

MR 300 CHINA-BURMA-INDIA -- Sec. A-1 -- WARFARE

MR 300 CHINA-BURMA-INDIA -- Sec. A-1 -- WARFARE

May 1942 thru December 1943

May 1942 thru Dec. 1943

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Map Room
Box 80

~~SECRET~~ *BR*
26 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES:

Subject: Shinohiku Mission, Formosa

1. 14 B-25's, 7 P-51's, and 8 P-38's attacked Shinohiku airdrome on Formosa at 1215 hours, 25 November. P-38's leading caught 9 enemy planes in landing pattern and 4 near field. B-25's following released 166 x 120 lb. frag clusters hitting plane area, hangars and shop buildings east side of field. 3 B-25's strafed barracks area after bombing run. P-51's followed bombers and strafed field thoroughly. Score as follows:

P-51's:	4 Sallys burned 2 Sallys probable and 3 Sallys damaged on ground 10 Oscars confirmed destroyed in air
P-38's:	6 Sallys destroyed in air 8 Sallys destroyed on ground 3 Nates destroyed in air 1 Stuker JU-87 dive bomber destroyed in air 2 J-52 type transports destroyed in air 2 Oscars destroyed, one in air and one on ground
B-25 Gunner:	1 Oscar destroyed in air
<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>37 destroyed, 2 probable and 3 damaged.</u>

Encountered machine gun and small arms fire over target. No AA encountered. Only 2 or 3 minutes warning if any. All planes returned safely.

2. Photographic reconnaissance of Shinohiku airdrome at 1220 hours: 41 large planes visible, 16 of which are afire. Large explosion south end of field; black smoke over apron and field prevented full damage appraisal.

3. These aircraft probably staged through Suichwan or possibly Kienow. Suichwan is approximately 425 miles from Shinohiku and Kienow 225.

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 8-8-78

DEC 1 1972

~~SECRET~~
CLAYTON BISSILL,
Major General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

300 C.D.I.
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SM
~~SECURITY
CONTROL~~

SECURITY CONTROL

Joint Chiefs of Staff

November 19, 1943

CG
ORAN ALGERIA

Number 579

(For the Joint War Plans Committee from the Home Team)

For Lt Col Frank McCarthy for delivery to Shawl from Sexton
my number 34

Further study of J. P. S. 320 permits preliminary
statement of strategical implications as follows: Part 1
enemy reactions.

(1). Japanese will guess our intentions within 2 weeks
after commencement of large scale construction at Calcutta
and Chengtu and Chengtu will become increasingly important
to them as the work progresses.

(2). The Japanese capabilities of interfering with our
bases in India are very slight beyond air attacks against
which we can develop effective counter measures.

(3). The Japanese will be unable to interfere seriously
with our ferrying operations between Calcutta and Chengtu.

(4). The Japanese can launch air attacks against Chengtu
and paratroop or air sustained long range penetration group
types of attack for destruction purposes.

(5). Ground advances can and will probably be made to
provide airfields closer to Chengtu. The nearest Jap Airfields
to Chengtu are now 4 to 5 hundred miles away.

(6). The missions from Chengtu to the objectives are
subject to interception from a point about 800 miles from the
target both going and returning. The intensity of interception
will increase with each mission the 1st mission suffering
relatively little.

(7). Japanese antiaircraft will be increasingly intense
with each mission but will never approach the intensity now
being met over Europe.

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CM-OUT-7503 (19 Nov 43)

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Number 579

November 19, 1943

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~~SECURITY
CONTROL~~

Part II--Targets from Chengtu.

Based on each mission accomplishing proper proportion of the total destruction the bombing during 1st 5 months will destroy the 20% cushion of coke capacity available to Japan and during succeeding 4 months will destroy 50% of the remaining available. Total destruction of coke capacity within bombing range would be accomplished in 14 months by total of 3,000 sorties. By December 1944 50% of steel output would be effected and by June 1945 slight steel stringency would be felt. By December 1945 results would be strongly felt and in 1946 would definitely injure Japanese capacity to wage war. Enemy capability to camouflage or cover ovens by smoke not considered. Additional targets of significance in the Japanese homeland may be reached from Chengtu with reduced bomb load. Accurate assessment of results which can be expected from effort directed against these targets has not been completed.

Part III--Targets from Other Bases.

From bases at Calcutta, Ceylon, Northwest, and Northern Australia relatively free from Japanese interdiction and accessible to waterborne transportation only slight long term economic damage can be inflicted, but continuous neutralization of the many available targets would force enemy to expend economic development of inner sphere, build refineries, and place the additional burden of transporting crude oil from N. E. I. to home refineries on the reduced tanker fleet.

Part IV--Strategic Implications

(1). J. I. C. states that our lack of information on the effectiveness of Chinese Forces will require U S Antiaircraft and combat ground troops at Chengtu for protection against Japanese air attacks and destruction raids. The theater commander has stated that he can defend the area with Chinese Forces and 2 additional fighter groups.

(2). The destruction of the coke industry is a very long range project and under favorable circumstances will not seriously affect the Japanese War Effort until early 1946.

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~~SECURITY
CONTROL~~

(3). Other targets in the Japanese homeland can undoubtedly be reached from Chengtu but examination has not been completed on the effect of their destruction on the Japanese War Effort.

(4). A short term plan for the defeat of Japan will not be materially assisted by the strategic bombing of the coke industry as envisaged in the proposed plan.

(5). Diversion of effort to implement the bombing of Chengtu will reduce the effort that can be brought to bear against the enemy in other areas.

Conclusions will follow in a separate message.

ORIGINATOR: JC/S (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: GEN HANDY
SGS

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CM-OUT-7503 (19 Nov 43) 0329Z mlc

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

WDCC
29 Oct
1241Z

JCYG A 38
29/0530Z
lmm

P R I O R I T Y

From: New Delhi
To: AGWAR
Chungking

No. AG 2524 AMMDEL
No. AN 1925 AMMDEL

29 October 1943

For Marshall reurad 3844 info AMMISCA from Stilwell

Barest necessities for initial equipment for 1 Y Chinese Division is 250 tons. Rock bottom monthly maintenance including ammunition is 320 tons. Total initial equipment for 10 Y divisions will require 2500 over HUMP tons. Monthly maintenance for 10 Y divisions will amount to 3200 tons monthly. Tonnage for 14th Air Force and other U S Forces in China will require monthly average of 6300 tons due to increases to Air Force in China. Chinese arsenal raw materials 500 tons monthly. Therefore, we are confronted with a total monthly over the HUMP tonnage of 10000 just to keep heads above water. No provision is made for reserves, contingencies and unpredictable factors which are bound to occur or the tonnage required to complete initial equipment of a minimum of 10 divisions (note that equipment for 30 divisions has been promised). SEAC is now wrestling with this tonnage problem in connection with the overall operation picture. Auchinleck does what SEAC directs. Mountbatten should have his recommended minimum ready in a few days.

No Sig.

3844 is CM-OUT-11173 (25 Oct 43) OPD

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98D Letter, 8-3-72

ACTION: OPD
INFORMATION: GEN. ARNOLD
GEN. SOMERVELL
CofS

DEC 1 1972

CM-IN-17607 (29 Oct 43) 1658Z cng

300 China Burma India ~~SECRET~~

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA CHUNGKING		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
RELEASED BY		VCNO	PRIORITY
DATE 5 OCT 1943			ROUTINE
FOR CODEROOM 2112/4			DEFERRED
DECODED BY HATCH/SHUGG			
PARAPHRASED BY KIRKBRIDE			PRIORITY
ROUTED BY KNIGHT			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

41715

NOV 6433

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT 20

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(ACTION VCNO)

COMMENCING 28 SEPTEMBER 6 PROXIED DRIVE INITIATED BY
 UNITS FROM 4 JAP DIVISIONS STATIONED ALONG HANGCHOW
 SHANGHAI WAHU RAILWAYS OPENED AGAINST GUERRILLAS AND 2
 CHINESE DIVISIONS SOUTHWEST OF TTIJZBJKE. KWANGTEH
 BELIEVED OBJECTIVE BUT DRIVE PROBABLY INTENDED TO
 DIVERT ATTENTION FROM CAMPAIGN TO CONTROL CHEKING
 NORTH FUKIEN AIRFIELDS. RATED: B 2.
 JAP RECEIVES 10,000 EACH IN HANGCHOW AND WAHU. NO
 EFFORT ANTICIPATED TO CAPTURE FOCHON ALTHOUGH OCCU-
 PATION ADDITIONAL ISLANDS OFF CHINA COAST EXPECTED NEAR
 FUTURE. NO ADDITIONAL TROOP MOVEMENTS SOUTHWARD

REPORTED
 16...ACT
 COMINCH...210...NAVADE...13.....

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 OSD Letter, 5-3-72

DEC 1 1972

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OPNAV-MCS-16 A 33053

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 By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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Filed 0235Z/30
MC

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCW
30 Sep 43
1514Z

M/L
EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

From: Chungking
To: AGWAR

Nr: 777 30th September, 1943

For the eyes of General Marshall alone from Stilwell.

A whispering campaign to discredit me has been going on for some time. It has apparently be encouraged by a group in the War Ministry on account of lost face. All sorts of stories have been carried to the Gissimo. Since they can't get anything on me, they simply manufacture stories or twist facts to make them look bad. So far I have been able to discredit all these crimes and now have a helper close to the throne by means of whom I get prompt warning. I believe I can keep ahead of the stream of mud, but certain quarters do not like the progress we are making, and the lies will continue.

New Subject. There is a slight improvement in allotment of troops and replacements for Yunnan. One more corps will be sent there, and 3 more will in case of need back up the garrison in Kwangsi. I am pushing on a plan for amalgamation of units throughout the army to produce 60 First-line and 60 Second-line Divisions and get rid of the trash. This plan has backing in at least one powerful quarter. Our instructor liaison teams are making very satisfactory headway in Yunnan. Plans for the second 30 seem to be accepted in general terms, but I haven't been able to get a commander named yet. The future hinges on success in Burma. This is a long road. I hope we can get something done before the war is over.

ACTION: OPD

No Sig.

INFORMATION C OF S

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OSD Letter, 5-8-78

CM-IN-21103 (30 Sep 43)

1952Z bjm

DEC 1 1972

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By RT, NARA, Date *4/13/94*

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JC70 A38
Filed 19/0420Z
PH

INCOMING MESSAGE CC7D
19 Aug 1943
1143Z

While 107

P R I O R I T Y

From: New Delhi
To: AGWAR

No. AG 1408 Ammdel 19th Aug 1943

I am still opposed to any combined liaison or operating staff with British in India (from Stilwell reurad 2414 August 11) I am perfectly willing to operate with British on mutual and cooperative basis. This is proving satisfactory in New Delhi now. I do not wish to establish as a principle the exchange of individuals between American and British Staffs. The proposal that the British retain the right to approve or disapprove our plans, while they simply inform us of theirs, indicates the policy they have in mind. I must avoid getting tied up so that my Chinese sources will dry up. Since Chinese as well as British are our Allies, thus should be treated alike, and I believe that the closer tie up with the British will operate to our distinct disadvantage with the Chinese. Our present arrangement is working smoothly, but as stated before, the War Departments decision will be carried out to the best of our ability.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: 2414 is CM-OUT-3666 (10 Aug 43) JCS

ACTION: JCS

INFORMATION: General Strong
OPD
LOG

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OSD Letter, 5-8-72

DEC 1 1972

CM-IN-14120 (19 Aug 43) 1550Z ejv

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12
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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CCWD

Filed 0912Z/19
MC

19 Aug 43
254Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

U R G E N T

From: New Delhi
To: AGWAR TIGAR GW 625
Chungking TIGAR M 198

19th August 1943

Immediate action on Auchinlecks three proposals plus more vigorous prosecution of certain improvement projects now under way (especially those involving additional yards and additional sidings) will substantially increase capacity of Bengal and Assam Railway. To General Somervell through General Stilwell from Wheeler replying to WAR message 41A August 16th information AMMDEL. Capacity will be slightly increased by better combinations of rail, water and highway movements. Barges and towboats now on requisition from US will materially increase river capacity, also tank barges now under construction by British. 6 inch pipe line from Calcutta to Dibrugarh will relieve Assam transportation system of more than 600 tons per day. Railway will be further relieved by British construction of approved pipe line projects for which materials are now arriving at Calcutta. Excluding tonnage through 6 inch pipe line our minimum tonnage requirements for all operations in upper Assam and for airfreight into China are 1200 tons per day. There is no justification for abandoning planned operations based upon limiting capacity of Assam transport system because we know that our requirements will use only about 25 per cent of total rated capacity of system. Americans are cooperating and assisting to secure increased capacity which involves material help, advice and continuous needling of both military and civil. We have built up some reserves in upper Assam and expect to get tonnage delivered that is necessary

CM-IN-14131 (19 Aug 43)

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Map Room
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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Page 2

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: New Delhi
To: AGWAR RIGAR GW 625
Chungking TIGAR M 198

19th August 1943

for our operations. We have submitted no complaints, protests or warnings to any official levels outside India. You may therefore assume that we believe we have our requirements in hand. On assumption that 6 inch pipe line will be built from Calcutta to Dibrugarh you may guarantee to British that Americans will reduce their tonnage requirements of about 1800 tons per day into upper Assam by at least 600 tons per day.

No Sig.

Note: Relayed to Quebec as #113
Reference not identified in WDCMC.

ACTION: Gen. Somervell

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen. Deane (CC/S)
LOG

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CM-IN-14131 (19 Aug 43) 1610Z dd

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INCOMING MESSAGE

14 August 1943.
11386

EYES ONLY

FOR GENERAL MARSHALLS EYES ALONE

PRIORITY

CORRECTED COPY

From: New Delhi
To: AGWAR

No. AMMDEL AG 1333 14th August 1943.

Eyes alone General Marshall. Following summarizes unnumbered Air Staff planning paper prepared by RAF HQ India. Subject Air Force required for operations in winter 1944-45. Summary starts. Assumptions: If Germany is defeated in Summer 1944 large scale offensive should start from India in winter 1944; 2 broad alternative courses of action are re-capture of Burma or pressure in Burma or pressure in Burma and a seaborne invasion of Japanese held territory elsewhere. Operations for re-capture Burma would require air support for amphibious landings. This support to be given initially from India but as airfields are captured necessary squadrons for support to be flown in. Air Forces required to support this operation roughly same in size and composition to those required for seaborne operations anywhere else. These forces in squadrons are: based in north east India for operations against Burma heavy bomber 10 light bomber 8 single engine fighter 8 twin engine fighters 4 fighter bomber 6 tactical reconnaissance 4 long range reconnaissance 1 and photo reconnaissance 2; Expeditionary force based in south India and Ceylon heavy bombers 10 light bombers 4 single engine fighters 16 twin engine fighters 8 fighter bombers 8 tactical reconnaissance 4 torpedo fighters 2 longrange reconnaissance 1 and photo reconnaissance 2; de-

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(CM-IN-11386 15 Aug 43)

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INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

From: New Delhi
To: AGWAR

No. ANMDEL AG 1833 14th August 1943.

fense of Ceylon single engine fighters 2 long range reconnaissance 1; northwest frontier light bombers 2 tactical reconnaissance 2; coastal flying boats 9 including 3 to be stationed in Ceylon; transport 32 an 25 per squadron. Total 146 squadrons. Of these 71 squadrons are now either present or projected leaving 75 as the increase on long range planning. For the expeditionary force gasoline requirement is estimated at 158,000 barrels per month. For advance into Burma and to meet any US expansion it will be necessary to construct more all weather fields east of Brahmaputra but in general in southern India existing and planned fields will be adequate since early displacement overseas is indicated (for Marshall from Ferris) summary ends. This is supplementary to AGWAR 1302 of 11th August and represents parallel RAF planning.

No Sig.

NOTE: Corrected copy of CM-IN-10412 (14 Aug 43) OPD.

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: SGS
Gen Deane (CCS)

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CM-IN-11336 (15 Aug 43) 1817Z ems

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Filed 13/10/43
HH

INCOMING MESSAGE

14 August 1943.
1235

EYES ONLY

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: New Delhi
To: AGWAR

No. ANMDEL AG 1327 13th August 1943.

(Eyes only Gen Marshal). Correction to paper mentioned in our AGWAR 1302 issued by GHQ (Marshall from Ferris) reduces by 50 the requirement of LC items (L) from 182 to 132 craft.

No Sig.

This message has been relayed to Quebec.

NOTE: AG 1302 is CM-IN-10115 (14 Aug 43) OPD.

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: SGS
Gen Deane (CCS)

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CM-IN-10478 (14 Aug 43) 1743Z ems

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filed 0820Z/13
BN

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
13 August 1943
1202

CORRECTED COPY
EYES ONLY GENERAL MARSHALL

From: New Delhi
To: Agwar

No. AMMDEL AG 1302, 13 August 1943.

Eyes alone General Marshall, war projects coordination and administrative Committee India on which Merrill represents US interests has received a directive to examine the ability of India to provide, maintain, accommodate, move and train during the year 1944 and 45 the forces and shipping which follow (Marshall from Ferris) Internal security of India 67 Battalions; defense of northwest frontier 57 Battalions 4 armored regiments and 4 RAF Squadrons; defense of Ceylon 1 Brigade and local defense troops 3 Squadrons RAF and 20 shore based Squadrons from fleet air arm; operations against upper Burma 3 Chinese Divisions plus US Troops from Ledo, 4 Infantry divisions 2 long range penetration groups 1 Tank Brigade 1 Parachute Brigade, Burma Army to strength about 10,000, 43 Squadrons RAF from Assam and northeast India and in reserve 3 Infantry Divisions and 1 Tank Brigade in Bengal and Bihar; Expeditionary force 8 and 230 amphibious Divisions 1 Infantry Division 1 Armored Division 2 airborne Divisions and 55 RAF Squadrons; general reserve in India 32 Squadrons RAF; and for coastal reconnaissance 9 RAF Squadrons. This accounts for all Divisions except 4. 2 of these 4 are training Divisions and 2 are considered a possible reinforcement for operations which will come from another theater and may either go direct to area of operations or may enter India only to replace Divisions which have already left. Estimated shipping and landing craft requirements are: 31 LSI (L), 16 LSP, 12 LSD 7 LSG or LSC, 108 LST, 160 LCT, 182 LCI (L) 92 MT/store ships 400 LCA, 200 LCP, 300 LCM and 60 LCM. Additional shipping for amphibious divisions and follow up forces are 60 personnel ships and 100 cargo ships and tankers. This connects with operations mentioned in my 1268 dated 9 August. To follow immediately in supplementary data.

No Sig

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CM-IN-10115 (14 Aug 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

300 P. I. China

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EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

PAGE 2

Number: AMMDEL AG 1302,

13 August 1943

Corrected copy of CM-IN-8916 (12 Aug 43) OPD

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: SGS
GEN DEANE (CCS)

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OSD Letter, 5-3-78

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CM-IN-10115 (14 Aug 43) 0513Z mca

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 13, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message which has just been received from General Stilwell is forwarded for your information:

"Rangarh, India
August 12, 1943

"Force of two divisions and corps troops of Rangarh Force is ready now except for 4,000 Infantry fillers. These can be absorbed quickly when received. This force is well trained and in good shape. If material arrives we will have two Light Tank Battalions and one each 4.2 Mortar Regiment to back us up. Mortar units will be thoroughly trained, tank units partially trained but enough to operate. Training of Rangarh Force has been thorough and continuous with emphasis on marksmanship, tactics, and special methods of jungle warfare.

"Yunnan Force reorganization ordered completed by September 1st; this means inactivation of one division in three to fill up other two. Chen Cheng now back in Kunming. I believe he will push this. It will give effective strength of 8,000 per division and replacements coming in slowly. By November divisions may be up to 10,000 each, depending on War Minister who now appears to be pushing the matter. It would be simple if they were willing to break up useless existing units as I have frequently recommended. There are now in Yunnan 8 Corps and 1 Division, 1 Corps on march in, and 2 Corps being held outside province for emergencies. After reorganization we will have on Paoshan front 9 divisions; on Mengtze front 8 divisions, in Kunming area 5 divisions; these troops have light weapons and mortars. With even very meagre tonnage, we can give them 5 battalions of 75 howitzers and some 60 mm mortars, rifles, Bazookas, 37's, and tommy guns with ammunition. Services will be sketchy but adequate.

"Two classes of Senior Officers Corps Division and Regimental Commanders have already taken course at Rangarh and more are coming. All other officers are going to Kunming schools. Unit training is being started in divisions. Instructor liaison groups starting off on August 20th.

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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"It is only the lack of weapons and ammunition that breaks our hearts, and 2,000 tons a month would set it up. In general the Yunnan Force, if it gets some weapons and signal material and if replacements come as promised, will be three times as good as it was before we took hold. It will still be far below the Rangarh standard but with Chen Cheng in command I believe it is capable of serious effort, and in view of numerical superiority has better than a fair chance of success. If the Generalissimo should really get behind the effort the chances would greatly improve. // 5

"The Ledo Road has been at a standstill for two months. Progress is picking up again. We will build Jeep road backward from Tagap Ga to meet road construction. Next 50 miles from roadhead at mile 51 very difficult. Best estimate is possible junction with Jeep road by end of year. Diversions for airfield construction have been serious but Wheeler is confident we can get through.

"Our advanced posts now within 30 miles of Shinbuiyang; we plan to take that place and build an airfield first thing to assure supply of one division that will push toward Mogaung. We can supply that division until the road gets through to Shinbuiyang; thereafter supply will be easy. With an airfield at Shinbuiyang it is only a question of number of planes available to support two divisions south of Shinbuiyang. With any luck road should be there by end of year. Unless Japs reinforce materially in Myitkyina and Paoshan area our attack has very reasonable prospect of success and if British put on pressure, Japs cannot afford to do it.

"British objections based on difficulty of supply. They intend to limit their advance to the Chindwin because they have no roads connecting with the net around Mandalay. If they stop at Chindwin Japs can divert forces to oppose Chinese attack. If British take Kalewa promptly they can push towards Shwebo over road they used on way out. This line should be capable of sufficient improvement to maintain them and they will have Chindwin to use as well. The attacks must be coordinated to keep the Japs from concentrating. They must be vigorous to get the depth required. Energy is needed to solve the supply problem, otherwise the means are available to do the job. Malaria bugaboo has not developed. Our American rate at Ledo is 1%. The Chinese rate averages 5%. British have been warning me about 25% rate. I discount serious Jap effort in the air. I do not believe they will materially increase the Burma garrison. I believe delay until the fall of next year will be dangerous. // 5

- 2 -

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
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"Last month the Japs knocked off just as Chennault was about to give up his forward line. All the effort and tonnage that goes to the air offensive delays the creation of dependable ground force. In another year China may crack up and be lost. If that happens not only do we lose our foothold but the Japs may be able to use the manpower we want. //

"Difficulties of operation are appreciated. Danger of Jap attack on Kunming has been foreseen but reasonable protection is in sight. Delay gives Japs further opportunity to mount the operation, whereas successful operation in Burma makes that area safe and allows us to retain a base needed to prepare for action in central and east China. I cannot see how delay can help us but I can see how it would hurt us. British fearful of results of unsuccessful attempt. Failure to try at all may be much worse.

"Above written in haste and with apologies. Will amplify on your call any points I have missed or underemphasized."



Chief of Staff

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GSD Letter, 8-3-78

DEC 1 1972

- 3 -

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Filed 11/2/43
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INCOMING MESSAGE

12 August 1943
1326

EYES ONLY

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY GENERAL MARSHALL

*Suggest waiting
for the "Committee" on
this or send it up
with note at least
being received.*

From: New Delhi
To: AGWAR

No. ANMDEL AG 1302 12 August 1943

Eyes alone General Marshall, war projects coördina-
Administrative Committee, India on which Merrill represents
U S interests has received a directive to examine the ab-
ility of India to provide, maintain, accommodate, move and
train during the year 1944 and 45 the forces and shipping
which follow (Marshall from Ferris) * of India 67 Battal-
ions; defense of northwest frontier 57 Battalions 4 armor-
ed regiment and 4 RAF Squadrons; defense of Ceylon 1 Brig-
ade and local defense troops 3 Squadrons RAF and 20 shore
based Squadrons from fleet air arm; operations against
upper Burma 3 Chinese Divisions plus U S Troops from Ledo,
4 Infantry Divisions 2 long range penetration groups 1
Tank Brigade 1 Parachute Brigade, Burma Army to strength
about 10,000, 43 Squadrons RAF from Assam and northeast
India and in reserve 3 Infantry Divisions and 1 Tank Brig-
ade in Bengal and Bihar; expeditionary force 8 and 3rd
amphibious Divisions 1 Infantry Division 1 Armored Division
2 airborne Divisions and 55 RAF Squadrons; general reserve
in India 32 Squadrons RAF; and for coastal reconnaissance
9 RAF Squadrons. This accounts for all Divisions except 4.
2 of these 4 are training Divisions and 2 are considered a
possible reinforcement for operations which will come from
another Theater and may either go direct to area of oper-
ations or may enter India only to replace Divisions which
have already left. Estimated shr pmoland landing craft

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GSD Letter, 5-8-78

CM-IN-8916 (12 Aug 43)

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From: New Delhi
To : AGWAR

(Page 2)

No, AMMDEL AG 1302 12 August 1943

requirements are:

32 LSI (L),
16 LSP,
12 LSD,
7 LSG or LSC,
108 LST,
160 LCT,
182 LCI (L) *,
200 LCP,
300 LCM and 60 LCM.

Additional shipping for amphibious division * up
forces are 60 personnel ships and 100 cargo ships and tank-
ers * this connects with operations mentioned in my 1268
dated 9 August hd to follow * data.

No Sig.

*Note: Being Serviced.

Action: OPD

Information: SGS
Gen Deane (CC/S)

CM-IN-8916 (12 Aug 43) 1911Z vc

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

In reply refer to Initials
and No.~~SECRET~~~~Op-16-PE~~NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

11 August 1943

MEMORANDUM

From: The Director of Naval Intelligence
To: The Naval Aide

SUBJECT: Recent Developments in the Burma Area

Enclosure: (A) Map of Burma

1. Operations:

Since the beginning of the current monsoon, 15 May - 1 June 1943, ground operations in Burma have been confined to patrol activity and the line separating Allied and enemy forces has remained approximately the same. In the Akyab area, the British have maintained a defense position at Bawli Bazar following their withdrawal from Buthidaung and Maungdaw, 9-11 May 1943. A successful raid placed Maungdaw in British hands for a few hours 21 July but they withdrew immediately. The Japanese captured Fort White in the Chin Hills on 29-30 May, but retired a week later to a point 11 miles W. of Kalembo. There have been minor patrol clashes N. of Sumprabum in N. Burma and sporadic fighting has occurred along the Salween River in the Tengyueh - Lungling sector but there is no indication of a major enemy offensive in this area, as the Japanese appear to be satisfied with the stalemated position which has existed for over six months.

From 1 June 1943 to date, the U. S. 10th Airforce and the R.A.F. have almost daily carried out air attacks on enemy installations and lines of communication throughout Burma. Heavy and medium bombers as well as fighters have bombed and strafed bridges, railway installations, oil fields and storage depots, airdromes, mines, road traffic, and supply sampans and steamers on rivers and along the coast. Air superiority has been consistently maintained by the Allies. Interception of our planes by Japanese fighters has been attempted only once since 1 June and there have been no enemy air attacks since the raid on Chittagong 29 May.

- 1 -

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SSD Foster, 9-3-72

DEC 1 1972

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Op-16-72

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SUBJECT: Recent Developments in the Burma Area

2. Jap Order of Battle:

Estimated Japanese Army air strength in Burma as of 1 July 1943 totaled 106 planes including 60 fighters, 36 bombers and 9 others; in Thailand and Indo-China 123 planes including 24 fighters, 72 bombers and 27 others. This makes a grand total of 228 planes which the enemy could move up into this front. As of 5 August 1943, Japanese Army strength in Burma was estimated at 82,000 which represents no substantial change in recent months.

3. Burma Area Transport System:

(A) Waterways:

Small craft operated over inland waterways continue to be the chief supply medium used by the Japs in Burma. The port of Rangoon was little used before the monsoon.

(B) Railways:

(1) Allied: Calcutta area railways will be seriously handicapped till October by recent unprecedented floods.

(2) Japanese: Construction of the important railway link from Thanbyuzayat, Burma, to Bangkok, Thailand, is being vigorously prosecuted from both ends, despite persistent U. S. bombings and monsoon conditions. Estimates on the probable completion date vary from October 1943 to June 1944, with the latter favored. The main line from Rangoon - Mandalay - Myitkyina is still used by the Japs although not without serious interruptions, and with nothing like normal pre-war traffic possible. Ferries have been improvised to replace bridges destroyed.

(C) Highways:

(1) Allied: The Manipur road from Imphal, Assam, into Burma has been made motorable but is impeded by landslides. Construction of the new motor road from Ledo, Assam, into Burma is nearing completion.

(2) Japanese: The following strategic routes have been improved or made motorable in dry weather by the Japanese:

(a) Coast Road: From Proma on the Irrawaddy River to Taungup on the coast. Construction continues on the projected extension from Taungup N. along the coast to Akyab but the route will probably be motorable after the rains only as far N. as the An River.

(b) Chindwin River Area: From Pakokku on the Irrawaddy N. via Gangaw to Kalamyo, Kalowa, and Pantha on the Chindwin River. Also from Kalewa to Ye'-U and Shwebo on the railway.

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Op-16-FE

SUBJECT: Recent Developments in the Burma Area

(c) In the Rhamo area N. via Myitkyina to Sumprabum, E. to Tengyueh (China), SW to Mandalay (all weather road), and W. to Katha, Mansi and Homalin on the Chindwin.

(d) In the Shan states from Lashio E. to Kunlong and beyond the China border to Loilem, and NE and SE from Keng Tung.

4. Political:

The granting of "independence" to Burma with U Ba Maw recognized as premier, together with the absence of any comparable gesture by the British has probably won Japan considerable support among the Burmese, despite the ceding of two of the Burma Shan States to Thailand. All the formalities calculated to lend an appearance of reality to the puppet show were scrupulously observed. In Northern Burma the Karens, Moslems, Kachins (and other hill tribes) remain pro-British. The "Burma Independence Army" is being promoted by the Japs but is not feared. Greater possibilities are inherent in the India Nationalist Army now being actively organized and trained in Burma and Malaya with the aid of Subar Chandra Bose, Indian Nationalist leader sent to Japan from Germany some time ago. However, the critical Indian food shortage, particularly in Bengal (due largely to hoarders and speculators) is regarded as more dangerous than Bose.

Sheehan


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
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INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
29 July 1943
14 Z

EYES ONLY

Marshall's eyes only

P R I O R I T Y

From: New Delhi
To: War

No. AMMDEL AG 1128, 29th July 1943

After turn down on 100,000 proposition (eyes alone Marshall reurad 2171 from Stilwell) I asked for 57,000 as essential minimum. Have reason to believe this will be approved. If so, it will be sufficient for our needs for next 6 months to 1 year.

No Sig

2171 is CM OUT 9498 (23 July 43) OPD

*We do not
have*

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: JC/S Gen Deane

CM-IN-20954 (29 July 43) 1537Z msh

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSLO BOMBAY	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		DNI	ROUTINE ROUTINE DEFERRED
DATE 27 JULY 43			
TOR CODEROOM 1929	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY WILLIAMS/TWINING			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY SHOAF			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY SOBEL			

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

241145 NCR 3791

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FOR DNI.

ARE YOU WILLING I ASK FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING ROYAL INDIAN NAVY ON FORTHCOMING VISIT BOMBAY TO APPROVE RELEASE TO THIS OFFICE OF ALL INFORMATION ABOUT PROVISION OF CONSTRUCTION REPAIR MAINTENANCE AND OTHER FACILITIES ALSO TRAINING PROGRAM ACQUISITION PROGRAM AND OTHER ASPECTS OF NAVAL PREPARATION FOR FUTURE CAMPAIGN BASED ON INDIA. OWING LACK U.S. NAVAL REPRESENTATION AT DELHI INDIAN ALUSLOS NOT NOW IN POSITION SUPPLY SUCH INFORMATION TO NAVY DEPARTMENT OR U.S. NAVAL ACTIVITIES ARRIVING INDIA. LOWER COMMANDS THAN FORIN NOT AUTHORIZED GIVE OUT THIS DOPE.

ACTION

P-0	
P-01	
P-02	
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P-07	
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VCH0	

16....ACT

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OSD Letter, 5-3-78

COMINCH....10/11....20G....NAVAIDE....FILE DEC 1 1972

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OPNAV-NCH-10

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241145 30 India, B. Chandra

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

Operations Division, WDGS
Asiatic Section, WDOFD
OPD 350.2 (23 Jul 43) WK

July 23, 1943

EYES ONLY

CG, U. S. ARMY FORCES, CHINA-BURMA-INDIA
FORWARD ECHELON, AMMISCA, CHUNGKING, CHINA

Number 3054

CG, U. S. ARMY FORCES, CHINA-BURMA-INDIA
REAR ECHELON, AMMDEL, NEW DELHI, INDIA

Number 2171

Substance of message (To AMMISCA and AMMDEL for Stilwells eyes alone from Marshall) dispatched recently by British Chiefs of Staff to Commander In Chief India follows: Stilwell while in London said he would like to increase Chinese at Ramgarh to 100,000. Desired that Commander In Chief India inform Stilwell of views of British Chiefs of Staff in the vein indicated below. Should also inform Viceroy.

British Chiefs of Staff are opposed to increase for following reasons: Capacity of Ledo Road (target capacity 3 divisions) limits Chinese that can be deployed from Assam into Burma. Accordingly additional Chinese could be employed only at expense of Imperial Troops. Whether the additional Chinese be employed as replacements (or reinforcements) in India or whether they be returned to China with equipment after training in India will in either case be at expense of air supplies to China and or maintenance of troops already in Assam. Meanwhile, British Chiefs of Staff are of opinion there is no limit to number well trained units that could be employed in China and feel best method for training these units is to fly necessary equipment and supplies from India to China. End British message.

Above for your information and comment to War Department.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: JC/S General Deane
C of S

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OSD Letter, 6-3-72

CM-OUT-9497 (23 July 43) 2147 Z mvh
CM-OUT-9498

DEC 1 1972

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

300 A. I. China

Admiral

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ALUSNA CHUNGKING	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
RELEASED BY	20 JULY 1943	CNO	PRIORITY RRRR ROUTINE DEFERRED
DATE	1406/20	FOR ACTION	
TOR CODEROM	SCHNEDIER	FOR INFORMATION	
DECODED BY	MORRIS	DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(b) and 5(D) on (S) OSD letter, May 8, 1978 RHP, NARA Date FEB 20 1973	PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY	ROONEY		
ROUTED BY			

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

PAGE 1 OF 2

191202

NCR 8640

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

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ACTION

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PART 1 RECEIVED AS 191102 NCR 8640
 PART 2 " " 191104 NCR 8650
 PART 3 " " 191100 NCR 8629

LENGTHY STUDY DATED JULY 15 MADE BY 2ND SECTION
 BOARD MILITARY OPERATIONS REGARDING FUTURE MILITARY

PLANS JAPANESE SUMMARIZES THAT THEY IN ORDER
 CARRY OUT THEIR CONTINENTAL POLICY WILL CONCENTRATE

BEFORE AND AFTER RAINY SEASON STRONG ARMIES
 FOR ATTEMPT TO INVADE INDIA. IF ALLIES MEET

EARLY SUCCESS SICILY OR INCREASE THEIR FORCES
 INDIA JAPAN MAY START ACTION PRIOR TO NOVEMBER.

10 POINTS EXPRESSED BRIEFLY ARE:

1. TOJO ADVOCATES SOUTHWARD ADVANCE.
2. ARMY PRINCIPAL FORCE REQUIRED
3. DIVERSITY ALLIED FORCES THIS THEATER AND VARIOUS FACTIONS INDIA
4. COMMUNICATIONS TO CHINA WILL BE CUT
5. DIVERSION JAP PUBLIC FROM PRESENT DEFEATS.
6. SUCCESS WILL TERMINATE ANGLO-AMERICAN

~~SECRET~~

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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NAVY DEPARTMENT

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RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION	DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(c) and 8(d) or (e) OSD letter, May 8, 1972 RHP, NARA Date FEB 20 1973	PRIORITY
DATE			ROUTINE
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DECODED BY	INFORMATION	DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(c) and 8(d) or (e) OSD letter, May 8, 1972 RHP, NARA Date FEB 20 1973	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED

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PAGE 2 OF 2

191202

NCR 8640

2299

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INFLUENCE ASIA AND STRANGLE CHINA.

7. INVASION INDIA EASIER THAN ATTACK RUSSIA WITH LESS EQUIPMENT REQUIRED.

8. SUCCESS WILL DESTROY ADDITIONAL ALLIED RESOURCES.

9. ATTACK WILL PLACATE AXIS DEMANDS FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION.

10. PERIOD BETWEEN DRY AND WET SEASONS FAVORABLE FOR ATTACK.

COMMENT SINCE MARCH JAP INCREASE BURMA FRENCH INDO CHINA AND THAI ABOUT 700,000 WHICH BELIEVED IN-

SUFFICIENT RATE FOR PROJECTED OPERATIONS. ABSENCE HERE INFORMATION TO SUPPORT CHINESE CONCLUSIONS

DOES NOT WARRANT BELIEF THAT JAP FORCES BURMA HAVE BEEN GREATLY INCREASED. THIS COMPARATIVELY

SUDDEN DECISION THAT INDIA WILL BE ATTACKED MAY BE DESIGNED TO AID CAMPAIGN TO INCREASE AID TO CHINA.

16.... ACTION

CNO....CO INCH....NAVAIDE....20G...FILE

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSLO COLOMBO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION CNO	PRIORITY RRRRRR
DATE 9 JULY 1943			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROM 1551			
DECODED BY FALLON		INFORMATION	PRIORITY
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PAGE 1 OF 2

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NCR 2299

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

ACTION

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 303 and 502 or 32

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

by *SA* NARS Date **DEC 20 1972**

YESTERDAY ON HIS INITIATIVE FLAG OFFICER CEYLON INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD RECEIVED WORD FROM ADMIRALTY THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF BRITISH AND US NAVAL UNITS WOULD BE BASED CEYLON IN FALL AND THAT HE WOULD CALL ON ME FROM TIME TO TIME FOR ASSISTANCE IN THIS REGARD. TODAY APPARENTLY MOTIVATED BY INFO NOT FORWARDED BY ADMIRALTY CHIEF RAF SUPPLY OFFICER CEYLON CALLED ON ME TO LEARN OF ANY FUTURE U.S. NAVY REQUIREMENTS IN CEYLON FOR AVIATION GAS AND OIL AS RAF IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROCUREMENT AND STORAGE OF SAME FOR ALL SERVICES. I INFORMED HIM THAT THIS OFFICE HAD NOT BEEN ADVISED BY NAVY DEPT OF ANY

SECRET

ACTION

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTML

FROM	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
RELEASED BY		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY
DATE			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED
DECODED BY			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	THOMAS		ROUTINE
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PAGE 2 OF 2

09/420

NCR 2299

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ACTION

ACTION

PARTICULAR NEEDS. NEVERTHELESS HE ASKED THAT I ATTEND A MONTHLY MEETING OF INTERESTED PARTIES TO DETERMINE AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE FORWARD NEEDS UP TO 4 MONTHS. IN VIEW OF THE CORDIAL RELATIONS MAINTAINED BY THIS OFFICE WITH BRITISH SERVICES CEYLON AND THEIR COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE PLEASE FORWARD INSTRUCTIONS FOR MY GUIDANCE.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 303 and 504 or 505
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By *ASH* NARS Date **DEC 20 1972**

16.....ACT

NAVAIDE...13...COMINCH...210P...CNO...FILE

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

SFA NR 217
30/0055Z
HH

1121Z

FOR THE EYES OF GENERAL MARSHALL ALONE

From: Chungking
To: WAR

No. 602 30th June 1943.

Conference with CCS yesterday (for the eyes of General Marshall alone from Stillwell) to get answer to CCS proposals, which he has been pondering for 12 days. At first he intimated general approval. Then he began on the Naval business again. He is a great naval expert. The general idea is for the Americans and British to take Rangoon. That would solve everything and then it would be worth while to fix up the Burma Road. After insistence by Hon on statement of numbers of ships available, and after several explanations of the words "Adequate force" I wrote a letter with a list of BB and DD and SS etc based on CCS estimates and Shang Chen gave it to him as an approximation. Repeated explanations that these proposals are for approval or disapproval on general lines and that details can be settled later, made no impression. Today he left town on a trip without giving me an answer. I expect him back on the 4th and will try and get an answer then. The above may convey a faint idea of the conditions under which we work.

No Sig

Action: OFD

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72

Information: Sec. Gen. Staff
Gen. Deane (CC/S)
C of S

DEC 1 1972

CM-IN-19124

(30 June 43)

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

SFA 309
0010/26
GW

CCWD
26 June
1946Z

FOR THE EYES OF GENERAL MARSHALL ALONE

From: Chungking
To: AGWAR

No.: 590, 26 June 1943

For the Eyes of General Marshall Alone from Stilwell. Informational, answer by CKS to proposal for Saucy expected soon. Long conference with HO Ying Chin yesterday, during which I was amazed to learn that CKS had not consulted him at all on this matter. This means that no one in War Ministry has been consulted. CKS personal Chief of Staff has not been consulted either, so the decision will apparently be a 1 man job unless the cook was called in.

*Chinese Minister of War,
Most Important Military
Person after CKS,*

New subject. HO told me that he and CKS had decided that it was most important to hold Szechwan and Yunnan strongly. Also that they planned to concentrate on equipping and training 60 Divisions and that the thing to do was to consolidate, making 2 divisions out of every 3. It has taken only 1 year for these 2 ideas to percolate so there are still hopes for China. HO is soft on American methods and American instructors but he has no conception of the value of time.

*has
operation
against
Burma*

New subject. I now learn that there is a gasoline stealing ring at Kunming involving both officers and enlisted men, and I can see no solution there except a thorough house cleaning from top down, if these reports prove correct.

New subject. Slow and painful progress on Y Force, in matter getting trucks, animals money for road, Trench Mortar Units, etc. If Japs do not erupt again, we have a chance of setting it up.

ACTION: OPD
INFORMATION: SGS, C of S

No Sig

CM-IN-16837 (27 Jun 43) 0243Z ems

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GSD Letter, 5-3-78

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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SFA 287
25,0522Z
DLB

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
26 June
1939Z

WSE

From: Chungking
To: AGWAR
New Delhi

587
AD 1276

25, June, 1943

Information wanted on Chinese operations comes to us in weekly meetings with Chinese General Staff ordered by CES for purpose of keeping me informed personally (for Chief of Staff reurad 2870 June 23 from Stilwell information Ferris) Am convinced he would strongly oppose inclusion of British in these meetings and that they would be cancelled if we made reports suggested. We have laboriously built up a certain amount of confidence, and we will risk losing it by this procedure. All data of any importance is passed to Washington in our reports, and the British mission here has access to the Chinese General Staff. The proposed reports would add very little to this data and would almost certainly operate to our disadvantage. I strongly recommend that the matter be dropped.

No Sig

NOTE: 2870 is CM-OUT-9782 (23 Jun 43) OPD.

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: General Strong
C of S
General Deane (JC/S)

CM-IN-18596 (29 Jun 43) 2113Z ems

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OSD Letter, 6-8-72

DEC 1 1972

Max R...
14

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


May 31, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT:

The attached dispatch is forwarded for
the information of the President in view of the
current Japanese offensive in the Ichang area.

Very respectfully,



CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

1 Atch.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stenart Date DEC 1 1972

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Page 1.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING ST MESSAGE

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

From: Chungking

Dated: May 28, 1943, 4 p.m.

No. 803

Rec'd: May 28, 1943, 8:03 p.m.

I arrived in Chungking 3 weeks ago and it may be of interest to the Department to have my impressions of the situation in China.

General Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters appear to be determined to follow a policy of resistance and are continuing to hold out. There is a feeling the situation in many aspects is out of control and is seriously deteriorating in practically all aspects. The economic situation is deteriorating rapidly and is leading toward something that may eventually spell ruin. While the economic situation is more rapid than the military situation, each is worsened by a vicious circle in the relationship between the 2. The shortage of food is affecting the troops more adversely than the shortage of ammunition has affected them during the past 5 and a half years (since the beginning of the year the price of rice in Chungking and Kweilin has doubled) and 1 of China's important "rice bowls" is being circled and lost to Free China by current Japanese military operations in Hupeh and Hunan Provinces. If the Chinese suffer further serious reverses on other fronts, if the Japanese success continues, or if the new crops are not good it is not unlikely that a crisis may be precipitated which will further greatly decrease Free China's power of resistance and endurance.

Chinese morale in general is being lowered progressively as a result of these circumstances and a combination of circumstances. It has seemed in the past that if the morale of Chinese leaders were maintained, the morale of the people and soldiers would continue at a fair level. One of the greatest dangers at present is the possibility that the already low morale of the people and the troops may break, regardless of the determination of some of the leaders to hold together the shaky economic and military setup. The common soldiers and the common people, always near the margin of subsistence, cannot continue to live on wishful thinking in regard to the post war world which helps sustain some high officials or on the belief in an eventual Allied victory. The people need food and clothing and the soldiers must have in addition to these things adequate air support, guns, ammunition and artillery. The extraordinary endurance and resistance of the Chinese has a limit and even greater than Chinese capacity in those respects is their capacity for accepting things as they are when they are faced with the inevitable.

CM-IN-19465

(30 May 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73
By R. H. Parks Data
DEC 1 1972

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

Page 2

INCOMING MESSAGE 943

In the growing trade and smuggling between occupied and unoccupied China there is an apparent tendency on the part of the military as well as other Chinese to make the best of the realities. If this tendency should remain unchecked--and if further advances should not be made by the Japanese--there is a strong probability of a further extension between occupied China and Free China of the armed truce which has existed in many places, with the Japanese and the puppets peacefully consolidating their position as they have in Manchuria, with trade across the static lines expanding and with Free China depending upon the other area economically.

Nevertheless, the existing situation cannot continue for a much longer period. According to a number of intelligent Chinese of affairs with sober, balanced, and conservative minds, the present conditions in China "can last" only from 6 to 12 months. Their estimates might be considered by the optimistic as exaggerated if they were speaking only in terms of inflation and currency depreciation, but it is difficult to believe that the population can or will continue indefinitely to stand up under an inflationary process which has made the cost of living 80 times what it was in 1937 and continues to increase about 10% a month. Agrarian unrest in a number of scattered places has already occurred. In the Provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, Kwangtung, Kweichow, Kansu, Ninghsia and Fukien (as a result of conscription, taxes (*) and other officials, requisitioning of grain for troops) with the exception that the famine is chiefly responsible in Kwangtung and bad crops in Fukien (with an increasing desertion of soldiers and petty officials to the puppets). General Sun Tien Ying with 30,000 troops was recently reported to have gone over to the puppet in Shansi Province.

If the problem is to be met, the magnitude of it should not be underestimated. The Chinese have adopted an attitude of sitting back and waiting for Great Britain and the United States to crush Japan and thereby settle their serious and increasing difficulties. This is a part of their deterioration in morale and their appreciation and acceptance of realities. An example of this psychological process is apparent in Chinese official circles by a highly developed interest in post war problems. They all seem to be seeking to escape from these realities, being unable to cope with them, into a vague but rosey future which unfortunately can never materialize unless something drastic is done successfully about the present situation.

CM-IN-19465

(30 May 43) mjc

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State Dept. Letter, 1-21-75
By R. H. Parks Date DEC 1 1972

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Page 3.

INCOMING MESSAGE May 28, 1943


China can no longer be aided by foreign loans. Political overtures are limited in usefulness to their effect upon leaders, who lead only in a negative way most of the time; political overtures do not help the people or the troops.

If the President and Mr. Churchill should invite the Generalissimo to a conference as suggested by Mr. Churchill, it is possible such a move would very much encourage Chiang as he feels that he has lost face with his officials and peoples because up to the present he has not received such an invitation. The soldiers and the people would be greatly encouraged by the recapture of Burma, but any concrete improvement in the economic situation, after the last upswing towards new confidence, would be long delayed during the process of having the Burma Road restored and putting it into effective use. Its actual economic benefits as a whole even then would be slight because in the lives of agrarian peasants foreign consumer goods play a small part.

The Minister of Economic Affairs, Wong Wen Hao, and some of the economically minded Chinese believe that if the Chinese could retake and hold Ichang and the hinterland leading into southern Hupeh and Hunan, and if the Hunan area could also be held, the flow of cotton and produce into Free China would soon cause a reduction of 50% in the cost of food and clothing. The Jap military successes on the Hupeh-Hunan front now in progress (see Embassy's telegram 800, of May 28, 9 a.m.) are currently making any such possibility all the more remote as a result of Chinese efforts in this direction. This brings up the question whether China's Allies might take any action in their own interest toward improving the situation as a whole and toward rehabilitating the morale of the Chinese troops. For example, would it be practicable for British and American military authorities to work out some tactical arrangement with the Chinese military whereby the Chinese, with sufficient American and British air support, would proceed to undertake determined offensive action to attack and recapture at least 1 or 2 militarily and economically important points such as Hankow, Ichang, and others. In regard to military matters, however, one can do no more than offer for possible consideration by those able to judge and decide such suggestions as occur to an observer who sees the necessity of doing something. If China's most valuable potentialities for the common war effort are not to be lost to us, there would seem to be little doubt that forthright and significant military action having a direct bearing upon the situation within China must be taken in the near future.

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State Dept Order, 1-11-78
By R. H. Parks Date DEC 1 1972

CM-IN-19465

(30 May 43)  RJC

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 4

Number 803

May 28, 1943

The Military and Naval Attaches request that this telegram be made available to the Navy and War Departments.

ATCHESON

S FED:MCW

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date **DEC 1 1972**

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CM-IN-19465

(30 May 43)

1610Z mjc

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTM

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM NAVAL ATTACHE CHUNGKING		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION CNO (DNI)	PRIORITY RRRR
DATE 28 MAY 43			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM 1414			
DECODED BY CONNOLLY		INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY JOHNSON			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY SOBEL			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

280520

NCR 5554

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			

ACTION

(FOR DIRECTOR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.)

F-0

F-01

F-02

F-015

F-0115

F-05

F-07

F-1

F-11

F-2

F-3A

F-30

F-31

F-32

F-33

F-34

F-35

F-3B

F-36

F-37

IG-00

VCNO

HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY A VERY RELIABLE CHINESE SOURCE THAT T.V. SOONG HAS TELEGRAPHED CHIANG KAI-SHEK THAT THE US AND BRITISH ATTACHES IN THEIR REPORTS FROM CHUNGKING HAVE DEPRECATED THE SERIOUSNESS OF PRESENT JAPANESE CAMPAIGN IN THE YANGTZE VALLEY. WHILE THE POTENTIALITIES OF THE HUNAN-HUPEH DRIVE ARE SERIOUS THE IMMEDIATE ACTION, IF OFFICIAL IDENTIFICATION OF UNITS INVOLVED AND AVAILABLE INFORMATION IS CORRECT, APPEARS TO FALL SHORT OF THE SCOPE OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE TRY TO INDICATE.

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-8-72

DEC 1 1972

16...ACT

COMINCH...20G...NAVAIDE...CNO...20P...FILE.

~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-50838-4

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

280520

300 B. I. China

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTM

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA CHUNGKING	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			RRRRRR
DATE 18 MAY 43			ROUTINE
TOX CODEROM 0337	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
DECODED BY NICHOLS/THOMSON			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

SOBEL

171716

NCR 8506

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

GCT

TEXT

ACTION

F-00
F-01
F-015
F-0015
F-05
F-07
F-1
F-11
F-2
F-3
F-30
F-31
F-32
F-33
F-34
F-35
F-37
IG-00
VCNO

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SPECIAL AGENT KEPT PRISONER SHANGHAI 1 YEAR BY JAPS ARRIVED CHUNCKING BY PLANE MAY 7. GIVEN SAFE CONDUCT VIA CANTON TO THIS CITY. TORTURED EARLY DAYS WITHOUT SUCCESS JAPS CHANGED TACTICS TURNED OVER TO CHOUFUHAI CHIEF LIEUTENANT WANH CHING WEI WHO SAID HE RELEASE HIM COME THIS CITY WITH PEACE PROPOSAL. NO ENTHUSIASM FOR PEACE TERMS APPARENT AND MY BELIEF THAT NO AGREEMENT WITH NANKING OR TOKYO WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE EXISTENCE CHINESE NATION WILL BE ENTERED INTO. ANY PUBLICITY CONNECTED HIS RETURN CHUNCKING WITH PEACE TERMS WOULD BE ANOTHER EFFORT OF JAPANESE TO CREATE DISCORD AND SUSPICION BETWEEN CHINA AND HER ALLIES.

16...ACT

COMINCH....CNO...20C...NAVAIDE...20OP...FILE

DECLASSIFIED
98D Letter, 5-3-72~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS)

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NCR-16

171716

300 P. China

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1943 10-22810-2

MEMORANDUM RE GENERAL CHIUNG SHIH HUI:

The above mentioned General was head of the Chinese Military Mission to the U.S. and is a high ranking officer in the Chinese Army. He was formerly Governor of a large province in China for some nine years.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

DN 13
130610Z
BMS

CCWD
1306Z
May 13

WFB

From: Chungking
To: MIBID

Number 184 May 13, 1943

General Oukaichhen former head Chinese Secret Police Shanghai returned recently Chungking, received publicity by Chinese officials, reported bearer peace terms from Japs, Cinc G2 states Govt will not discuss peace terms with any Jap or Wang Ching Wei representative. Recent radio cast from Nanking and reported telegram Wang Ching Wei to Gissmo appealing for peace substantiate reported peace proposal General Wu. General Hsiung Shi Hui despite public favor reported openly criticizes US, have talked to source states heard Siung in private deprecate American war effort and intentions, another source stated Hsiung at some public meeting Kwangsi people in Chungking made most derogatory public address. Hsiung reported encouraging peace proposals Japan China, Sino G2 admits peace emissary but is emphatic Govt refusal even discuss.

Depass

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By *[Signature]* NARS Date **DEC 20 1972**

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF
LOG

G2 Dist.	Action	Info
MC		☒
THONG		
KRONER		
BRATTON		☒
SET		
CURL		
DISS		
AIR		
GA		☒
FE		☒
NA		
LA		
TOLL		
REC		
DEG		
TRNG		
SC		
ED		
PS		
DRR		
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WH		

CM-IN-8421 (13 May ~~SECRET~~ 1943) MAY 13 1943 COPY No.

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

312 B.L. China

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY
PARAPHRASE

May 2, 1943

Telegram no. 635

Dated: May 1, 1 p.m.

From: Chungking

Rec'd: May 1, 1:20 p.m.

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE PAST WEEK AS SUMMARIZED
FROM THE MILITARY ATTACHE'S REVIEW:

On April 26 and 28 the Japanese air force made surprise attacks on United Nations Bases in Yunnan. There was other Japanese air activity of a minor nature in other parts of unoccupied China.

In the Tai Heng mountain region of South Shansi Province serious fighting developed with the Japanese operations beginning about mid-April. The Japs rapidly surrounded and then captured or defeated Chinese troops. On April 26 the Japs announced the conclusion of the major operation and the program of mopping up. The Twenty-fourth Army group, which is the one concerned, was considered as above average. The Jap forces which carried out this speedy campaign had been in the area for some time. An indication of the resistance which the Chinese Army is at present able to put forth against determined opposition may be drawn from the rapidity with which they were decimated in this case. This is the fifteenth time the Japs have tried to consolidate their positions in this area, according to Chinese sources. The Chinese repulsed earlier Jap efforts by destroying water facilities as they withdrew; the Japanese having insufficient supplies retired following each of the earlier operations. The current campaign is considered to be intended to drive the Chinese entirely out of this area after which puppet troops would take over, and would possibly be able to hold it against a counterattack from the Chinese. It would then be possible for the regular Jap forces to be removed from this area for use elsewhere without endangering the Jap hold on North China to any serious extent. 40,000 Jap troops are engaged in this operation according to Chinese reports.

CM-IN-949 (2 May 43)

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

No. 635

INCOMING MESSAGE

No indications have been observed of Jap intentions to conduct any coordinated military action in the China theater. No fighting of any importance occurred in other parts of China.

Vincent

S:WDM:LEY

Action: G-2

Information: OPD
CG AAF

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
DEC 1 1972

CM-IN-949 (2 May 43) 1126Z vc

G2 Dist.	Action	Info
MC		✓
STRONG		
KRONER		
BRATTON	✓	✓
SIT.		✓
CURR.		✓
DISS		
AIR		
E-A		
FE	✓	✓
NA		
LA		
COLL		
SPEC		
GEOG.		
TRNG		
JSC		
BO		
FS		
PER		
CC		
FIN.		
POW		
REC		
FL		
CIG		✓
IIC		✓
ONI		✓
WH		✓

U. S. JOURNAL NO. 14 5 MAY 2 1943

SECRET

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WVNA 7
filed 0332Z/29
fb

INCOMING MESSAGE

March 29, 1943
1231 Z

From: Karachi
To: CG AAF

In Reply Cite: TATRA B 365 March 29, 1943

There are approximately 200 aircraft of various types on the airdrome at Abadan which have been assembled and test flown by our people and accepted by the Russians. McMullen to Frank signed Clark. Some of these aircraft have been there awaiting delivery for as long as 5 weeks. In view of this delay in fly away delivery by the Russians it is suggested that action be taken to determine if the Russians are being allocated aircraft in numbers greater than they can operate. If such is the case this aircraft should be diverted to either the 9th or 10th Air Force, where it can be used.

No Sig

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: G-2 (S.D.)
CG AAF
Log

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72

DEC 1 1972

CM-IN-15767 (29 Mar 43) 1650Z ems

SECRET

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WVMA NR 17
filed 126215Z
gmc

INCOMING MESSAGE

March 12, 1943
1215Z

EYES ONLY

FOR THE EYES OF GENERAL MARSHALL ALONE

From: Chungking
To: AGWAR

In Reply Cite: 223 March 12, 1943

For the eyes of General Marshall alone. Chen has arrived. Leaving with him today for Kunming. He has expressed approval of all plans. Conference with Ho Ying Chin yesterday in which matters of organization and equipment were discussed and ironed out. Prospects are now brighter after long period of delay and obstruction. British Air Mission has arrived and will probably complicate the air situation. They obviously expect us to smooth the way for them. In view of recent Jap activity in North Burma am sending another regiment to X to make it safe.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72

DEC 1 1972

ACTION: GEN. MARSHALL

CM-IN-6684 (13 Mar 43)

1437Z

bjm

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

300 P.I. China

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

DN 22
Filed 05/0502Z
ESF

CCWD
Mar 5, 1943
1649Z

In Reply Cite: 193, March 5, 1943

Pass (from Stilwell) to T V Soong, Chinese Foreign Minister, following message "Chen Cheng still absent. Extremely slow progress at Kunming. Obstruction and delay continues. Appealing to Ho Ying Chin again. He was much impressed by Ramgarh and indicates desire to help. Will keep you informed. Best wishes signed Stilwell."

No Sig.

Action: G-2 (For Chinese : Embassy)

Information: OPD
SGS

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-78

DEC 1 1972

CM-IN-2461 (5 Mar 43) 2207Z ce

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

30 P. J. Chester

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message has just been received from General Wedemeyer who is now in Ceylon awaiting favorable weather for a hop to Australia. Wedemeyer is the chief Army Planner for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and accompanied General Arnold to India and to Chungking. He is to see MacArthur, Halsey and Nimitz en route home, to familiarize himself with the situation throughout the Pacific and orally to inform the principal Army commanders regarding the decisions taken at Casablanca.

"Conferences in India and China have been concluded with satisfactory results. Our immediate concern should be the vigorous implementation of operations contemplated before Monsoon. We must stimulate the British to increased activity, otherwise Akyab will not be taken prior to beginning of Monsoon. I deem this important. British Staff officer expressed strong doubt that Akyab would be captured prior to Monsoon. If British do accomplish objectives outlined to the Generalissimo by Anglo-American representatives, the Chinese will only half-heartedly collaborate, if at all. The above information may help you in discussions with Dill. He was most generous in his assistance and contributed a great deal to the success of the conferences.

"The Chinese have not been given full information concerning the Rangoon phase of the Burma operation because of possible leakage. It is important that T.V. Soong does not obtain this feature of the plan in his discussions with you, the President, the Secretary of State or any member of your Staff.

"Stilwell would appreciate your help in this regard to retain confidence of the Chinese. For the time being the Chinese are being told that plans are fluid with definite and more detailed decisions to be made later. My personal observation indicates that Stilwell understands the situation in the China-India-Burma area better than the British and better than the Chinese themselves. We should leave nothing undone to convince the Chinese that he enjoys our full confidence and that we look to him as the chief arbiter in important matters concerning China. Would it not be timely and appropriate to award Stilwell a D.S.M.? His effectiveness will be commensurate with the prestige he enjoys with the Chinese.

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 6-3-72



DEC 1 1972

SECRET


DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECRET

"Re your NR 517, I have given Stilwell a resume of major decisions resulting from Anfa conference along with associated pertinent matter. I will inform MacArthur, Harmon and Emmons and will caution Harmon and Emmons as you directed.

"The terrain in many parts of Burma suggests the employment of alligator tractors, amphibious jeeps, possibly light amphibious tanks. I mentioned this to Stilwell and he agrees. This subject should be considered.

"Departure for Australia delayed by unfavorable weather. All preparations complete for prompt departure when weather improves."


Chief of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 8-8-78

DEC 1 1972

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

February 16, 1943

From: Aluslo Colombo

For Action: OPNAV

Number 151106 NCR 475

Part 1 150847 NCR 469

Part 2 151106 NCR 475

Pass the following from Wedemeyer to General Marshall,
War Department, for General Marshall's eyes alone.

Conferences in India and China have been concluded with satisfactory results. Our immediate concerns should be the vigorous implementation of operations contemplated before monsoon. We must stimulate the British to increased activity otherwise Akyab will not be taken prior to beginning of monsoon. I deem this important. British Staff Officer expressed strong doubt that Akyab would be captured prior to monsoon. If British do accomplish objectives outlined to the Gissimo by Anglo American representatives the Chinese will only half heartedly collaborate if at all. The above information may help you in discussions with Dill. He was most generous in his assistance and contributed a great deal to the success of the conferences. The Chinese have not been given full information concerning the Rangoon phase of the Burma operation because of possible leakage. It is important that T. V. Soong does not obtain this feature of the plan in his discussions with you, The President, The Secretary of -----* or any member of your staff. Stilwell would appreciate your help in this regard to retain confidence of the Chinese. For the time being the Chinese are being told that plans are fluid with definite and more detailed decisions to be made later. My personal observation indicates that Stilwell understands the situation in the China India Burma Area better than the British and better than the Chinese themselves. We should leave nothing undone to convince the Chinese that he enjoys our full confidence and that we look to him as the chief arbiter in important matters concerning China. Would it not be timely and appropriate to award Stilwell a DSM? His effectiveness will be commensurate with the prestige he enjoys with the Chinese.

CM-IN-8057 (16 Feb 43)

SECRET

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300 Burma, India, China

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

DECLASSIFIED
93D Letter, 6-3-78
DEC 1 1972

May Room

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

SECURITY CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

Number 1151106 NCR 475

Page 2

February 16, 1943

Re your number 517 I have given Stilwell a resume of major decisions resulting from ANFA conference along with associate pertinent matter. I will inform MacArthur Harmon and Emmons and will caution Harmon and Emmons as you directed. The terrain in many parts of Burma suggests the employment of alligator tractors amphibious jeeps possibly light amphibious tanks. I mentioned this to Stilwell and he agrees. This subject should be considered. Departure for Australia delayed by unfavorable weather. All preparations complete for prompt departure when weather improves.

"Missing Group. Probably "State"

Navy Distribution:

General Marshall (For his eyes alone)

Army Distribution:

Action: General Marshall

Information: OPD

General Deane (CC/S)

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-78

DEC 1 1972

CM-IN-8057 (16 Feb 43) 1258 Z mvs

~~SECRET~~

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

MK 2
Filed 9/2100Z
sh

CCWD
February 9, 1943
1639Z

From: Chungking
To: MILID

No. 51, February 9, 1943

Conference Sino G 2 today states probability Japs conclude China war this year. Indications being Tokyo promised decisive victory this year, Jap radios now employing code Chinese unable to decipher dealing with operations of special units such as artillery cavalry and transport and which employed in past before large scale operations undertaken, Jap Consular officials in China and Russia lately most friendly Russian officials, increased power Wang Ching Wei by Japs extended his influence over all occupied China such as appointing Wang Ching Wei man Mayor Tientsin and Wang made Chairman of a North China Bureau, also reported movement Kwantung army troops South Wall, increased bombings Chinese cities. Movement Kwantung troops south of Wall not confirmed but G 2 investigating report. His opinion that move if made will be within next few months comment: Indications given have been noted here and possibility all out China War discussed frequently. My belief move will be prefaced by peace offers to China which will be spurned. Offer if made could be indication time of attack which probably would follow shortly thereafter. Japanese Army so far has played minor role United Nations War and no great problem complete China conquest. Strong air operations however would prolong campaign tie up many Jap troops and might even defeat the operation: Recommend any contemplated increase air operations China theatre be expedited.

Action: G-2 *FF*
Information: OPD, CG AAF, LOG
CM-IN-4881 (10 Feb 43) 0528 Z MVS

Depass

DECLASS: E)
E.O. 11652, Sec. 303 and 304 or (D)

OSD letter, May 2, 1972

By *ASH* WARD Date *DEC 21 1972*

~~SECRET~~

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U. S. JOURNAL NO. 56 FEB 10 1943

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date *4/2/94*

500 Burma, India China

Capt. for Major Murphy.

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY OF JAPANESE CAPABILITIES IN BURMA

December 24, 1942.

According to the latest G-2 estimates there are at present a total of five Japanese Divisions in Burma.

The 33rd Division is based at Manywa with one regiment last reported at Kalawa and in the nearby Shin Hills; another near Pauk in Pakokku Province and the balance of this division is in the Akyab area, and at Magwe. (Recent British estimates from India place the total Japanese forces in the Akyab area as being the equivalent of a regiment of infantry plus anti-aircraft and artillery units.)

The 55th Division is based at Mandalay with detachments at Bhamo, Myittha, Kamaing and Magaung. (Additional units from this division have recently been reported moving Northward in the Hukawng Valley near Maingmang, and on various recent occasions our fighter planes from the Dinjan area have strafed and bombed small enemy concentrations, storage houses and truck convoys in this region.)

The 56th Division is based at Lashio with one regiment at Tengueh; another further south at Kunlong; the third at Heemwi, near Lashio, and various detachments from these regiments at points in between such as Lamling and Kokang. (While Chinese G-2 and Chinese press dispatches frequently indicate much higher figures it is not thought that at any time recently there have been more than 5,000 or 6,000 enemy troops actually in Western Yunnan Province, with the balance of this 56th Japanese division further South as above indicated.)

The 18th Japanese division is based at Taunggyath with detachments at Meiktila and on the railroad further south toward Toungoo. This division was originally a square division but has been depleted by withdrawals of at least parts of two regiments which are now believed to be on Ondaloanal.

The remaining division known to be in Burma has not been identified but is based at Rangoon with detachments as far north as Prayag and Toungoo and at least parts of three different regiments at Moulmein on the Gulf of Martaban, at Ma-Ubin in the Irrawaddy delta and at Minhla which is halfway between Rangoon and Prayag.

In nearby Thailand there are two unidentified Japanese divisions, in Indo China the 21st division, and in Malaya the 5th Division, and at least part of the famous Guards Division. (Recent Chinese G-2 reports indicate that another unidentified Japanese division has landed in Indo-China and today this same source reports some shifting of enemy troops from Indo-China into Thailand and Burma.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
SSS Letter: D-3-78

DEC 1 1972

SECRETARY TO THE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

Comment: While an actual Japanese offensive into Yunnan Province for the purpose of taking Kunming cannot be entirely ruled out as a possibility it is believed by our observers in both China and India that there is no present indication whatever of such a move. The recent land fighting in Western Yunnan near Tengyueh is dismissed by them with the suggestion that the Japanese there have been merely trying to wipe out pockets of Chinese resistance on the Western banks of the Salween, rather than make any serious effort to cross this difficult barrier and proceed further in the direction of Kunming. Despite frequent press and Chinese reports to the contrary it is felt that in reality the Japanese have been preparing for offensive action in the S. W. Pacific while possibly trying to strengthen their defensive position in Burma.

It remains to be seen as to whether the British advance along the Bay of Bengal towards Akyab following behind the withdrawal of Japanese forces in the Maungdaw-Buthidaung area develops into anything more than a local operation and if so we may expect to see some prompt shifting of the present Japanese dispositions in the areas described above.

According to the latest MIS-ONI report dated December 15th, it is estimated that the Japanese have available a total of 342 combat planes in Burma, Thailand and Indo-China, and a total of 288 in China and Hainan.

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-8-78

DEC 1 1972

-2-

~~SECRET~~

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1942

Major General E. M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.

Dear General Watson:

A communication has been received from New Delhi, India, which states that a small mission has arrived in Lhasa, Tibet, and has been received by the government of Tibet with the highest honors.

It is believed that the mission referred to is one initiated by the Office of Strategic Services and which carried a letter to the Dalai Lama from the President.

G. V. Strong
GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 8-3-78

DEC 1 1972



~~SECRET~~

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR 156
filed 18/1815Z
MM

December 18, 1942
2055Z

Pouch

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

PRIORITY

From: New Delhi

TO: Immediate AGWAR

Re AMMDEL AG 234 December 17, 1942

For eyes General Marshall alone. From Stilwell. Conference with Wavell today. Admiral has not returned so no information available on Naval strength. Wavell does not expect further help in Navy, Air or Ground Forces. His plans contemplate only the occupation of Akyab and an advance to the Chindwin, with raiding parties to the east. Further advance dependent on situation, which makes it highly improbable. He is very fearful of breakdown in supply during rains, due to lack of roads. Told him that for military and political reasons it is necessary for us to proceed in any case in attempt to open road to China. Matter rests there pending arrival of Admiral. I feel we must do everything possible to reestablish communications in spite of obvious difficulties and in spite of fact that a weak British effort on west side will allow Japs to concentrate strongly against Paoshan front. Road work will be slow due to late arrival of machinery and difficulty of moving it to K. Wheeler now making reconnaissance of first fifty miles and will report December twenty first. General attitude of Wavell's staff is that troops cannot be supplied during rains, that road work cannot go on at that time, and that malaria cannot be handled. Further conference coming up. New subject. Your one eight one nine received just before leaving Chungking. Answered from Delhi. Apologies for delay.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5

Note: 1819 is CM-OUT-3721 (12-11-42) OPD.

DEC 1

Action copy: Gen. Marshall

CM-IN-8024 (12-18-42) **SECRET** ems

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

See Bureau Indian China

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WDQ 246
0300/17
BMS

INCOMING MESSAGE ^{CCWD} 0305/17

From: New Delhi
To: AGWAR

No: Ammel 230 Dec 16, 1942

For eyes of Gen Marshall alone. From Stilwell.
Many thanks for prompt action on C-eighty sevens
and help as indicated in your one eight one nine,
Wavells staff emphasizing great difficulties of
proposed operation but according to our people here,
Wavell himself is now behind the proposal and pushing
them. There is great reluctance to undertake anything
before next November. British here have orders to
plan for major operation next fall involving twenty
two divisions. Wavell absent but will be here
tomorrow.

No Sig

Note: WD 1819 is CM-OUT-3721 (12/11/42)OPD.

Action Copy: Gen. Marshall

CM-IN-7215 (12/17/42) 0842Z 1aw

DECLASSIFIED
GSD Letter, 5-3-78

DEC 1 1972

Gen Deane

SECRET

COPY No. 10

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300 Dasma, India, China

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

WK 179
Filed 2/1438Z
ecm

WDCC
December 2, 1942
2037Z

From: New Delhi
To: AGWAR

No. Aquila 8000 A December 1, 1942

Last four months both American and Japanese fighters in this theater have operated successfully against night bombardment during periods of moonlight without radar on aircraft. For Arnold from Bissell informational to Amisca Amel AMSAF and USAFIA. American fighters destroyed three Japanese bombers in flight at night during July and two in November. Japanese fighters successfully intercepted and attacked several RAF bombers near Rangoon and Navy shot up four Liberators during November. Crews of five of six B twenty fours attacking Rangoon zero two hundred November thirtieth saw Japanese fighters close in. One plane did not return.

Japanese search lights illuminate bombers and indicate their general location. Apparently on signal from fighters anti aircraft guns and search lights go out of operation and fighters close. Japanese habitually light red or yellow flares or electric lights on the ground to indicate to their pursuit general course followed by retiring bombers. These lights appear to be out on by ground personnel upon hearing bombers coming. Courses over the ground of several individual bombers are sometimes visible at one time. In American Fighter operations at night Chinese ground observers without special equipment reported general location of hostile aircraft through radio ground command net which passed information to fighters in flight with sufficient accuracy to permit interception and destruction.

Japanese failure to intercept American medium bombers at night probably due to fact B twenty fives faster than most Japanese pursuit. No B twenty fours operating above twenty two thousand have been intercepted at night but from this altitude targets cannot be distinguished well enough to permit worthwhile results.

DECLASSIFYING
OSD Letter, 5-3-78

CM-IN-999

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

300 Bureau, India, China

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

From: ~~Drain~~
To: ~~Drain~~ **INCOMING MESSAGE**

No. Aquila 8000 A December 1, 1942

Page two.

Recommend greater attention in design to obliteration of exhaust glow from bombers.

Also recommend investigation of value to our forces for intercepting hostile bombers at night of using flares or lights on the ground as done by Japanese.

no sig

Action Copy: CG AAF

Info. Copies: OPD
G-2
LOG

CM-IN-999

(12/3/42)

0603Z

ce

U.S. DEPT. OF WAR 55 DEC 3 1942


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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94



[illegible]

Drawn By R.A. Johnson Draftsman M.I., D., W.D.

M.I.D. W.D. 4111-04

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

CD 137
Filed 24/1835Z
ecm

CCWD
Sept 25, 1942
0130Z

From: Chungking
To: Agvar

No. Ammisca 1181 September 23, 1942

General view of situation here. Lull in air operations on account of tense gasoline situation. We cannot afford to invite action until we build up a stock at Kunming. Bissell doing fine job on maintenance and reconditioning of transport planes. Number available increasing consistently. Average load increased to over five thousand pounds. Total tonnage carried increasing to respectable proportions. (For Chief of Staff) preparations made for night flying in event of hostile interference. Fighter defense at Dinjan being organized. Work on new fields going forward fairly well.

Wheeler doing excellent work in SOS in spite of rail transport difficulties due to civil disturbance. Wheeler and Bissell have been in Chungking for ten days; all questions at issue gone over thoroughly. We are attempting water shipment from Karachi to Calcutta to avoid interruption of rail traffic. Satisfactory arrangements made with Chinese CDS agencies in India. Chinese have not previously thoroughly understood procedure.

In Chungking attention is focused on situation at end of war rather than on vigorous effort to finish it. Powers that we are vitally concerned to emerge with firm control backed up by material strength now being furnished by United States. This is fundamental fact that makes it difficult to get them to accept wholeheartedly any reorganization that would disturb the status quo. Progress can be made only step by step, and

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72

DEC 1 1972

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Karachi
To: Agwar

No. Ammsca 1181 September 23, 1942

Page two.

each step must be overwhelmingly proven.

Further demands for more transport planes are to be expected. I have taken the LINE that air transport can never fill their needs and that the only solution is to reopen Rangoon. The more intelligent among them see this now. It will gradually become apparent by the majority, but meanwhile they are inclined to sit back and demand that we do the impossible by air.

The Chekiang dash Kiangpa "fighting" has been enormously exaggerated by the press. I believe the commander was tipped off to take it easy. The Japs merely made a raid with a provisional force of detachments for various garrisons, picked up food supplies, damaged the air fields, and withdrew. The Japs have undoubtedly weakened their China garrisons and are still withdrawing units. Jap action against China at any point unlikely, although Yunnan is still vulnerable. However, whether or not on my insistence, CKS is moving more units into Yunnan and conceivably can make it safe.

The Thirty Division Plan is still hanging fire. I am working at it as best I can, and believe that Chinese action or inaction in this matter will best prove their intentions for wholehearted participation in the war effort.

Stilwell

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OSD Letter, 8-3-78

DEC 1 1972

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: G-2
CG AAF
LOG

U.S. JOURNAL NO. 150 SEP 25 1942

CM-IN-10959 (9/25/42) 1729Z cc

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA CHUNGKING</u>	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE <u>2 SEPT 1942</u>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <u>1654</u>	INFORMATION	DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(2) and 5(D) or (6) OSD Letter, May 3, 1978 By RHP, NARS Date <u>FEB 20 1973</u>	PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>SHAW/HELSHEY</u>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

ROONEY

020450 HCR 9324

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

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ACTION

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F-01
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DOCTOR KING INFORMED ME VERY CONFIDENTIALLY ON 30TH THAT NEGOTIATIONS BY CISSINO AT LANCHOW FOR EXTENSION OF CENTRAL GOVT CONTROL OVER SINKIANG WERE PROCEEDING FAVORABLY. HE STRONGLY INTIMATED RUSSIANS NOT PLEASED BUT UNABLE PREVENT DUE CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER AREA. ASSERTED SOVIETS HAD ENGINEERED MURDER OF GOVERNOR'S BROTHER BY HIS WIFE AS PROTEST TO THAT OFFICIALS VISIT TO CHUNGKING IN JUNE FOR PRELIMINARY TALKS. (SEE NY JULY 1941) KING SAID GOVERNOR WOULD RETAIN HIS POST AND PROVINCE WILL BE OPENED TO TRAVEL BY FOREIGNERS. CENTRAL GOVT. TROOPS HAD NOT YET ENTERED PROVINCE BUT WERE STANDING BY IN KENSU.

AM NOW INFORMED BY OTHER USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT MADAME CHIANG ARRIVED CHUNGKING ON 31ST TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF CISSINO TO CONSUMMATE NEGOTIATIONS. LATER REMAINS LANCHOW UNABLE POSSIBLY FOR REASONS OF FACE TO GO ALL THE WAY

DECLASSIFIED

OSD Letter, 6-3-78

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

300 1/NOIA, Bora, 1/2/78

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(PAGE 1)

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
FOR CODEROOM	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY			ROUTINE
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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

020450 NCR 9324 (PAGE 2)

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F-37
IG-00
VCNO

TO MEET SUBORDINATE WHO HIMSELF IS UNABLE TO LEAVE HIS PROVINCE DUE LOCAL TENSION. OFFICIAL PARTY INCLUDES MILITARY. FOREIGN OFFICE. KUOMINTANG OFFICIALS ALL OF WHOM WILL BE STATIONED HERE. ARRANGEMENTS WILL ^{PROBABLY} BE SIMILAR THOSE IN EFFECT IN YUNNAN. MEANWHILE CHIANANG HAS INVITED COMMUNIST LEADER MAOTZETZNR COME TO LANCHOW. LATTER SAID TO BE SENDING CHIEF OF STAFF LING PIAO. PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT GISSIMO HAS ENGINEERED OUTSTANDING POLITICAL VICTORY BOTH OVER MOSCOW AND CHINESE REDS.

16..ACTION

20G..COMINCH. (NAVIDE)..CNO..200P..FILE

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(C) and 5(D) or (G)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
RHP, NAME Date FEB 20 1973

~~SECRET~~

020450

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WVNA 32
Filed at 18/1220
ge

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
Sept 18
1811

WVZ

From: Chungking

To: Milid

No. 351, Aug 28, 1942

Sources believed reliable and in position to know advises that Shenh-Sgih-Tsai Governor of Sinkiang communicated with Moscow requesting assistance to establish a Soviet State in Sinkiang. Russians sent his proposal to Chungking and Gissimo personally went to Lanchow few weeks ago. He relieved Sheng and appointed Hoyaotsu Governor. Sheng (finding himself turned down by Soviets) was induced to reaffirm allegiance to Chungking and given post of pacification commissioner of Kansu Ninghsia Suiyuan. Chungking getting permission to move troops into Sinkeang.

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Action Copy: G-2 *FE*

Info. Copies: OPD, CG AAF, LOG

CM-IN-8230 (9/19/42) 1333Z vaj

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OSD Letter, 8-3-72
DEC 1 1972

U.S. JOURNAL NO. 119 SEP 19 1942

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300 Bureau, India, China.

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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SECRET

**WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

*John MacCre
for yr. files
WAT*

August 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached messages have been received
from General Stilwell giving first-hand information
of the situation in India.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.

Incls.



SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-8-72

DEC 1 1972

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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SECRET

August 21, 1942.

From General Stilwell, Karachi.

No. AMMISCA 52.

There has been no material change in political situation past 24 hours. Madras area worse. Some parts of Higar situation out of hand. Bombay, nearly all factories fully at work. Calcutta trolleys still out but busses running. Railroad vicinity Benares still interrupted. Air patrols from Calcutta go out along railways to discover sabotage early. It is rumored Gandhi is on hunger strike. Passes now required for all workers, officials and visitors at Army General Headquarters, Delhi. Power of search and arrest of suspicious characters also granted at Army Headquarters. All papers are closely censored, for which reason publication is being suspended by some, particularly those sympathetic to Congress. British are apparently giving United States good information but complete data is sometimes questioned as pertains to riots, deaths, injuries and any such like data.

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OSD Letter, 8-3-72

DEC 1 1972

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

C
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SECRET

August 19, 1942.

From General Stilwell, Karachi.

No. AMMISCA 49.

For the first time British GHQ admit deterioration political situation in India. In general, this has taken place in the east and south. Conditions in west and northwest satisfactory. British GHQ indicated some concern about strike in General Motors Shops, however, 80 percent of workers have now returned.

Considerable anxiety is expressed about the coal area in eastern India. Communists now appear to be actively assisting Congress leaders. Arrests are planned for some of these leaders. Sabotage continues to spread with some damage to railways and utilities in Calcutta, Dacca, Nagapur and Madras areas. In affected areas, tracks have been pulled up, telephone poles pulled down, bridges burned or dismantled and trains and stations damaged or burned. All surface trains and cars in Calcutta are stopped. At Bangalore in southern India firing on mob killed 43 and injured 73. Broadcasts from Germany are supporting the Congress movement and messages in code are being sent.

Information of reasonable reliance indicates that a general railroad strike is planned throughout India beginning August 23rd. There appears to be some organization at present in the civilian disturbance activities. A hint was made at British GHQ this morning that conditions were such as to justify martial law, which may be the next step.

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72

DEC 1 1972

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WVNA 30
Filed at NPT/3
go

INCOMING MESSAGE

CSWD
Aug 3, 1942
2302

From: New Delhi

To: MILID

No. 432, Aug 3, 1942

see below
Strength army of India first July all figures in thousands. Field forces three nine seven frontier defense six eight internal security seven one schools arsenals GHQ and training three six five. Osmun secret. Miscellaneous one eight two overseas one eight nine total one two seven two located as follows Eastern Army one nine five Southern Army two zero one north west Army one seven nine Central Command three one nine Ceylon six two unassigned three one six. Written report follows.

Field Forces - - - 397,000
Frontier Defense - - 68,000
Internal security- - 71,000
Schools, arsenals,
GHQ, training- - - 365,000
Miscellaneous- - - 182,000
Overseas - - - - 189,000

NO SIG
Eastern Army- - 195,000
Southern Army - 201,000
NorthWest " - - 179,000
Central Command 319,000
Ceylon - - - - 62,000
Unassigned - - - 316,000

ACTION: G-2 - 13.6
Total 1,272,000

INFO. COPIES: OPD, A-2, CGAAF, SOS-TAG, LOG

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OSD Letter, 8-8-78

DEC 1 1972

CH-IN-1118 (8-4-42) 0154Z

M.I. 3. JOURNAL NO. 185 AUG 3 1942

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

300 INDIA

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA CHUNGKING</u>	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>10 JULY 42</u>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>KELLEY</u>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>SARNOFF</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

ROUTED BY ROBINSON

080100 NCR 9841

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

GCT

TEXT

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 8-3-72

DEC 1 1972

REPORTED BY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT MME CHIANG WILL LEAVE SHORTLY ~~RECENTLY~~ FOR USA TO MAKE PERSONNEL ~~RECENTLY~~ APPEAL AMERICAN PUBLIC FOR INCREASED AID TO CHINA. SHE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ GEN HUANGPING HEYGOAD POSSIBLY HOLLING TOTONG. DECISION SAID MADE BY GISSIMO WHEN HUANG REPORTED AFTER HIS RECENT RETURN THAT NEITHER SOONG NOR HU SHIH CARRIES ENOUGH WEIGHT TO SWING TIDE BUT ADMIRATION HELD BY US PUBLIC FOR CHIANGS PERSONALLY WOULD DO TRICK. GISSIMO RECENTLY VERY UPSET OVER DIVERSION LONG PROMISED LEASE LEND PLANES AND ASKED THAT HARRY HOPKINS COME CHUNGKING. WIFE'S VISIT IS SIMILAR MOVE TO FORCE IMMEDIATE AID AS BELIEVE CHIANG GENUINELY WORRIED OVER PROSPECT FURTHER JAP OFFENSIVES TO END WAR. HE IS PROBABLY UNDER THINLY VEILED ¹REDICULE FROM PRO NAZI FACTION HERE OVER NON ARRIVAL ON ROAD WHICH BRITISH

~~SECRET~~

SEE PAGE 2

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

080100

300 China

WAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTM T

CHAPTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

080100 NCR 9841

PAGE 2

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

AND RUSSIANS CONTINUE (2 GARBLED GROUPS)

16...ACTION

RECORD COPY: COMINCH...NAVAIDE...13...CHO...FILE
200P...

COPY OF THIS DESPATCH MADE AT
DIRECTION OF CAPT. MCCREA FOR
POUCH OF 7/11/42. Jo

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GND Letter, 6-3-77
DEC 1 1972

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached hereto is a radiogram from General Stilwell recommending that Mr. Currie delay his departure until the arrival of General Gruber about July eleventh.

I called General Marshall and he feels that rather than have Mr. Currie delay his departure we should make an effort to have the two meet somewhere en route. The Operations Division will attempt to arrange this through the Air Ferry Command.

John R. Deane
J.R. DEANE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

Incl.

DECLASSIFIED
GSD Letter, 8-4-78

1972

*Attended to
June 5 1942*

~~**SECRET**~~

WA 23
filed 1015/5
md

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

COND
July 5, 1942
0642 Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

U R G E N T

From: Chungking
To: AGWAR for Ammisca Washington DC

No. 910 Ammisca, July 5th, 1942

Consider it most important that Currie delay his departure until after arrival of General Gruber. For Gen Marshall. With luck Gruber should arrive shortly after July eleventh.

Stilwell

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: G-2
A-2
CG AAF
TAG
LOC
File

CM-IN-1523

(7/5/42)

0730Z

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OSD Letter, 6-3-72

DEC 1 1972

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

BRANCH	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSLO BOMBAY INDIA	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	ROUTINE
RELEASED BY 1 JULY 1942			DEFERRED
DATE 27/1	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
TOR CODEROOM MILITUS			ROUTINE
DECODED BY COLEMAN			DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY			

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY
 (GERMAN) 17152/27 NCR 4444

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT 052000 APRIL.

JAWHARLAL NEHRU HAS BEEN PERSUADED BY GANDHI TO ACCEDE TO PLAN FOR NEW INDIAN CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MOVEMENT PROBABLY ON MASS SCALE. ISSUE EXPECTED BE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF BRIT AUTHORITY FROM INDIA. GANDHI INSISTING THIS COURSE THOUGH ADMITTING POSSIBILITY TEMPORARY CHAOS. SAYS INDIAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT TREAT WITH AXIS WOULD AGREE DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS AGAINST AGGRESSORS. NEHRU'S REASONS FOR AGREEING:

- (A) DISTRUST AND HATRED OF BRITISH SO DEEP AFTER CRIPPS FAILURE THAT NO MOVEMENT TO ALLY WITH BRIT CONTROLLED GOVERNMENT EVEN AGAINST AXIS WOULD GET POPULAR RESPONSE.
- (B) IF GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION COLLAPSES OWING JAP INVASION CONGRESS MUST TAKE OVER IN LARGE AREAS AND ITS LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE MADE READY ONLY BY TESTING THEM WITH REAL ACTION NOT SHAM MOD. THIS IMPORTANT AS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
 OSD Letter, 8-8-78
 DEC 1 1972

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

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 E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

PAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
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DATE _____			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM _____			DEFERRED
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.
(PAGE TWO OF 10152/27 NCR 444)

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

MANY PEOPLE THINK BRIT ARMY WOULD NOT MAKE STAND AGAINST JAP INVADER IN BENGAL BUT ONLY IN BIHAR THEREBY RESULTING IN BREAKDOWN OF PRESTIGE OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION ELSEWHERE IN INDIA AND CHAOS OUTSIDE OF LARGE TOWNS.

(C) IF THROUGH MASS CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE CAMPAIGN AS IN 1920 AND 1930 SPIRIT OF RESISTANCE IS INCUCCATED IN INDIVIDUALS THEY WILL BE MORE LIKELY TO RESIST JAPS WHEREVER JAP ARMY IS NOT IN ACTUAL OCCUPATION.

NEHRU STILL DEAD AGAINST JAPS BUT NOW AGREEING WITH GANDHI THAT EVERYTHING ELSE IS SUBORDINATE TO RIDDANCE OF BRIT POWER. DECISION ON NEW MOVEMENT WILL BE MADE AT CONGRESS WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING EARLY IN JULY. JINNAH PRES MUSLIM LEAGUE YESTERDAY TOLD RELIABLE FRIEND THAT IF CONGRESS LAUNCHES CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE HE INTENDS TO CARRY LEAGUE INTO ACTIVE OPPOSITION. AT LEAST LOCAL CLASHES WOULD INEVITABLY FOLLOW.

SECRET

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OSD Letter, 5-3-73

DEC 1 1972

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

PAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
RELEASED BY _____	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
DATE _____			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM _____			DEFERRED
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.
(PAGE THREE OF 1015Z/27 NCR 4444)

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

MY VIEW IF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE STARTED SITUATION SOME
LOCALITIES MAY DEGENERATE TO THE BURMA STANDARD.

THIS INFO FROM GANDHIS LATEST WRITINGS AND TALK WITH
NEHRU.

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OSD Letter, 8-3-72

DEC 1 1972

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: 16.....

12.....13.....COMINCH.....

FILE: 200P.....P1A.....00.....CH0.....

1015Z/27 NCR4444

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSLO BOMBAY INDIA		OPNAV	RRRRRRRR
FROM	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE
RELEASED BY			DEFERRED
DATE			PRIORITY
FOR COORDROOM	INFORMATION		ROUTINE
DECODED BY			DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY			

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY
(GARTH) 10102/27 NCR NCR 4435

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

CAIT RAJA GOPALA CHARIE. PREMIER MADRAS NOW CONFERRING WITH JINNAH PRES MUSLIM LEAGUE SEEKING CHANCES OF MUSLIM LEAGUE AND INDIA AMONG RESETTLEMENT TO AROUSE A COUNTRY AGAINST JAPS.

MY 271015 AND INTEL REPORTS 54-42 PARA 5. THIS IS RAJA'S LATEST MOVE IN LONELY CAMPAIGN TO ASSOCIATE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES IN WAR EFFORT. IN RECENT SOUTH INDIA TOUR HE GOT MUCH

SUPPORT FROM ORDINARY PEOPLE BUT POWERFUL INDIAN CONGRESS ORGANIZATION FROM WHOSE WORKING COMMITTEE HE RECENTLY RESIGNED UNSHAKENLY AGAINST HIM. LAST WEEK HE TOLD GANDHI THAT HE

WITH OR AGAINST CONGRESS HE WOULD CONTINUE CAMPAIGN WHICH HIS OPINION ONLY POSSIBLE HOPE INDIA'S SALVATION. GANDHI WHO EARLIER AGREED BUT FAILED SEE JINNAH ON VISIT TO BOMBAY RE-

MAINED UNCONVINCED. RAJAJI PRESENTLY TRYING LEARN IF MUSLIM LEAGUE WOULD SUPPORT HIS EFFORT FOR INDIAN LEADERS TO STEP IN TO GOVT TO ORGANIZE PEOPLE AGAINST JAPS. JINNAH WHO WANTS

PRINCIPLE OF PAKISTAN CONCEDED ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE MAN TO PUT DOWN BUT RAJAJI SAYS HE NOT UNHOPEFUL IF IN FURTHER TALKS HE CAN GET MORE DEFINITE COMMITMENTS FROM JINNAH RAJAJI MAY HAVE STRONGER HAND DEALING WITH CONGRESS AND SETTLEMENT THOUGH DOUBTFUL IS POSSIBLE TO AVOID INCIPIENT CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE CAMPAIGN. (THIS FROM TALK WITH RAJA GOPALA CHARI)

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: 16.....
13. 10/11..20G...COMINCH..NAVAID....OPDO.....
FILE: 20CP.....

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OSD Letter, 5-3-74

10102/27

NCR 4435

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77143

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381-10-100

271010

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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WB 31

Filed 0405/1
ams

INCOMING MESSAGE

CSWD

July 1, 1942
1010 GMT

P R I O R I T Y

From: New Delhi
To: Immediate MILID

No. 291, June 30, 1942

Public confidence and morale withstood news Libya better than expected public approves Soviet agreement and second front but worried Re China. Ghandis threatenings are chief political interest. Now hedging, desires retention Amer British troops in Free India governed by Indians. Osmun secret. Confusion in Congress growing. Jinnah Rajgopalachari met to discuss demands Muslim League expect no immediate results. Sikander and Sikhs in Punjab reached important communal agreement with Sikh representation in ministry, excellent move. Forward block ban by govt quietly accepted. Following most secret govt decided remove ban Communist Party Plan use individual offers assistance in war effort and protect source. Labor calm but commodity shortage rising cost living hoarding grain causing some unrest. Railway militarization plan advancing well some opposition organized labor. Difficulties in new defensive areas between troops local population mostly overcome. Faxlul Hug Bengal movement not important.

Osmun

Action Copy: G-2 Bc

Info. Copies: OPD, A-2, CG AAF, TAG, LOG, FILE

MIL JOURNAL HQ

066

JUL 1 1942

28

CM-IN-0083 (7/1/42) 1113Z

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INCOMING MESSAGE

CDW154
Filed NPT
RMC

CSWD
June 26, 1942
9:46 PM

Priority

From: New Delhi

To: Milid

No 273, June 26, 1942

Indian newspapers minimized Tobruk previous fall now emphasize seriousness although army authorities attempting tone them down. Tobruk gives opportunity enemy propaganda but effect if successful will be most gradual. Osmun. Ghandi efforts have not reduced voluntary recruiting. HUQ Prime Minister Bengal fighting Muslim League to safeguard his insecure position: likely fail to stop Rajgopalachari Prime Minister Madras with personal integrity and influence is attempting coordinate Congress Muslim League find solution Pakistan, opposing Ghandi: likely to fail. Ghandi nervous fears growing confusion India someone with sound constructive ideas may carry country. Ghandi attitude bitter anti American and we are forwarding detailed report. Nehru not anxious British leave India as necessary administration army police civil service business country avoid chaos.

Osmun

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72

ACTION: G-2 *Ac*

DEC 1 1972

INFO COPIES: OPD, A-2, CGAAF, TAG, LOG, FILE

MIL JOURNAL NO.

019

JUN 27 1942

27

CM-IN-8745 (6/26/42) 11:33 PM

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

300 India

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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7 WVNA
Filed 1435/26
ACH

INCOMING MESSAGE

CSWD
June 26, 1942
12:39 P. M.

URGENT

See State

From: Chungking
To: Agwar

No. 873, Ammisca, June 26th, 1942.

For Sec. War and Chief of Staff. Conference with CKS on twenty fourth unexpectedly made some progress on scheme for training Chinese troops in India. Plan was tentatively accepted by CKS. At conference on twenty sixth gave him the news about diversion of heavy bombers from India to Egypt, and diversion rpt diversion of a dash twenty nines now arriving Khawtum. These two items made profound impression on him, and he directed me to inform the President as follows "CKS believes the President is sincere and feels these orders were given without his knowledge or consent. Feels that Allies do not regard China as part of allied war effort rpt allied war theater. China had done her best for five years. Questions whether allies are doing their best for China. If crisis exists in Libya, a crisis also exists in China. He had assurances that Tenth Air Force was to operate in China and expected notification before any part of it was taken away. Now it appears that Allies have no interest in China Theater, and he wants an answer, yes or no, to the question do the Allies want the China Theater maintained?" Madame then added that pro dash Japanese activity here was pronounced and the question was whether or not the United States wanted China to make peace. Both CKS and Madame were bitter about this matter, and they were not mincing words when they asked for an unequivocal answer to the question as to whether or not the Allies were interested in maintaining the China War Theater.

Believe this matter is of such importance that it should be presented by an officer who knows the background and the issues involved thoroughly, I am returning Gen. W. R. Gruber to the United States at once by

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

See China

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page two, No. 873, June 26th, 1942.

air, and request confirmation of this action. CKS made an urgent plea that either I go myself or that I send a well dash qualified officer and was obviously relieved to know I was planning it. In my opinion rpt in my opinion the matter has reached a very serious stage.

Stillwell.

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: SGS
LOG
File

CM-IN-3586 (6-26-42) PM 2:05

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DEC 1 1972

FILE JOURNAL NO.

156

JUN 26 1942

~~SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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WB 193

Filed 021000

ett

INCOMING MESSAGE

CSWD

June 21, 1942
1:48 A. M.

From: New Delhi
To: Immediate Milid

#254, June 20, 1942

Effect of Coral Sea and Midway battles on chances of Jap invasion of India or Ceylon is subject of long British official appreciation date mid June which will be air mailed. Conclusions summarized herewith. Recent naval battles likely to intensify Japans already essentially defensive attitude and any future operations will probably aim to improve defensive position rather than to attempt new venture at a distance. Ruling considerations for future operations are, first, consolidation of gains for unaided defense against all comers, second insufficiency of air forces and for the time being of carriers. From Osmun. India and Ceylon potential commitments elsewhere. A short hopping attack along coast of Bay of Bengal is possible but unlikely during monsoon after which defense should be adequate to prevent success, in any case results would probably not justify the effort required, particularly in the air, temporary occupation of Ceylon would offer substantial advantages but for lack of carriers is unfeasible before October first by which time defense should be adequate. Appreciation ends. Believe this appreciation overstates defensive nature of Japanese strategy and over looks influence of possible German successes in Middle East, for instance German approach to Red Sea or Persian Gulf might

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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ATTN: 0320/3
R3 363

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

#254, June 20, 1942 From: New Delhi To: Milid Page 2

bring full scale Jap offensive to seize Ceylon and perhaps west coast Indian ports reestablish sea communications with Axis partners and gain access to Middle east oil.

No Sig

Action Copy: G-2 *AC*

Info. Copies: OPD
A-2
CG AAF
TAG
LOG
File

CM-IN-6706 (6-21-42) AM 6:01

MIA JOURNAL NO.

72

JUN 21 1942

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WB 136
2320/15
dj

INCOMING MESSAGE

CSWD
June 15
833P

PRIORITY

From: New Delhi
To: MILID

No. 108 June 15, 1942

British still intrnd complete their section Ledo-Haukon Valley road. British section runs through Ledo, Ikhapani, Tipang, Kumlao, Ngokpi, Bampong, Pasgsau pass. Present status Chinese section this road from Pangsau pass through Shingbuiyang, Kamaing, Mogaung, Jyitkyina unknown but Chinese responsible for construction if conditions permit. British have in Ledo prefabricated materials for suspension bridges across Tirap and Namchik rivers. Osmun secret. Construction of bridges to begin in July anticipated completion middle September. Refer map Assam and Burma number 83 M already dispatched. Tirap river bridge 140 foot span located 11 miles east of Ledo at point R 3971. Refer 92 A Map Oamchik river Bridge 100 foot span located between Ngokpi and Lisok at latitude 27 degrees 17 minutes north longitude 96 degrees 02 minutes east. Both bridges built for load capacity 30 hundredweight.

Osmun

Action Copy: G-2 *AE*

Info. Copies: OPD
A-2
CG AAF
TAG
Log
File

CM-IN-4835 (6/15/42) PM 10:43

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER		TENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ALUSLO BOMBAY	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY				ROUTINE
DATE	8 JUNE 1942	INFORMATION		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM	1333/9TH		PRIORITY	
DECODED BY	PARSONS		ROUTINE	
PARAPHRASED BY	YEAGER			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

GARTH

1052Z/8

NCR 1951

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

MY 030510:

Lt Jg Talbot USNR

VICEROY DRESSED DOWN MAHARAJA HOLKA OF INDOR, SAYING EMBARRASSMENT HAD BEEN CAUSED HIM GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND H.M. GOVERNMENT BY OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT, U.S., AND THAT HE AND SECY OF STATE AMEDY TOOK SERIOUS VIEW BECAUSE INDIAN PRINCES NOT SUPPOSED ENTER POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN STATES. VICEROY'S POLITICAL AGENT LATER HANDED MAHARAJA DRAFT OF LETTER HE SHOULD SEND VICEROY APOLOGIZING FOR OPEN LETTER, ADMITTING HE HAD BEEN WRONG TO USE SUCH CHANNELS, STATING HE HAD ACTED ON OWN INTIATIVE AND NOT ON ADVICE. MAHARAJA NOW CONSIDERING WHETHER HE IN STRONG ENOUGH POSITION TO SEND LETTER SAYING INSTEAD HE REGRETS ANY PERSONAL EMBARRASSMENT TO VICEROY BUT WAS ONLY TRYING TO MAKE WHAT CONTRIBUTION HE COULD TO UNITED NATIONS WAR EFFORT AND THOUGHT VICEROY WOULD APPROVED SUCH MOTIVES.

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OCD letter, May 3, 1972

By UA NARS Date DEC 20 1972~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

37143

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081052 300 India

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

AL MESSAGE		NAVY DEPARTMENT	
DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
FOR CODEROOM	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE 2 OF

1052Z/8

NCR 1951

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT

TEXT

CONTINUES TO FEEL HE IS RIGHT IN ADVOCATING INT ARBITRATION OF INDIAN PROBLEM AND LEGALLY CORRECT IN METHOD HE USED. REALIZES GOVERNMENT OF INDIA VERY DISPLEASED WITH HIM BUT STILL HOPES GAIN ACCEPTANCE OF HIS PROJECTED CONSTITUTION FOR INDOA STA.

THIS INFO FROM PERSONAL TALK WITH MAHARAJA. INDIAN PRESS RESPONSE TO OPEN LETTER VERY FAVORABLE.

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: 16.....

10/11....13....COMMON....

FILE: P1A.....

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OGD letter, May 3, 1972
By 324, NARS Date DEC 20 1972

1052Z/8 NCR 1951

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/96

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM BOMBAY INDIA	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			~~ROUTINE~~
DATE 5 JUNE 1942			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM SCS	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY MULVEY			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY V. TUCKER			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

ENS ROONEY

030510 NCR 9832

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

GCT

TEXT

MAHARAJAH OLKA OF INDORES OPEN LETTER TO PRES US MAY 28 ADVOCATING
INT ARBITRATION INDO BRITISH DISPUTE. BACKGROUND OF MAHARAJA'S APPEAL
 IS LONG STANDING DISSATISFACTION WITH THIS PUPPET LIFE AND BITTERNESS
 AGAINST IMPERIAL POLICY. WHEN IN AMERICA LAST MAHARAJA INVESTIGATED
 POSSIBILITY BECOMING US CITIZEN WOULD HAVE ABDICATED HAD THAT BEEN
 POSSIBLE. GREATLY ADMIRES AMERICA AND HAS OFFERED WHOLE RESOURCES INDORE
 STATE TO US WAR EFFORT IN INDIA. LETTER TO PRES PREPARED UNDER GREAT
 TENSION AND COMPROMISE URGED ON HIM BY FRIENDS INSTEAD OF OUTRIGHT
 STATEMENT GIVING UP THRONE AND BLAMING BRIT IMPERIALISM FOR LACK OF
 INDIAN PEOPLES SUPPORT OF ALLIED WAR EFFORT. PERSONAL STRESS INCREASED
 BECAUSE MAHARINI (AMERICAN WIFE) JUST FLOWN BACK TO US AND UNDERGONE
 OPERATION DOCTORS HOSPITAL NY. AFTER OPEN LETTER PUBLISHED MAHARAJA
 SUMMONED TO SEE VICEROY THIS DATE. IF HE RETAINS THRONE HE INTENDS
 INTRODUCE INDORE STATE EXTREMELY DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION WITHIN FEW
 WEEKS. HIS SINCERITY UNQUESTIONED. THIS INFO CONFID BUT RELIABLE.

DISTRIBUTION

16....ADAMON

10/11...113...COMMON. JESSE FILE 11. FIN FILE 11. FNL...

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030510

200 Bureau, Indian, China

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

*Capt. McLean
for your files.*

May 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Stilwell in a radio dated May 25, 1942 makes the following recommendations regarding the reopening of the Burma Road:

"Reurad 713 of May 24 plans have been completed for maximum employment of 10th Air Force in direct support of China Theater and will be put into effect at earliest possible time. My belief in decisive strategic importance of China is so strong that I feel certain a serious mistake is being made in not sending American Combat Units into this Theater to regain Burma, clear Thailand, and then from China force entry into the triangle Hanoi-Hainan-Canton from which control can be disputed of Major Enemy Air Lanes from Japan and Manchuria and enemy sea lanes in the South China Sea. Such action will give great lift to Chinese, counter Chinese peace elements and aid me in organizing Chinese Forces for decisive offensive action. British are more interested in augmenting their own Forces by our Air Units primarily for defence of India and not in pursuit of successful plan of campaign against Japan. I recommend transfer to India of 1 or more American Divisions without delay."

It is proposed that the following message be sent to him and it is therefore, submitted for your approval:

"Your analysis of the strategic importance of China as set forth in your number 61 May 25 is fully appreciated here.

For Stilwell from Marshall.

However the shipping required to transport one or more American Divisions to your command and to support them once in your area would involve an undertaking which we are simply not repeat not in a position to make.

In order to take maximum advantage of all means available in India to the United Nations, the following is presented to you for your consideration and recommendation. Apparently Chinese

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DEC 1 1972

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~
-2-

Lend-Lease munitions now in India cannot under present arrangements be employed against the enemy. Please consider proposition that based on a British agreement to take the offensive for purpose of reopening the Burma Road these munitions might be turned over to them. The approval of the Generalissimo would be essential to such an arrangement. Also it would be important that Chinese hopes for reopening of the road should not be prematurely raised. Your position of command or direction in such an undertaking would be determined after receiving your report and your specific recommendations in regard to this phase of the matter."

s/ George Marshall
Chief of Staff

O.K.

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFYING
DATE 5-1-73

DEC 1 1972

WC 65
filed 1925/27
spf

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CSWD
May 28
12:08 A

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: New Delhi
To: AGWAR

No. Ammisca 73 May 27, 1942

For your information I have issued the following instructions " Paragraph 1 effective at once all US Army Personnel now attached to or employed with the 1st American Volunteer group air (AVG) come under command and control of the Commanding General 10th Air Force who is also charged with the responsibility for all measures to effect the smooth transition of the AVG into the 23d Pursuit Group so that this unit will continue to be an operating command to the maximum practicable extent.. Upon induction command of 23d Pursuit Group is vested in the commanding General 10th Air Force. Operational direction of this unit will be coordinated with the special instructions of Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. All action preparatory to induction will likewise be coordinated with the wishes and instructions of the Generalissimo Paragraph 2 effective at once the commanding general 10th Air Force is charged with the supervision of all preparatory measures regarding Halpro unit and with command and control of this unit upon arrival in this theater subject to any special instructions which may be issued by the War Department. Stillwell."

Stillwell

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: G-2, A-2, CG AAF, SGS,
TAG, and File.

CM-IN-7824 (5/28/42) AM 1:41

U.S. JOURNAL NO

27

MAY 28 1942

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72

DEC 1 1972

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COPY No.

25

300 Corona India, *India* THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Inclosed herewith is a radiogram received from General Stilwell last night which outlines his plans for the immediate future. Our No. 983 referred to in paragraph 3 was one commending him for the courageous manner with which he met the hazards and difficulties incident to the last ten days of the Burma campaign.

There is also inclosed a radiogram received from our Military Attache in Russia telling of the experiences and treatment of the crew of the plane from General Doolittle's mission which was forced to land in Russia.

J. T. McNarney
J. T. McNARNEY,
Major General,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

Incls.
2 radiograms.



DECLASSIFIED
GSD Letter, 8-2-78

DEC 1 1972

~~SECRET~~

300 China Burma India
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WB 17
Filed 0920/26
ame

INCOMING MESSAGE

CSWD
May 26, 1942
6:16 A.M.

URGENT

From: New Delhi
To: AGWAR

Nr. 62, May 25, 1942.

Para 1 I arrived Dinjan May 23rd, conference with Wavell, arrived Delhi May 24th. For Marshall from Stilwell. Will go to Chungking as soon as Wavell gets back, probably 27th. All our personnel out of Burma except Capt. Hambleton who I believe is with 22nd Division. 1 officer and 3 enlisted men hospitalized with malaria. No other trouble enroute except few cases dysentery and heat exhaustion now recovered.

Para 2 Will maintain large proportion of our staff in China as evidence our intentions to stand by. Plan for training Chinese troops in abeyance. Trying to find way to get them here.

Para 3 Many thanks for the expression of confidence in your 983. It was a humiliating experience to be run out of Burma and I feel keenly the inadequacy of my efforts to prevent it.

Stilwell.

Note: WDCMC has no record of 983.
Attention invited to (CM-OUT-2270, 5/12/42)SGS.

Action Copy: SGS

Info. Copies: OPD, G-2, A-2, CG AAF,
TAG, and File.

CM-IN-7262 (5/26/42) AM 7:35

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OSD Letter, 5-3-78
DEC 1 1972

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Op-16-F-2

May 25, 1942

F-2 0072

A-3 4143

~~SECRET~~

Subject: Failure of the British Commando Effort in China.

This serial consists of reports from the U. S. Naval Attache, Chungking, from Mr. Kennick, British, who was in charge of the non military sections of the British Commando Group, and from Mr. Eric Nyholm, Dane, who was in active charge of the Commando Training School. These reports make clear the reasons for the failure of the British Commando efforts. They point out many of the difficulties involved in giving any sort of assistance to China, particularly in any joint enterprise where cooperation from the Chinese is essential to success. This serial should be read carefully by all who are interested in guerrilla or related activities in China.

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 OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
 NAVY DEPARTMENT
INTELLIGENCE REPORT ^{Dapt letter 3-23-23}
 Date ^{APR 4 1943}

Serial 6/42
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Monograph Index Guide No. 100 - Various
 (To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide.
 Make separate report for each main title.)

From NAVAL ATTACHE at CHUNGKING Date April 25, 1942
 (Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference ALHAMA TO OPNAV DESPATCH 060001 OF APRIL 1942
 (Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)

Source Official plus personal observation Evaluation RELIABLE RAS
 (As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with identity
 when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, established, unverified, etc.)

Subject CHINA Political Forces Various
 (Nation reported on) (Main title as per Index Guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

BRIEF.—Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

FAILURE OF THE BRITISH COMMANDO EFFORT IN CHINA

The attached report to London from the Chief of the British Economic Warfare Service in China, with Enclosures "A" and "B" thereto, has been made available in the strictest secrecy. It sets forth the story briefly of the failure of the recent Commando effort in China. The events described therein afford an unusual insight into the present situation in China and the attitude of China toward the Occidental World today. The underlying forces and the implications involved are far more fundamental and serious than can be seen at a glance or embodied in a brief report.

The episode is of particular interest to us because of the sentiment that has grown rapidly in recent months in the U.S.A. for assistance to China and especially in view of vague reports reaching Chungking that an effort similar to the one described herein has been contemplated by the U. S. government. It should be readily apparent from the evidence set forth herein that any such idea is wholly impracticable and should be abandoned forthwith for despite the particular anti-British angles involved, the basic implications affect all foreigners.

Had this effort succeeded in getting organized and commenced operations in genuine collaboration with the Chinese, its potentiality for producing useful enemy information would have been tremendous in addition to the actual physical damage it could have produced.

Its failure is a combination of many causes which are not clearly defined, but some of which are set forth below:

a. The fundamental and psychological inability of the Chinese to cooperate in the real sense of the term. The innate superiority complex of the Chinese, ever-present considerations of "face", national pride, basic distrust of foreigners and devious political factors and intrigues are all involved in this.

DNI (2), Ambassador, MA, General Stilwell, File

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b. The mistake of the British in assuming open control of the project after war broke and especially in placing a former "Taiwan" in charge of the work. Mr. Keswick, despite his personal integrity, charm and ability, typifies in the Chinese mind, as a scion of the House of Jardine, Matheson, Ltd., the "Master versus Slave" psychology of the past hundred years of Sino-British relations which the Generalissimo is bent on eradicating.

c. The far flung and insidious power of the Chinese Secret Service who control the guerrillas and who undoubtedly feared interference by the foreigners. This undoubtedly included opposition to foreigners learning any secrets and possibly included fear of disruption of the existing state of affairs at the front.

d. The cumulative affect of the progressive loss of Hongkong, Singapore and Rangoon and the resultant openly expressed contempt of the British by Chinese in all walks of life from the Generalissimo on down.

e. The complete incompetence of General Chow and his lieutenants who were assigned by the Generalissimo to work with the foreigners.

The following comments and background explanation are added as a preface to the report:

The British initiated two separate and distinct Commando projects during the Spring of 1941. The first was a strictly military affair organized and trained in Burma under the control of the British Military Attache to China, Major General L. E. Denny (late Chief of the British Military Mission). This project was known as the "204" Mission and was composed entirely of British Army personnel, many of whom had previous experience in Commando work in Norway, France, Crete, Libya and Abyssinia. Although organized to fight in China this group could not be used until actual war was declared between Great Britain and Japan. They have been in China since December, 1941, but have accomplished little and are also being withdrawn.

The second effort - that described herein - was organized by the Ministry of Economic Warfare to operate prior to a declaration of war. It was composed of non-British nationals and was to operate as an undercover unit to train and work with Chinese guerrillas on sabotage and terrorism behind the Japanese lines, rather than in straight commando raids as envisaged for "204". The Chinese personnel assigned by the Generalissimo for the two groups to work with were likewise separate and distinct. The man assigned to work with "204" was an army man and his men were selected direct from the Army whereas General Chow Wei-lung was a guerrilla chief from Shanghai area and his personnel was selected from college students. These young men proved to be, incidentally, very keen and enthusiastic students and the pity of this entire episode is that the project could not have gone on, for the young Danes working with them under Mr. Nyholm were likewise a capable and energetic lot who knew their business. There is no doubt that there is a clear, clean water flowing underneath the surface in China, but completely inbedded under a thick crust of filthy politics and stupidity.

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I have known Mr. Khyola for fifteen years and have been in intimate daily contact with him and his project ever since he arrived in Chungking in November, 1941. I have likewise known Mr. Kewiatok for several years and have had equally close contact with him. The delays and frustration, together with the continual suspicion, petty politics and intrigues, which have attended their efforts beggars description.

It is significant that when they first arrived, nothing was too good for them. This was particularly true of Mr. Kewiatok who accompanied the Generalissimo's official party to India together with the former British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, and on that trip rendered continuous assistance to the Generalissimo and his entourage. This state of cordiality continued for sometime after their return to Chungking until one day the situation suddenly froze up mysteriously, but significantly just after the demand which General Chou Wei-lung had made for complete control of all foreign personnel and supplies. A request by Mr. Kewiatok to Dr. Hollington Tong (confidant and interpreter to the Generalissimo) for an appointment with the Generalissimo was met with the frigid response that such would have to be obtained through the Foreign Office although the informal approach had always been the rule (and still is for many others).

Shortly after this Dr. Tong was sent by the Generalissimo to see the British Ambassador personally and request the withdrawal of the China Commando Group. No explanation was given. The Generalissimo then left town for a few days. Upon his return requests to see him both from the Chief of the British Military Mission and from the British Ambassador himself were ignored for over two weeks. The Generalissimo then sent General Shang Chen, Chief of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the National Military Council, and Dr. Tong to call upon the British Ambassador and discuss details for the withdrawal of the group. It is extremely significant that the British Ambassador accepted this treatment, especially since the Generalissimo is concurrently Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The British Ambassador did not in fact see the Generalissimo until 24 April when the former was permitted to call to confer upon the Generalissimo the decoration of Grand Commander of the Bath. At this time the reasons for the withdrawal of the China Commando Group were discussed and the Generalissimo was asked if the withdrawal from China of Mr. Kewiatok personally was desired. The Generalissimo disclosed any such desire, but gave as his reason for requesting withdrawal of the group the allegation that they had been "interfering" in Provincial politics. He did not elaborate on this, but from other sources the following instances are known to have been reported to him in greatly exaggerated form:

1. REMARKS A British group has been operating with the guerrillas here quite separately from the Commando projects since before the fall of Hongkong. This group was under Mr. Kewiatok's control after his arrival. It had assisted Admiral Chen Chak to escape from Hongkong and there have been rumors that this popular Cantonese might be named

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Chairman of Kwangtung Province. Kwangtung is still semi-autonomous politically and there is no telling what political undercurrents and rumors may have been circulating in connection with British activities, or for that matter how guilty the British on the spot may be.

2. SUIYUAN This report arose because of a letter written by one of the Group, one George Soderbaum, longtime resident of Inner Mongolia, to General Fu Tso-yi, Chairman of Suiyuan, offering to come up and help him. It demonstrates, among other things, that the mail of the Group had been closely watched.

3. YUNNAN During the stop-over in Kunming of the Generalissimo's party returning from India, when they were entertained by Chairman Lung Yun, Mr. Keswick made what he insists was an innocent request to call upon the Chairman. This appears to have been reported to the Generalissimo as an attempt to intrigue. Relations with Yunnan have always been delicate, albeit friendly, but Lung Yun is treated by the Generalissimo as an ally rather than a subordinate. (See reference in Enclosure "B", page 4, to the erroneous report concerning the arrival of one hundred members of the "204 Mission" in Yunnan who were rumored in Chungking to be a part of a secret army being brought in by Mr. Nyholm)

The foregoing are merely a few sidelights on the whole episode. I agree in general with Mr. Keswick in his conclusion that the important lesson to be learned is that "China in her present mood will not allow foreigners to play with her guerrillas, (that) she will take any equipment we give her and will hang on to it for her own use in her own time and until the Far Eastern situation changes we cannot expect anything better from this 'octopus' ally." The experiences which the British have had in this effort, which in the main was an honest and straightforward effort to help the Chinese, should be a lesson to us. We should not permit the Chinese, to turn now to us and importune us to undertake anything similar, for there is little doubt that we should encounter the same difficulties.

J. M. McHUGH,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Naval Attache and Naval Attache for Air.

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(COPY OF REPORT MADE TO THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
LONDON, BY MR. JOHN KENNICK, DIRECTOR OF THE FIRM OF
JARDINE, MATHESON, LTD., WHO RETURNED TO CHINA IN DECEMBER,
1941, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE M.E.W. IN CHINA WITH THE
RANK OF FIRST SECRETARY IN THE BRITISH EMBASSY)

April 13th, 1942

CHINA COMMAND GROUP.

The Generalissimo's order to close down was a great disappointment, not only to me but to everyone working here. However, it may be a blessing in disguise for I have been feeling for some time that the situation was most unhealthy. You will have gathered this from my telegram No. 77. It was beginning to look as if we were about to spend very large sums of money and at the best to do little more than scratch the surface of China.

I enclose some notes prepared by Mr. Nyholm on the story of the Group that give a fair picture essentially and factually though I think the hostile attitude of the Generalissimo is over painted. I attribute the failure of the scheme to the following causes:

- (a) Change of attitude of the Chinese since the loss of Hongkong and Singapore. It is only here that one realises how sad and how bitter is the feeling about Hongkong where all the Chinese that count had their money, their wives and quite a few of them their sweethearts.
- (b) The complete incompetence of General Chow and his organisation which has resulted, perhaps in self defence on his part, in the misunderstanding of our whole position and our motives.
- (c) Internal Chinese politics, intrigues and suspicions.

To write up the story would be a long job and perhaps would achieve nothing. An important lesson, however, emerges and that is that China in her present mood will not allow foreigners to play with her guerrillas, she will take any equipment we like to give her and will hang on to it for her own use in her own time and until the Far Eastern situation changes we cannot expect anything better than this "octopus" ally.

J. K.

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Chungking, April 9, 1942

SUMMARY OF ATTACHED REPORT ON THE CHINA COMMANDO GROUP
SUBMITTED BY MR. NYHOLM TO MR. KESWICK.

1. ORIGINAL CONCEPTION OF THE SCHEME.

Early in 1941 it was decided to offer more active military help to China by providing modern explosives, leadership and co-ordinated planning for Chinese sabotage and irregular Guerilla forces. (This was before the Pacific War began and before "204" Mission had entered China).

Owing to the political situation then existing it was imperative to provide this help through the medium of and under the cover of a Danish industrial concern employing neutral technical experts. Mr. Nyholm of the Madsen Corporation was selected as leader of this organization.

2. UNDERSTANDING WITH THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES.

The Generalissimo agreed to a plan proposed by H. M.'s Ambassador whereby a group of Danes ostensibly neutral employees of a Danish armament manufacturers would be sent to China at the expense of the British Government and would

1. Import substantial quantities of modern explosives and sabotage "gadgets".
2. Establish training schools for demolition & sabotage.
3. Establish advance section at the front to plan and execute commando raids and sabotage behind Jap lines.
4. Establish an advisory board attached to the H.Q. of General Chow Wei-lung who was appointed to unify all Chinese irregular guerillas under his command.

3. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN.

A group of Danes, etc. having special knowledge of China have been recruited and secretly trained in Malaya. Equipment, motor transport, explosives, etc. have been supplied by the British Army. The Group moved to China after the outbreak of the Pacific War and was recognized officially as CHINA COMMANDO GROUP commanded by Mr. Erik Nyholm (who was given a special commission of Lieutenant Colonel). A school was established near Chungking in March 1942 and in early April the first bunch of enthusiastic Chinese youth graduated.

4. CHINESE OBSTRUCTIONS.

Instead of cooperating General Chow made systematic obstructions of the work of the C.C.G. partly because he had no organization whatsoever to cope with the situation and partly with a view to getting unconditional control of all stores of explosives and so as to reduce the C.C.G. to the status of an advisory board without any obligations on their part.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

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5. ORDER TO WITHDRAW.

In April General Chaw made demands on the C.C.G. which could have reduced the efficiency of the unit to zero and which showed a complete misunderstanding of the original agreement with the Generalissimo. Refusal to comply with these demands led to Generalissimo's order for immediate withdrawal.

6. ANALYSIS OF CAUSE OF HOSTILE ATTITUDE.

1. Aggressive attitude resulting from British loss of prestige and influence of "Asia for the Asiatics" doctrine. This is a strong political trend which amounts to anti-foreignism.
 2. Fear that the C.C.G. may on its own disrupt the state of undeclared peace on the front and provoke Jap reprisals, without the consent of the Chinese Govt., which would not be forthcoming.
 3. Fear that closer collaboration between the C.C.G. and the Chinese Commando Army will disclose that the said army is being built up as a political army on the lines of Gestapo and, for the present, not as a fighting unit on the front.
 4. The Chinese High Command desires to receive foreign help without any obligation to carry on warfare against the Japs or any interference from foreign officers.
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Chungking, April 9, 1942

A REPORT ON THE CHINA COMMANDO GROUP

1. ORIGINAL CONCEPTION OF THE SCHEME

In the beginning of 1941 a scheme was evolved with the active support of the British Ambassador to China, for active military aid to China through the support of Chinese irregular forces which were then taking a considerable toll of the enemy.

These forces, were, however, poorly supported by the Central Government; most of them were in bad need of money, equipment and arms. Furthermore there was no coordinated leadership, no liaison with the regular armies and no attempt for planned operations. Various irregular units and bands operated in no man's land and behind the Japanese lines entirely on their own, a haphazard fashion, often seeking monetary and commercial benefit rather than the destruction of the enemy. Certain large armed bands which called themselves Guerillas or Irregulars were engaged exclusively in profitable smuggling and attached or harassed the Japanese only if the latter attempted to enforce the blockade too severely.

It was evident that the irregular forces could and should be employed to a better advantage and that appreciable results might be achieved by supplying them with much needed arms, leadership and intelligent staff work.

At that time, i.e. early in 1941, the British Authorities were not in a position to provide direct military assistance to the Chinese. A project was, therefore, made and approved whereby to avoid any implications of G.B. this help would be given through the medium of, and under the cover of, a Danish industrial concern by neutral civilians who were to act as technical experts in the employ of such a concern.

In August 1941 two free Danes - Erik Nyholm of the Madsen Corporation and Hans Tofte were entrusted with the leadership of such an organization. Mr. Nyholm was given very wide powers and, after consultation with the highest military authorities in Malaya and H.M.'s Ambassador to China, the whole plan was submitted by Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

2. UNDERSTANDING WITH CHINESE AUTHORITIES.

This plan, subsequently approved by the Generalissimo, consisted of the following main points:

- a. The importation to China via Burma of a substantial quantity of most modern explosives and of various demolition apparatus and sabotage appliances commonly called "gadgets".
- b. The establishment of training schools for guerilla demolition squads in Chungking and in war zones at Loyang, Chekiang, Hunan, Kwangtung, etc.
- c. The establishment of "advance sections" in war zones entrusted with the distribution of demolition materials to trained guerillas for definite approved jobs, and for planning commando raids.

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- d. The establishment of a central advisory board attached to the H. Q. of General Chow Wei-lung, C-in-C of the Chinese Commando Army which was conceived in view to unify all guerilla units. General Chow had already under his control about 40,000 men of the Chung Yi Army operating as irregulars in Chakiang of a "Mixed Guerilla Unit" and of a Railway Demolition Corps.
 - e. This central organization was to be divided into Training, Operations, Transport, Intelligence, and Supply Departments. All operations were to be carried by the Danish Commander of the organization in full coordination and with the cooperation of General Chow.
 - f. All charges for the establishment of the organization, pay of the personnel, explosives, etc. were to be borne by the British Government.

3. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN

In the meanwhile a contingent of volunteers chiefly of Danish nationality was recruited in the U.S.A., China, Malaya and elsewhere. The men were selected with a view to their past experience and knowledge of China and of the Chinese language.

In November, the majority of these men received a special course in the use of modern explosives and commando warfare in a Technical (secret) training school in Malaya and in December the contingent moved to Burma and were supplied with motorized equipment, stores and an important quantity of demolition "gadgets" and explosives.

When the Pacific War broke out, it was no longer necessary to use the Madsen Corporation as cover and the new organization was placed under the control of a special representative of the British Govt., Mr. John Keswick. Upon Mr. Keswick's arrival to China, the organization received the status of a special British unit under the name of China Commando Group. Mr. E. Nyhalla was commissioned in the British Army and appointed Commander of the Group.

On February 4th the personnel and convoys of lorries carrying explosives, etc. started moving from Burma and a base at Kweiyang was established. In March the first training school was organized in Chungking near General Chow's H.Q. and on April 12th the first (and the last) group of 70 Chinese youths will graduate there in demolition guerilla tactics, fieldcraft, etc.

The eagerness and avidity to learn of the Chinese students on the one hand, and the organization ability and hard work of the instructors, Lt. Petersen, Lt. A. S. Olsen, Lt. F. A. Olsen, assisted by two other Europeans, on the other hand started the school on a good sound basis of which all concerned were well satisfied and which promised excellent results for the future.

By the middle of the course it became evident that even better results could have been achieved if the Chinese command would interfere less with the programme by taking a great deal of the students' time for political speeches, spiritual mobilization, etc. Furthermore,

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the Chinese command did not provide sufficient materials for demolition which, owing to strict control of scrap metal, it was impossible for foreigners to purchase on the market.

4. OBSTRUCTION BY THE CHINESE.

While this good work was being carried on, all other plans and the whole organization of the C.C.G. was systematically obstructed by General Chow himself and his staff. Thus:

1. At the Kweiyang Base the Military Authorities failed to provide adequate storage facilities for explosives, garage space and living quarters.
2. Owing to congestion at Kweiyang the personnel of the C.C.G. had to stay in a public hotel where no secrecy was possible. It is understood that this was done on purpose in order to facilitate spying by General Chow's agents. Explosives and stores were put into two much too small and wet dugouts and there was no possibility of unpacking materials up to date.
3. Liaison Officers supplied by General Chow at Kweiyang were employed chiefly in spying on C.C.G. and were, instead of assisting the Group, sending fantastic reports to Chungking. They obstructed all they could.
4. When quarters were finally provided, the Chinese stationed there a number of undisciplined soldiers whose duties were to prevent the C.C.G. moving lorries out of the yard with previous approval of Chinese H. Q. and to guard secret stocks of gasoline accumulated for speculation purposes by General Chow's representative, General Wu.
5. The erection of a house for Commando's H.Q. near General Chow's own H.Q. in the suburbs of Chungking was constantly interfered with by General Chow who once ordered (but subsequently cancelled the order) the destruction of the building on the grounds that it was too visible from the air, and finally tore up the path leading to the new house. It is typical that when the Group's new building was changed from white to a camouflage green, General Chow began to paint his H.Q. white!
6. When asked to assist the Commando Group in arrangements with Chinese Government Transport organization to move from Lashio to Kweiyang 2,000 drums of the Group's gasoline, General Chow sent to Lashio a representative, a Major General Tung. The latter made absurdly costly estimates and requested an advance payment of three million dollars for the transport; then offered as an alternative that we should supply our own gas for the consumption of the hired trucks which, according to him would amount to 1,200 drums of gasoline out of 2,000 drums. Our generous estimate of the gas consumption was 256 drums. Finally General Tung arranged a convey of 10 trucks and was caught by the Chinese Customs trying to smuggle, under the cover of C.C.G., over two tons of silk and lipstick.

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7. General Chow constantly pressed the Commando to turn over to him all their equipment, explosives, lorries and gasoline for use and disposal at his discretion leaving the foreign Commando personnel only as advisers and instructors without any powers of control.

On 20th March these demands were finally presented under the form of what may be called an ultimatum. Besides requesting the immediate release of all equipment, lorries and gasoline, the General requested even that the name of China Commando Group be withdrawn. He also made fantastic accusations that the Commando sent secret agents all over China and established clandestine wireless stations and requested their immediate withdrawal.

In a subsequent conversation with General Chow the latter stated that he had proof that the Commando brought into China "over a hundred" armed officers and men without his consent. The proof consisted of copies of records of the passport control stations on Burma Road collected by Tung. On these records there appeared indeed names of over a hundred British armed officers and men; they were members of General Denny's "204" Mission.

5. ORDER TO WITHDRAW

The acceptance of General Chow's demands to hand all the Commando's property over to him unconditionally would have rendered the Commando Group absolutely useless for the purpose for which it was planned. It was out of the question to agree to turn dangerous explosives over to an organization which did not possess experts for handling and using same. The request to hand over all gasoline and trucks was nothing but an extortion; furthermore, without our own means of transport the Commando would cease to exist as a self contained unit. This is apparently what the Chinese wanted by their request to withdraw the name C.C.G.

The demands were therefore rejected on the ground that they were contradictory to the original understanding between Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and the Generalissimo, and General Chow was informed that the case would be presented to the Generalissimo for reconsideration.

Mr. Kewick immediately applied for an audience with the Generalissimo but the audience was not granted and, instead of a reply, the Generalissimo sent a curt verbal message on April 4th to H.M.'s Ambassador requesting the immediate withdrawal of the C.C.G. No reasons were given to the Ambassador and the Generalissimo left the next day for Burma without any further word.

6. ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF GENERALISSIMO'S HOSTILE ATTITUDE.

The chief cause of a drastic action by the Generalissimo whereby the help of a friendly power was rejected in an abrupt and discourteous manner is definitely a cardinal change of policy by China, which, no longer hard pressed militarily by the Japanese, wishes to prepare for an opportunity to sit on the fence, or even to open the door towards an understanding with Japan should the Allied cause receive further set backs.

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But the position of the C.C.S. was more complex. A thorough study of the problem leads to the belief that the Generalissimo's decision has been influenced by the following aspects:

a. **MILITARY SITUATION** With the exception of the Burma area, there is practically no military activity anywhere on the Chinese front. A situation "we won't touch you if you don't touch us" seems to exist to such a degree that it may be called a state of undeclared peace, which permitted since the outbreak of the Pacific War, the withdrawal from China of seventeen Japanese divisions.

All Chinese, from the High Command to the humble citizen, believe that it is now up to Great Britain and America to do the fighting and that this is the time for China to concentrate on reconstruction and re-equipment.

The Chinese High Command, having grasped that the object of the C.C.S. and the chief aim of its individual members was not to give equipment away unconditionally but to promote and execute commando raids, became afraid that such raids might disrupt the equilibrium on the front and thus provoke reprisals by the Japanese armies. Hence the request that the members of the C.C.S. must act exclusively as technical instructors under the closest Chinese official (and secret) supervision. There was general mistrust, in spite of early assurances of complete understanding, that the Group would act on its own.

b. **SECRET INTER-POLITICAL ASPECT** Even from a superficial contact with General Chow it became evident that the organization of General Chow's Commando Army is only a cover for the establishment of a secret armed force, with a strong political influence (under Bai Li's supreme leadership) somewhat similar to the Gestapo. When General Chow submitted a list of weapons which he asked to be donated to his Army, the chief item was a large stock of deadly poisons, apparently to be used against internal political opponents and not against the Japanese.

To give foreigners even an inkling of these activities would certainly not suit Chinese politicians and there remained only two alternatives: to shunt the foreign staff of the C.C.S. completely or to send them out of China before important secrets leak out.

c. Desire by the Chinese to exploit the international situation for their own benefit.

All Chinese propaganda in U.S. and the U.S.A., born of the much exaggerated praise of alleged Chinese victories, and fanned to a white heat by sentimentalists or paid agents like Owen Lattimore, is invariably following the principle: "Give us more guns, more planes, more trucks, more money, as otherwise we cannot continue our gallant struggle". But whenever new equipment arrives it is either misused and wasted or stored away for "future use". Thus there are more tanks, ammunition and guns in Chungking than anywhere in the fighting zone. Also, whenever a substantial lot of military equipment reaches China, the Chinese declare they need something else before they can start fighting. It became evident that their aim is to rearm, reequip their army and industries out of Lend-Lease equipment without any obligation on their part.

-5-

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By Authority of State

Dept letter, 3-23-73

By RA/P Date APR 2 1973

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~

It is reasonable to assume that General Chow presented demands for the G.I.S. military stores in order to stock himself up for future political emergencies just as much as from any desire to use them against the Japanese.

When the situation in Burma worsened and the possibility of further supply from India became problematic, the usefulness to General Chow of the G.I.S. as source of booty ceased to exist and he allowed himself to use pressure on the Generalissimo for their withdrawal. A Chinese expressed the situation in these words: "The prospect of further deliveries from G.I.S. are so bad that we can afford to lose friendship."

4. LOSS OF BRITISH PRESTIGE & "AIDS FOR ASIATICS" SLOGAN

Allied reverses in the Pacific area make the Chinese sincerely believe their own propaganda that they are gallant fighters who never surrender and who are the only nation capable of resisting Japan. The resulting loss of British prestige and exaggerated Chinese belief of their own strength and superiority of extreme nationalism, push them more and more into the acceptance of the "Aids for Asiatics" slogan. With this mentality they permit themselves insulting acts today against the British, but tomorrow it may be against the Americans as well.

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By Authority of State

Dept letter, 3-23-73

By RAH Date APR 2 1973

-6-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Herewith is General Stilwell's reply to our radio of yesterday which authorized him to use the 10th Air Force in the India-Burma-China region in accordance with his best judgment. It will be noted that in his reply General Stilwell recommends sending American combat units into this theater and suggests that one or more divisions be sent without delay. This recommendation is being studied in the War Department but in view of the present military and shipping situation, the proposed action does not appear to be feasible at this time.

Joseph B. Murphy
Deputy Chief of Staff

*The President has seen
file R.*



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OSD Letter, 8-3-72

DEC 1 1972

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

8 WVNA
filed 243/25
MS

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CSND
May 25 1942
1:15 PM

INCOMING MESSAGE

U R G E N T

From: New Delhi
To: Agwar

No. NR 61 May 25th, 1942

For Marshall from Stilwell. Reurad 713 of May 22 (#1) plans have been completed for maximum employment of 10th Air Force in direct support of China Theater and will be put into effect at earliest possible time. My belief in ~~deisive~~ strategic importance of China is so strong that I feel certain a serious mistake is being made in not sending American Combat Units into this Theater to regain Burma, clear Thailand, and then from China Force entry into the triangle Hanoi Hainan Canton from which control can be disputed of Major Enemy Air Bases from Japan and Manchuria and enemy sea lanes in the South China Sea. Such action will give great lift to Chinese, counter Chinese peace elements and aid me in organizing Chinese Forces for decisive offensive action. British are more interested in augmenting their own Forces by our Air Units primarily for defence of India and not in pursuit of successful plan of campaign against Japan. I recommend transfer to India of 1 or more American Divisions without delay.

No Sig

(#1) Came courth

SERVICE WILL BE MADE ON REQUEST

FOOTNOTE: Radio 713 (CM-OUT-5032 5/24) OPD
Recission of mission of 10th Air Force.

ACTION COPY: OPD

INFO. COPY: G-2 A-2 CG AAF SCS TAG FILE

CM-IN-7037 (5/25/42) 2:17 PM

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Aircraft to be Used in Assisting
China.

In compliance with your instructions, transmitted by phone this morning by Captain McCrea, a study has been made of the possibility of dispatching 25 to 50 planes from India to China in order to assist the Chinese in the defense of that area.

In view of our incomplete knowledge of the possibilities for air operations within China, it is essential that the decision as to the support to be given to China be left to General Stilwell who is expected to arrive at Dinjan. Generals Wavell, Alexander, Brereton, Gruber, Maiden, Wheeler, and Bissell are now at Dinjan awaiting conference with General Stilwell on his arrival. Placing the Tenth Air Force under the complete control of General Stilwell will permit most effective use of air forces available in that area.

A copy of the message being dispatched to General Stilwell and a copy of radio number 737, Amisca, May 23, from Chungking are attached.

Joseph S. McNamara
Acting Chief of Staff.



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DEC 1 1972

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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May 24, 1942.

From Marshall to AMMISCA, New Delhi.

This message urgent for General Stilwell from General Marshall. For your information, summaries of two messages dated May 22nd received here by General Hsiung Shih Hui from Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek are quoted below.

1. "Situation in Chekiang is most serious.

Japanese determined to occupy air bases at Chuchow Lishui and Yushan. Chinese are handicapped by lack of heavy armament and air support. Since reverses in Burma, Chinese people greatly puzzled by apparent allied indifference toward China theater. Unless effective steps are taken immediately, situation will grow worse and worse until it will be too late."

2. "Jap concentrations at Nanchang may move

against eastern or southern Kiangsi with airbase at Kian as objective. Japs in Shansi and eastern Shantung have increased activity. Also Japs have concentrated air units at Hankow. If Chungking is heavily bombed again this summer and if Chinese do not see any help from their allies, Chinese confidence in their allies will be completely shaken. This may presage total collapse of Chinese resistance. Never has the situation looked more critical than today."

Instructions contained in our 479, April 15th, relating to the employment of Brereton's air force in conformity with British direction in Indian Ocean Bay of Bengal region in general area from Ceylon northward, is rescinded repeat is rescinded. Notify appropriate

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British authorities. The tenth air force is under your command and its employment in the India Burma China region is completely repeat completely at your discretion.

Units departing immediately to balance the tenth air force and your service of supply consist of the ground echelon of two medium bombardment squadrons, one photo squadron; and five each .50 caliber antiaircraft machine gun batteries, an aircraft warning company, and miscellaneous engineer, medical, and other services.

MARSHALL.

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OSD Letter, 8-8-78

DEC 1 1972

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WC 196
filed 2400/23
LB

CSWD
May 23, 1942
11:47 P M

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Chungking
To: AGWAR for Ammisca

No. 735 Ammisca, May 23, 1942.

For Brig Gen Doolittle. Following points may be assistance like missions as they represent consensus opinion your crewmen and are for your consideration in your report: (1) secure everything possible within ship in case of violent maneuver or forced landing. (2) secure everything on body before parachute jump. In majority of cases most crewmen lost equipment in air such as flashlights, first aid equipment, musette bags, pistols, etc. (3) each parachute, particularly seat type parachutes, should be especially snugly fitted for the men who will use it. (4) more gunnery practice absolutely essential as most crew members frankly admitted that they had had little actual gunnery. (5) as mentioned before should be emphasized that gun sight and bendix turret proved unsatisfactory. Crew men believe would have had more victories with simpler sight and satisfactory turret. Believed reason azimuth relay and motor of turret burned out was that the gunner, in order to watch for possible attack, traversed turret constantly while over or near enemy territory, while he only used vertical when actually in combat. Before any more these turrets sent into action considered essential this be corrected. (6) throat mikes of rear gunners in almost all cases unsatisfactory. This report made by practically every crew. Only satisfactory use of throat mike was when gunner actually pressed mike against throat with his hands, which, of course, impossible while using guns. Much trouble was caused by this as will be detailed

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

No. 735 Ammisca, May 23, From: Chungking page 2

in mailed report. (7) Objectives folders should be prepared not only for high altitude but for low altitude. Many pilots and bombardiers complained inability recognized approach to objectives as they had studied high altitude layouts only, rather than from angle vision of their approach. (8) Better maps if possible showing more Terrain features, if possible detailed colored maps, both Japan and China. (9) Front guns too hard to remove resulting in several cases in front glass being cracked. (10) Absolute necessity of thorough first aid courses for all crew members. (11) a document should be carried in language of any country passed over or where forced landing might be made saying in language of that country crewman is American and reward will be paid stated amount to bring crewman to safety. (12) A complete check list for each member of crew of what they must prepare to do (A) Before take dash off (B) in normal operations (C) in combat (D) in bailing out or forced landing. All of these suggestions from your Mission Personnel and aid in possible future Missions. From Bissell iprd in addition it might be interest for you to report that several large ships presumably enemy seen off China coast at night were fully lighted. This for use our submarine or aircraft.

Stilwell

Action Copy: CGAAF

Info. Copies: OPD G-2 A-2 TAG FILE

CM-IN-6698 (5/24/42) 3:03 am

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MAY 24 1942

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INCOMING MESSAGE

WVNA 34
FILED 820p/23
BVC

CWVD
May 23, 1942
8:30 P. M.

From: WREC 1
To: AGWAR for ANNISCA

No. 734, May 23, 1942

J#168 5/6

In addition to previous confirmed information of targets bombed by Doolittle Mission and cabled in our number 698 May 8th briefing of last crewmen shows following: Plane number 40-2282, pilot 1st Lt Travis Hoover, bombed with good effect with high explosives and incendiaries Tokyo powder factories and magazines near river north of main railroad station and imperial palace. This bombing was done from 900 feet and the debris flew to a height higher than that of airplanes. From Russell. Plane number 40-230 (41), pilot 1st Lt Harold F Watson bombed Tokyo from (200) feet and scored direct hits with high explosives and incendiaries on Kawasaki truck and tank plant and other Factory Buildings and congested Districts near railroad station south of the Imperial Palace Prd crew from this plane also observed large fires in District bombed by General Doolittle prd plane number 40-2263, Pilot Capt David H Jones, bombed Tokyo from 1200 feet and made direct hits with high explosives and incendiaries on power station, oil tanks, a large manufacturing plant and congested area southeast of Imperial Palace Prd this unidentified Factory was a new building which covered approximately 2 city blocks Prd plane number 40-2261, Pilot 1st Lt Ted W Gawson, report made by Corporal Thatcher who is only member of crew thus far to arrive at Chungking Prd he was on lookout for pursuit planes and is not sure what part of

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2

From: HEC 1
To: AGWAR for AMNISCA
No. 734, May 23, 1942

Tokyo was bombed but is certain that hits were made on a large Factory and thickly congested area as he afterwards saw clouds of black smoke and debris there. Plane number 40-2268, Pilot 1st Lt Donald G Smith bombed Kobe entirely with incendiary bombs just south of main business district of city and started fires in machine shops, large aircraft Factory, Dock Yards and Ship Yards northern part of Bay. Prd Doolittle can inform you of main objective of this aircraft as it was hit prd rough sketches showing the position of these attacks accompanying mailed report prd it is believed that gunner technical Sergeant Eldred Q Scott of Aircraft number 40-23 (# 3) 3 shot down 1 enemy pursuit prd request this information also to Doolittle and Col Robert Walsh, A-2 Division, Air Staff Prd.

Stilwell

Came (# 1 threv)
Came (# 2 fifteen hundred)
Came (# 3 more)

Service will be made on request.

Note: No. 652 (CM-IN-1592, 5/6/42) OPD.
Ref. Doolittle Mission.

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: G-2, A-2, CG AAF, SGS, and File, and TAG.

CM-IN-6655 (5/23/42) PM 11:40

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INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

CSWD

May 21
728A

O 46
950/21

From: Chungking
To: AGWAR for ANMISCA

No. 720 May 21, 1942 ANMISCA

Generalissimo at 430 morning May 21 requested Bissell send following to War Department "Generalissimo has received information from Washington to the effect that the 50 repeat 50 transports with 4 repeat 4 engines which were to have been substituted for 2 engine transports for the air freight service were not repeat not to be made available. Is this correct repeat is this correct. If so Generalissimo states the result of failure to maintain effective communications between China and the outside world would have most serious effect on Chinas future prosecution of the war. Generalissimo requests reply"

ANMISCA Chungking has received no information whatever on this project.

Bissell proceeding May 21 to New Delhi via Dinjan for conference on Halpro. Request reply for Bissell both to Chungking and New Delhi. Bissell.

Stilwell

ACTION COPY: OPD

INFO COPIES: G-2, A-2, CGAAF, TAG, FILE.

CW-IN-5722 (5/21/42) AM 7:59

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J-89

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MAY 21 1942

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

PO 152
filed 2200/21
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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

SWD
May 21, 1942
4:07 P. M.

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Chungking
To: AGWAR for AMMISCA

#726 AMMISCA, May 21, 1942

Following received from Chinese Minister of War with request it be delivered to General Magruder now enroute Walter Reed Gen Hosp "The news of your return to America has been received with regret which I feel only the greatest by the fact that it was received too late for me to bid you farewell at the Airport.

You have rendered the United Nations an invaluable service since your arrival in China, by promoting the cordial personal relationship existing between the personnel of the United States, China, Great Britain and The Netherlands as well as your contribution in coordinating the United Nations efforts toward our common enemy.

I share your confidence, during these times when the cooperation between the United States and China as growing closer daily, that our joint efforts can end only in victory for The Allies cause.

With the hope that you will not continue to neglect your health, I wish you every good fortune and a safe voyage sincerely Ho Ying Chin."

Stilwell

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: G-2
A-2
CG AAF
TAG
File

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DEC 1 1972

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239
MAY 21 1942

CM-IN-5891 (5/21/42) 7:58 PM

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WB 38
filed 17/0630
mm

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER 3:55A

CSWD
May 17, 1942

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: New Delhi
To: MILID

No 148 May 16, 1942

Issuing of joint declaration about India by Tripartite Axis powers may be still undecided, as desired inclusion of statement on Arabia may seem premature. Decided yesterday 40 mile Jeep track from Ledo toward Hukawdg Valley to be proceeded with: as is privately intimated, labor can be spared from airfield construction: whether work will be resumed on Ledo-Fort Hertz roads after the rains to be decided later. Advance HQ Army in Burma opened at Imphal on 15th. On 14th HQ 1st Burma Corps reached Tamu and Japs entered evacuated Kalewa: while British planes attacked barges near Kin, firing 2. Americans bomber Myitkrina airfield with 28 fighters parked there, destroying at least 3. On (2 #1) goods train derailed in sand probably by Hurs. Air survey of area reported disturbed near Chittagong saw nothing abnormal.

Osmun

(2 #1) Came twelftr. Service on request.

Action Copy: G-2

Info. Copies: OPD
A-2
CG AAF
SGS
TAG
File

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CM-IN-4621 (5/17/42) 5:29 AM

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CSWD
May 13, 1942
10 :47 PM

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Chungking
To: Agwar for Amisca Washington DC

No. 681 May 13, 1942

Generalissimo approved in principle on May 12th project outline urad 26 May 9. Generalissimo was informed of number of airplanes and mission involved, avg cooperation required, Base Area and advanced fields selected but was not furnished the detailed material requirements which would have complicated the issue. Generalissimo authorized working out all details with appropriate Chinese agencies. This is under way.

Request information on number of bombs of each type that can be carried on each B-24 with gasoline tankage for 3100 gallons. Request verification of number of clusters of 3 incendiary bombs each that are required. Request repeat of last 3 sentences your 326.

American aircraft must bring spare oxygen containers as neither of the 2 oxygen manufacturers have more than enough containers to meet avg requirements. Wheeler has been requested for data on containers available at Karachi. Manufacturing capacity daily at 150 atmospheres in 1,000s of litres: Chungking-164, Kweiyang 246.

There are no 2,000 pound bombs in China.

Due to the very considerable movements of material required and the limited fuel, motor and air transport available it is estimated that from 3 weeks to 1 month will be required to assemble materials called for or suitable substitutes.

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DEC 1 1972

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page Two No. 681 May 13, 1942

There is a permanent Russian Military Mission at Chengtu. This personnel will know of the assembly of material and the preparation for operation of the scope outline in urad 626. Effective action by Washington to prevent this information reaching Japanese thru Russian Channels would be most helpful. From Bissell. Acknowledge.

Stilwell

FOOTNOTE: Radio 626 (CM-OUT-1929 5/9/42) CG AAF.
Halpro task force leaving about May 15

ACTION: CG AAF

INFO COPIES: OPD, G-2, A-2, SGS, TAG, FILE

CM-IN-3679 (5/14/42) AM 3:02

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44. WVNA
Filed 232/13
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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CSWD
May 12, 1942
9:16 PM

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: New Delhia
To: Milid

No. 139 May 12, 1942

Nehru wrote friend May 1st as follows.
".DO not think you appreciate my position or that of Congress. We can not possibly participate in any propaganda on behalf of the government. Am distressed that my name and picture are being used in government publicity. Situation is far more serious than our complacent friends Stafford Cripps and Co realize. Cripps has effectively succeeded in creating tremendous revulsion of feeling against British government and all its works in India. He chooses to live in paradise of his own creation and honourable members of Parliament indulge in most foolish of platitudes. You may have some idea of how things are fashioning by reading proceedings of all India Congress Committee. Even that will give you only a faint idea. End" British officials comment is that above is personal opinion of Nehru and probably that of many Congress leaders but not necessarily that of Rank and file.

Osmun

ACTION COPY: G-2 (13E)

INFO. COPY: OPD A-2 SGS TAG FILE

CM-IN-3393 (5/13/42) 3:31 AM

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M.I.S. JOURNAL NO

J-15
MAR 13 1942

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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DAILY SUMMARY

No. 3

WAR DEPARTMENTAL OPERATIONAL

DECISIONS AND ACTIONS

7:00 A.M., 11 Dec. to 7:00 A.M., 12 Dec. X

ABRIDGED FORM FOR

THE WHITE HOUSE

43
~~43~~