

Map Room Files.

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BOX 169. (Continued)

2. A-16/3 WARFARE -- PROTECTION OF CONVOYS: June, 1942 - August, 1943.

Includes Report of the Atlantic Convoy Conference: March

1 - 12, 1943.

A16-3 (Protection
of Convoys)

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

August 26, 1942

Memorandum for the President

Via: Admiral Leahy

Subject: Implementation of TORCH and of NORTH RUSSIA Convoys -
Simultaneously - during September-October 1942.

Reference: Your oral instructions of August 20th (P.M.).

1. The matter of implementing both TORCH and the NORTH RUSSIA Convoys - simultaneously - during September-October 1942 has been duly "explored" in accordance with your instructions, in order to develop what reductions and/or cessations would ensue with respect to convoys in the Western Atlantic Area (west of 26° W.).

2. The requirements as to simultaneous implementation of TORCH and of NORTH RUSSIA Convoys can be met - with the exception of 10 DD (5 new, 5 old) - if the following premises are accepted:

- (a) North Atlantic trade convoys and the Iceland shuttle will continue as before, since ships must go to the UK, and must be kept running to Iceland to join PQ Convoys there.
- (b) South Atlantic Task Force is reduced to three old light cruisers. This will result in virtual isolation of Brazil, and very heavy losses in shipping on routes to the Near East, Persian Gulf and India, as well as in the heavy traffic which Great Britain proposes to divert from the West African route to our waters.
- (c) Panama Canal Area loses all destroyers. This weakens the defense of the Canal and may result in heavy losses in traffic between U. S. and Panama.
- (d) Service Force convoys must be discontinued. These now supply Caribbean Bases (Army and Navy), Bermuda (civilian, as well as Army and Navy needs) and

*Iceland to
Russia*

Regraded Unclassified

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

August 26, 1942

Memorandum for the President

Via: Admiral Leahy

Subject: Implementation of TORCH and of NORTH RUSSIA Convoys -
Simultaneously - during September-October 1942.

Iceland. Fuel and provisions probably can be moved to Iceland in trade convoys and by independent sailings, but ship losses will be high.

- (e) It will be impossible to escort routine Army Caribbean convoys or any special Army movements.
- (f) Coastal and Caribbean convoys will be kept in operation with reduced escorts. These have to be kept running to move oil, bauxite and other vital cargoes. Reduction in escort forces will be as follows:

EASTERN FRONTIER loses 11 DD
GULF FRONTIER. No loss. Retains 2
Sound School DD.
CARIBBEAN FRONTIER loses 8 DD.
PANAMA FRONTIER loses 5 DD.

Egging
H. J. KING.

Al6-3(Protection of
Convoys)

July 23, 1942.

CROSS-INDEX SHEET

From: United States
To: Japan

For message from M. STALIN to the PRIME MINISTER
dealing with the necessity for continuing convoys
to Russia via the Northern Route, see file

Al6-3(U.S.S.R.)

While the continued operation of convoys is essential
to our war effort, the full protection of convoys is essential
possible, such a plan is being developed by the Navy.

A16-3 (Protection of Convoys)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

CSWD
July 14, 1942
1940Z

PRIORITY

From: London
To : Agwar

No. 358, July 14, 1942

Recent message from COMINCH to Admiral Stark in Russian convoys contained inquiry as to practicability of operating British or American air units at Murmansk. This has been exhaustively discussed with British Air Force and with General Spaatz. We unanimously agree that the project, under the conditions existing, is not repeat not feasible. From Eisenhower to General Marshall. The principal purpose of this move would apparently be to operate against German air fields in Northern Norway, since bomber types could not operate effectively against enemy bombers actually attacking our ships. Unless bombers were preceded into Murmansk by supply and maintenance Echelons and by pursuit and antiaircraft they would be destroyed, probably immediately upon landing. The situation without strong Russian assistance, which in view of experience with last convoy they are unable to give, would be much worse than that encountered by our air units in Java. The only way that British or American fighters and antiaircraft could enter Murmansk would be by convoy which would be almost impossible unless carrier based planes in considerable numbers could be provided for protection during transit. We assume it impractical to furnish carrier based planes in any number since if this could be done there would be no critical need for land based planes.

While the contemplated temporary diversion of strength would, in my opinion, be fully justified if effective results appeared possible, such a promise does not exist in this case.

Admiral Stark fully concurs in these conclusions and requests you furnish a copy to Admiral King.

Eisenhower

ACTION COPY: OPD

INFO. COPY: G-2 A-2 CG AAF TAG COMINCH LOG FILE
CM-IN-4916 (7/14/42) 2233Z

28

237 JUL 14 '42
COPY No.

SECRET

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COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I return herewith your memorandum of July 7th with the following comment.

I am in entire accord with your view as to the advantages of escorted convoys.

I have established convoy systems, beginning with the most dangerous areas, as acquisition of escort vessels permitted. I have used vessels of every type and size that can keep up with the ships they guard. I have accepted the smallest escorts that give promise of a reasonable degree of protection. So far the following convoy systems have been placed in operation:-

January	Special troop convoys in and beyond U.S. waters.
15 May	Halifax to Boston and Long Island Sound.
15 May	Norfolk to Key West.
1 July	Key West to Trinidad via Aruba.
6 July	Panama to Key West.
7 July	Aruba to Halifax (British tankers with Canadian escorts).

These convoys are a step in the right direction, but we are still at a disadvantage in the following respects:-

(a) Escorts are unduly weak, consisting of a too large proportion of small craft with little fighting power.

(b) Only medium speed (nominally 10-knot) convoys are at present possible. 15-knot and faster ships normally proceed independently. Very slow ships are, where possible, moved from port to port in daylight with a token escort of small craft.

(c) There are no regular convoys at present to Gulf ports, but it is expected that 83-foot cutters will become available in the near future for this service.

(d) Small craft now used in the Caribbean frequently cannot keep up with convoys against the trade wind.

(e) A dangerous concentration of unprotected shipping exists in the open sea beyond Trinidad.

(f) The smaller craft now extensively used in escort service will not stand winter weather in the North Atlantic.

My goal - and I believe yours also - is to get every ship under escort. For this purpose we (the United States and Great Britain) need a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

July 9, 1942

very large number - roughly 1000 - sea-going escort vessels of DE or corvette type. I am doing my best to get them quickly.

E. J. King

RW
D.C.S

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL KING

Please read the enclosed and return for my files.

This furnishes excellent proof of what I have been talking about for many weeks. You will note that in the Canada-Greenland area where very few merchant ships are sailing independently three were lost between May 17th and June 27th, and five sailing under escort were lost in the same period.

On the other hand, off the U. S. Atlantic coast, thirty-three merchant ships sailing independently were lost and only four were lost under convoy in the same period.

So also in the Gulf of Mexico -- thirteen ships sailing independently were lost and only one under ~~convoy~~ *escort*.

In the Caribbean sixty-nine sailing independently were lost and ten under escort.

The grand totals also bear out my constant pleas -- one hundred and eighteen ships sailing independently were lost as against twenty under escort.

I still do not understand the long delay in making all ships sail under escort.

I realize the problem of making up escorts for convoys but about three months have elapsed since we undertook it. I also realize that strict observance of convoy rules will slow up voyages of many ships but, frankly, I think it has taken an unconscionable time to get things going, and further I do not think that we are utilizing a large number of escort vessels which could be used, especially in the Summer time. We must speed things up and we must use the available tools even though they are not just what we would like to have.

FDR F. D. R.

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Office of Naval Intelligence
Op-16-P-10

July 4, 1942

MERCHANT VESSEL LOSSES: WEEKLY

ATLANTIC OCEAN WEST OF THE 30TH MERIDIAN

<u>Off Canada & Greenland</u>	<u>Sailing Independently</u>		<u>Sailing under Escort</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
May 17-23	2	2,441	-	-	2	2,441
May 24-30	1	1,188	-	-	1	1,188
May/Jun 31-6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jun 7-13	-	-	4	19,556	4	19,556
Jun 14-20	-	-	1	5,627	1	5,627
Jun 21-27	-	-	-	-	-	-
Totals	3	3,629	5	25,183	8	28,812
<u>Off U.S. Atlantic Coast</u>						
May 17-23	6	27,947	-	-	6	27,947
May 24-30	6	34,319	-	-	6	34,319
May/Jun 31-6	10	42,451	-	-	10	42,451
Jun 7-13	2	13,367	-	-	2	13,367
Jun 14-20	4	16,481	2	14,298	6	30,779
Jun 21-27	5	22,298	2	8,617	7	30,915
Totals	33	156,863	4	22,915	37	179,778
<u>Gulf of Mexico</u>						
May 17-23	4	22,512	-	-	4	22,512
May 24-30	2	11,608	-	-	2	11,608
May/Jun 31-6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jun 7-13	2	21,659	-	-	2	21,659
Jun 14-20	2	5,161	1	7,117	3	12,278
Jun 21-27	3	14,779	-	-	3	14,779
Totals	13	75,719	1	7,117	14	82,836
<u>Caribbean</u>						
May 17-23	16	78,605	-	-	16	78,605
May 24-30	12	45,147	1	1,828	13	46,975
May/Jun 31-6	12	63,357	1	5,446	13	68,803
Jun 7-13	10	48,404	7	41,542	17	89,946
Jun 14-20	12	52,469	1	5,010	13	57,479
Jun 21-27	7	47,183	-	-	7	47,183
Totals	69	335,165	10	53,826	79	388,991
<u>TOTAL</u>						
May 17-23	28	131,505	-	-	28	131,505
May 24-30	21	92,262	1	1,828	22	94,090
May/Jun 31-6	22	105,808	1	5,446	23	111,254
Jun 7-13	14	83,430	11	61,098	25	144,528
Jun 14-20	18	74,111	5	32,052	23	106,163
Jun 21-27	15	84,260	2	8,617	17	92,877
GRAND TOTALS	118	571,376	20	109,041	138	680,417

NOTES: A merchant ship is regarded as sailing under escort when accompanied by one or more surface combatant vessels or patrol craft.
For a few vessels known or believed to be lost it has been necessary to estimate the date and place of sinking.
Two (2) merchantmen sunk West of the 30th meridian but South of the Equator are included in the tabulation for the Caribbean above.
The above figures, particularly for recent weeks, are subject to revision as more information becomes available.

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MERCHANT VESSEL LOSSES: WEEKLY

Division of Naval Intelligence
Op-16-F-10

ATLANTIC OCEAN WEST OF THE 30TH MERIDIAN

June 28, 1942

1942	Off Canada and Greenland		Off U.S. Atlantic Coast		Gulf of Mexico		Caribbean		TOTAL	
	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons	No.	Gross Tons
Dec/Jan 28-3	2	7,603	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	7,603
Jan 4-10	1	5,851	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5,851
Jan 11-17	5	19,855	5	32,101	-	-	-	-	10	51,956
Jan 18-24	8	43,501	12	74,154	-	-	-	-	20	117,655
Jan 25-31	2	7,889	7	49,039	-	-	-	-	9	56,928
Feb 1-7	2	11,487	11	83,970	-	-	-	-	13	95,457
Feb 8-14	3	19,268	3	20,611	-	-	-	-	6	39,879
Feb 15-21	1	7,965	9	46,888	-	-	16	80,595	26	135,448
Feb 22-28	4	26,220	9	55,139	-	-	15	82,035	28	163,394
Mar 1-7	1	5,112	7	38,454	-	-	16	35,316	14	78,882
Mar 8-14	-	-	14	67,404	-	-	6	41,611	20	109,015
Mar 15-21	-	-	16	108,190	-	-	2	15,121	18	123,311
Mar 22-28	1	8,620	9	61,951	-	-	-	-	10	70,571
Mar/Apr 29-4	-	-	12	69,483	-	-	2	12,485	14	81,968
Apr 5-11	-	-	13	90,721	-	-	6	32,614	19	123,335
Apr 12-18	1	3,696	9	48,616	-	-	6	43,887	16	96,199
Apr 19-25	-	-	12	63,343	-	-	2	10,689	14	74,032
Apr/May 26-2	-	-	6	32,547	-	-	6	42,005	12	74,552
May 3-9	2	10,779	8	42,027	6	27,022	8	31,617	24	111,445
May 10-16	7	33,665	8	39,750	4	31,603	13	70,273	32	175,291
May 17-23	2	2,441	6	27,947	4	22,512	16	78,605	28	131,505
May 24-30	1	1,188	6	34,319	2	11,608	13	46,975	22	94,090
May/Jun 31-6	-	-	11	44,360	-	-	15	78,270	26	122,630
Jun 7-13	4	19,556	2	13,367	2	21,659	17	89,946	25	144,528
Jun 14-20	1	5,627	6	30,779	2	8,677	12	54,769	21	99,852
Jun 21-27	-	-	3	15,343	-	-	5	30,190	8	45,533
TOTALS	48	240,323	204	1,190,503	20	123,081	166	877,003	438	2,430,910

NOTES: The above figures, particularly for recent weeks, are subject to revision as more information becomes available.

For a few vessels known or believed to be lost it has been necessary to estimate the date and place of sinking.

Two (2) merchantmen sunk West of the 30th meridian but South of the Equator are included in the tabulation for the Caribbean above.

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MEMORANDUM BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE

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1. I have taken action - or will take action - as follows on the recommendations of the conference:

(a) A.C.C.-1 (Command Relations) and A.C.C.-2 with A.C.C.-2/1 (Convoy and Escorts) have been referred to the high commands concerned recommending concurrence and implementation, with some minor modification in the case of A.C.C.-2.

(b) A.C.C.-3 with A.C.C.-3/1 (Air Support) has been referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

(c) A.C.C.-4 (Training) is hereby referred to the high commands concerned for consideration of the recommendations and such action as they may desire to take.

(d) A.C.C.-5 (Communications and Operational Intelligence)

(1) I will present recommendations A-3 and C-1 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the suggestion that they be referred to the Combined Communications Board for study and recommendation as to implementation.


(2) Attention of the Admiralty and Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa, is hereby invited to recommendation B-1.

(3) Recommendation D-1 has been submitted to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Chief of the Canadian Air Staff for consideration.

2. The conference report will be brought to the attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as follows:

(a) A complete copy of the conference report is being delivered to each member of the C.C.S. and to the Secretariat.

(b) A digest of recommendations and resulting action will be furnished for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.


E. J. KING

Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
Chairman of the Conference

Distribution of complete report:

To Members of C.C.S.	CinCLant Fleet (1)
Admiral Leahy (1)	CTF 24 (1)
Field Marshal Dill (1)	Comdr. 4th Fleet (1)
Admiral Noble (1)	Eastern Sea Frontier (1)
Air Vice Marshal MacNeece-Foster (1)	Gulf Sea Frontier (1)
General Marshall (1)	Caribbean Sea Frontier (1)
General Arnold (1)	A/3 Survey Board (2)
Secretariat (2)	COS US Army (3)
To Others:	Army A/3 Command (1)
CinC, U.S. Fleet (8)	BAD for distribution (12)
VCNO (Op-12) (1)	Canadian Delegation for
NTS (1)	distribution (9)

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ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

BRIEF

At the suggestion of the Canadian Naval Service Headquarters, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet proposed to the Admiralty and Naval Service Headquarters that a conference be held in Washington to discuss operational control of North-western Atlantic Trade Convoy Escort Forces and other convoy problems. This proposal was accepted and delegations were appointed. These met in Conference in Washington at 1000 on March 1, 1943, with representatives of the United States Navy, the United States Army, the War Shipping Administration, the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Royal Canadian Air Force present.

Short addresses outlining the reasons, purposes, and aims of the Conference were delivered by the senior members of the delegations.

Sub-committees were then appointed to study and report upon the main problems to be considered. These are covered in six reports together with recommendations for implementation. These reports covered:

COMMAND RELATIONS

Reported in A.C.C. 1

CONVOY AND ESCORTS

Reported in A.C.C. 2, with recommendations for implementation in A.C.C. 2/1

AIR SUPPORT FOR ATLANTIC CONVOYS

Reported in A.C.C. 3, with recommendations for implementation in A.C.C. 3/1

TRAINING AND MATERIAL READINESS OF OPERATIONAL ESCORT GROUPS

Reported in A.C.C. 4

COMMUNICATION AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Reported in A.C.C. 5

COORDINATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SUB-COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

Reported in A.C.C. 6

On March 12, 1943, the Conference, having completed its agenda and having made recommendations for the implementation of the various reports, adjourned.

H. M. Wilson
 H. M. WILSON,
 Commander, R. N.

J. G. Mackinlay
 J. G. MACKINLAY,
 Commander, R. C. V. R.

J. F. Bowling
 J. F. BOWLING,
 Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
 Secretary.

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5. Communications and Operational Intelli- gence.....	ACC5
6. Coordination and Implementation of Sub- Committee Reports.....	ACC6

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ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

Attending Conference

UNITED STATES

U. S. Navy - Cominch

Admiral E. J. King, USN	Cominch
Vice Admiral R. S. Edwards, USN	CofS
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, USN	DCofS
Rear Admiral J. L. Kauffman, USN	Allied A/S Board
Rear Admiral W. R. Funnell, USN	ACofS(R)
Rear Admiral M. K. Metcalf, USN	DC&R
Rear Admiral W. S. DeLany, USN	ACofS(O)
Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, USN	Prosop. ACofS(O)
Captain W. C. Wickham, USN	C&R Section
Captain D. P. Moon, USN	Plans Division
Captain F. P. Thomas, USN	Plans Division
Captain J. M. Haines, USN	ASW Officer
Captain M. B. Gardner, USN	Plans Division
Captain P. K. Fischler, USN	Op. Officer
Captain C. R. Todd, USN	Readiness Division
Commander B. C. McCaffree, USN	SeaFron Section
Commander J. P. W. Vest, USN	Allied A/S Board
Commander H. H. Smith-Hutton, USN	Operations Division
Lieut. Comdr. W. R. Edsall, USN	Operations Division
Lieut. Comdr. J. D. McKinney, USN	C&R Section
Lieut. Comdr. J. F. Bowling, USN	Secretary
Lieutenant D. H. Northrup, USNR	Assistant Secretary

U. S. Navy - Other

Vice Admiral R. M. Brainard, USN	CTF-24
Vice Admiral A. Andrews, USN	ComEastSeaFron
Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, USN	Director, WTS, OpNav
Rear Admiral O. C. Badger, USN	Director, OpNav Logistic
Captain S. B. Robinson, USN	Plans Div.
Captain H. M. Mullinix, USN	Operations Officer, ISF
Captain A. F. Carter, USNR	Air Operations Officer, ESF
Captain A. H. Balsley, USN	Head of Fuel Sect. WTS, OpNav
Captain A. G. Shepard, USN	Operations Off. CaribSeaFron
Captain S. H. Ingersoll, USN	Operations Off. Cincant
Commander J. K. B. Ginder, USN	N.A.S., Anacostia
Commander C. C. Wood, USN	ASW Off. GulfSeaFron
Commander J. F. Goodwin, USN	Asst. Operations Off. CTF-24
	Operations Off., Comsant

U. S. Army

Major General C. P. Gross, USA	Chief of Transportation
Brig. General W. T. Larson, USA	Comdg. Gen. AAF A/S Command
Brig. General J. E. Upston, USA	OPD, WDGS
Brig. General E. L. Eubank, USA	Hqtrs. AAF
Colonel G. C. McHenry, USA	Hqtrs. AAF
Colonel Donald Lyon, USA	Hqtrs. AAF
Lieut. Col. R. D. Meyer, USA	Army Transportation Service
Lieut. Col. I. L. Branch, USA	AAF A/S Command
Lieut. Col. E. D. Reynolds, USA	Army Liaison - ASW
Dr. E. L. Bowles	Representative of SECWAR

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CANADIAN MOST SECRET

UNITED STATES

War Shipping Administration

Mr. J. E. Cushing

GREAT BRITAIN

Admiralty

Admiral Sir Percy L.H. Noble,	Head of B&D, Washington
KCB, CVO	
Vice Admiral Sir Henry R. Moore,	Vice Chief of Naval Staff
KCB, CVO, DSO	
Rear Admiral J.M. Mansfield, DSC	Allied A/S Board
Captain H. W. Morey, R.N.	B&D, Washington
Captain G. R. Waymouth, R.N.	Deputy Dir. Signal Dept.
Commander H. M. Wilson, R.N.	B&D, Washington
Commander H. C. Burton, R.N.	Staff Officer, Trade Div.
Commander N. W. Dixon, R.N.	Staff Officer, Opr. Div.

Coastal Command, R.A.F.

Air V. Marshal A. Durston,	CofS, Coastal Command
CB, AFC	
Group Capt. J.W. Herer, R.A.F.	Coastal Command
Group Capt. C.W. Dicken, R.A.F.	Coastal Command

CANADA

Royal Canadian Navy

Rear Admiral V.C. Brodeur, RCN	Canadian Member, CJS
Capt. H. G. DeWolf, RCN	Director Plans Div.
Capt. H. N. Lay, RCN	Director Operations Div.
Capt. W. B. Creery, RCN	Chief of Staff, COMC
Comdr. J.G. Mackinlay, M.C.	Canadian Liaison Off., Cominch

Canadian Air Force

Air V. Marshal N.R. Anderson,	Air Staff Member, Air Council
RCAF	
Air V. Marshal, G. V. Walsh,	Air Force Member, CJS
M.B.E.	
Group Capt. A.P. Campbell, RCAF	Senior Staff Officer, East.
	Air Command
Group Capt. M. Costello, RCAF	Deputy Air Member, Air
	Staff (Operations)
Wing Comdr. H.M. Hendrick, RCAF	Signals and Communications

A.C.C. 1st Meeting

ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

Minutes of Meeting

Held at Washington, D. C.
On Monday, March 1, at 1000

1943

It seems to me that so much of our time is spent in discussing the Atlantic, but that the Pacific has potentialities for submarine difficulties. In my view, not only should you recognize this fact, but remember that the development of such potentialities may well require transfer of anti-submarine units to the Pacific where they are now surplus to the point of confusion.

While this conference was originally called at the suggestion of Vice Admiral Bell, for the purpose of exploring the questions, the operational control of the northwest Atlantic convoys and propagation of radio direction finding lines in the western North Atlantic, it has, since the 1st of March, "just grown," until we now have the opportunity of giving much needed consideration to anti-submarine warfare throughout the Atlantic.

The topics for discussion are:
1. Russian convoys.

2. Study of the Atlantic convoy routes and assignment of available assets.

3. The air support of convoys and the coastal defense of the Atlantic.

4. Exploration of the meaning of recent reports.

Some other matters of importance are: (a) the size of convoys, (b) the size and composition of escort groups, (c) air cover, (d) search and ship losses. You need not consider yourselves bound by this agenda. Any representative feels that there is any one of you should be free to deal in order that the recommendations of this conference may be as complete as possible. It is to be noted that the number of convoys running in the Atlantic is now stabilized. It is believed to be in the vicinity of 100. This is a very difficult problem to solve, but due to the problems of British trade it is a very difficult problem.

While not perhaps directly related to the above, it is suggested that there should be some of the points of departure and arrival of convoys with suggestions as to traffic control in the ports. For instance, the port of New York is one of the most congested ports in the world. There is plenty of evidence

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1. OPENING ADDRESS BY ADMIRAL KING

ADMIRAL KING opened the Atlantic Convoy Conference by an opening speech as follows:

I am glad to welcome to this conference you officers who have the grave responsibility of exploring our capabilities for waging war against the U-boats.

I note that there are representatives of the Royal Navy, Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Royal Canadian Air Force, the United States Army, and the United States Navy.

It seems to me important to take note at once that we here are concerned with the Atlantic, but that the Pacific has potentialities for submarine difficulties. In my view, not only should you recognize this fact, but remember that the development of that potentiality may well require transfer of anti-submarine means to the Pacific where they are now menager to the point of obsolescence.

While this conference was originally called at the suggestion of Vice Admiral Helleo, for the purpose of exploring two questions, the operational control of the northwest Atlantic escorts and promulgation of radio direction finder fixes in the western north Atlantic, it has, as we said of Topsy, "just growned," until we now have the opportunity of giving much needed consideration to anti-submarine warfare throughout the Atlantic.

The agenda includes consideration of:

Russian convoys.

Re-study of the Atlantic convoy routes and assignment of available escorts.

The air support of convoys, and at the special request of the Admiralty,

Exploration of the training of escort groups.

Some other matters of importance are: (a) the size of convoys, (b) the size and composition of escort groups, (c) air coverage, shore based and ship based. You need not consider yourselves bound by this agenda. Any appropriate topic that occurs to any one of you should be duly raised in order that the recommendations of this conference may be as comprehensive as possible. It is to be hoped that the number of convoy routes in the Atlantic is now stabilized. Each addition is all too obviously not only another difficult problem in itself, but adds to the problems of existing routes that are already difficult.

While not perhaps directly germane to your instructions, note should be taken of the points of departure and arrival of convoys with suggestions as to traffic control in the ports. For instance, the port of New York is now congested beyond its harbor capacity. There is plenty of evidence

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that many ports of arrival cannot unload ships in a reasonable time after they arrive.

On our side of the Atlantic I propose to raise at once the matter, for instance, that cargo and troops destined for the United Kingdom and for Iceland and for Russia be loaded in New York and Boston. Hampton Roads and Chesapeake area shall be used for loading cargo and troops that are going into the Mediterranean. That Charleston be used for South America and the West Indies. And New Orleans for the Canal Zone, and so on.

On the West Coast it is more or less automatic now that everything bound for Alaska goes via Seattle, but that particular allocation, or that principle of allocation of cargoes and troops to be loaded in certain ports may well enter into your consideration.

I take upon myself the privilege of offering some advice as to how you should go at the matters in hand. You cannot consider anti-submarine warfare as divorced from the rest of the war effort. You must keep in mind the broad military decisions that have been approved by the Prime Minister and the President upon which every phase of warfare must be based. And you must not fail to take into consideration the principle of areas of national responsibility which have been established for good and sufficient reasons.

Obviously, our objectives cannot be attained if the U-boat menace is not checked. This is recognized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff who have laid down the principle "that the defeat of the U-boat must remain the first charge on the resources of the United Nations." Thus we see that the High Command recognizes that the anti-submarine war is a matter of first importance; but we must also recognize that the defeat of the U-boat is not of itself the goal we seek, however much it is an essential step in reaching the goal. May I add the observation that your immediate task is to protect our shipping by what may be called defensive anti-submarine warfare.

At the present critical time we must use our limited anti-submarine resources defensively in order to maintain the flow of shipping that is essential to the general aims of the war.

It is a fact, for reasons with which you are all familiar that we cannot devote all our resources to fighting submarines while we defer the rest of the war to a future time when it would be easier to handle. We have got to devote our somewhat limited overall resources only in part to fighting the submarines. This makes it necessary that we use what we have to the very best advantage.

The aim we seek is unification of effort. You all know in a general way the meaning of unified effort, but when it comes to details of organization there is bound to be divergence of opinion. I hope you gentlemen will not find it impossible to reconcile such differences as you may have in this matter.

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May I caution you not to think that unity of command is a panacea for all military difficulties or that it is the sine qua non of unity of effort. Unity of Command in appropriate circumstances does unify the effort, but inappropriate centralization of command produces only the form and not the substance of unified effort. Personally, I do not see how all of the war effort even in any one area can be premised on anti-submarine warfare alone. A point upon which I have very strong personal opinion is the avoidance of mixed forces. It is a great pleasure to work with our Allies, and we can always learn something from each other, but, nevertheless, I have had what to me is conclusive proof that these advantages are more than nullified by the handicap of effort that is inherent when forces of different nations with different customs and systems of command are brigaded together.

I recognize, of course, that when we are faced with the necessity for stretching our fighting resources to the limit it is not always feasible to avoid mixing ships and units. But insofar as it is possible we should give each nation an area of responsibility in which the operating forces are all of that one nation.

I have heard something about "killer groups" which may be of great use when we can get enough means, provided they are used directly in connection with the convoy routes, for that is where the "bait" is. I see no profit in searching the ocean, or even any but a limited area, such as a focal area--all else puts to shame the proverbial "search for a needle in a haystack."

Let me say again, by way of emphasis, that anti-submarine warfare for the remainder of 1943, at least, must concern itself primarily with the escort of convoys.

We are particularly honored by the presence here of Admiral Noble. His long experience as Commander in Chief of the Western Approaches has given him an exhaustive knowledge of anti-submarine warfare. I have been most anxious for him to give you gentlemen the fruits of his experience, and I have asked him to present a general talk on anti-submarine warfare. I am glad to say that he has consented. I will now turn the conference over to Vice Admiral Edwards, who will preside for me, while you go to work on the many subjects that you have to consider.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS remarked:

"I should like to say, first of all, that everything that goes on in this conference must be kept entirely secret. Furthermore, I wish to call your attention to the fact that the Admiralty has requested that there be no publicity as to the fact that there is a conference going on, either now or afterwards. Please be sure that nothing leaks into the press about this."

ADMIRAL EDWARDS introduced ADMIRAL NOBLE.

2. ADDRESS BY ADMIRAL NOBLE

Commander in Chief, and Gentlemen: as you all know, Vice Admiral Moore has been sent over from the British Admiralty

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to be the Admiralty's representative at this conference. Therefore, my talk, which will be brief, will be in general terms.

To my mind, the greatest factor in the successful prosecution of this war is shipping. The conservation of shipping, therefore, is, as your Commander in Chief has stressed in his opening remarks, of the very greatest importance.

Too much shipping is in danger of being destroyed. And at this moment the situation is causing anxiety to all concerned. A ship sunk with its valuable cargo, very probably produced with such care in this country, for the general use of the United Nations, prolongs the war. On the other hand, the safe arrival of a ship at its destination must shorten the war. Those are very simple facts, but they are the bedrock of why we are all meeting together to see if we can counteract this submarine menace.

The submarine menace, to my mind, is becoming every day more and more an air problem. We haven't had enough aircraft during the last two years. We are just reaching a point where we see ahead of us the chance of getting enough, and I am sure that this conference will come to some agreements and decisions as to how to best use these aircraft when we get them and when they get to their proper operational theaters.

My experience is that provision of air cover is the only way to enable a slow moving convoy to escape a pack of U-boats which has been following it. The aircraft causes the U-boats to submerge, thereby allowing the convoy to use evasive tactics.

Another point which I think sometimes one forgets is that if you lose a lot of ships out of a convoy, apart from the loss of valuable shipping and even if we are building more shipping between us then we are losing, the effect on the morale of the merchant navy must not be lost sight of. It is a tremendously important factor and one can imagine on a very stormy dark night when sometimes ten or fourteen ships in a particular convoy are sunk and a lot of lives lost, that it must have some effect on the morale of the other men in the ships that sail with it. It is like sending an unarmed man out into war, and human nature being what it is, I think it is wonderful how they have stood up to it and are standing up to it now.

To my mind there is no sign of any shaking of morale, but it is a thing to be thought of always.

So much for the air which, as I still say, will become the main feature of killing this U-boat.

The surface escorts have two essentials which are necessary in my opinion; the training of the individual crew in the use of the intricate instruments which are being improved every day, and which are for the use of detecting a submarine, whether on the surface or whether under the water; and, secondly, the training of a group like a football team to work together, to learn each other's tactics and to study how best a group should use the instruments I have just mentioned.

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If this training can be achieved, and if these groups could be kept intact, then as the number of escorts being built over here grows as the months go on, it might be more possible to achieve that very much to be desired end. In our particular sphere we have tried very hard to do it, and when we have been able to, the results have been most apparent. Just taking a team picked at random and sending them out has sometimes led to disaster.

I welcome the formation, if I may say so, of this new Anti-submarine Board. I am sure that the officers selected are going to be the beginning of a very great advance towards a common policy in all of these matters. They will have the advantage of the latest advice from every country which is fighting this problem. I am sure that Admiral Moore, when his turn comes, will tell you many points that he has brought over with him from the Admiralty. I look upon it as a compliment to have been asked to speak upon this and I hope that the work of this conference will have a result which will bring improvement to the whole method of tackling this problem.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS introduced ADMIRAL BRODEUR.

3. ADDRESS BY ADMIRAL BRODEUR

Thanks for welcome to Conference on behalf of C.N.S. and C.A.S.

Canadian Representatives thank Admiral King for his very encouraging remarks regarding Commands of mixed units.

At the very beginning of this Conference we Canadian representatives wish to state emphatically and frankly that we are here primarily to assist and help in finding the most permanent solution to the submarine menace first in the Atlantic and elsewhere. And for this purpose, we are bringing our full cooperation in every sense of the word.

This Conference is to a very great extent due to repeated requests from the Canadian Naval authorities who have felt for sometime past that the very best A/S effort was not being made especially in the North Atlantic because of the present complicated chain of authorities operating convoys and A/S operations in that area which we feel is not producing maximum efficiency with the limited number of escort ships and aircraft available.

The principal reason for Canadian authorities to request this conference was first of all to clarify and improve the present complicated chain of Commands in existence in the Northwest Atlantic. And therefore it is with very great disappointment that we Canadian representatives observe from the proposed agenda that the most important subject, i.e., that of operational control in North and Northwest Atlantic, is not included. It will be remembered that the above subject was included as the first item to be discussed in all communication on this Conference.

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I must point out to the Conference that the main reason why Canadian representatives are here today was to discuss and settle that most important question and on behalf of the C.M.S. and the C.A.S. I request that the proposed agenda be so altered as to include this item.

If this important question of operational control is not discussed first, it is not seen how items 9, 10 and 11 can be discussed fairly and properly.

Expecting that the Conference will agree to this addition to the agenda, the following proposals with reference to North Atlantic convoys for A/S protection are hereby tabled by the Canadian representatives:-

1. A N.A. area to be established and defined as the area north of 40°N. In this area control of convoys and A/S warfare be exercised solely by British and Canadian authorities (except U.S. sea frontiers.)
2. The present C.O.A.C. to become C. in C., N.W. Atlantic and to have general direction of all surface and Air Force employed in A/S warfare in N.W. Atlantic.
3. Control of convoys, U-boat information, diversion of convoys to be exercised in N.W.A. by M.S.H.Q. and control exercised by M.S.H.Q. and C. in C., N.W.A. to be similar to that by Admiralty and C. in C. W.A. in N.A.

The main reasons for Canada making this proposal are very strong and are as follows:-

- (a) Today Canada provides a large proportion of escort vessels on N.A. convoys and provides an even larger proportion of escort aircrafts. In addition Canada possesses up to date, fully equipped sea and air bases for the purpose. Therefore we are fully qualified by quantity and quality to assume that responsibility and, in addition, we have 3 years of experience at that very special type of operations.
- (b) From the beginning of this war, Canada's aim has been to expand her Naval and Air Armed Forces as efficiently and as rapidly as possible in order to play a very definite role in the North Atlantic as well as other war theaters and the war production programme has been laid down accordingly.

And finally I wish to impress this most important fact about Canada which appears to be so little understood, that is, that all Canadian armed forces are under the control of one, only one, higher authority which is the Canadian Government and only by the latter's consent can armed forces be moved from Canada or from one theatre of war to another and if all sub-committees studying the present agenda will remember that very important factor, a great deal of time will be saved and many misunderstandings avoided.

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In conclusion, I wish to assure you we have come here with one very definite aim and that is to give our fullest cooperation to any scheme that will destroy the present submarine menace, and we consider the very best way to obtain that result is by first placing the operational commands on sound efficient bases.

4. REMARKS AND DISCUSSION.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS remarked:

"In order to clear up any misunderstanding, I will read the agenda for this conference. It was sent out by despatch to all concerned, but, apparently, did not reach Canada, and may not have reached some other addressees. Item One is the operational control of escorts in the Northwest Atlantic area, including aircraft of North Atlantic bases. Two, is the Russian Convoys. Three, is study of escorts available in the Atlantic. Four, is study of necessary Atlantic convoy routes and escort requirements for those routes. Five, assignment of escorts to meet convoy requirements. Six, air support of Atlantic convoys. Seven, unification of control of convoy and escort arrangements in the Northwest Atlantic. Eight, need for training of operational escort groups; and nine, control of information disseminated by civil agencies regarding convoys and ship movements. Number nine has been added since the despatch was sent out.

"The Canadian Air Force representative will now make a few remarks."

Remarks by AIR VICE MARSHAL ANDERSON:

"We are much indebted to the C.I.C. U. S. Navy, for extending an invitation to the Royal Canadian Air Force to attend this conference. We have in the past year supported the Royal Canadian Navy to our utmost ability in giving support to the protection of convoys and sweeps against U-boats in the Northwest Atlantic, and we have found it a great pleasure, not only to afford protection to our own British ships, but, also, United States vessels which may be going through our area, when that is called upon. We have had very pleasant acquaintances with Com-TaskFor 24 at Argentia in operations which are very closely allied to our area in trying to coordinate these operations, and I must say that as far as we're concerned, we have the bases, we have the aircraft that can do the ordinary patrol and protection that is required, we think, in the extent of some 13 squadrons, that will be operating this year in that area. The only thing we lack is very long-range ability to cover the mid-ocean points to coastal command, where the U-boats are now concentrating their attacks, and we'd like, if possible, to secure the aircraft to do that job, in the Atlantic. Thank you."

ADMIRAL EDWARDS introduced MAJOR GENERAL GROSS.

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Remarks by GENERAL GROSS:

"The Army, of course, is vitally interested in the results of this effort. We are raising an army of seven and one-half million men. We want to get the greatest proportion of that army overseas in the year 1943, and the loss rate by submarine will determine that to a great degree. And, therefore, the objective as indicated by Admiral King is naturally the objective of the army. There is only one thing that might save that, Admiral. You indicated rather definitely your view as to what ports should serve what theater. We, in the last year and a half have built up our ports to serve overseas forces, and they don't quite meet as rigidly as you indicated the idea that Boston and New York would take care of U. K. and Hampton Roads would take care of the Mediterranean. With those huge movements contemplated in the Mediterranean theater, our establishments at Hampton Roads won't immediately fulfill such objectives.

"And we have organized around New York with Boston and Hampton Roads more or less as a flexible group of ports, the service of any huge movement, no matter where directed in the Atlantic. And while I think that we can flexibly shift to Boston and Hampton Roads, or Baltimore; many of our cargo ships; when it comes to some of the faster convoys, we have a battery of areas behind New York with great capacity, which we haven't got to the same extent either behind Boston or Hampton Roads. So while we can use that which we have erected in the last year we can't do it quite as arbitrarily, or with a fence between the Mediterranean and U. K. as you have indicated.

"I think we can definitely meet what you said about Charleston and New Orleans."

ADMIRAL KING said that his point was to work in that direction. That New York was being overloaded and it was getting where it couldn't handle the shipping. That it was not expected to make the change forthwith, but to begin to reorient cargoes and troops and to improve port capacities so as to handle transportation on the general principles mentioned.

GENERAL GROSS agreed and said the situation is subject to change. That there was a definite relationship between overseas ports and maintenance and our forces, and that it was flexible enough to respond. That we were strong at Boston, but recent convoy arrangements had more or less stripped Boston.

ADMIRAL KING said the reason he had brought the subject up as a matter of consideration by this Conference was to relate the ports of departure to areas overseas, and that he had no idea of rigidity, because when big movements take place it was necessary to use all ports, but that if we began reorienting now so that the ports relating to the regions overseas can become more or less stabilized we would be better off in three months, six months, or nine months than we now are.

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GENERAL GROSS said the army would cooperate.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS introduced BRIGADIER GENERAL LARSON.

GENERAL LARSON said that he was on the operating end. That he was looking for and expecting some long range equipment which could reach places not now covered. That he considered the main question of the conference to be where the operations are to be applied.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS introduced Mr. J. E. Cushing of the War Shipping Administration.

MR. CUSHING said he was present as an observer and to give any information and cooperation possible.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS introduced VICE ADMIRAL MOORE.

5. ADDRESS BY ADMIRAL MOORE

The Naval Staff of the Admiralty is very glad, indeed, to be able to be represented at this conference, and we felt that the conference at this time was particularly opportune because of the change in the German command to Admiral Doenitz.

We feel that that certainly will not mean any lessening of the attack against shipping, wherever it may be. I think it is certain that he will increase the pressure on us if he possibly can.

So we particularly felt that this was the right moment in which to get together and really get our team all working on one and the same lines. I didn't propose to go into any particular details now of any proposal by the Naval Staff of the Admiralty, but there are three points I feel might be useful to be considered now.

The first is the question of the time factor. The very fact that the Germans are probably going to apply great pressure to us makes it seem to us, at any rate, that we should, perhaps divide our conclusions into two.

First of all, what we can do immediately, because the danger is with us now. We have this pressure already being applied, and, therefore, anything that we can do at once is of great importance. Any day now, we may get really serious attacks on any of the convoys crossing the Atlantic. Secondly, it may be useful if we look a little further ahead and see what we may be able to do in a few months' time. I feel that we should particularly deal with the question of what we can do quickly.

Then another point that might be useful is that we should try and keep any conclusions flexible.

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I think it really meets the points made by the Commander in Chief in his opening statement, where he pointed out that this conference is dealing with the Atlantic, and that more serious pressure may be applied in the Pacific at any moment. I would add, if I might, that we also have the Indian Ocean, where we have actually at this moment the beginnings of pressure. It may be that that is going to grow. Therefore, anything that we do or think of or suggest at this Conference should be flexible.

Thirdly, I would like particularly to endorse the remarks that Admiral Noble made earlier about the importance of the air. There is no doubt in our minds from the experience we have had in the Atlantic, that with these big packs of U-boats, it is essential that we should have the air--and the air not working as a separate entity, but as part of the team, working in our view, alongside of the control of the surface escorts, hand in hand, and looking at the same map. We feel it is not sound being in different rooms or buildings, they should be side by side, working for the common cause. That is our experience from the British side.

"We will appreciate the Army facilities in New York, and we have used every endeavor to get this thing going and clicking in that area.

"However, we have also looked to Norfolk. Norfolk at the present time is capable of handling about 30 ships. I understand with increased facilities they will in May or June have that stepped up to about 50 ships.

"So we are looking forward, under the direction of the Commander in Chief, to give everything we can to make available those different ports, well realizing that this enhancement of shipping is bound to come.

"I understand that in Norfolk the facilities are next to New York in availability, anchorage facilities, etc., while Charleston, as you know, has not the facilities in the anchorage of large ships. We have found that but very definitely in the handling of convoys on this coast.

"That, in very brief, is what we are doing and what we are trying to do with the facilities along this coast.

"As far as the Eastern Sea Frontier is concerned, I might mention that I have been a believer in the fact that sooner or later, and probably it will be sooner than later, we are going to have an active condition on this coast, on the Eastern Sea Frontier, and we are trying to meet that active condition as best we can.

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6. ADDITIONAL REMARKS AND DISCUSSION

ADMIRAL EDWARDS introduced AIR VICE MARSHAL DURSTON.

AIR MARSHAL DURSTON remarked:

"We have come over here with very open minds on this subject, prepared to discuss, and coordinate our ideas with yours.

"There is one little point I would like to offer, and that is, with reference to mixed forces. I don't know whether you, Admiral King, really meant that to apply to the air, because we have had quite a lot of experience just lately with two of your air squadrons working with us. There is no doubt, perhaps, that the air is different from the surface work."

ADMIRAL EDWARDS introduced VICE ADMIRAL ANDREWS, who made the following remarks:

"Admiral King and Gentlemen: I have noted with great interest the remarks that have been made by our Commander in Chief and, also, you other gentlemen. Involving the thought of the Commander in Chief, we have been making a study of the facilities of this coast relative to the availability of the capabilities of shipping out of New York and Boston, and other places on the Eastern Sea Frontier. We have had as many as 425 ships at one time in New York. And as you know, we have sailed from New York in one day, approximately 150 ships. New York is capable of quite a large amount of shipping.

"We will appreciate the Army facilities in New York. And we have used every endeavor to get this thing going and clicking in that area.

"However, we have also looked to Boston. Boston at the present time is capable of handling about 50 ships. I understand with increased facilities they will in May or June have that stepped up to about 80 ships.

"So we are looking forward, under the directive of the Commander in Chief, to give everything we can to make available these different ports, well realizing that this enhancement of shipping is bound to come.

"I understand that in Norfolk the facilities are next to New York in availability, anchorage facilities, etc., while Charleston, as you know, has not the facilities in the anchorage of large ships. We have found that out very definitely in the handling of convoys on this coast.

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"As far as the Eastern Sea Frontier is concerned, I might mention that I have been a believer in the fact that sooner or later, and probably it will be sooner than later, we are going to have an active condition on this coast, on the Eastern Sea Frontier, and we are trying to meet that active condition as best we can.

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"We are suffering, as you all know, from lack of escorts and lack of air, and especially, lack of long distance air.

"So the whole thing boils itself down, I think, into better cooperation.

"I had a conference with the Canadian officials last summer. And I think we are all working to the same end, and I am quite sure that this conference will bear excellent fruit along that line."

ADMIRAL KING turned over the conference to VICE ADMIRAL EDWARDS as presiding officer, and excused himself with the following remark:

"I make this suggestion before I shove off -- that this conference might adopt the slogan, 'A ship saved is worth two built.' Think it over."

ADMIRAL KING here left the conference.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS made the following remarks:

"We will get down to the business. There are certain things on the agenda that do not concern everybody. I should like to start with a subject in which everyone is concerned, including the Army Service of Supply, and the War Shipping Administration, and that is the question of what are the necessary convoy routes?

"It is obvious we wish to economize on convoy routes. The question now comes up, can we stabilize what we have, or do we need any more, or can we get along with less. I would say in that connection, one of the things that is imperative more than anything else, is the oil convoy to the U. K. and Gibraltar. These have absorbed escort ships that we had hoped to be able to place on the North Atlantic routes. I am assured by the oil people that they are absolutely necessary, but I should like to explore the matter briefly while all hands are here."

ADMIRAL MOORE said:

"I think at the moment there is probably no need for any further routes than what we have at present. The north route straight to U. K. will, obviously, have to remain, and I can see no way at the moment of avoiding the direct convoys to the Gibraltar Area. In fact, I should say the probabilities were that those would tend to increase in size, if they don't in number. I think there is no question about the need for those.

"There is one possible change we have had in mind, where it hasn't been necessary to put the shipping into convoys yet. If we manage to put sufficient pressure onto German U-boats in the North Atlantic, they may well spread to the South Atlantic. There it is going to be a more difficult problem, because, as you all know, our bases are not so conveniently situated for meeting them.

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"I think any sub-committee that deals with convoys should at any rate just look at that problem. We have given it a certain amount of study already in regard to continuation, really, of convoys coming down from the U. K., passing Gibraltar, possibly going off into Gibraltar and going on farther down to Freetown, and then, if necessary, that might have to be continued right on to the Cape.

"As long as we have to use the Cape Route for our big troop convoys, and, of course, it can be used, also, for quite a large proportion of war stores coming from this country as well, we may have to get some form of convoy and some form of protection for the shipping in the South Atlantic.

"We have looked at it from the point of view of providing air so that we can move air in quickly on to the west coast of Africa, and, possibly, having a route down the South Atlantic on that side. I suggest the sub-committee might look at that particularly."

7. DISCUSSION OF RUSSIAN CONVOYS

ADMIRAL EDWARDS said:

"May I ask this, Admiral? In connection with the Russian convoys, my understanding is that 16 ships a month is the present commitment. Is this correct?"

ADMIRAL MOORE replied:

"No, I think the commitment really is as much as we can give, rather than so much a month."

ADMIRAL EDWARDS asked if the commitment was limited by port capacity.

ADMIRAL MOORE replied:

"Yes, they can take more than 16 a month. Speaking from memory, they can unload roughly 16 ships at a time, 12 to 16, but they do that in about ten days time. Therefore, one can really double that and take it in a month. The last convoy we sailed for Russia, we should have sailed with thirty ships -- in fact, we sailed with twenty-nine, and they said they could accept those with a certain delay in the turn-around up there. We have to send larger numbers than can be unloaded immediately because we are limited by the number of convoys we can run and limited by the escorts and protection that the Home Fleet can give. In fact, the cycle that we are expecting to run to, is nearer 36 to 42 days; and with 30 in a convoy, this works out rather more than 16, somewhere in the order of 20 to 24 a month."

ADMIRAL EDWARDS said:

"The Casablanca Conference, as I recall, decided on 16 a month, partly on account of port conditions, but I think principally because the idea was to get as much into Russia by the southern routes, where shipping is relatively safe. Is that your understanding, Gross?"

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GENERAL GROSS replied:

"My understanding was that the 16 was limited by the British Naval arrangements. If they had more escorts they could double it."

ADMIRAL MOORE said:

"That was so at the time in the mid-darkness worst period. When the Casablanca conference was meeting, was the worst dark period of all. That convoy has been taken within 150 miles to 200 miles of the German area north of Norway. In mid-winter when there is darkness all night, and only half twilight for three hours in January, the Commander in Chief of the Home Fleet limited the number he would take in a convoy to 16. I think that is why 16 was mentioned at Casablanca, where they were meeting about that time, and that was the figure we had just been to. That was on account of the physical difficulty of looking after the convoy in total darkness for some eight days and to avoid stragglers. To have stragglers within 150 miles of the enemy air base is just asking for trouble."

ADMIRAL EDWARDS said:

"My impression, Admiral Noble, was that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had sixteen as a rather firm commitment. The reason I make a point of it is that the President feels so strongly on the matter. I think we will have to produce for him a definite, firm plan for the Russian convoys, or he won't accept any of this; and that 16 ships a month seems to be a basis they are working on now. And I was about to ask Admiral Moore if he thought that he could say that the Admiralty accepted that as a commitment."

ADMIRAL MOORE said:

"I don't think we can accept a basis of so many per month, because the monthly rate of 16, actually, we're hoping to improve on."

ADMIRAL EDWARDS asked:

"Can you accept an average?"

ADMIRAL MOORE replied:

"An average of 16 a month would be within what we hope to be able to do. I know the First Sea Lord made the point at the Casablanca Conference that the size and number of convoys that can be passed around North Cape is purely an operational question."

GENERAL GROSS said:

"Any failure with better weather to get these convoys through possibly could be met by diversion to the Persian Gulf, because of increased capacity being made in that direction."

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8. DISCUSSION OF CARIBBEAN OIL

ADMIRAL EDWARDS said:

"I would like to ask Captain Carter, for the benefit of everyone, to explain the reasons why it is necessary to take oil from Aruba and Curacao for the Cape or Gibraltar traffic. It is a rather complex technical question from the petroleum viewpoint, and I think every one would benefit by an understanding of it."

CAPTAIN CARTER said:

"Admiral, we have a problem of not only getting these supplies to North Africa and Europe, but we, also, have the problem of keeping refineries operating at such capacity as to produce their maximum of 100 octane gasoline, these refineries being the Gulf Coastal refineries and the Caribbean refineries."

"If, in trying to work out the best for escorts, we said we would load vessels for North Africa in the Gulf, would interfere with two things: First, fuel, resulting from refinery runs in the Gulf, can, for the most part, be sent to the East Coast, or to other required destinations by tank cars, whereas there is no relief for the very essential Caribbean refineries except by tankers."

"Therefore, we worked out a program of moving the so-called OT convoys from the Caribbean to North Africa with the idea that a large part of Naval fuel required in North Africa would be supplied by that route. It was tentatively decided and approved by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, to set up two groups of six fast tankers each, from the Caribbean to North Africa. In the discussions of this last week, the possibility has been considered of opening up that cycle and using these ships to great advantage in meeting fuel requirements in New York."

ADMIRAL EDWARDS said:

"I wanted that point brought out because there are times when the submarine activity slackens off in the Aruba-Curacao area, and under normal conditions we would take most of the escorts away from that region temporarily when we have a slack time. However, the importance of the refineries at Aruba and Curacao are so great and they are so exposed to possible bombardment or commando raids that we have felt it necessary in the interest of the oil situation in general to keep a very close watch in that vicinity and more than a normal-sized protecting force in that region."

"In connection with the Anti-Submarine Command everyone here has observed with great admiration the speed and efficiency with which the Coastal Command took charge of the air situation when the submarine threat developed late last fall. We feel here, and I presume you do in London, that the fact that we have got through this much of the winter without very severe losses on the northern route is very largely due to the fine work that those planes have done."

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9. APPOINTMENT OF SUB-COMMITTEES

The Conference then proceeded with the selection of sub-committees to study and report on matters that had been raised. Sub-committees were nominated to study the following subjects:

- (A) COMBAND RELATIONS
- (B) CONVOY AND ESCORTS, to report on:
 - (1) Necessary Convoy Routes,
 - (2) Escorts that are available,
 - (3) Assignment of escorts to meet convoy requirements,
 - (4) Composition of Escort Groups,
 - (5) Size of convoys,
 - (6) Russian Convoy,
- (C) AIR SUPPORT FOR ATLANTIC CONVOYS, to report on:
 - (1) Aircraft requirements for adequate air coverage,
 - (2) Availability of aircraft,
 - (3) Availability of bases,
 - (4) Conclusions and recommendations,
- (D) TRAINING AND MATERIAL READINESS OF OPERATIONAL ESCORT GROUPS
- (E) COMMUNICATION AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

ADMIRAL EDWARDS then asked if anyone had any ideas they thought should be brought out before the sub-committees started to work. He then announced that the General Conference would meet again at 1800 Wednesday March 3rd.

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A.C.C. 2nd Meeting

ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

Minutes of meeting

Hold at Washington, D. C.
On Wednesday, March 3, at 1400.

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CAPTAIN DUFFY outlined A.C.C. 2 and stated that the main reason for the meeting was to discuss the requirements for the escort of the convoys. The War Shipping Administration was briefed of this fact.

After paragraph 6 of A.C.C. 2 was read in regard to the escort of the convoys, CAPTAIN DUFFY asked if only eight corvettes with no escort were contemplated. It was stated that eight "effective" escort vessels were contemplated.

CAPTAIN DUFFY stated there would be a mixture of escorts and other escorts, and corvettes under present arrangements and that some destroyers would have to be found to put on the convoys. That the escorts would probably end up by being a mixture of destroyers and corvettes, changing the groups around a bit.

After the reading of paragraph 7 of A.C.C. 2 in regard to the escort of the convoys, the question was raised by CAPTAIN DUFFY regarding the number of escorts for the convoys. It was stated that there were two groups of 3, and for a number of 4 destroyers and that they were supposed to be operational destroyers. That the total number assigned to that escort was 5. That they probably were long enough to cover the convoys to provide for upkeep and training.

CAPTAIN DUFFY expressed the opinion to CAPTAIN SHAW that 3 destroyers per escort group was insufficient, and asked if they could be increased, perhaps to 5.

CAPTAIN SHAW said that it was hoped that this number could be increased to 4.

After the reading of paragraph 8 of A.C.C. 2, in regard to the escort of the convoys, the question was raised as to number of ships to be in the convoys. It was brought out that the first two would have approximately a total of 30 ships which would be divided between the one that goes out on the 15th of March and the one that goes out on the 15th of April. That they were "vulnerable" and that they were to be run with about 100 escorts each.

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ADMIRAL EDWARDS opened the second meeting of the Atlantic Convoy Conference.

1. COMBINED RELATIONS
(A.C.C. 1)

ADMIRAL EDWARDS stated this report would be ready later.

2. CONVOY AND ESCORTS
(A.C.C. 2)

ADMIRAL DELANY outlined A.C.C. 2 and stated that the main routes as indicated are required and cannot be reduced. The War Shipping representatives are satisfied of this fact.

After paragraph 6 of A.C.C. 2 was read in regard to Aruba to U.K., UC-CU oil convoys, ADMIRAL EDWARDS asked if only eight corvettes with no spares were contemplated. It was stated that eight "effective" escort vessels were contemplated.

ADMIRAL MANSFIELD said there would be sloops, mixture of sloops and other classes, and corvettes under present arrangements and that some destroyers would have to be found to put on the runs as well. That the escorts would probably end up by being a mixture of destroyers and corvettes, changing the groups around a bit.

After the reading of paragraph 7 of A.C.C. 2 in regard to Aruba and West Africa, OT convoys, the question was raised by ADMIRAL EDWARDS regarding the number of escorts for the OT convoys. It was stated that there were two groups of 3, one for each convoy of 6 tankers and that they were supposed to be operational destroyers. That the total number assigned to that service was 6. That they presumably have a long enough lay-over in Guantanamo to provide for upkeep and training.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS expressed the opinion to CAPTAIN SHEPARD that 3 destroyers per escort group was insufficient, and asked if they could be increased, perhaps to 6.

CAPTAIN SHEPARD said that it was hoped that this number could be increased to 4.

After the reading of paragraph 8 of A.C.C. 2, in regard to TORCH area, UGF-UCS convoys, the question was raised as to number of ships to be in these convoys. It was brought out that the first two would have approximately a total of 80 ships which would be divided between the one that goes out on the 29th of March and the one that goes out on the 15th of April. That they were "slows" and that they were to be run with about six escorts each.

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It was stated that information from the Army and a study of the number of ships which would arrive in the TORCH area in the KMS convoys indicated that the port facilities of the African ports can handle the ships that will come in there.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS then asked GENERAL GROSS:

"General Eisenhower's latest despatch said he wanted convoys run on half the interval we did before; do you think this 15 day schedule will meet that?"

There followed a brief discussion in which it was brought out that Col. Meyers and the Commander in Chief's Atlantic Operation's Officer had conferred the previous afternoon and that they had drawn up their schedule of sailings and escorts to carry through the UGF's and UGS's that are now scheduled through May, that Col. Meyers was definitely pleased with the interval. It was brought out that General Eisenhower's request had to do with some special movements; that present schedule considered lay-over in Gibraltar, time of arrival in Gibraltar, etc., and that the U. S. and Britain would exchange information to coordinate these factors and minimize delays. That the proposed schedule was the most satisfactory solution which could be reached.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS made the point that he wished that situation clearly understood because if we went to this arrangement there would be no slack anywhere. It was agreed that it was understood.

After reading paragraph 9 of A.C.C. 2, in regard to shipping for Iceland, it was brought out that the changes in HX cycles would benefit both the Iceland arrangements and the Russian arrangements.

After reading and discussion of paragraph 10 of A.C.C. 2, in regard to U. S. coastal convoys, it was brought out that if "things get hot" in the Western Atlantic it will be necessary to combine the KN's and GN's.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS asked GENERAL GROSS regarding the effect which the Air Ferry system would have on shipping. It was brought out that the northern route would be used as soon as available, that construction was fairly well along and that movements would be largely that of supply. ADMIRAL EDWARDS stated that last spring, being caught without warning resulted in a late start and upset escort arrangements. He added that once the convoy system is frozen with everything you have, it doesn't expand easily.

GENERAL GROSS stated that a good job was done last year and that we could possibly count on a supply problem on the same scale as last year.

It was stated that the African Coastal convoys had not been studied by the sub-committee.

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There followed a discussion regarding the training and repair facilities in Guantanamo, San Juan, etc. area for the OT convoy escorts. It was brought out that Guantanamo was now near its top capacity. ADMIRAL EDWARDS stated that an additional submarine for training purposes would probably need to be brought up from Panama about every two months to fit in with cycles.

It was brought out that it would be desirable to increase numbers of escorts, especially in the large convoys and in the tanker convoys.

The question was then raised regarding the Russian commitments and the secretary was directed to record the following statement by VICE ADMIRAL MOORE:

Question by ADMIRAL EDWARDS:

"Would you make a statement that it is the intention of the Admiralty to continue these convoys on not more than the present scale unless major operations interfere?"

Reply by VICE ADMIRAL MOORE:

"Yes, It is our intention to continue running the convoys to Russia. The maximum size the Commander in Chief Home Fleet is prepared to take at present is 30 ships, and it will be approximately a 42-day cycle. But that must be subject to the operational requirements in other ports of Europe and also to the results of each convoy and the experience gained, depending upon the enemy action in North Russia and Russian waters. That is our present intention, a 42-day cycle, and 30 ships in a convoy."

After the above discussion, the report of the sub-committee, Appendix "A" of A.C.C. 2, on Convoys and Escorts was accepted.

Appendix "B" of A.C.C. 2 was then taken up. The Conference accepted this report with the recommendation that the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Naval Staff Canada and the Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet adopt the suggested classification of vessels and agree to exchange information as to their assignments of vessels suitable for escort duty. The Committee suggests the use of the report form recommended by the sub-Committee with such changes in details as may be found necessary by each service for its own report.

3. AIR SUPPORT FOR ATLANTIC CONVOYS
(A.C.C. 3)

ADMIRAL BELLINGER outlined A.C.C. 3, the report of the sub-committee on Air Support for Atlantic Convoys, which after discussion, was accepted by the Conference as a whole. The Conference then recommended that it be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for consideration of the possibility of accelerating the supply of aircraft listed in the category "immediate minimum requirements."

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A. C. C. 3rd Meeting

ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

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- After discussion the Conference adopted the report of the Joint Committee on the following additional recommendations:
- (a) That recommendations A-1 and C-1 be referred to the Combined Communications Board for study and recommendations as to implementation.
 - (b) That recommendation B-1 be referred to the Admiralty, Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa, and the Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet for consideration.
 - (c) That recommendation D-1 be referred to the Chief of the Canadian Air Staff and the Chief of Staff U. S. Army for consideration of the advisability of carrying out this recommendation as a combined Canadian-U. S. project.
 - (d) That recommendation E-1 be referred to the Joint Committee for study and report.

General MacArthur stated that the Joint Committee on the Atlantic Convoy Conference, which was held at Washington, D. C., on March 5, 1943, had completed its work and that the recommendations of the Joint Committee would be forwarded to the appropriate authorities for their consideration.

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ADMIRAL EDWARDS opened the third meeting of the Atlantic Convoy Conference.

1. COASTLAND RELATIONS
(A.C.C. 1)

ADMIRAL EDWARDS stated this report would be ready later.

2. COMMUNICATIONS AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
(A.C.C. 5)

COMMANDER SMITH-HUTTON outlined A.C.C. 5.

After discussion the Conference accepted the report and made the following additional recommendations:

- (a) That recommendations A-3 and C-1 be referred to the Combined Communications Board for study and recommendations as to implementation.
- (b) That recommendation B-1 be referred to the Admiralty, Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa, and the Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet for consideration.
- (c) That recommendation D-1 be referred to the Chief of the Canadian Air Staff and the Chief of Staff U. S. Army for consideration of the advisability of carrying out this recommendation as a combined Canada-U. S. project.
- (d) That action on recommendation D-2 be deferred pending receipt of report of the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board.

COMMANDER SMITH-HUTTON stated that Dr. Bowles, who was attending the Conference as a representative of the Secretary of War, would submit at a later meeting certain recommendations of a technical nature in the form of a Technical Paper to be appended to A.C.C. 5.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS then adjourned the Conference to meet again at 1000 Monday, March 8, 1943.

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A.C.C. 4th Meeting

ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

Minutes of Meeting

Held at Washington, D. C.
On Monday, March 8, at 1000

1943

"Integrated over-all technical planning is so vital a part of the antisubmarine program that it warrants top-level consideration along with tactical planning. There should be integration not only between the tactical and technical planning but also within the field of technical planning itself.

"Some idea of the importance of increases in 'killing' efficiencies and their dependence both on operational framework and weapons may be gained from the following: It is estimated that during the last year one sighting in forty was fatal to the U-boat and that for every 100 U-boats destroyed 4000 sightings were required. Should top-level attention be concentrated relentlessly on this problem to the end of maximizing to the utmost the possibilities of improvements in communications, radar, electronics, etc. to navigation and weapons, it would even not without the realm of possibility to increase the efficiencies of kills by a factor of five. Granting the existence of some 400 German submarines at this time and the addition of some 600 in 1944 the conclusion as to the importance of this effort is self-evident.

"Aircraft are taking on increasing responsibility in the program of antisubmarine warfare. The mobility of the aircraft is of an order different from that of the surface craft -- as much as ten times as great. Facilities apply fast for surface craft operations may not necessarily be adequate for the efficient application of aircraft. Likewise, the communications systems are not necessarily identical in the two instances. The success of their application will depend largely upon the establishment of a planned framework of communication and navigational aid conforming to this increased mobility.

"The importance of navigational aid is obvious, but its presentation is important upon understanding of what is wanted -- particularly the how -- and how it may be fitted into the antisubmarine warfare framework to increase effectiveness.

"Already the Lorenz Navigation System is installed in the west coast of North America. The extension of this system to cover the entire North Atlantic route to the British Isles is planned. For surface craft navigation and for air navigation systems the need for extension of this system to include the east coast, the northeast coast of South America, and the west coast of Africa, is apparent to any who are conversant with the importance of understanding of what this war will require. It is not from a navigational aid for it permits precise direction to the location of sightings by aircraft or surface craft and the Lorenz receiver. This should increase the accuracy of sightings and hence the accuracy of predictions. The Lorenz

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ADMIRAL EDWARDS opened the fourth meeting of the Atlantic Convoy Conference.

1. ADMIRAL EDWARDS asked if any sub-committee which had already reported had any supplementary report to be made.

2. ADMIRAL EDWARDS announced that a technical paper prepared by DR. BOWLES had been distributed. After discussion of the paper ADMIRAL EDWARDS proposed that the conference take note of the paper and include it in the record for consideration by the naval and air authorities of the United States, Canada and Great Britain in connection with planning for equipment.

The following paper prepared by DOCTOR E. L. BOWLES was read into the minutes:

"Integrated over-all technical planning is so vital a part of the antisubmarine program that it warrants top-level consideration along with tactical planning. There should be integration not only between the tactical and technical planning but also within the field of technical planning itself.

"Some idea of the importance of increases in 'killing' efficiencies and their dependence both on operational framework and weapons may be gained from the following: It is estimated that during the last year one sighting in forty was fatal to the U-boat and that for some 100 U-boats destroyed 4000 sightings were required. Should top-level attention be concentrated relentlessly on this problem to the end of emphasizing to the utmost the assimilation of improvements in communications, radar, electrical aids to navigation and weapons, it would seem not without the realm of possibility to increase the effectiveness of kills by a factor of five. Granting the existence of some 400 German submarines at this time and the addition of some 300 in 1943 the conclusion as to the importance of this effort is manifest.

"Aircraft are taking on increasing responsibility in the program of antisubmarine warfare. The mobility of the aircraft is of an order different from that of the surface craft--as much as ten times as great. Facilities amply fast for surface vessel operations may not necessarily be adequate for the efficient application of aircraft. Likewise, the communications framework is not necessarily identical in the two instances. The success of their application will depend largely upon the establishment of a planned framework of communication and navigational aids conforming to this increased mobility.

"The importance of navigational aids is obvious, but their appreciation is dependent upon understanding of what is available -- particularly the new -- and how it may be fitted into the antisubmarine warfare framework to increase effectiveness.

"Already the Loran Navigation System is installed on the east coast of North America. The extension of this system to include the entire north convoy route to the British Isles is scheduled. For surface craft navigation and for air antisubmarine warfare the need for extension of this system to include all the Atlantic Coast, the northeast coast of South America, and the west coast of Africa, is apparent to one who has examined the problem with an understanding of what this gear will accomplish. It is more than a navigational aid for it permits precise specification of the position of sightings by aircraft or surface craft carrying the simple Loran receiver. This should increase the accuracy of plots and hence the accuracy of predictions. The Loran grid makes

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possible the dispatching of a surface craft or an aircraft to the location of a sighting or sinking. Moreover it insures systematic accurate coverage in search. A preliminary study has been made of the Atlantic Coverage problem but in the interest of brevity it is not included here.

"Similarly a preliminary study has been made for a point-to-point Atlantic automatic-coding teletype network for antisubmarine warfare. This study includes facilities of this character already in operation, extensions scheduled, and extensions necessary for complete perimetric coverage of the Atlantic. Further study will be necessary to determine the adequacy of existing and scheduled channels in terms of traffic capacity.

"The inclusion of electrical altimeters, beacons, approach systems, and radar in the over-all plans for communications and navigational facilities is essential, and further study of these devices alone and in relation to the newer air weapons should have attention from top-level."

3. COMMAND RELATIONS
(A.C.C. 1)

CONTROL OF THE U.K.-NORTHWEST NORTH ATLANTIC CONVOY SYSTEM (Appendix "A" to A.C.C. 1) was outlined by ADMIRAL EDWARDS.

After discussion, the Conference accepted Appendix "A" to A.C.C. 1 and recommended that it be referred to the appropriate authorities of the Governments concerned for implementation if they approve.

4. CONTROL OF A/SW IN THE NORTHWEST AFRICA REGION
(Appendix "B" to A.C.C. 1) was outlined by ADMIRAL EDWARDS.

After discussion the Conference accepted Appendix "B" to A.C.C. 1 and recommended that VICE ADMIRAL MOORE take up direct with the Admiralty, the status of the Gibraltar Command, and that the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, present the statement to General Eisenhower, who is the Commander in Chief of the Allied Force in that theater of operations.

5. ADMIRAL EDWARDS proposed that a sub-committee be appointed to draft measures to coordinate and implement the recommendations of the sub-committees; taking into consideration certain comments from the Admiralty, Naval Service Headquarters and Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet which have recently been received and which bear on the matters considered by the sub-committees.

This proposal was accepted by the Conference and the following sub-committee was appointed:

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COORDINATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

Vice Admiral Sir Henry R. Moore
Vice Admiral R. S. Edwards, U.S.N.
Rear Admiral V. C. Brodeur, R.C.N.
Air Vice Marshal A. Durston, R.A.F.
Air Vice Marshal N. R. Anderson, R.C.A.F.
Brigadier General W. T. Larson, U.S.A.
Brigadier General E. L. Eubank, U.S.A.

6. ADMIRAL EDWARDS asked if there was any further business from any committee or any individual. There being none, he announced that the next meeting of the General Conference would take place at three o'clock Tuesday afternoon, March 9, 1943.

The conference then adjourned.

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A.C.C. 5th Meeting

ADMIRAL HENDON opened the fifth meeting of the Atlantic Convoy Conference.

1. AIR SUPPORT FOR ATLANTIC CONVOYS
ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

ADMIRAL HENDON Minutes of Meeting recommendations

of the Sub-Committee on Coordination and Implementation
Held at Washington, D. C.
On Wednesday, March 10, at 1400
in regard to the recommendations of the Sub-Committee on
1943
Air Support for Atlantic Convoys. These recommendations
of the Sub-Committee on Coordination and Implementation
were accepted by the Conference and are attached to
A.C.C. 3 as paper A.C.C. 1/1.

2. ADMIRAL HENDON then adjourned the Conference,
to meet again at 1500, Friday, March 12, 1943.

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ADMIRAL EDWARDS opened the fifth meeting of the Atlantic Convoy Conference.

1. AIR SUPPORT FOR ATLANTIC CONVOYS
(A.C.C. 3)

ADMIRAL EDWARDS outlined the recommendations of the Sub-Committee on Coordination and Implementation in regard to the recommendations of the Sub-Committee on Air Support for Atlantic Convoys. These recommendations of the Sub-Committee on Coordination and Implementation were accepted by the Conference and are attached to A.C.C. 3 as paper A.C.C. 3/1.

2. ADMIRAL EDWARDS then adjourned the Conference, to meet again at 1000, Friday, March 12, 1943.

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A.C.C. 6th Meeting

ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

Minutes of Meeting

Held at Washington, D. C.
On Friday, March 12, at 1000

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2.

CONVOY AND RESERVE
A.C.C. 2.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS brought up A.C.C. 2 for further discussion. He stated that there were certain modifications desired by Admiralty and Naval Service Headquarters.

After some discussion, ADMIRAL EDWARDS said these proposed modifications would be included in A.C.C. 2, the Report of the Sub-committee on Convoys and Reserves.

After discussion of the way in which the recommendations and modifications in A.C.C. 2 would be put into effect, ADMIRAL EDWARDS said the matters therein should be handled by despatch to HSHQ and the Admiralty to obtain concurrence and save time in starting the new convoy system.

ADMIRAL HUGHES said in further discussion of A.C.C. 2 that the First Sea Lord wanted entered in the minutes of the Conference that the proposed escort arrangements would absorb the whole of the British escort resources and leave nothing which could be diverted to other operations.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS stated that the same was true with respect to United States escort resources.

ADMIRAL HUGHES said the same was also true in regard to Canadian resources, and added that the six minesweepers were being moved from the West Coast in order to relieve East Coast operations for service in the support group.

3.

CLOSING OF CONFERENCE

ADMIRAL EDWARDS stated that in bringing the Conference to an end he wished to express his appreciation to the members for the trouble they had taken to come to Washington; for their work on the sub-committees; and for the broadminded attitude which had assisted the Conference to handle what otherwise would have been difficult situations.

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ADMIRAL EDWARDS opened the sixth meeting of the Atlantic Convoy Conference.

1. AIR SUPPORT.
A.C.C. 3/1.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS read certain proposed modifications to paper A.C.C. 3/1, the Recommendations and Comments by the Sub-committee on Coordination and Implementation in regard to AIR SUPPORT, A.C.C. 3, which had previously been accepted by the Conference.

After discussion these modifications were accepted by the Conference and are embodied in A.C.C. 3/1 of this report.

2. CONVOY AND ESCORTS.
A.C.C. 2.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS brought up A.C.C. 2 for further discussion. He stated that there were certain modifications desired by Admiralty and Naval Service Headquarters.

After some discussion, ADMIRAL EDWARDS said these proposed modifications would be included in A.C.C. 2, the report of the Sub-committee on Convoys and Escorts.

After discussion of the way in which the recommendations and modifications in A.C.C. 2 would be put into effect, ADMIRAL EDWARDS said the matters therein should be handled by despatch to NSHQ and the Admiralty to obtain concurrence and save time in starting the new convoy cycles.

ADMIRAL MOORE said in further discussion of A.C.C. 2 that the First Sea Lord wanted entered in the minutes of the Conference that the proposed escort arrangements would absorb the whole of the British escort resources and leave nothing which could be diverted to other operations.

ADMIRAL EDWARDS stated that the same was true with respect to United States escort resources.

ADMIRAL BRODEUR said the same was also true in regard to Canadian escorts, and added that the six minesweepers were being moved from the West Coast in order to relieve East Coast corvettes for service in the support group.

3. CLOSING OF CONFERENCE.


ADMIRAL EDWARDS stated that in bringing the Conference to an end he wished to express his appreciation to the members for the trouble they had taken to come to Washington; for their work on the sub-committees; and for the broadminded attitude which had enabled the Conference to handle what otherwise would have been difficult situations.

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ADMIRAL MOORE said he wished to thank the Conference for the manner in which they had dealt with his problems throughout the meetings and that he was pleased that agreements had been reached.

ADMIRAL BRODEUR said that on behalf of the Canadian Services represented at this Conference, he wished to express their sincere appreciation for the full cooperation and understanding they had received in the study and settlement of the Canadian problems.

The Conference closed at 1200, 12 March, 1943.


J. F. BOWLING,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N.
Secretary.

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A.C.C. #1

March 8, 1943.

ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

COMLAND RELATIONS

(Previous reference A.C.C. First meeting, Item 9.)

1. A Sub-committee was directed by above reference to study and make recommendations in regard to COMLAND RELATIONS.

2. The report of the Sub-committee on U.K.-Northwest North Atlantic Convoy System was accepted by the Conference with the recommendation that it be referred to the appropriate authorities of the Governments concerned for implementation if they approve. This report follows as Appendix "A".

3. An additional report of the Sub-committee (Appendix "B") on the Control of A.S.W. in the Northwest Africa Region was considered. The Conference decided to invite the attention of the High Commands concerned to the situation that exists, but to make no recommendation other than that operational controls of A.S.W. operations be coordinated in the areas in question.

H. M. WILSON,
Commander, R.N.

J. G. MACKINLAY,
Commander, R.C.V.R.

J. F. Bowling
J. F. BOWLING,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N.
Secretary.

A.C.C. 1

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REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE ON COMMAND RELATIONS
CONTROL OF THE U. K.-NORTHWEST NORTH ATLANTIC CONVOY SYSTEM

D I S C U S S I O N

1. Reallocation of forces in the past several months, incident to opening of additional convoy routes and activities in the Mediterranean, has caused the withdrawal of the most of the U.S. escort vessels from Task Force 24. Consequently, it has become appropriate for Great Britain and Canada to take complete charge of the Northern North Atlantic convoy system, with primary responsibility assumed by Great Britain.

2. This report deals with measures for withdrawing the United States from participation in the command of the U.K.-Northwest North Atlantic convoy system, and for establishing a new scheme of control and protection.

3. In considering its recommendations concerning coordination of air and surface forces the Sub-committee accepted as sound principles (1) that ASW aviation in any area should be under the operational direction of the Naval commander responsible for protecting shipping in that area, and (2) that general operational control of aircraft in that area should be exercised by one Air Commander. However, these principles must be applied flexibly in order to use the mobility of aviation to the best advantage and to meet special conditions such as those created by the several distinct and separate responsibilities of Canada and the United States in their respective parts of the Greenland-Newfoundland-New York region.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

4. That U. K. and Canada take complete charge of trade convoys between the British Isles and New York and ports north thereof (HX, SC and ON convoys), with the understanding that the United States is to retain strategic authority and responsibility throughout the Western Atlantic Area and that all existing arrangements and agreements are to remain in effect except as specifically modified herein.

5. That the Admiralty, in cooperation with NSHQ, control and protect HX, SC and ON convoys in accordance with the following plan:

- (a) Western Ocean Meeting Point (WESTOMP) to be established at about the 47th Meridian as the line where western local escorts are to join westbound and leave eastbound HX, SC and ON convoys.
- (b) Routing of HX, SC and ON convoys:
 - (1) Admiralty to route both ways eastward of WESTOMP.

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- (2) NSHQ to route both ways westward of WESTOMP, with concurrence of Commander Eastern Sea Frontier as to parts of routes that lie within that frontier.

(c) Diversions of HX, SC and ON convoys:

- (1) Admiralty to control diversions eastward of WESTOMP.
- (2) NSHQ to control diversions westward of WESTOMP, except in the Eastern Sea Frontier where all diversions are to be made by the Frontier Commander.
- (3) Diverting authorities as defined above to have authority to divert any convoys or ships whatsoever in the areas where they control diversions, as may be necessary to keep such convoys or ships clear of HX, SC and ON convoys.

(d) Information as to routing and diversions:

- (1) The Admiralty, NSHQ and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, to keep each other informed of all routings and diversions in the Western Atlantic Area.

(e) Surface escorts of HX, SC and ON convoys:

- (1) To be under operational control of the Admiralty and NSHQ, respectively, eastward and westward of WESTOMP.

(f) Air cover of HX, SC and ON convoys to be the responsibility of the following:

- (1) U.K. to the limit of aircraft range from bases in U.K. and Iceland.
- (2) Canada to the limit of aircraft range from bases in Labrador, Newfoundland and Canada. This is to be part of the general air cover of the region as set forth in paragraph 6.
- (3) Commander Eastern Sea Frontier to the limit of range of aircraft based in the frontier, coordination with AOCEAC to be arranged locally.

(g) Convoy size and cycle:

- (1) To be determined by the Admiralty. Changes in cycle to be subject to concurrence of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and NSHQ in order that coastal convoy arrangements may be modified to conform.

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h. Rescue:

- (1) U.K. and Canada to provide for rescue and salvage along the general ocean route of HX, SC and ON convoys.

6. That the following system of operational control of ASW aviation be established in the Labrador-Newfoundland-Canada region, to provide air cover not only for HX, SC and ON convoys but for all shipping within aircraft range.

- (a) All ASW aviation of the associated powers based in this region to be under the general operational control of the Canadian AOC Eastern Air Command, Halifax, who, under the general operational direction of the Commander in Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command, shall be responsible for the air coverage of all shipping within range, including Greenland convoys and other shipping under U. S. control.
- (b) The Commander in Chief of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command and the AOC Eastern Air Command to operate a combined headquarters at Halifax to facilitate the coordination of all their surface-air ASW forces.
- (c) All ASW aviation based in the Labrador-Newfoundland area to be under the local operational control of the Canadian AOC, St. Johns, who, under the local operational direction of the Flag Officer Newfoundland, will be responsible for the air coverage of all shipping within range.
- (d) The Commander of the Canadian Naval Sub-Command, St. Johns, and the Canadian AOC, St. Johns, to operate a combined headquarters for the coordination of all surface-air ASW forces in the Labrador-Newfoundland area. The AOC to have on his staff, officers of air commands concerned.
- (e) U. S. to agree that ASW planes of U.K. and Canada may use U. S. air fields in Greenland in emergency.

7. That the following arrangements be placed in effect - or be confirmed where already in effect - in order to coordinate control of other shipping with the control of HX, SC and ON convoys.

- (a) CHOP for all Atlantic shipping to be based on line as follows: From the South Pole north on the 26th Meridian to Latitude 00°-35' North; thence to 29-00 N, 47-00 W; thence north on 47th Meridian.

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- (b) Independents (merchant vessels and troop transports sailing without through escorts) between U.K. and Canada-United States to be routed by appropriate authority of the country of departure. These vessels to be chopped for diversion purposes to the country who is responsible for diversion on crossing the chop line as prescribed in paragraph 7 (a).
- (c) Greenland convoys to be operated by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, through a U. S. Naval Commander designated by him who will provide the escorts and local air coverage within the range of Greenland based aircraft in supplement to the coverage proscribed in paragraph 6 (a). Routings and diversions to be controlled by Commander in Chief, C.N.W.A.C., in the Canadian Coastal Zone; elsewhere by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet or U. S. Naval Commander designated by him.
- (d) Iceland shuttle (if maintained) to be operated by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, through a U. S. Naval Commander designated by him, who will provide the escorts, provide a local air cover and route shuttle convoys to and from meeting points with trade convoys to be designated by the Admiralty. Diversions to be controlled by the Admiralty.

8. That the United States:

Retain Argentina and Londonderry as bases for U. S. Naval forces, making excess facilities available for maintenance of RN and RCN escort vessels.

NOTE 1. The U. S. Eastern Sea Frontier for the purposes of the above recommendations is defined as the water area bounded by a line running as follows: From the International Boundary line off West Quoddy Head to position Latitude 43° North, Longitude 67° West; thence to position Latitude 42° North, Longitude 65° West; thence to Latitude 27° North, Longitude 75° 30' West where the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers meet; and thence northwesterly to the seaward end of the boundary between Duval and St. John's Counties, Florida, in approximate position Latitude 30° 15' North, Longitude 81° 20' West.

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NOTE 2. The Canadian Coastal Zone for the purposes of the above recommendations is defined as all waters included within a line joining the following points:

- (a) Cape Murchison, Latitude $63^{\circ} 15'$ North, Longitude $64^{\circ} 00'$ West.
- (b) Latitude $47^{\circ} 00'$ North, Longitude $47^{\circ} 00'$ West.
- (c) Latitude $43^{\circ} 00'$ North, Longitude $49^{\circ} 00'$ West.
- (d) Latitude 42° North, Longitude 65° West.
- (e) Latitude 43° North, Longitude 67° West.
- (f) International boundary at West Quoddy Head.

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APPENDIX "B" TO A.C.C. 1

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REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE ON COMMAND RELATIONS
CONTROL OF ASW IN THE NORTHWEST AFRICA REGION

Discussion

1. TORCH operations have served to create in the sea area between 26°10' N to 43° N and between 2° W and 40° W a shipping focal area similar in all basic respects to those in U. K., NW Atlantic and Caribbean.

2. In each of the three focal areas named, control of surface and air ASW forces has been centered in one commander with subordinate air and surface forces. In the case of the Casablanca-Gibraltar area this has not been done, and there exist in that area three authorities, namely F.O., Gibraltar, A.C.C. Gibraltar and Commander Moroccan Sea Frontier, who function on a common mission without complete coordination.

Conclusion

3. Provided a command relation similar to that existing in other focal areas mentioned above could be set up, it is felt that whatever difficulties of coordination now exist would be resolved.

A.C.C. 1

App. "B"

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A.C.C. 2/1

March 12, 1943.

ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

CONVOY and ESCORTS

Comment and Recommendation of Sub-Committee
on Coordination and Implementation

(Previous References: A.C.C. Fourth Meeting, Item 5; A.C.C. 6.)

1. Acceptance of the Convoy Plan in A.C.C. 2 is recommended. Escorts and other protective measures will be below the standard of adequacy, but the plan makes the best possible compromise between essential shipping needs and the existing acute shortage of escorts.

2. With reference to Appendix "B" of A.C.C. 2, it is recommended that exchange of information relate only to escorts assigned to the Atlantic and to West Coast mercantile coastal convoys north of San Francisco. Information as to other forces is not needed for convoy planning and should be kept on a high level of security.

H. M. Wilson

H. M. WILSON,
Commander, R. N.

J. G. Mackinlay

J. G. MACKINLAY,
Commander, R. C. V. R.

J. F. Bowling

J. F. BOWLING,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
Secretary.

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A.C.C. #2

March 4, 1943.

ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

CONVOY AND ESCORTS

(Previous Reference: A.C.C. First meeting, Item 9.)

1. A sub-committee was directed by the above reference to study and make recommendations in regard to CONVOY AND ESCORTS.
2. The report of the sub-committee was accepted by the Conference. The report follows as Appendices "A" and "B".
3. A statement by Vice Admiral Moore regarding Russian Convoys is included as Appendix "C".

H. M. WILSON,
Commander, R. N.

J. G. MACKINLAY,
Commander, R. C. V. R.

J. F. Bowling
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Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy,
Secretary.

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APPENDIX "A" TO A.C.C. 2

REPORT OF THE ESCORT AND CONVOY SUB-COMMITTEE

1. The Sub-Committee is of the opinion, (1) that the present main convoys (that is, the HX, SC, ONS, ON in the North Atlantic trade routes; the CU-UC and OT-TO oil convoys; the UGF and UGS convoys to the TORCH area; the KMF combined with WS, and KMS combined with OS convoys to the TORCH area and Freetown; the UR convoy from the UK to Iceland and the JW from UK to Russia; the U. S. coastal, Caribbean, Gulf and South Atlantic convoys) are required; (2) that these routes are the limits of the number which can be maintained with some reasonable assurance of safety, in view of the number of escort vessels now available. If new routes must be established incident to submarine threats, then the present escort strength must be reduced to provide such escorts. This same pertains in the event of new additional combat operations that may be undertaken. The Committee agrees that escorts are available for the routes listed, on the sailing intervals recommended below.

2. The Sub-Committee is of the opinion that it is feasible to accept the Admiralty's proposal to sail HX and SC convoys on a 5 and 8 day sailing interval, respectively, and beginning about 30 April for the HX and about 23 March for the SC convoys.

3. The escort requirements for the mid-ocean groups for the above cycle can be met with escort groups furnished by the Admiralty. Fourteen groups are required with a strength of 6 effective escorts per group. This gives consideration to time in port to conduct group training and overhaul. The 14 escort groups will be made of the 8 groups which are now on that run, plus 4 Canadian groups which are to be returned to mid-ocean escort work, plus 2 additional groups that had been originally earmarked for the UC convoys.

4. Regarding the Western local escorts necessary to handle convoys on the above-mentioned cycle, it was decided that 3 additional escort groups, bringing the total to 11, would be required to handle escorts in the Western local areas. This would also require the SC convoys to depart from Halifax and would require a local convoy, Boston to Halifax, the former on an 8-day sailing interval, and the latter on a 4-day sailing interval, and also that the BX-XB convoys sail on those intervals regardless of any delays in the SC or ONS. The representative of the Eastern Sea Frontier states that Boston can accommodate this shipping, and the representative of NSHQ states that the same pertains to Halifax, considering the dates when these convoys will be instituted. The HX convoys would continue to sail from New York. In order to provide the additional groups for the Western local escorts, Canada will require:

- (a) The return of 15 corvettes to Canada by the Admiralty.
- (b) The retention by Canada of 8 ISLE class British trawlers.
- (c) The use of destroyers now in the Western Support Force.

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5. The next convoy under discussion was the oil convoy from Aruba to U. K., known as the UC-CU convoy. UC-1 is now enroute to Aruba with 17 slow tankers, escorted by 4 U. S. destroyers and 6 British escort vessels. Returning to U.K., the convoy will consist of 12 fast tankers, with the same escort. U.S. can continue this escort service if the Iceland shuttle is abandoned.

6. That oil convoy will sail on a 52-54 day interval. This will provide a 6-day turnaround in U.K., and an 18-day turnaround in the Aruba area. During the 18-day turnaround, the escorts can be overhauled and serviced at Guantanamo, and within this period the tankers will make one round trip to New York with oil for that pool.

7. The next convoy under discussion was the oil convoy between Aruba and West Africa, the OT convoy. It was decided that this convoy would continue on a 28-day interval under the escort of U.S. vessels. That interval would permit the fast tankers in the OT convoy to shuttle oil to the New York pool under the same conditions as mentioned above for the CU convoys; that is, the U.S. escorts would escort the tankers from Aruba to Guantanamo where they would obtain their refitting and overhaul while the tankers proceeded independently between New York and Guantanamo.

8. Considering the requirements for the TORCH area, it was decided that the UGF-UGS convoy would sail on a 25-and 15 day interval, respectively. The present sailing interval for the UGS's is now 25 days, but the requirements in that area necessitated a shorter interval on these slow convoys. No adjustment in the escorts of the UGF convoys is required. One additional escort is required when the sailing interval of the UGS convoys is shortened to 15 days. This additional group is to be provided by the return of 4 destroyers now in the CU convoys, plus 2 additional destroyers which the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, states he can supply. Information at hand indicates that the port facilities in African ports are capable of handling the number of ships that will be expected to sail in the convoys on the above intervals. This matter has been discussed with Army representatives and a schedule for both these convoys, satisfactory to both the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and the Army Transportation Service, has been arranged. The 15-day interval on the UGS convoys will start with UGS-7, now scheduled to leave U.S. on 29 March.

9. Regarding shipping for Iceland, eastbound shipping for Iceland is currently sailed in every other SC convoy, and detached from that convoy south of Iceland to be escorted onward by local escorts. It is proposed that eastbound shipping for Iceland sail direct to the U. K. in appropriate HX or SC convoys, and thence to Iceland, via the UR-RU convoys. Some shipping time will be saved by reason of the fact that the sailing interval in the North Atlantic convoys has been reduced, and there is a possibility that one or two escorts in the Iceland area may be relieved for other service. In addition, the above proposal gives more freedom in the diversion of SC convoys. Consideration was also given to the retention of the present escort vessels in the Iceland area, with the idea that they act as a striking or support group that would be available to augment convoys, within their cruising radius, in the event that the convoy came under submarine attack.

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10. The U. S. coastal convoys will retain their present sailing intervals in order to meet the sailing intervals of the HX convoys.

11. At present there are 3 American ships in the "A" group of the mid-ocean escorts. The Admiralty members state that they are in a position to relieve these ships in late April. When these ships are relieved, it is possible to assign them to reinforce the Greenland patrol and thereby possibly provide 2 escort groups for the SC convoy.

12. The Committee is particularly anxious that note be taken of the fact that because of the reduction of escorts in the Western locals and U. S. coastal convoys, more reliance must be placed on air coverage. This is likewise applicable to the HX and SC convoys.

RECOMMENDATIONS

13. That the following reallocation of forces be made in the northern North Atlantic Area:

- (a) U.S. to withdraw Iceland shuttle escorts (4 destroyers, 3 Coast Guard cutters, 1 minesweeper).
- (b) Iceland shuttle service to be abandoned. Shipping for Iceland to proceed from North American ports to U.K., then in U.K. convoys to Iceland.
- (c) U.K. to furnish such local services in Iceland as are now performed by Iceland Shuttle escorts.
- (d) U.K. and Canada to furnish all escort vessels for HX, SC and ON convoys as set forth in A.C.C.-1. (See sub-paragraph (f)). Also for BX convoys.
- (e) U.S. to make available to U.K. until 1 July 1943 one group consisting of an auxiliary carrier and 5 operational destroyers to support HX, SC, ON convoy escorts. U.K. to maintain two such groups and Canada one support group (destroyers or corvettes) without carrier.
- (f) U.S. to withdraw U.S. vessels (3 Coast Guard cutters) now in HX, SC, ON escort service when U.K. can furnish replacement vessels.

14. That U.S. furnish escorts for following ocean convoys:

- (a) Canada - Greenland.
- (b) U.S. - Northwest Africa.

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- (c) Curacao - U.K. (oil). Escorts for this must come from present Iceland Shuttle; these vessels should be relieved by RN ships by 1 April:

Note: It is the intention of U.S. to furnish 2 ACV's to assist in protecting convoys (b) and (c) above.

15. That the following convoy plan be placed in effect, the closing of the cycle of HX - SC - ON convoys to become fully effective about 1 May 1943:-

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CONVOY PLAN

Convoy	Desig.	Av.No.of		Snd.	Days	Gps.	Esc.per	Total	Spares	Total
		Ships	Int.		Enr.					Escorts
Lidocean Escorts (Br-C)	SC-ONS	60	5	10	11					
	HX-ON	60	8	7.5	12.5	14	6	84	42	126
Western Locals (Br-C)	HX-SC	60	5	10	6					
	SC-ONS	60	8	7.5	7.5	8	4	32	8	40
Boston-Hallifax (Br-C)	BX-XB	30	4	7.5	2.5	3	4	12	3	15
UK-Russia (Br)	JW-RA	25	42	9	11	2	5	18	0	18
NF/Sydney-Greenland (US)	SG-GS	10	18	8	5	2	4	8	0	8
UK-Iceland (Br)	UR-RU	14	7	8	4	2	4	8	0	8
New York-Key West (US)	NK-KN	40	5	8	6.3	4	4	16	4	20
New York-Guantanamo (US)	NG-GN	40	5	8	7.5	5	4	20	5	25
Key West-Guantanamo (US)	KG-GK	10	10	8	3	2	4	8	2	10
Galveston-Key West (US)	HK-KH	25	5	8	4	4	4	16	4	20
Gtmo.-Aruba-Trinidad (US)	GAT-TAG	35	5	8	5.9	5	4	20	5	25
Guantanamo-Panama (US)	GZ-ZG	15	10	8	3.8	2	4	8	2	10
Trinidad-Bahia (US)	TB-BT	30	10	8	14	5	4	20	5	25
NY-Casablanca/Gibraltar (US)	UCF-GUF	23	25	14.5	12	2	9	18	0	18
NY-Casablanca/Gibraltar (US)	UGS-GUS	60	15	9	19	4	6	24	0	24
Curacao-UK (US)	CU-UC	12	54	14.5	15	1	9	9	2	11
Aruba-Casa./Gibraltar (US)	OT-TO	8	28	14.5	13	2	4	8	0	8
UK-Gibraltar/Freetown (Br)	KF/ WS-MKF	20	30	15	7/14	1	6	6	2	8
UK-Gibraltar/Freetown (Br)	MS/GS- KS/SL	55	20	9	12/16	3	6	18	6	24
UK-Gibraltar (Br)	OG-HG	40	30	7.5	13	1	6	6	2	8
TOTAL										451

Regraded Unclassified

APPENDIX "B" TO A.C.C. 2

APPENDIX "B" TO A.C.C. 2

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REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE ON ESCORTS

1. In discussing the escort situation, the Sub-Committee agreed that considerable benefit could be obtained from the periodic exchange of information between the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy regarding numbers of escort vessels available and the assignments of those vessels. To this end the various types of vessels suitable for escort duty were grouped in general classes, based on endurance and having regard for sea-keeping qualities. In addition a standard form was adopted to show assignments of vessels to areas in these general classes.

2. It is recommended that at the beginning of each month each Navy furnish the other two with copies of the list of assignments, with own numbers filled in as of the first of the appropriate month. In this manner all principal participants in the war against submarines will be kept informed of the overall situation with regard to vessels suitable for escort duty. It is believed that better coordination of effort will result from this exchange of information.

CLASSIFICATION OF VESSELS SUITABLE FOR ESCORT DUTY

1. For purposes of exchange of information between the Admiralty, NSHQ Ottawa and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, vessels suitable for escort duty will be divided into the following classes:

<u>Class</u>	<u>Letter</u>	<u>Endurance</u> <u>At 12 knots</u>
Fleet Destroyers	D	Over 3500 miles
Long Range	L	Over 3500 miles
Medium Range	M	2000 to 3500 miles
Short Range	S	Less than 2000 miles
Coastal	C	

2. It was agreed by representatives of the three Navies that vessels would be listed in the following classes:

<u>U.S.</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>Canadian</u>
<u>Fleet Destroyers</u>	<u>Fleet Destroyers</u>	<u>Fleet Destroyers</u>

* Includes high speed minesweepers, high speed transports, and seaplane tenders (which are ex-destroyers) which are ex-destroyers and may be used for escort duty.

** Fleet minesweepers (AM's and SAM's) have sufficient endurance to be classed as Long Range, but are suitable for long ocean convoys only under favorable weather conditions.

APPENDIX "B" TO A.C.C. 2

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Long Range

Converted old Des- troyers *	Frigates (TS Corv- ettes)	Frigates (TS Corv- ettes)
Cutters PGCG (327')	Cutters	
Frigates (TS Corv- ettes)	Sloops	
DE's	DE's	

Medium Range

Unconverted old Des- troyers	Escort Destroyers	Escort Destroyers
Corvettes (SS)	Corvettes (SS)	Corvettes (SS)
Fleet A/S Minesweep- ers (220') **	Fleet A/S Minesweep- ers (220') **	Algerine Class Escort Vessels
A/S Yachts (PG's)	Algerine Class A/S Minesweepers	Bangor Class A/S Minesweepers
PC's (180')	Bangor Class A/S Mine- sweepers (Diesel)	(Diesel)
	PC's (180')	

Short Range

A/S Minesweepers (180')	HUNT Class Destroy- ers	Bangor Class A/S Minesweepers
PC's (173')	Bangor Class A/S Minesweepers (Steam)	(Steam)
	A/S Minesweeping Trawlers	
	A/S Trawlers	

Coastal

SC's (110')	A/S Minesweeping Trawlers	Fairmile Motor Launches
YMS's	A/S Yachts (small)	A/S Yachts (small)
AMc's	Wairs	A/S Minesweeping Trawlers
A/S Yachts (small)		

* Includes high speed minesweepers, high speed transports, and seaplane tenders (destroyer), all of which are ex-destroyers and may be used for escort duty.

** Fleet minesweepers (AM's and BAM's) have sufficient endurance to be classed as Long Range, but are suitable for long ocean convoys only under favorable weather conditions.

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
CANADIAN MOST SECRET

_____ Navy

Date _____

VESSELS SUITABLE FOR ESCORT DUTY

Assignments						
	Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers	Antiaircraft Ships	Fleet Destroyers	Long Range Escorts	Medium Range Escorts	Short Range Escorts
<u>ATLANTIC AREAS</u>						
<u>Fleet Use</u>						
<u>Midoccean escort groups</u>						
<u>Western Locals</u>						
<u>Iceland</u>						
<u>St. Johns/Sydney - Greenland</u>						
<u>New York - Key West</u>						
<u>Galveston - Key West</u>						
<u>Key West - Guantanamo</u>						
<u>Guantanamo - Panama</u>						
<u>Guantanamo - Aruba - Trinidad</u>						
<u>Trinidad - Bahia</u>						
<u>New York - Casablanca (troop)</u>						
<u>New York - Casablanca (cargo)</u>						
<u>Curacao - U.K.</u>						
<u>Aruba - Casablanca</u>						
<u>U.K. - Iceland</u>						
<u>U.K. - Russia</u>						
<u>U.K. - Gibraltar/Freetown (troop)</u>						
<u>U.K. - Gibraltar/Freetown (cargo)</u>						
<u>U.K. - Gibraltar</u>						
<u>Coastal Escorts</u>						

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VESSELS SUITABLE FOR ESCORT DUTY

Navy

Date

VESSELS SUITABLE FOR ESCORT DUTY

Assignments	Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers	Antiaircraft Ships	Fleet Destroyers	Long Range Escorts	Medium Range Escorts	Short Range Escorts	Coastal Escorts
<u>ATLANTIC AREAS (Cont'd.)</u>							
<u>Ships refitting, converting or undergoing major repairs</u>							
<u>Ships working up and training</u>							
<u>TOTAL</u>							
<u>MEDITERRANEAN AREA</u>							
<u>Fleet Use</u>							
<u>Miscellaneous convoys</u>							
<u>Ships refitting, converting or undergoing major repairs</u>							
<u>Ships working up and training</u>							
<u>TOTAL</u>							
<u>LEVANT AREA</u>							
<u>Fleet Use</u>							
<u>Miscellaneous convoys</u>							
<u>Ships refitting, converting or undergoing major repairs</u>							
<u>Ships working up and training</u>							
<u>TOTAL</u>							

U.S. SECRET
 BRITISH MOST SECRET
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Navy

Date

VESSELS SUITABLE FOR ESCORT DUTY

	Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers	Antiaircraft Ships	Fleet Destroyers	Long Range Escorts	Medium Range Escorts	Short Range Escorts	Coastal Escorts
<u>Assignments</u>							
<u>PACIFIC AREAS</u>							
<u>Fleet Use</u>							
<u>Miscellaneous convoys</u>							
<u>Ships refitting, converting or undergoing major repairs</u>							
<u>Ships working up and training</u>							
<u>TOTAL</u>							
<u>INDIAN OCEAN</u>							
<u>Fleet use</u>							
<u>Miscellaneous convoys</u>							
<u>Ships refitting, converting or undergoing major repairs</u>							
<u>Ships working up and training</u>							
<u>TOTAL</u>							
<u>WEST AFRICA</u>							
<u>Fleet use</u>							
<u>Miscellaneous convoys</u>							
<u>Ships refitting, converting or undergoing major repairs</u>							
<u>Ships working up and training</u>							
<u>TOTAL</u>							

Navy

Date _____

Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers

Antiaircraft Ships

Fleet Destroyers

Long Range Escorts

Medium Range Escorts

Short Range Escorts

Coastal Escorts

SOUTH AFRICA

Fleet use

Miscellaneous convoys

Ships refitting, converting or undergoing
major repairs

Ships working up and training

TOTAL

GRAND TOTAL

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BRITISH MOST SECRET
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APPENDIX "C" TO A.C.C. 2


STATEMENT FOR RECORD BY VICE ADMIRAL MOORE
REGARDING RUSSIAN COMMITMENTS

1. VICE ADMIRAL EDWARDS asked VICE ADMIRAL MOORE (regarding the Russian convoys) if he would make a statement that it is the intention of the Admiralty to continue these convoys on not more than the present scale unless major operations interfere.

VICE ADMIRAL MOORE replied;

"Yes. It is our intention to continue running the convoys to Russia. The maximum size the Commander In Chief Home Fleet is prepared to take at present is 30 ships, and it will be approximately a 42-day cycle. But that must be subject to the operational requirements in other parts of Europe and also to the results of each convoy and the experience gained, depending upon the enemy action in North Russia and Russian waters. That is our present intention, a 42-day cycle, and 30 ships in a convoy."

2. The Secretary was directed to enter the above statement in the record.


J. F. BOWLING,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
Secretary,

A.C.C. 2

App. "C"

A.C.C.-3/1

March 12, 1943.

ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

AIR SUPPORT

Recommendation and Comment by Sub-Committee
On Coordination and Implementation

(Previous reference A.C.C. 4th Meeting, Item 5; A.C.C. 6)

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N

1. It is recommended that measures to accelerate production (up to 1 July, 1943) of "immediate minimum requirements" of A/S aircraft be limited to such action as the services concerned can take without interference with production schedules. There should be no large diversion of aircraft earmarked for other theaters of war, but 128 VLR aircraft in addition to 132 now in sight as set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 below, are needed with such urgency as to warrant recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff arrange to supply them immediately by diversion from other planned deployments.

2. It is recommended that countries concerned estimate A/S aviation requirements for the period subsequent to 1 July, 1943, for their respective areas of A/S air responsibility and take steps to insure procurement as rapidly as possible.

C O M M E N T

3. Special equipment for A/S planes is not prospectively available in quantity materially exceeding the planned output of A/S aircraft up to 1 July, 1943, but enough possibly can be found to equip the planes referred to above. However, planes can be used with a reasonable degree of effectiveness without Radar and other special ASW equipment.

4. In view of the shortages of aircraft in all theaters of active operation it would be most undesirable to divert to ASW any large number of aircraft now earmarked for these theaters, but the urgent need for a total of 260 VLR for A/S operations justifies the recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff explore the possibilities of diverting 128 to ASW in addition to the 132 which are to be assigned by 1 June in accordance with present plans.

5. Present plans provide for concentrating in the most critical areas--the North Atlantic convoy route and N. W. Africa--all VLR to become available (ready to operate) within the next few months. This will provide for the following distribution, which is not only not adequate for these areas, but leaves the less critical areas unduly exposed:

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- (a) NW Africa. U. S. Army now has 2 squadrons of B-24's (LR) in this area. These will be replaced at an early date by B-24's (VLR), and will be maintained at a level of 24 operational planes.
- (b) UK-Iceland. British (as stated by Air Vice Marshall Durston) plan following deployment of VLR planes:

Now in operation	15
By 1 April	15
1 June	15
1 July	15
	60

- (c) Newfoundland. U. S. plans following deployment of VLR planes (Data as to planned deployment furnished by Vice Admiral Edwards for U. S. Navy and by Brigadier General E. L. Eubank for the U. S. Army Air Force.):

By 1 April	12	(Army LR to be replaced by VLR beginning in April)
1 May	12	(Army)
	12	(Navy)
1 June	12	(Army)
	48	

6. The maximum possible use of ACV is necessary to augment the scanty escorts and air cover that can be provided for convoy protection. It is understood that UK and US contemplate assigning the maximum possible number of ACV's to convoy protection duty.

7. With respect to Canada's responsibility for the Labrador-Newfoundland-Canada A/S air area (as outlined in A.C.C. 1), it must be recognized that Canada does not have--now or in prospect--any VLR aircraft but does have about 200 crews trained in ASW and familiar with flying conditions in the area. Assignment of U. S. planes to operate under Canadian control, as now contemplated, is necessary to take care of the immediate situation. It would appear appropriate for Canada to bring before the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff the question of allocating VLR to RCAF.

8. U. S. representatives submit as a matter of record that the U. S. policy is to avoid freezing any A/S aviation to any particular area. The general plan is to regard all A/S

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air units as available for shifting from time to time to areas where the need is greatest. However, in view of the critical situation on the northern convoy route, it is agreed that there should be a definite commitment of U. S. VLR planes to the Newfoundland area for the period ending 1 July, 1943, when the situation should be re-examined.

H. M. Wilson

H. M. WILSON,
Commander R. N.

J. G. Mackinlay

J. G. MACKINLAY,
Commander, R. C. V. R.

J. F. Bowling

J. F. BOWLING,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy
Secretary.

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Copy No. 59

A.C.C. #3

March 4, 1943.

ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

AIR SUPPORT FOR ATLANTIC CONVOYS

(Previous reference: A.C.C. First Meeting, Item 9.)

1. A sub-committee was directed by the above reference to study and make recommendations in regard to AIR SUPPORT FOR ATLANTIC CONVOYS.

2. The Conference accepted the report and recommended that it be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for consideration of the possibility of accelerating the supply of aircraft listed in the category "immediate minimum requirements." The report follows as Appendix "A".

Representatives:
Admiral P. W. L. ...
Admiral A. C. ...
Captain H. M. ...
Captain M. B. ...
Commander J. F. W. ...
Commander B. C. ...

H. M. Wilson

H. M. WILSON,
Commander, R. N.

J. G. MacKinnon

J. G. MACKINNON,
Commander, R. C. V. R.

J. F. Bowling

J. F. BOWLING,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
Secretary.

APPENDIX "A" TO A.C.C. 3

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REPORT BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIR SUPPORT FOR
ATLANTIC CONVOYS

The Committee met on the afternoon of March 1, 1943. The general subject was discussed and the Committee then proceeded with the work involved in formulating its report.

MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE

Admiralty Representatives:

Air Vice Marshal A. Durston, C.B., A.F.C.
Group Captain C. W. Dicken, R. A. F.
Group Captain J. W. Merer, R. A. F.

Canadian Representatives:

Air Vice Marshal N. R. Anderson, R.C.A.F.
Group Captain A. P. Campbell, R.C.A.F.
Group Captain M. Costello, R.C.A.F.
Group Captain A.L. James, R.C.A.F.

U.S. Army Representatives:

Brigadier General W. T. Larson, U.S.A.
Colonel G. C. Mc Henry, U.S.A.
Lieutenant Colonel E. D. Reynolds, U.S.A.

U.S. Navy Representatives:

Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U.S.N.
Rear Admiral A.C. Davis, U.S.N.
Captain H. M. Mullinix, U.S.N.
Captain M. B. Gardner, U.S.N.
Commander J. P. W. Vest, U.S.N.
Commander B. C. Mc Caffree, U.S.N.

APPENDIX "A" TO A.C.C. 3

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REPORT BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIR SUPPORT FOR
ATLANTIC CONVOYS

Annexes:

Annex A - Immediate Minimum Requirements, Present Strength, and Combined Tentative Deployment of Anti-Submarine Aircraft.

Annex B - Availability of Bases for Operation of Anti-Submarine Aircraft.

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

1. The purpose of the following study is to determine:
 - (a) The number of shore-based anti-submarine aircraft required to provide adequate protection for Atlantic convoys.
 - (b) The availability and deployment of aircraft for this task now and in future.
 - (c) Availability of bases for operation of these aircraft.

DISCUSSION

Extent of Air Cover.

2. In this study, the minimum number of operational shore-based aircraft considered to be adequate to provide air cover for convoys has been assessed approximately on the following basis:

- (a) One aircraft for each convoy throughout daylight hours.
- (b) One aircraft for every two convoys throughout hours of darkness.
- (c) The large fast troop transports which are normally unaccompanied by surface escort are considered as convoys.

3. The Immediate Minimum Requirements of aircraft are based primarily on giving air protection to convoys and do not provide for sustained offensive operations not directly related to convoys in the various areas.

4. This paper does not bring under consideration the lighter-than-aircraft operating in and planned for certain areas, nor the short range shore based aircraft.

Number of Aircraft.

5. The minimum number of anti-submarine aircraft required in each area on the above basis is shown in Annex "A". It is emphasized that these figures are the actual operational strength of aircraft and do not include reserves which will naturally vary with the local maintenance and operational factors in the particular theatre of operations.

Availability of Bases.

6. The bases available for the operation of the above aircraft are shown in Annex "B".

7. In connection with the operation of very long range (V.L.R.) aircraft (land plane), it is considered that unless the approaches are unobstructed, the length of the main aerodrome runway should be 6,000 feet minimum.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8. That the present number of V.L.R. aircraft, as indicated in Annex "A", is not sufficient to provide adequate A/S coverage of convoys.

9. That the present numbers of aircraft in the LR and MR categories are adequate for immediate minimum needs provided the deficiencies in aircraft in the VLR category are made good, at which time a readjustment of deployment should be made. Attention is invited to the fact that many of present LR and MR aircraft are of obsolescent types and should be replaced with types having better performance.

10. That the number of V.L.R. aircraft required should be provided at as early a date as possible, bearing in mind that early assignments will bear greater returns proportionately than the same assignments later.

11. Existing bases in the Atlantic are adequate for the operation of the required aircraft except:

(a) Iceland. The field at Reykjavik is useless for V.L.R. aircraft operations. The immediate operation of V.L.R. aircraft (land plane) from Iceland requires that Meeks Field be made available.

(b) Greenland. Present communications are unsatisfactory by reason of magnetic disturbance. Low frequency radio may provide satisfactory communication and its use should be investigated. The approaches to Bluie West I are not satisfactory for all-weather operation. If good communications can be provided, Bluie West I can be used as an alternate landing field in conjunction with other North Atlantic bases, with the possibility of intermittent operation of aircraft from this field.

(c) Southeast Atlantic. Many of the bases necessary for aircraft for the anti-submarine protection of convoys on the West Coast of Africa are in being. Several bases have yet to be established or developed. Sufficient aircraft for the full scheme of protection of convoys are not yet available, but it is expected that these bases will be completed by the time aircraft are available.

DEPLOYMENT OF ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT

- VLR - Very long range. Effective operational radius greater than 600 miles (range 2,000 miles plus). Include Coronado, specially fitted B.24 and specially fitted Halifax.
- LR - Long Range. Effective operational radius up to 600 miles (range up to 2,000 miles). Include B.24, B.17, Sunderland, Catalina, Mariner, Ventura (P.V.1), Halifax.
- MR - Medium Range. Effective operational radius up to 400 miles (range up to 1,200 miles). Include B.25, Hudson, Wellington, Whitley, Ventura (P.V.3).

	IMMEDIATE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS			PRESENT STRENGTH			COMBINED TENTATIVE DEPLOYMENTS as of July 1, 1943.		
	VLR	LR	MR	VLR	LR	MR	VLR	LR	MR
U.K.-Iceland	120	96	160	52	186	120	52	192	100
N.W. Atlantic (Nova Scotia to Greenland)	36	48	72	0	39	75	24	108 ^b	72
U.S. Atlantic	24	48	48	0	22	160	80 ^a	101	96
Caribbean	24	72	48	0	48	60	12	84	0
S. America	12	108	0	0	36	0	0	48	0
S.W. Africa	0	0	120	0	0	60	0	0	60
W. Africa	0	57	32	0	36	37	0	36	37
Gib.-N.W. Africa	20	36	29	0	36	60	24	36	60
Bermuda	12	12	0	0	12	0	12	12	0
Ascension	12	12	0	0	0	8	0	0	0
TOTAL	260	489	500	52	415	580	204	617	425
	Total 1249			Total 1047			Total 1246		

- Notes: a - 80 Army AF a/c shown in this theater pending re-assignment.
- b - 4 Sqdns. U.S. Navy, 1 sqdn. U.S. Army, 4 sqdns. R.C.A.F. (uncoordinated tentative deployment by U.S. Navy, U.S. Army and R.C.A.F.)

The combined tentative deployment as of July 1, 1943 is regrouped as follows:

	VLR	LR	MR
R.A.F.	52	228	257
R.C.A.F.	-	48	72
U.S. Navy	36	324	-
U.S. Army	116	17	96
	<u>204</u>	<u>617</u>	<u>425</u>

The number of aircraft listed under the caption, "Combined Tentative Deployment as of July 1, 1943," represents the combined proposed deployment of anti-submarine warfare aircraft as of that date by the Royal Air Force, Royal Canadian Air Force, U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army. These numbers were arrived at through independent and uncoordinated planning. The deployment to areas as indicated does not represent the firm assignment of the aircraft to these strategic areas.

Note: Gibraltar-H.W. Africa area extends southwards from Latitude 43°N to Latitude 26°N.

W. Africa area extends from latitude 26°N Southwards to latitude 10°S.

S.W. Africa area extends from latitude 10°S to the Cape of Good Hope.

Antigua	12 a/c	Yes	Suitable for minor operation - can be improved.
Bahia	12 a/c	Yes	
San Luis	12 a/c	Yes	Suitable for minor operation - can be improved.
Porto Rico	12 a/c	Yes	Suitable for minor operation - can be improved.
Montal	36 a/c	Yes	
Recife	12 a/c	Yes	
Bahia (Aratu)	12 a/c	No	
Acossion	12 a/c	Yes	Clear approaches
Pernambuco, Brazil	12 a/c	Yes	Clear approach 5774 being extended to 7000. Est. date of availability April 30th.

U.S. Navy

Georgetown, B.B.	3 a/c
Montal	12 a/c
Aratu (Bahia)	12 a/c

Georgetown, B.B.

U.S. Navy

Porto Rico	24 a/c	Yes	Capacity based on dispersed positions - suitable for minor operations.
Antigua	12 a/c	Yes	Suitable for minor operations.
St. Lucia Island	12 a/c	Yes	Suitable for minor operations.
Wallis Field	12 a/c	Yes	Suitable for minor operations.
Edinburgh, Trinidad	36 a/c	Yes	
Verona, Jamaica	36 a/c	Yes	Unlimited capacity - can be used.

AVAILABILITY OF BASES FOR OPERATION OF
 ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT

Base	Aircraft Capacity Land	Sea	Suitable for V.L.R.	Remarks
<u>SOUTH AMERICAN AREA</u>				
<u>U.S. Army</u>				
Atkinson	12 a/c		Yes	Suitable for minimum operation - can be improved.
Campesina, Cuba	12 a/c		No	
Zandery, Cuba	12 a/c		Yes	Suitable for minimum operation - can be improved.
Belem	12 a/c		Yes	
Sao Linz	12 a/c		Yes	Suitable for minimum operation - can be improved
Fortaleza	12 a/c		Yes	Suitable for minimum operation - can be improved
Natal	36 a/c		Yes	
Recife	12 a/c		Yes	
Bahia (Aratu)	12 a/c		No	
Ascension	12 a/c		Yes	Clear approaches
Fernando Noronha, Brazil	12 a/c		Yes	Clear approach 5772 being extended to 7000. Est. date of availability April 30th.
<u>U.S. Navy</u>				
Georgetown, B.G.		3 a/c	Yes	
Natal		12 a/c	Yes	
Aratu (Bahia)		12 a/c	Yes	
<u>CARIBBEAN AREA</u>				
<u>U.S. Army</u>				
Borinquen	24 a/c		Yes	Capacity based on dispersed position - suitable for minimum operations.
Antigua	12 a/c		Yes	Suitable for minimum operations.
St. Lucia Island	12 a/c		Yes	Suitable for minimum operations.
Waller Field	12 a/c		Yes	Suitable for minimum operations.
Edinburgh, Trinidad	36 a/c		Yes	
Vernam, Jamaica	36 a/c		Yes	Unlimited approach can be extended.

Base	Aircraft Land	Capacity Sea	Suitable for V.L.R.	Remarks
<u>CARIBBEAN AREA</u>				
<u>U.S. Navy</u>				
Camaguey, Cuba	12 a/c		No	Communications not satisfactory. Plan under consideration to provide landline. The 4000 ft. runway is to be extended to 11,000 ft.
Guantanamo, Cuba	24 a/c		No	Same as Camaguey. Has been used by trans-Atlantic aircraft for some years. The approaches to Camaguey are good and V.L.R. should be able to operate there satisfactorily. Only one runway but it is into prevailing wind. Communications not satisfactory for A/E.
Gt. Exuma, Bahamas		12 a/c		
Jamaica		12 a/c		
Coco Solo, Pan.	12 a/c	48 a/c	No	
San Juan, P.R.	24 a/c	48 a/c	No	
St. Thomas, V.I.		12 a/c		
Antigua, B.W.I.		12 a/c		
Trinidad, B.W.I.		36 a/c		
<u>NORTH AMERICAN (U.S.) AREA</u>				
<u>U.S. Army</u>				
Grenier	24 a/c		Yes	
Westover	24 a/c		Yes	
New York	-		No	Not suitable
Langley Field	12 a/c		Yes	
Charleston, S.C.	12 a/c		Yes	
Miami	12 a/c		Yes	
New Orleans	-		No	Not suitable
Galveston	12 a/c		Yes	
Jacksonville	12 a/c		Yes	
<u>U.S. Navy</u>				
Quonset	24 a/c	48 a/c	Yes	
New York	36 a/c		Yes	
Norfolk	12 a/c	24 a/c	No	
Elizabeth City		24 a/c		
Cherry Point	24 a/c		Yes	
Charleston		12 a/c		
Jacksonville	12 a/c	24 a/c	Yes	
Panama River		6 a/c		
Miami	12 a/c		No	
Key West	24 a/c	36 a/c	No	
Bermuda	12 a/c	24 a/c	Yes	

Base	Aircraft Capacity		Suitable for	Remarks
	Land	Sea	V.L.R.	
<u>NORTH AMERICA (CANADIAN) AREA</u>				
<u>U.S. Army</u>				
Goose Bay, Lab.	15 a/c or	15 a/c	Yes	Communications not satisfactory. Plan under consideration to provide landline.
Gander, N.F.	45 a/c	15 a/c	Yes (See Note 1)	The 4800 ft. runway is to be extended to 6000 ft. Note 1: Gander has been used by trans-Atlantic aircraft for some years. The approaches to Gander are good and V.L.R. should be able to operate there satisfactorily. Only one runway but it is into prevailing wind. Communications not satisfactory for A/S warfare.
Blair West 1, G.	15 a/c		No	
<u>U.S. Navy</u>				
Argentia, N.F.	45 a/c	45 a/c	(See Note 2)	
<u>Canadian</u>				
Botwood, N.F.		30 a/c	No	Note 2: These aerodromes have 5000 ft.
Torrey, N.F.	30 a/c		(See Note 2)	runways with good approaches and may be suitable for V.L.R. a/c operation. They can be used in any event as auxiliary aerodromes.
Stephenville, N.F.	30 a/c		(See Note 2)	
Sydney, N.S.	30 a/c		(See Note 2)	
North Sydney, N.S.		15 a/c	No	
Dartmouth, N.S.	30 a/c	30 a/c	Yes	
Yarmouth, N.S.	30 a/c		(See Note 2)	
Debert, N.S.	(Training School)		(See Note 2)	
Greenwood, N.S.	"	"	No	
Shelburne, N.S.		15 a/c	No	
Chatham, N.B.	15 a/c		(See Note 2)	
Gaspe, Que.		15 a/c	No	
Mont Joli, Que.	15 a/c		No	
Seven Islands, Que.				Now under construction. 3 6000 ft. runways to be provided.

Base	Aircraft Capacity		Suitable for	Remarks
	Land	Sea	V.L.R.	
<u>ICELAND</u>				
<u>U.S. Army</u> Reykjavik			No	
Meeks Field	36 a/c		Yes	
<u>UNITED KINGDOM</u>				
A large number of bases are available.				
<u>N.W. AFRICA</u>				
Port Lyautey	24 a/c		Yes	
Casablanca	12 a/c		No	
Agadir	12 a/c		Yes	Under construction until April 30th
<u>W. AFRICA</u>				
Port Etienne	12 a/c	12 F/Bs	Not at present	Facilities for operation of flying boats should be available mid-March. Slipway will be completed about Oct. 1, 1943. Aerodrome being extended with ENE/WSW runway lengthened to 6000 ft. French intend to operate Hudsons from there.
Dakar	Steel mat runway completed 2/28/43			
Lagos		12 F/Bs	No	Moorings and accommodations are available. There is an R.A.F. Maintenance Unit at Lagos in connection with Takoradi a/c delivery route. Also 2 aerodromes but both are fully in use. The closing down of M.U. may provide further accommodation.

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A.C.C. #4

March 4, 1943.

ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

TRAINING AND MATERIAL READINESS OF OPERATIONAL ESCORT GROUPS

(Previous Reference: A.C.C. First Meeting, Item 9.)

1. A sub-committee was directed by the above reference to study and make recommendations in regard to TRAINING AND MATERIAL READINESS OF OPERATIONAL ESCORT GROUPS (SURFACE CRAFT AND AIRCRAFT).

2. The report of the sub-committee was accepted by the Conference, which concurred in the recommendations, and recommends that they be referred for consideration to the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Naval Staff Canada and the Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet, with special reference to the need for more submarines for A/SW Training. The report follows as Appendix "A".

H. M. Wilson

H. M. WILSON,
Commander, R. N.

J. G. Mackenlay

J. G. MACKENLAY,
Commander, R. C. V. R.

J. P. Bowling

J. P. BOWLING,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
Secretary.

A.C.C. 4

APPENDIX "A" TO A.C.C. 4.

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March 3, 1943.

ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

Minutes of the meeting of the Sub-Committee on Training and Material Readiness of Operational Escort Groups.

Committee Members Rear Admiral J. L. Kauffman, USN
 Chairman and Steering Member.
 Rear Admiral J. M. Mansfield, RN
 Captain U. B. Creery, RCN
 Captain C. R. Todd, USN
 Captain Paul Cassard, USN
 Col. G. C. McHenry, USAAF.
 Group Captain J. H. Greswell, RAF
 Group Captain A. P. Campbell, RCAF
 Commander H. M. Wilson, RN
 Lt. Cdr. H. R. McKibben, USN
 Lieut. D. G. Irvine, USN

SUBJECT of the conference: Training and Material Readiness of Operational Escort Groups (Surface Craft and Air Craft).

1. The report of the sub-committee on "Training of Anti-submarine Forces to the Combined Chiefs of Staffs Planners on Measures to Combat the Submarine Menace" was referenced and its conclusions on "Training of Anti-submarine Forces" adopted as a basis for discussion.

NOTE: The report referred to above has only a limited distribution. The report that follows is complete without need for reference thereto.

2. It was decided that discussion would be in general terms only, and that for purposes of discussion the subject would be subdivided as follows:

I. Training:

- (A) Surface craft.
 - (1) Single ships.
 - (a) New construction.
 - (b) Refresher courses.
 - (2) Group training.
 - (3) Coordinated training between ships and aircraft.
- (B) Aircraft.
 - (1) Night and day training.
 - (2) Basic and single aircraft training.
 - (3) Squadron shakedown and working up.
 - (4) Coordinated training between planes and ships.

II. Material Readiness.

- (A) Surface craft.
- (B) Aircraft.

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3. SURFACE ESCORT BASIC TRAINING

The following points were brought out in the discussion.

(a) Due to the necessity for utilizing anti-submarine ships for various purposes, basic training for these ships must include training in both anti-aircraft and surface gunnery and in torpedo firing, in addition to purely ASW training.

(b) The attached diagram of the proposed basic DE training program was introduced by the USN and discussed. RN and RCN basic training for surface escorts was discussed. In general, the flow is from "paid off" ships to manning depots and pools, augmented with the product of recruit schools. From pools and depots to commissioning yards. From yards to the shakedown base. The RN stated the system was satisfactory for the RN as long as the allotted time and syllabus were strictly adhered to. The RCN state their system is similar and satisfactory except that engineer artificer training has not been satisfactory in the past. Measures have been taken which should overcome the difficulty.

(c) It was agreed that though the systems differed they were considered to be generally satisfactory.

(d) The members wish to stress the importance of training of engineering personnel along with the training in purely ASW matters. It is agreed that the training of engineers in maintenance has not been sufficiently emphasized in shakedown programs.

(e) It was agreed that the Officer in Charge of basic training should be given wide powers to decide when a ship has reached a satisfactory state of training before its release to the operating authority. If operating forces find it necessary to utilize ships during shakedown periods that the ship so utilized must be returned to the shakedown base to complete its training.

4. REFRESHER TRAINING.

(a) It was agreed that individual ships and groups after becoming part of operational forces must continue their training at every opportunity.

(b) It was agreed that the shortage of tame submarines assigned for training purposes for both surface and air, is seriously affecting the war effort. And further that no opportunity for utilizing operating submarines for training purposes should be missed. To date the provision of tame submarines for the U. S. air forces has been practically non-existent.

5. SYNTHETIC TRAINING AIDS. It was agreed:

(a) That the development of synthetic training aids was considered most important and should be given high priority and further, that all types of synthetic training aids should be widely distributed to the anti-submarine forces of the United Nations, particularly at convoy bases and escort centers.

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(b) That the development of synthetic training aids for surface craft has produced satisfactory types but that the production and distribution of these devices must be expedited.

(c) That the air forces lack chiefly ASW synthetic bombing trainers, and further that some type of satisfactory ASW synthetic bombing trainer should be developed, produced, and distributed widely throughout Sea Frontiers and all operating areas.

(d) The RCN "action room" - a type of realistic training mock-up - was discussed. It was agreed that it is not a substitute for sea training but is complementary to it and as such has considerable value.

6. TECHNICAL DEVICES AND WEAPONS.

Paragraph 79 of the reference report is quoted below and concurred in fully by the Committee:

"That a continuously functioning central agency, with representatives from desired United Nations, be provided.

- (a) To obtain earlier and closer coordination of technical effort, development, and production along anti-submarine lines.
- (b) To maintain a joint list of recommended priorities of development along technical lines and production after development."

7. AIR ESCORT BASIC TRAINING.

It was agreed that air personnel detailed to ASW duty should have specialized ASW training, as crews, in the type aircraft which they will operate, prior to joining an operating ASW squadron. While this training is not now provided in all cases, plans have been formulated to accomplish the above objective.

8. SURFACE GROUP TRAINING.

(a) The advantages of the group system were discussed and it was agreed that the system has great merit and should be adhered to. The group system has proved itself to be the best form of anti-submarine organization for surface escorts.

(b) It was agreed that separate Group Commanders should be assigned to command escort groups who should not be burdened with the command of an individual ship in the group. His duties should be primarily operational in character. He should conduct ASW operations at sea and personally supervise sea and harbor training of his group.

(c) An adequate staff for the Group Commander must be provided which should consist of at least:

- (1) One Communication/Radar/HFDF officer, together with the necessary technical and coding board assistants.
- (2) One A/S specialist officer.

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(d) It was agreed that to provide a proper foundation on which to build operational training, the committee strongly recommends that an adequate number of units of each type of air and surface craft, currently in use in ASW operations, be specifically assigned for training of nucleus crews for the expanded construction program of ASW forces.

9. COORDINATED SURFACE AND AIR TRAINING.

(a) The Committee considers that the principal requirement in coordinated operations of surface and air ASW units is effective inter-communication between all units by both visual and radio channels. The effectiveness of inter-communication between air and surface units at present is not satisfactory in either visual or radio channels and must be improved.

(b) Training should be coordinated at the bases to achieve the following objectives:

- (1) To familiarize surface escort personnel with the appearance and capabilities of aircraft and vice versa.
- (2) To familiarize surface escort personnel with ASW tactics employed by ASW aircraft.
- (3) To familiarize and train aircraft personnel with the convoy and escort formations and the tactics to be used under all conditions.

(c) It was agreed that, as well as the training at bases, it would be desirable to have joint training centers where surface and air personnel could be given joint training in ASW operations. Whenever practicable, units should receive training at these joint training centers before becoming operational.

10. PERSONNEL

The problem of stabilizing ASW personnel was discussed at length. It was agreed that:

- (a) Personnel trained in ASW, both surface and air, should be shifted about as little as possible and particularly should not be shifted out of ASW duty.
- (b) The vital importance of all phases of ASW and its relation to the total war effort should be stressed and publicized.
- (c) The problem of leave, liberty, and relaxation of escort crews was discussed. It was agreed that the problem is important and is closely related to morale and quality of performance of duty.

11. MATERIAL READINESS, SURFACE CRAFT.

(a) The Committee agrees that in order to obtain the full effectiveness of ASW units, an adequate force of trained maintenance personnel and facilities should be provided at all operating bases. However, in addition, the operating personnel

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of each unit must be constantly instructed and supervised in order that operational breakdowns and lay-ups will be reduced to an absolute minimum, and that maximum operational performance can be obtained at all times.

(b) The Committee desires to emphasize the fact that, with the inexperienced personnel which we are now forced to utilize in all activities, there must be more training and supervision of actual operations at sea.

12. MATERIAL READINESS, AIRCRAFT.

The joint air forces considered that the present state of material readiness of aircraft is satisfactory.

1. That more "lean" submarines must be provided for training both air and surface craft as their lack is seriously affecting the war effort.

2. That there be continued development of synthetic training aids for surface and air forces, not as a substitute for sea training but as complementary thereto.

3. That an organization be established for the purpose of coordinating procedures and tactics of ASW operations.

4. That particular attention be given to specialized ASW training for crews of aircraft prior to their joining an operating ASW squadron.

5. That the group system of operating ASW forces be universally adopted and the integrity of groups maintained.

6. That separate group commanders be assigned to command ASW groups whenever this is physically possible; the Group Commander to be provided with an adequate staff.

7. That an adequate number of units of each type of air and surface craft be assigned for training ASW personnel.

8. That immediate steps be taken to coordinate training between surface and air craft with particular emphasis on communications.

9. That centers for joint training of air and surface ASW forces be established.

10. That the transfer to duties not concerned with the prosecution of ASW of personnel specially trained for and experienced in ASW be held to an absolute minimum.

11. That trained technicians be assigned to each operating ASW group to supervise actual operations at sea during off-duty periods so that operators' effective manpower be increased and the operating efficiency of unsatisfactory units can be taken.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That, in addition to ASW training, all ASW units must be given basic training in the use of all combatant weapons with which they are fitted.
2. That the training of operating engineering personnel in own ship operation and maintenance be stressed equally with that of ASW personnel.
3. That, except in grave emergencies, ships should not be turned over to operating units until their basic training has been completed.
4. That "Refresher" training is considered essential and that all operating schedules must be drawn up with this in mind.
5. That more "tame" submarines must be provided for training both air and surface craft as their lack is seriously affecting the war effort.
6. That there be continued development of synthetic training aids for surface and air forces, not as a substitute for sea training but as complementary thereto.
7. That an organization be established for the purpose of standardizing procedures and tactics of ASW operations.
8. That particular attention be given to specialized ASW training for crews of aircraft prior to their joining an operating ASW squadron.
9. That the group system of operating ASW forces be universally adopted and the integrity of groups maintained.
10. That separate group commanders be assigned to command escort groups whenever this is physically possible; the Group Commander to be provided with an adequate staff.
11. That an adequate number of units of each type of air and surface craft be assigned for training ASW personnel.
12. That immediate steps be taken to coordinate training between surface and air craft with particular emphasis on communications.
13. That centers for joint training of air and surface ASW forces be established.
14. That the transfer to duties not concerned with the prosecution of ASW, of personnel specially trained for and experienced in ASW, be held to an absolute minimum.
15. That trained technicians be assigned to each operating commander to supervise actual operations at sea during refresher training periods so that necessary corrective measures to increase the operating efficiency of unsatisfactory units can be taken.

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March 4, 1943

ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE


COMMUNICATIONS AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

(Previous Reference A.C.C. First Meeting, Item 9.)


1. A sub-committee was directed by the above reference to study and make recommendations in regard to COMMUNICATIONS AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

2. The report of the sub-committee, Appendix "A", was accepted by the Conference with the following additional recommendations:


- (a) That recommendations A-3 and C-1 be referred to the Combined Communications Board for study and recommendations as to implementation.
- (b) That recommendation B-1 be referred to the Admiralty, Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa and the Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet for consideration.
- (c) That recommendation D-1 be referred to the Chief of the Canadian Air Staff and the Chief of Staff U. S. Army for consideration of the advisability of carrying out this recommendation as a combined Canada-U. S. project.
- (d) That action on recommendation D-2 be deferred pending receipt of report of the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board.



H. M. WILSON,
Commander, R. N.



J. G. MACKINLAY,
Commander, R. C. V. R.



J. F. BOWLING,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.
Secretary.

A.C.C. 5

APPENDIX "A" to A. C. C. 5.

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SPECIAL SUB-COMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

I. The subject of communications covers too wide a field to be dealt with in more than a cursory fashion in the time at the disposal of this sub-committee, nor is the Committee composed of members qualified to reach decisions on some of the technical points involved. However, the Committee has discussed the general problems with those officers responsible for communications or their representatives.

II. Conclusions and recommendations on the subjects are as follows:

A. D/F Network

1. Active efforts to improve equipment, organization and technique are noted.
2. The plans to extend the D/F net southward on both sides of the Atlantic are noted. The Committee recommends that this extension be given a high priority.
3. The Committee recommends that improved communication services to accomplish the following be given a high priority:

(a) To expedite the interchange of bearings between Washington and London and between London and Ottawa. (Ref. paragraph C(b))

(b) To expedite the transmission of bearings from stations well placed to provide longitudinal cuts. This relates particularly to stations in Iceland, Greenland, Sierra Leone and Georgetown. (British Guiana)

B. Convoy Communications

1. These are, in general, satisfactory, but delays in some operational messages and intelligence messages appear excessive. As a recent example, a delay of 2-3 hours in diverting convoy TA-36 was noted. The Committee recommends that:

(a) "Battle organizations" be developed to handle convoy communications by convoy diverting authorities in Admiralty, Naval Service Headquarters and U. S. Navy Department. This "Battle organization" should be adjacent to the operational authority and the plotting room; should have its own specialized staff; have direct reception and remote control of transmitters.

(b) The Halifax high power low frequency radio station be completed as soon as possible since this station is essential to satisfactory communications on the HX, SC, ON convoy routes.

APPENDIX "A" to A. C. C. 5

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C. Trans-Atlantic Communications

1. The further improvement of trans-Atlantic communications is considered to be essential. It is recommended that:

- (a) Direct high frequency radio circuits between CinCMA and Halifax be allocated immediately. Two-way remote control working to be developed as soon as practicable.
- (b) The provision of teletypewriter facilities with automatic coding and decoding, using existing cable and radio facilities between the following authorities be provided as an urgent requirement.

- 1. Admiralty to Navy Department.
 - 2. Gibraltar to Navy Department.
 - 3. CinCMA to Halifax.
 - 4. Between Intelligence Centers.
- (See A 3 (a))

D. Air Communications.

1. The air communication problem has not been dealt with but the following points have been noted:

- (a) Reliable communications from St. Johns, Newfoundland to Goose Bay are urgently needed.
- (b) Voice circuits from Halifax to St. Johns, Newfoundland are urgently needed.

If (b) is accomplished, this will complete voice communications between all Canadian Air Bases on the East Coast.

2. It is recommended that consideration be given to providing communication facilities between air commands suitable for the prosecuting of anti-submarine warfare throughout the North and South Atlantic Ocean Areas, and that these developments be carefully coordinated between the authorities concerned. It is recommended that the Combined Communications Board is a proper body to effect this coordination.

E. New Technical Developments.

1. The application of new technical developments, including Radar and Loren have not been considered by this committee.

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March 12, 1943. ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF SUB-COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

(Previous Reference: A.C.C. Fourth Meeting, Item 5.)

1. It is recommended that the implementation of A.C.C. 1, A.C.C. 4 and A.C.C. 5 be as indicated in the action of the Conference as a whole, as indicated on the cover sheets of the papers concerned.

2. This sub-committee submits comment and recommendation concerning A.C.C. 2 and A.C.C. 3, in a form suitable for prefixing to each of those papers.

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J. G. Mackinlay
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J. F. Bowling
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