

PSF

China

1939-40

February 15, 1939

Original letter from General Chiang Kai-shek
with translation is in Famous People Folder-
Drawer 3--1939

Document is now with this file.
9/27/62 EFD

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE STATE DEPARTMENT
FOR PREPARATION OF THE
PROPER REPLIES.

F. D. R.

Letter from Honorable Nelson T. Johnson, State Dept., 1/30/39 to the President, enclosing a letter addressed to the President in Chinese from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and English translation attached, and a letter in English addressed to the President by Dr. H. H. Kung, President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Finance. These letters are dated December 11, 1938 extending Season's greetings and referring in situation in China. The photograph of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, referred to in Mr. Johnson's letter did not accompany these papers to the State Dept.

China

February 14, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

I am sending you, for forwarding, letters from the President to His Excellency General Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman, National Defense Council, and His Excellency Dr. H. H. Kung, President of the Executive Yuan of the Chinese Government.

M. H. McINTYRE
Secretary to the President

hm

Letters signed by the President 2/14/39 to the above sent to Sumner Welles for forwarding.

February 14, 1939

My dear General Chiang:

I have received, through the courtesy of Ambassador Johnson, your kind letter of December 11, 1938, together with your photograph. I appreciate very much the sentiments expressed in your letter and I am pleased to have the photograph which Ambassador Johnson informs me is an excellent likeness.

In my conversations with Ambassador Johnson I have been very glad to hear of you and to obtain from him an expression of your views.

With kind personal regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

His Excellency
General Chiang Kai-shek,
Chairman, National Defense Council,
Chungking, China.

3
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1939 FEB 6 AM 11 03

The Executive Yuan

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Chungking, China.
December 11, 1938.

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. President:

On the eve of Ambassador Johnson's departure for Washington, I take great pleasure in sending this message of remembrance and greetings to you, sincerely hoping that it will find you in the best of health and cheer.

The spirit of the Season brings to me renewed appreciation and pleasant recollections of the delightful visits I had with you last year as well as the kind reception which you were good enough to extend to me during my visit in your country. I wish to assure you that I remember them and am grateful to you for them.

I take this opportunity to reassure you of the deep appreciation which the Chinese Government and people feel for the sympathy and moral support which your Government and people have abundantly shown to us in our struggle for the rights of freedom and independence as well as for the cause of peace and justice. Though born of the people's inborn hostility against aggression, our national resistance against the invader receives much encouragement from such unfailing friendship as America has shown us under your illustrious leadership.

No one is better qualified than Ambassador Johnson to present you full and authentic information concerning the effects of Japan's aggression on American interests in China as well as the

determination


The Executive Yuan

determination with which China is pursuing its campaign of resistance and reconstruction. It is my sincere hope that the progress of events in the Pacific will find our two Republics standing shoulder to shoulder and cooperating to the fullest possible extent in upholding and safeguarding those ideals and interests which we so dearly cherish in common.

Allow me to extend to you and Mrs. Roosevelt my best wishes for a very Merry Christmas and Happy New Year.

I remain, Mr. President,

Sincerely yours,


H. H. Kung.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C.
U. S. A.

院政行府政民國
THE EXECUTIVE YUAN,
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT,
CHINA.

PERSONAL

President Franklin D. Roosevelt

President of the United States of America

Washington, D. C.

Kindness of Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson

3
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1939 FEB 6 AM 11 03

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 30, 1939.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
My dear Mr. President:

With reference to our conversation on the evening of January 22, I am enclosing herewith letters addressed to you and given to me the day of my departure from Chungking. The letters consist of one letter addressed to you in Chinese, with English translation attached, by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and a letter in English addressed to you by Dr. H. H. Kung, President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Finance. There is also attached a photograph of the Generalissimo which the latter desired that I convey to you. The Chinese inscription on the face of the photograph is to the effect that Chiang Chung Cheng (the Generalissimo's familiar name) presents this photograph to President Roosevelt. It is dated December 11, 1938, or the 27th year of the Chinese Republic. I consider the photograph an excellent one of the Generalissimo as I saw him last.

Faithfully yours,

Nelson A. Rockefeller

Enclosures.

The President,

The White House.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON


February 13, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

In response to your memorandum of February 4 there are enclosed for your consideration a draft of a letter to His Excellency General Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman, National Defense Council, in reply to his letter of December 11, 1938, and a draft of a letter to His Excellency Dr. H. H. Kung, President of the Executive Yuan of the Chinese Government, in reply to his letter of the same date.

If you approve of these draft letters, I would suggest that upon signature they be returned to this Department for forwarding to General Chiang and to Dr. H. H. Kung through our Embassy in Chungking. The letters from General Chiang and from Dr. H. H. Kung, together with Ambassador Johnson's letter transmitting those letters to you, are returned herewith.

Faithfully yours,



(For enclosures,
see following page.)

The President,

The White House.

Enclosures:

1. Draft of letter to General Chiang Kai-shek.
2. Draft of letter to Dr. H. H. Kung.
3. From General Chiang to the President, December 11, 1938, returned.
4. From Dr. H. H. Kung to the President, December 11, 1938, returned.
5. From Mr. Nelson T. Johnson to the President, January 30, 1939, returned.

一

國民政府軍事委員會用牋

羅斯福總統閣下 中正 十月十五日去

電已由中國駐美大使轉到十一月十日

惠復維誦之餘無任欣慰茲 中正 已親與

貴國大使詹森先生詳論今日東亞

局勢並請其行抵華盛頓後將 中正

意見面陳

閣下同時又託其轉遞 中正 近影一幀

藉示

國民政府軍事委員會用牋

欽佩

宏才偉績之微忱專此布達祇頌
勛綏

蔣中正

中華民國三十七年十二月十日

西維斯福總統閣下

國民政府軍事委員會緘

*This is the
original letter
from
Chiang Kai-
Shek.*

*Translation at-
tached.*



China - 1938

HEADQUARTERS OF THE GENERALISSIMO
(TRANSLATION)

Chungking,
December 11, 1938.

Dear President Roosevelt:

The Chinese Ambassador at Washington has transmitted to me your kind message of November 10 in reply to my telegraphic message of October 15. I have read your words with great pleasure and interest. I have since thoroughly discussed the situation in the Far East with Mr. Nelson Trusler Johnson, American Ambassador to China, and entrusted him to present my views to you in person when he arrives in Washington. I have also requested him to bring you a copy of my picture as a token of my admiration of your great ability and statesmanship.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) CHIANG KAI-SHEK

His Excellency
Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
Washington, U. S. A.

P.F.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

On the eve of his departure for Cody, Wyoming, the American Ambassador to China, Mr. Nelson T. Johnson, left at the Department for transmission to you the letter here attached.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

From Mr. Johnson,
dated February 27, 1939.

The President,
The White House.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 27, 1939.

Mr. President:

The Chinese people under the leadership of the National Government now temporarily seated at Chungking and under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek intend to continue resistance to the Japanese invasion of China. It is my belief that the Chinese will be able to continue this resistance indefinitely. Generalissimo Chiang told me the day before I left Chungking last December, and I know no reason to doubt the statement, that his armies were intact and that they had military supplies sufficient to carry them on for two years at the present rate of guerrilla expenditure. They hope for assistance from the outside world in the economic field. Chinese Government supplies of silver are practically exhausted and they will be put to it to maintain China's currency in exchange for foreign currency.

Japan lost the war when it failed to obtain a peace dictated on the basis of Japanese terms under the walls of Nanking as the British did in 1842. When the Japanese took Nanking, found the Government gone and the Chinese
armies

armies gone they were left with the alternatives of consolidating their positions at Shanghai and in north China and controlling an established Chinese Government in the interior from the coast, or proceed to the conquest of China. It is my conviction that the Japanese Army chose the latter alternative. It has from time to time announced, and continues to announce, that peace is not possible until it has smashed the Chinese National Government and Generalissimo Chiang. This announced policy and the cruelties which have accompanied the Japanese advance into the interior have done more to unite the people of China behind the National Government and Chiang, who symbolizes the Chinese desires for an independent national existence, than anything else and I feel that the Japanese Army has commenced something which it cannot finish. I feel, however, that it is going to take a long time for the military leaders of Japan to discover this, for the Chinese are in no position to administer a decisive defeat to the armies in the field. The struggle must go on as it is now, the Chinese resisting by means of guerrilla tactics which at best can only prolong the conflict to the point where Japan will be exhausted economically, culturally and physically. I sometimes wonder whether the East is not threatened with the kind of collapse of civilization which we have sometimes heard Europe threatened with if another

European war should commence. War is on in the East. There is no leader in China who could make peace with the Japanese and carry his people with him and there is no leader in Japan who could make peace with the Chinese on terms less than the Japanese Army desires and carry the Army with him. The only hope that the Japanese have at the present time is to make peace with a Japanese-fostered régime or régimes in China but such a peace will of necessity involve the Japanese in the responsibility of disarming the people of China in order to make it possible for the writ of such a Japanese régime to run beyond the walls of the towns in which the régimes have their homes.


History will record that the outstanding event of this decade was the end of the British Empire as a unit. The Statute of Westminster marked that end. London is paralyzed now in any decision that it may have to make for it cannot make such a decision on the assumption that Canada and Australia and South Africa will support its decision without question. The frontiers of the United States are the world. As the eldest son of the old British Empire (a son, it is true, who ran away from home and set himself up independently in business at the time when the Empire was in the making) we must from now on share with Canada, Australia and South Africa and England the responsibility of maintaining the ideals which characterized
international

international intercourse during the years that the British Empire was dominant in world affairs or see those ideals lost. We are strong and capable and whether we like it or not our decisions are looked for and listened to with a great deal of respect. We must lead the world out of the chaos in which it is now struggling. I feel that the day of colonial empires is past. Japan must slowly come to that realization. Japan has already expended a greater sum upon its attempt to start an empire in Asia than England spent as the initial cost of the establishment of the British Empire. If civilization is not to be lost, the United States must and will play a greater part in its preservation than we now seem conscious of the necessity for. Dictatorships such as that now controlling Japan understand force and will yield only to superior power. It is not a question whether we are going to war or not. The question is whether we are ready to fight for the ideals which we have hitherto held as necessary to a peaceful existence. If the world and particularly the dictatorships understand that we are prepared to fight, they will exercise more care in their relations with us and the rest of the world. You cannot send a policeman armed with a truncheon to deal with a gangster who is armed with a machine gun.

The situation demands that we, as the most powerful unit in a world of nations, must begin now to consider

the part that we are to play. Unless we begin to show our teeth now and indicate to the world and specifically to Japan that we mean business we may forever find ourselves estopped from taking action. We may perhaps find ourselves with a Japan taking everything west of the 180th meridian as the Japanese sphere of influence and interest within which we may neither improve or fortify our own interests nor enter without Japanese permission. Time is with China in its conflict with Japan but time is with the totalitarian states in their relations with the democracies. We should do what we can to assist and encourage the Chinese in their fight for an independent national existence. The Pacific area will be safer for us and for the world if there are three nations involved, namely, China, Japan and the United States, than if there are but two, Japan and the United States. Japan cannot complete its adventure in China without the financial assistance of the United States and we as a government should take such steps as may be necessary to discourage financial assistance to Japan or to those régimes which Japan may attempt to set up in China. We cannot afford to wait upon other nations in regard to this matter. It is not a question of saving British chestnuts, our own chestnuts are involved.

Respectfully,


Nelson Truster Johnson



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/15242

July 29, 1939

My dear General Watson:

I enclose a copy of a note of July 21, 1939, from the Chinese Ambassador forwarding for transmission as indicated in the note copies of a telegraphic message received by him from twenty-two organizations of the Chinese people.

In accordance with the Ambassador's request I have transmitted copies of the message also to Senator Pittman and Mr. Bloom and have acknowledged the receipt of the Ambassador's note informing him of the action taken in response to his request. There appears to be no further action in the matter required.

Sincerely yours,

Cordeell Hull

Enclosure:

Note from Chinese Ambassa-
dor with enclosure.

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson, U. S. A.,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.

*file
personal*

China

Department of State

~~SECRET~~
DIVISION

Far Eastern

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted **July 25**

ADDRESSED TO

General Watson

Secretary to the President
The White House

CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1939

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I beg to inform you that I have received the accompanying telegraphic message from twenty-two organizations of the Chinese people for transmission to the President of the United States, yourself, the Honorable Key Pittman, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate and the Honorable Sol Bloom, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives.

I shall be greatly obliged if you will be good enough to forward the message to its respective high destinations.

I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

HU SHIH

Enclosure:
Copies of
telegraphic message

Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State.

**TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE
FROM TWENTY-TWO ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE**

Imbued with the wild ambitions of attaining hegemony in the Far East, Japanese militarists have used brute force in invading our country. Wherever they went they cruelly murdered our civilians and at the same time they caused harm to the lives and property of citizens of friendly nations in China and took discriminating measures against their interests.

Of late the Japanese invaders, having been made to suffer repeated heavy losses as a result of our counter-offensives, have deliberately picked on peace-loving nations such as Great Britain, the United States and France to give vent to their wrath. They have since illegally blockaded the foreign concessions in Tientsin, searched and arrested foreign nationals, prohibited the entry of foodstuff and vegetable supplies, thus endangering the livelihood of tens of thousands of people. In the name of Chinese public organizations, they have engineered and started anti-British movements. These foul violations of laws were unprecedented in the past twenty centuries of world history.

For already two years, we, the Chinese people, have been resisting the invaders. In the present blockade of foreign concessions in Tientsin, we are deeply sympathetic to the foreign nationals concerned in their forbearance and courageous stand against the brutalities of the Japanese militarists.

Though

Though remote from the scene, we solemnly pledge to them our moral support. This telegram is sent you with the request that you, on behalf of the American Government and people, use all power at your command to condemn all brutal actions taken by the Japanese militarists to banish Third Power interests from China, and that you cooperate with other countries unanimously to enforce economic sanctions against Japan in order to hasten the collapse of the aggressor nation.

On our part, we, a nation of 450,000,000 people, swear to continue the struggle in collaboration with all peace-loving peoples in the world, until Japan, Public Enemy of Mankind, is expelled beyond the comity of civilized nations.

The Chinese public organizations which jointly sent the above telegram are:

Chekiang People's Enemy-Resisting and
Self-Defense Committee,
Chekiang Farmers' Association,
Chekiang Chamber of Commerce,
Chekiang Women's Committee,
Kiangsi Mobilization Committee,
Kiangsi Federation of Enemy-Resisting and
War-Aid Associations,
Kiangsi Women's New Life Movement Promotion Association,
Fukien Mobilization Committee,
Fukien Federation of Enemy-Resisting and
War-Aid Associations,
Kiangsu First District Mobilization Committee,
South Anhwei People's General Mobilization Committee,
South Anhwei Tea Trade Union,
Branch of the National Relief Commission in the
Third Relief Area,
Chekiang Wartime Cultural Enterprises Committee,
Southeastern Daily,
Frontline Daily,
Kiangsi Min Kuo (People's) Daily,
Anhwei Daily,
Sin-Chow Daily,
Southern Daily,
North Fukien Daily,
South Kiangsu Daily.

VOID

China
1

August 5, 1939

Message from Navy Dept--Confidential
In re-future moves of Chiang-Kai-Chek

See-Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939



In reply refer to
FE 711.942/213

*File
Personal*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

China
1

[8/9/39]

My dear General Watson:

I enclose a copy of a note of July 31, 1939 from the Chinese Ambassador forwarding for transmission to the President two telegraphic messages which the Ambassador has received from the representatives of Chinese nationals in Singapore, Straits Settlements, and Ipoh, Malay States, relating to the note sent on July 26 to the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan signed in 1911. There appears to be no action required in the matter other than to acknowledge the Ambassador's note, which I have done.

Sincerely yours,

[Handwritten signature]
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Note from Chinese
Ambassador, July 31, 1939.

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson, U.S.A.,

Secretary to the President,

The White House.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

FE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

General Watson.

CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

July 31, 1939

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I beg to inform you that I have received for transmission to the President the two following telegraphic messages from the representatives of Chinese nationals in Singapore, Straits Settlements, and Ipoh, Malay States, respectively:

(1) On behalf of eight million overseas Chinese in Southern Asia, we congratulate and thank you for giving notice to Japan terminating the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. We consider it a great step forward in the cause of humanity and world peace. It is our ardent hope that you will soon see your way to convene a conference under the Nine-Power Treaty.

Tan Kah-kee, Chairman of the
Federation of China Relief Funds
of Southern Asia.

(2) In support of the telegraphic message from the Chairman of the Federation of China Relief Funds of Southern Asia, we beg to add that your courageous determination in abrogating the American-Japanese Commercial Treaty is a great contribution toward the cause of righteousness and justice and to hope that you will

continue

Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State.

continue your efforts in curbing aggressors.

Leong Hsin-nan, Chairman of the China
Relief Funds Committee, Ipoh,
Malay States.

I shall be much obliged if you will be good
enough to have the messages forwarded to their high
destination.

I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

HU SHIH

PSF: China

CJ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated August 28, 1939

Rec'd 8:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1621, August 28, noon.

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Discussions with those French outside the Government who have done the most to assist Chiang Kai Shek in his resistance to Japanese aggression reveals the opinion that the present opportunity should be taken to obtain a statement from Chiang Kai Shek as to the minimum terms on which he would conclude a peace with Japan which would present the independence and possibility of free development of China. It has been suggested to me that this initiative should be taken by the United States through our Ambassador to China and that you should attempt to bring about the end of the war in China and the alignment of Japan with France and England against Germany.

I understand that fear of Russian attack is now great in Japan and believe that you should consider most carefully the advisability of some sort of action of this kind. The French and British have their minds too fixed on Germany to handle this problem adequately.

BULLITT

KLP:HPD

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confidential

PSF: Chien


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 7, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to my letter of May 29 and other correspondence in regard to the Yunnan-Burma Highway, there is enclosed a further memorandum on the same subject embodying information recently received in the Department.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:
Memorandum.

The President,
The White House.

Department of State

BUREAU }
DIVISION |

FE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 9/6/39

ADDRESSED TO

The President

September 6, 1939

During the latter part of June the American Consul at Yunnanfu made the journey from that city to the Burma border in three days' driving time. Although the rainy season had started several weeks previously, the general condition of the highway was found to be good and the Consul concluded that it would be possible to keep the road open during the rainy season, but that great difficulties would be encountered during August and September. The western part of the road is the weakest section and operations on this section are handicapped by lack of sufficient personnel for road work.

The Consul found the organization of the highway as a military road decidedly faulty. One of the principal difficulties appeared to be the fact that there is a division of responsibility for the operation of the highway between the Yunnan-Burma Highway Bureau operating under the Ministry of Communications and the Southwest Transportation Company which is under the Military Affairs Commission.

An American traveler (Richard Watts, Jr., dramatic critic of the New York Herald Tribune) who arrived in Rangoon on August 9 after a seventeen-day journey from Yunnanfu, found the western section of the highway between Lungling and the Burma border in very bad condition. He stated that war supplies were only "dribbling through",

through", that all traffic might be stopped by further damaging rains, and expressed the opinion that the highway as a life line for China is "very weak".

According to information obtained from the Defense Department of the Government of Burma, the Burma section of the highway, about 120 miles in length, is to be made into a first class road, not only metalled for its entire length, but also surfaced with asphalt, tar, or other bituminous material. As much as possible of this improvement work will be done during the next dry season.

The Consul at Yunnanfu reports that the first shipment of export goods over the Burma road left Yunnanfu on August 12, 1939, and consisted of 53 tons (106,000 pounds) of tung oil in 277 standard steel gasoline drums consigned to the Universal Trading Company in New York. The principal reason for shipping this oil through Rangoon is believed to be the superior terminal facilities there. Actually there is no shortage of freight space on the Yunnan-Indochina railway, but the congestion of inward freight at Haiphong makes it difficult to handle export shipments rapidly and efficiently.

Dr. R. C. Robertson, head of the Division of Pathology and Sciences in the Lester Institute of Medical Research in Shanghai, and Commissioner, League of Nations Anti-Epidemic Unit No. 2, recently made an inspection

trip

trip over the highway. In an article describing this trip he explained that the valleys of the large rivers flowing south through Yunnan had always shown a heavy incidence of malignant malaria, and toward the southern and western parts of the Province, where an annual rainfall of 120 inches is common, malaria is endemic to a "disastrous" extent. He asserted that mortality among workmen on the Yunnan-Burma highway has been very great, that the Burma section of the road passes through "some of the worst malaria districts of the world", and that reports of many fatalities were still coming in, especially from the districts near Mongshih, "where malignant tertian malaria is rife".

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
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

I believe that you will be interested in the attached copy of a memorandum prepared in the Department under date May 18, on the basis of information from American diplomatic and consular officers, in regard to the operation of the Yunnan-Burma Highway during the approximately five months that it has been open to traffic.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'A. H. Hays', written over the typed name 'A. H. Hays'.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of
May 18, 1939.

The President,
The White House.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

FE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted.....

ADDRESSED TO

The President.

COPY

May 18, 1939

Yunnan and Burma Highway

It is felt that the following brief survey of the operation of the Yunnan-Burma highway during the approximately five months that it has been open to traffic may be of interest at this time.

Arrival of munitions in Rangoon

The first vessel carrying war materials for China was reported to have arrived in Rangoon on November 3, 1938.⁽¹⁾ By January 18 it was reported that there were 9,000 tons of war materials at Rangoon;⁽²⁾ on March 16 the Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that approximately 15,000 tons had arrived at that port of which some 2,000 tons had been shipped to Lashio;⁽³⁾ and by April 13 it was reported in Chungking that there were 30,000 tons of munitions at Rangoon awaiting shipment⁽⁴⁾ into China and a Southwest Transportation Company officer stated that 3,600 tons had been shipped to Lashio.⁽⁵⁾ Calculated on a

basis

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- (1) Rangoon's November 3, 5 p.m.
 - (2) Rangoon's despatch 143, January 18, 1939.
 - (3) Rangoon's March 16, 5 p.m.
 - (4) Chungking's 260, April 13, 1 p.m.
 - (5) Rangoon's despatch 170, April 8, 1939.

basis of duty paid the value of war materials formally cleared for shipment from Rangoon up to March 4 was estimated at about United States \$9,676,800.(6) The Consul at Rangoon reports that munitions continue to arrive at that port direct and in relatively small amounts via Singapore and Colombo.(5)

The amount of Burma customs duty payable on war materials reexported overland to China (in most cases slightly over 3% ad valorem) constituted a burden to the Chinese but recent reports from Rangoon indicate that the Governor of Burma has now ordered that duty on such goods shall not exceed 1% ad valorem.(7)

Munitions are said to include high explosives, machine guns and ammunition, shells, anti-aircraft guns, small arms and ammunition, trench mortars, two tanks and a few field guns. They are reported to be of Russian, German, Czechoslovakian, Italian and French origin.(6)

Transport facilities

High explosives have been stored in a barge in the Rangoon River and storage facilities for other war materials have been established at Rangoon. Storage facilities for
about

(5) Rangoon's despatch 170, April 8, 1939.

(6) Rangoon's despatch 160, March 18, 1939.
Rangoon's despatch 153, February 18, 1939.

(7) Rangoon's November 12, 1938, 8 p.m.
Rangoon's April 23, 4 p.m.

about 6,000 tons of both dangerous and non-dangerous goods are reported to have been established at Lashio and for 1,500 tons at Chefang.⁽⁸⁾ Most of the war supplies are sent by rail from Rangoon to Lashio and from there are transported by a Rangoon haulage contractor, who is reported to be employing 185 Chevrolet trucks in this service, to Chefang, some 150 miles from Lashio and 24 miles across the Chinese border. From Chefang they are carried on to Yunnanfu and other parts of China in Southwest Transportation Company trucks.⁽⁹⁾ By April 8 over 500 American truck chassis had arrived in Rangoon and more were reported to be en route. They are being supplied with bodies and reportedly put into service by the Southwest Transportation Company between Chefang and Yunnanfu.⁽¹⁰⁾

It is reported that many truck chassis as well as large quantities of petroleum products are being purchased in the United States under the Export-Import Bank credit to the Universal Trading Corporation.⁽¹¹⁾

In this connection it is of interest to note that the Consul at Yunnanfu reports that grading work on the proposed

Burma-

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- (8) Rangoon's despatch 170, April 8, 1939.
Rangoon's despatch 160, March 18, 1939.
(9) Rangoon's despatch 170, April 8, 1939.
(10) Rangoon's despatch 168, April 8, 1939.
(11) Rangoon's despatch 168, April 8, 1939.
Rangoon's despatch 157, March 2, 1939.

Burma-Yunnan Railway is progressing rapidly but that in as much as there appears to be no bridge or culvert construction carried on there is no assurance that the roadbed will be completed at an early date. (12)

Movement of war materials into China

Reports from Yunnanfu indicate that during December small shipments of supplies arrived in that city from Burma over the new road, but it is believed that the road was later closed to heavy traffic for a short period and that, due principally to lack of trucks, regular transport of war materials did not start until March. (13)

Reports from various sources indicate that although the transport is not very well organized or very efficient some 900 to 1200 tons of war supplies per month are arriving in Yunnanfu. There have been no reports of any export produce carried by the trucks on their return journeys toward Burma, most trucks observed while returning over the Yunnanfu-Hsiakwan section of the road having been carrying motor fuel. (14)

By way of comparison it may be noted that over 5,000

metric

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- (12) Yunnanfu's despatch 153, March 23, 1939.
(13) Yunnanfu's despatch 136, January 31, 1939.
Rangoon's despatch 160, March 18, 1939.
(14) Rangoon's despatch 170, April 8, 1939.
Yunnanfu's despatch 153, March 23, 1939.
Press reports.

metric tons of freight per month enter Yunnan over the Yunnan-Tonkin Railway and that from May to September 1938 an average of 90,000 tons of goods per month were reportedly moved on the Canton-Hankow Railway.⁽¹⁵⁾ It is thus apparent that the new highway is as yet far from being a supply route over which any considerable volume of war materials enters China.

Future Prospects

It appears to be generally admitted that the road will in all probability be damaged by landslides and wash-outs during the rainy season which lasts from May or June through November but many observers are hopeful that some traffic will be possible during this period. An agent of the Bank of China who recently traveled over the road stated that there are 20,000 men employed in improvement and reconstruction and 10,000 in road maintenance work. It is the opinion of Consul Meyer at Yunnanfu that the present force will have to be considerably augmented if even the Yunnanfu-Hsiakwan section (first opened to traffic about three years ago) is to be kept open during the rainy season.⁽¹⁶⁾ In any event it appears probable that the small
stream

(15) Yunnanfu's annual commercial report, February 28, 1939. Press reports.

(16) Rangoon's despatch 173, April 13, 1939. Yunnanfu's despatch 153, March 23, 1939.

stream of war supplies now reaching China via Burma will, within the next month, dwindle to nominal proportions until near the end of the year at which time, with the advent of the dry season and with additional trucks available, it may be expected to resume its flow at substantially above the present volume.

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personal*


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to my letter of May 24 transmitting a copy of a memorandum on the Yunnan-Burma Highway, there is enclosed a supplementary memorandum on the same subject embodying information received in the Department within the past few days.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:

Memorandum of
May 29, 1939.

The President,
The White House.

May 29, 1939.

Confidential statistics of the Defense Department of the Burma Government show that during the period December 15, 1938, to April 23, 1939, war materials to the value of 37,623,000 rupees or more than US\$13,000,000 were passed by the Rangoon customs for transit through Burma to China. These supplies consisted chiefly of machine guns, shells and cartridges. Czechoslovakia is named as the country of origin of more than 30 percent, France and Russia more than 22 percent each, the United States more than 12 percent, Belgium nearly 9 percent and Denmark more than 3 percent in addition to small quantities from Great Britain and Germany.

By May 1, 1,386 American trucks were reported to have arrived in Rangoon and assembly of these trucks, which had been delayed by labor troubles, was expected to start shortly. Additional American trucks were expected to arrive in Rangoon soon, as were 300 five-ton Thornycroft trucks, the first shipment of what was reported in the press to be an order of 1,300 of these trucks placed by Chinese interests under a British credit.

According to a memorandum written by the Rangoon representative of the Foo Shing Trading Corporation (associated with the Universal Trading Corporation of

New York)

New York) the Foo Shing organization will maintain a thousand American trucks on the Yunnan-Burma highway to transport wood oil for export and it is estimated that this number of trucks will be able to keep 108 tons of goods per day moving in each direction. The highway between Lashio and Yunnanfu will be divided into four sections and storage facilities will be constructed at the termini of each section so that if one section of the road is closed, goods may be kept moving over the other sections. It is expected that trucks will make the entire trip between Lashio and Yunnanfu in seven days. So far there has been no cooperation between the Southwest Transportation Company (engaged principally in the transport of war materials into China) and the Foo Shing Corporation. However, the Rangoon representative of the latter concern suggests in his memorandum that an immediate effort be made to come to an agreement with the Southwest company providing for the cooperative utilization of the transportation facilities of the two companies.

(Rangoon's despatches nos. 178 of May 1 and 179 of May 2, 1939, and telegram of May 27, 5 p.m.)

The President,

The White House.

*file
Confidential*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON


January 25, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

I believe you will find interesting the attached copy of a memorandum on the subject of the Burma Road, prepared by Major J. M. McHugh, U.S.M.C., Assistant American Naval Attaché in China. Major McHugh accompanied Ambassador Johnson on his recent trip by motor car from Chungking to Rangoon, and the memorandum is based on observations made during that trip.

You will find attached to the memorandum a brief explanatory comment prepared by Ambassador Johnson.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

1. Memorandum by Major McHugh.
2. Comment by Ambassador Johnson.

The President,
The White House.

COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 20, 1939.

PA/H:
Mr. Hornbeck.

"In the conclusions set forth on pages 8 to 12 of the attached report there occur the following sentences in reference to the road to Burma:

"That it can and will be completed to this point in time to be of any real value during the present conflict is open to grave doubt."

"The volume of war material which can be transported over this route and the overhead incident thereto is a matter of simple arithmetic which can easily be computed from the basic statistics of mileage and gasoline consumption of our trip alone -- and the result is not encouraging."

By way of comment I desire to say that these statements result obviously from a consideration of the length of the road, statistics which we compiled regarding our own consumption of gasoline and the numerous difficulties obviously to be overcome in putting the road into condition for the handling of the amount of heavy traffic necessary to move large quantities of goods

in

in trucks. The present conflict, in my opinion and in the opinion I am sure of Major McHugh, is going to last for a considerable period of time and we did not intend by these statements to convey the idea that the road would be of no service whatever in assisting the Chinese in their resistance. It is our feeling that the road will be of considerable assistance; that this assistance will increase as time goes on and as effort is made to improve the condition of the road and to supply it with the necessary equipment to handle traffic over it. Neither McHugh nor I wish to leave any doubts in the minds of anyone as to the difficulties involved.

FE:NTJ:REK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~AMERICAN CONSULATE
RANGOON BURMA

31 December, 1938.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Subject: The Burma Road

The following is a brief report of our recent trip over the new motor road connecting KUNMING, YUNNAN, with LASHIO, BURMA:

A. DETAILS OF THE JOURNEY

(1) Dates We left CHUNGKING at 7:30 A.M., December 12, 1938, and arrived at LASHIO at 6:30 P.M., December 26, 1938, travelling by way of KWEIYANG, KUNMING, HSIA KUAN (TA LI FU), PAO SHAN, LUNG LING and MANG SHIH. Actual travel time was ten days, as follows: CHUNGKING to KWEIYANG, two days; KWEIYANG to KUNMING, three days; KUNMING to HSIA KUAN, two days; and HSIA KUAN to LASHIO, three days. Three additional days were required to drive from LASHIO to RANGOON. Stop-overs to exchange necessary official calls and service our transportation were made as follows enroute: one day at KWEIYANG, three days at KUNMING and one day at TA LI FU.

(2) Mileage and Gasoline The following table shows the mileage between the various points enroute as measured on the speedometer of our car. This varies only slightly with information supplied us from Chinese, British and French sources, the differences being due either to mechanical variation in instruments or the exact location of points from which readings were taken:

CHUNGKING

CHUNGKING TO KUNMING	726 miles
KUNMING to HSIA KUAN	264 "
(TA LI FU is 7 miles to the north of HSIA KUAN, off of the main road)	
HSIA KUAN to LASHIO	<u>480</u> "
Total	1,470 miles

(LASHIO to RANGOON - 612 miles)

We consumed sixty five (65) gallons of gasoline from CHUNGKING to KUNMING and seventy five (75) gallons from KUNMING to LASHIO. Gasoline is available at certain points along the route between CHUNGKING and KUNMING, but is issued only against written authority from the Liquid Fuels Division of the Ministry of Finance at CHUNGKING or by local authority of Provincial Governments. Ordinary travellers cannot purchase at random nor can they easily procure such authority. I had already taken steps to procure permits to purchase gasoline along this section of our route for a trip to KUNMING prior to receipt of orders to make the trip to BURMA and it had required eight days for the passes to be issued even though permission to obtain them had immediately been granted upon receipt of my request. There are no stocks of gasoline available, however, along the KUNMING - LASHIO route at present, not even as far as HSIA KUAN. We were accompanied on this latter stage by Mr. T'an Po-ying, the newly appointed Managing Director of the road who is taking over control from the Yunnan Government as of 1 January, 1939. He was sent to KUNMING by plane by the Minister of Communications to facilitate our journey in any way possible and took the occasion to make his first inspection of the route. It was necessary, however, for him to bring along a truck to carry gasoline supplies for the outgoing and return journeys

of

of the cars. The local representatives of the foreign oil companies in KUNMING have no stocks along the route nor any concrete plans as yet as to when they may locate same.

(3) Transportation for the trip The car used by us was a 1935 model, Ford V-8 Sedan, which I had purchased second hand in HONGKONG in September, 1938, and had driven from there via CANTON to HANKOW, thence back to CHANGSHA and on to CHUNGKING. We carried with us in this car a Chinese mechanic and our personal baggage and bedding plus spare parts and surplus gasoline in a limited quantity. I had had this car thoroughly overhauled in HONGKONG despite the fact that it had only been run 8,500 miles; had had a special carrier built on the rear capable of carrying thirty (30) gallons (3 Cases) of extra gasoline; had had the springs reinforced; and had had the car equipped with spare parts for every conceivable emergency. We also carried a set of blocks and tackle, tow rope and pick and shovel. Spare parts are not available at points in Central China, except at KUNMING in very limited and uncertain quantity. Had it not been for the availability of this car at CHUNGKING when the question of this trip arose, it is doubtful if the trip would have been attempted, for commercial transportation is not only scarce, but mechanically unequal to the strain of such a trip. Mr. T'an commandeered for his use a brand new 1938 Ford V-8 Sedan and a new Dodge truck yet had recurring trouble with both all along the route due to the carelessness of his chauffeurs and their failure to service their equipment carefully at the end of each day's run.

B. DESCRIPTION OF THE ROUTE

(1) CHUNGKING to KUNMING The road from CHUNGKING to
KUNMING,

KUNMING, although taken for granted by those who have not travelled it, is a very difficult route. There are five mountain passes between CHUNGKING and KWEIYANG and six more between KWEIYANG and KUNMING. In the former group, starting with an altitude of approximately 400 feet at CHUNGKING, one attains altitudes up to 3,500 feet and in the latter group, from an altitude of 2,600 feet at KWEIYANG, one reaches 6,600 feet on one pass. (Altitudes were taken by us all along the route and were found to agree substantially with those shown on maps and engineering blueprints). The road has a rock base throughout, but the surface has been largely washed away by the long rainy season and by heavy traffic in recent weeks and is very jagged and uneven, especially between KWEIYANG and the YUNNAN border. Grades are steep and curves are sharp, many of them requiring on the ascent full power in low gear on a Ford V-8. Just west of AN NAN in western KWEICHOW one descends the side of a mountain over a very rough road in twenty five successive and very sharp curves, losing 2,000 feet in three kilometers, and then immediately regains this altitude plus another 300 feet in a climb of five kilometers on the opposite mountain. Chinese trucks are nevertheless negotiating this road regularly, albeit with frequent breakdowns and casualties. It is no exaggeration to state that at least fifty percent of the total distance traversed was in second gear due either to ascending or descending slopes or to uneven road surfaces.

(2) KUNMING to HSIA KUAN This section of the road is less than two years old although it is an old caravan route. Prior to the outbreak of the present war there were very few cars in YUNNAN and little demand for improvement of this section. Its development, therefore, is practically concurrent

with

with the HSIA KUAN - LASHIO section. There are two main passes to cross, the second being the highest of the entire route - 8,600 feet. Part of this road is in excellent condition and part very poor. The latter is especially true through the first pass which lies between KUNMING and CH'U HSIUNG where several serious slides have occurred. Here, as in similar situations further along, it will not only be necessary to slope the cuts back to a more normal angle of repose, but likewise imperative to maintain a constant patrol and repair gangs. Work on widening and improving these cuts is already in progress. Driving along this section of the road is, however, relatively easier than on the KWEICHOW roads due to the excellent condition of the latter part over the second pass.

(3) HSIA KUAN to LASHIO This section also is in reality the general line of a very old caravan route. The motor road, while following roughly this line, is in the main a virgin road which has literally been carved out of the sides of mountains. Starting from an altitude of 6,400 feet at HSIA KUAN, the road traverses seven passes to the BURMA border and two more between that point and LASHIO. Work on this section was first started in December, 1937, and the road was initially declared open in July, 1938. Serious slides during the wet season forced its closure, however, and the metalling of the surface was likewise far from complete so that the road was only again opened to passage shortly prior to our trip. Work is in progress all along the route widening it, surfacing it, completing bridges and coping with slides. It is by no means finished and its ultimate utility as an artery for heavy and continuous traffic depends entirely on how assiduously and vigorously

its

its improvement is pushed.

There are certain sections through which the road passes where the geology is such that constant patrolling and repair will be required. These points principally are, (a) the first pass south of HSIA KUAN between there and the YANG P'I river, (b) the beginning of the ascent to the MEKONG DIVIDE, (c) recurring sections on both slopes of the SALWEEN DIVIDE, (d) the entire LUNGLING - MANGSHIH section and (e) the LUNG (SHWELI) river divide just north of the BURMA border. In these sections the geology is of a conglomerate composition -- either talus or detritus, resembling the deposit of a flood despite the fact that it is several thousand feet high, and is constantly crumbling and slipping. This whole area is apparently under terrific strain for the sedimentary rock has been bent and crushed until it has little cohesion. It is exactly as though the road had been cut along the slopes of a mound of granulated sugar which constantly melts or slips from under it. Only constant supervision such as has been exercised for years in the Panama Canal will keep the road open through these areas.

(4) Present condition for traffic The road is not yet in condition to handle heavy traffic and it is impossible to predict when this condition will be attained. Work is progressing all along it although the number of workmen employed is obviously insufficient and apparently considerably less than that mobilized to break the ground earlier in the year. The people are turned out for work on the road by the magistrates of their respective districts as a form of taxation and get neither pay nor food for their efforts. No call upon their services is possible during the summer months when the crops need attention for they will not turn out

out then and the road will obviously go out of commission during the rainy season of the coming year for there are places that will not yet be in condition by that time to withstand the weather and there will be very little if any local labor to commandeer for such emergencies. Mr. T'an spoke of bringing in a large number of experienced road builders from KIANGSI Province in order not only to improve the quality of the work, but to have permanent crews available. This is quite possible to do and if done will be a distinct asset, for KIANGSI was where the Generalissimo started his road building program and there are undoubtedly large numbers of refugees from there available for this work.

Many very substantial stone and concrete bridges have already been built while others are in process of construction. Present by-passes around these, however, will be closed by the advent of the coming rainy season in April if any remain uncompleted by that time. The suspension bridge over the MEKONG river is rated at seven and one half tons and appears serviceable if properly watched. The reinforcing of the suspension bridge over the SALWEEN is already 75% complete and will be finished very shortly. It is rated at fifteen tons and will be superior to the MEKONG bridge when finished. We did not note any sharp or difficult approach to this bridge as reported in November by Mr. Hunter of the Central Aircraft Factory.

The chief point where difficulty will probably occur for heavy trucks seems to be in the elbows of curves at the tops of valleys where the road winds from one mountain to the next. There are a multitude of these in any ascent or descent and in many cases the turn is far too sharp and the culvert or fill not only too narrow, but not squared to

the normal approach of the vehicle. Work is already in progress at many places to correct this, but the bridges where necessary have already been located and some may have to be rebuilt. The road needs widening in many places not only to permit the free passage of vehicles, but to strengthen it. Work on this is already in progress in frequent instances but the number of workmen is at present insufficient to guarantee completion prior to the coming rainy season. It was interesting to remark the migration of a large number of Yunnanese into northern BURMA for road work where they obtain substantial remuneration for their services.

C. CONCLUSIONS

The building and opening of this road is obviously the result of a pressing need on the part of the Chinese who now find themselves practically cut off from the outside world. The work to date -- the mere fact that a road has been built through such formidable terrain -- is a distinct credit to the Chinese. The BURMA Government is, in fact, behind schedule in the development of their section of the road from the obvious fact that they never believed the Chinese could and would build this road. With continued improvement and constant supervision over dangerous sections the road has every possibility of becoming a serviceable artery for traffic. That it can and will be completed to this point in time to be of any real value during the present conflict is open to grave doubt. And when the present conflict is settled, the question remains, Will the Chinese continue to improve this route? Once the pressure is removed and negligence sets in, the route will close. Only one slide unattended is necessary to produce this.

But

But the future cannot be predicted. The pressure to develop and use the road is stronger than ever at present and there certainly is no sign as yet of any settlement of the present war nor any clue as to how it might come about. The new Managing Director of the road, Mr. T'an, is a very well educated engineer of German training who appears to possess an unusual amount of energy and common sense. He informed us that he had just been granted an allotment of forty thousand pounds sterling of foreign exchange with which to buy further road equipment and is now enroute to HONGKONG to arrange for these purchases. He likewise appears to have under him several competent and industrious engineers. He has already had considerable experience in the Northwest in opening up the routes to the U.S.S.R. and there therefore is no ground on which to discount the present intentions or ability of the Chinese to go ahead with the development of the road.

A high official in the BURMA Government informed me that there is not enough potential commerce or mineral wealth in YUNNAN to justify the continued development or use of the road after the present war. He admitted, however, that if it could be kept open clear into SZECHUAN it might succeed commercially. Whether he is right remains to be seen. It has always been assumed that there is considerable undeveloped mineral wealth in the western part of China, but it is doubtful if any accurate and comprehensive survey has ever yet been made. The road would appear to be worth the gamble as a commercial venture alone, not to mention its political possibilities as an offset to the French influence in YUNNAN.

As to the volume of traffic it can carry, the Chinese
are

are already talking of 150 trucks per day in each direction and making plans to employ the thousand new trucks recently reported to have been obtained on credit from the U.S.A. Obviously, the installation of efficient service crews and stations plus large stocks of fuel all along the route will be necessary to maintain such traffic, and these precautions, other than for limited fuel stocks and a branch garage of the Southwest Transportation Corporation at Kweiyang, do not now obtain on the older section of the route from KUNMING to CHUNGKING. There is a very evident and crying need along that route for the coordination and servicing of motor transport. Likewise, very strict discipline and schooling of chauffeurs will be required and thus far no such move has been made elsewhere to any appreciable degree in this respect, not to mention the fact that proper care and routine servicing of machinery is not an inherent trait of the Chinese. An efficient despatching system for the control of traffic will also be required especially since the Chinese plan to utilize a large amount of native transport. In this latter respect Mr. T'an has plans for an improved native two-wheeled cart, animal drawn, with steel axle, pneumatic tires and ball-bearings recovered from broken trucks. He claims he has already employed this successfully in the Northwest each vehicle transporting one and one-half tons of gasoline. The idea itself appears possible of some success, but its installation along the route we have just travelled would obviously produce a hopeless traffic jam unless very rigid despatching and control were exercised.

The volume of war material which can be transported over this route and the overhead incident thereto is a matter of simple arithmetic which can easily be computed from the

basic

basic statistics of mileage and gasoline consumption of
our trip alone -- and the result is not encouraging.

Respectfully submitted,

J. M. McHUGH

Major, U.S.M.C.
Assistant Naval Attache

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

September 22, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum has been received from the Chinese Ambassador with the request that it be passed on to you.

CH

China

According to a report, dated September 18, of Chinese official source in Moscow, the Soviet Government gave the following assurances:

(1) The declaration of Soviet Russia's readiness to aid China in her military resistance will be followed by facts. Russia will in no way change her original plan. There is no reason for China to entertain any fear and suspicion.

(2) Japan has not yet proffered any suggestion to negotiate for a non-aggression pact. The Soviet Government would certainly keep General Chiang informed through the Chinese Ambassador, should any such suggestion be received in the future. Japan does not seem to have such intention.

(3) The Red Army's march to Poland is solely for the protection of Russian minorities and for the security of the frontier, and certainly does not mean Russian participation in the European conflict.

(4) The attitude of Soviet Russia toward Great Britain and France will, in a way, be decided on the basis of the attitude of the latter two countries toward Soviet Russia. If they fail to understand Russia's position in Poland and take a belligerent attitude, Russia will be prepared for such an eventuality.

September 21, 1939.

761.94/1141

China
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October 20, 1939.

Letter from Sec. Hull to the President

In re-attached cablegram from the Secretariate of State of the Holy See which was left by Monsignor Ready at the State Dept.

Subject: Secretariate of State of Holy See received information from Unknown source that Chinese officials "desire the Holy See to take steps to establish peace between China and Japan".

Sec Hull also encloses for the President an analysis of the above subject. Both the cablegram and analysis were returned to the State Dept.

See: Italy folder-Drawer 1-1939

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 1, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Reference, the call which Dr. W. W. Yen, former Chinese Minister to the United States, is to make on you on November 2, at twelve-thirty, noon.

Dr. Yen will present to you a letter, dated July 20, from Chiang Kai-shek, a copy of which, as supplied for your advance information by the Chinese Ambassador here, is hereunder attached. Chiang Kai-shek has asked Dr. Yen to "exchange views with you concerning the general situation in the Far East".

In the letter under reference, Chiang Kai-shek states that the main points of his thought relate to: (1) the upholding of the principles of the Nine Power Treaty, with emphasis upon adoption by this Government of economic measures against Japan; (2) China's need of material assistance; and (3) the European situation in relation to the Far East.

The Department offers comment as follows:

With regard to Chiang Kai-shek's first point, it is believed that the attitude and position of this Government with regard to the question of treaty observance and with

regard

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regard to the principles which this Government believes should govern relations between and among nations have been made clear in many public statements by high officials of this Government, and that this Government's attitude and position remain unchanged. With reference to the suggested adoption by this Government of economic measures against Japan, it is believed that the whole question of our future commercial relations with Japan must, naturally, depend upon developments. Both the executive and the legislative branches of the Government have been giving consideration to this subject. Suggestions for action by this Government are examined in the light of the traditional policies of the United States and of the current attitude of the American people, and within the framework of the laws of this country. -- Chiang Kai-shek also suggests that this Government might call a conference either to bring about a settlement of the Far Eastern situation or as a preliminary to the taking of economic measures against Japan. It is believed that until Japan's military leadership shall have become convinced of the necessity of modifying its objectives and altering its methods, action by the Government of the United States directed toward bringing about an adjustment of the Sino-Japanese conflict by diplomatic processes would be inopportune: such an adjustment, if achieved, could only be on a basis which would have the effect of assisting

Japan


Japan toward acquisition of a legal title to some portion of what the Japanese armies have seized (and are by no means sure of holding) by force. It is believed that the calling at this time of a conference as a preliminary to the taking of economic measures against Japan would have little or no chance of serving a useful purpose, especially in view of the preoccupation of other powers with military operations in Europe and prevailing uncertainties regarding current diplomatic moves and developments.

With regard to Chiang's second point, China's need of material assistance, it is understood that this Government desires to be constructively helpful where it is appropriate and possible for it to act within the framework of the established policies and laws of the United States.

With regard to Chiang's third point, the European situation in relation to the Far East, it is to be noted that Chiang's letter was written before the outbreak of war in Europe. After the war began, the Chinese Government appeared for some time to be apprehensive lest the foreign relations of Great Britain and France, and possibly developments between the Soviet Union and Japan, might assume an orientation unfavorable to China. On September 5, the American Ambassador to China called on Chiang Kai-shek and communicated to him, under instruction from the Department, a statement that we had no indication of any material

developments

developments which would seem to make warrantable the apprehensions of which Chiang had given an intimation. This Government has constantly exchanged with the British and the French Governments information in regard to the Far Eastern situation; our attitude and position in regard to features of that situation have on numerous occasions been made known to those Governments; and it is believed that our views are clearly understood by them. During recent weeks various developments in China have given the Chinese Government renewed confidence in the capacity of China to resist; developments in relations of other countries have tended to allay the Chinese Government's apprehensions referred to above; and Chiang Kai-shek has repeatedly affirmed that China has no intention of making peace on the basis of Japanese terms as currently (and more or less vaguely) outlined by Japanese spokesmen or agents.



Enclosure:
Copy of letter from
Chiang Kai-shek,
July 20, 1939.

(Copy of translation)
Strictly Confidential

Chungking, July 20, 1939.

My dear President Roosevelt:

I wish to thank you, first of all, for your kind letter of April 18 replying to my message of March 25, and to express my deep appreciation for your approval of certain remarks which I had occasion to make in the interests of international order and justice.

I am now sending Dr. W. W. Yen, who served for several years as China's diplomatic representative in the United States, to Washington to see you and, on ^{my} behalf, exchange views with ^{you} concerning the general situation in the Far East. I have also asked him to bring you this letter in which, with your permission, I am going to set forth my points of view for your consideration.

The main points of my thought relate to the following: first, the upholding of the principles of the Nine Power Treaty; second, China's need of material assistance; and third, the European situation in relation to the Far East.

Regarding the first point, it is quite clear that Japan has in no way changed her untenable attitude toward international treaties. She is not more inclined now than at the time of the Brussels Conference to show any respect to the Nine Power Treaty which she freely signed. What Japan fears, however, is strong insistence backed by effective

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weapons upon the observance of treaty rights and obligations which she considers herself able to ignore with impunity, as long as the parties concerned only voice their dissatisfaction by words. She has even been encouraged to believe that violations of treaties might become faits accomplis which would eventually obtain recognition by the Powers.

In your speech delivered before Congress on January 4, you spoke of the "many methods, short of war, but stronger and more effective than mere words, of bringing home to aggressor governments the aggregate sentiment of our people". I am sure that all such methods must have been thought out and carefully examined by you and your Government. I venture to think, however, that there are certain measures which may be found particularly efficacious and which may therefore hasten the termination of the present conflict.

Now, the weapon^s at the disposal of the United States which will prove effective necessarily include the absolute prohibition of the exportation of materials and implements of war to Japan, especially iron and petrol, the prohibition of the importation of staple Japanese products, the increase of tariff rates on those products as has been done in the case of German imports, the closing of certain ports to Japanese ships, and other measures of a similar nature. There are, of course, stronger and more effective weapons. But these economic reprisals which are fully justified in international law and, I believe, also permissible under American domestic law, will be sufficient to bring home to Japanese militarists the weight of public opinion of the United States which they cannot afford to ignore.

These measures, which will have the effect of weakening Japan's sinews of war and her general economic conditions, will inevitably compel her to take the only safe course left her by agreeing to solve all problems concerning China and other interested Powers at the council table. It will then be possible

for the United States, by virtue of the Nine Power Treaty or her well recognized position as a peace-promoting State, to call a conference at which the participating Powers may be able to seek, by processes of free negotiation, a settlement based on reason and justice. Measures of reprisal are thus only the means to an end - an end desired by all peace-loving nations and bound to be accepted even by aggressor nations.

The termination of the conflict by conference may perhaps be brought about in another way. The Government of the United States may first invite the Powers chiefly concerned to a conference at Washington or elsewhere and, in the event of Japan declining to participate, would be the more justified in applying to a recalcitrant country the measures outlined above. The enforcement of such measures even for a brief space of time will surely bring Japan back to her senses and ultimately make her accept the conference proposal. Thus, the principles of the Nine Power Treaty may be upheld.

The second point of my thought relates to China's need of material assistance. After about two years' hard struggle for national existence, China, I believe, is now in a much better position than at any time during that period. The morale of our people as well as our army is excellent; the whole nation is more firmly united than ever; and the strength of our armed forces, in consequence of their recent reorganization and intensive training, is much greater than ever before. I state these facts because I know that, as the most trustworthy friend of China, you are deeply concerned with the outcome of our struggle.

I do not mean to say, however, that we are without serious handicaps. Owing to financial and transportation

difficulties, our army is not yet adequately equipped as it should be. Furthermore, in the event of a European war, new difficulties are bound to arise in the matter of transportation, and any material aid which friendly nations may then be willing to accord to China, will certainly meet with more obstacles in reaching its destination.

Having enjoyed the benefit of America's moral support and financial help in the form of commercial credits, China looks forward with great earnestness to further timely material assistance from the American Government and financiers. Substantial amounts granted at this juncture would be of inestimable value to us in view of Japan's attempt to undermine our currency and economic fabric.

China is traditionally a peace-loving country. Relentless and ceaseless pressure of Japanese aggression in China has forced us to take up arms to resist, for we realize that as long as Japanese aggression persists, no peace consonant with justice and in conformity with the principles of the Nine Power Treaty can be attained. Unless and until such a peace is secured, China is determined to fight on and will never yield or surrender. If material assistance to China by friendly nations can be assured, there will not be the slightest doubt that she can and will curb the ambition of the Japanese militarists. In this way, China will be enabled not only to protect her own territorial and political integrity, and the rights and interests of the Western Powers in China, but also to contribute a large share to the maintenance of international peace and order.

The third point of my thought concerns the European situation in relation to the present conflict in the Far East. The present situation in Europe seems to be very discouraging. Should war break out, involving all the great democratic Powers

in Europe, it is a certainty that Japan would employ all means of coercion and intimidation vis-à-vis Great Britain and France in order to bring about a change of the attitude they have hitherto assumed toward the Sino-Japanese conflict.

In such an eventuality, the attitude and action which the American Government may take, will prove to be the decisive factor in the shaping of future events in the Pacific. The recent transfer of the American fleet to the Pacific demonstrates your great statesmanship and proves that you are fully aware of, and prepared to assume, the responsibilities which will fall upon your great country in the Pacific region when war breaks out in Europe. In that event, I sincerely hope that your country will exercise its best influence on the democratic Powers in Europe so that they may not come to any understanding with the aggressor nations in the Far East, which would be contrary to the spirit of the Nine Power Treaty, detrimental to the rights and interests of China and prejudicial to the successful prosecution of China's war of resistance.

The calling of a conference to settle the present bloody conflict, the enforcement of measures of reprisal against a treaty-breaking Power as a means to an end, the rendering of further assistance to a nation that is fighting for the maintenance of law and order among nations as well as for its own existence, the assuming of more responsibilities in the Pacific region in case of war in Europe, and any other possible methods, short of war, for securing peace are consistent, I suppose, with the laws of the United States and the current opinion of the American people, and may also, I venture to hope, be considered within the bounds of practicability.

I have no doubt that you have been giving serious consideration to the various aspects of these measures. What I feel inclined particularly to emphasize is the importance of the time factor. We have already fought for two years a war of resistance which,

on account of Japan's increasing pressure, political, economic as well as military, is now entering its most critical stage. I therefore cannot refrain from expressing the fervent hope that your Government will take some positive action in dealing with the aggressor and giving further assistance to the defender before the end of the present year. I trust that other signatories of the Nine Power Treaty will not fail to follow your lead.

The attitude and action of the United States, with all her prestige, strength and resources, constitute a factor which Japan, however defiant and desperate she may be, must reckon with. The United States is at present the only country which Japan yet respects and to whose admonitions she cannot refuse to listen. You therefore hold the key to the solution of all Far Eastern problems, and consequently other problems of the world.

Knowing that you are endeavouring to achieve the same end as we are now fighting for, namely, the upholding of the sanctity of treaties and the maintenance of international peace and order, and confidently believing that your great country is China's real friend in time of crisis, I take the liberty of writing you this confidential letter, setting forth unreservedly for your kind consideration my personal views which, I am sure, represent the unanimous sentiment of the Chinese people. Any views which you may express to Dr. Yen in his capacity as my personal representative will be deeply appreciated and will receive my closest attention.

Very sincerely Yours,

(Signed) Chiang Kai-shek.

[Nov. 9, 1939]

My dear General Chiang:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of July 20, 1939, which was delivered to me on November 3 by your distinguished countryman, Dr. W. W. Yen, who was at one time Chinese Minister to the United States.

I greatly appreciate receiving through your letter and through Dr. Yen an expression of your views in regard to various aspects of the situations in the Far East and in Europe. As the situations have changed in important respects since your letter was written, especially by reason of the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, and as Ambassador Johnson called upon you on September 5 and, under instruction, discussed various questions bearing upon those which you mention, I shall not attempt to comment in detail on the views expressed in your letter.

I assure you that, as stated to you by Ambassador Johnson, the fundamental and traditional foreign policy of the United States is unchanged. Our attitude and position in regard to the situation and problems in the Far East have on numerous occasions been made known to various of the other governments concerned.

I have had several pleasant conversations with the present Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih. Officials of the Department of State are at all times accessible to him, and the agreeable relations which he maintains in Washington provide continuous opportunity for helpful exchanges of views in regard to all aspects of the situation in the Far East, which situation continues to receive the closest attention of a number of officials of this Government including myself.

I have greatly enjoyed meeting and talking with Dr. Yen.

Very sincerely yours,

His Excellency
General Chiang Kai-shek,
Chairman, National Defense Council,
Chungking, China.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

FE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 11/7/39

ADDRESSED TO

The President

(TRANSLATION)

Chungking, July 20, 1939.

My dear President Roosevelt:

I wish to thank you, first of all, for your kind letter of April 18 replying to my message of March 25, and to express my deep appreciation for your approval of certain remarks which I had occasion to make in the interests of international order and justice.

I am now sending Dr. W. W. Yen, who served for several years as China's diplomatic representative in the United States, to Washington to see you and, on my behalf, exchange views with you concerning the general situation in the Far East. I have also asked him to bring you this letter in which, with your permission, I am going to set forth my points of view for your consideration.

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Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Chiang Kai-shek.

羅斯福大總統閣下

20372

閣下代表中正與

博士前來華府晉謁

茲特派遺曾任中國駐美使節之顧惠慶
贊許無任銘感。

正曩者為國際秩序與正義所發之言論荷蒙
大札承答中正三月二十五日燕函並特對於中

接奉四月十八日

羅斯福大總統閣下：

態度迄今毫無改變其愚妄之政策該國之不
關於上述第一點日本對於國際公約之

實之援助三歐洲大勢對於遠東全局之影響。
閣下申述所懷一九國公約之維護二對華物

部意茲擬就次列三事向

閣下之考量而期有以教正之。

親遞此函藉申鄙意以供

閣下交換關於遠東大局之意見中正並請其

本年一月四日

期成爲既成事實而使各國無形中默認也。
此項權利與義務必將認爲可以長此漠視，且
與文字對日本之行爲表示不滿，則日本對於
之制裁爲之後盾也。若關係各國僅能以言辭
發約國堅持條約之權利與義務，而以有效
前比京會議之時無異。惟日本之所懼，乃在各
欲尊重其自由發訂之九國公約，實與年餘以

體辦法略陳如下：

為比較有效，可使目前糾紛能迅速終止之具
周密之計劃，無待中正之贅言。姑就鄙意認
閣下對於此類方法，必已先我細加檢討，作有

深信

侵略國政府感覺美國人民集體之情緒。^{『中正}
尚有多種方法，較諸空言強硬而有效，足以使
閣下對貴國國會議員致詞中有云：『除戰爭外，

此種辦法已足使日本之軍閥感覺美國道義
日固自尚有其他更形強硬而有效之武器。惟
特種商港以及其他類似性質之辦法。美國對
如對德國物品之辦法。三、不許日本船隻使用
要物品之輸入。增加日本物品之進口稅率。一
軍用品。而以鋼鐵與煤油為最。二、禁止日本重
次列諸款。一、絕對禁止對日輸出軍用材料與
美國現時所採用之有效武器。必包括

他關係國家之問題。屆時美國當可以九國公
 集體會議之方式，以解決一切有關中國及其
 取對於其本身唯一安全之途徑，而同意於以
 般經濟力之實效，實施之後，必可迫使日本採
 上述辦法，既有削弱日本戰鬪力及其一
 內法所容許者也。

報復手段，固合於國際公法，亦復為貴國國
 與輿論之力量，而不敢繼續漠視，且此種經濟

七
另一種方式促成之。即由美國政府邀請主要
又以會議終止目前糾紛之辦法。或可以
即侵略國家亦終至於接受者也。
手段。此項目的乃切愛好和平國家所企望。
決。故上述報復辦法。實僅為達到目的之一種
自由談判程序。尋求一基於理智與正義之解
平倡導者之地位。召集會議。俾參加各國得以
約簽訂者之資格。或本其舉世公認為世界和

國經過過去兩年為國家生存而努力奮鬥之
至於第二點則為對華物質援助問題。
國公約之原則可以維持於不墮。

理智而終將促其接受會議之辦法。如此則九
縱僅經短期間之執行亦必可使日本恢復
此頑抗之國家實施報復辦法。此種報復辦法。
日本拒絕參加。則美國政府更有充分理由對
關係國家在華威頓或其他地點舉行會議。若

中國軍隊之武器。迄未能達到充足之境地。尙已無嚴重之困難。財源之支絀。運輸之艱阻。使閣下。俾略終所懷者也。但此並非謂中國現時任何時期為優越。此實可告慰於中國至友之而言。最近新編練之軍隊與兵力。亦較二年來氣。現更奮發。全國團結亦愈為鞏固。若舉軍事始以來任何其他時期為穩固。蓋中國國民心士結果。其現時之地位。中正深信已較自戰事開

府與金融界能繼續在物質上予以及時之接濟，
業貸款式之財政援助，現時仍熱望貴國政
閣下與貴國道義與精神上之支持，及以商
中國在以往業經得到
比較今茲為更大。

此種物質欲達到其目的地，其所遭遇之阻力
之困難，屆時縱令各友邦願以物質援助中國
不幸歐戰爆發，中國在運輸上必將遭遇更多

終止以前，決不能獲得一合乎正義與九國
於抗戰之一途。中國人民深悟在日，日本侵略未
橫暴的與不斷的侵略，使中國人民不得不出
量。
中國為傳統的愛好和平之國家。日本之

量款項，則其所發生之效用與影響，將不可計
制與經濟機構之時，貴國倘能及時假以大
與積極之協助。值此日本正力圖破壞中國幣

必能多所貢獻。

對於維持國際秩序與太平洋永久之和平，亦與政治的完整，暨各友邦在遠東之權益，且將野心。如此中國不僅能保衛其本身之領土的民之此種決心，當更能迅速粉碎日本軍閥之閣下復能確允中國以物質之援助，則中國人之時，中國必繼續抗戰，決不止。倘公約原則之和平，但非至此種和平，可以獲得

的決定因素。今年四月，貴國艦隊調返太平洋，態度與行動必成為太平洋上未來局勢形成之在上述情況之下，惟貴國所將採取之逼令英法改其對中日戰爭所持之態度。均將捲入漩渦，日本必用盡其一切威脅手段，焦慮不堪，倘不幸歐戰爆發，歐洲各民主國意所欲申述之第三點。現時歐洲局勢殊令人又歐洲大勢與遠東全局之關係是為部

及中國之權益與九國公約之精神，並妨礙中
 與遠東侵略國之日本成立任何諒解，使有損
 國家，運用其至大之權威，使此等國家不至
 歐戰爆發，中正切望貴國能對歐洲各民主
 上應盡之責任，與肩負此種責任之決心。若果
 閣下充分準備歐戰爆發後，貴國在太平洋
 閣下卓越之政策，與偉大之抱負，並證明
 洋之舉已顯示

貴國在太平洋上擔負較大之任務，以及其他
國公約與遠東和平之目的，歐戰爆發之後，
以積極之援助，使其能繼續抗戰，達到維護九
法與秩序及其本身生存而奮鬥之中國與
法，以為達到目的之手段，二對於因維護國際
法，中日戰爭，而對破壞條約國家，實施報復辦
上，述各節，一，召集集體會議，以解決目前
國之繼續抗戰也。

不惜破釜沉舟，加緊其對華之壓迫，因之中國
戰已歷兩載，邇來敵人對軍事經濟與政治皆
不更贅一言者，乃在時間因素之重要。中國抗
閩下必已先中，正而熟策之矣，惟中正所不能
可見諸實施。凡此種種，竊信
相違背。而按諸實際，亦均已超越理想階段，而
與貴國法律及貴國人民現時之輿論不
除戰爭外，可以招致和平之可能方法，愚意均

不如以重視。蓋貴國在現時。實為日本所惟一
行動。無論日本如何頑強。愚妄。時至今日。決不能
以美國威望之隆。實力之厚。其所採之態度與

以為九國公約其他簽字國之倡是已。
兩事。貴政府能於本年內。採取切實行動。
閣下表示一種懇切之期望。即關於制止日援華
是以願向

抗戰工作。此比時實已跨入最嚴重之階段。中正

閣下所領導之偉大國家復為中國危難中之
之和平是也。而

即擁護條約之尊嚴，維持國際之秩序，與世界
閣下之努力，與中國之抗戰，其目的完全一致。

現時

之樞紐。

閣下實握有解決遠東問題及其他世界問題
畏服之國家，而

中華民國三十八年七月二十日

五

政祺

蔣中正



隆情珍視。明教於無既也。肅此佈臆。並頌
尊見告。知中正之代表。顏惠慶博士。則中正將感謝

公意。初非中正一人之私言。尚承以

閣下之採擇。凡所纓列。實代表我全國人民之

密函陳諸左方。以供

真友。基於此種事實。中正用特不拘形迹。以此

[Nov. 9, 1939]

My dear Dr. Kung:

I have received and I appreciate the kind remarks contained in your letter of August 17, 1939, which was presented by Dr. W. W. Yen with whom I had a pleasant conversation on November 3.

I was gratified to note in your letter the statements of appreciation of the position and attitude of this Government. I need not reaffirm at length that we are giving the closest attention to developments in the Far East and that the attitude and policy of this Government remain unchanged.

With kind personal regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

His Excellency
Dr. H. H. Kung,
President, Executive Yuan,
Chungking, China.

China - 1939

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1939

My dear Mr. President:


In response to your memorandum of November 4, 1939, there is enclosed for your consideration a draft of a letter to General Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the National Defense Council of the Chinese Government, in reply to his letter of July 20, 1939, which was handed to you November 3 by Dr. W. W. Yen, former Chinese Minister to the United States. There is also enclosed a draft of a letter to Dr. H. H. Kung, President of the Executive Yuan of the Chinese Government, in reply to his letter of August 17, 1939, which Dr. Yen also presented to you.

If you approve of the draft letters, I would suggest that upon signature they be returned to this Department for forwarding to General Chiang and Dr. Kung through

The President,
The White House.

through our Embassy at Chungking. The letter from General Chiang and that from Dr. Kung are enclosed herewith.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Cordell Hull".

Enclosures:

1. Draft of letter to General Chiang Kai-shek.
2. Draft of letter to Dr. H. H. Kung.
3. From General Chiang to the President, July 20, 1939, returned.
4. From Dr. H. H. Kung to the President, August 17, 1939, returned.

Copy

November 4, 1939.

Respectfully referred to the Department of
State for preparation of reply.

F.D.R.

The Executive Yuan

PERSONAL

Chungking, China.
August 17, 1939.

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House, Washington, D.C.,
U. S. A.

Dear Mr. President:

I take great pleasure in sending you this message of remembrance and greetings through Dr. W. W. Yen, former Chinese Ambassador to Washington, who is on his way to attend the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference in Victoria as head of the Chinese Delegation.

Allow me to thank you for your esteemed letter received sometime ago through the courtesy of the American Embassy here and for your kind sentiments expressed therein toward the Chinese Government and people. Through Ambassador Johnson I was glad to learn also that you were enjoying good health and giving close and sympathetic consideration to the situation in China.

It is a source of satisfaction to me, as it must be to you also, to note the extension of economic cooperation between our two countries, particularly at the present moment. For your leadership which has made such friendly cooperation possible, I wish to assure you of my hearty appreciation.

I cannot let this opportunity pass without expressing my high admiration of the courageous and statesmanlike step you have recently taken in declaring the abrogation of the American Trade Treaty with Japan. Prompted though it was by the necessity of protecting America's commercial interests, this timely measure was heartily welcomed and appreciated in China, especially as it came at a time when international developments were none too encouraging. I cannot sum up the reaction of the Chinese nation better than to quote Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek who, only a few days before the world knew of your historic move, expressed the following belief: "The power making for justice held in the hands of friendly nations is now in process of gathering energy, and when the fitting moment comes it will make itself felt in a very effective manner. We believe that no friends will abandon or betray us while we ourselves remain sound and upright."

To

The Executive Yuan

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt -- (pp. 2)


17/8/39

To you, Mr. President, I need hardly say that China is in effect fighting the battle of all democratic nations. The oft-recurring incidents in which the Japanese have trampled upon American rights and interests with impunity make me feel indeed sorry that our invaders have, in their undeclared war in this land, brought American rights and interests within the ambit of their lawlessness and aggression. Clearly, for America to help China financially and otherwise in checking the aggressor's ambition is to safeguard the security of America itself. On the other hand, I feel confident that if America should exert the full weight of its economic pressure on Japan, the latter's feet of clay must give way.

I look forward to ever closer friendship and cooperation between our two countries under your illustrious leadership.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,


H. H. Kung

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1939

*file
personal*

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith copy of a cable from Dr. Kung concerning the production of tungsten and tin in China. With it I am sending a map showing the producing centers.

Sincerely yours,

Wm. M. Guthrie Jr.

The President,
The White House.

COPY

Translation from Chinese

December 11, 1939

Cablegram received from Dr. H. H. Kung, Chungking, China

To Mr. K. P. Chen, Washington, D. C.

Telegram December 8th received. Based on present mining and transportation conditions, total production of tungsten is estimated at minimum 10,000 tons for next year. This may possibly reach 12,000 tons if conditions are favorable.

Sometime ago the National Resources Commission appointed the Peking Syndicate, a British firm in China, as selling agents of tungsten abroad. Sales were to be limited to the amount not needed by the Government. Any amount may be reserved by the Government for its disposal.

Next year about 5,500 tons will be required for barter purposes for delivery to Russia; 500 tons earmarked for Great Britain under the British credit arrangement; and 1,000 tons contracted to sell to France for cash. This leaves an estimated balance of about 3,000 tons. All the available balance, if any, may be shipped to the United States for sale.

At present the principal port of shipment is Haiphong. Small quantities can also be shipped from the ports of Kwantung and Chekiang Provinces.

Total annual production of tin is about 10,000 tons, and has been entirely turned over to the Central Government. Inasmuch as Kwoh-Chiu, the producing center of Chinese tin, lies close to the Yunnan- Indo-China Railway, transportation is convenient and regular delivery of tin is assured.

Please convey this information to Secretary Morgenthau.

H. M. O'G -
1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 13, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

Will you speak to me
about this?

F. D. R.

Memo from Lauchlin Currie
to the President re Navy purchases
of tungsten. Also memo from Ray
Spear of the Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts in the Navy Department
in re bids on tungsten ore.

Copy

The Secretary of the Treasury
Washington

December 14, 1939

China
1

My dear Mr. President:


I am sending you herewith copy of a cable
from Dr. Kung concerning the production of tungsten and tin in
China. With it am sending a map showing the producing centers.

Sincerely yours,

H. Morgenthau Jr

The President
The White House

See: Morgenthau folder-Drawer 1-1939



MAP OF HIGHWAYS AND RAILROADS IN SOUTH-WESTERN CHINA

LEGEND:

- HIGHWAY COMPLETED
- - - RAILROAD COMPLETED
- · · INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
- - - PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY AS OF 1913

SCALE: 1:4,000,000

January 6, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CAPT CALLAGHAN

Encloses Memo of Jan 5, 1940 to Chief of Naval Operations

Admiral Stark,

Subject:--Japanese Diplomatic Pressure on France.

Japanese Minister outlined steps that would be necessary for France to take if their relations were to be improved.

See:Jan 6th memo-Navy folder-Drawer 1-1940



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 30, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Reference aide-mémoire handed to you January 27 by the Chinese Ambassador in company with Dr. W. W. Yen, and your query whether there is any need to do anything in reply.

It is our judgment that the aide-mémoire does not call for a reply. The only matters discussed in the aide-mémoire not mentioned in recent communications to you from General Chiang Kai-shek are: (1) the terms reputedly agreed to between Mr. Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese, and (2) General Chiang's request that this Government make known its attitude toward the projected Wang Ching-wei régime. No reply specifically on the question of the first point would seem to be needed. The question whether this Government should make some sort of declaration in regard to the projected Wang régime is being given careful study in the Department. It is believed that while a statement by the President would not seem to be called for, a statement by the Secretary of State, perhaps in the form of a formal reservation of rights, may probably be found advisable some time in the course of the development of
this

this situation. The Department will continue to give careful attention to this matter.

The original of the aide-mémoire and the text of the reputed agreement of December 30, 1939, between Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese are returned herewith.

Enclosures:

1. Aide-mémoire,
January 26, 1940.
2. Text of reputed
agreement of
December 30, 1939.

CH

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

FE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 1/29/40

ADDRESSED TO

The President

AIDE-MEMOIRE

1. General Chiang Kai-shek acknowledges the receipt of the letter of the President of the United States, dated November 9, 1939, and the telegram of the President, transmitted by the American Embassy, in reply to his telegram of December 19, 1939, and thanks the President for the same.

2. General Chiang feels deeply grateful to the President for persuading sometime ago the Premier of the French Republic to maintain an attitude of consistent and continuous assistance to China with regard to transportation facilities over Indo-China, and is happy to inform the President that conditions have now somewhat improved.

3. General Chiang hopes that the President will, after the expiration of the American-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911, use his best efforts to curb Japanese aggression and render all assistance possible to China, as General Chiang had intimated in his letter brought in person to the President by Dr. W. W. Yen. General Chiang also hopes that, especially as China's finances will meet with increasing difficulties with the approach of February, the President will see his way to render immediate financial assistance to China.

4. General Chiang wishes to inform the President that the text of the secret treaty entered into by Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese, as published in Hongkong on January 22, is strongly supported by external evidence and, as far as his knowledge goes, is absolutely authentic.

5. With

5. With the publication of the Wang-Japanese secret agreement, General Chiang earnestly hopes that the United States Government, or the President himself, will in one form or another make known publicly and solemnly the attitude of the United States, as hitherto consistently maintained, as regards this matter and the proposed new puppet government which Japanese machinations have been busily engaged in making. In General Chiang's opinion, such a declaration will not only raise the morale of the Chinese people, soldiers and civilians alike, but will also serve as a great blow to Japanese militarist ambitions, thereby contributing in no small degree to the benefit of Chinese resistance and the general situation in the Far East.

Washington, January 26, 1940

TEXT OF A TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CHUNGKING

January 23, 1940

The full text of the agreement signed on December 30, 1939, between Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese revealed by Kao Tsung-wu and Tao Hsi-sheng:

Fundamental points for readjustment of the new Sino-Japanese relations:

- (1) The Governments of Japan and China, in accordance with the principles prescribed in Annex One, readjust the new relations between the two countries.
- (2) The Chinese Government recognizing the existing facts accomplished during the incident and prior to the restoration of peace between contracting parties gradually readjust on the basis laid down in the above Article their relations so far as permitted by circumstances.
- (3) The Chinese Government shall recognize the continuance of special state of affairs given rise to by forces of circumstances during the incident.
- (4) The said special state of affairs is to be progressively adjusted according to the principles for readjustment of the new Sino-Japanese relations and in concordance with changing events and general settlement of the incident.
- (5) As to the execution of the two aforementioned Articles the ways and means are to be decided upon separately.

I

The principles for readjustment of the new Sino-Japanese relations with a view to attaining common goal of establishing peace and new order in the Far East, Japan, China and Manchukuo shall maintain among themselves neighborly relations and close cooperation. The basic principles, therefore, are as follows:

- (a) To establish on basis of reciprocity general cooperation between Japan, China and Manchukuo, especially friendly relations common front against Communism and economic collaboration.
- (b) To establish a zone of strongest Sino-Japanese solidarity in North China and Mongolia with regard to national defense and economic development. For the reason of checking the spread of Communism, Mongolia shall be designated as an area where Japanese paramount position both militarily and politically shall especially be established.
- (c) To establish a zone of strongest Sino-Japanese economic solidarity in Lower Yangtze Valley.
- (d) To establish Japanese paramount position in certain designated islands along the sea coast of South China.
- (e) As for the details for the execution of the foregoing Articles the contracting parties agree to

take

take as basis the principles embodied in II

II

The main items for the readjustment of the new Sino-Japanese relations.

A. Regarding the principle of Friendly and neighborly relations. In order to affirm their respect for intrinsic intimacy of their relationship to achieve general and harmonious cooperation to safeguard peace in the Far East and to prove their neighborliness by concrete facts, Japan, China and Manchukuo shall seek for ways and means to establish a solid block among themselves through mutual assistance and promotion of friendly relations.

- (1) China shall recognize the Empire of Manchukuo. Japan and Manchukuo shall respect the territory and sovereignty of China. Japan, China and Manchukuo shall establish their new relation.
- (2) Japan, China and Manchukuo shall abandon all those acts and causes relating to politics, diplomacy, education, propaganda, trade and so forth that are detrimental to mutual friendship. Such acts and causes shall also be prohibited once for all in future.
- (3) Japan, China and Manchukuo shall hereafter conduct their diplomacy on basis of mutual cooperation. In their relations with third Powers they shall not act contrary to such basic principle.
- (4) Japan, China and Manchukuo shall cooperate to amalgamate, create and develop their culture.
- (5) Japan is to appoint necessary advisers to new Central Government to participate in its work of reconstruction. In those organizations located in zones where strongest Sino-Japanese solidarity is to be maintained and other specially designated areas, Japanese advisers and staff members are to be placed.
- (6) Following progressive and concrete realization of neighborly relationship between Japan, China and Manchukuo, Japan will accordingly give consideration for restoration of concessions and abolition of extraterritoriality.

B. Regarding the principle of mutual defense. Japan, China and Manchukuo shall cooperate in checking the spread of Communism and in maintaining common peace and order.

- (1) Japan, China and Manchukuo shall undertake to weed out in their respective territories Communists and Communist organizations. They shall also cooperate and mutually assist in Anti-Communist propaganda and intelligence work and other related matters.
- (2) Japan and China shall jointly execute their Anti-Communist program. In order to attain this aim Japan shall station necessary troops at strategic points in North China and Mongolia.
- (3) Separate Anti-Communist Alliance shall be concluded.

- (4) According to actual situation either in whole or in part those troops stationed outside of areas designated in article two shall be withdrawn as rapidly as warranted by circumstances. But all Japanese troops now stationed in North China and the lower Yangtze Valley shall remain until peace and order are firmly reestablished.
 - (5) In order to jointly maintain peace and order, China shall concede Japan the right to station troops and warships at certain specially designated points along the Yangtze Valley and in certain specially designated islands along the sea coast of South China.
 - (6) Japan reserved for herself the right to claim and supervise for military purposes those rail-ways, air lines, postal and telegraphic services, important harbors, and water routes in those areas garrisoned by Japanese troops.
 - (7) The Chinese police, Army and other armed forces and their equipments and military establishments within the areas garrisoned by Japanese troops should be reduced temporarily to minimum requirement for internal order and national defense. Japan will participate in China's efforts to organize her army and police through appointment of advisers and training officers and supply of arms and munitions.
- C. Regarding the principle for economic cooperation. To prove their solidarity of interest and determination for mutual defense by concrete facts and to make up their mutual deficiencies, Japan, China and Manchukuo agree to adopt the guiding principle of reciprocity in developing their industries and promoting their economic welfare.
- (1) To put the afore-mentioned principle as well as the following stipulations into practice, Japan, China and Manchukuo shall conclude necessary agreements with regard to the development of resources, customs, revenues, trade, aviation, communications, postal and telegraphic services, astronomical and general surveys, and so forth.
 - (2) In view of economic solidarity and common defense, China shall grant Japan special privileges and facilities to develop and utilize resources especially those underground resources in North China and Mongolia. Again in view of same economic solidarity, Japan should have necessary facilities for development and utilization of specially designated resources even in areas outside of North China and Mongolia.
 - (3) In all other industries, Japan will accord China necessary aid for their development. With regard to agriculture, Japan will assist China in its improvement so as to increase its production and stabilize the livelihood of the people.
 - (4) Japan will accord China necessary aid for formulation of China's financial and economic policy.
 - (5) With regard to trade, China shall adopt appropriate tariff rates and customs system to promote commerce in general between Japan, China and Manchukuo.

At the

At the same time, China shall facilitate and rationalize supply and demand of raw materials between Japan, China and Manchukuo especially with reference to North China.

- (6) With regard to the development of China's communications, postal and telegraphic services, astronomical and general surveys, Japan will lend China the necessary assistance and even active participation. The development of Aviation in whole China, railroads in North China (including Lunghai Line), ocean transportation between Japan and China and that along the Chinese coast, river transportation in the Yangtze, and postal and telegraphic services in North China and the lower Yangtze Valley should be the main items for Japanese active participation in the field of communications.
- (7) Japan and China shall cooperate in reconstructing New Shanghai.

Articles Attached:

- (1) The New Central Government shall indemnify those Japanese nationals who have sustained in China losses in rights and privileges since the beginning of the China incident.
- (2) Prior to the establishment of the new relations between Japan and China the New Central Government shall confidentially consult Japan with regard to all important matters affecting Japan.

Additional stipulations regarding the fundamental points for the readjustment of the new Sino-Japanese relations:

A. The main provisions regarding the readjustment of relations with provisional government:

- (1) The term "North China" herein employed is intended to designate in general the Hopei, Shansi and Shantung Provinces situated south of The Great Wall (The Great Wall itself is not included) and that part of the Honan Province lying north of the old course of the Yellow River.
- (2) In view of special character of North China, in that it is the zone where absolute solidarity between Japan, China and Manchukuo exists, especially with reference to national defense and economic development, and in accordance with the principles laid down for the readjustment of the new Sino-Japanese relation, the Political Council of North China shall be established for the purpose of settling locally those matters vis-a-vis Japan and Manchukuo.
- (3) The matters regarding authority and organization of the said Political Council in North China shall be discussed and determined in the Central Political Council. *such matters shall be taken up for agreement between Wang Ching-wei and Wang Koh-ming.
- (4) The Authority and organization of the Political Council of North China shall be fixed in such a way as to enable it to accomplish concretely the following tasks when new Sino-Japanese relations have been normalized. Even prior to that time, however, efforts shall be made to bring about the progressively

desired.

*prior, however, to the establishment of the Central Political Council.

desired objective. The name of Provisional Government shall be abolished. The Political Council of North China should temporarily permit the continued existence of those accomplished facts in order to effect smooth transfer of political authority so that the people will not suffer from sudden change.

1. Regarding common defense especially Japanese participation in checking Communism and maintaining order:
 - a. Relating to the settlement of matters connected with the stationing of Japanese troops;
 - b. Relating to the settlement of matters connected with Japanese participation in checking Communism and maintaining order;
 - c. Relating to the settlement of matters connected with military cooperation between Japan and China.
2. Regarding economic cooperation especially the development and utilization of underground resources and supply and demand of raw materials and commodities between Japan, China, Manchukuo and North China:
 - a. Relating to the settlement of matters raised by the problem of according Japan necessary special facilities in developing and utilizing underground resources;
 - b. Relating to the settlement of matters raised by the problem of rationalization of supply and demand of raw materials and commodities between Japan, Manchukuo, Mongolia and North China;
 - c. Relating to the settlement of matters connected with Japanese participation in regulation of currency and exchange between Japan, Manchukuo, Mongolia and North China;
 - d. Relating to the settlement of matters connected with Sino-Japanese cooperation in aviation, railway transportation, postal and telegraphic services, and ocean transportation along main trade route.
3. Regarding the settlement of matters connected with the employment of Japanese advisers and staff members.
4. During the period when there is need for perpetuation of Federal Reserve Bank system and other systems therewith connected, the Central Government shall lend to it necessary assistance.
5. The temporary regulations governing the main matters of division of powers between the Political Council of North China and the New Central Government:
 - a. In order to defray necessary expenses and safeguard necessary income, the Political Council of North China shall be temporarily

entitled

entitled to certain stipulated amount of surplus of customs revenues and of salt tax and entire yields from consolidated tax, though the said revenues and taxes are, in principle, the sources of income for the Central Government; the power of supervision over the above-mentioned national taxes shall be entrusted by the New Central Government to the Political Council of North China;

- b. The Political Council of North China shall be given the right to float loans within certain limits;
 - c. The Government properties shall belong to the Political Council of North China as they do at present, but new arrangements regarding these properties shall be made gradually;
 - d. The customs, postal service and aviation should eventually be placed under the control of the New Central Government, but the change of the present state of affairs shall be effected progressively;
 - e. The administration and the management of transportation on the Lunghai Railway shall be placed under the Political Council of North China;
 - f. Excepting officials of Ministerial rank, the authority for appointing all its officials shall be given to the Political Council of North China;
 - g. Diplomatic negotiations with third Powers shall be conducted by the Central Government. Negotiations for the settlement of local affairs with Japan and Manchukuo shall, however, be undertaken by the Political Council of North China.
- B. Main provisions regarding the readjustment of relations with the Reformed Government.

- (1) Though the Reformed Government should be induced to amalgamate eventually with the Central Government, its stand shall be respected so that it can remain stable and discharge of duties prior to the establishment of the New Central Government.
- (2) Though the establishment of the Political Council after the inauguration of the New Central Government,* the prestige and standing of important members of the latter organization should be given full consideration by Wang Ching-wei.
- (3) After the establishment of the New Central Government and dissolution of the Reformed Government, the former shall temporarily permit the continued existence of the accomplished facts so that the transfer of the political authority will be smoothly made and the people will not suffer from the sudden change.
- (4) In the area of the lower Yangtze Valley where the strongest Sino-Japanese economic solidarity is to be realized, Japan's special demands are as follows:

1.

* cer. be spared by virtue of the New Central Government,

1. Regarding New Shanghai:
 - a. Relating to matters connected with Japanese participation in reconstructing a New Shanghai;
 - b. Relating to the settlement of matters connected with the stationing of Japanese troops in New Shanghai;
 - c. Relating to matters connected with Japanese participation in establishing and improving aviation, important ocean transportation, and postal and telegraphic services;
 - d. Relating to the settlement of matters connected with Japanese participation in other enterprises in New Shanghai.
 2. In order to expedite realization of the above - mentioned Japanese demands, necessary arrangements for establishing Sino-Japanese economic consultative organization and the like should be planned and put into effect.
- C. Main provision regarding the readjustment of relations with the United Autonomous Government of Mongolia.
- (1) The term "Mongolia" herein employed is intended to designate in general the territory north of the Inner Great Wall (The Inner Great Wall itself is included).
 - (2) In view of the special character of Mongolia in that it is the zone where the strongest solidarity between Japan, China and Manchukuo in matters relating to national defense and economic development exists and in the fields outside of diplomacy (negotiations with Japan and Manchukuo to be excepted), such as administration, legislation, jurisdiction, military affairs, and negotiations with Outer Mongolia, The Central Government shall recognize that Mongolia should possess broad autonomous powers and should form highly Anti-Communist autonomous area on the basis of the accomplished facts.
 - (3) In order to establish the relationship between the United Autonomous Mongolian Government and the Central Government prior to the convocation of the Central Political Council, the following items shall be agreed upon in written documents between Weng Ching-wei or his representative and Prince Teh or his representative in conference:
 - a. The Central Government recognizes the fact of the United Autonomous Mongolian Government's being highly Anti-Communist and autonomous.
 - b. Relating to the adjustment of the relations between the two regimes, separate agreement shall be made after the establishment of the New Central Government with the present understanding as a basis.
 - (4) After the above-mentioned understanding is made the United Autonomous Mongolian Government shall despatch delegates to participate in the Central Political Council.

(5) In the Central Political Council no discussion shall be allowed on matters lying outside of the scope prescribed by the understanding embodied in Article three.

- D. Regarding Amoy. Wang Ching-wei shall recognize the fact that Amoy is a special administrative area.
- E. Regarding the specially designated islands along the sea coast of South China. Among the specially designated islands along the sea coast of South China, the Hainan Island shall be given a local administrative organization (including departments for military affairs) placed directly under the control of the New Central Government. In view of the paramount position that Japan enjoys in that island the said political organization shall be empowered to dispose of the following matters raised by Japanese demands:
- (1) Those connected with the stationing of Japanese troops;
 - (3) Those connected with the development and utilization of specially designated resources indispensable for national defense;
 - (2) Those connected with the Sino-Japanese co-operation in military affairs and in the maintenance of order;
 - (4) Those connected with aviation, postal and telegraph services, and ocean transportation.

The above-mentioned governing principle will be applied to our demands which should be agreed upon later between Japan and China and also to matters connected with China's internal affairs that should be regulated by herself.

The Chinese Embassy,
Washington, D. C.



In reply refer to
PR 893.51/7048

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 15, 1940

My dear Miss LeHand:

I am enclosing for the information of the President a copy of a note dated March 11, 1940, which the Secretary received from the Chinese Ambassador, requesting that the telegraphic message from General Chiang Kai-shek quoted therein be transmitted to the President.

In as much as the Ambassador has been informed that General Chiang's message has been transmitted to the President, it is believed that there is no need for further action.

Sincerely yours,

L. J. Jamieson
Chief of Protocol

Enclosure:
From the Chinese
Ambassador, March 11.

Miss Marguerite A. LeHand,
Private Secretary to the President,
The White House.

Department of State

PR

BUREAU }
DIVISION }

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted -----

ADDRESSED TO

Miss LeHand

CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1940.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have the honor to inform you that I have received from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek the following telegraphic message, dated Chungking, March 9, 1940, for transmission to the President of the United States:

To the Chinese Government and people who are fighting in resistance to aggression, the newly announced Export-Import Bank credit will mean not only fresh material assistance, but also new moral encouragement. All this has been made possible only by your leadership and direction. Please accept my sincere expression of appreciation and gratitude.

I shall be greatly obliged if you will be good enough to transmit the above message to the President.

I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

HU SHIH

Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State.

Published in Foreign Relations of
the U.S., 1940, Vol. IV - The Far East,
pp. 656-657.

7/18/56 RLJ

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

shown
✓
June 1, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.

CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

5-28-40

TELEGRAM TO
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK
CHUNGKING, MAY 17, 1940.

The Chinese Government and people, in their bitter struggle against aggression and lawlessness in international life, deeply appreciate the valuable friendship and assistance which the American Government has shown them in the past.

Japan's military advance having been bogged down, her undeclared war on China has developed into primarily an economic warfare. Recently the strain on our currency has been aggravated by the announcement of the possible creation of a puppet bank of issue at Shanghai and by the worsening of the European situation, resulting in unprecedented rise of prices and fall of exchange. Unless our exchange resources are strengthened, deterioration of conditions would continue to the further disturbance of trade, while the collapse of our currency would inevitably discriminate against American economic interests. The recent spontaneous appeal of the American Information Committee at Shanghai, urging your Government to extend loan for the support of Chinese currency, was undoubtedly prompted by the conviction that Japan's renewed attack on Chinese currency is seriously detrimental to American trade.

To meet the present situation the Chinese Government has taken action to curtail all postponable expenditures and reserve internal credit, and to carry out internal policies designed to help upholding the value of the currency.

The Chinese

The Chinese Government has also augmented the stabilization fund, chiefly from the resources of Chinese banks, but also with a contribution from a British bank.

While these measures should permit the tiding over of immediate difficulties, China needs further cash resources to cope with possible developments after the present funds are exhausted and to slow down the rate of deterioration.

I therefore earnestly hope that the American Government under your illustrious leadership can at this strategic time see its way clear to broaden the scope of financial assistance to China by taking into consideration the possibility of supporting the Chinese currency by a cash loan or by other effective means which your financial experts may suggest.

I trust that you, Mr. President, will not hesitate to help our national cause to the fullest extent, particularly at a time when our staunch struggle is approaching the decisive stage of success or failure. If, as I hope, you are favorably disposed to these proposals in principle, I shall be glad to appoint a representative for the negotiation of detailed arrangements.

The Chinese Embassy,

Washington, May 28, 1940.

China

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In view of this apparently indiscriminate bombing of Chungking without reference to military objectives, should we call it to the attention of the Japanese Government?

F. D. R.

Dispatch from Johnson in Chungking in re Japanese planes bombing Chungking.



*file
personal*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Before your memorandum of June 13 in regard to the apparently indiscriminate bombing of Chungking was brought to my attention, I issued to the press a statement on this subject, a copy of which is enclosed for convenience of reference. In the light of your memorandum, I am also telegraphing Ambassador Grew at Tokyo to bring that statement to the personal attention of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Hee

Enclosure:
Press release,
June 13, 1940.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

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ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted.....

ADDRESSED TO

The President.....

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

JUNE 13, 1940
No. 287

In response to inquiries from correspondents in regard to reports of the bombing of Chungking yesterday, the Secretary of State said that according to information which has reached the Department from official and unofficial sources, Chungking has been extensively bombed on each of several recent days and yesterday was intensively and indiscriminately bombed by more than one hundred Japanese planes; that yesterday's casualties among the civil populace will probably number several hundred; that various buildings of the American Methodist Mission, including a church, were damaged by concussion; and that two groups of Japanese planes flew over the American Embassy premises but no bombs fell in the immediate vicinity of the Embassy. The Secretary added that the attitude and the position of the people and the Government of the United States toward ruthless bombings of civilian populations have been made abundantly and frequently clear, and that we wholeheartedly condemn such practices wherever and whenever they occur.

Chungking, June 14, 1940

Dear Mr. President,

World events are transpiring with such violence and rapidity that more than ever I feel impelled to seek your counsel and assistance. Being unable to come to Washington personally I am requesting Mr. T. V. Soong, with whom you are already well acquainted, to come in my stead.

I have given Mr. Soong full authority to discuss and negotiate on behalf of the Chinese Government. Needless to say, he has my entire confidence and may discuss with you matters which I would entrust to no other person. He has full knowledge of our internal situation, and of our relations with foreign Governments, and I beg you to accord him the same kind consideration as you would to me personally.

With kindest regards, I am

Yours faithfully,

Chieng Kai-shek

His Excellency

President Franklin D. Roosevelt

Present

蔣中正

His Excellency

President Franklin D. Roosevelt

Present

Kindness of

Mr. T. V. Soong



*File
Personal
Confidential*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 11, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

It is believed that you will be interested in an excerpt from a report of September 7, 1940, received by mail from the American Consulate at Rangoon, as follows:

"The Burma-Yunnan highway has been in much better condition during the rainy season this year than it was last year. Although the surface of the road is very rough, and landslides and washouts have caused temporary delays, the road has remained open throughout the rainy season, and it is understood that the highway has been open to traffic from Lashio all the way to Yunnanfu."

Faithfully yours,

The President,
The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 22, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I have a hunch that we ought to do something in regard to the Chinese loan quickly or not at all -- because I have real fear that the domestic situation in free China will deteriorate unless we do something fast. Will you work on this?

F. D. R.

China
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THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE LIBRARIAN

November 20, 1940

Dear Missy:

I hope you won't think this is a ride around Haines Point, but I have something so heavily on my mind that I must say four words about it. You will decide, of course, whether you think it belongs in the waste basket.

I have word from Dr. T. V. Soong that he received yesterday morning a cable from China indicating that the domestic situation in free China is deteriorating very rapidly and that the necessity for the loan which the Chinese Government has requested is critical. Obviously I know little or nothing about the loan, itself, except that it has been discussed. It is, however, my impression that the application has had sympathetic attention everywhere but that no one either in the Treasury or in the Export-Import Bank or any other agency possibly involved has been willing or able to see the thing through. If we should fail to do in time what we have every intention of doing sometime, it would be a very sad thing.

I repeat that I know nothing about the negotiations for the loan but I do feel that Dr. Soong's report should be made available in case it is of importance.

It was lovely seeing you.

Faithfully yours,

Archibald
Archibald MacLeish

Miss Marguerite Le Hand
The Personal Secretary
The White House
Washington, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
PR 811.001 Roosevelt, F.D./6757

November 23, 1940

My dear General Watson:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a note dated November 7, 1940 from the Chinese Embassy at Washington, together with a translation of a telegram enclosed therewith addressed to the President by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. There is also enclosed a copy of the Department's reply to the Embassy and a copy of a telegram sent to the American Embassy in Chungking requesting that the message quoted therein be transmitted to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on behalf of the President.

Sincerely yours,

George T. Summerlin
George T. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol

Enclosures:
Copies of four communications.

Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

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ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 11/20/40

ADDRESSED TO

General Watson

CHINESE EMBASSY

WASHINGTON

November 7, 1940

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I beg to enclose herewith a telegram, with English translation, addressed to President Roosevelt by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek congratulating the President on the occasion of his reelection.

I shall be greatly obliged if you will be so kind as to transmit the message to its high destination.

I wish to take this opportunity to join in the sentiments expressed by the Generalissimo.

I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

For the Ambassador:

Liu Chieh

Enclosures:
Telegram from Chungking,
November 6, 1940
Translation of telegram

Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State

TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM
CHUNGKING, NOVEMBER 6, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

It is with the greatest gratification that I learn of your reelection for a third term as President of the United States. This is good tidings for the cause of human justice and world peace. Not only the American Government and people are to be congratulated for the able leadership they have found in you, but their rejoicings are shared by all those nations who love freedom and are striving to defend themselves. I wish to offer you my sincerest congratulations.

Chiang Kai-shek

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM SENT

GRAY

November 15, 1940

8 p.m.

AMEMBASSY

CHUNGKING (CHINA) VIA NAVAL RADIO

190.

The following telegram addressed to the President by General Chiang Kai-shek has been received from the Chinese Embassy:

QUOTE It is with the greatest gratification that I learn of your reelection for a third term as President of the United States. This is good tidings for the cause of human justice and world peace. Not only the American Government and people are to be congratulated for the able leadership they have found in you, but their rejoicings are shared by all those nations who love freedom and are striving to defend themselves. I wish to offer you my sincerest congratulations. UNQUOTE.

Please transmit to General Chiang Kai-shek in reply a message from the President, as follows:

QUOTE I greatly appreciate the congratulatory message which you were so kind as to send. Your good wishes are most heartening both as a personal expression and as renewed indication of the friendship which has traditionally existed between the American and the Chinese peoples. UNQUOTE.

WELLES
ACTING

811.001 Roosevelt, F.D./6757

PR:HCS:GLG/HES

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1940

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

With reference to the Embassy's note of November 7, 1940, enclosing a telegram addressed to the President by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, congratulating the President upon his re-election to the Presidency of the United States, I have been pleased to transmit the telegram to the President.

The Department is transmitting the President's message of acknowledgment through the American Ambassador at Chungking.

Sincerely yours,

George T. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol

His Excellency

Dr. Hu Shih,

Chinese Ambassador.

811.001 Roosevelt, F.D./6757

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U. S. A.

—
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

*File
Personal
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December 20, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is enclosed, for your information, a copy of a note from the Chinese Ambassador dated December 16, 1940, together with a copy of its enclosure, a translation of a telegram to me from General Chiang Kai-shek in which General Chiang, inter alia, extends to you an expression of his gratitude for the recent action of this Government in announcing loans to China.

I am asking Dr. Hu Shih to convey to General Chiang our appreciation of his message, and I believe that no further action in regard thereto is needed.

Enclosure:
From Dr. Hu Shih,
December 16, 1940,
with enclosure.

C.H.

CHINESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

December 16, 1940

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I take pleasure in forwarding herewith a telegram from General Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Executive Yuan, under date of December 12th, in which he expressed his appreciation to you personally in connection with the loans recently announced by the President.

I wish to join in the sentiments expressed in the General's telegram.

I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

HU SHIH

Enclosure:
Telegram

Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State

TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM TO HONORABLE CORDELL HULL FROM
GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK, CHUNGKING, DECEMBER 12, 1940.

I feel deeply grateful for the practical measures which President Roosevelt and yourself have adopted in order, on the one hand to aid China, and on the other, to suppress the aggressor. The loans recently announced in Washington is another evidence of the readiness on the part of the United States to sustain China in her struggles for complete national independence. Every further step which the United States takes in regard to the Far Eastern situation tends to increase the sense of gratitude of the Chinese people towards the United States, and at the same time strengthens their determination to fight on till final victory is won.

I wish to take this opportunity to express to you my sincerest thanks.