single party. Often now the words "If I live . . ." creep into his conversations.

Meantime, until he dies or retires, Stalin's position is so overpowering that his merest whim becomes an edict although he often may not mean that it should be. His household and his office are run quietly and efficiently, taking into account his pet likes and dislikes. He likes chess, skittles, movies and piano music. In his youth he liked to ride and shoot, but he hasn't done either for years. His artistic tastes are simple, almost conventional. When he listens to music he prefers folk songs or the great classics of Russian opera such as Glinka's *A Life for the Czar* or Borodin's *Prince Igor*.

For a busy man Stalin manages to put his fingers into an incredible number of Moscow's intellectual pies. When he expresses displeasure with some creative work, however, it does not always mean that the offending artists are "liquidated" or even shoved into obscurity. He walked out on Shostakovitch's operatic attempt, *Lady Macbeth from Mzensk* because the music was too difficult and unmelodious—and besides he didn't care for the story. The Soviet press gave the young composer a severe critical laceration, but he has managed to survive Stalin's displeasure and to write even better music.

One of the most popular young Soviet writers is Konstantin Simonov. Before the war he courted a prominent actress by writing passionate verses to her. Some of them were printed in the newspapers and magazines. All Russia followed the romance breathlessly. The verses were collected and published together with many more intimate ones. When a publisher asked Stalin for his opinion of the poetry, Stalin scoffed, "That's the kind of book which should have been printed in *two* copies. One for him and one for her. That's all." The book was hurriedly withdrawn from the bookstalls. Nothing dire happened to Simonov except that he married the girl and be-

came better known as a correspondent and playwright than as a poet.

Stalin reads a lot, although he hasn't as much time for it as before the war. He has a habit of telephoning people in the middle of the night to express his opinion on their books. When Ilya Ehrenburg was writing *The Fall of France*, he had troubles with the Foreign Office censors who were reading his copy as fast as he finished it. The first half of the novel had been sent to Stalin by the author, more as a gesture than anything else. A few days later Stalin called Ehrenburg at the Moskva Hotel and said he liked the book but hoped "you will bear down harder on the Germans in the second half." Ehrenburg agreed and mentioned, in passing, that he was having censorship difficulties. Stalin made no comment, but the rest of *The Fall of France* passed the censors without a single word being changed. Ehrenburg received the Stalin Prize for this novel.

On several occasions Stalin's intervention has saved literary works from obscurity. A war story, *March-April*, by Vadim Zozhevnikov, had been turned down by the cinema committee as too flimsy for a screen play. But when word spread that Stalin had personally congratulated the author, the committee changed its mind. The movie version of *March-April* was showing on Moscow's screens last spring and an impartial observer might agree with the film committee's original decision.

Stalin himself is the world's best-selling author. His *Leninism* has been printed in every language, and the sales within the U. S. S. R. alone are close to 3,000,000 copies. Shortly after the war, his booklet "On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union" was published. Within a few days 5,500,000 copies were bought. A fourth edition is now being printed, bringing the total to 15,000,000.

Although his literary style is textbook dry, Stalin occasionally has a sardonic flare. The world first heard about Stalin's crisp, edged retorts as a result of the long interview which he granted H. G. Wells many years ago. When asked if he was going to change the world, Stalin replied, "Not very much."

When the present Finnish premier, Paasikivi, visited Moscow in 1939 on a mission to learn Russia's terms for a peaceful settlement with Finland, he was gravely agitated after Stalin had named the conditions. Said Paasikivi, with a worried frown, "If we brought back to Helsinki such terms as these, there would be no crowds in the streets to sing and cheer for us as there were when we left to come to Moscow." Stalin snapped back, "Don't worry about that—Molotov, Zhdanov and I will come to sing and cheer for you."

Several years ago a Moscow correspondent wrote to Stalin asking about the rumors that he was dying or about to undergo a serious operation. Back came a note from Stalin: "I know from reports of the foreign press that I long ago abandoned this sinful world and moved into the other world. As one cannot doubt such foreign press dispatches unless he wants to be expelled from the list of civilized people, I request you to believe them and don't disturb me in the calm of the other world."

He likes to say the unexpected

Stalin has talked to no reporters since 1941, but he has met many times more British and Americans during the war than he did in his previous 63 years. Although correspondents are thus far excluded from Stalin interviews, they fill his special mailbox at the Kremlin with a weekly deluge of letters. Once in a while Stalin will use one as an excuse for clarifying some important point of Soviet policy.

Correspondents now get their stories about Stalin by interviewing his constant stream of important visitors. Last August the London Poles sent a delegation to Moscow headed by ex-Premier Mikolajczyk. One of the group was Professor Grabski, the man who drew up the Treaty of Riga which Stalin has many times denounced. During the discussions at the Kremlin, Grabski moved over and sat next to Stalin. He began pounding the table and shouting about Poland's claims to Vilna and Lwów. Stalin said very little and some of the delegates felt that old Grabski had queered the act with his violence. But when they left Stalin shook Grabski's hand and said with a broad grin, "You know, you're a very good propagandist. I enjoyed it."

Stalin speaks and reads no other language but Georgian and Russian although he is at home in many of the Soviet Union's offshoot languages. In 1934 he began to learn English. But he soon gave it up, deciding he was too old. "And besides," he told a friend, "I can understand the Mickey Mouse movies without English." He does know a few words, and on one occasion he surprised some British and American guests after a Kremlin banquet by saying in English, "The lavoratory is on the left, friends."

Stalin likes to say unexpected things to his visitors. At Teheran Roosevelt and Churchill were having a chat, waiting for Stalin.

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PSF: Russia

STALIN AT 65 (continued)

Timing his entrance like a Barrymore, he stepped quickly into the room and in a deep, guttural English pronounced a sentence he had carefully learned: "What the hell's going on here, anyhow?"

Immediately after the Teheran Conference a story began making the rounds in Moscow which reflected Russian impatience over the "second front." The Shah of Persia, went the story, made a gift of an 11-year-old girl to Churchill. Roosevelt was shocked by this Oriental custom, but Stalin quieted him down. "But it's infamous," Roosevelt argued, "the girl hasn't even reached the age of puberty." To this Stalin replied, "Never mind, by the time Churchill makes up his mind to do anything, she will have long since matured."

Stalin's public utterances are very formal and full of slogans, but they do have rare flashes of the human touch. Once during a nationwide radio address, he paused to drink a glass of water. When he had finished —and the sounds of his drinking were audible over the air—he said, "Excuse me, comrade, I have eaten too much herring for breakfast."

At a party congress Stalin criticized Soviet officials who although "honest and loyal" were also "incompetent as executives, incapable of organizing anything." To emphasize his point, Stalin repeated this dialog:

Stalin: How are you getting on with the sowing?

Executive: With the sowing, Comrade Stalin? We have mobilized ourselves.

Stalin: Well, and what then?

Executive: We have put the question.

Stalin: And what next?

Executive: There is a turn, Comrade Stalin, soon there will be a turn.

Stalin: But still?

Executive: We can say there is an indication of some progress.

Stalin: But for all that, how are you getting on with the sowing?

Executive: So far, Comrade Stalin, we have made no headway with the sowing.

Although the Soviet Union is often called the "world's greatest bureaucracy," foreign diplomats say Stalin consistently battles against red tape and bungling. He makes such quick decisions himself that he cannot understand why others act so slowly. He has little sympathy with stupidity in any form. Recently someone tried to excuse an official for making a garbled report on the grounds that he was an illiterate because his parents had been simple peasants. Stalin said, "That is no excuse. Our enemies do not wait to ask about your parents."

For years Stalin has impressed upon government and party leaders the necessity of studying American methods, not only in industry but in office routine. Since long before the war, admiration for the U. S. has been one of Stalin's strong traits. Years ago he characterized the essence of Leninism as a "combination of Russian revolutionary zeal with the practical American spirit." During the war this admiration for America has grown tremendously among all sections of the people.

Stalin wants peace, not revolution

Another trait of Stalin's, a stubborn one, is his intense hatred of Russia's backwardness. He has hated Russia's backwardness more than he has hated world capitalism, and this fact has saved Russia. This hatred drove him to push through collectivization of farms at any cost, to build up the morale, to promote the Stakhanovite speed-up movement, to make peace with Hitler for enough time to plan and build for the war he knew was coming. Always Stalin has wanted his country to get over its easy-going ways. He kept reminding the people that "to slacken the tempo means to fall behind. And the backward are always beaten."

When he lashed home this thesis, he would conclude by warning that the attitude of the outside world toward the Soviet Union would be: "You are backward, you are weak, so you are wrong. Hence you can be beaten and enslaved . . . You are powerful, so you are right, hence we must look out for you."

Such nationalistic pleas caused foreigners to compare his dictatorship to that of Adolf Hitler. When Stalin read such comparisons in the American press during the Nazi-Soviet pact, he was furious. He told a British diplomat, "Russia has no intention whatsoever of expanding into Central Europe or Western Europe . . . Those who think I would ever embark on the adventurous path of conquest blatantly underestimate my sense of realities. People who make analogies between Hitler and myself show they know nothing about politics."

Many people who know things about politics are now saying that Stalin is too old to be interested in plotting and carrying through a world revolution. He wants peace. At 65 he believes that he can make his greatest contribution to the workers of the world by establishing socialism in one country, by raising the economic level of the masses in Russia to new highs, by setting up the Soviet Union as the shining example for others to follow—*if they wish to follow.*

Stalin may well be satisfied to go down in history as the man who helped drive Russia out of her backwardness, as the man who solved the national and minority problems, as the only ruler of Russia who ever defeated his nation's enemies in the west and in the east. He can die happy knowing that he has lived to see the fulfilment of this poem which he wrote about his country when he was only 16:

"Know that the one who fell like ashes to the ground,
Who long ago became enslaved,
Will rise more high than these great crags
Winged with brilliant hope."

IN SOVIET SKETCHES AND BANNERS STALIN IS OFTEN GROUPED WITH LENIN, MARX AND ENGELS, HEROES OF RUSSIAN SOCIALISM