

● PSF

State Dept.

1939

PSF: State

State -

January 10, 1939.

Dear Bertie:-

It is good to have your letter. I really envy you in Lisbon and I had no idea it was such a delightful climate at this time of the year.

Congress has started and I think our antediluvian friends have got themselves into a bit of a jam. I have told them some simple home truths and intimated that they had every legal right to go their own way but that if they did, they would bear the full responsibility!

After a good deal of conversation on their part, I think the session will settle down and be comparatively quiet -- that is if you can keep peace in Europe.

Love to Olive. I do hope you will be coming back for a little visit to Dutchess County this Summer.

As ever yours,

Honorable Herbert C. Pell,
American Legation,
Lisbon,
Portugal.

Lisbon, December 15, 1938

My dear Mr. President:

I hope you will excuse me writing you a non-business letter. In the first place I want to wish you the best of luck next year and the continuance of happiness and success and also both in Olive's name and mine to thank you for this very interesting and pleasant post.

I read in the papers that you are now under about eight inches of snow while I sit in my office without a waistcoat in brilliant sunlight looking out over the Tagus which is more than a mile across and only a few hundred yards away. I have just walked around the garden by a bank of narcissus and seen nasturtiums--or should I say nasturtia, and sweet peas. Although the less noble, I think I have the pleasanter job and I thank you for it.

I have read your speech in the south and on the whole I prefer eggs too but I can not say that I would not like them on a slice of fried millionaires now that the idea is suggested to me. A haunch of Hopson would make a noble dish for any sideboard. It has been

-2-

suggested that the Republicans are right and that if you have authority enough to get scrambled eggs served hot on the second floor you have more authority than any one man should have. The real answer of course to this is that such a thing is not an example of human power, it is a miracle.

I hope that you will give my best regards to your family and especially to your mother who has always been so very nice to us. I think she would very much enjoy a visit to Portugal and it is an easy trip to make.

The only thing I have to tell you in an official way is to ask you to remember that if I can be of any service to you, I am at your command. It was only the occurrence of the crisis just before I intended to sail that prevented me from coming back and taking part in the campaign just finished.

If at any time you feel that an old friend, whom you can trust and who I hope you think is not without intelligence will be of any service to you, you must let me know. I might (being unhampered by routine) be of use.

With renewed thanks from both Olive and me,

Very, respectfully yours,

The President,

The White House.

Brutus Pell
Herbert C. Pell

DST: State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

January 31, 1939

	<u>Present Post</u>	<u>Proposed Post</u>
Leland Harrison	Minister at Bern	Ambassador at Lima
Ray Atherton	Minister at Sofia	Minister at Bern
J. Walter Lambeth		Minister at Sofia
William Dawson	Minister at Montevideo	Ambassador at Panamá
Edwin C. Wilson	Counselor of Embassy, Paris	Minister at Montevideo
Laurence Steinhardt	Ambassador at Lima	Ambassador at Moscow

The post of Minister to Iran should, I think, now be filled. I suggest the names of these Foreign Service officers of Class I as suitable candidates for that position in accordance with their precedence in Class I:

Clarence E. Gauss,
now Consul General in Shanghai;

Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr.,
now Counselor of Embassy in Lima;

Alexander C. Kirk,
now Consul General and Counselor
of Embassy in Moscow.

Handwritten: *File* (top left) and *PT* (top right)

Lisbon, Portugal,
February 11, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much indeed for your letter of
January 10th.

I hope there will be no general war in Europe this summer but I would not care to bet very much on the continuance of peace. There seems to be no doubt that the Germans have fortified the harbor of Vigo which is about as far from the fighting in Spain as it is possible to get. It is manifest that a rifle or even a box of sandwiches would be of more use in the present war than all the guns in the world concentrated at Vigo. We can safely infer that this is being done to protect them from another enemy. They are now trying to terrify the Portuguese with the idea of the Blitzkrieg. I think that they honestly believe that they will be able to overwhelm, terrify, and starve, England and France in a very short time. Of course they hope that the British will abandon France. There can be no doubt that they are pretty well convinced that a show of force is all that is needed to get what they want from Great Britain and that everything said to the contrary

in Parliament is pure bluff. The danger is of course that they will get themselves so far out on a limb that they will not be able to return.

The recent attack on you in Italy suggests that they are in a far more violent state of jitters than any of us realize. You and I know the danger of an attack based on insufficient information and have always avoided such a thing. You have here the extraordinary case of a Cabinet Minister launching a diatribe against the head of a foreign State because of a phrase attributed to him and not taking the trouble to check it up. It would not have taken more than a few hours to get in communication with the Ambassador in Washington and find out exactly what had been said. On such a subject the Ambassador would have undoubtedly received a prompt answer. The fact that they are in such a nervous state and have command of the force to begin a general catastrophe does not indicate much security.

I want to congratulate you on the way in which you have handled the situation in Washington. You have given them just about enough rope to achieve the proverbial effect.

There is a rumor which was reported to me by the French Minister to the effect that Germany and Italy are planning to raise their Lisbon Legations to the rank of Embassies and if this were done, I am told that the French would immediately follow. He is watching the situation pretty carefully because in a case like this it is important,

at least for the time being, to be ahead of the other fellow.

I hope to get back this summer either before Congress closes or after you have gone to Hyde Park and that I shall see you there although I do not expect to open my house this summer. It would be too expensive for a short visit.

I am still happily enjoying the sunshine here and reading of storms and blizzards in other places. Both Olive and I continue to thank you for having sent us to Lisbon.

Faithfully yours,

Herbert C. Pell
Herbert C. Pell

The President,
The White House.

HCP:DG

11
xx

PSF: State Dept.
Confidential Code xx

THE PRESIDENT

February 20, 1939

6 pm

3

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE UNDER SECRETARY.

The British Ambassador who has just returned from England gave me this morning the text of a personal and secret message sent to you for your information by the British Government ^{and received by telegram today.} After referring to previous memoranda sent by the British Government to the French Government, the message states that the British Government has informed the French Government as regards Switzerland that if Germany invaded Switzerland and France thereupon declared war upon Germany, the United Kingdom would go to the assistance of France in the same way that they understood France would be willing to support Great Britain if Germany invaded Holland and Great Britain thereupon declared war upon Germany.

The remainder of the message reads textually as follows:

QUOTE In reply to the French arguments regarding Anglo-French solidarity in face of an unprovoked attack by Germany or Italy, His Majesty's Government in the

United Kingdom stated that joint action by Germany and Italy against the two Western Great Powers or against any one of them would clearly have to be resisted in common by the two Powers with the whole of their resources; indeed the obligations which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had assumed towards the French Government by treaty already cover the case of an unprovoked attack delivered upon France by Germany whether acting alone or in support of Italy. While it was possible that in the event of an attack on France by Italy alone France might feel that it was not necessarily in her interests that Great Britain should intervene if the effect of such intervention were to bring Germany into what might otherwise be a localized conflict, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were fully conscious that the risks to which the two Powers were severally exposed could not be disassociated. The French Government would have noted the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons on February 6th. It was in the light of this situation that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had proposed to the French Government the extension of staff conversations as indicated

-3-

in paragraph 2 of Lord Halifax's shorter message of February 7th.

The terms of this reply to the French Government are being communicated to the Belgian Government for their secret information. UNQUOTE

Hull

U SW:IJ

*file
personal*

April 7, 1939.

~~Strictly Confidential~~

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

The President has asked me to express his deep appreciation and thanks to Lord Halifax for the several recent memoranda concerning the European situation, which you were good enough to transmit to him.

The President would be very grateful if you would forward this message to Lord Halifax.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

The Honorable
Sir Ronald Lindsay, P.C., G.C.M.G.,
K.C.B., C.V.O.,
British Ambassador,
Washington, D. C.

S JFS:HHR

A true copy of
the signed origi-
nal. C

U.S.S. HOUSTON

PSF: State

HEADING:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PINK 32

0024 AMBASSADOR PHILLIPS TELEGRAPHS THAT THE THIRTY COUNTRIES ACCREDITED TO THE HOLY SEE WILL BE REPRESENTED BY THEIR DIPLOMATIC AGENTS AT THE CORONATION OF THE NEW POPE WHICH MAY TAKE PLACE AS EARLY AS MARCH TWELVE. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT SEVERAL OF THESE INCLUDING FRANCE GREAT BRITAIN POLAND AND IRELAND WILL SEND SPECIAL DELEGATIONS. MR. PHILLIPS STATES THAT CARDINAL MUNDELEIN FAVORS THE APPOINTMENT OF A "REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT" FOR THE OCCASION AND SUBMITS FOR CONSIDERATION THIS SUGGESTION. ACCORDING TO THE RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE THERE IS NO PRECEDENT FOR SUCH ACTION 1500.

PRESIDENT

1609/24 feb.

FROM: THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Release.....

ACTION: THE PRESIDENT.....

Deferred.....

Routine.....

Priority.....

INFO:

C.W.O.....

Super.....

President	Adm. Leahy	Rear Adm. McIntire (MC)	Mil. Aide	Naval Aide	Adm. Aide	Flag Office	Copies to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 9, 1939

	<u>Present Post</u>	<u>Proposed Post</u>
✓ Alexander W. Weddell	Ambassador to Argentina	Ambassador to Spain
✓ Claude G. Bowers	Ambassador to Spain	Ambassador to Poland
✓ A. J. D. Biddle	Ambassador to Poland	Ambassador to Argentina

*See
file
personal*


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

It is a pleasure to enclose a copy of a very friendly telegram sent to the Secretary of State by Senhor Oswaldo Aranha while on the return journey to Brazil. You will note that Senhor Aranha requests that there be conveyed to you his grateful appreciation for all the courtesies extended to him and his associates during their stay in this country. A copy of the reply sent to Senhor Aranha is also enclosed.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

Copy of telegram
from Senhor Aranha,
March 13, 1939;
Copy of Department's
telegram in reply
thereto.

The President,
The White House.

COPY:CMS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

20wu m 141RADIO RCA

S S ARGENTINA N. Tuckerton 654p March 13 1939

Hon Cordell Hull

STATE DEPARTMENT

I kindly ask you to accept and convey to the President my grateful appreciation of all the courtesies which were extended to me and my associates during our stay in your country President Roosevelt's great vision of the relations between the United States and the sister republics of this continent your own steadfast desire to bring about practical Pan Americanism and the untiring assistance rendered by the members of the different government departments were instrumental in creating an atmosphere of understanding and cooperation which permitted us to carry on our conversations in the spirit of greatest cordiality and reach the important decisions at Washington they mark a new era of closer collaboration between the countries of this hemisphere which cannot fail to result in the creation of a safer happier and stronger continent

Oswaldo Aranha

March 14, 1939

HIS EXCELLENCY
OSWALDO ARANHA
SS ARGENTINA
AT SEA EN ROUTE TO RIO DE JANEIRO

I have received with deep appreciation your very kind telegram sent while en route to your country, and I have brought to the attention of the President the message which you so generously requested that I convey to him.

The keen understanding which you and the capable officials assisting you invariably gave to the discussions of our common problems made possible the practical cooperative measures which give an added meaning to the inter-American spirit of collaboration. I am joined by the officers of my Government, who were gratified at the opportunity to work with you, in assuring you that it is our steadfast desire to preserve and strengthen the relations between our two countries on the fullest basis of cooperation and friendship. On behalf of the President and for myself, I cordially reciprocate your kind good wishes and reiterate the assurances of my friendship and esteem.

Cordeell Hull

*file
Personal
Place*

File State

Lisbon, Portugal
March 15, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

The fighting in Spain appears to be pretty well over. I have never been able to look on this contest, even from as close as Portugal, except in the way that I look on all other European events, that is to say, with an almost exclusive consideration of how their outcome one way or another will affect the maneuverings of England and Germany. Both sides are now marking time waiting for the presentation of the joint bill from Germany and Italy to Franco. It will probably be a big one and the English are now devoting themselves to an effort to prevent them from collecting.

My own opinion is that they will succeed in keeping some military control of selected places. I should be surprised if between them they get less than Vigo and one of the Balearic Islands. They will unquestionably want in addition to this, air facilities from which to launch an attack on the southwest of France.

The efficacy of the recent American activity is best proven by the hostile clamor it has aroused. I

am convinced however that the Germans still believe that there is no limit to British patience and that they will be able to undermine the British until they have gotten themselves into an overwhelming position. They resent your activity because they feel that American sympathy and American resources may stiffen British resistance. They are, however, still convinced that British talk will not be followed by action.

No one who was in England as I was during the crisis last autumn, and saw the feverish preparation going on only to be followed by a complete surrender and who considers the various bi-elections in England can fail to realize how extremely tenable is such a contention although I do not myself agree with it.

I do not know if I will be able to get back to America this year. I should like very much to see you but I want to save up as much of my leave as possible so as to return for the Campaign next year. It will be a hard fight and especially so, for that small band of Progressives to which I belong who believe that it is more important to destroy the possibility of reaction than it is to mark out a future course. There can be no danger if we can avert disunion.

I have not been in America for two years but from all I can hear, the reactionary element has learnt nothing. The leaders of business continue

to look on their posts as places of opportunity for profit rather than of responsibility. Unless this is changed, no earthly force can prevent them from committing suicide.

You would be happy to hear the way in which all intelligent and reasonable people in Europe talk about you. You are generally considered as the greatest support of prosperity and the strongest pillar of peace. I hope that I will be able to get over to see you during the spring. Olive sends her best and joins in my thanks to you for this pleasant post.

Faithfully yours,

Bertie P 4
Herbert C. Pell

The President,

The White House.

HOP:DG

file
personal
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Budapest, April 21, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

Your telegram to the dictators asking for guarantees for thirty-one countries, including Hungary, was received here privately with great enthusiasm, but officially with reserve.

Count Csáky's interview which he gave out at Rome in reference to Wilson's Fourteen Points and American meddling in European affairs is widely disapproved of here, even though it is realized that it was made under considerable pressure. Ex-Foreign Minister de Kánya says that, inasmuch as no one had addressed any remarks to Hungary, if Csáky had more age and more experience he would probably have had sense enough to keep still, no matter what

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

what pressure was brought upon him. Of course Csáky is pro-Axis, and I consider him a very shifty individual. Count Teleki, however, is very anti-German and is a man in whom one can have confidence. In the last analysis it is not Count Csáky who is going to make this country's policy but Count Teleki, and most of all the Regent.

Members of the Diplomatic Corps - with the exception, of course, of those representing the dictator countries - have almost without exception approved your message to the dictators and have characterized this act as one of the most important and timely movements made in years, and believe that its effect will be far-reaching.

There is a general feeling everywhere that Messrs. Hitler and Mussolini are in such a position that they couldn't change their course if they would, and therefore that war cannot be averted. Nevertheless,

that


that it will be difficult for the two dictators to make a convincing reply and that it therefore puts them in a very awkward position not only vis-à-vis the people of the thirty-one countries but those of their own countries. Incidentally, Tibor Eckhardt who is in very close touch with things in Germany said that the British broadcasts in German are very effective and that one of his friends who is a newspaperman wrote him that Julius Streicher recently called a meeting of newspapermen to find ways of combatting this propaganda.

There is no change in the feeling in Hungary towards the Germans: they hate them as cordially as they ever did. I am certain that it is Hungary's intention to stay neutral in case of a war if they possibly can. It is almost certain that if they do go in a war it will be on the side of Germany because they are so tied up with them that it will be

difficult

difficult to escape; also, they are still weak-minded when it comes to Transylvania or any portion of their former territory. However, things can change. If Germany makes any threat to Hungarian independence or they push them too hard anything can happen. After all these people are not subservient.

With warmest regards, I am,
Yours most cordially,


John F. Montgomery

Enclosure:

Statement made by Count
Csáky at Rome.

TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT MADE BY THE
HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER (COUNT CSAKY)
AT ROME TO THE EDITOR OF THE STEFANI NEWS AGENCY.

(Original Text, as published by the
Hungarian Telegraph Bureau on April 19).

"The message of the President of the United States was in fact an unpleasant surprise. I believe there is not a Hungarian in the whole world who could ever forget the history of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. The Hungarians living within or outside the boundaries of present-day Hungary recall in every minute of their lives these woeful fourteen points, and they can never forget the Treaty of Trianon which resulted from these fourteen points. There is not a soul to whom it is not clear that the precarious peace founded on such a basis poisons day after day both the lives of the individuals and the relations among peoples.

"Wilson's action is still too recent, and the results thereof were far too tragic for ourselves for there not to be alive in us a feeling against all that the Treaty of Trianon committed to the disadvantage of genuine peace. This explains that I, on my part, for example, am unable to judge without a certain bias of this further American interference with the affairs of Central Europe.

"We want to be left quietly to work in our own way at the side of our proven friends, in order that in peace we may repair the damages caused first by the World War, and subsequently by the lack of knowledge and of understanding on the part of others."

PSF: *State*

2 *over* *State*
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


May 10, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your information a telegram received last night from Caffery. I believe the message from President Vargas contained therein will be of interest to you.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:
No. 151, May 9, 1939,
2 p.m. from Rio de
Janeiro.

The President,
The White House.

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

RIO DE JANEIRO

Dated May 9, 1939

Rec'd 2:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

151, May 9, 2 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY.

President Vargas asked me to "tell your President that we trust him and that he can trust us". He made this remark at the end of an informal conversation we were having in regard to the world situation in general.

CAFFERY

KLP

*PST
State Dept*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 17, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HERBERT FEIS

Will you digest this for
me and let me have your slant
on it? It should be kept con-
fidential.

F. D. R.

Letter of May 9, 1939 from
Ambassador Bullitt enclosing
memorandum - "A New Defensive and
Offensive Method for Liberal
Nations" - sent to him by Monsieur
Andre Istel through Daladier.

State

June 17, 1939.

Dear Jeff:-

Many thanks for your note. I am delighted that General Marshall's visit worked out so well.

I hope to see the Brazilian Chief of Staff in about ten days.

With my warm regards,

As ever yours,

Honorable Jefferson Caffery,
American Embassy,
Rio de Janeiro,
Brasil.


Rio de Janeiro,
June 7, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

I am writing to tell you how very successful General Marshall's visit has been here in Brazil. He has conducted himself in the most intelligent manner; and he has been tactful, understanding, co-operative, untiring, and effective. At the same time his simplicity and naturalness have won an amazing number of friends and admirers. The members of the Brazilian Government in general, and the officers of the Army in particular, are delighted with him.

I thought that you might like to hear this.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Jefferson Caffery". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Jefferson Caffery".

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

*file
personal*

*PSF:
State Dept*

London, June 19, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

Since leaving for London, I have been haunted by a feeling that in my last letter to you, probably dated June 6th, when referring to the problem of a possible colony for Germany I said West Africa when I meant East Africa. I was probably being too careful, and one of those geographical aberrations crept in. I am anxious, if I did commit that error, to have it corrected.

Since here a usually well informed source has told me that Germany is reported to be doing a great deal of secret submarine construction and planning to do very much more. If true it is possible that the airplane threat is in part a red herring across the trail. It also presupposes that Germany has no intention of attacking England and France

The President,
The White House,
Washington.

until the submarine construction has been brought to completion, a year and a half or two years hence. You will recall that Admiral von Tirpitz maintained that the use of the submarine was not the mistake that Germany made in the Great War but rather that she started it too late.

Meanwhile, however, we have to weigh the human element. Hitler is a neurotic, with much more in his scale of feminine than masculine, and the recent British decision to conduct propaganda by air in Germany itself will, I feel, make him ready to scream with fury. Should he begin to suspect that his star is declining and lose hope of being ceded advantages, the danger — a psychological one, I admit — is that he will do something desperate to try and preserve his place with the German people. Napoleon was a different type because he was much further in the scale towards the masculine; but when he saw things going ill, even he committed the great errors of the campaigns in Portugal and Russia, taking a gambler's chance. The other danger, as I see it, with both Hitler and Musso, is that the human brain is simply not capable of standing such strain as they

have been under, for such a long period. Collapse or unbalanced and disastrous decisions should be expected.

In the letter above mentioned I referred to meager British financial efforts in Rumania and elsewhere in the Balkans. Since I have had the advantage of being here for a few days conferring, I have come to the conclusion that they are doing what they can, poor dears, and are hardly in a position to do much more. It has been suggested that tactically it might be shrewd for the British to back the Italians financially in their plans of would-be economic penetration in the Balkans. I doubt it. For the other countries I am unable to speak, but anyway so far as Rumania is concerned this would not work very well, as the Italian economy is not complementary to that of Rumania, as is the German.

With highest regard, believe me, dear Mr. President,

Yours most respectfully,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Minister to Rumania

P.S. In my above mentioned letter when referring to the welcome press report that Mrs. Roosevelt, your Mother, might be coming to Rumania I omitted to mention that King Carol does not, as a rule, move back into residence in Bucharest from Sinaia until sometime in November.

F.M.G.

Memo for Watson
From Sumner Welles
July 11, 1939

*Baltic-Finland
State Dept*

Attaches conf despatch No 1082-June 7, 1939
from Amb. Biddle for the President.

Subject---discussion which took place between
Biddle and the newly appointed Russian Amb
Sharonov and his observations of the Soviet
ambassador in Warsaw on current Anglo-Soviet
discussions, also in regard to position of Finland
and the Baltics.

See Poland folder-Foreign File-Drawer 1-1939



File
Pro mail
State Dept

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON


July 24, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

I have received this morning a personal letter from Jefferson Caffery of which I am enclosing a copy for your information. I believe that the information contained in this letter will be of interest to you.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:

From Jefferson Caffery,
July 17, 1939.

The President,

The White House.

C
O
P
Y

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rio de Janeiro, July 17, 1939.

Dear Sumner:

Aranha told me this afternoon that he had talked this morning with someone in whom he has entire confidence, who arrived today on the CAP ARCONA from Germany, who had had a fifty minute conversation with Hitler a few days ago before his departure. Hitler had expressed much concern over the attitude of the United States in regard to Germany and had bitterly attacked President Roosevelt. He had expressed great disappointment over the fact that President Roosevelt had not replied to his well-known speech in the Reichstag, and made it clear that he had been hoping for and expecting a reply. Aranha interjected, "how clever the President was not to reply". Hitler said that England gave him no concern, but the United States did give him considerable concern.

Hitler added that when he ascertained that Ribbentrop had given Argentina a sort of ultimatum in connection with the arrest of a German, whose name I have forgotten, over the Patagonian business, he personally had reprimanded Ribbentrop and said that his policy with regard to South America was definitely to be one of conciliation, and that Ribbentrop should not follow up the ultimatum.

An hour after the conversation described, he had received the Argentine Ambassador at Berlin, who was traveling also on the CAP ARCONA. The Argentine Ambassador remarked that when he took his Government's reply to Ribbentrop's sort of ultimatum, the German Foreign Office said

The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

-2-

that the whole business had been a mistake and that they
had not meant it as an ultimatum.

With all good wishes,

Yours very sincerely,

JEFFERSON CAFFERY

Grace:

Tell Sumner that the letter
has already gone.

F. P. R.

file
journal
PSP
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PSF: State

SS 17

Please pick up
P.B.T.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

It has recently come to my attention that President Somoza has forwarded to you, through the Nicaraguan Legation in this city, an inscribed copy of his book entitled "El Verdadero Sandino e El Calvario de las Segovias", and that a letter of acknowledgment to President Somoza has been submitted to you for your signature.

At the time of the assassination of Sandino by the Guardia Nacional, of which President Somoza was then Commander, charges were publicly made that his Government and the American Legation in Nicaragua had conspired with the Guardia to have Sandino killed. Although the charge that the American Legation was implicated was utterly false, the book tends to corroborate General Somoza's boast, which he has often made in private conversation, that he was responsible for Sandino's summary execution. Should it become public that


The President,

The White House.

that you have written to President Somoza acknowledging the receipt of this book, I believe that there is a real danger that the old charges with regard to our connection with Sandino's death might unfortunately be revived.

Under the circumstances, I wish to suggest for your consideration that it would be preferable in this instance for this Department to inform the Nicaraguan Legation that the book has been forwarded to you and that no written communication be sent to President Somoza.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'D. H. Kelly', is written over the typed text 'Faithfully yours,'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial 'D' and a long, sweeping tail.

P. P. F.

59/3

July 17, 1939.

My dear President Somoza:

I have received with deep appreciation the copy of your book El Verdadero Sandino y El Calvario de las Segovias which you so kindly sent to me through Dr. De Bayle, your Minister at Washington.

I assure you that this token of your friendship will be a welcome and valuable addition to my library.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

His Excellency
General Anastasio Somoza, #
President of Nicaragua,
Managua.

x432
11979-13

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
—
DIVISION OF PROTOCOL

July 17, 1939.

Miss Tully,
The White House.

Dear Miss Tully:

In accordance with our telephone conversation, I am enclosing herewith a rewritten draft of a letter to President Somoza.

J. V. Dunn

PR:SPRUKS:LAW

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

Letter from Hon. Geo. T. Summerlin, State Dept. 7/14/39 to Miss Lehman, with attached draft of letter for the President's signature to General Anastasio Somoza, President of Nicaragua, dated 7/13/39, signed by the President but his signature was crossed out. The letter thanked the President of Nicaragua for a copy of El Verdadero Sembrano o El Calvario de las Segovias. Miss Tully stated that the President wanted another letter prepared for the President's signature and that she had talked with Mr. Summerlin about it.

Sent to Mr. Summerlin x20
7/15/39.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1939

In reply refer to
PR

My dear Miss LeHand:

In compliance with the President's memorandum of July 12, 1939, I am returning herewith the book entitled El Verdadero Sandino o El Calvario de las Segovias, sent to him by General Anastasio Somoza, the President of Nicaragua, together with a draft of a suggested letter to General Somoza for the President's signature.

If you will return the letter to me when signed, I shall be glad to forward it to the American Minister at Managua for appropriate delivery.

Sincerely yours,

L. J. Sumner
Chief of Protocol.

Enclosures:
Book;
Draft letter.

Miss Marguerite A. LeHand,
Private Secretary to the President,
The White House.


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1939.

My dear President Somoza:

Thank you very much for sending me a copy of your book El Verdadero Sandino o El Calvario de las Segovias. I greatly appreciate your friendly thought in bringing this work to my attention.

Very sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Franklin D. Roosevelt". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Franklin" being more prominent and the last name "Roosevelt" written in a more compact, stylized manner.

His Excellency
General Anastasio Somoza,
President of Nicaragua,
Managua.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 12, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. GEORGE T. SUMMERLIN

S
Will you be good enough
to prepare a personal letter of
thanks for my signature?

F. D. R.

Letter from Hon. George T. Summerlin,
Chief of Protocol, 7/10/39 to Miss LeHane,
with attached copy of a book entitled
"El Verdadero Sandino o El Calvario de las
Segovias", which General Anastasio Somoza,
the President of Nicaragua, has inscribed
to the President. Also enclosed is a copy
of a translator's statement concerning the
book, and a copy of the covering note from
the Nicaraguan Legation. Mr. Summerlin asks
President's wishes in connection with the
acknowledgment of the book.

2021 JUN 17 10:00 AM
WASHINGTON
1200 BELL ST NW

Please return
this top file to
Mr. Summerlin
—

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

The following papers were returned to the State Department, 7/18/39:

Letter from G. T. Summerlin, State Dept., 7/10/39 to Miss Lehman, transmitting book entitled "El Verdadero Sandino o El Chivario de las Segovias" which General Anastasio Somoza, the President of Nicaragua, has inscribed to the President (book not returned), translator's statement concerning the book, and covering note from the Nicaraguan Legation, copy of Mr. Summerlin's letter of 7/14/39 to Miss Lehman, and copy of draft of letter for President's signature to General Somoza (this draft not sent). Also sent to Mr. Summerlin for delivery to General Somoza is President's letter of 7/17/39.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY


July 31, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Thanks very much for letting
me see this.


*file
personal*

C.H.



No. 10

My dear Mr. President:



In accordance with your oral instructions to me to visit neighboring Missions and write you of my impressions, I recently made a trip to Athens, out and back by one of the two excellent new Rumanian boats which gave me a six-day stopover in Athens, but unfortunately, only a few hours each way at Istanbul and not enough time to run up to Ankara. Jack MacMurray and practically all of the staff were at Ankara but I had some talks with the very knowledgeable Commercial Attaché, Gillespie, who has been in Turkey for many years, and with the Military Attaché. Our departing and regretted Military Attaché Major Reilly accompanied me.

While in Athens I saw quite a bit of our distinguished Minister Mr. MacVeagh. He has the qualifications, is able, well informed and a real authority on the classical Greek period, the latter being much appreciated and commented upon by the Greeks. While there I had many talks with former Colleagues, notably Djuvara, the Rumanian Ambassador, and Baron van Breugel Douglas, the Dutch Minister who used to be in Washington, various informed Greeks, and also a conversation after dinner at MacVeagh's house with Mavrodi, the more or less acting Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs. There is a
real

The President,

The White House.

real community of interest between Greece and Rumania. Gafencu, the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, is shortly going to Athens on an official visit, and Prince Paul, the Diadoque, is coming here this week for the "Strajerii" or boy scout celebrations. While the Greeks are naturally very disturbed with the Italians in Albania, and the reported number of Italian troops has mounted now to over eighty thousand, which, with a further slight increase would be more than the Greeks themselves could muster, nevertheless there is as yet no tangible threat, only a potential menace. The Greeks are almost equally anxious as to what the future holds for Yugoslavia. Prince Paul of Yugoslavia, I feel convinced, will do his utmost to preserve the country's neutrality and categorical assurances to that effect were given to Gafencu when a few weeks ago he met with Sincar Markovic, the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, on a boat at the Danube border. However, only the future can tell how these situations are going to work out.

Everywhere I went I heard, as I have here again and again, expressions of intense gratification over your messages. There is a feeling of hope in the air that America sympathizes with the problems of these little fellows over here and that you take a personal interest. Turkish solidarity also is a great comfort to them. There would appear to be no doubt as to its genuineness, and due to close Russo-Turkish relations
that

that means that Russia is in reserve somewhere in the background: a less welcome prop but, nevertheless, potential.

The checkerboard of Europe now shows a fairly brave front for the white chessmen. Hitler ponders over his black chessmen thinking hard as to what his next move will be. England, France and Russia have succeeded in reestablishing a semblance of the old balance of power and of collective security. (A friend of mine refers always to the pending Russian agreement as an Alice in Wonderland contraption.) Personally, however, I doubt whether the brave front will be enough to restrain the Power Gluttons from trying out some new moves after the crops are practically gathered and recovery has raised its head again in America. In England and France it is already showing, in the latter due to the enlightened policies of Paul Reynaud. Hitler is talking himself and some of his people into a frenzy about "encirclement". He will end up by believing it himself. And the Poles, bolstered up by the British promises, have become uncompromising. So possibly the next onslaught will be primarily upon Yugoslavia. It might be considered better tactics first to undermine the Balkan Entente and, with promises to Bulgaria, present both Turkey and Rumania, not to speak of Greece, with a menacing situation on their flanks.

In my humble opinion no assurance of the maintenance of the status quo can be had unless, in addition to the

brave

brave front, tempting bait can be dangled before the Germans, during good behavior, in the form of a colony—west coast of Africa, raw materials, and/or, eventual financial and economic cooperation. In the latter field Russia could play a useful role. Germany's trade with Russia has dwindled to almost nothing. Formerly it was of major importance.

Meanwhile both here and in Greece there is deep disappointment and even chagrin over the result, or rather lack of result, of the recent City dictated negotiations with Leith Ross and his British Financial Mission. Britain seems anxious to "do something", but only if it does not cost too much. There is a feeling in the air that more passed at Munich between Chamberlain and Hitler than meets the eye and that Britain is going to be mighty careful not to step on any German toes in the field of trade in the Balkans. Here there were certain concrete results which, when pooled with recent French efforts to take more Rumanian oil, will help in the general picture—which, however, has a German foreground.

Then there is the important question of armament. I have been impressed by the spontaneous mobilization in this country and the spirit shown. The Rumanian peasant is a good soldier, intensely patriotic and can stand any amount of hardship and punishment. Between four to five times as many more responded to the mobilization call than were expected. The Rumanian Army, however, could only put up a real stiff resistance if properly equipped. The trade pacts with England

and

and France do not help much as neither Britain nor France are in a position to supply anything substantial in the way of arms. Under Leith Ross's recent accord I am given to understand that the British are quietly passing along a few old "Warspite" planes which are now lumbering and out of date. Our markets are practically closed due to the Johnson Act and the inability of Rumania to raise the money to pay on the nail on a cash and carry basis. Personally, I have been here long enough to have formed the conviction that the Balkan Entente, if properly equipped, could—and probably would—put up a magnificent fight against German political domination. Were perchance our markets open and made accessible I think that even Bulgaria might join up. Together with Poland and Turkey that would make a very formidable bloc indeed. On the other hand, if Yugoslavia is weakened or otherwise incapacitated by fissiparous methods, who knows what the future role of Rumania will eventually be. One can be sure that if Germany really makes a move on the Ukraine, Germany will endeavor to entice the Rumanians by promises, inter alia, of a slice thereof if they are good and march along. I admit that I am trying to peer a long way into the future but stranger things than this have happened. But there are, of course, two schools of thought in Rumania: that which believes Rumania should stick to its former allies—with reservations as to present day Russia—and that which holds it should tie

up

up with Germany. The latter is very much the lesser so far and has but a small following as yet. Above all, Rumania wants to live. This nation wants to continue. It is progressing rapidly and has had a foretaste of what a greater developed Rumania might be. They like to compare Rumania's possibilities with our country before the great development after the Civil War. The King has a stake, and a big one, a fine boy coming along, and if aid from elsewhere is not forthcoming this country cannot fight alone and ill equipped. Due to the geographical difficulties not too much can be expected of Great Britain in time of stress. There is also always the big potential leverage for the Germans of control of Rumania's principal source of arms and equipment. Any increase in German political influence in Rumania would almost certainly bring in its wake sad times for the Jews here.

As long ago as March 17, 1938 in a Despatch to the Department, No. 215, I concluded with the following paragraph:

"Whatever one reports nowadays, with the present world tempo, is usually stale by the time it reaches you, but with economic conditions as they are and, inter alia, with the decline in respect for France, above all for its everlasting politics and politicians, with Great Britain either unwilling or unable to make up its mind, with the fatalistic reception accorded here in high circles of the union of the Germans under Hitler, with the subtle and skilful diplomacy of the German Minister in Bucharest, Herr Fabricius, with the horror and dread which prevails of Russia and even of the passage of Russian troops—on the ground that once in they could never be got out again—I would venture to say that this country will tend to swing more and more, though cautiously, towards Berlin. Whether bloodshed will so be averted and whether history will be any the more peacefully

written


written for this development, or how soon it will occur, or whether suddenly or by gradual processes, I am as yet unable to determine, but nothing short of a really startling development of strength in England and France, coupled with real interest in this country, a miraculous strengthening of the Little and Balkan Ententes or some other unforeseen development, can arrest the trend."

I sincerely hope that your health has entirely recovered and that the summer will not be too hard on you. My wife and I have taken a villa at Sinaia near here, but first I am going to London and Paris when I hope to have the advantage of talking things over with Ambassadors Kennedy and Bullitt. These occasions with their opportunities of personal contact are of great value, at least to me.

The vernacular press reports that Mrs. Roosevelt, your Mother, is planning a trip to Rumania. If true, it would be splendid. She would have a wonderful reception. I would be most awfully grateful if I could have some advance notice of her coming. It is true that Bucharest in summer is frightfully hot, but not quite as hot, as a rule, as Washington. However, Sinaia and other resorts in the mountains are only two hours or so away by car. The King moves to his summer residence at Sinaia towards the end of June and all the Cabinet manage to find excellent reasons why they should be there—if not away on leave—as much, if not more than they are in Bucharest. Another good thing about the summer here is that the heat subsides earlier than with us, usually around the first of September.

With highest regard, dear Mr. President, believe me,

Yours most respectfully,



State Dept
1

August 4, 1939

President sends to Bullitt for his information
and return THE COMMENT prepared by the following:
Feis, Morgenthau, Lauchlin Currie on memorandum
from a French Banker friend of Daladier which
Ambassador Bullitt had previously sent to the
President.

See; Bullitt folder-Drawer 1-1939

File

Memo to Gen Watson
From G.T. Summerlin
August 10, 1939

In re-request of the President to deliver to
the King of England a number of airplane
photographs taken in Washington during
the British Royal visit--given to Stanley
Woodward to give Joe Kennedy to transmit.

Copy of thanks from King's Secretary attached.

See-King and Queen file-Drawer 1-1939.

State Dept
1

Memo to President
From Sumner Welles
August 10, 1939

In re-Welles conversation with Count Jerzy Potocki,
Polish Ambassador --Memorandum of conversation
attached.

Subject-General European Situation

Note kept

For despatches from KIRK--Foreign Office--
Berlin, Germany. Dated August 24th and 25th-1939

See Germany folder-Foreign File--Drawer 1-1939

PSF: *State*

Please return to Secretary's Office,
State Dept.

EDA
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
cated to anyone (D)

PARIS

Dated August 25, 1939

Received 8:05 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1585, August 25, noon.

PERSONAL AND ~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Your messages to Hitler and Moscicki are admirable.
The Polish Ambassador here has just expressed to me his
deep gratitude for them.

Please do not forget as soon as the first shots are
fired to issue an appeal to all nations to refrain from
bombing cities and civilian populations. France, England
and Poland will agree; Germany doubtless will not; but the
moral position will be clear and in the long run the moral
position will count.

BULLITT

DDMHPD



file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

I am transmitting to you the translation of a message addressed to you by the President of Ecuador. Since I am sure you will think it desirable, I am giving the text of this message to the press for release.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,
The White House.

TRANSLATION
POSTAL TELEGRAPH

1939 AUG 26 PM 5 48

NA423 73 CABLE 1/50 VIA AAC

Quito, Ecuador 26 1225P

His Excellency

President Roosevelt,
Washington, D. C.

In this grave hour I adhere to the new urgent appeal which Your Excellency has made to European countries to seek the necessary solution of their differences by pacific means. Whether that noble invitation is accepted or not, Your Excellency will have deserved the applause of all men who are observing, with fear, the approach of a catastrophe for civilization.

AURELIO MOSQUERO NARVAEZ
President of the Republic of Ecuador.

(52).

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



PSF: State

*Van Der Stuyt
State Dept.*

*file
personal*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith a letter I have received this afternoon from the Ambassador of Belgium with regard to your suggestion concerning a neutral channel to the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp in the event of the outbreak of war. You will see that the Ambassador has consulted his Government in the matter and that the Belgian Government gratefully accepts the proposal and would be glad to have any suggestions you may care to present.

I am consulting War and Navy today and I shall talk further with the Belgian Ambassador and with the Dutch Minister tomorrow and as soon as we have come to some determination as to all of the elements involved, I shall lay our recommendations before you.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
No. 3263 from Belgian
Embassy, August 29, 1939.

The President,
The White House.

COPY

AMBASSADE DE BELGIQUE

Washington, August 29, 1939

D. 4923

No. 3263

Dear Mr. Under-Secretary,

I have just received a cable instructing me to express to the President the deep appreciation of my Government for the proposition which he was kind enough to make yesterday to establish, if possible, a free channel assuring the security of transportation between the United States and Belgium, and to tell him that the Belgian Government gratefully accepts this proposition.

My Government would also be grateful for any suggestions which the President would be kind enough to make, in regard to the most feasible procedure to follow in the circumstances.

May I have recourse to your unfailing courtesy in order to transmit this message to its high destination.

I have the honor to remain, dear Mr. Under-Secretary, with high regard,

Yours sincerely,

VAN DER STRATEN

The Honorable
Sumner Welles
Under Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington.

Attached

2 Radio Reports-Aug 30, 1939

August 30, 1939.

RADIO REPORT - 8:15 A.M.

The British Cabinet met at noon today to consider Hitler's reply to the British note. Nothing authoritative has been learned respecting its contents, although an Associated Press report from London states that it expresses Hitler's willingness to negotiate directly with Poland under certain circumstances. Another report states that it stresses Hitler's desire for improved relations with Great Britain.

Berlin is reported to be optimistic, although Nazi circles state that the German demands are unchanged. Von Papen has left Germany for Ankara. The German press is reported to take a more friendly tone toward Great Britain today.

A C.B.S. report from Paris said the Yugoslav Premier has announced his country's intention to defend its integrity.

The French Line has ordered the Normandie to remain in New York until further notice. French school children are being evacuated from Paris today.

Increased

-2-

Increased tension is reported in Danzig as a result of the dispute over the railroad service.

Eu:Thompson:AMR.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

August 30, 1939.

RADIO REPORT: 11:00 a.m.

Foreign Office officials in London are telling correspondents that Great Britain is replying to Hitler and that the reply will leave the way open to a further communication from Hitler. It was also stated that Hitler has asked for territorial concessions from Poland and has requested that a Polish emissary come to Berlin. London was reported to be opposed to this request.

The AP reported that Ambassador Kennedy called at the Foreign Office at three o'clock and remained for an hour.

The A.P. also reported that General Weygand had arrived by air in Beirut and that he had been chosen as commander of the allied forces in the Eastern Mediterranean area.

The N.B.C. reported from London that a decree for general mobilization was issued in Warsaw today.

The A.P. reported that Japan was rushing large forces into Manchukuo.

AUGUST--no date

RADIO REPORT 2 P.M.

There is still no word, with the exception of the routine communiqué, of what transpired in today's British Cabinet meeting. It is reported that foreign Embassies have been informed that a firm reply was drafted to Hitler's message, but no details have leaked.

In the course of the day Herr Hitler convoked a secret meeting of the Reichstag in the Embassies' Reception Room at the Chancellery. The official Berlin statement said that the Chancellor analyzed the present situation to the Reichstag members, described it as serious and was accorded a great ovation. Following the meeting of the Reichstag Hitler communicated once again, the fourth time in twenty-four hours, with Mussolini. It is reported in Rome that Hitler told Mussolini that in view of the failure of the British Cabinet to reply promptly to his offer, he would be obliged to stiffen his demands.

The official spokesman in Rome denied at the close of the afternoon that Mussolini had taken over foreign affairs from Count Ciano and also denied that Count Grandi had flown to London. It was admitted, however, that Mussolini is planning a last-minute intervention. He will make it plain that peace, however, must be based on honor and justice for Germany and Italy.

Eu:Pell:MHL

Attached

3 Radio Reports-Aug 26, 1939

August 26, 1939.

RADIO REPORT - 3:00 P.M.

It was announced from London that the British Cabinet has just adjourned without issuing any statement. It will meet again tomorrow. According to an official statement issued by the British Foreign Office, it is said that reports in the newspapers purporting to give the substance of concrete proposals which Sir Neville Henderson was alleged to have brought back from Berlin were totally devoid of all foundation. The statement points out that the British standpoint remains clear, ^{that it} It is for Poland to decide whether any proposals are acceptable as a basis for negotiation and that according to the Anglo-Polish Agreement, Poland will decide whether its vital interests are threatened.

It is further said that it is too late for Sir Neville Henderson to return to Berlin tonight, but that he will probably carry the reply of the British Cabinet after its meeting tomorrow.

According to one report from London, the French reply to the German Chancellor's proposals has already been despatched and contains an offer to continue the negotiations

on

on a basis of complete parity, without rejecting or accepting them. It is further reported that the British Prime Minister may call a special session of Parliament on Monday.

Radio commentators called attention to the reports which continue to circulate, not only in London, despite official denial, but also in Rome and in Paris that Hitler made specific proposals for the settlement of the German-Polish problem. The British Government's denial that these proposals have been received is taken by some to indicate that if it can be announced that no proposals were received, there need be no official announcement that they have been rejected. There is also a belief current in London to the effect that the negotiations which are said to have begun may last for a considerable period, during which all sorts of conflicting rumors and speculations will continue to be heard, but that no definite decision will be made. There is some speculation that the German Government is considering a solution of the Danzig question based on a note of the American Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, dated August 1918, which outlined President Wilson's "fourteen points".

From

-3-

From Berlin it is announced that no civil traffic on German railways will be permitted after Monday morning.

In France, military preparations are continuing to the point where complete mobilization has nearly been reached.

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

The Military Attache in Berlin in a telegram sent at 5 p.m., Berlin time, reported that there were indications that general mobilization orders were then in effect and that movements in the direction of the frontiers have nearly been concluded. He believes that the anniversary of the Battle of Tannenberg may be the time for action.

Eu:Reber:RMB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

August 26, 1939.

RADIO REPORT - 4:30 P.M.

Reports following a Cabinet meeting in London indicated that the British Government had decided not to reject Chancellor Hitler's "suggestions" out of hand, and that consultation would now take place with the French and Polish Governments and with the Governments of the Dominions and a further session of the Cabinet will take place as soon as the replies have been received.

It was said in London that the British Government will make a counter proposal involving a change in the status of Danzig and that the British will probably propose joint German and Polish control of the City, with certain adjustments regarding access to the City by Germany and passage between Germany and East Prussia. Admittedly, however, these reports are largely speculation. The most that has been said officially is that consultations with various European and non-European governments are under way.

From Berlin word comes that Hitler has called off
the

-2-

the Nuremberg Party Rally scheduled for September 2 and 3. Military preparations have increased, if anything, and it is generally conceded that Germany is fully mobilized and prepared for any eventuality.

In Moscow, Marshal Voroshilov issued a statement following the departure of the British and French military missions in which he put the blame for a rupture of the conversations with the Peace Front squarely on Poland. He said that Poland's refusal to permit the entry of Russian troops into Poland in the event of hostilities had rendered further conversations useless, since evidently the Peace Front was insincere in its approach to Russia.

Information from Moscow indicates that a drive is under way against former Czech citizens. Many of those who sought refuge in Russia after the events of last September have been arrested and Czech Legation was seized today and its files confiscated.

Warsaw reports an intensification of incidents, including shootings and burnings and invasions of Polish territory. Word has been received in Warsaw from Danzig that the Polish grain elevators in that City have been confiscated.

There

There is evidence of intensive diplomatic activity in Rome. Signor Mussolini has seen the German Ambassador twice and is said to have communicated directly with Chancellor Hitler. Count Ciano received the French and Belgian Ambassadors, and the Pope has had a number of diplomatic audiences. The belief persists in Rome that a peaceful solution of the crisis will be found and reports are current that a four-power conference of Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain will be called and will be followed by a conference of wider scope.

There is no sign of a weakening in Paris, where the conviction is maintained that to compromise with Hitler will be to sign the death warrant of Poland, if not now, in the immediate future, and imperil the West.

August 26, 1939.

RADIO REPORT - 6:30 P.M.

At the close of Saturday in Europe, attention everywhere was focused on London, where the British Cabinet has been considering proposals from Chancellor Hitler which in the course of the day ~~have~~^{were}, first, "terms", and, later, "suggestions".

Late news from London indicated that consideration was being given to some form of counter proposal and that efforts were being made to induce the French Government to align itself with the British plan. At the close of the day, official circles in London stressed the fact that diplomatic negotiations were continuing and that steps were being taken to point out to Poland the realities of the military and diplomatic position. It was stressed that there was no idea of backing down in the face of German pressure, but the difficulties of Britain's enforcing its obligations to Poland were stressed. Viscount Halifax had a long meeting with the Polish Ambassador, after which it was said that the various alternatives

now

now confronting Britain and Poland had been discussed.

In Paris at a late hour it was suggested that the German Chancellor might be prepared to localize the immediate issue to Danzig and the Corridor. France, it was said, would be insistent that Poland's economic integrity must not be infringed. There was a careful avoidance of the use of the term "political integrity".

Military preparations continued just the same, and the prevailing tone was one of pessimism.

There was great activity in Rome all through the evening. Gayda, in his latest article, emphasized that Germany had submitted a "plan" to the British and said that there was hope that this plan, which had been discussed with Signor Mussolini before it went to London, would furnish a basis for negotiation.

Signor Mussolini saw the German Ambassador on several occasions and was said to have been in direct communication with Chancellor Hitler throughout the day. Late in the evening, the report was current in Rome that Count Ciano would visit London. There was, however, no official confirmation of this report.

Italian military preparations continued and at the close of the day the Franco-Italian frontier was closed.

Reports from Berlin were categorical: There would be
either

either war or a peace based on the fulfillment of German demands. In Government circles there was a great deal of optimism about the prospects of peace, and it was stressed that events have by no means as yet got beyond the diplomatic stage. There is a conviction in influential circles that the British Government will accept the Chancellor's demands as a basis of discussion. In all events, everything now depended on the crucial meeting between Chancellor Hitler and Sir Neville Henderson.

Despite the official optimism, military activity became increasingly noticeable. Clearly, the German nation was under arms.

Eu:Pell:RMB

to President and no based upon a 40-40-40
party a new party would be formed in
22 new states to strengthen the party and to

Attached

5 Radio Reports-Aug 27, 1939

August 27, 1939

RADIO REPORT: 10 a.m. and Previous

Due, it is said, to a deep cleavage between members of the Government, the British Cabinet meeting has been postponed three times. London's Sunday press is "tough" and Conservative Party Headquarters have informed the Prime Minister that the voters will not accept appeasement. Mr. Chamberlain, however, is determined not to close the door to a compromise. Sir Neville Henderson will not return to Berlin until after the Cabinet has reached its decision.

Paris is of the view that the chances of a peaceful solution are slim. One third of the country has been placed under military control and all women and children have been ordered to leave Paris. Premier Daladier is conferring with the army and navy chiefs and military preparations are being rushed.

In Rome, desperate efforts to preserve the peace are proceeding neck and neck with war preparations. Signor Mussolini has taken over the direction of foreign affairs from Count Ciano (it is reported) and is in direct contact with Herr Hitler. The Government spokesman wrote this morning that Italian influence is being used to facilitate exchange of views.

Early

Early reports indicate a definite change of tone in Berlin. There is much less confidence, much less certainty that the "Allies" and Poland will back down, much less assurance that the British Cabinet is preparing another Munich. Military preparations continue and food and coal are rationed. The German Government has announced that if Switzerland, Belgium, Luxemburg and Lithuania remain neutral, their frontiers will be respected. The same guarantee has been given Lithuania by Poland.

It is announced that the BREMEN has turned back to Germany.

August 27, 1939.

RADIO REPORT: 12 noon

The British Cabinet completed its deliberations about 11 o'clock a.m. our time and the Prime Minister immediately went to Buckingham Palace in order to make a report to the King. It was announced that the Cabinet would meet again tomorrow (at 7 a.m.) and that Sir Neville Henderson would return to Berlin after this meeting. No communiqué was issued after the Cabinet session and Ministers, in order to avoid questioning, left through the Garden Entrance of No. 11 Downing Street.

Versions of Hitler's "suggestions" are being allowed to leak out in London, making it appear that Hitler demanded full satisfaction of Germany's claims against Poland as a condition precedent to an International Conference which would discuss disarmament and a return of Germany's colonies.

There was, too, an indication from well-informed circles that the British Government was in very close contact with President Roosevelt and was consulting with him regarding peace moves.

France is intensifying its war preparations. The Prime Minister has been holding continuous meetings at the Ministry of War with the chiefs of the French army and navy. A further order was issued to the population of Paris, warning all civilians whose presence in Paris was not absolutely necessary

necessary to prepare to leave the City at once.

From Rome came reports that Signor Grandi was leaving for London on a secret mission. These reports have not been confirmed, and Italy is now mobilizing.

The latest reports from Berlin indicate that the German Minister of Propaganda is preparing the German people for a rejection of Hitler's plan. Official word from the Ministry says that the British were evidently disinclined to clasp the hand which Hitler had extended and that the responsibility for what might happen must rest with them.

Late this morning the Japanese Embassy in London instructed all Japanese to leave Europe immediately.

August 27, 1939.

SPECIAL RADIO REPORT - 12:15 P.M.

German mobilization complete - 40 Divisions are massed on Polish frontier and 60 Divisions in the West.

Hitler has summoned a special meeting of Party leaders at the Reichstag.

In Paris it is said that, although Hess has warned that the German drive would be devastating, there are increasing rumors that there have been evidences of unrest among the people, particularly in the former Czech provinces, and that Herr Hitler is not entirely sure, in view of the firm Anglo-French stand, that a war could be successful. There is another unconfirmed rumor that there have been desertions from the German army.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

August 27, 1939.

RADIO REPORT - 3:30 P.M.

It has been reported from Rome that military preparations continue, but that the order for general mobilization is still being held in abeyance pending Sir Neville Henderson's return to Rome and the results of the Anglo-German negotiations. It continues to be believed in Rome that Mussolini is still able to save peace, but if all efforts fail, highly placed Italians reject the idea that Italy may remain neutral.

A semi-official statement issued in London stated that Britain would uphold the "letter and spirit" of the Anglo-Polish Pact. It is also reported that another message has been sent to the British Government from Germany today.

From Paris it is announced that a special German emissary arrived today bearing Herr Hitler's rejection of the French reply sent yesterday. Shortly afterward the American Ambassador called on the Premier. It was also announced that the Foreign Office has called a special meeting of all foreign correspondents at 10:00 o'clock tonight (4:00 p.m. Washington time).

It

STATES OF INDIA
CHIEF OF DEFENSE
CHIEF OF DEFENSE

It has been reported that the Turkish Foreign Minister informed the German Ambassador that Turkey would stand by its agreement with Great Britain.

An unconfirmed press despatch from Warsaw stated that a German patrol attacked a Polish factory across the frontier in Silesia but were repulsed by a Polish patrol.

CONFIDENTIAL

The following reports have been received from the War Department:

Military Attaché in Warsaw telegraphed at 4:15 Warsaw time that Poland has now 1,500,000 men under arms, comprising 30 regular and 30 reserve divisions, and some 1000 to 1200 first line airplanes.

The Military Attaché in Berlin telegraphed at 4:15 Berlin time that all military personnel, including foreign military attachés, have been requested by the German War Office not to leave Berlin without permission. It is believed in the mobilization commenced yesterday that the first stage will be completed by Tuesday. Movement of certain reserve units has also been observed and all active units now appear to be en route to battle position.

The

The Military Attaché in France telegraphed at 2:15 Paris time that fifteen divisions were reported on the French frontier and that there were now, counting reserves, 70 to 75 divisions under arms in Germany. France now has under arms in the metropolitan area and North Africa 2,300,000 men.

A radio news flash just received (4:30 p.m.) states that it has been officially announced in Paris that Herr Hitler has refused to negotiate with Poland.

August 27, 1939.

RADIO REPORT - 5:30 P.M.

Closing-hour rumors from London are to the effect that the British Government in its reply to Hitler will map out the basis for a general European solution and among other things will propose a six-months' truce. This, of course, is only rumor, and it is evident from their remarks that virtually no information has leaked out to the press and radio in the British capital.

In general, London was well satisfied that a day had been gained in the crisis and it was believed that Hitler was shaken in his position and might, if his face could be saved, be persuaded to accept a solution short of war.

All radio commentators agreed that as Sunday ended a subtle change had taken place in the atmosphere in London and the margin of possible escape from armed conflict was believed to be wider, although no one could give any specific reason for this conclusion.

Rome was filled with rumors that peace would be preserved. It was known that Mussolini was in close and regular contact with Hitler and with London, and

the

the belief was general that he was once again intervening as an intermediary to save the peace.

Incidentally, during Sunday afternoon, Mussolini cabled a reply to Premier Mackenzie King's appeal for peace to the effect that he would make every effort to preserve world peace.

In Paris it was believed that Britain and France now have taken the initiative and that Germany is beginning to be worried. The feeling persists that war can be averted but just how is not told. A communiqué was issued from the Ministry of War after the German reply was flown to Paris by a special agent of Herr Hitler. The communiqué said that the German Government had replied with a blank refusal to Premier Daladier's suggestion that Poland and Germany might work out directly a peaceful agreement. The communiqué continued, on August 25 at 5:30 Herr Hitler had summoned the French Ambassador in Berlin, M. Coulondre, to a meeting. The German Chancellor had described the "atrocities" which he said were being inflicted on the German population of Poland. He said that he could not tolerate a continuation of the situation with Poland, and in correcting this situation he might have to take measures which would result in German

and

and Polish blood being spilt. Subsequently, Premier Daladier replied through Ambassador Coulondre, emphasizing the desire of France for peace and telling of his efforts to work for an understanding between France and Germany. M. Daladier then suggested to Herr Hitler that he consider the possibility of mediation by a third party. He (Premier Daladier) could not believe that the German Government would wish a war to break out without an attempt at a peaceful solution. On August 26, Ambassador Coulondre was informed by Herr Hitler that he could not accept the suggestion of Prime Minister Daladier for mediation by a third party. This message was confirmed by Dr. Bauer, the German Chargé d'Affaires in Paris today.

There were also indications from the War Office that every preparation had now been made short of German mobilization. France was on guard waiting for Herr Hitler's next move.

The latest report from Berlin indicates a state of some uncertainty in the German capital. The German officials deplored the delay of the British in replying to the Chancellor's proposals and said that time was of the essence of the situation. Hitler was in very

close

[illegible]

-4-

close contact with Mussolini, directly by telephone and through the Italian Ambassador in Berlin and the German Ambassador in Rome. There was no let-up in attacks on Poland.

file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

August 29, 1939.

RADIO REPORT: 3:05 p.m.

N.B.C. has a report that Warsaw has accused Germany of an act of aggression against Poland as the occupation of Slovakia is a threat to Poland's security.

Eu:Coe:VEJ

PSF: Stala

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

September 2, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Historical precedent for excluding
foreign warships from certain Atlantic waters.

1. This is a preliminary report: further documentation follows. There is historical precedent for drawing a line well out in the Atlantic Ocean and requiring that foreign warships or military operations be not permitted within that zone.

2. The following precedents have been turned up thus far:

(a) November 30th, 1805, President Jefferson proposed to extend the neutrality of our territory at least to the Gulf Stream in response to an inquiry from (Senator) John Quincy Adams. (J. Q. Adams' Memoirs, Vol. I, pp. 375-376).

J. Q. Adams thought it advisable to

"squint at it and to accustom the nations of Europe to the idea that we should claim it in future."

(b) 1806: James Madison (Secretary of State) instructed Monroe and Pinckney to negotiate

with Great Britain for "neutral immunity" for a space between the coast and

"the natural indication furnished by the well-defined path of the Gulf Stream". (American State Papers: Foreign Relations, Vol. 3, p. 121).

(c) November 6, 1914, Peru proposed to Secretary Bryan

"joint action of all the American republics to guarantee the inviolability of their trade routes by freeing them throughout their extent from the effects of the hostilities of the belligerent naval forces".

Peru suggested a line

"equidistant from the other continents on both the Pacific and the Atlantic sides." (Foreign Relations, 1914 Supplement, p. 443).

(d) November 13, 1914, Chile informs us that Brazil had requested of Great Britain

"the establishment of a neutral zone in the Atlantic from the American coast to the meridian of Cape Verde, in order to prevent the serious disturbances which have been caused to the American maritime commerce by the present European conflict". (Ibid, 435.)

(e) November 18, 1914, Argentina proposed to us that the American republics authorize the Pan American Union to propose to the belligerents that certain sections of the southern Atlantic and Pacific be closed to naval warfare.

(f) December 3, 1914, Ecuador proposed

"an agreement of the American diplomats tending to induce the belligerents to declare the seas that wash the coasts of America a neutral zone so as to exclude from them entirely the warlike operations" (ibid, 694).

(g) December 22, 1914, the Acting Secretary of State (Lansing) stated his understanding that the Pan American Neutrality Commission would consider suggestions for guaranteeing immunity or neutralizing areas such as those described above.

The suggestion appears to have died there.

3. It is apparent that not only is there precedent in our history, but that there is ground for asking concurrence of the American republics, notably Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru. Apparently the only thing that stopped Jefferson from doing it in 1805 is the fact that we had not sufficient strength to enforce a zone thus laid down.

A. A. Berle, Jr.
A. A. Berle, Jr.

Sept 3, 1939

Memorandum to James Dunn--State Dept

From Gen Watson

Asks him to send the body of the attached telegram to our Chief de Mission in London, Paris, Berlin and Warsaw, Poland. This by direction of the President.

See: Watson folder-Drawer 1-1939

*James
State Dept
1*

file personal

PSF: State 1

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1939


My dear Mr. President:

With reference to our telephone conversation of last night, I am enclosing herewith a copy of the telegram I sent to Caffery with regard to the report we had received that German submarines were out in the Atlantic and asking him to remind General Goes Monteiro of the potential dangers we believed existed in the Island of Fernando Noronha. I am also enclosing a copy of Caffery's reply to my message.

With regard to the suggestion you made last night as to a practical way in which the War Department could make available some old guns to the Brazilian Government by selling them to some American citizen who would act as an intermediary, I have taken the matter up immediately with General Marshall in order to see how this may most easily be worked out.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures

The President,
The White House.

COPY

*"Coffery"
State*
1

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

August 31, 1939

NO DISTRIBUTION

AMEMBASSY

RIO DE JANEIRO (BRAZIL)

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE
UNDER SECRETARY.

Some time ago reports were received by this Government indicating that certain German interests possessed facilities on the Island of Fernando Noronha which might make it possible for that Island to be converted into a German submarine base in the event of the outbreak of a European war. During the visit here of General Goes Monteiro this possibility was discussed with him since the question would, of course, be one of immediate concern to the Brazilian Government as well as of concern to the United States and to every other American republic. Reports which have subsequently reached me persist in affirming that the information mentioned was well founded.

I have today received a secret report that eight ocean-going German submarines left German ports today for the Atlantic. I believe it would be well for you to mention these reports to Aranha and to General Goes Monteiro and to state that if I receive any additional information of a similar character, I shall at once communicate it to them through you.

HULL

RPF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C-1)

Rio de Janeiro

Dated September 1, 1939

Rec'd 1:50 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

282, September 1, 2 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR UNDERSECRETARY.

Your 162, August 31, 6 p.m.

Aranha tells me that since the return of Goss Monteiro additional troops have been sent to Fernando Noronha and that adequate measures will be taken to meet the situation mentioned in the first paragraph of your telegram.

CAFFERY

PEG

State Dept
Letter to Gen Watson
From Maurice Leon
September 13, 1939

Encloses memorandum which he hopes the General will bring to the attention of the President.

Memorandum relates to information which the late John Quinn, *dead -* friend of Mr. Leon, told him about the activities of Senator Borah and Judge Daniel F. Cohalan regarding their pro-german relations during the World War. President sent to Hull to read and return--his memo is attached.

See: Hull folder-Drawer 1-1939

OFFICE OF
THE COUNSELOR



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

Enclosed is a report of a conversation with the
Minister of Rumania ^{and with Mr. Hauman} from which you will see the ground
on which he claims the Rumanian Government acts in de-
taining the Polish officials.

We are awaiting a reply to a cable to Mr. Gunther
asking for information.

Those who have made an examination of the question
have reached the conclusion that the action of the
Rumanian Government is not a violation of international
law.

Yours very sincerely,

Enclosure:

Copy of memo-
randum.

The President

The White House.

Roosevelt

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE:

September 22, 1939.

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Radu Irimescu, Minister of Rumania, and Mr. Dunn.

COPIES TO:

The Minister of Rumania came in this morning by appointment, and stated that he had received telegraphic instruction from his Government to the effect that the assassination of Prime Minister Calinescu yesterday would not become the occasion of any internal disorder. His Government stated that the appointment of General George Argesanu as Chief of the Government was for the purpose of maintaining order with the support of the army, and in order to prevent any subversive elements in the country from taking advantage of the death of the Prime Minister for attempting to cause disorder. The Minister said that, in his opinion, Argesanu would be succeeded within a month or so by a civilian Chief of Government, who he thought would

- 2 -

would very possibly be either Tatarescu, up to recently Rumanian Ambassador in Paris, or the present Minister of Justice, Iamandi, who has the confidence of the important political leaders in the country.

The Minister stated that in his opinion there would be no internal disruption in Rumania at this time, which made him feel more comforted, as the Rumanian Government would no doubt have many questions arising from their relations with Germany and the Soviets to deal with at the present time. He said he felt that if Rumania were attacked, she would fight in defense, and in this respect he felt Rumania would be greatly aided by the advice and assistance in its staff work of the French military officers, who have been in Rumania for some time.

The Minister then spoke of the detention in Rumania of officials of the Polish Government. He said that the Germans had called the attention of the Rumanians to the proclamation issued by President Moscicki of Poland before leaving his own country to enter Rumania, in which he declared that the Polish Government, in leaving Polish soil, was proceeding to a country where they would be able to carry on the functions of the Polish Government in defense of its territory. The Germans claimed that as the entire military action of Poland was still under the direction of the Polish Government officials according to their own declaration, it would be unneutral for

the

the Rumanian Government to permit such activities. The Minister further said that the Rumanian Government had been perfectly willing to permit the Polish officials, with the exception of Smigly-Rydz, as head of the Polish Army, to leave Rumania if they would make a declaration that they were proceeding to a neutral country, but that in the face of the Polish President's declaration, they could not, as a neutral, permit the transit of the Polish officials through Rumania if they were proceeding to a belligerent country. He said that in the absence of a declaration to proceed to a neutral country the Rumanian Government was faced with the necessity of interning the Polish officials. The Minister went on to say in confidence that it appeared likely that Germany would declare the disappearance of the Polish state or its occupation of Polish territory, and the Rumanian Government would then be in a position to take the view that the Polish Government was no longer at war with the German nation and could release the Polish officials. This, I take it, was in the manner of a personal opinion of the Minister. He did say that the question of the action taken by the Rumanian Government with regard to the detention and internment of the Polish officials was done on the advice of the legal advisers to the Rumanian Government with respect to the maintenance of Rumanian neutrality.

The

The Minister then went on to say that it was the understanding of the Rumanian Government that the Germans and the Soviets, when they made their recent pact of non-aggression, had agreed upon certain spheres of influence in Northern Europe and in Southwestern Europe, which would be exercised by the respective Governments. His Government understood that as far as Rumania was concerned, that portion to the East and South of the Carpathian Mountains was to come under Russian influence, and that part West of the Carpathian Mountains, or Transylvania, was to come under German influence. He pointed out that the oil fields would thus be in the sphere of Russian influence, but he said that an arrangement had been probably agreed upon which would permit the Germans to have the delivery of the Rumanian oil for their use in the prosecution of the present war. He said that eventually he felt that the clash of Russian and German influences might very easily occur in Rumania, but that in his opinion there would be no violent disagreement between those two Powers, at least during the initial stages of the present war, that is, for perhaps at least a year. He thought, however, that it was inevitable that the old issues of Russia's desire to proceed South to the Dardanelles and Germany's plan to proceed East to Asia Minor would bring about a conflict between Russia and Germany at some time in the future.

Mr. Irimescu

- 5 -

Mr. Irimescu said that as far as the immediate question of Bessarabia was concerned, there was no occasion for the Soviets to claim any necessity to "protect" the Russians in Bessarabia, as, under the Rumanian law, the great landed estates had been divided and had been distributed to the peasants, and there could be no possible accusation of suppression of the Russians by the Rumanians in Bessarabia, or of oppression of minorities anywhere in Rumania.

James Clement Dunn.

*RW
a.b.g.
9/10/39*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5:30 a. m., Oct 8, 1939

The following is a paraphrased code cablegram received at the State Department:

Brussels, October 7, 1939, 5:00 p. m.
From Mr. Davies,
For The President and Mr. Hull.

Here the fear is great that either one or the other of the belligerents may possibly undertake imminently some action which will harden the situation, as it now stands, into a bitter, irrevocable, horrible and really long war. The possibility of an immediate assault by Germany on the Western front is not the only cause of this anxiety, but there is also the fear that the other side might destroy, by some precipitous action, the trembling bridge of peace which might yet be afforded by delay. Here people continue to cling desperately to the hope that time together with the development of some possibly unforeseen events, might avert the catastrophe to be averted before it is definitely and finally established.

I have been requested, in this, their darkest hour, by a high source to state that the President of the United States is the only person in the world who can possibly avert the holocaust. I have likewise been asked to say that they hope that somehow he might find a way of making again an effort of some sort similar to those noble ones which he has made in previous crises and which have so evoked the admiration of all the lovers of liberty throughout the world.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2

A special messenger bearing a dispatch in regard to this is following on the Clipper.

(Telephoned to H by Mr. Lyon in the Secretary of State's office.)

Boaz Long
U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 10, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Re: Crash of Ecuadoran Plane.

Information from the State Department is to the effect that yesterday they had instructed Ambassador Long to transmit written condolences to the President of Ecuador over the fatal crash of Ecuadoran Army plane. Ambassador Long was also instructed to state that the above condolences were transmitted under the express instructions of this Government.

The above action was in accordance with the State Department's practice of reserving personal condolences from the President for such major disasters as earthquakes, etc. Under the same State Department policy, matters of this instant nature are handled as stated above.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

State Dept

October 10, 1939

Memorandum for Sec of State from the President

Suggests Hull send telegram to Phillips to intimate at his convenience to the Papal Sec of State that the President is happy by the impartial printing of American News in the Osservatore Romano etc etc.

See: Italy folder-Drawer 1-1939

File 1

Three messages from Navy of October 20, 1939

1. Re-Submarine sighted off Daytona Beach--memo unsigned
rec'd at White House 8:30 P.M. by D. Long
2. Re-French Consulate message--signed Collins-rec'd at
White House 8:30 A.M. By D. Long
3. Re-Ermy Friedrich vessel-signed Collins--8:30 A.M. Rec'd
White House by D. Long.

Message of Oct 21, 1939

- (a) Re-German ships at Talcahuano only the Osorno appears
in condition to continue voyage etc.
- (b) Re H.M.S. Achilles-signed Bowers--7:30 P.M. rec'd by D. Long
at White House.

See: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 20, 1939

My dear Mr. Lewis:

With reference to your telephone conversation this morning with an officer of the Department, I take pleasure in informing you that, according to the latest information on file at the Department, the following are the present Members of the Permanent Court of International Justice:

M. Guerrero, President (Salvadorian).
Sir Cecil Hurst, Vice President (United Kingdom).
Count Rostworowski (Polish).
M. Fromageot (French).
M. de Bustamante (Cuban).
M. Altamira (Spanish).
M. Anzilotti (Italian).
M. Urrutia (Colombian).
M. Negulesco (Rumanian).
Jonkheer van Eysinga (Netherlands).
M. Cheng (Chinese).
Mr. Hudson (United States of America).
M. Ch. De Visscher (Belgian).
M. Erich (Finnish).

The composition of the Council of the League of Nations is as follows:

United

Mr. David Lewis,

National Railway Mediation Board,
Interior Building,
Washington, D. C.

- 2 -

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
France.
Italy (Italy's withdrawal from the League will become
effective December 11, 1939).
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Bolivia.
New Zealand.
Sweden.
China.
Latvia.
Belgium.
Iran.
Peru.
Dominican Republic.
Greece.
Yugoslavia.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Paul T. Culbertson

Paul T. Culbertson,
Assistant Chief, Division of
European Affairs.

file personal.

SUGGESTED ANSWER TO HITLER'S PROPOSALS

The Press is repeatedly publishing proposals accredited to Chancellor Hitler that the United States intervene to bring about peace. It is suggested that after feeling out the French and British Governments, the President consider the following proposal:

- FIRST. That the belligerents submit all their claims, disputes and contentions to the Permanent Court of International Justice, giving the Court plenary power to pass upon the same and to decide any subsequent questions which may arise in the premises.
- SECOND. That the Court shall have power, *pendente lite*, to declare such armistice or suspension of hostilities as it may consider desirable.
- THIRD. That the parties signatory to the agreement of submission solemnly undertake to accept and abide by the decisions of such Court as final and obligatory and to refrain from the use of any military measures in contravention of the Court's orders and decrees.

October 23, 1939.

*Caffery
still Asst*

Memorandum for Captain Callaghan

The President encloses a conf message from Amb Caffery at Rio de Janeiro regarding the ship DELNORTE observing submarine at entrance to Santos Harbor. Asks that Callaghan speak to him about this.

See: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939

Mr. Saugstad is in Secretary Hull's
office.

*file
Confidential*

PSF: State


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Oct. 29, 1939

~~DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS~~

For The White House

Following message telephoned by Coast Guard for
Mr. Saugstad (Department of State) at 5:15 P.M.
Oct. 29, 1939: "The following message from Air
Station Coast Guard St. Petersburg-British steamer
armed freighter on course 345 degrees speed 17 knots
was sighted forty miles west Cape Roman by sea plane
V1115 today" (Cape Roman is probably Cape Romano)


George M. Graves

*file
personal*

*PSF: State Dept
1*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 20, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum of October 17, 1939, I am enclosing a suggested letter for you to send to Minister Pell in reply to his letter to you dated October 4.

Faithfully yours,

Doyle

Enclosures:

1. From Mr. Pell,
October 4, 1939.
2. To Mr. Pell.

The President,

The White House.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION (FP)
BUREAU ()

ENCLOSURE

TO

LETTER DRAFTED _____

ADDRESSED TO

The President

Dear Bertie:

I have received your letter of October 4, 1939, applying for a transfer to the Ambassadorship in Germany.

Your statements regarding your special interest in the problems at this post under the present international situation have been noted and your desire for the appointment will be given careful consideration when the matter of sending another Ambassador to Germany is taken up.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Herbert C. Pell,
American Minister,
Lisbon.



Lisbon, Portugal
October 4, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

I have arrived here after a slow and interesting but not uncomfortable trip.

I have a great favor to ask of you. Just before I left the United States our Ambassador to Germany resigned. If you intend replacing him, I would be very much obliged if you would consider me for the position. Both Olive and I speak German and know Germany, and you know perfectly well that neither of us will go native. I would be particularly interested in the problem of the British prisoners. I believe that the war will last some time and I would like to develop among them some sort of an educational institution for their improvement. This would be most interesting to me and I trust that my services would be valuable to the country.

I was not able to discuss this with you when I was in America as I sailed immediately after Mr. Wilson's resignation.

Olive sends her love to you both. She also is

most/

most anxious for this promotion and as you know in this sort of business the wife of a representative is at least half the mission.

With our best regards to you and to Eleanor, and renewing the pledge I gave you in your office,

Faithfully yours,

Herbert C. Pell
Herbert C. Pell

The President,

The White House

HCP:DG

PSF: State Dept
1

October 24, 1939.

Dear John Wiley:-

Thank you for that most interesting
dispatch which you sent to me.

You and Mrs. Wiley are having lots
of excitement but you are doing a splendid job
under difficult circumstances. It is a great
comfort to have such a well equipped person as
yourself in such a critical spot.

My affectionate good wishes to
you both.

As ever yours,

Honorable John C. Wiley,
American Legation,
Riga,
Latvia.

*Missy & thanks him
very much*

Riga, Latvia, September 12, 1939


Dear Miss LeHand:

As an innovation, it might be interesting to show the President something that is neither urgent nor important. I enclose, therefore, copy of a despatch I have just sent the Department reporting a conversation with Burckhardt, ex League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig. Sidelights are sometimes more illuminating than floodlights, and Burckhardt spoke at length of his contacts with Hitler, Gauleiter Forster, etc. The enclosure has about the same tonnage displacement as an article in COLLIERS; light reading.

Irena was profoundly touched by the telegrams she received from the President and you when she got her citizenship. I'm glad, indeed, she's not dependent on Polish citizenship at this particular moment and in this part of Europe.

Now that Cassandra has been finally vindicated, but not Senator Borah, I hope that you can all survive this new deluge of work. It must be tremendous. Please give my respects and warmest regards to the President.

Yours sincerely,



Miss Margaret LeHand,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.



C O P Y
LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Riga, September 8, 1939

No. 476

Subject: Conversation with Dr. Burekhardt, ex-High
Commissioner of Danzig.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

To confirm my telegram No. 120, September 8,
11 a.m., I have the honor to report that the ex-
High Commissioner of the League of Nations at Danzig
dined with me last night. Dr. Burekhardt was in a
state of acute depression over the tragic outcome of
his mission in Danzig. His task had been that of
appeasement

appeasement and the prevention of war and he is in the painful process of searching his conscience to ascertain what, if anything, he had left undone; had he devoted his activities and talents to best avail?

He sought to bolster his spirits with the consolation that he had succeeded, at least, in retarding the march of events. Dr. Burckhardt explained that the German Government had definitely decided on a coup last June in Danzig. To save the situation, he had gone to Königsberg, where he had seen Gauleiter Erich Koch. He had pledged his word of honor to the Gauleiter that if Danzig were bruskiy re-incorporated in the Reich there would be war. Gauleiter Koch, deeply impressed, had shown considerable moral courage. At the risk of offending the Fuehrer and powerful Party elements, he had proceeded immediately to Herr Hitler and had laid Dr. Burckhardt's representations before him. An intermediary promptly brought back word to Dr. Burckhardt that the plans in question had been cancelled. Moreover, Dr. Burckhardt took particular pride in believing that he had been responsible for delaying the application of the Nuremburg Laws for more than a year.

Dr. Burckhardt recalled that his status in Danzig had been quite different from that of his predecessor, Mr. Sean Lester. The latter had been vested with authority to refer complaints directly to the Council of the League. Dr. Burckhardt was authorized only to report to the Committee of Three (Great Britain, France and Sweden). He had been urgently instructed to avoid ruffling the surface in any way. Lord

Halifax

Halifax had been particularly insistent in this regard. Thus Dr. Burekhardt was in Danzig only as a moderating influence.

Lord Halifax, he said, had showed the most detailed knowledge of Danzig affairs. When they met at Geneva, Lord Halifax would query him even with regard to the industrial production of individual factories, citing the exact figures for previous years. M. Bonnet, on the other hand, seemed to be extremely vague. At their last meeting M. Bonnet wondered: "How does one pass the evening there? Est-ce qu'il y a de jolies femmes la bas?" The French Foreign Minister also inquired whether there were many Germans in Danzig. "Why don't the Poles just throw them out?", he asked. Indeed, M. Bonnet's knowledge of the Free City was limited to the sole fact that there was a gambling casino at Zoppot.

To judge from Dr. Burekhardt's remarks, he led an active social life while High Commissioner in Danzig and had frequent and pleasant contact with Polish officials and society. He spoke very highly of the Polish Commissioner, M. Chodacki. He rented an extensive and excellent shooting place in Poland adjoining the Danzig frontiers; he also seems to have had considerable personal contact with high German officials whom he joined frequently in shooting parties. He evidently was on fairly close personal terms with Dr. Greiser, the President of the Danzig Senate, and with Gauleiter Forster, too. In his relations with Nazi leaders, however, he had constantly to swallow derisive allusions to the League of Nations, as well as rude pleasantries in respect of himself. These affronts, according

according to his story, he accepted with philosophic calm.

Dr. Burckhardt spoke at length with regard to his two interviews with Herr Hitler. He described Herr Hitler as being entirely feminine in character; eager to make his charm felt. Dr. Burckhardt pictured him as having the eyes of an archangel in a mask of vulgar clay. He was clearly impressed by the Fuehrer; he said that when he was with him he had the definite feeling that he was in the presence of a man of destiny; one who had qualities other than those common to humanity, but one who was possessed, tormented. Dr. Burckhardt reverted to Herr Hitler's feminine qualities, which he emphasized. He attributed to the Fuehrer the political ethics of a woman; a certain type of woman, one in quest of a fur coat.

Dr. Burckhardt felt convinced that Herr Hitler was very susceptible to outside influence and he deplored that France and Great Britain had not made more of an effort in this direction. The wrong type of men were sent to see him and not enough personal contact was sought. Some one like Herriot, for example, instead of people like Halifax, might have had a decisive influence on the Fuehrer's mind.

When they were together, Herr Hitler lamented to Dr. Burckhardt that he had had no opportunity to learn foreign tongues. With foreign statesmen he had been able to establish real contact only with M. Francois Poncet, who spoke German perfectly. The Fuehrer had liked the French Ambassador enormously. With all the others there had been either such inadequacy in their knowledge of German or such a barrier thrown up by the process of translation that real personal

personal contact had been impossible. This Herr Hitler continued, made it, of course, difficult to get a proper understanding of foreign countries. He was, however, beginning, only now, really to learn something about the United States. Captain Wiedemann, the Consul General at San Francisco, was sending him reports of a very "positive" nature.

Dr. Burckhardt's first interview with the Fuehrer was in 1937, in which the Fuehrer followed the classic procedure of such meetings; he did all the talking. At that time Herr Hitler announced to Dr. Burckhardt that the problem of Danzig was question No. 1. It would have to be settled first; all other questions, Austria, the Sudetenland, etc., would follow in their natural order. His second and last interview took place quite recently (August 11). It had been quite different; Herr Hitler, sad and depressed, not only listened but even seemed eager to hear what Dr. Burckhardt had to say. Dr. Burckhardt talked to him openly and frankly. He was able to warn the Fuehrer of the crushing responsibility that he personally would have to assume before history if war broke out.

Herr Hitler's face took on a terrifying aspect. He joined thumb and forefinger to within an imperceptible gap and said "If the Poles do only this, it is war". He added that if Great Britain insisted on having war, it suited Germany better for it to break out this year rather than next year. Nevertheless the Fuehrer finally agreed that the Danzig question should not be violently agitated, that trouble should not be provoked over the situation there.

At the close of their conversation the Fuehrer took Dr. Burckhardt by the arm and led him out on a balcony in order to admire the view. "Ach, ich möchte so in der Ruhe bleiben",* he said. Dr. Burckhardt retorted that the decision rested in his hands. "Nein, es gibt doch Notwendigkeiten".** At the close of their conversation it was understood between them that they should meet again the following week.

As an Austrian, Hitler had hated the Czechs. It had been Herr Hitler, not the Party, who had been the driving force in respect of the Sudeten Germans; who had carried matters to the extreme on March 15. In the matter of Danzig this was not the case. Dr. Burckhardt was convinced that Herr Hitler had not been propelled by any violent personal emotion against Poland. Actually, thought the High Commissioner, Herr Hitler, an Austrian, liked the Poles. He spoke frequently of "Pilsudski und ich" and seemed to have a warm regard for the late Marshal.

Herr Hitler made a curious and revealing statement to Burckhardt; he had been provoked into seizing all of Czechoslovakia because of an article in the French press by Pierre Cot (in substance that Prague was a perfect place whence to bomb Berlin). Dr. Burckhardt argued in reply that statesmen had to keep irresponsible press

* "Ah, I would so like to remain in peace."

** "No, there are still requirements (to be fulfilled)".

press utterances in their proper and inconsequential perspective, that he was surprised that Herr Hitler would be influenced by anything so unimportant. Herr Hitler answered vehemently that he was a leader of the people (Volksführer) and a proletarian, that anything that formed public opinion was to him far from inconsequential, it was reality. If, continued Herr Hitler, statesmen abroad could only realize how sensitive he was to humiliating foreign press calumnies he was sure they would do something to prevent them. If they had only done so in the past "I would have acted quite differently".

To revert to the Fuehrer's attitude towards Poland, Herr Hitler, in discussing his demands in respect of Danzig and the Corridor, spoke to Dr. Bueckhardt only of Danzig and extraterritorial communications across the Corridor. The Fuehrer had taken pencil and paper and had drawn a passage with Polish lines of communication traversing it either under or over. Herr Hitler's architectural leanings were apparently entirely engrossed by designs of how it could all be worked out. There had been no reference to or apparent interest in Upper Silesia, Teschen or other purely territorial questions.

Dr. Bueckhardt felt strongly that Herr Hitler in his Polish policy had been reluctantly propelled by radical elements within the Party, acting through Herr von Ribbentrop. Indeed, Herr Hitler, had attempted to resist. Gauleiter Forster told Dr. Bueckhardt that he had been present at an interview when Herr Hitler angrily told Herr von Ribbentrop that he "would not be driven in this way".

In

In fact, Dr. Burckhardt attributed to Herr von Ribbentrop the role of evil genius in the outbreak of war. When Colonel Beck visited Berchtesgaden he had left Herr Hitler "under the influence of his charm". Later in January when Herr von Ribbentrop returned from his visit to Warsaw, he gave the Fuehrer an entirely perverted and false version of his negotiations with the Polish Foreign Minister. Dr. Burckhardt firmly insisted that he spoke with definite knowledge. Herr von Ribbentrop had deliberately sabotaged any possibility which existed of composing Polish-German differences.

I asked Dr. Burckhardt if there was anything specific in the negotiations which had adversely tipped the scales. He replied that probably Commissioner Chodacki's note had exercised a bad influence on Hitler's mentality. The note was more or less in the form of an ultimatum. He thought that M. Chodacki himself was not responsible for it and had not really approved it. The note had probably been drafted and delivered on orders from Warsaw. Dr. Burckhardt made it evident that he had strongly disapproved of this Polish démarche in Danzig.*

Dr. Burckhardt stated that his final and supreme effort with Herr Hitler to avert the catastrophe, namely, a subsequent interview, had been prevented by a most unexpected

* M. Chodacki's note was delivered on August 4. It preceded Dr. Burckhardt's interview with the Fuehrer by one week.

expected and untoward incident. When he separated from Herr Hitler on August 11 it had been in an atmosphere of good will and mutual understanding, but the proposed second interview never took place. M. Bertrand de Jouvenal of the PARIS SOIR and CANDIDE had made it impossible.

M. de Jouvenal had visited Danzig with a personal friend of Dr. Burckhardt's. The latter invited them both to dinner. While at dinner Gauleiter Forster quite unexpectedly called Dr. Burckhardt to the telephone. He told him that the Fuehrer desired to see him at four o'clock the next afternoon. Dr. Burckhardt replied that it was too late in the evening for him to reach Berchtesgaden by the time indicated. Gauleiter Forster replied that the Fuehrer was sending a special plane for him. He added that the trip was to be made in the utmost secrecy and that news of it was under no circumstances to leak out. Dr. Burckhardt returned to the dining room and passed off his absence with an easy commonplace. After dinner he was again obliged to excuse himself in order to prepare cipher telegrams informing Colonel Beck, Lord Halifax and M. Bonnet of his approaching meeting with the Fuehrer. The following morning he flew to Berchtesgaden as arranged. M. de Jouvenal's journalistic suspicions had been aroused. Dr. Burckhardt subsequently learned that he had gone to the airport and by bribery had learned that a plane had arrived from Berchtesgaden and had returned thereto. He immediately

diately published the story, adding gratuitously that after the conference in Berchtesgaden Dr. Burckhardt would proceed to London. The fat was immediately in the fire and the horrible spectre of "appeasement" was raised; Dr. Burckhardt and Lord Halifax were in collusion to sell out the Poles. Dr. Burckhardt expressed the fervent wish that during the present war he would have occasion to meet M. de Jouvenal alone in a nice, dark trench.

Dr. Burckhardt gave numerous sidelights on the Fuehrer and Nazi ideology in the course of our conversation: Apropos of the new Reich Defense Council, headed by Field Marshal Goering, Dr. Burckhardt found that the vast authority vested in this body was very significant. It confirmed the High Commissioner's conviction that Herr Hitler was no longer the Fuehrer, he was now merely the German idol. Herr Hitler had gone through a prolonged Cromwellian phase; he now saw himself only in the guise of Frederick II. That explained why he was rushing to the Front; joining his troops.*

Gauleiter Forster was apparently outspoken to a cynical degree in his statements to Dr. Burckhardt. The latter quoted the Gauleiter as boasting that in the present war all the German reactionaries would be killed; they would be in the front line. "We," gloated Herr Forster, "will not be there." The Gauleiter also quoted the
Fuehrer

* Perhaps also why he regretted not speaking foreign languages. Frederick II spoke six.

Fuehrer as saying that only a victory could restore German self-respect and eradicate the inferiority complex produced by the Treaty of Versailles.

Another frank and interesting admission was made to Dr. Bueckhardt by the Gauleiter; that they were having trouble with the "little king", who was making difficulties. Gauleiter Forster said the Fuehrer was insisting that some way would have to be found to eliminate Victor Emmanuel.

On the subject of the German campaign in Poland, Herr Hitler declared that the German Army would encounter no serious difficulties. He explained to Dr. Bueckhardt that, of course, the German General Staff had knowledge of the plans of all their possible adversaries. The Czechoslovaks, for example, had prepared a good little plan for little people, realistic and practical. The Poles though had plans that could only be described as super-Napoleonic.*

In a generalization of the situation of Germany, Herr Hitler described the fundamental problem of the Reich as having

* It is interesting to compare this statement with the following passage from the DEFENSE OF BRITAIN by Liddell Hart: "Polish military doctrines, while refreshingly unconventional and more imbued with the idea of manoeuvre than those prevailing in western Europe, show an optimism which may be justified by the particular topographical conditions, yet raise a doubt whether her leaders have their 'feet on the ground' to anything like the same extent as the Czech General Staff, who talked a language of realism which was soberly impressive in comparison with most of the other military hierarchies of Europe?"

having to do only with wheat. This, the Fuehrer told Dr. Burckhardt, should require no territorial expansion in order to supply German needs. Unfortunately, though, every time Germany made a trade agreement, as, for example, with Rumania, Great Britain would intervene and destroy its effect. The result, he said, was that the problem of wheat could only be solved by "planting the German flag".

Dr. Burckhardt expatiated at length on the lack of "generosity" of Nazi Germans. What had pained him the most was the attitude taken by his Danzig servants during the last several days of his stay there. His butler had not only become insolent but domineering. His last night in Danzig had been very stormy. The noise of the bombing of the Polish Post Office had been deafening and he had only obtained a little sleep about five in the morning. At eight o'clock his butler pounded violently on his door and shouted "Heraus", to announce that the Gauleiter was there. Herr Forster entered and abruptly notified Dr. Burckhardt that his functions had ceased, that his presence was no longer desired and that he had two hours in which to leave Danzig. After this peremptory message, discourteously delivered, Herr Forster amazingly added, "I trust, however, that this will not interfere with our personal relations". Dr. Burckhardt turned his back, stating, "Between us there are no personal relations". Gauleiter Forster appeared hurt.

The Nazi guards had been in the High Commissioner's house

house all night. In anticipation of the end, Dr. Burckhardt had previously burned all of his confidential archives. When preparing for his imminent departure he picked up a dossier of unimportant private correspondence, one of the guards snatched it from his hands. He was unable to take any of his private manuscripts or papers with him. His household and personal effects, including his library, had to be left behind. A turbulent crowd swarmed into his house from the street. After some time the Nazi guards ejected them, but only when it was discovered that they were pilfering. As he left the house, there was a hostile demonstration by the crowd, shouting "death to the dog". He and his three cars were then escorted to the frontier by the SS. As his car pulled away a messenger had rushed to him and handed him a letter. When he subsequently opened it he found it came from the German Consul General. The letter expressed his deepest regret for what had happened. It had been done by Nazis, the Consul General explained courageously, and he kindly offered to do anything in his power to look after Dr. Burckhardt's abandoned possessions.

Some days before his departure Dr. Greiser had warned him confidentially that he should leave, that something nasty was being prepared for him. He communicated this warning to Geneva but decided that it was his duty to stay until the end. Dr. Burckhardt expressed great satisfaction, though, that he had been able to send off his wife in advance. She would never have been able to understand

or

- 14 -

or stand what had taken place.

As Dr. Burckhardt left my house he signed my guest book as "Burckhardt, le Zog du Nord".

In reviewing Dr. Burckhardt's remarks I can only suggest that he felt exaggeratedly that Danzig was the axis around which everything revolved and that he was inclined to ignore the larger forces which were at play. Perhaps, Dr. Burckhardt attached excessive importance to questions of diplomatic technique wherein he saw the final issue, war or peace, hanging on the tactical choice between rebuff and emollient. Finally, he failed to see the moral pointed by his own story; that in any difference which arose between Herr Hitler and Party hot-heads, it was the more radical thesis which prevailed.

I venture to add that Dr. Burckhardt spoke with warm praise and admiration of Consul Kuykendall; of his tact, alertness and sympathetic attitude.

Respectfully yours,

John C. Wiley

(In quintuplicate)

File No. 711

JCW/lmb

PSF:

State Dept
1

October 31 1939

My dear Mr. President:

I transmit as of possible interest a copy of
despatch no. 1921 of October 20, 1939, from the
American Embassy at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, setting
forth the difficulties encountered by the Embassy
and our consulates in Brazil in obtaining adequate
and accurate information with regard to the activi-
ties of belligerent vessels in Brazilian waters.

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

Enclosure:

Despatch no. 1921,
October 20, 1939,
from American Embassy,
Rio de Janeiro.

The President,
The White House.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

RA

ENCLOSURE
TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

The President

DUPLICATE

Rio de Janeiro, October 20, 1939.

No. 1921

Subject: Activities of Belligerent Vessels
in Brazilian Waters.

ORIGINAL AND THREE COPIES BY AIRMAIL -- CONFIRMATION
COPY BY STREAMER.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's circular telegram of October 17, 8 p.m., and to previous correspondence concerning the unsatisfactory reporting of the arrival and departure of belligerent vessels at ports where they have taken refuge.

The Department's interest in this subject is fully appreciated, and the Strictly Confidential Instruction of September 20th; Circular Telegram of September 29, 7 p.m.; Circular Telegram of October 11, 6 p.m.;

Telegram

Telegram No. 203 of October 14, 4 p.m., and Circular Telegram of October 17, 8 p.m., have been carefully noted, their contents communicated to all the consular officers in Brazil, and a particular endeavor made to effect compliance.

In order to appraise the situation and to understand why immediate reports have not always been furnished the Department on movements of German vessels, it should be noted that the coastline of Brazil is slightly longer than the American coastline from Passamaquoddy Bay to Brownsville, Texas. The coast is dotted with inlets and islands, and the delta of the Amazon, comprising a district larger than the State of South Carolina, has a labyrinth of deep water bayous, channels and outlets. At some points in vast areas along deep water, there are no inhabitants, no telegraph offices, no Brazilian Government stations, and no provision whatsoever for vigilance against unneutral activities.

An intelligent and determined naval power could perform unneutral acts in Brazil with considerable freedom. British intelligence work in reporting activities of German ships or German agents is somewhat obscure. This work appears casual and ineffective but it is possible that this impression is erroneous.

The Brazilian Government has every good intention to prevent unneutral activities, specifically the outfitting or supplying and fueling of German warships, submarines or armed raiders. The Navy, however, is woefully inadequate and while it maintains a patrol vessel

vessel at several of the larger ports, it is in no shape to conduct a thorough surveillance of belligerent vessels. Many more destroyers and airplanes would be required than Brazil can supply.

Brazilian naval officers are now detailed as Captains of the Port at Pará, São Luiz, Parnahyba, Natal, João Pessoa, Cabedello, Pernambuco, Maceió, Aracajú, Bahia, Ilhéos, Victoria, Rio de Janeiro, Santos, Paranaguá, Florianópolis, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande, and Pelotas.

The Brazilian Navy Department with much good will daily furnishes the Embassy telegraphic reports from these offices with respect to belligerent vessels. Their information, however, is neither prompt nor accurate. For example, the Port Captain at Rio Grande reported that the ship Rio Grande was not in that port. The Embassy had a contrary report from the Consular Agent, whereupon, after an exchange of telegrams, the Port Captain admitted his mistake. The Port Captain at Pará still declines to admit that the German ship Koenigsberg is at that port, although our Consul reports that it has been there several weeks.

As of October 19th, the most reliable reports give the following German ships in Brazilian ports:

Pará: KOENIGSBERG
WORDERNEY

Pernambuco: URUGUAY
BERTA FISHER
WOLFSBURG
SÃO PAULO
ENTRE RIOS

Bahia

Bahia: ANTONIO DELFINO
BAHIA
MACEIO
WOLEWER

Rio de Janeiro: LA CORUNA
WAKAMA
BAHIA BLANCA

Santos: BABITONGA
SANTOS

Rio Grande: RIO GRANDE
MONTEVIDEO

In an endeavor to report the activities of German ships, the Embassy checks with the General Staff of the Brazilian Navy, the Captaincy of Ports Service, and the Maritime Police Service. When it developed that none of these reports are trustworthy, the Naval Attaché has for the past several days taken a launch and personally covered the bay of Rio de Janeiro and checked on each German ship.

Since Brazil is in practice unable to prevent un-neutral acts, our offices cannot without large expense cover this long coast. I am sure the Department does not wish to employ a fleet of airplanes for this purpose.

A German submarine might conceivably obtain fuel during the night at any of the large Brazilian ports, and could do so at any time on the deserted portions of the coast. The Brazilian Government does not maintain watchmen on the German merchant ships. The Embassy checks with the large American oil companies which furnish most of the fuel oil and Diesel oil to ships in Brazil. However, oil could be obtained clandestinely
from

from smaller Brazilian companies handling Mexican oil, or oil from the refinery at Rio Grande, or from previously arranged secret stores. Several Panamanian tankers bring oil from Aruba to Brazil and a close check is kept to avoid their fueling German ships at sea.

I have endeavored to picture the difficulties of maintaining the accurate check desired by the Department and since the Brazilians are helpless effectively to guard their coasts and harbors, I shall await further instructions as to how far the Department wishes me to go in taking over patrol work and employment of agents. A more satisfactory information service could be had by the employment of, say, six agents to travel over Brazil, with ample allowance to cover launch hire and particularly air travel. A tentative allotment of \$5,000 per month would be necessary. Even then, no guarantee whatsoever can be given as to detection of unneutral acts, but at least the arrival and departures of German merchant ships could accurately be learned.

The German Embassy at Rio de Janeiro is the center of German Maritime Activities in Brazil. A force of about eighty people is employed at that office. The French efforts towards protection of commerce are merged with those of the British and are in themselves negligible.

The coastline of Brazil offers good facilities for fueling, provisioning, and outfitting raiders or warships. It has been reported to the Department that several of the larger German merchant ships on the South

American

American run carried compartments for storage of torpedoes and repair parts for submarines.

I have endeavored to put the possibilities of this situation frankly at the worst, but without exaggeration, before the Department. However, as a matter of fact, I am of the opinion that thus far there has been very little of unneutral activity on the part of German shipping in Brazilian waters. Also, I am of the opinion that the Embassy will eventually be able to bring about a slightly more reliable Brazilian reporting service than now exists.

The Uruguayan and Argentine coasts are not as difficult to patrol as that of Brazil, but the region around Punta Arenas affords numerous hiding places where warships could refit much in the same manner as they could be refitted in the Amazon delta.

It is assumed that the Department's interest is chiefly in the activities of German ships, and that reports need not be rendered on the normal entries and departures of British and French merchant ships at Brazilian ports. These ships generally pick up their convoys off the respective ports. There is nothing to prevent their fueling or supplying British warships outside the ports and probably this is currently done.

Respectfully yours,
For the Ambassador:

William C. Burdett,
Counselor of Embassy.

File No. 711
WCB:JLW

FAST



RCA

DIRECT



RADIOGRAM
R.C.A. COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
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1939 NOV 4 AM 9 20

LC THE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

RESPECTFUL BRAVOS

WILEYS

*John Wiley is
Minister
of Estonia & Latvia*

*P.S.
to prepare reply*

State - 1

Telephone: National 2600

Form 111WN—TD 142

To secure prompt action on inquiries, this original RADIOGRAM should be presented at the office of R.C.A. COMMUNICATIONS, Inc. In telephone inquiries quote the number preceding the place of origin.

State Dept
1

November 9, 1939.

Memo for the President from Cordell Hull

Attaches map and memo by Moffat on situation
relating to Belgium and Holland in event of possible
German invasion.

See: Cordell Hull folder-Drawer 1-1939

IN RE REFER TO JKD/ek.
FILE NO. 800.1



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Oslo, Norway, November 10, 1939.

The President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. President,

I wish to express the deep gratitude of myself and of the officers and clerks of the Warsaw Consulate General for the generous commendation contained in your kind letter of September 27, 1939. We all feel very greatly honored and encouraged.

Very respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John K. Davis".

John K. Davis,
American Consul General at Warsaw,
(Temporarily in Oslo).

FOR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
PR 123 D 292/587

December 9, 1939

My dear Miss LeHand:

With reference to the letter of September 27, 1939, which the President addressed to John K. Davis, Esquire, American Consul General at Warsaw, who is temporarily in Oslo, I am enclosing herewith a reply from Mr. Davis expressing his appreciation and that of the officers and clerks of the Warsaw Consulate General for the President's commendation.

Sincerely yours,

E. H. Renshaw
Chief of Protocol.

Enclosure:
Letter from Mr. Davis.

Miss Marguerite A. LeHand,
Private Secretary to the President,
The White House.

Copy

November 11, 1939

State Dept

Memorandum for Sumner Welles

Please speak to me about the Brazil
plan to service her foreign debt. See Caffery's
despatch # 392, November 10.

F. D. R.

See: Sumner Welles folder-Drawer 1-1939 for
original of the above memo.

State Dept
1

November 20, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This has to do with a conference called in compliance with your suggestion to consider Bullitt's cable re:aluminum.


Edwin M. Watson

Attaches memo to him from H. E. Collins-Procurement Div-Treasury
Re:conference about aluminum.

See: Bill Bullitt folder-Drawer 1-1939

Uusi Suomi 30.4.39.

Kusi Suomi 30.4.33





Helsingin Sanomat
20. 11. 39.



Kuorot Amerikan lähettiläälle laulamassa. — Yhdistyneiden ministeri Schinert kuuntelee laulua.

ORDER OF PRECEDENCE
IN THE PRESENTATION OF THE
FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC CORPS
TO THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. ROOSEVELT
AT THE DIPLOMATIC RECEPTION
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1939

The Ambassador of Peru
The Ambassador of the Argentine Republic
and Señora de Espil
The Ambassador of the Turkish Republic
and Madame Ertegun
The Belgian Ambassador
The Ambassador of Mexico
and Señora de Castillo Nájera
The Ambassador of Poland
The Ambassador of Ecuador
and Señora de Alfaro
The Ambassador of Cuba
The Ambassador of the French Republic
The Chinese Ambassador
The Japanese Ambassador
and Madame Horinouchi
The Ambassador of Brazil
and Madame Martins
The Ambassador of Venezuela
The Royal Italian Ambassador
and Donna Lily Colonna
The Ambassador of Panama
and Señora de Bory
The Ambassador of Chile
and Señora de Cabero
The Ambassador of Spain
and Señora de Cárdenas
The Ambassador of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
and Madame Gumsansky
The British Ambassador
The Ambassador of Colombia

The Minister of Sweden
and Madame Boström
The Minister of Guatemala
and Señora de Recinos
The Minister of Portugal
and Madame de Bianchi
The Minister of Hungary
and Madame Pelényi
The Minister of the Union of South Africa
and Mrs. Close
The Minister of Uruguay
The Minister of Norway
and Madame Munthe de Morgenstierne
The Minister of El Salvador
and Señora de Castro
The Minister of Greece
The Thai Minister
and Madame Abhibal Rajamaitri

The Minister of Lithuania
and Mrs. Zadeikis
The Minister of Yugoslavia
and Madame Petitch
The Minister of Latvia
and Madame Bilmanis
The Minister of the Dominican Republic
and Señora de Pastoriza
The Minister of Bulgaria
and Madame Maounoff
The Minister of Costa Rica
and Señora de Castro Beccho
The Minister of Bolivia
and Señora de Ganchalla
The Minister of Czechoslovakia
and Madame Hurban
The Minister of Haiti
and Madame Lessot
The Minister of Nicaragua
and Señora Doña de De Bayle
The Minister of Rumania
and Madame Irimescu
The Minister of Ireland
and Mrs. Brennan
The Minister of Egypt
and Madame Hassan
The Minister of the Netherlands
and Madame Loudon
The Minister of Finland
The Minister of Honduras
and Señora de Crocora
The Minister of Denmark
and Madame de Kruiffmann
The Minister of Canada
The Minister of Switzerland
and Madame Bruggmann
The Minister of Paraguay
and Señora de Fernández

The Chargé d'Affaires of Germany
The Chargé d'Affaires of Iran

The Acting Consul General of Estonia
and Madame Kaly

State, Dept

December 22, 1939.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM THE PRESIDENT

RE***Soviet Restrictions against American citizens connected
with the Diplomatic Corps

See: Russia folder-Drawer 1-1939



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
RA 832.911/49

December 22, 1939

My dear Miss LeHand:

The signed photograph of the President which you sent to the Department with your letter of August 2, 1939 for transmittal to the Brazilian Press Association was officially placed in the Hall of Honor of the Associação Brasileira de Imprensa in Rio de Janeiro on December 6.

You may be interested in bringing to the President's attention the address made at the ceremony by Dr. Aranha, the Foreign Minister. A copy of a despatch of December 8 from the American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro containing the text of Dr. Aranha's address is enclosed.

As you will see, the Foreign Minister's remarks were extremely eulogistic of the President. I have it from an independent source that Dr. Aranha's hearers were deeply moved

Miss Marguerite A. LeHand,


Personal Secretary to the President,

The White House.

-2-

moved by the sincerity of his laudatory references
to the President.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "A. Nelson". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "A" and a long horizontal stroke.

Enclosure:

From Embassy, Rio de Janeiro,
No. 2189 of December 8, 1939.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

RA

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

Miss Marguerite A. LeHand

DUPLICATE

Rio de Janeiro, December 8, 1939.

No. 2199

Subject: Placing of President Roosevelt's
Photograph in the Hall of Honor
of the Brazilian Press Association.

ORIGINAL & THREE COPIES BY AIR MAIL --- CONFIRMATION
COPY BY STEAMER.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report to the Department that the autographed photograph which President Roosevelt presented to the Brazilian Press Association (Associação Brasileira de Imprensa) last July was officially placed in the Hall of Honor of the new Press Building in this city before a capacity audience at a ceremony on December 6th.

Many prominent Brazilians were present on this occasion, including Dr. Oswaldo Aranha, Minister for

Foreign

Foreign Affairs, Dr. Afranio de Mello Franco, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, representatives of the Brazilian press, et cetera, and also the Argentine and Mexican Ambassadors. Dr. Herbert Moses, President of the Brazilian Press Association, opened the meeting with eulogistic remarks about President Roosevelt and the traditional friendship which exists between Brazil and the United States. He was followed by Dr. Belisario de Souza, one of Brazil's leading newspapermen, who likewise highly praised President Roosevelt and the "Good Neighbor Policy created by him."

1/ I also made a short address on that occasion (copy
2-3/ enclosed) and was followed by Dr. Oswaldo Aranha who made an extremely laudatory speech (copy and translation enclosed) exalting the personality and character of the President and his friendship for Brazil.

The ceremony in connection with President Roosevelt's photograph was widely covered by the Brazilian press, as
4/ shown by the set of enclosed newspaper clippings.

Respectfully yours,
For the Ambassador:

William C. Burdett,
Counselor of Embassy.

Enclosures (4)

1. Copy of Ambassador Caffery's address.
2. Copy of Dr. Aranha's address.
3. Translation of same.
4. Set of newspaper clippings.

File No. 891
TAX:LEF.

A true and
correct copy
of the original
is attached
KSJ

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 2189 of Dec. 8, 1939.
From the American Embassy at Rio de Janeiro

Address made by Ambassador Caffery at the Brazilian
Press Association on December 6, 1939.

It is to me a high privilege to accept the invitation of the Associação Brasileira de Imprensa to attend this distinguished gathering, and it is especially gratifying to witness this manifestation of friendship toward my country. This ceremony speaks for itself to a degree where words are unimportant. Your placing in your Hall of Honor the picture of the Chief of State of the country I represent is an eloquent expression of your goodwill and friendship to my fellow Americans and a tribute to the statesman who has so fervently labored for the doctrine of inter-American cooperation.

We are facing grim realities in our overseas relations. I know that we will not falter and that our common ideals will be upheld. President Roosevelt dedicated himself to the ideal of goodwill in the Americas. It has been the cornerstone of his policy, but it is obvious that without cooperation no successful solution of our problems can be reached. Through his voyage to this country and the splendid reception he received, he has the privilege of friendship with its statesmen and a firsthand knowledge of its problems. The happy relations with your great country have made possible a significant era in the progress of inter-American friendship.

With the gravest of problems to overcome and definite principles to uphold, he believes that democracy and peace, as expressed in the Conferences of the American Republics, mean a common interest and a common objective. With the world in turmoil our two countries can face the future in confidence.

This ceremony is a high honor to my country and to its President. I desire to acknowledge it and to express the high appreciation of it. May the ideals which prompted the Associação Brasileira de Imprensa to show this significant mark of esteem continue to flourish and may the Associação continue under its distinguished President to fulfill the high duties of public service which it has so happily carried on in the past.

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 2189 of Dec. 8, 1939
From the American Embassy at Rio de Janeiro

Source: Correio da Manhã
December 7, 1939.

Portuguese text

"É lamentável que, na Casa do Jornalista, um Ministro de Estado venha sofrer imposições ... Mas é a realidade, que tenho de confessar sem protestos, submettendo-me á vontade sempre impositiva do Presidente da Associação Brasileira de Imprensa.

Depois do que já ouvimos, poucas palavras posso acrescentar. Quero apenas registrar aqui, e agora, as minhas impressões no decurso desta solemnidade - de que a Associação Brasileira de Imprensa está homenageando um dos melhores e maiores homens da nossa época e que merece o maior respeito de todo o universo, não só como Presidente dos Estados Unidos da America do Norte, porque todos os Presidentes dos Estados Unidos sempre mereceram a amizade e applausos dos brasileiros, orientando, como orientaram, a acção de seu país conjugadamente com a acção do Brasil, mas especialmente pelas raras virtudes que tem revelado, quer na direcção de seu paiz, quer na de sua propria vida.

O Presidente Roosevelt é, sem duvida um exemplo: basta contemplar o esforço moral que movimenta o seu physico, para evidenciar ser elle um predestinado dentro de si mesmo. Suas ideias e seus actos fazem-no creator do apreço de seus concidadãos e de admiração de quantos apreciam o poder da vontade na manifestação suprema e na suprema conquista, pelo dominio sobre si mesma, sobre a sua propria vida e sobre os grandes destinos dos Estados Unidos da America do Norte.

Só tenho razões para congratular-me com a Associação Brasileira de Imprensa pela homenagem que recebeu do Presidente Roosevelt, traxida por um dos membros desta Associação - o seu retrato, homenagem que S. Ex. prestou com segura certeza e convicção: por certo vós que conheceis a lingua inglesa, sabeis que só um homem que bem quer expressar seus sentimentos de affecto para com o nosso paiz, pode escrever nesse idioma, "Brasil", com "S".

Essa homenagem com que o Presidente Roosevelt distinguu a Associação Brasileira de Imprensa merecia esta honra, fazia jus a estas demonstrações. Depois de seu retrato ser incorporado áquelles outros que figurarão na Sala de Honra e na galeria desta Associação, como dignos de sympathia dos jornalistas brasileiros, seja elle sempre olhado não apenas como um devotado amigo do Brasil e como um "leader" que mais amplitude, extensão e significação deu á ideia pan-americana, mas sobretudo como um dos homens que nesta hora, melhor podem, com os demais homens de boa vontade espalhados pela America e pelo mundo, salvar as futuras gerações de desastres que as gerações actuaes, em momentos de locura, e de ambição, preparam para os destinos humanos."

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 2189 of Dec. 8, 1939.
From the American Embassy at Rio de Janeiro.

Source: Correio da Manhã.
December 7, 1939.

English translation

It is distressing that, in the Casa do Jornalista (Press Building) a Minister of State should be imposed upon... However, it is the truth and, I must confess without protest, I am submitting myself to the ever-imposing will of the President of the Brazilian Press Association.

After what we have just heard, there is little I can add. I only wish, here and now, to express my impressions of this occasion - that the Brazilian Press Association is paying tribute to one of the best and greatest men of our age who deserves the highest respect of the entire world, not only as President of the United States of America, since all the Presidents of the United States have always deserved the friendship and applause of the Brazilians, orientating, as they have done, the action of their country in common accord with the action of Brazil, but more especially because of the rare virtues which he has revealed, in the guidance of his country as well as in his private life.

President Roosevelt is, without doubt, an example: it is sufficient to contemplate the moral effort which directs his actions, to find assurance that he is predestined within himself. His ideas and his actions make him deserving of the esteem of his countrymen and of the admiration of all those who appreciate will-power in its supreme manifestation and in its supreme conquest, through self-control and in the direction of his own life as well as that of the great destiny of the United States of North America.

I have every reason to congratulate myself as well as the Brazilian Press Association for the tribute which it received from President Roosevelt through one of the members of this Association - his photograph - a positive and convincing tribute; surely all of you who know the English language realize that only a man who wishes to express his sentiments of affection for our country can write "Brasil" in Portuguese with an "s".

This tribute with which President Roosevelt distinguishes the Brazilian Press Association, deserved this honor and justified these demonstrations. After his photograph has joined the others who will appear in

the

the Hall of Honor and Gallery of this Association, as deserving of the esteem of the Brazilian Journalists, let him always be regarded not only as a devoted friend of Brazil's and as a leader who has given the greatest scope, extension and significance to the Pan-American idea, but above all as one of the men who, at this moment, can, with the rest of the willing men throughout America and the world, save the future generations from the disastrous fate which the present generation, in moments of insanity and ambitions, is preparing for human destiny.

Stella report

EL EMBAJADOR DE CUBA
WASHINGTON.

December 22, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

Although I hope to have the pleasure of paying my respects to you soon after Christmas, I beg leave to express my sincere thanks, as Ambassador and as a Cuban, for the generous cooperation extended to my Government by your Government during the negotiations of the Supplementary Trade Agreement signed in Washington on the 18th instant.

On that occasion I shall transmit to you, in person, the message of thanks and gratitude of my Government with which I have been entrusted.

With my very best wishes for a happy season, I remain, my dear Mr. President,

Respectfully and sincerely yours,

Pedro Martinez Fraga
Don. Pedro Martinez Fraga

His Excellency
Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 29, 1939

In reply refer to
PR

My dear Miss LeHand:

With reference to the President's memorandum of December 27, the note from the Cuban Ambassador addressed to the President does not require an acknowledgment. Accordingly, the note is returned herewith.

As soon as the Ambassador shall have made a request to be received by the President, I shall immediately communicate with General Watson.

Sincerely yours,

E. E. Cummings
Chief of Protocol

Enclosure:
Original note addressed to
the President by the Cuban
Ambassador.

Miss Marguerite A. LeHand,
Private Secretary to the President,
The White House.

RECEIVED
JAN 28 1940
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C.



Department of State

PR

BUREAU
DIVISION

ENCLOSURE
TO

Letter drafted 12/28/39

ADDRESSED TO

Miss LeHand

RADIO BULLETIN - 7 o'clock

At 5:45 the National Broadcasting Company reported contrary to expectations that the Soviet Parliament had failed today to ratify the Soviet-German Pact of Non-Aggression and postponed action thereon until later in the week.

Switzerland was reported to have mobilized today.

It was said that the Duke of Alba had given Great Britain and France assurances that Spain would not permit the use of her territory by Germany or Italy for air bases in the event that war should break out.

Sweden and Finland were reported to have dropped out of the Sterling Bloc.

(Up to 7:00 p.m. there has been no further news of importance over the radio. Due to atmospheric conditions difficulties are being experienced in getting broadcasts through from Europe.)

State Dept.

To the President from Sumner Welles---November 1939

Draft regarding proposed transfer of certain American
Ships of American registry to a Foreign flag--states
his conclusions.

See: Neutrality folder-Drawer 2-1939