

PSF: Messages to Congress, suggestions for

2 items

Subject File

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*Message
National Defense*

*PSF: Messages
to Congress*

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

1934 or 1935

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

The President,

The White House.

Date- *2-17-51*

Signature- *Carl L. Spear*

Dear Mr. President:

In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to submit herewith, in broad terms, my opinion as to the effect produced upon our national defense from the point of view of the responsibilities of the War Department, by Japan's denunciation of the Washington Treaty, and likewise my recommendations as to the action that should be taken in consequence.

I should like to say at the outset that I have approached this problem with an open mind and with the primary object in view of determining the irreducible minimum degree of preparedness necessary to obviate, rather than to wage war.

Our present state of preparedness, as you already know, is inadequate to meet our needs. Japan's denunciation of the Washington Treaty has made her more definitely than any other nation in the recent past, a potential enemy of the United States and has increased the danger of war between the two nations. Moreover, the denunciation of the Treaty sensibly diminishes the security of the Panama Canal, Hawaii and Alaska, since Japan will be free after December 31, 1936 openly and probably unmolested to use her Mandate Islands for military purposes, thereby bringing the menace of an attack measurably closer.

In consequence of Japan's action, the inadequacy of our preparedness is accentuated. Her action has, in fact, produced a situation that throws into bold relief the inadequacy of our available means to assure the defense of the vital strategical triangle Panama-Hawaii-Alaska, upon the inviolability of which depends the safety of our Pacific coast, as well as the success of any necessary war effort on our part in the Pacific. Specifically, this inadequacy consists of the insufficient strength of the Regular Army and of deficiencies in munitions, in equipment and in modern weapons, especially in aircraft, antiaircraft guns, tanks, motor vehicles, gas defense equipment, and automatic weapons. This inadequacy of our preparedness makes it impossible for us to accomplish the following operations, all of which would have to be undertaken simultaneously -

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Successfully to meet a sudden attack launched against the Panama Canal, Hawaii, or Alaska;

To furnish sufficient immediate readiness forces for use either for covering or for expeditionary operations; and

To complete at least our initial mobilization of combat forces with the celerity required by modern war.

The Philippines and Guam present a special problem. Their vulnerability, already serious, because of their proximity to Japan and great distance from the United States, has been accentuated by the denunciation of the Washington Treaty.

The fact that the Treaty will not actually be abrogated until December 31, 1936, may leave available a period of two years during which much can and should be done to correct the deficiencies in our defense, in order to enable us to meet the changed situation. But we cannot strengthen the fortifications of the Philippines nor fortify Guam and the Aleutians until after December 31, 1936, whereas it is to Japan's interest to strike soon, if she intends to strike at all. If she fails to do this, however, prior to the abrogation of the Treaty, then any move on our part thereafter materially to strengthen the fortifications of the Philippines, or to fortify Guam or the Aleutians, would undoubtedly tend to increase the chance of war with Japan.

Moreover, the value, in actual war, of any military measures that we might decide to take west of Hawaii, would be dependent primarily upon the strength of our defensive position in the Eastern Pacific - upon our full and unhampered use of the Panama Canal and of our base in Hawaii, upon our effectively covering the Pacific Coast and Alaska, and, lastly, upon our ability to carry out our initial mobilization. Unless and until these preliminary conditions are assured, it would scarcely be profitable for us materially to strengthen our position west of Hawaii.

The inherent strength of our strategic position, inclusive of the strategic triangle Panama - Hawaii - Alaska, together with a reasonable state of preparedness, would not only be a strong factor

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in obviating war with Japan, but would constitute a condition precedent to our successful prosecution of such a war, if it should nevertheless ensue. The Philippine Islands, Guam and the Aleutians are exposed and vulnerable, however, and their seizure by Japan would be a grave blow to our prestige and pride, even though we forced her eventually to relinquish them. The implications of such seizure can not be disregarded, however, and must therefore necessarily enter any calculation as to the requirements of our preparedness. The considerations outlined above demand -

First: That our Pacific coast, the Panama Canal and our base at Hawaii be made reasonably secure by early completion of approved defense projects covering material and defensive installations.

Second: That the strength of the Regular Army be increased, in order to provide -

a. Adequate peace-time defense garrisons for Hawaii and the Panama Canal, and an increase in the garrison of Alaska.

b. Immediate readiness forces for use either for covering or for expeditionary operations.

c. An effective nucleus of personnel to make possible the initial mobilization; and

Third: That the War Reserves of supplies and munitions be augmented to cover the critical shortages for the combat forces in the initial mobilization for war.

The foregoing requirements include the increase in the Air Corps, both in personnel and materiel, recommended by the Baker Board and approved in principle by you. They will involve an increase of the Regular Army by 2,000 officers, in five equal increments, and 46,250 enlisted men, and the following estimated cost:

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
Annual cost of the increase in enlisted men..\$ 20,434,460
Annual, cumulative, cost of each increment
of officers..... 1,565,000

Materiel (Non-recurring cost):

Ammunition.....	\$ 67,400,300	
Antiaircraft artillery.....	36,182,733	
Motorization, General.....	23,934,000	
Modernization of Field Artillery.....	38,252,019	
Mechanization.....	22,108,450	
Aircraft (3-year program).....	133,663,200	
Seacoast Defenses -		
Panama	\$ 5,800,000	
Hawaii	5,000,000	
Pacific Coast	13,000,000	23,800,000
Modern Equipment.....		25,000,000
Total Non-recurring Costs.....	\$360,451,910	

These figures constitute the irreducible minimum required to put the defensive means for which the War Department is responsible on an adequate basis to meet the changed situation brought about by Japan's denunciation of the Washington Treaty. They are not only conservative but modest. They are not designed primarily with a view to give us adequate means to wage war, but to obviate it.

Sincerely yours,


Secretary of War.

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Messages to Congress

BSF

"message National Defense"

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

(SC) EF37

NOV 28 1934

My dear Mr. President:

You are undoubtedly aware that the Japanese Cabinet has decided to recommend an expenditure for national defense greatly in excess than has hitherto been the case. While our records do not indicate just how this money is to be spent, I have directed our Naval Attache in Tokyo to make a report as soon as he is able to ascertain any facts.

For your information I am forwarding herewith a table showing the relative strength of the United States and Japanese navies in each category as they will be on 31 December 1936 if the present building programs as authorized by the respective countries are carried out. This table will also show the ships which each nation will have which are not restricted by the treaty limitations.

Our program of replacements for the next fiscal year requires your decision whether or not the funds for building these ships should go in the naval appropriation bill or come from the Public Works Administration funds. Perhaps it would be better to obtain these funds from PWA (thus giving quick employment) because it is possible, in view of the limitation of armament situation and of the increased Japanese budget, that a larger sum will be desirable than could be obtained in the appropriation bill; or, on the other hand, it is possible that Congress might increase the appropriation over the budget recommendation thereby preventing the desired balance. Therefore to me it would seem more desirable to leave the amount to be allotted to your discretion, which would be the case if it came from the Public Works Administration funds.

While as you know we have laid out an orderly program gradually to bring the Navy to treaty strength by the replacement of overage ships, it might be well, in view of the

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Date- 2-17-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

unsettled conditions, to speed up this program which of course could only be done in case of an allotment from PWA funds.

I might add here that our own Navy Yards are now working nearly to capacity and are not able to lay down many more ships at this time, additional to those projected, unless their building facilities are increased - a thing which I do not recommend at this time solely for speeding of purposes. However, I have had a survey made and find that the private yards could take on immediately an additional thirty-five vessels; and, as we are permitted under the Treaties to replace overage ships, it would be entirely feasible to utilize these facilities in our private ship yards to lay down more destroyers and submarines at once.

We are very much in need of ships which are outside of the treaty categories, - these being those auxiliaries which must go with the Fleet to care for the logistic requirements. Sometime ago I directed the General Board to make a survey on these necessary auxiliaries which was done, and I am forwarding a copy of their recommendation. I would like, however, to call your attention to the fact that these auxiliaries are now very much needed, and I would recommend, if PWA funds could be obtained, that we lay down, or acquire from the Shipping Board and convert, as soon as practicable the following ships:

	1st year	2d year	3d year	Total
Tenders, for Patrol planes:	1	—	1	2
Gunboats, 2000-T class	3	2	2	7
Submarine tender	1	—	—	1
Destroyer tenders	1	1	1	3
Oilers, fleet speed	1	—	1	2
Hospital ship	1	—	—	1
Repair ship	—	1	—	1
Fleet tugs	1	1	—	2
Mine sweepers	—	2	2	4
	9	7	7	23

I am glad you are enjoying a much needed rest and hope you will take as long as possible so as to return here in fine shape when Congress meets. While I am working hard I am ashamed of the little I have to do in comparison with you, but I have been trying to run the Navy so as not to add to your burdens.

Sincerely yours,

Claude A. Swanson

Claude A. Swanson

The President,
The White House.

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Enclosures ()

NAVAL STATUS OF UNITED STATES AND JAPAN AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1936 (Estimated)

		<u>Built</u>				<u>Total Built</u>		<u>Building</u>		<u>Total</u>		<u>Treaty Allowance</u>
		<u>Underage</u>	<u>Overage</u>									
		No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	Tons
<u>Capital Ships</u>	U.S.	15(a)	455,000	-	-	15	455,400	-	-	15	455,400	455,400
	Japan	9(a)	272,070	-	-	9	272,070	-	-	9	272,070	272,070
<u>Carriers</u>	U.S.	4(b)	100,500	1	11,500	5	112,000	1	20,000	6	132,000	135,000
	Japan	4(d)	88,370	-	-	4	88,370	2	20,100	6	88,470	81,000
<u>Cruisers A</u>	U.S.	16(e)	152,425	-	-	16(h)	152,425	2	20,000	18	172,425	180,000
	Japan	12	107,800	-	-	12(i)	107,800	-	-	12	107,800	108,400
<u>Cruisers B</u>	U.S.	14	110,500	-	-	14	110,500	3	30,000	17	140,500	143,500
	Japan	17	95,395	1(f)	5,055	18	100,450	3	25,000	21	100,450	100,450
<u>Destroyers</u>	U.S.	39	81,010	77(g)	87,990	116	150,000	6	9,350	122	159,350	150,000
	Japan	70	96,427	3(g)	9,113	73	105,500	12	17,980	85	123,480	105,500
<u>Submarines</u>	U.S.	25	33,560	23(g)	19,140	48	52,700	5	6,500	53	59,200	52,700
	Japan	36	52,508	-	-	36	52,508	5	8,200	41	60,708	52,700

- (a) All capital ships are included as underage. Actually 7 United States, 4 Japanese will be overage at that time, any tonnage which will be added by modernization not included. About 9,000 tons will be added to U.S. tonnage by modernization, IDAHO, NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI.
- (b) Does not include LANGLEY, which is not only experimental, but is also over-age.
- (c) Includes HOSHO (7,470 tons) experimental and which will probably be replaced.
- (d) This is the maximum number of cruisers A United States is allowed to complete by Dec. 31st 1936. An additional cruiser VINCMERES is due for completion Jan. 2, 1937, two days after Dec. 31st 1936.
- (e) One cruiser which becomes over-age in 1936, the KUMA, has a displacement of 5,100 tons by saving 45 tons on the completed displacement of the NOGAMI, MIKUMA and KURANO, the KUMA may be retained without exceeding Treaty allowance of 100,450.
- (f) Number and tonnage approximate, numbers retained are dependent to some extent on individual tonnages of ships retained. Tonnage shown is difference between under-age built tonnage and Treaty Allowances. Numbers are based on examination of those now on Navy list which can be retained in order to complete Treaty allowances. Treaty requires "gradual" scrapping. However if scrapping is delayed until 31 December 1936, the number of overage vessels on hand on that date would be U.S. (224) 245,780 tons; Japan (42) 39,820 tons or a total built tonnage of U.S. (264) 308,930 tons, Japan (112) 136,207 tons.
- (g) Does not include ROCHESTER (7,350 tons)
- (h) Does not include ASAMA, YAKUMO, IZUMO, IWATE and KASUGA (59,410 tons) old cruisers suitable for coast defense work.

Data prepared 27 November 1934

SHIPS NOT RESTRICTED BY TREATY

	United States			Japan								
	In commission	Out Commission	Total	In Commission	Out Commission	Total						
	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.						
Minelayers	5	8,840	11	21,130	16	29,970	35	8,314	2	10,750	37	19,284
Minesweepers	29	24,360	8	6,720	37	31,080	6	3,690	7	5,074	13	8,764
Submarine Chasers	17	1,275	6	450	23	1,725	2	600	-	-	2	600
Gunboat	5	7,680	1	1,160	6	8,840	14	5,350	-	-	14	5,350
Coast Defense	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	36,310	3	22,800	7	59,410
Net Layers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2,155	3	2,155
Torpedo Boats	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1,561	1	527	4	2,108
Destroyer Tenders	6	60,960	2	21,750	8	82,700	0	-	-	-	0	-
Submarine "	5	40,500	1	9,000	6	49,500	4	21,015	-	-	4	21,015
Aircraft "	1	11,500	1	19,250	2	30,750	2	33,550	-	-	2	33,550
Repair Ships	2	19,720	1	8,100	3	26,820	1	600	-	-	1	600
Store Ships	2	21,100	2	25,200	4	46,300	3	38,065	-	-	3	38,065
Collier	-	-	3	57,640	3	57,640	2	15,757	-	-	2	15,757
Oilers	8	110,850	10	158,850	18	269,500	7	93,100	2	28,100	9	121,200
Sub-Rescue Vessels	5	6,170	1	1,120	6	7,290	1	11,441	-	-	1	11,441
Miscellaneous (Aux)	47	210,539	30	122,710	77	333,249	9	37,659	2	27,405	11	65,064

Estimate of Japanese Naval Budget for 1935-1936

(1)	Ordinary account - regular occurring items	¥ 203,000,000
(2)	Ship construction-construction of auxiliary vessels	156,420,000
(3)	Aviation force-equipment of	10,600,000
(4)	Maintenance expenses of newly constructed vessels	36,200,000
(5)	Modernization and major alterations to vessels (modernization and alteration to capital ships ISE and HYUGA, carrier HOSHO and several light cruisers)	44,500,000
(6)	Maintenance expenses of aviation stations	10,000,000
(7)	Supplementary expenditure for construction of auxiliary vessels (¥7,000,000 of this amount is for replacement of destroyer MIYUKI, recently sunk)	7,000,000
(8)	Airplanes and other armament for the Aviation Corps	15,000,000
(9)	Replenishment and renewal of arms (ammunition, smokeless powder, etc.)	10,000,000
(10)	Purchase of naval stores (including purchase and storage of crude oil)	7,000,000
(11)	Land and sea equipment (construction of additional shops at navy yards and improvement of equipment)	9,000,000
(12)	Grand Naval Maneuvers	5,000,000
		¥513,720,000

Estimated Japanese Army Budget ¥ 450,000,000

STUDY OF AN ORDERLY SCHEDULE OF BUILDING AUXILIARIES AND MINOR COMBATANT VESSELS

TYPE	Estimate of Number Required	NUMBER OF TYPE TO BE LAID DOWN (OR CONVERSION UNDERTAKEN) BY YEARS														
		1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
Gunboats	9 ^a	1		1		1		1		1		1			1	
River Gunboats	8 ^b		1		1		1		1		1		1			
Destroyer tenders	6		1		1		1			1				1		1
Ammunition ships	1													1		
Store ships	4				1				1				1			1
Hospital ships	2						1					1				
Mine sweepers	21	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		1			
Oilers	8			1		1		1		1		1		1	1	1
Transports	2 ^c								1							
Repair ships	4	1	1								1				1	
Submarine tenders	5	1		1		1		1			1					
Submarine rescue	5				1		1		1		1		1			
Ocean tugs	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			

Notes:- a. Including PG50 and 51 now under construction.

b. Including replacements for PALOS and MONOCACY, recommended herein to be laid down in 1937.

c. Only one replacement transport provided prior to 1955.

COMPARATIVE DATA - NAVIES OF THE WORLD.

- (1) Age as at the end of 1934 (31 Dec. 1934),
- (2) All tonnages under column "Building and Appropriated For" are estimated.
- (3) May also replace FURIOUS, EAGLE and HERMES (experimental ships).
- (4) Available to replace MIYUKI sunk about the 1st of July 1934.