

Col Park

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

Executive, OPD, WDGS
General Hull

24 March 1945

TOP SECRET

Commanding General, United States Forces, India Burma
Theatre, New Delhi, India

Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command, Kandy, Ceylon

Commanding General, USAF in China Theatre, Chungking, China

Number: WARK 58110

TOP SEC to Wheeler from Marshall reference your TST 1696;
information Sultan and Wedemeyer.

In so far as immediate assistance to French resistance forces now in Indo-China is concerned, see WARK 57903. Statement of policy therein was given to Wedemeyer by Admiral Leahy. Wedemeyer has been authorized to talk to Bleizot on the single subject of relief for the French underground.

For your information, the question of clandestine operations and support of guerrilla forces in Indo-China by Mountbatten is under discussion on the highest level. The British view is that the Generalissimo at Ramgarh after Sextant authorized such activities even though Indo-China is in the China Theatre, and that that agreement should be recognized by the United States and Great Britain. The U.S. stand is that, Indo-China being in Wedemeyer's theatre, he should control and coordinate for the Generalissimo any activities by Mountbatten in Indo-China which may be necessary.

You will be kept informed of any decisions reached.

End.

ORIGINATOR: Gen. Hull
INFO : JC/S; Adm. Leahy; Gen. Arnold; Gen. Bissell;
Adm. King; C of S
CM-OUT-58110 (Mar 45) DTG: 241624Z ejo

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OPD letter, Mar 3 1972

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TOP SECRET

Operations Division, War
Strategy & Policy Group
Col John B. Cary 6448

23 March 1945

Commanding General
United States Forces
India Burma Theater
New Delhi, India

Commanding General
U S Army Liaison Section
Headquarters Southeast Asia Command
Kandy, Ceylon

Number: WARX 57903

TOP SEC to Sultan and Wheeler signed Marshall.

Following paraphrase of "MAPLE" 52 from Wedemeyer to Chennault is furnished for your information: Begin paraphrase: Chief of French Naval Mission in Washington says 14th Air Force able and willing to assist resistants in Indo-China but requires permission from Washington. Statement of new attitude U S Government obtained informally is to help the French provided that does not interfere with planned operations. Chennault may undertake operations against Japanese in Indo-China in order to assist French subject to limitations of this policy. Paraphrase ends. Complete answer to Wheelers TST 1696 will be sent shortly.

End

Note: TST 1696 is CM-IN-23778 (23 Mar 45)

ORIGINATOR : Gen Hull
INFORMATION : JC/S
Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

CM-OUT-57903

(Mar 45)

DTG 240023Z

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IVI
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From: CG US Army Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon
To: War Department
CG US Army Forces, India Burma Theater, New Delhi India
CG Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon,
Bhamo, Burma
No: TST 1696 22 March 1945
[redacted] from Wheeler to Marshall info Sultan and
Evans sgd Timberman TST 1696.

*Liaison
between
Gen Sultan
and Adm
Mountbatten*

Suggest you look at SEACOS 337 March 211143Z and
SEACOS 338 March 211145Z concerning the French Military Mis-
sion dispatched by Admiral Mountbatten to British Chiefs of
Staff info JSM.

Gist of these messages follows:

Begins SEACOS 337:

1. Mountbatten delighted with proposal that General
Blaixot be formally appointed as accredited agent of the
French Provisional Government. Such action would extend
scope and prestige of French cooperation and commitment in
SEAC.
2. If political objections to French participation
out here are being reviewed SAC hopes that Corps Leger D
Intervention Mat be allowed to come to Ceylon at once.
3. SAC also hopes that decision not to support French
request for aircraft manned and maintained by French personnel

CM-IN-23778

(23 Mar 45)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 21 1974

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IV
PRIORITY

Page 2

From: OG US Army Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon

No: TST 1696

22 March 1945

to take part in special duties operations in Indo-China may be reconsidered.

4. If French proposal to send French aircraft and crews to this theater was approved in principle it would greatly encourage them. Blaixot says they already have necessary personnel.

5. Wheeler has seen these radios but did not participate in the discussion of the arrangements outlined in SEACOS 337 and 338.

Ends SEACOS 337.

Begins SEACOS 338.

1. British are providing as many supplies to French Indo-China as possible within their resources available for special duties work. Procedure hitherto adopted has been in two phases:

A. Establishment of a communication network with French underground movement in FIC.

B. Supply to selected places of a limited quantity of arms and demolition stores for training and ultimate use by Guerillas.

2. It has never been Mountbatten's policy to supply French regular armed forces with weapons of war. Japanese action has caused underground movement and French armed forces

CM-IN-23778

(23 Mar 45)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

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[REDACTED] IVI
PRIORITY

Page 3

From: CG US Army Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon

No: TST 1696

22 March 1945

to become mixed. In conformity with policy in L. B. above British supplying to limit of their resources both Guerillas and Armed Forces. Supply to FIC is very difficult due to long distances and adverse weather conditions. Supplies can be sent to Moncay only at the expense of other groups in FIC.

3. Mountbatten does not intend to allow recent events in FIC to affect operations now in progress in SEA. He is raising with British Chiefs of Staff (SEACOS 337) French proposal to man and maintain two squadrons of aircraft inasmuch as the whole question of French participation in war against Japan is still unsettled politically.

4. Air Vice Marshal Whitworth-Jones now in London has complete information on this subject.

Ends SEACOS 338

Comments:

I had previously informed Mountbatten of US policy in regard to non-recognition of French participation in FIC. I further pointed out yesterday that the above messages were in conflict with US policy and as DSAC I did not concur in them.

I have just seen a radio from the British COS stating that General Marshall had informed them that Chennault has been ordered to fly in ammunition to French Detachment. Does this action by War Department mean that US policy towards French Indo-China has been changed?

CM-IN-23778

(23 Mar 45)

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JCS memo. 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

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[REDACTED] I VI
PRIORITY

Page 4

From: CG US Army Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon

No: TST 1696

22 March 1945

Request that we be kept informed through US channels
of any changes in US policy regarding PIC.

End

SEACOS 337 and SEACOS 338 not received by WD CMC

ACTION: JC/S

INFO : Adm. Leahy; Gen. Arnold; Gen. Hull; Gen. Bissell;
Adm. King; C of S

CM-IN-23778

(23 Mar 45)

DTG: 221409Z

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By RHP, NLR, Date

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Col C. R. Peck 77500

20 March 1945 *WJ*

Commanding General, USAF India Burma Theater, New Delhi, India

Commanding General, USAF China Theater, Chungking, China..

Commanding General, U S Army Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon

Commanding General, China Theater, Rear Echelon, Kunming, China.

Number: WARX 56081

TOPSEC book message to Sultan for action, to Wedemeyer and Wheeler for information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The British Chiefs of Staff have now agreed to the immediate transfer of the Mars Brigade provided that transport aircraft to move it are provided without prejudicing the operations of NCAC and of the 14th Army now in progress. The U. S. Chiefs of Staff have informed the British that they have instructed you to move the Mars Brigade in accordance with Wedemeyer's request and that in their opinion the provision of transport aircraft for this movement will not prejudice the operations now in progress of either the 14th Army or the NCAC but that in case a question arises, the matter will be open to further discussion in accordance with the agreement in CCS 452/37.

You will move the Mars Brigade to China in accordance with General Wedemeyer's request. Transport aircraft to move the Mars Brigade will be provided from those available to the China Theater, NCAC and ATC.

End.

ORIGINATOR: JC/S
INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Hull
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

CM-OUT-56081

(Mar 45)

DTG 202200Z hrw

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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SM 522-71

IMMEDIATE

From: SACSEA, Mountbatten
To: British Chiefs of Staff
Rptd: Joint Staff Mission
Re: SEACOS 335 19 March 1945
SEACOS 335

1. The implication in Para 3(e)^x of JSM 606 T.O.O. 162035 is that although Wedemeyer will not ask for transport aircraft engaged in supporting the 14th Army, he might ask for some of those supporting N.C.A.C. I am sure you realize that the transport aircraft force I am using in the battle of Burma must be regarded as a single force, available over the whole of Burma. Thus, I reserve the right to switch any part of this force from XV Corps or N.C.A.C. to 14th Army and vice versa, and in fact have already had seriously to restrict the operations of XV Corps by switching all its transport aircraft in order to increase the air supply in support of 14th Army.

2. My Chief of Staff has just returned from the front and tells me that in spite of this switch and of working all available aircraft above sustained rates, the average short fall in air supply to 14th Army is already 130 tons per day, while the IWT short fall amounts to another 150 tons per day. I have been anxious not to operate transport aircraft at more than 33 per cent above sustained rates, but General Sultan has reported that if the transport aircraft now supporting N.C.A.C. were restricted to this rate, they would supply only 520 tons per day, which is 217 tons per day below current N.C.A.C. requirements. These aircraft must therefore be operated by far higher rates than I had hoped would be necessary.

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CM-IN-21410

(20 Mar 45)

per SM 522-71

DEC 22 1971

Signature: *[Signature]* COPY: *[Signature]*

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Franklin D. Roosevelt

CLASSIFIED

per SM 532-71

IMMEDIATE

Date-

DEC 22 1971

Page 2.

From: SACSEA, Mountbatten

Signature, *RAH*

Re: SEACCS 335

19 March 1945

3. My intention is to exploit towards Moilem with 36 Division, this will greatly increase the range at which supplies will have to be flown, and will still further strain the transport aircraft on N.C.A.C. front, even though additional N.C.A.C. forces may be withdrawn. Whereas I am prepared personally to take the risk of removing a few thousand shock troops like Mars force, I am not prepared to take the grave risk of failing to support any of the troops already committed to battle by taking away any of their air transport, until adequate supplies can be provided through Rangoon.

4. I have repeated to you my message SACSEA 5101 T.O.O. 190331Z to Leese from which you will see that I intend doing all I can to help Chinese.

End

* In SAC 5101

Admiral Mountbatten told General Leese that he wanted the rest of the Mars force to go unless the latter felt that its withdrawal would have a really crucial effect on the battle.

x This Para 3(e) reported General Wedemeyer's statement at the C.C.S. meeting on Friday, 16th Jan. that he would not call on air reserves supporting 14th Army.

NOTE: Reference not identified in WD CMC

ACTION: CCS;

INFO : Adm. Leahy; Gen. Arnold; Gen. Hull; Gen. Bissell;

Adm. King; C of S

CM-IN-21410

(20 Mar 45)

DTG: 191858Z

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TOP SECRET I VI

URGENT

From: CG Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon
Bhamo Burma

To: War Department
CG US Army Forces, India Burma Theater, New Delhi India
CG US Army Forces, China Theater, Chungking China
CG "Y" Forces, Rear Echelon, Kunming China
CG US Forces China Theater, Rear Echelon Kunming China

Nr: CHC 1455 12 March 1945

[REDACTED] to Marshall info Evans Gross McClure
and Weart from Sultan CHC 1455

In radio SEAC03 328 Mountbatten has informed British Chiefs of Staff that he now releases entire 475th Infantry to China Theater. He has instructed me to proceed to move this regiment, which will be effected by transport aircraft available to China Theater.

Mountbatten further stated that he now expects NCAC to press forward to carry out General Leese's directive, which was summarized to you in my CHC 1225 dated 1st March.

He specifically states that he now looks to 124th Cavalry to do the job that entire Mars Brigade would have been called upon to do. He thus expects the 124 Cavalry to advance to Mandalay and assist in battle for that area.

He reiterates once more that he will be unable to furnish transport aircraft to move troops to China at any time before the port of Rangoon is opened.

CM-IN-12461 (12 Mar 45)

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 22 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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~~SECRET~~ IVI

URGENT

page 2

From: CG Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon
Bhamo Burma

Nr: CHC 1455

12 March 1945

Comment:

I have had as yet no indication from either
Mountbatten or China as to what was agreed in recent con-
ference with Generalissimo about the advance of CAI beyond
the Hsipaw-Lashio area.

You will be kept informed.

End

FOOTNOTE: 1225 1s CM IN-837 (1 Mar) JCS

ACTION: JC/S

INFO: Adm. Leahy
Gen. Arnold
Gen. Hull
Adm. King
CofS

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 22 1973

CM-IN-12461 (12 Mar 45) DTG 120355Z

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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5m 522-71

From: SACSEA
To: British Chiefs of Staff
Info: Joint Staff Mission
Nr: SEACOS 328

11 March 1945

1. At meeting in Chungking it was made clear to Wedemeyer's representatives McClure and Gross and substantiated by General Chen Cheng that their most urgent need of all was for remainder of 475th U.S. Infantry Regiment to be transferred to China to start training and reorganize Chinese divisions about to be re-equipped.

2. Although this can ill be spared from battle and from a purely military point of view Leese advises against this move I am so anxious to do everything I consider possible to help China that I am prepared to take risk of releasing this formation forthwith and am doing so.

This has been repeated to General Carton de Wiart, Sultan and Leese.

End.

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per 5M 522-71

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- R/H

ACTION: CC/S
INFO : Adm Leahy
General Arnold
General Hull
General Bissell
Adm King
C of S

CM-IN-14060 (14 March 45)

DTG 111535Z da

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SM 522-71

[REDACTED]
MOST IMMEDIATE

From: War Cabinet Offices
To: SACSEA for Mountbatten
Info: Joint Staff Mission
Re: OZ 1458

6 March 1945

Reference SEACOS 319

You should avoid discussing these proposals with Generalissimo. If he raises question you should inform him matter is under consideration by Combined Chiefs of Staff. This will make it unnecessary for you to discuss question of responsibility for protection of Road to China.

End

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per SM 522-71

SEACOS 319 is CM-IN-2156 (2 Mar 45) CC/S

Date- DEC 23 1971

Signature- RHO

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Adm. Leahy; Gen. Arnold; Gen. Hull; Gen. Bissell;
Adm. King; C of S

CM-IN-6617

(7 March 45)

DTG: 061810Z

[REDACTED]
ojc

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~~TOP SECRET~~ IVI

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: CG, Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon,
Bhamo, Burma

To: War Department

Nr: CHC 1257 2 March 1945

Personal to Marshall for US Joint Chiefs of Staff
from Sultan ChC 1257.

I. Please refer to my CHC 1185 of 28th February,
CHC 1213 of 28th February, CHC 1224 of 1st March, CHC 1225
of 1st March, CHC 1226 of 1st March and CHC 1238 of 2nd March,
all of which concerns the transfer of US and Chinese resources
from North Burma to China.

II. Under existing directives, India-Burma Theater
has real and substantial obligations both to US Forces,
China Theater, and to Southeast Asia Command. As Commander
of the Chinese Army in India, I must also, both in
principle and as a practical matter, pay due regard to the
wishes of the Chinese Government on the employment of
Chinese Forces.

When General Wedemeyer, Admiral Mountbatten,
and the Generalissimo make conflicting demands for the same
forces under my command, my only possible course of action
is to refer such conflicting demands to higher authorities
for decision. This I have done.

III. The purpose of this present radio is to
furnish you certain additional information and comments
to assist you in reaching your own conclusions on this
subject.

CM-IN-2499 (3 Mar 45)

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 22 1973

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Page 2

From: CG, Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon,
Bhamo, Burma

Nr: CHC 1257

2 March 1945

IV. I have made no estimate of the urgency of the needs for combat units put forward by US Forces, China Theater. When such a requirement is stated by China Theater, I assume the need is there and try to meet it. If SEAC objects it is then referred to you.

V. China Theater and General Ho Ying Chin propose to move one battalion of the 475th Infantry now, the remainder of the 475th Infantry beginning 10th March, the remainder of the Mars Brigade beginning 1st April, one Chinese Division beginning 1st May, another beginning 15th May and the third beginning 1st June. The basis question for the Chiefs of Staff is whether such transfers would jeopardize approved operations by SEAC now in progress in Burma.

VI. SEAC has two principal objectives prior to the monsoon. Their primary objective is to clear Rangoon. A secondary, but nonetheless determined, objective is to make a landing on the Kra Isthmus as an initial step toward Singapore. The British in this theater desire most intensely to reach Singapore by the time US Forces land on the main island of Japan.

VII. The prospect of reaching Rangoon prior to the rains depends upon the outcome of the present battle around Mandalay, where the Jap has apparently decided to make some sort of stand. I do not believe that the presence of the Mars Brigade is essential to insure the success of the Mandalay battle. With the Chinese Army in India and the British 36th Division, I can seize the Hsipaw-Lashio area

CM-IN-2499 (3 Mar 45)

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 22 1973

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SECRET

Page 3

From: CG, Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon,
Bhamo, Burma

Rr: CHC 1257

2 March 1945

shortly. There may be a real fight at Hsipaw, but we are now some 11 miles from Lashio without strong opposition. It should be possible soon to turn the 36th Division southwest to assist in the Mandalay fight. Although I am now restricted by the Chinese Government in the use of CAI to the Hsipaw-Lashio area, I can continue a certain amount of pressure with CAI to the south. At the recent ***** expected to go well. If it does not, there will be needed far more substantial forces than the Mars Brigade. Such forces would have to be found from units now being withdrawn from the Areakan and from units which are now being prepared for the Kra operation in May. There is no shortage of British Ground Forces for the Burma operation. It is more a matter of supply. Admiral Mountbatten is primarily concerned, in my opinion,

First, lest transport aircraft be withdrawn from him during his battle in Burma, and

Second, lest the removal of US and Chinese Ground Forces will require him to employ British Troops in North Burma which are designed for the Kra operation.

The transfer of the Mars Brigade on the proposed schedule would leave sufficient NCAC Forces to seize and secure the general Hsipaw-Lashio area and to afford some pressure to the south and toward Mandalay. Additional British forces would be required only if the Mandalay battle takes an unexpected adverse turn.

CM-IN-2499 (3 Mar 45)

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date

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Page 4

From: CG, Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon,
Bhamo, Burma

Rr: CHC 1257

2 March 1945

IX. With regard to the proposed moves of the Chinese Army in India, such moves are phased with the beginning of the monsoon and should not affect the Burma campaign. Leese expects to be in Rangoon by the time CAI movements to China would be well under way. If, however, the Mars Brigade is released to China, and then the Generalissimo insists upon withdrawing Chinese Division earlier than the schedule now proposed, the effect on the Burma campaign would be serious. The move of US and Chinese Troops must be considered together. To avoid confusion, it should be noted that the first separate Chinese Regiment is not considered a stable member of the Mars Brigade. General Ho and China Theater representatives agreed at Bhamo that it might be the last CAI unit to return to China and be used for security purposes along the road for a more or less indefinite period depending upon the situation.

X. China Theater states that the proposed moves would require one combat cargo squadron during April and two combat cargo squadrons during May from resources outside China Theater. SEAC now has sufficient transport aircraft to support the drive on Rangoon. I do not believe it would be fair to General Leese to threaten him with a prospective loss of any transport aircraft which are now supporting Fourteenth Army. He cannot commit large forces into lower central Burma without an assured air supply. Of course, if Rangoon is cleared before the moves of CAI are completed, or if the two air commands have completed their special support mission, some transport aircraft might be available by Mountbatten. Otherwise, however, I believe that strenuous

CM-IN-2499 (3 Mar 45)

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OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 22 1973

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To: ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Page 5

From: CG, Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon,
Bhamo, Burma

Wt: CHC 1257

2 March 1945

efforts should be made to find the transport aircraft required by these troop movements from among the following sources: Aircraft provided by Combined Chiefs of Staff from resources outside India-Burma and China Theaters, aircraft now supplying WCAC, aircraft now available to China Theater, and diversion of aircraft from the Hump. This subject is being carefully studied by my staff.

XI. The transfer of any resources from Burma should be subject to reconsideration if there is a substantial change in the course of the battle in Burma. I believe, however, that the proposed schedule for ground forces would not jeopardize such operations, under present reasonable expectation.

XII. In my opinion, therefore,

(A) The proposed transfer of US and Chinese Ground Forces should be approved by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(B) The Generalissimo should be asked to confirm that the schedule of CAI units is acceptable to him; in this connection you are reminded that Mounbatten will visit the Generalissimo within a very few days.

(C) Such approval should not prejudice reconsideration of moves not already effected if the course of the battle in Burma demand it.

(D) Transport aircraft should be found to effect these moves without calling upon aircraft now supplying the British campaign in Central Burma, at least until Rangoon is cleared.

CM-IN-2499 (3 Mar 45)

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 1.4 and 1.5(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May 4, 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

By DBS

Date MAY 22 1973

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 6

From: CG, Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon,
Rhamo, Burma

Nr: CHC 1257

2 March 1945

XIII. It would be appreciated if you would arrange to
let General Merrill read this and related messages.

End

FOOTNOTE: 1225 1s CM-IN-837 (1 Mar 45) JC/S
1226 1s CM-IN-857 (1 Mar 45) Gen. Hull
1213 1s CM-IN-467 (1 Mar 45) JC/S
1238 1s CM-IN-2004 (2 Mar 45) Gen. Hull
1224 1s CM-IN-1300 (2 Mar 45) JC/S
1185 1s CM-IN-28643 (28 Feb 45) JC/S

ACTION: JC/S

INFO: Adm. Leahy
General Arnold
General Hull
Adm. King
CofS

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 22 1973

CM-IN-2499 (3 Mar 45)

DTG 021048Z

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
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SM 522-71


PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

From: CG US Army Forces India Burma Theater New Delhi India
To: War Department
Nr: CRA 5164 1 March 1945
Sultan to Marshall TOPSEC CRA 5164

Relayed is message TST 1607 from Timberman to Sultan:

"In the first part of our TST 1603 of 26 February we spoke of two other radios about to be sent out by SUPREMO. This is the one about future strategy, dispatched 26 February as SEACOS 317 to Chiefs of Staff information Joint Staff Mission.

Paraphrase follows:

1. In compliance with COSSRA 200 of 3 February it is my decision that after Rangoon has been captured the next principal objective of my command is Singapore.


2. The governing factor is speed in getting there, consequently it is my intention to establish a bridgehead on the Malayan Peninsula with the land troops which I now have, not delaying for arrival of formations from Europe provided amphibious resources are furnished me in time and the build-up of air resources follows the present schedule. C-in-C India is ready to lend me his reserve division on condition that as soon as the Arakan is clear I give him a division from that source as a replacement. I further hope to produce one more division from the Arakan soon enough to take part in an early June operation and, subsequent to the capture of Rangoon four additional divisions from Burma.

CM-IN-767 (1 March 45)

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IVI

PRIORITY

From: CG US Army Forces India Burma Theater New Delhi India
Hr: CRA 5164 1 March 1945

3. Considerations of speed dictate that the intermediate steps be as few as possible, and considerations of economy dictate that they be as cheap as possible. As a result my decision is to follow what I think is the most inexpensive route as far as Ground Forces are concerned as well as the quickest, which is by way of the Kra Isthmus. Such an advance uses the benefits of what we have done in Burma and maintains my present impetus. Additionally I will then have an area permitting me to interdict the Japanese principal moves of C to a serious extent.

4. Most recent intelligence available indicates that the area of Phuket would give me an adequate advance air base and naval anchorage. This area is centrally located to support continued attacks on Malaya and beyond.

5. The Port Swettenham-Port Dickson area would constitute my next objective after Phuket. A foothold here would give me bases from which to deploy for my Singapore assault.

6. An advance by way of the Andamans-Nicobars would require an expensive assault and although these islands would furnish useful anchorages, their location is not advantageous in support of operations against Malaya and beyond. Consequently I have discarded this approach.

7. Although an assault on north Sumatra will later be required, in my opinion it is not necessary now.

8. Careful consideration has also been given to an attack through the Sunda Straits on Bangka Island and

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CN-IN-767 (1 March 45)

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Date- DEC 22 1971

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██████████ IVI
PRIORITY

Page 3

From: CG US Army Forces, India Burma Theater New Delhi India
No: CRA 5164 1 March 1945

Singapore. However even aside from other considerations the East Indies Fleet has been denied resources sufficient for operations so distant from Ceylon, due to the augmentation of the British Pacific Fleet.

9. Although I am planning to clear Rangoon before the monsoon I must select the best possible outline table which will stand up whether Rangoon is cleared before the monsoon or not. Here is my program:

(1) Two divisions plus to secure the area. Phuket in early June 1945.

(2) A force of the order of 4 divisions to capture the Port Swettenham-Port Dickson area in October 1945. The condition upon which this operation would depend is the completion in this theater by August 1945 of Force W and in addition a part of Force Y at a date earlier than the current prediction although not earlier than I was originally promised.

(3) Take Singapore December 1945 - March 1946. This operation will probably require the advance formations promised me from Europe as well as the arrival in this theater of the rest of Force Y in time to turn loose for the final assault enough of my present forces. This will be true except in the event that enemy resistance is weaker than expected.

(4) Following the above operations I propose to clear all of southeast Asia. My requirements will be the rest of the forces promised me.

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CM-IN-767 (1 March 45)

per SM 522-71

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 IVI
PRIORITY


Page 4

From: CG US Army Forces India Burma Theater New Delhi India
No: CRA 5164 1 March 1945

10. I will send you by letter the plans for the foregoing and for additional expedition in my theater. I will send you separately a statement of what I will need in gliders and transport planes.

11. I must call your attention to the fact that although we do not propose to go through with DRACULA as originally planned, continued provision of DRACULA resources should be made. I will require for the operations set forth in this radio the resources I asked for in connection with DRACULA and when notifying you of later demands for resources full credit will be taken for the DRACULA stores. In view of the above, I request that the DRACULA supply program continue and that the rate thereof even be increased if possible. Please confirm soon that this will be accomplished.

12. Emphasis should be placed upon the timely arrival in this theater of amphibious resources since the speed with which I can employ to the full my air and land forces will be governed thereby. A separate radio will be sent you in this connection.

13. Code words for the operations described herein have been selected and are being sent you in another radio." Paraphrase ends.

Paraphrase of IN 29128 (28 Feb 45) ^{End} CC/S
ACTION: CC/S


INFO : Adm Lesby
General Arnold
General Hull
General Bissell
Adm King

Per SM 522-71

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CM-IN-767 (1 March 45)

DTG 010726Z

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SM 522-71

PRIORITY

From: CG US Army Forces India Burma Theater New Delhi India
To: War Department
Nr: CRA 5165 1 March 1945

Relayed is message TST 1608 from Timberman to Sultan. Sultan to Marshall TOPSEC CRA 5165.

" Second of the two radios mentioned in the first part of our TST 1603 was despatched as SEACOS 318 on 26 Feb to British Chiefs of Staff info Joint Staff Mission from Mountbatten.

Paraphrase follows:

1. I have outlined in my SEACOS 317 of this date my schedule for future operations. This schedule may be seriously retarded unless Naval assault forces can be made to arrive in this theater at an accelerated rate.

2. Your radio COSSEA 150 of 25 October 44 established April 45 as the target date for my receipt of Force W and July 45 as the target date for my receipt of Force Y. I was advised early this month by the Admiralty that as early as possible Force W would be completed but that Force Y should not be anticipated to be prepared for training in combined operations in the Indian Ocean prior to six months after the defeat of Germany, assuming Germany's defeat in June 45 or any date later than that. Now it is my understanding that Force Y will not be prepared for Indian Ocean operations until February of next year.

3. With the exception of an adequate headquarters ship (needed most urgently) I shall have enough amphibious resources for a two brigade assault on Phuket, provided no

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CM-IN-727 (1 Mar 45)

Per SM 522-71

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ IVI
PRIORITY

Page 2

From: CG US Army Forces India Burma Theater New Delhi India

Nr: CRA 5165

1 March 1945

further delay on the promised build up of Force W occurs.

4. It is my hope that my land and air resources will be sufficient to secure the port Swettenham - Port Dickson area in October of this year. Basing my requirements on the intelligence of this area now available to me, I judge that my amphibious resources will be just enough for this attack provided I get, prior to August, at least the following:

24 LST (2) complete with LCT (5) also th LSH (L) and (3) included in Force Y.

If there is a delay in completing Force W there must necessarily be corresponding increase with respect to Force Y.

5. The speeding up of the arrival in my theater of the entire Force Y will make sure that the attack on Singapore and any operations subsequent to that are not delayed.

6. The fact that the delay in the projected arrival of Naval assault forces is attributable to the trend of the war in Europe and the deallocation of available manpower is fully understood by me. Even so I must urge that every effort be made to provide these forces to me as soon as possible because of the importance of not delaying the tempo of my strategy because of a shortfall in such resources.

7. As soon as possible I will send to you preliminary forecast of the merchant shipping I will require for the attacks against Phuket and against the Port Swettenham - Port Dickson area. I desire to avoid the hazard of being obliged

CM-IN-727 (1 Mar 45)

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Per SM 522-71

Date- DEC 22 1971

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IVI

PRIORITY

Page 3

From: CG US Army Forces India Burma Theater New Delhi India

Nr: CRA 5165

1 March 1945

to use my meager resources of amphibious lift on jobs which can be performed by merchant shipping, and therefore I am very anxious that my merchant shipping requirements be fulfilled in every respect. Provision of inland water transportation and necessary merchant shipping now to take the place of those landing craft in the Arakan will determine the availability of amphibious resources for the Phuket operations."

End

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per SM 522-71

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- RHP

FOOTNOTE: Paraphrase of CM-IN 29136 (28 Feb 45)

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Adm. Leahy, Gen. Arnold, Gen. Hull, Gen. Bissell,
Adm. King

CM-IN-727 (1 Mar 45)

DTG 010727Z

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~~SECRET~~
"AMOG"
PRIORITY

From: CG, Northern Combat Area, Forward Echelon, Bhamo Burma
To: War Department
Supreme Commander Southeast Asia Command, Kandy Ceylon
CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China
CG, US Army Forces, India Burma Theater, New Delhi, India
CG, Iceland Base Command

No: CHC 1224

1 March 1945

For information to Mountbatten info Marshall for US Joint
Chiefs of Staff, info Gross please pass to Weart, info Evans,
Leese from Sultan CHC 1224.

*See
Correction*
which are desired by China when CAI returns to China.
The discussion brought out considerable information about the
tentative plans of China Theater for the move of CAI to China.
This is forwarded to you for your study before your prospective
visit to Chungking since the matter of the future employment
of CAI will undoubtedly arise in your conference with the
Generalissimo. The move of CAI to China is primarily a question
for decision by you and the Generalissimo, as commanders of
adjacent strategic theaters.

2. Move of CAI units to China. General Ho Ying Chin
and US Forces, China Theater, have considered the phasing of
the moves of CAI to China in the light of the following factors:
dates required for participation in China counter offensive,
logistic problem of transporting units to China and supplying
them after arrival in China, performance of their missions
in SEAC, and the need for reasonable rest of rehabilitation
prior to engagement on new fronts. It was stated that these
units are not desired in China earlier than their proposed
employment in China requires, primarily because of supply

CM-IN-1061

(1 Mar 45)

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 22 1973

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~~SECRET~~ "AMDG"

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page #2

From: CG, Northern Combat Area, Forward Echelon, Bhamo Burma

No: CHC 1224

1 March 1945

difficulties. It was also clear that China has an interest in the security of the overland road to China and considers the security of the Lashio area essential to the security of the road. The following schedule of CAI movements reflects the thought of General Ho Ying Chin and US Forces, China Theater, on the subject:

- A. Beginning 1st May, one division of the new First Army.
- B. Beginning 15th May, the remaining division of the new First Army.
- C. Beginning 1st June, the 50th Division.
- D. Corps and Army troops would be phased from 15th April through 15th June in such a way as to provide at any one time a balanced force in CAI as well as a balanced force of CAI units which will have moved to China.
- E. Representatives from China recognized that any such schedule would be subject to some extent to the tactical situation in Burma. For example, prior to the departure of the 50th Division, beginning on 1st June, the seriousness of the Jap threat to the road would have to be reconsidered. They also indicated that they would be willing for the 1st Separate Chinese Regiment to remain in Burma so long as it was needed for patrolling or otherwise securing the road.

3. Employment of CAI in Burma prior to move to China: Since two months still remain before China contemplates beginning the movement of CAI units, and since ECAC is now very close to Lashio, the question arose as to the employment of CAI units in Burma prior to their proposed departure to China. China representatives agreed that the seizure and

CM-IN-1061

(1 Mar 45)

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

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[REDACTED] "AMUG"

~~SECRET~~
Page #3

From: CG, Northern Combat Area, Forward Echelon, Bhamo Burma

No: CHC 1224

1 March 1945

security of Hsipaaw-Lashio area are essential and that some move southward from these points might be necessary to achieve this end. They are opposed in principal, however, to any serious commitment beyond the Hsipaaw-Lashio area and raised two practical difficulties. They did not wish CAI to be committed or extended in a manner likely to interfere with the proposed movement schedule; further they wished CAI to have a certain amount of time for rest and rehabilitation. From my own point of view, any considerable advance southward from the Lashio-Hsipaaw area would place a great additional strain on the 143 aircraft now supporting NCAC.

4. Method of moving CAI units to China. Unfortunately, animals of the size necessary to carry normal CAI pack loads are practically non-existent in China. The least expensive method of moving these animals to China is by air. China Theater estimates that two combat cargo squadrons not now available to China Theater will be required to move CAI from 1st May to 15th June.

5. Comments.

A. I repeat that the above is forwarded for your information prior to your Chungking visit. The Chinese Government has made no final or firm demand upon me as Commanding General CAI, for the return of CAI on the schedule mentioned above, nor do I know of any such request made direct to you. The program outlined above is, however, a good indication of what the demand will probably be. If you wish me to discuss this with you on your way to Chungking or if you wish me to send someone to Kandy, Barrackpore, or elsewhere for further

CM-IN-1061

(1 Mar 45)

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[REDACTED] "MUG"

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page #4

From: CG, Northern Combat Area, Forward Echelon, Bhamo, Burma

No: CHC 1224

1 March 1945

discussions I shall be glad to do so. Please indicate your wishes on this point.

B. I understand that General Ho Ying Chin and US Forces, China Theater, will recommend to the Generalissimo the schedule indicated above. It is for you to estimate the effect of such moves upon your operations in Burma.

End

* Being serviced

ACTION: JC/S

INFO : Admiral Leahy, General Arnold, General Hull,
General Bissell, Admiral King, C of S

CM-IN-1061 (1 Mar 45) DTG 010928Z m/m

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PRIORITY

SECRET

From: CG, Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon,
Bhamo, Burma

To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces, India Burma Theater,
New Delhi, India

Nr: CHC 1225 1 March 1945

To Marshall for US Joint Chiefs of Staff info Evans
from Sultan ~~TOP SECRET~~ CHC 1225.

Just received by me is operations instruction number
12, dated 27 Feb, from Allied Land Forces, South East Asia,
to Fourteenth Army, XV Indian Corps, and Northern Combat
Area Command. This instruction is summarized as follows:

A. Overall objective is to capture Rangoon before
the rains.

B. The Mandalay battle is approaching its climax;
The Japanese intention is to fight at Mandalay, hence the
action in that area will be hard and slow.

C. To get to Rangoon before the monsoon, it will be
necessary to destroy the Japanese at Mandalay; this will
require the concentrated effort of Fourteenth Army and NCAC.

D. Certain withdrawals of XV Corps troops from the
Arakan will continue.

E. Fourteenth Army will destroy Japs confronting
it at Mandalay and seize Rangoon before the monsoon.

CM-IN-837 (1 Mar 45)

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 22 1973

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IVI
PRIORITY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 2

From: CG, Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon,
Bhamo, Burma

Nr: CHC 1225

1 March 1945

F. NCAC will secure with all speed the general Kaysukme-Lashio area, will then turn southwest to assist in destroying the Jap forces in Mandalay, and will then exploit towards Loilem.

G. XV Indian Corps will contain maximum Jap Forces, will destroy enemy in that area will destroy enemy in the An area (town of An is on Arakan coast northeast of Ramree Island), and will continue toward Prome from a bridgehead in the Taungup area. This Corps must operate without use of air transport.

2. Comments.

A. Above directive, especially paragraph F, raises squarely the problem of the future employment of NCAC in Burma.

B. In my CHC 1213 dated 28 February and my CHC 1224 dated 1 March, I forwarded to you information on the probable demands from China for the move of US and Chinese forces of NCAC to China. In those radios, it was made clear that extended or heavy operations by Chinese and American elements of NCAC beyond the Hsipaaw-Lashio, will be resisted by General Ho Ying Chin and US forces, China Theater. Our information is that the Generalissimo will also object.

CM-IN-837

(1 Mar 45)

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

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~~SECRET~~ VI
PRIORITY

Page 3

From: CG, Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon,
Bhamo, Burma

Nr: CHC 1225

1 March 1945

C. There follows shortly a series of comments by me on this situation which may assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in getting a clear picture of the issues involved in these present complications. Present indications are that the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Gissimo will be pressed now by SEAC for decisions on the future employment of US and Chinese resources in SEAC.

D. I must inform you as I have already informed Leese and Mountbatten, that I now have an order from SEAC and instructions from the Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army which will be in conflict very shortly. For the immediate future no such conflict exists because the seizure of the Hsiping-Lashio area by NCAC is accepted by China and that operation will take a certain amount of time.

E. Mountbatten and the Gissimo will meet in a few days and this general matter will undoubtedly be discussed. Some arrangement may in fact be reached but it is hard to see how the present demands of SEAC and the plans of US forces, China theater can be reconciled. Therefore, you should place this problem under immediate study in the event urgent action is required from you.

End

NOTE: 1213 is CM IN 467 (1 Mar 45) JC/s

ACTION: JC/s

INFO : Admiral Leahy, General Arnold, General Hull,
Admiral King, C of S

CM-IN-837 (1 Mar 45) DTG 010924Z m/in

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TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES
CHINA THEATRE

Chungking, China.
February 1945.

FAR EAST STRATEGY

1945

1. The war in the Far East for the remainder of 1945 should be conducted with a view to eliminating the dynamic of the enemy war effort, located in the Japanese Archipelago. Large scale operations in the interior of China with American ground forces should be avoided. Landing operations, naval sweeps, air strikes, lodgments on islands or on the Asiatic Coast should be selected and executed only to contribute, directly or indirectly, to the early occupation and/or complete neutralization of Kyushu and Monaka Islands.

2. Advantages of the above overall strategy follow:

a. Exploit overwhelming superiority, qualitatively and quantitatively in the air and on the sea.

b. Concentrates resources in strategically situated bases in timely and effective manner for vital preparatory or "softening up" operations that must precede final assaults on Japanese Homeland.

c. Deny or at least restrict to the enemy the opportunity to employ effectively his strong ground forces.

d. Probably prevent, certainly restrict, the movement of personnel, war making equipment and supplies to the Mainland of Asia for continued resistance there.

e. Possibly cause Japanese capitulation this year, (1945) which would:

(1) Save American lives and resources in the overall effort although initial losses may be heavy.

(2) Strengthen American position at peace table. Victory would have been accomplished by U.S. efforts primarily. (British Dutch, French and Russian interests in the Far East are

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OSD letter, May 3, 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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unquestionably in conflict with political and economic principles of U. S.)

f. Operations against targets in close proximity to and actually on the Japanese Homeland will precipitate decisive naval engagements affording U. S. Fleet the opportunity to complete the decimation of the enemy naval arm. As operations, air and surface, approach closer to the Japanese Archipelago, large scale air battles will be fought causing heavy attrition of Japanese air force. Also occupation or neutralization of Honshu and Kyushu would eliminate 80% of Japanese air industry thus setting stage for total destruction of enemy air resources.

g. If Japan does not capitulate but elects to continue the struggle on the Asiatic Mainland, the occupation and/or complete neutralization of Kyushu and Honshu Islands would:

- (1) Reduce the enemy's war making potential very materially.
- (2) Establish strategically situated naval and air bases with excellent sea communications in the Japanese Archipelago and along the China coast, which would facilitate combined land, air and sea operations against the enemy's continental citadel.
- (3) Give the Generalissimo opportunity, in time and resources, to create Chinese land forces that can and will carry the burden or at least a proportionate share of the fighting on the continent.
- (4) Strongly affect the Japanese people psychologically. Their unquestioning faith in and fanatic support of their Emperor and the country's political and military leaders would undoubtedly be shaken. In lieu of increased devotion and effort there would be apathy and bewilderment. Excellent conditions would thus exist for effective employment of psychological warfare.

3. The following should be considered before adopting the above strategy:

a. Enemy resistance will be intense and fanatic, causing very heavy losses in American lives and material. Every man, woman and child will fight tenaciously for his homeland.

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b. Unless the Americans vigorously exploit during 1945 their strategic initiative the Japanese may successfully concentrate essential industries and supplies on the Asiatic Mainland. As a result their war making potential may not be lowered appreciably even though Kyushu and Honshu are occupied.

c. A Chinese political crisis may be precipitated if Allied operations are conducted to gain lodgements on coast between Shantung Peninsula and Shanghai because that area is more under Communistic than Central Government influence.

d. Makes more remote the establishment of economic stability in China because the sea communications with subsequent flow of vital supplies to China would be delayed. This is Chinese morale factor that cannot be disregarded.

1946

4. If the war is not ended upon the successful occupation or neutralization of the Japanese Homeland it is reasonable to assume the following conditions will prevail in the Far East:

a. ENEMY SITUATION - WINTER 1945-46.

- (1) An industrial crescent around the Gulf of Chihli supported by appropriate raw materials produced or stockpiled in the general area Korea - Manchuria - Chahar - Shansi - Honan - Shantung will be established by the Japs, on a scale sufficient to support continued large scale ground force operations.
- (2) Enemy dispositions and preparations will be completed for the defense and economic exploitation of the Asiatic Mainland included in the general area North of 28° parallel and East of 110° East Longitude. Japanese sources of raw or processed materials in other areas of the Far East will be cut off by Allied air and naval action.
- (3) Remnants of Japanese Naval Force will be bottled up in Gulf of Chihli and Yellow Sea.

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- (4) Japanese Air Force will be reduced very materially by attrition during 1945 operations. The industrial crescent on the Mainland of Asia will be capable of producing only a limited number of planes per month, certainly insufficient to replace losses sustained.
- (5) Relations between Russia and Japan will be broken off or severely strained because tangible evidence of strong Russian reinforcements moving to Far East will become available to Japs. Neither will declare war. Offensive action to improve security of mainland citadel may be initiated by Japanese the Summer or Fall of 1945. Offensive operations with limited objectives may be launched in order to sever the Russian Trans-Siberian Railroad at points near Manchurian border for example, Skovorodina, Ushumun, Kuibyshevka, Arkhara, Khabarovsk. In desperation the Japanese may even accept more than calculated risks and undertake operations to seize the strategic salient extending along Sikhota Alin and thus deny to the Russians and Americans potentially effective air and naval bases.

Maritime Provinces

b. ALLIED SITUATION - WINTER 1945-46

- (1) Upon Germany's capitulation the concentration of military forces in the Far East will be accelerated and intensified, not only by the United States and Britain but also by Russia. This may precipitate action by the Japanese and accordingly the Russians may be engaged in military operations immediately South of the Amur River and in area of Sikhota Alin mountain range. Also the Americans may be operating sea and air forces from bases made available in Kamchatka, Sakhalin, and in Siberia.
- (2) Operable air and sea bases will be available within very short range of remaining areas of Japanese resistance and excellent sea communications may be established to all of these bases. Enemy occupied areas will be isolated in such manner as to preclude mutual assistance either economically or militarily.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

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- (3) A Chinese Army, with approximately 30 divisions, trained and equipped, will be available for effective ground operations in China. Strong American air forces and possibly artillery and armored elements may be allocated to support Chinese ground forces.
- (4) Lines of Communications will be expanded to permit an average monthly delivery of approximately 75,000 tons of supplies into China through India and Burma during 1945. This amount of tonnage should support very effective air and ground operations within the China Theater. Operations scheduled for the remainder of 1945, by China Theater Forces, particularly if assisted by subsidiary operations of POA and SWPA, may result in the opening of a port with lines of communications leading to the interior of China. This would greatly improve the logistical support of Chinese Forces, and also aid materially in alleviating the present deplorable economic situation in the country.
- (5) Almost unlimited resources, air, ground and sea, will be available to the Allies for continued and intensified employment against the enemy throughout the Far East.
- (6) Critical raw materials produced in the area, for example, rubber, hemp, oil, cochina bark, will be available to Allies.

CONCLUSION

5. All efforts of the United States Forces in the Pacific and the Far East should be directed toward the earliest possible defeat of Japan. Any operations which do not contribute directly or indirectly, to the attainment of this objective should not be undertaken.

6. During the remainder of 1945:

- a. The SWPA and POA conduct operations to seize and occupy the Islands of Kyushu and Honshu.
- b. The China Theater conduct operations, air and ground in China and Indo-China to contain, divert and destroy maximum enemy forces and resources.
- c. SEAC conduct operations, air and ground, in Burma, Malaya and Netherlands East Indies to contain, divert and destroy the maximum enemy

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date FEB 26 1973

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forces and resources.

g. Combined Chiefs of Staff assign to British, Australian and Dutch Forces coordinated under SEAC the task of recovering, policing and rehabilitating all areas remaining under Japanese control in Burma, Malaya and Netherlands East Indies.

h. United States Forces assist the Philippines in the task of recovering, policing and rehabilitating areas of the Philippine Archipelago remaining under Japanese control. This assistance must not be permitted to militate against the vigorous and continuous effort to occupy or completely neutralize the principal islands of the Japanese Archipelago.

i. Throughout the Pacific area and the Far East the development of sea and air bases, port facilities and warehousing must be held to the absolute minimum consistent with requirements of military forces operating against the Japanese Homeland. All United States Service Units and Resources of the Army and Navy must be immediately allocated and employed to support these operations.

j. The United States equipment, munitions and supplies presently located along the general supply base line Australia - New Guinea - Solomons advance to a supply base line Luzon - Marianas, and thus insure adequate and timely logistical support of operations directed against the Japanese citadel.

k. Every scheduled operation conducted by FOA, SWPA, SEAC and China Theater must be carefully examined to determine contribution each will make toward the early and successful occupation of Kyushu and Honshu.

l. All Theaters in the Pacific and the Far East conduct an intensified coordinated psychological warfare campaign directed against the enemy home front and fighting forces.

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"IVI"

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~~TOP SECRET~~

From: CG, Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon,
Myitkyina, Burma.

To: War Department.

Nr: CHC 290

17 January 1945.

To Marshall and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff from
Sultan and Wedemeyer CHC 290.

In conference at Myitkyina on 15 January, General
Sultan and General Wedemeyer propose the following policy
to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to WARX 87164,
dated 5 January:

operations in N. Burma

1. The first task of SEAC is to complete the
execution of phase 2 of CAPITAL in order to secure the air
route and land L of C to China. Until objective phase 2
CAPITAL is accomplished no US resources should be committed
to operations that do not definitely contribute the RETO.
If the present reduced forces of NCAC, and such CEF as General-
issimo may make available, are unable to secure the vital
Lashio area as envisaged in phase 2 CAPITAL prior to 1st
April 1945, additional forces must be provided by SEAC to
insure early accomplishment of this task.

2. After phase 2 of CAPITAL has been fully executed,
and appropriate ground force, composition and strength to be
recommended later, should be disposed to protect the air
route and land L of C to China until Japanese threat is de-
finitely removed.

3. After phase 2 of CAPITAL has been fully executed,
the US Tactical Air Units now assigned to India Burma Theater
(including air commandos) must be made available for trans-

CM-IN-16165 (17 Jan 45)

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(2) and 5(3) or (4)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

*Northern
Combat
Area
Command
Chinese &
U.S. troops*

310

300 C B 8

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TO: [REDACTED] "IVI"

PRIORITY

Page-2-

From: CG, Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon,
Myitkyina, Burma.

Nr: CHC 290

17 January 1945.

fer to China as rapidly as they are desired by the China Theater, except for fighter squadrons required for the defense of the air route and land L of C to China. The strength of this defense will be determined later but is now estimated to be two squadrons. The remainder of the tactical air effort in Burma, or elsewhere in SEAC, after phase 2 CAPITAL should be undertaken by the Royal Air Force.

4. With respect to US transport aircraft now supporting SEAC operations, these aircraft should continue to furnish this support until 1st June 1945 to afford SEAC an opportunity to secure Rangoon prior to that date. After 1 June 1945 these transport aircraft (less those required to support the US Chinese Forces remaining in India Burma) should be made available for transfer to the China Theater.

5. Except in grave emergency China Theater will give two weeks notice to SEAC and India Burma Theater prior to initiation of movement of air or ground units to China.

6. In response to specific question asked in WARX 87164.

A. China theater can effectively employ beginning on one March, all US Ground Service units which can be provided by India Burma Theater.

B. China Theater can effectively employ all US Tactical Air Units and supporting air service troops with redeployment beginning upon completion of phase 2

CM-IN-16165 (17 Jan 45)

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By DBS

Date MAY 22 1973

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Page-3-

From: CG, Northern Combat Area Command, Forward Echelon,
Myitkyina, Burma.

Nr: CHC 290

17 January 1945.

CAPITAL.

C. China Theater can effectively employ a minimum of 1 additional combat cargo group with supporting air service units with deployment beginning 1st June. This is in addition to all transport aircraft now deployed in China.

D. Detailed studies by both theater staffs are now in progress to determine a tentative schedule of movement of units to China land.

End.

ACTION: Gen Hull

INFORMATION: JC/S
Gen Arnold
Adm King
CofS

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

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From: CG, US Army Forces India Burma Theater New Delhi, India
To: War Department
Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command, Kandy, Ceylon
Nr: CRAX 55. 2 January 1945

TOPSEC Marshall and Mountbatten from Sultan CRAX 55.

As of 0700 hours 1 January a total of 10985 Chinese, 169 United States personnel, 21 jeeps, 24 anti-tank guns and 1056 animals of 22 Division and new 6th Army were delivered to China. Animal movement is completed. To be lifted from Lado are 488 recovered wounded of * division.

End

* being svcd.

ACTION: Gen Hull

INFO: CG/S
Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

CM-IN-1221 (2 Jan 45)

DTG 02/0533Z

bem

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RT, NARS Date **FEB 26 1973**

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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Joint Chiefs of Staff
77500

1 January 1945

Commanding General
USAF India Burma Theater
New Delhi India

Commanding General
USAF China Theater
Chungking China

Commanding General
US Army Liaison Section
Kandy Ceylon

Commanding General
USAF China Theater
Rear Echelon
Kunming China

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

Number WARX 85058

book message to Sultan and Wedemeyer for
action, to Wheeler for information from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.

With further reference to WARX 80368, the Combined Chiefs
of Staff agreed on 22 December 1944 that should the Supreme
Allied Commander, Southeast Asia report that proposed div-
ersions of resources to China from his theater would
materially limit the execution of operation Capital, the
decision on such a move would lie with the Combined Chiefs
of Staff. Should, however, a situation develop in China
which, in the opinion of the United States Joint Chiefs of
Staff is one of extreme emergency, such a diversion could
be made on the decision of the United States Joint Chiefs
of Staff without awaiting the final decision of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

End

ORIGINATOR: JC/S

INFORMATION: Admiral Leahy
General Arnold
General Hull

General Bissoll
Admiral King
C of S

CM-OUT-85058 (Jan 45)

DTG 011830Z

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SM 522-71

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Per 54522-71
DEC 22 1971

From: S A C S E A
To: Chiefs of Staff Date-
Info: Joint Staff Mission Signature- RHO
No: SEACOS 289 30 December 1944

The recent swift advance South in Arakan has changed whole concept of operation TALON. Patrols reached Foul Point on 26 December and found no enemy there and it is fairly clear that he is pulling out.

At my meeting with C-in-C's Calcutta on 21 December the possibility of an ad hoc amphibious operation was foreseen and I gave approval for preparation to be made for launching it with target date 20 - 27 January provided there was no interference with preparations of TALON proper at later date.

The present situation however now warrants a reconnaissance in force from ~~(Foul Point)~~ during next few days. This reconnaissance has been planned for D day, 3 January, H hour 12:30 FG. The general concept is an assault by 3rd. Commando Brigade on Northwest beaches followed by 51st Brigade of 25th Division: thereafter an overland advance to capture and open the port.

Naval bombardments force consisting of Newcastle, Nigeris, Phoebe and 3 destroyers has been sailed from Trincomalee.

This reconnaissance will not prejudice the subsequent launching of TALON proper should this still prove necessary.

Further details will be forwarded later.

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Hull, Gen Bissell,
Adm King, C of S

CM-IN-30310 (31 Dec 44) 1926Z pa

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SM 522-71

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per SM 522-71

From: SACSEA
To: Chiefs of Staff
Info: Joint Staff Mission

Date:

DEC 22 1944 Assault and capture
of AKYab

Signature: RKP

No: SEACOS 289

30 December 1944

The recent swift advance South in Arakan has changed whole concept of operation TALON. Patrols reached Foul Point on 26 December and found no enemy there and it is fairly clear that he is pulling out.

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The present situation however now warrants a reconnaissance in force from (forecast ? point) during next few days. This reconnaissance has been planned for D day, 3 January, H hour 12:30 FG. The general concept is an assault by 3rd. Commando Brigade on Northwest beaches followed by 51st Brigade of 25th Division; thereafter an overland advance to capture and open the port.

Naval bombardments force consisting of Newcastle, Nigiris, Phoebe and 3 destroyers has been sailed from Trincomalee.

This reconnaissance will not prejudice the subsequent launching of TALON proper should this still prove necessary.

Further details will be forwarded later.

ACTION: CC/S

End

INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Hull, Gen Bissell,
Adm King, C of S

CM-IN-30310

(31 Dec 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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FROM COMINCH & CNO		FOR ACTION		ASTERISK (*) AIRLARM ADDRESSEE		PRIORITY	
RELEASED BY R S EDWARDS				CI MCPOA		ROUTINE	
DATE 28 DEC 1944				BUSANDA		~~ROUTINE~~	
FOR CODEBOOK 2145						BASEGRAM	
DECODED BY		INFORMATION				PRIORITY	
PARAPHRASED BY D SMITH				CHECKED BY LENIHAN		ROUTINE	
NOTED BY				DITTED BY D SMITH		~~ROUTINE~~	
ONE IF DELAYED INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE						IF OPERATIONAL	
282110				NCR 49513		CHECK BELOW	
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP						(Use G. C. T.)	

YOUR SERIAL 282116. PROCEDURE APPROVED ON ASSUMPTION THAT
 PLAN APPLIES EQUALLY TO EMBARKED TROOPS. YEN RATE SUBJECT
 CONFIRMATION AND LATER DISPATCH.

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 By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Opns Div WDGS Pol
WDOPD Lt Col Hannah
OPD 336 TS (28 Dec 44)

28 December, 1944

Commanding General,
USAF China Theater,
Chungking, China.

Commanding General,
USAF India Burma Theater,
New Delhi, India.

Number: WARK 86195

TOPSEC from Marshall personal to Wedemeyer for action
and Sultan for information.

Chief of French Naval Mission in United States has
presented a memorandum to CCS regarding French participation
in resistance operations in Tonking. French memorandum
proposes support by 14th Air Force to French resistance
elements and states "General Blaisot will assign in the
very near future an officer from his staff to Allied Head-
quarters in Chungking. This officer would keep him in-
formed of the progress of operations."

Para. 2. French reference to "Allied Headquarters
in Chungking" is not understood here. Therefore, following is
furnished for your guidance in view of possibility that French
may be referring to your headquarters and may approach you
to obtain concurrence to establishment of French Liaison
officer at headquarters under your command prior to time
CCS reply to French memorandum.

Para. 3. The State Department has advised that
"In a memorandum to the Secretary of State dated October 16,
the President stated that in his judgment at that time we
should do nothing in regard to resistance groups or in any
other way in relation to Indo-China."

CN-001-86195 (Jan 45)

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 8(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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SECRET**

Number: MARK 86195

28 Dec 44

Page

Para. 4. At a later date, the President informed the State Department that American approval must not be given to any French Military Mission being accredited to the Southeast Asia Command. In this latter connection see MARK 66178 of 21 November 1944.

End.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: GEN BISSELL
C OFS

CH-OUT-86195 (Jan 45) DTG 032113Z mos

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OSD letter, May 8, 1978

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Joint Chiefs of Staff
77500

21 December 1944

Commanding General
USAF India-Burma Theater
New Delhi, India

Commanding General
USAF China Theater
Chungking China

Commanding General
U.S. Army Liaison Section
Kandy Ceylon

Commanding General
China Theater
Rear Echelon
Kunming, China

Number WARX 80368

book message to Sultan and Wedemeyer for action, to
Wheeler for information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Joint Chiefs of Staff are informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff substantially as follows. The United States Chiefs of Staff recognize the desirability of Wedemeyer informing Mountbatten of his future requirements for U.S. resources, and agree that Mountbatten should inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the effect on his operations of the transfer of resources to fill Wedemeyer's needs. The United States Chiefs of Staff are unable to waive the reservation made in CCS 308/8. In view of this reservation, they do not consider that agreement, either by Mountbatten or by the British Chiefs of Staff, is an essential preliminary to the transfer of U.S. Army Air units from India to China, although they recognize the desirability of first obtaining SEAC's agreement to the transfer if time and other conditions permit. United States Chiefs of Staff request the British Chiefs of Staff to direct

CM-OUT-80368

(21 Dec 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 21 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Number WARX 80368

Page 2

Mountbatten to assist Wedemeyer and Sultan in carrying out the directives of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff contained in WARX 70954 and WARX 72134. This ends substance of Joint Chiefs of Staff memo to Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sultan is, therefore, directed to consult with Mountbatten prior to the diversion of U.S. aircraft from India to China so that his action may cause least interference with SEAC operations. Agreement should be obtained when practicable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, do not consider that Mountbatten's agreement to any transfer is necessary.

Wedemeyer is directed to keep Mountbatten informed, in so far as practicable, of his further requirements for resources from India-Burma.

End

ORIGINATOR: JC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Hull, Gen Bissell,
Adm. King, C of S

CM-OUT-80368

(21 Dec 44)

1749Z

ngs

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: Chiefs of Staff
To : Joint Staff Mission

Repeated: SACSEA 9 December 1944
Ref SEACOS 275.

We agree in the circumstances that BAMBOO cannot
be done before next monsoon starts.

*amphib. operation against
Western Coast of Malay Peninsula*
End

SEACOS 275 is CM-IN-6527 (7 Dec 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFO : ADM LEAHY
GEN ARNOLD
OPD
GEN BISSILL
ADM KING
C OF S

CM-IN-10960 (11 Dec 44) 1731Z mcs

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per SM 522-71

Date-

DEC 22 1971

Signature-

[Signature]

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

SECRET

PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ Marshall for JCS info Chennault CFBX 27108
signed Wedemeyer.

First. Air movement of troops to bolster forces defending southeast China will make heavy inroads on tonnage next two months:

Second. Necessity for air haul to our remaining Far Eastern bases severely limits volume of supplies which can be furnished them and competition thus is entered between needs of photo job and implementation of M1 supporting strikes both of which must in part be kept from Far Eastern fields.

Third. Coastal poor weather season now being entered upon introduces delays and possibility of costly abortive missions.

Viewing these varied demands for air employment and in light of newly introduced logistic problems and tonnage consumptions request redesignation of areas to be mapped with indications of relative priority and embodying the absolute minimum coverage needed.

ACTION: Jt Chiefs of Staff
INFO: Adm Leahy; Gen Arnold; OPD; Gen Bissell; Adm King; C of S

CM-IN-23024

(24 Nov 44)

0106Z

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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[REDACTED]
MOST IMMEDIATE

From: SACSPA
To: Chiefs of Staff
Info: Joint Staff Mission

Nr: SEACOS 262

22 November 1944

From Mountbatten for British Chiefs of Staff

1. I have received an urgent request from Commanding General U.S. in China Theater for the release from this theater of two combat cargo squadrons of 25 aircraft each, for employment in China. He states that the serious situation developing rapidly in China necessitates this additional airlift for the re-disposition of forces and their supply. He requires their use from 25th November until 15th January.

2. I have investigated ^{Ops in N. Burma} the possibility of meeting his request. So far as CAPITAL is concerned there will already be an overall deficiency of transport aircraft during this period. I have just heard from Carton de Wiart that the Generalissimo contemplates the removal of part of the Yunnan force now actively supporting CAPITAL owing to the situation in China, and this further emphasises the need to husband all my resources for CAPITAL. I therefore feel that the removal of transport aircraft would greatly prejudice the chances of success of CAPITAL and would not accord with my directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3. The only other way in which I could provide the airlift Wedemeyer requires would be by releasing from my Strategical Air Force the 7th Heavy Bombardment Group,

CM-IN-22717 (23 Nov 44)

[REDACTED]
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JCS Memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date 3

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

3/0 CBB

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**TOP
SECRET**

[REDACTED]
MOST IMMEDIATE

page 2

From: SACSEA

Nr: SEACOS 262

22 November 1944

consisting of 48 B 24 aircraft. This group would provide the lift that Wedemeyer requires, and has had previous experience of transport work in China. If therefore the Combined Chiefs of Staff wish me to help Wedemeyer in this way I will send this group to him at once.

4. The plan for TALON has been based on ten British and US Heavy Bomber Squadrons being available for the preliminary bombardment and I would therefore ask that Wedemeyer should be instructed to return the 7th Heavy Bombardment Group to me in sufficient time to take part in TALON which would mean their return a few days earlier than he stipulated.

5. A very urgent decision is requested.

END

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Admiral Leahy
General Arnold
General Hull
General Bissell
Admiral King
CofS

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

CM-IN-22717 (23 Nov 44) 1754Z bjm

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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~~TOP SECRET~~ AMUG
PRIORITY

From: CG, US Army Forces, China Theater, Chungking, China

To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces, Shadazup, India
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Areas,
Hollandia, New Guinea
CG, US Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
CG, Army Air Forces, India Burma Sector,
Calcutta, India
CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China
CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India
CG, US Army Forces, India Burma Theater,
New Delhi, India

No: CFBX 26359

15 November 1944

~~TOP SECRET~~ to Marshall for Joint Chiefs of Staff
COMGENSWPA, CINCPAC and Sultan info Merrill Stratemeyer
Chennault LeMay and Tunner CFBX 26359 from Wedemeyer.

FIVESOME agreement dated 5 November 1944 signed at
Hollandia by representatives SWPA, POA, India, Burma and
China Theaters approved with exceptions as follows:

A. Due to fall of Liuchow 14th Air Force will have
to operate from Kunming; therefore search plan B for the
14th Air Force must be adopted.

B. Ground situation in southeast China is so
critical and dangerous it is imperative large numbers
reinforcements be flown from north China to the threatened
area west of Liuchow immediately. This operation and
future air movements of equipment and troops will markedly
reduce tonnage that can be allocated to 20th Bomber Command
and 14th Air Force.

CM-IN-14916

(16 Nov 44)

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 22 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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~~SECRET~~ AMUG
PRIORITY

Page 2

From: CG, US Army Forces, China Theater, Chungking, China
No: CFEK 26359 15 November 1944

The 349 sorties recommended by the conferees for 20th Bomber Command for December cannot be met. It is anticipated that the cost and adjustments of tonnage for the air transportation of reinforcements will be determined by 20 November and new estimate of sorties for 20th Bomber Command determined.

C. The 14th Air Force will be able to fully perform its search mission in plan B from Kunming base. Contemplated 14th Air Force supplementary operations from our most eastern airfields if still in our possession during landing operations on Luzon will suffer reduction due present necessity of large scale air troop movements.

D. Every effort will be made to limit these movements and air support missions for Chinese current operations to the minimum so as to provide as large a supply as possible for support of the Luzon operations. We will do the best we can toward this be assured.

E. The missions specified in the FIVESOME agreement completely replace plans PAC-Aid and alternate PAC-Aid. Stockpiling as contemplated in those plans has been nullified by operational necessities arising out of changed situation.

End

ACTION: JC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Hull

Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 22 1973

CM-IN-14916 (16 Nov 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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SM 522-71

From: Chiefs of Staff
To: SACSEA
Info: C-in-C India
Joint Staff Mission

Nr: 146 11 October 1944
COSSEA NO. 146

Following from Chiefs of Staff.

1. United States Chiefs of Staff concur in our views as expressed to them in the immediately following telegram, (COS(W) 371)* to the effect that DRACULA will have to be postponed until after the Monsoon of 1945.

2. You should therefore take action in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 of COS(W) 371* and include in your proposals programme of your requirements for the move of the necessary forces into S.E.A.C.

End

* C.C.S 452/32 is COS (W) 371. T.O.O. 111420Z

ACTION: CCS
INFO : ADM LEAHY
GEN ARNOLD
GEN HANDY
GEN BISSELL
ADM KING
C OF S

CM-IN-20255 (21 Oct 44) 2249Z mcs

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Per SM 522-71

DEC 22 1971

signature- RHP

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Col C. R. Peck W.D. 77586

22 September 1944

Commanding General
USAF China Burma India
Forward Echelon
Chungking, China

Commander in Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
Brisbane, Australia

Commander in Chief
Pacific Ocean Area
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Supreme Commander
Southeast Asia Command
Kandy, Ceylon

Central District
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number WARK 34928

[REDACTED] book message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Stilwell, Nimitz, and MacArthur for action, to Mountbatten for information, and to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff and Headquarters Communication Zone Main for information

Subject: Outline plans for the provision of land-based air support from China.

Revised PAC-AID, ALTERNATIVE-PAC-AID and PRE-PAC-AID submitted by CG, USAF, CBI, have been examined. Plans PRE-PAC-AID and ALTERNATIVE-PAC-AID are approved subject to the following limitations:

CN-OUT-34928 (22 Sep 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

WARX 34928

Page 2

1. Execution of these plans will be carried out with resources now available or committed.
2. Forces will not be moved to China unless, in the opinion of the CG, USAF, CBI, they can at that time be profitably employed there.
3. Forces will not be removed from India-Burma, if in the opinion of the CG, USAF, CBI, their removal will endanger Burma operations.
4. The Seventh Bomb Group will be returned to combat operations as soon as Fourteenth Air Force supply requirements in the Forward Area can be met by other means.

Allocation of Hump tonnage will be done in accordance with the priorities established in WAR 87086, 26 August 1944.

Operations of the XX Bomb Command in furtherance of these plans will be in addition to the optimum 225 sorties per month, until D-15 of the Formosa operation. Allocation of supplies will be adjusted accordingly.

The preparatory phases of ALTERNATIVE-PAC-AID will be commenced now. The basic principles outlined in the PAC-AID plan should be applied to ALTERNATIVE-PAC-AID in so far as they are applicable and feasible.

CINCPAC and CINCSOWESPAC are being furnished by courier, copies of PRE-PAC-AID and ALTERNATIVE-PAC-AID as a basis to establish their requirements for air support from China bases during Philippines and Formosa operations.

CG, USAF, CBI and CG Twentieth Air Force, are charged with the responsibility of providing air support from China bases for Pacific operations in accordance with requirements to be established by CINCPAC and CINCSOWESPAC. Direct

CM-OUT-34928 (22 Sep 44)

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

W4RX 34928

Page 3

communication between Headquarters concerned is authorized.
This answers CFAX 12928 from CG, USAF, CBI.

End

ORIGINATOR: JC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OFD
Adm King
C of S

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JCS Memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

OK-OUT-34928 (22 Sep 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOT

URGENT

From: OCTAGON
To: War Department
United Kingdom Base Section, London, England
Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, Kandy, Ceylon

Nr: OCTAGON 42 16 September 1944

[REDACTED] to Mountbatten Kandy for action, to United Kingdom Base Section, London pass to British Chiefs of Staff, Headquarters Communications Zone Main and to AGWAR for information from the Combined Chiefs of Staff; WAR pls pass to following addressees Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, Kandy Ceylon, India and United Kingdom Base Section London, England.

Your directive for "CAPITAL" and "DRACULA" from Combined Chiefs of Staff follows:

Your object is the destruction or expulsion of all Japanese forces in Burma at the earliest date. Operations to achieve this object must not, however, prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air staging post at Myitkyina, and the opening of overland communications.

The following are approved operations:

A. The stages of operations "CAPITAL" necessary to the security of the air route, and the attainment of overland communications with China.

B. Operation "DRACULA". The Combined Chiefs of Staff attach the greatest importance to the effective

CM-IN-15356 (16 Sep 44)

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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[REDACTED] TOT

URGENT

from: OCTAGON

Nr: OCTAGON 42

Revised
16 September 1944

discharge of the task under paragraph 2 (A) and to the execution of operation "DRACULA" before the monsoon in 1945, with a target date of 15th March.

If "DRACULA" has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, you will continue to exploit operation "CAPITAL" as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of operation "DRACULA", 1945 in November.

End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Adm King
C of S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

CM-IN-15356 (16 Sep 44)

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OF LETTERS "IVI" TO CLASSIFICATION OF
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TOP SECRET
URGENT

**TOP
SECRET**

From: US Liaison Office, Kandy Ceylon

To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India
Theater Headquarters, New Delhi, India

No. TST 733 18 August 1944

To Marshall information Sultan from Stilwell
TST 733.

Paraphrase of LOKAN 27 which should be examined
in connection with CRAX 11129 from Sultan.

"Execution of operation CHAMPION and timely air-
born operations against Lashio are precluded if conditions
imposed by Stratmeyer are accepted. British Chiefs of
Staff agree that for many reasons VANGUARD can not be mounted
before mid-March 1945. Since Stratmeyer estimates that
two additional combat cargo groups and the air commando
can be maintained by the service units of Number 1 and
Number 3 combat cargo groups and of Number 1 air commando,
which are to be effective in SEAC by 1 February, 1945, it
looks as if these additional resources could be accepted
in time for use in a new concept of VANGUARD. However,
since the new VANGUARD is based on the release of resources
from Europe it does not follow that any of the additional
air resources required for the operation will come from
these combat cargo groups.

The Joint Planning Staff in London realize need for
all additional air resources for either operation and are

CM-IN-16390 (18 Aug 44)

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date

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TOP SECRET

**TOP
SECRET**

Page #2

From: US Liaison Office, Kandy, Ceylon

No. TST 733 18 August 1944

planning along that line. Conclusion is that if CHAMPION is to * that difficulties of receiving additional combat cargo groups and additional air commando if October must be overcome. If the new concept of VANGUARD is * plan then arrival of combat cargo and air commando units can be delayed until 1 February 1945 when adequate service personnel can be provided.

Wedemeyer is being asked to bring up these points on his Washington visit.

* Being serviced.

End..

NOTE: 11129 is CM IN 15418 (17 Aug 44) Gen Arnold

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFO: Gen Handy
C of S

GM-IN-16390 (18 Aug 44) 1317Z ben

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date FEB 26 1973

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TOP SECRET
URGENT
FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

From: CG, US Army Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon
To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India Theater
Headquarters, New Delhi, India
No: TST 730 17 August 1944

To Marshall EYES ALONE info Sultan EYES ALONE
from Stilwell TST 730.

Further to my TST 725, date 17 August, on SEAC
operations. Mountbatten now reports that British Chiefs of
Staff wish phases 1 and 2 of Mandalay plan executed as soon
as possible, with Rangoon plan in mid-March to use resources
coming from Europe.

My comment: Phase 2 of Mandalay plan brings main
British force into Yeu area where Giffard hopes to have his
main fight with Japs defending Mandalay. This proposal is
in line with my comment number 5 of TST 725 and is one with
which I concur provided forces now available are committed to
first 2 phases of Mandalay plan and are not withheld for
Rangoon.

End

Footnote: 725 is CM-IN-16055 (18 Aug 44) Gen Handy

ACTION: Gen Handy
INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Mr. Stimson
C of S

CM-IN-16319 (18 Aug 44) 1150Z hrt

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972
FEB 26 1973
By RT, NARS Date

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URGENT

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

From: CG, U.S. Army Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon

To: War Department
CG, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, India
Theater Headquarters, New Delhi, India

No. TST 725 17 August 1944

TOP SECRET eyes alone to Marshall info Sultan from
Stillwell TST 725.

British Chiefs of Staff may soon propose a substantial change in SEAC directive in order to permit airborne and amphibious operations against Rangoon next spring. Operations meanwhile would be limited to defense of India and the Mogaung-Myitkyina area so as to conserve maximum resources for Rangoon. If present directive stands, SEAC proposes to make main effort in an airborne and overland advance of Mandalay. My forces in North Burma and the Yunnan Force would advance to Lashio, exploiting into the lower Irrawaddy valley if possible. My comments follow:

1. Rangoon operation means that we will get no help from British in opening road to China this year except limited reinforcement for Chinese - Americans in North Burma. Concentration of our effort in the north without strong threat from the west will let Jap defend Bhamo and Lashio with maximum advantage to him.
2. British recognize that Rangoon operation may postpone indefinitely the opening of the road to China. This raises all the old arguments of the past 2 years. Now must be added the fact that we are ready to exploit the road.

GM-III-16055 (18 Aug 44)

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RT, NARS Date FEB 26 1973

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EYES ONLY

Page -2-

TOP
SECRET

From: CG, U.S. Army Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon

No. TST 725 17 August 1944

Assam LOC has been picked. Pipeline program is in good shape; first 6 inch line is delivering gas from Calcutta to Tinsukia. Major engineering job on the road to China has been completed. Within 30 days after Japs are off the road trace, we shall be moving vehicles, heavy equipment, pipeline materials, and critical supplies to China. Regular trucking operations can begin during the dry season while road is being improved to all - weather standard.

3. It would be a serious mistake to let up on the Jap in Burma and give him a long breathing spell. Recent operations have seriously weakened his entire position; under pressure it will become desperate and we should seize this chance to exploit decisively by prompt action.

4. An Allied decision to drop the road will have a disastrous effect on our position in China, especially if decision is also made to by-pass China ports with main Pacific forces. Our plans to organize an effective war effort by the Chinese and our widely publicized commitments to China make it essential to continue road project. The record is clear as to the inducements we offered for the advance of X and Y forces.

5. Rangoon operation will require large additional resources in men and material from outside SEAC; in fact, it depends upon partial redeployment from Europe. I believe we should proceed with maximum effort we can make with resources now available (Mandalay Plan). If redeployment from Europe is possible, we can then attack Rangoon; if European war goes more slowly than expected, we shall have accomplished much in Burma with what we have.

CM-IN-16055 (18 Aug 44)

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (F)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date FEB 26 1973

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Page -3-

**TOP
SECRET**

From: CO, U.S. Army Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon

No. TST 725 17 August 1944

6. Mandalay Plan may involve slight delay in SEACS projected amphibious drive to the south, although this is doubtful. Rangoon operation timed for next March, however, will postpone indefinitely and possibly permanently our plans in China. With respect to timely support for Pacific offensive, large scale assistance from China against Japanese, and long range U.S. interests in Pacific, I consider our China program must get higher priority than mopping up operations in Southeast Asia.

End of comments.

I recommend that U.S. Chiefs of Staff insist once more that SEAC conduct operations without delay to secure overland route to China, and that strong preference be expressed to British Chiefs of Staff for main British effort in direction of Mandalay.

End

ACTION: GEN HANDY
INFO : GEN ARNOLD
C OF S

CM-IN-16055 (18 Aug 44) 0304Z me5

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY
E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(b) and 3(b) or (c)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date FEB 26 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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~~TOP SECRET~~
PRIORITY

From: CG, US Army Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon
To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India, Theater
Headquarters, New Delhi, India

Nr: TST 709 17 August 1944

~~TOP SECRET~~ to Marshall for personal attention
Wedemeyer from Maddocks info Sultan signed Stilwell TST 709.

This following is paraphrase of message from Gifford for Mountbatten.

"Command set up of land forces for VANGUARD and CHAMPION is being considered. I am assuming Chiefs of Staff have agreed to Allied land C in C with integrated staff. A force of at least two corps will be involved in either VANGUARD or CHAMPION. With VANGUARD Rangoon will be area, with CHAMPION Central Burma will be area. In both places there must be an Army Commander and Staff in command. This command should be able to devote his time to operations. He should not be burdened with administrative problems and L of C problems. The Allied land C in C should set up under himself and L of C Command and staff responsible for L's of C.

CHAMPION set up would then be as follows: Under Allied C in C would be NCAC, and in Imphal area, Fourteenth Army with XXXIII and IV Corps under command, in Arakan XV Corps, and command of L of C.

VANGUARD arrangements would be as follows: Under Allied C in C would be NCAC, in Imphal area IV Corps, in

CM-IN-15621 (17 Aug 44)

~~TOP SECRET~~
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RT, NARS Date

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To: [REDACTED]
PRIORITY

(Page 2)

From: CG, US Army Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon
Nr: TST 709 17 August 1944

Arakan area XV Corps, in Rangoon area Fourteenth Army with I Corps from outside SEAC and XXXIII Corps, and also L of C Command.

All responsibility for administration in rear area would be taken under this set up from fighting commands who could devote attention solely to operations. Such an organization would fit in with set up recommended by Whitworth Jones Committee which studied ways of improving cooperation between Army and Air. NCAC for operation of CHAMPION would have 10 USAAF. For Fourteenth Army there would be one adequate sized composite group. For XV Corps there would be similar group. The A lied land C in C would work with the RAC and 3 TAF by whose headquarters he and his staff must be situated.

A like set up would be worked out for VANGUARD. Staffs and organizations for this are being studied.

Information copy of this wire might be passed to CIGS."

End

ACTION: Gen Handy (For Gen Wedemeyer)

INFO: Gen Arnold
C of S

CM-IN-15621 (17 Aug 44) 17512 bem

TO: [REDACTED]
E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION
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From: CG, US Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon
To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces in China, Burma and India,
Theater Headquarters, New Delhi, India
Nr. TST-688 16 August 1944

To Marshall for personal attention Wedemeyer from
Maddocks and to Sultan TST 688 signed Stilwell.

Here following is paraphrase of answer of C in C EF
to LOKAN 19.

Am not able to comment on military aspects of
projected operations. My views on VANGUARD are known to you
and if resources are found I strongly support it.

Now follows paraphrase of Stilwell's answer to LOKAN
19.

On para 2, to fulfill directive we must keep up
offensive and exploit this year's success.

On para 2 B, this assumes VANGUARD is approved which
is not so.

On para 3, a defensive stand may be taken by Japs.

On para 4, no comments.

On para 5, meaning not clear. Does it mean NCAC is
to go on passive defensive.

On para 6, do not agree. In my opinion no serious
offensive will be undertaken. They will hold Katha Bhamo
line. Having been mauled replacements are needed and Japs

OM-IN-15185

(17 Aug 44)

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Page 2

From: CG, US Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon

Nr. TST-688

16 August 1944

do not think it vital to hold area north Katha Bhamo line.

On para 7, action only to the west of Chindwin would not deter them from attack on Mogaung Myitkyine if such a decision has been taken. A determined offensive across Chindwin would deter them and there is no reason to limit operations to west side.

On para 8, if Japs move on Mogaung Myitkyina, all out effort must be made to stop it regardless of effect on VANGUARD or directive is being disregarded. Security of the air route must be maintained.

On para 9 A, no remarks.

On para 9 B, if we give up Tarzan to supply VANGUARD, an operation not yet approved, we are not following our directive.

On para 9 C, if a determined operation were carried out across the Chindwin in addition, it probably would. The meaning of this paragraph seems to be that from October to March WCAC will conduct operations alone.

On para 10, our directive to protect and broaden the air route to China requires us to exploit present success and to press our advantages with all possible force at all points.

Paraphrase of Stilwell's message ends.

CM-IN-15185

(17 Aug 44)

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Page 3

From: CG, US Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon

Nr. TST-688

16 August 1944

Now follows paraphrase of Giffard's answer to LOKAN
19.

Having just toured fronts I can say Japanese have been decisively beaten, losing many men and much material. ~~SLIM~~ has been ordered to go on to Chindwin and to secure Kalewa and Kalembo. We are now 17 miles beyond Tamu on road to Sittaung and are at mile post 65 on the Imphal-Tiddim Road. Weather is interfering with movement.

2. Pursuit of Japanese by Fourteenth Army should not be limited. To press him now and inflict losses will more likely make formations available ~~for~~ for VANGUARD than would assumption of defensive position at this time. Defense would require as many or more troops than offensive. Pulling back now to Imphal Plain would give Japanese the initiative and give them a rest. Pressing our present advantages we draw his reserves to the north thus helping VANGUARD. Pursuit now means occupying forward positions later but Japanese could not later take advantage of this. This past year they were able to for they were in good condition, which they are unlikely to be again for a long time.

3. Knowing that our superiority in weapons and armor will give us advantage in dry belt Jap will try to hold us as far north as he can. There is no good defensive line in lower Burma. His most probable course of action is one suggested your 3 A. Rumors exist that starting date may be end of September. My guess is later. Since Arakan covers airfields needed for VANGUARD offensive here would be bothersome, so precautions are being taken. Course you mention 3-B is not probable. If we withdraw Japanese might start offensive, but not likely on this year's scale. Course proposed in 3-C is a

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Page 4

From: CG, US Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon

Nr. TST-688

16 August 1944

possibility but is unlikely unless we stop pressing our advantages held now.

4. Herewith my view for operations from now to March.

First, to make secure the Yitkyins Mogaung staging area.

Second, to press the Japanese in Burma with all possible means to keep him from regaining offensive.

5. To send 1 division as reinforcement for NCAC for defense would not help situation Imphal, but continuance of pressure on Japanese by NCAC would make secure Mogaung Myitkyins area and also relieve pressure on Imphal area. Present NCAC forces are sufficient in my opinion.

6. To do VANGUARD requires 5 divisions in addition to Airborne troops. Because of area and difficult tasks adequate forces must be available. VANGUARD could be allotted following forces in March. If Forted Airborne Division. 1 assault, 1 Air Transit and 2 Infantry Divisions. From outside SEAC 3 divisions must be formed. These must arrive prior to operations for 1 additional Air Transit Division and 2 more airborne follow up divisions are required and operations must begin with SEAC having a 2nd division reserve. Rehabilitation divisions in Army groups reserve could fulfill this need. Overseas divisions to get acclimatized and trained should reach theater before end of year. Accompanying these must be Signals and a Corps Headquarters.

Paraphrase of Giffard's message ends.

GM-IN-15185

(17 Aug 44)

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From: CG, US Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon

Nr. TST-688

16 August 1944

Following is paraphrase of Peirce's answer to LOKAN 19.

Not knowing extra resources which may have been made available makes it difficult to answer. Such being the case, I assume expenditure of resources at present here must be so handled that requirements listed in your para 2 can be met.

2. I agree with material in paragraphs 1 to 6. Relative paragraph 7 action by us west of Chindwin would not cause Japanese to change any plan for attack on Myitkyina.

3. Relative to paragraph 8 and 9, not having seen Giffard, in my opinion best action involves moving on to Kalewa this Monsoon season that we may hold Kalewa and bridge ~~there~~ on Chindwin and fortified positions on east bank Atrium Japanese L of C. Thus as our own L of C we could have Chindwin from Sittaung to Kalewa. Also necessary for us to move north to Homalin to prevent move by Japanese against Ukhrul.

4. Success in present offensive toward Kalewa and Sittaung would give us good cold weather positions and block Japanese threat to Imphal.

5. Air route must be exploited and present control of Myitkyina staging area must be retained. This object is much more important than effort to move south to open road to China before VANGUARD is launched.

6. Reference you para 9 C, an answer is difficult to give but 1 additional division should be enough if present information is correct.

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Page 6

From: CC, US Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon

Nr. TST-688

16 August 1944

7. For success of VANGUARD complete air supremacy must be gained in Rangoon area before operation commences. Heavy bomber action can best achieve this supremacy. For this task units from B 29 forces might be employed.

8. Our requirements in air transport must have been met completely and there must be time to allow them to have concentrated training if VANGUARD is to be successfully carried out.

Paraphrase of Peirce's message ends.

End

*Being serviced.

Note: LOKAN 19 is CM-IN-13533 (15 Aug 44) Gen Handy
(Gen Wedemeyer)

ACTION: Gen Handy (Gen Wedemeyer)

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
C of S

CM-IN-15185

(17 Aug 44)

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From: CG, US Army Liaison Section, Kandy Ceylon

To: War Department

No: TST 694

16 August 1944

To Marshall for personal attention Wedemeyer
from Maddocks signed Stilwell TST 694.

Tossing a paraphrase JPS brief on LOKAN 19 prepared
here in Kandy 14 August.

Paraphrase commences.

Para 1. Following views are based on assumption
that in March 1945 VANGUARD will be carried out. Granting
this following paper presents JPS views on operations which
should then be put into effect in north Burma.

2. If the date for VANGUARD is March 1945, the
initiative must be maintained in north Burma in the
meantime. This may result in land communications to China
being opened before VANGUARD bears results. There seems
to be no need to have SEAC directive changed.

3. It is agreed that Para 3A is most probable
course and that B and C might accompany it.

4. After October 1st a Japanese offensive may
start. Possibly 2 regiments will move from Mowdok toward
Coxs Bazaar. As many as 4 regiments may move north up the
Kalapanzin and Maungdaw line. Plans for such a movement
are perhaps already indicated. There are 3 of our divisions

CM-IN-15396 (17 Aug 44)

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date May 22 1973

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Page 2.

From: CG, US Army Liaison Section, Kandy Ceylon

No: TST 694

16 August 1944

in Arakan, but 2 are West African which are short on artillery. At Dohazari 1 army reserve division will be stationed. All of these would be employed in the fighting. By the time the enemy offensive starts work on airfields in Ramu Cox's Bazaar area will be under way in preparation for VANGUARD. Risk of enemy interference with our engineer work for VANGUARD must be faced. For a short time it might be wise to commit 1 division from Army Group Reserve to the Arakan. But over a long time the general situation need not be affected.

5. It is not probable that the 1944 Imphal offensive will be staged again. To move back to the Imphal plain would be unfortunate. Present monsoon operations give promise of giving us the line of the Chindwin, a decided advantage.

6. There is no evidence that the Japanese plan an operation against Mogaung Myitkyina, but that might be done, especially if we give them the initiative. Not more than 2 divisions would likely be available for such an offensive in December. By March it might be mounted with 2½ to 3 divisions if no action had taken place on Chindwin. Factors influencing Japanese forces employed are other operations carried out by them, whether we have held the initiative, the amount of replacements from outside of Burma.

7. If our movement toward Kalewa continues it will seriously hinder Japanese attempt to start operations against Mogaung Myitkyina. Operations by us west of Chindwin later if we lose contact now would not then change Jap plans.

CM-IN-15396 (17 Aug 44)

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From: CG, US Army Liaison Section, Kandy Ceylon

No: TST 694

16 August 1944

8. Material in Para 8 is agreed to.

9. A. Material in 9A is agreed to.

10. Material in Para 9B is agreed to but if we retain initiative on Chindwin and if assumptions stated in Para 6 above are true 1 less division might be used.

11. Material in Para 9C is agreed to. Penetration brigades from 3 Indian Division could be used here. But air maintenance requirements would be increased over those now allotted for 2 British Division. In case Japanese launch 3 division offensive road trace to China might not be secure unless NCAC received added reinforcements. Necessity of moving Army Group Reserve to Myitkyina Mogaung area rapidly must be therefore considered.

12. If by the date expected present allotments of resources reach India enough transport aircraft should be available to make a small airborne operation possible in north Burma by end of January. It would be necessary before VANGUARD to replace losses in gliders and aircraft.

13. For the move to Kalewa Kalemyo engineer resources within formations (US Organic Engineers) can provide land maintenance through the good weather. Just as long as they are not expected to construct an all weather road. To operate the Chindwin field more engineer resources will be needed. If enough aircraft for VANGUARD are given us and

CM-IN-15396 (17 Aug 44)

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Page 4

From: CG, US Army Liaison Section, Kandy Ceylon

No: TST 694

16 August 1944

then left in the theater units forward of the roadhead of the all weather road could during the 1945 monsoon be supplied by air. VANGUARD should result if successful in permitting maintenance from the south. If forces east of Chindwin are not over 2 divisions, no limiting problem should arise. Conclusions:

14. 1st, we must retain the initiative.
- 2nd, if the date for VANGUARD is set back to March 1945 total additional forces of 1 more division will be required by NCAC and Fourteenth Army to permit NCAC to be directly reinforced if the Japanese open an offensive against them.
- 3rd, assumption of defensive positions elsewhere in Burma would not make available for VANGUARD any additional forces.

Paraphrase of JPS brief on LOKAN 19 ends.

Following are comments by Generals Maddocks and Beebe on LOKAN 19: We could not accept Para 1 of LOKAN 19 as received and had prepared an American viewpoint along the lines of Stilwell's comments which we proposed to use if JPS could not agree that LOKAN 19 was based on the assumption that VANGUARD had been ordered. This was agreed to as is indicated in Para 1 above. The only real fight developed over Para 2 LOKAN 19. Our comments on that were the best we could get without a split which we hesitated to force on our level. We stood firm that the initiative in

CM-IN-15396 (17 Aug 44)

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From: CG, US Army Liaison Section, Kandy Ceylon

No: TST 694

16 August 1944

north Burma must be retained and there should be no change in our directive. We pointed out that if sufficient resources were made available to the theater both modified CHAMPION and VANGUARD could be accomplished. We further stated that if the proposed plan eliminated the establishment of a road and pipelines through north Burma, it would be most difficult if not impossible to get American resources for VANGUARD. The comments of the C's in C's are being forwarded. Do you wish me to continue sending these messages? Further, will you please give men any guidance you can for the American here so that our stand about post monsoon operations will coincide with that in Washington?

End

ACTION: Gen Handy (For Gen Wedemeyer)

INFO: Gen Arnold

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

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CM-IN-15395

(17 Aug 44)

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PRIORITY

From: CG, US Army Forces Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon
To: War Department
Re: TST 662 15 August 1944

To Marshall for Wedemeyer from Nadhocks signed
Hazeltine TST 662.

Forwarding to you paraphrase of message from
Mountbatten for Stilwell, Peirse, Giffard and Somervell,
numbered LOKAN 19.

Paraphrase begins.

1. Request has been made for my views on operations
for March 1945 in North Burma. I realize that in this
situation my present directive would have to be changed. I
have been asked the extent of the modification necessary.
Following are my first reactions.

2. Objects until March 1945 in North Burma should
be 1st securing the staging base Mogaung Myitkyina, 2nd
preventing the Japanese from starting operations which
would involve our forces needed for VANGUARD.

3. Post monsoon operations by Japanese might be:
1st, in Arakan a limited offensive,
2nd, in Imphal a renewal of this years offensive,
3rd, large scale operations against the
Myitkyina Mogaung sector.

4. Considering Para 3 above 1st point sufficient
forces are in Arakan to meet any anticipated threat there.

CM-IN-13533 (15 Aug 44)

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From: CG, US Army Forces Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon
No: TST 662 15 August 1944

5. Considering Para 3 above 2nd point it is not probable that Japanese will repeat this years Imphal offensive. Should such an operation be undertaken adequate forces are in the location to repel the attack if our forces are pulled back into the Imphal plain from their advance monsoon positions. Doing this would not affect the safety of airbases in Myitkyina Mogaung area provided VANGUARD is launched in March 1945.

6. Considering Para 3 above 3rd point a Japanese offensive against Myitkyina Mogaung area is most probable step. The extent to which the Japanese have reinforced Burma from outside will determine the size of this operation.

7. If the Japanese select this operation do you believe any British offensive west of the Chinwin would change the Japanese decision or cause them to limit their offensive?

8. In my opinion in order for a British offensive east of Chinwin to change a Japanese plan for operations against Myitkyina Mogaung this British offensive must threaten Japanese L of C north from Mandalay. To do this might mean employing such large forces that in March 1945 VANGUARD could not be mounted.

9. Possible operations by which we could meet a Japanese action against Myitkyina Mogaung are:
1st, fly in our divisions to Mandalay area.

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From: CG, US Army Forces Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon

No: TST 662

15 August 1944

This force would eventually be defeated in detail even though we could accomplish our objective.

2nd, next winter TARZAN operation could be started. Because of Japanese increased forces and defenses this would need 2 divisions plus glider borne troops, LRP units and a parachute brigade. There would not then be left sufficient air trained and airborne units in March 1945 to make VANGUARD possible.

3rd, 1 air transit division could be flown into Myitkyina Mogaung area. This division along with 36th Division would sufficiently reinforce until March NCAC right flank and air base against likely Japanese reinforcement. If this is true this plan is cheapest and draws on no airborne resources. Its scope might be inadequate to permit the ** to China to be secured until VANGUARD has been completed. A permanent air supply commitment would be involved to lessen burden on Leda Road.

10. Request at first possible date your personal preliminary comments and later your consolidated comments.

CM-IN-13533

(15 Aug 44)

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From: CG, US Army Forces Liaison Section, Kandy, Ceylon

No: TST 662

15 August 1944

Paraphrase ends.

Comments submitted on this message will be forwarded when available.

End

*Being Serviced

ACTION: Gen. Handy (Gen. Wedemeyer)

INFO : Gen Arnold
C of S

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CM-IN-13533

(15 Aug 44)

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TOP SECRET

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India,
Theater Headquarters, New Delhi, India

To: War Department

Nr. CRA 10418

10 August 1944

TOPSEC. To Joint Chiefs of Staff CRA 10418 from
Sultan.

Studying now your WARX 76573 of 6 August. Your proposals most welcome as currently we are preparing directive and establishing an adequate deception section within the theater. Believe most satisfactory procedure is to accept your offer of trained team of officers. It is desired that army member, of field grade, be available for permanent assignment this theater. Outline of our proposed implementation program within theater, covering also trained personnel requirements, will go forward shortly direct to Bissell.

End

Corrected copy of CM-IN-8791 (10 Aug 44) Gen McFarland (JC/S)

ACTION: Gen McFarland (JC/S)

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
CofS

CM-IN-9235 (10 Aug 44) 22232 bjm

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E.O. 12812, Sec. 1.4 and 1.5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RT, NARS Date FEB 26 1973

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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

For General Marshall's Eyes Only

EYES ONLY

From: CG US Army Forces, China, Burma and India Forward
Echelon, Chungking, China

To: War Department
CG US Army Forces China, Burma and India Rear
Echelon, New Delhi

NR: CFBX 17969 31 May 1944

Eyes alone Marshall info Sultan from Ferris signed
Stilwell CFBX 17969.

British General Deviant and American General Ferris were given following information from General Ho Ying-Chin, Chinese Chief of Staff. General Ho states he is speaking for Generalissimo and wants our War Department informed of the following: Japanese have changed strategy to the use of ground troops against United States, Great Britain, and China because Japs realize their inferiority in Air and Naval forces. They intend to knock China out first and thus prolong the war. Concerning the recently concluded fishing or non-aggression agreement between Japanese and Russo * Chinese definitely feel that some agreement was reached permitting Japanese troops to be withdrawn from Manchuria.

Japs able to increase available forces by 1,570,000 due to the change in their conscription age limits to 19 and 45. This will permit 25 to 30 new divisions and also furnish replacements. Furthermore this year 500,000 soldiers are obtainable from Formosa and Korea. On pretext Russians needed at home, the Russians Military Mission in China is leaving soon. Failure of Chinese Communists to operate against Japs arouses suspicion of Chinese Government that

ON-IN-317 (1 Jun 44)

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-page 2-

From: CG US Army Forces, China, Burma and India Forward
Beihelon, Chungking, China

NR: CFBX 17969

31 May 1944

this is Russian directed.

Japs had 20 Divisions in Manchuria prior to fishing agreement of which 54th, 14th, 16th, 2nd, 52nd Divisions were moved to French Indo China, Thailand, and Burma area. After fishing agreement following changes made: 71st and 27th Divisions moved to China; 29th, 10th, and 53rd Divisions (total 5) were moved to Thailand, Burma and French Indo China. 28th Division to Honan, 9th Division to Hongkong, 12th suspected at Singapore, the 11th Division suspected as Canton bound, 3rd Tank Division in Honan Province. In Manchuria remains 6 divisions, 13 frontier Defense Brigades, 8 independent Infantry Brigades, 2 Cavalry Brigades, 2 Garrison Brigades, 1 Tank Division.

Distribution of Jap forces follows: On general exterior line of Burma-Malaya-Dutch East Indies-Palau-Yap-Guam-Bonin are 43 divisions. Along this line main concentrations in Philippines and Burma. Major and decisive naval battle will be fought in the center of the defense, the Kuriles-Hokkaido, Bonin, Formosa line. Japs will destroy Chinese main forces and the air bases. Wanted by Japs are Hankow-Canton and Hankow-Peking railways. For Yangtze Gorge, Sian and Kunming is Japs general plan.

Trains of about 30 cars each totalling 471 troop trains and 21 ammunition trains moved over Tientsin-Pukow railway between 1 March and 8 April. Japs also moved 133

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From: CG US Army Forces, China, Burma and India Forward
Echelons, Chungking, China

NR: CPEX 17969

31 May 1944

troop trains and 3 ammunition trains between 9 April and 8 May. Troops from Korea, Japan and Formosa plus these troop trains totals about 500,000. Chinese place following in Hankow-Wuchang area based on information which Chinese trust: 39th, 13th, 27th, 3rd, 34th, 40th, 68th, 116th, and 58th Divisions; 16th and 17th Independent Mixed Brigades; 5th, 7th, 12th Independent Infantry Brigades. Equivalent to 11 Divisions is total. Now follows a list of independent Infantry Brigades and locations as reported: 1st New Guinea; 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Hopeh; 9th Suiyen; 10th and 11th Shansi; 8th and 13th Canton; 6th at Chengking. Arrived at Canton according to reports are the following units: 104th Division, 19th, 22nd and 23rd IMB, 8th and 13th Independent Infantry Brigades (these are equivalent to 4 Divisions). Also located in Canton area 350 tanks and armored cars and 1 Hongkong Defense Brigade. At Hongkong on 18 May 20,000 Jap troops were reported to land. This may be 11th Division. Chinese say 60,000 to 70,000 Jap troops left Manchuria. Their destination is not known and Chinese admit some of the figures may be duplicated herein.

Japanese are constructing defense works, repairing communications and building airfields along the Peking-Hankow and Lunghai railways. Japanese crossed the Hsinchao Ho River at 2 points on night of 27 May. This is indicative of the beginning of capture of Hankow-Canton railway in near future. Japanese increased strength in Northern Indo China by 20,000 making total of 30,000. Also being

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From: CG US Army Forces, China, Burma and India Forward
Echelon, Chungking, China

NR: CPBX 17969

31 May 1944

rushed is repair of highways and construction of airfields. This indicates contemplated drive on Kuning area and is considered as a diversionary movement for Burma operations.

Ho Ying-Chin asked the following: That our respective governments be informed: That more air forces be made available to China. Ho stated further that Chinese troops poorly equipped and are without enough support and find it difficult to cope with this very serious situation as it is developing. The Chinese asked that Hankow be bombed by Chennault and attack Yangtze shipping which the Japs are undoubtedly using for supply. I asked Chinese where airfields were being built in Honan and reply was Shuchang, Chengchow, and Sincheng. Anon my query on Jap plane dispositions as follows: 2,985 Central and South Pacific area, 2,125 in Burma, Thailand, Indo China area, 1,490 in China and Manchuria, 3,680 in Japan proper Korea and Formosa. Of all these 1,745 are training and 8,535 are combat. 700 Army and 800 Navy planes and figures for monthly production. Main trouble of Japs is pilots.

My comments follow: Chinese are definitely concerned and worried; Chinese may have made some errors in strengths herein; accuracy on all strengths and locations are not conclusive but it is reasonable to assume that Sinos have good sources of information available; numbers shown may be greater than actual. The Chinese desired this information be forwarded to War Department without delay,

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From: CG US Army Forces, China, Burma and India Forward
Echelon, Chungking, China

NR: CFBX 17969

31 May 1944

asked that the information be held closely for obvious reasons as it relates to overall United Nations effort. We do not know the orders given by the Chinese to their troops on this subject.

In original discussion General Ho asked that United States approach Russians and request that Russian contain Japs in Manchuria, but when asked to give this request in writing Ho declined saying that Chinese wished to give the matter more thought and would defer their request. He further stated that the request would not be put through their Minister of Foreign Affairs to our State Department.

New subject:

General Chennault is today in Chungking conferring with Generalissimo relative to the support the Chinese can expect from the 14th Air Force in countering the Jap advance.

No Sig

* Being serviced.

ACTION: 6Gen Bissell

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
SGS
Col Park ✓
LOG

CM-IN-317

(1 Jun 44)

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From: CG, US Army Forces in China, Burma and India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

To : War Department

No : CRA 4415 28 May 1944

To US Joint Chiefs of Staff CRA 4415 [REDACTED] C from
Sultan.

Being forwarded by courier is "Outline Plan for Air Support of Pacific Operations" prepared by Army Air Forces, India-Burma Sector, in conjunction with 14th Air Force, 20th Bomber Command, and Services of Supply. This plan is approved by this Headquarters and is forwarded as answer to WARX 31202, dated 3rd May. Admiral Mountbatten has seen an outline of the plan and has accepted it in principle, subject to comments which he will submit to British Chiefs of Staff upon receipt of final draft. This radio summary contains 2 parts.

Part 1 contains our recommended course of action and includes an augmentation of ATC Hump operations.

Part 2 is an alternate plan which shows what can be done with resources which are present or are known to be available for this theater. It should be noted that new Theater troop basis mentioned in your WARX 32939 dated 6th May and WARX 42185 dated 27th May has not yet arrived.

Part 1.

1. Assumptions.

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By DBS

Date MAY 22 1973

Col Park

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From: CQ, US Army Forces in China, Burma and India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

No : CRA 4415 28 May 1944

A. That operations in north Burma will be successfully carried out as outlined in Phase 1 of our radio CRAX 2927 dated 7th May. Refueling stations for ATC use would then be available in the Myitkyina area by not later than 1 October.

B. Personnel, equipment and facilities will be made available for expansion of ATC Hump operations as outlined in CRAX 2927 (and in plan enterprise.)

C. That US Air Forces in this Theater, other than ATC, will not be substantially augmented for these operations.

D. That staging and advance airdrome areas in eastern China which are now available to us will remain in Allied possession through the attack on Formosa.

E. That the situation in Burma will permit the withdrawal by January, 1945, of the bulk of US Air Combat Forces for deployment in China.

Paragraph 2. Weather.

It should be noted that February is in worst season of year for operations in southeast China although situation is somewhat better over Formosa. Air operations may therefore be limited by weather to unpredictable extent. This factor causes us to plan completion of stockpiling by 1st January; tonnage carried between 1st January and 15th Feb-

ON-IN-22117 (29 May 44)

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From: CG, US Army Forces in China, Burma and India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

No 1 CRA 4415

28 May 1944

ruary considered as safety factor and stocking for additional operations by VLR's or Air Task Force.

Paragraph 3. ATC augmentation.

To maintain our present position in China and to prepare timely and significant air support from China bases for Pacific operations, and early and substantial increase of ATC lift is essential. The augmentation proposed in enterprise plan (see also CRAX 2927 dated 7th May) which reaches 29000 tons per month by December, 1944, is minimum which we consider acceptable. In absence of full and timely ATC augmentation, it is proposed to divert entire 7th Bomber Group to Hump operations on or about 1st July, 1944. This would provide an additional 1350 tons per month initially and 1845 additional tons per month when refueling at Myitkyina can begin. These additional deliveries to Kunming would provide useful supplement to ATC tonnage but would not be substitute for proper augmentation.

Paragraph 4. Employment of 20th Bomber Command.

Plan contains recommendation to Commanding General, 20th Air Force, that approximately 75 photographic, sea search and patrol sorties be flown by VLR's, plus approximately 402 combat sorties, making total of 477 sorties by VLR's for which stockpiling is to be provided in addition to MATTERHORN requirements. VLR supporting operations include reconnaissance beyond the operational range of other available air-

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From: CG, US Army Forces in China, Burma and India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

No : CRA 4415

28 May 1944

craft and operations, coordinated with those of Air Task Force in China, to intercept enemy reinforcements moving by air and sea to Mindanao and Formosa and to neutralize, to the extent possible, enemy air bases on Formosa point to the attack on this island.

Paragraph 5. Operations to provide indirect support for attack on Mindanao.

US Air Forces in India and China will continue their present missions, with emphasis upon containing and destroying enemy air forces in those areas and enemy shipping off China. In addition, 14th Air Force will furnish Pacific Task Force Commander the maximum obtainable information as to movement of enemy forces by sea. On the approach of D-Day, 14th Air Force will, to the full extent of its means, interdict movements of enemy reinforcements moving southward by sea and air.

Paragraph 6. Operations to provide direct and indirect support for the attack on Formosa.

A. All US Air Force units in India and China will seek the maximum attrition of enemy air forces, Naval craft and shipping and will furnish, within the limits of their operational radius, intelligence as to movements of enemy reinforcements by sea and air.

B. An Air Task Force would be organized to become

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By **DDO**

Date **MAY 22 1973**

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From: CG, US Army Forces in China, Burma and India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

No : CRA 4415

28 May 1944

operational on D minus 15 from base in southeast China.
Subject to modification to meet existing situation, its
composition would be as follows:

- 2 heavy bomb groups,
- 4 medium bomb groups (including 1 CACW group which
equals 2/3 US medium bomb group),
- 4 fighter groups plus 1 fighter squadron,
- 1 night fighter squadron,
- 2 photo reconnaissance squadrons, and
- 1 troop carrier squadron.

These units are now assigned to 14th Air Force and
to Army Air Forces, India-Burma Sector. This deployment
would leave 2 US fighter squadrons and any available US
air commando groups in the India-Burma Sector.

C. Phased with D-Day for Formosa operations, this
Air Task Force would keep Pacific Task Force Commander ad-
vised of movements of enemy reinforcements toward Formosa
by sea and air, and would interdict such reinforcement to
the limit of its capabilities. It will attempt to gain
local air superiority over Formosa and beginning D minus 5, it
will undertake to neutralize principal enemy air bases on
that island. Its operation would be greatly strengthened
by the addition of another fighter group, not now avail-
able in CBI Theater.

CM-IN-22117 (29 May 44)

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From: CG, US Army Forces in China, Burma and India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

No : CRA 4415 28 May 1944

Paragraph 7. Command and Staff.

Air Task Force should operate under Commanding General, 14th Air Force. Commanding General, Army Air Forces, India-Burma Sector, will furnish Air Task Force Commander and skeleton staff, and will be responsible for timely movement of combat units to China from India and will coordinate the supply and support of the Air Task Force in China.

Paragraph 8. Air Task Force Deployment.

For direct support of Formosa operation, Air Task Force will be deployed in Kweilin Area and on fields lying generally southeast, east and northeast thereof. Tactical units will occupy following fields:

Ten Chuck
Liuchow,
Yano Tong,
Ehr Tong,
Lingling,
Siuchwan,
Sincheng,
Kanchow,
Fan Cheng,
Changting,
Kien,

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From: CG, US Army Force na, Burma and India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

No : CRA 4415 28 May 1944

Namyung,
Hengyang and
Kienov.

Paragraph 9. Communications.

An improvement in signal communications in China will be required to furnish the necessary point to point communication, fighter control, navigational aids, air warning, and radio countermeasures. Due to the presence of 10th Air Force Units in the proposed Air Task Force and the necessity for operating with Pacific Forces, conversion of the 14th Air Force to VHF radio equipment will be required. Subject to studies now under way additional signal personnel will be needed in China as follows; some of which may be available from forces now in India:

1 Signal Service Battalion, less one company,
4 Wing Signal Companies,
10 AACs point to point radio stations,
16 lightweight radar reporting platoons, team U, of
T/O and E, 11-400, and
2 fighter control squadrons.

Paragraph 10. Engineer requirements.

The necessary constructions and improvement of runways, operational buildings, housing, and bulk storage

CM-IN-22117 (29 May 44)

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From: CG, US Army Forces in China, Burma and India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

No : CRA 4415 28 May 1944

Facilities for the Air Task Force in China are a minor problem and accomplished within 4 months with presently available resources, except for 132 tons of tentage and 498 tons of bulk storage materials. For construction in India and China in connection with ATC augmentation, 30 additional Engineer officers are required. 2 Aviation Engineer battalions which were diverted from this theater should be replaced as soon as possible to assist with this work in India and Burma.

Paragraph 11. Services of Supply support.

Necessary SOS support can be given this plan, including deliveries over the Assam LOC, development of refueling bases at Myitkyina, and improvement of Kunming-Kweilin LOC. Note that CRAX 2927 contains requirements for SOS troops to support ATC augmentation.

Paragraph 12. Stockpile requirements:

A. The following tonnage must be moved to Forward Areas in southeast China to support this plan: initial move of units from India, including:

60 days maintenance other than airplane engines-1541 tons,

Signal personnel and equipment (including conversion of 14th Air Force to VHP)-3264 tons,

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From: CG, US Army Forces in China, Burma and India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

No : CRA 4415 28 May 1944

Tonnage and bulk gasoline tankage-630 tons,
30 days combat maintenance of Air Task Force-34910,
VLR operations (in Forward Areas)-4342 tons;

Total in Forward Areas, 44687 tons.

B. For purposes of this plan only, and not for
MATTERHORN, the 20th Bomber Command will require 13025 tons
delivered in the Chengtu area.

C. Total tonnage required in China by this plan,
beyond the 11500 tons per month assumed to be necessary
for current operations and excluding MATTERHORN, is 57713
tons. This tonnage will provide only 30 days uninterrupted
combat operations by the Air Task Force at following oper-
ational rates per month:

Heavy bombers 30 hours,
Medium bombers 60 hours,
Fighters 40 hours.

However, tonnage delivered after 1st January will
increase the scale of operations by so much; further, the
normal requirements of 14th Air Force will drop greatly
when its major combat elements begin to operate as part of
the Air Task Force. The 11500 tons per month allowed above
for current operations includes provision for the continuous
operation of the 14th Air Force at present rates.

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From: CG, US Army Forces in China, Burma and India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

No : CRA 4415

28 May 1944

Paragraph 13. Comments on part 1.

Paragraph A. This plan can be supported logistically provided ATC is augmented fully and without delay.

B. The growing Japanese threat to forward airbases in southeast China may require the use of stockpiles to meet an emergency situation within eastern China itself. Even if this present plan is frustrated by enemy action, it is vitally important to the Pacific operation to prevent the Japanese from consolidating the general area east of Kweilin. Thus, in any case, the present plan supports the Pacific thrust and should be implemented.

Part 2.

Paragraph 1. Assumptions.

The only change in assumptions over part 1 is that no ATC augmentation will occur.

Paragraph 2. Delivery of tonnage into China.

Existing ATC facilities can deliver by 1st January 1945 a total of 4340 tons beyond the 11500 tons per month required by current operations. The 7th Heavy Bomb Group can deliver in the same period a total of 9585 tons, using Myitkyina after October 1st as a refueling base. Total tonnage available for Air Task Force operation would then be

CM-IV-29117 (29 May 44)

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Page 1

From: CG, US Army Forces in China, Burma & India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

No : CRA 4415

28 May 1944

only 13925 short tons. (This result emphasizes the importance of augmenting ATC operations to take advantage of the prospective availability of a refueling station at Myitkyina.)

Paragraph 3. Composition of Air Task Force.

To permit the maximum air effort from China bases, it is assumed that elements of the 14th Air Force will continue to operate at their present rates and that an Air Task Force from the 10th Air Force would move to China to operate intensively for 30 days, using the stockpile of 13925 tons mentioned above. Such an Air Task Force would consist of:

- 1 heavy bomb group,
- 2 medium bomb groups,
- 1 P-51 group,
- 2 P-51 squadrons, and
- 1 P-38 photo reconnaissance squadron.

Paragraph 4. Comments on part 2.

A. Tonnage available under part 2 precludes the conversion of 14th Air Force (ground stations) to VHF, thus raising difficult operational problems, since 10th Air Force units will be by that time VHF equipped.

B. The lack of adequate fighter strength in part 2

CM-14-22117 (29 May 44)

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From: CG, US Army Forces in China, Burma & India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

No : CRA 4415

28 May 1944

seriously prejudices the chance of successful operation
over Formosa since a strong enemy build-up in that area
is inescapable.

C. Part 2 is not a recommended plan, but is for-
warded for information only.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: 2927 is CM-IN-7019 (10 May 44) Gen Handy

ACTION: Joint Chiefs of Staff

TO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
SGP
Adm King
Log

CM-IN-22117 (29 May 44) 10413 ml

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 22 1973

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24-78784 258

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

I think that you and King and Marshall and Arnold should have a meeting on this. I am still confident that every bit of logic in our Army-Navy plans makes it vital that we keep the operations going over the hump to the fullest possible extent.

It is clear to me that if we put the China operations on one side of the scale as compared with the southern Burma or Sumatra operations, the China plans will far outweigh the Burma or Sumatra shots in the dark.

F. D. R.

*For Mr. Tolson
Mr. E.A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Nease
Mr. Gandy*

6 March

WAR DEPARTMENT
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February 21st, 1944 Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

From: SACSEA

To: Chiefs of Staff

Rptd.: J.S.M., Washington

Date- DEC 22 1971

SEACOS 99

Signature- RHA

Following for Chiefs of Staff from Mountbatten. Your COSSEA 63.

In accordance with my present directive I am already carrying out maximum land offensive which my present lines of communication can support in both the Fourth Corps area and Arakan in conjunction with Gen. Stilwell's Leda advance and L.R.P. operations.

2. All resources which can be maintained logistically have been put into the present campaign and no forces have been withdrawn or withheld for use in CULVERIN. This is in spite of the advice of my Commanders in Chief and Combined Staff that the maximum offensive would probably prejudice the possibility of mounting CULVERIN in November without reinforcements of 1 or 2 additional divisions from outside India.

3. Stage has in fact been reached in the Arakan offensive which makes it doubtful whether two divisions will now be relieved in time to take part in November CULVERIN.

4. In spite of every effort including L.R.P. operations I do not believe in view of the Japanese build-up which now includes an 8th division that 4th Corps can seize the Shwebo-Monywa area before the monsoon or that it would be logistically possible for it to hold this area during the monsoon if it did so. Nor do I anticipate that the Leda forces can advance to Myittha in time to complete the road across the Hukawng Valley before the monsoon without which it will be logistically impossible for them to hold it.

CM-IN-16376

(23 Feb 44)

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24-53394AB 18000

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Franklin D. Roosevelt
~~DECLASSIFIED~~

per 5M 522-71

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- *RHS*
Page 2

SEACOS 99

5. The problem is solely one of lines of communication and can neither be solved by mere fighting troops nor by ignoring the logistical factors which are paramount.

6. In SEACOS 96 I have already indicated the immediate necessity of withdrawing transport aircraft from the HUMP to assist in the supply of Arakan forces and to permit the employment of the three L.R.P. brigades and wish again to emphasize the vital importance of this to the offensive operations in North Burma. There are no roads into North Burma other than the two mountain roads neither complete nor all-weather which we are constructing behind our advancing troops. No development of these can compete with the well-developed road, rail and river communications at the disposal of the Japanese. If further operations are to be undertaken in Burma they can only be supported by the provision of still more transport air craft.

7. General Stilwell is fully aware of my views and of the advice given to me by my other Commanders-in-Chief and by my Combined Staff. General Wedemeyer and his AXION Staff are equally aware of General Stilwell's stated objections to the policy I have proposed in regard to a revision of the directive I am at present carrying out and in regard to future strategy in S.E.A.C.

8. I feel that the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff expressed in J.S.M. 1519X must be based on arguments put up by General Stilwell and with which he is aware I disagree and which are contrary to the logistical facts advanced by my staffs.

9. While I regret that General Stilwell should have made representations in Washington without reference to me and before General Wedemeyer had had an opportunity of presenting

CM-IN-16376 (23 Feb 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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[REDACTED]

SEACOS 99

Page 3

my proposals. I have complete confidence in General Wedemeyer and do not wish to change or add to his instructions in any way.

10. Request you will pass copies of this signal to Combined Operations Headquarters for AXIOM.

Time of Origin 211551

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN BISSELL
GEN ARNOLD
CoS
ADM KING

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REF ID: A66100

per SM 522.71

410-

DEC 28 1971
Signature-

RAH

CM-IN-16376

(23 Feb 44)

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103 89-71

[Handwritten signature and scribbles]

Combined Chiefs of Staff

December 22, 1943

CG, FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 5454

USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-7196

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 286 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The following is quoted from the approved report of the Sextant Conference, CCS 426/1, paragraph 24:

"We have agreed to delay Major Amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal until after the next Monsoon and divert the landing craft now assigned to Buccaneer to operations ANVIL and OVERLORD."

Reference NAF 552 report urgently detailed requirements in assault shipping and landing craft over and above those now allocated, including craft ex-Buccaneer

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen. Strong
Gen. Arnold
Adm. King
Log

CM-OUT-8338

(22 Dec 43)

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Per JCS 29-71

DEC 22 1943

1524Z cv

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310 *Buccaneer*

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Am
SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: New Delhi
To: AGWAR

No. 97 10 January 1944

To Marshall for Handy from Wedemeyer signed Stilwell.

Estimated completion of Matterhorn Airfields follow:

Chengtu → In China, 2 will be operationally complete 31st January; 2 additional operationally complete 30th April.

Calcutta → In India, 1 will be barely operational 31st March; 1 additional barely operational 30th April; 4 will be ready for limited operations 30th June; 5 will be operationally complete 30th September. Reference is your radio 85, 5th January.

Southeast Asia Command has no visible operational requirement for the 2 Aviation Engineer Battalions requested in our COPIR 36 until after monsoon, but I strongly support request of Sultan for immediate shipment of these Battalions to assist Matterhorn in hopes of expediting above dates. In CBI answer to your 5326, which is their AG 172 this was given.

No Sig

85 and 5326 is CM-OUT-1222 (4 Jan 44) OPD
36 is CM-IN-11208 (18 Nov 43) OPD
172 is CM-IN-6259 (10 Jan 44) OPD

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: C OF S, GEN ARNOLD, GEN SOMERVELL

CM-IN-6334 (10 Jan 44) 1806Z mcs

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DATE 11/15/1972 BY SP-6/BJ

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

*Adm. Brown
File*

Parish 22 Nov

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SECURITY CONTROL

Secretary, Gen. Staff

November 20, 1943

SEXTANT

Number 1010

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

For the Senior Team at SEXTANT from the Home Team, Joint War Plans Committee

This is our 3rd message and contains our conclusions and recommendations. Complete paper will be dispatched by courier after additional information is received from the AAF relative to the performance data of the B 29. The paper will contain a discussion of Japanese targets that can be reached from bases in other areas.

It is concluded that:

(1) The plan as stated cannot be implemented. The 1st Bombing Mission can be conducted about July 1944 if the plan is revised and immediate steps are taken to implement it.

(2) Logistic considerations are not complete and additional service troops and supplies will be required.

(3) Troops and shipping must initially be diverted from other theaters to implement the plan. This diversion will probably be further increased by additional requirements as operations progress.

(4) The British must be consulted to arrange for the necessary airfields in India and to insure the availability of the port capacity that will be required at Calcutta.

(5) United States combat forces (antiaircraft and possibly other ground forces) will be required in China to insure the protection of the Chengtu Base.

(6) The facilities which will be constructed in implementing this plan may fit into the pattern of and contribute

CM-OUT-8334 (21 Nov 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Page #2

November 20, 1943

to the requirements of an over-all short term plan for the defeat of Japan but the destruction of the coke industry as envisaged is a long range project and will not contribute to a plan for the defeat of Japan by the fall of 1945.

(7) Further examination must be made for other targets within range of Chengtu which, although not as vital as coke, will produce positive results earlier with the same or a lesser effort.

(8) The principle of economy of force is violated in that during the last 9 months approximately 14% only of the total number of flights by combat planes involved in the operation will be strikes against the enemy.

It is recommended that:

(1) The effects on a short term plan for the defeat of Japan of the employment of the B 29 aircraft against Japanese targets both military and economic that can be reached from other more accessible bases which will support full B 29 offensive power be considered.

(2) If the proposed plan is approved, the target date be changed to July 1944 and the plan be revised to insure inclusion of complete target analysis, the necessary ground forces and adequate service forces and logistical support.

(3) If approved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff establish a priority for the implementation of the plan with other approved operations.

End of conclusions and recommendations.

ORIGINATOR: SCS

INFORMATION: OPD
JCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)
GEN ARNOLD
LOG

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

CM-OUT-8334 (21 Nov 4 [REDACTED]) PP

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EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

Secretary, General Staff

September 1, 1943

GENERAL STILWELL
AMMISCA CHUNGKING CHINA

Number 3283

American troops will be assembled (from Marshall for Stilwell's EYES ONLY.) In India in early November for organization, training, and employment in Burma for deep penetrations under Wingate in February 1944. Messages have just been dispatched to MacArthur and Harmon calling upon them to provide 1,000 rugged jungle battle tested volunteers. 2,000 more will be provided from jungle trained units of the Caribbean Defense Command and Continental US. The thought occurred to me that Brink with a cadre of officers and men who are familiar with Wingates work in the theater could organize the installation and supervise this training.

The general plan is to prepare 3 American long range penetration groups (battalions.), 2 of these perhaps to operate ahead of Ledo forces and 1 from Yunnan in cooperation with similar British columns operating to the South. Details as to our suggested organization into 3 independent battalions, equipment and supply arrangements are being prepared by the staff and will immediately follow. Wedemeyer who will be with Mountbatten is working this matter up.

ORIGINATOR: SGS

INFORMATION: OPD
Cofs

CM-OUT-383 (1 Sep 43) 1848Z 1cc

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EX. 114-1-1 (X) (C)
EX. 114-1-1 (X) (C)
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

Office Chief of Staff

September 1, 1943

GENERAL MAC ARTHUR
CINC SWPA BRISBANE AUSTRALIA

Number 7435

GENERAL HARMON
NECAL NOUMEA NEW CALEDONIA

Number 7513

The urgent necessity for getting operations (Eyes Alone Mac-Arthur and Harmon, Harmon pass to Halsey from Marshall) for the reconquest of Burma mounted in the most effective manner is of great importance and concern to the President and the Chiefs of Staff. At Quebec an agreement was reached that there would be American ground participation though on a very limited scale and concentrated entirely on reinforcing a special operation by Brigadier Wingate of the British Army on an enlarged and greatly improved scale over his 5 column penetration deep into Burma last spring. Preparations have now reached a point where we must dispatch to India at the earliest possible moment an American contingent of the highest caliber.

With Mountbatten's enthusiasm and drive we are confident that the return on the investment will operate to the advantage of your operations in the South and Southwest Pacific and the small down payment of American forces involved is therefore fully justified. Success will depend upon building this force around a nucleus of proven troops who have fought against the Japs in the jungle in your theaters.

It has accordingly been decided to concentrate 3,000 American troops in India for organization into 3 independent battalions to be intensively trained there and to operate in Burma early in 1944 with British contingents of the same sort. A column will make a deep penetration in front of the 3 general advances, 2 composed of Chinese troops from Yunnan and Lado, and 1 of British troops south

CM-OUT-384 (1 Sep 43)
CM-OUT-385

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

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EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

Book Message

Page 2

September 1, 1943

through Imphal. The aggressive action of the American columns is depended upon to insure a determined advance in their rear by the Chinese contingents which Stilwell has developed. The troops in these columns will be engaged in operations of a most strenuous nature and will be far in advance of friendly supporting troops and must live off the country except as supplied by air for which very special provisions are being made and assembled. 2,000 of the 3,000 men required are being selected as volunteers from the Caribbean and continental U.S. who have had jungle training. It is desired to obtain 700 from the South and 300 from the Southwest Pacific.

The men should be volunteers of physical ruggedness and combat experience in jungle fighting.

Replacements for these troops will be dispatched on the shipping which is being prepared to pick up the detachments herein referred to. This shipping will leave the west coast October 1st.

Details are being prepared by the General Staff as a matter of urgency and will be forwarded to you shortly.

ORIGINATOR: SGS

INFORMATION: OFD
CofS

CM-OUT-384 (1 Sep 43) 13492 dd
CM-OUT-385

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

SECRET FEB 26 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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~~CONTROL~~

Operations Division, WDGS
Asiatic Section, WDOFD
OPD 320.2 Sec (31 Aug 43) WX

WLB

Number 7488

Number Range 7517

White Horse

White Horse

(1 Sept 43)

4-1365a-Spa-4(25) and 5(D) or (25)

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

Book Message

Page 2

August 31, 1943

14 Corps, total 40; grand total 274 (12 officer 262 EM).

From South Pacific: Specially selected Lt Col for Battalion Commander. Bn Staff 3 Capts; Hq Co, 1 Capt 1 Lt 1 Mr Sgt 1 1st Sgt 3 Staff Sgts 3 Sgts 12 Corps 5 Pvts, total Hq and Hq Co 31; Pioneer Plnt, 1 Lt 1 Staff Sgt 2 Sgts 4 Corps 30 Pvts, total 38; Radio Communications Platoon, 1 Lt, 1 Tech Sgt 1 Staff Sgt 2 Sgts 6 Corps 14 Pvts, total 25; Weapons Plnt, 3 Staff Sgts 9 Sgts 15 Corps 85 Pvts, total 112; Rifle Companies, 1 Capt 15 Lts 2 1st Sgts 11 Staff Sgts 31 Sgts 36 Corps 339 Pvts, total 435; Attached Medical, 1 Major 3 Capts or Lts 1 Tech Sgt 1 Staff Sgt 3 Sgts 7 Corps 12 Pvts, total 28; Attached Veterinary, 1 Capt or Lt 1 Sgt 1 Corp 2 Pvts, total 5; grand total 674 (28 officer 600 EM).

Desire that the number of volunteers who meet the requirements as to stamina courage and battle experience in jungle warfare be reported to the War Department by 10 September. This report should indicate that the quotas by grade and qualifications have been met or indicate wherein the quotas have not been met together with reasons.

The above troops will take with them from the South and Southwest Pacific individual jungle equipment and arms, which will be supplemented in India.

Movement of these troops from South & Southwest Pacific to India will be accomplished by troop shipping leaving West Coast US late September and going through to India via South and Southwest Pacific which will carry replacements for latter theaters for the troops selected in accordance with the above.

Information is desired immediately for purpose of coordinating shipping as to where and when troops for this service can be assembled in South and Southwest Pacific for movement. Preferably only 1 point should be used in each South and Southwest Pacific for assembly of troops.

CM-OUT-439
CM-OUT-440

(1 Sept 43)

U.S. 11888, Sec. 5(D) and 5(F) or (G)

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NLR 101
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Book Message

Page 3

August 31, 1943

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: ADM KING
GEN SOMERVELL
SUS

CM-OUT-439
CM-OUT-440

(1 Sept 43)

2032Z

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(b) and 3(b) or (c)

OPD letter, May 3, 1973

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94