

FOIA Marker

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National Security Council - European Affairs

Bekkering, Michelle - Chron Files

Stack:	Row:	Sect.:	Shelf:	Pos.:	FRC ID:	Location or Hollinger ID:
V	17	10	2	1	35172	1000002500

Folder Title:

January 2003 [4]

Withdrawn/Redacted Material

The George W. Bush Library

DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
030	Briefing	[Briefing]	2	01/23/2003	P1/b1; P5;
030a	Talking Points	[Talking Points]	1	N.D.	P1/b1; P5;
031a	Briefing	[Briefing]	2	01/24/2003	P1/b1; P5;
031b	Talking Points	[Talking Points]	1	N.D.	P1/b1; P5;
032c	Briefing	[Briefing]	2	01/22/2003	P1/b1; P5;
032d	Talking Points	[Talking Points]	1	01/23/2003	P1/b1; P5;
032f	Draft	[Briefing]	2	01/22/2003	P1/b1; P5;
032g	Draft	[Briefing]	2	01/23/2003	P1/b1; P5;

COLLECTION TITLE:

National Security Council - European Affairs

SERIES:

Bekkering, Michelle - Chron Files

FOLDER TITLE:

January 2003 [4]

FRC ID:

35172

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

Deed of Gift Restrictions

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
032h	Draft	[Talking Points]	1	N.D.	P1/b1; P5;
033a	Memorandum	[Memorandum] - To: Condoleezza Rice - From: Badley A. Blakeman	1	01/23/2003	P1/b1;
035	Memorandum	[Memorandum] - To: Steve Hadley - From: Pam Quanrud	1	01/17/2003	P1/b1;
035a	Memorandum	[Memorandum]	1	N.D.	P1/b1; P3/b3;
035b	Summary of Conclusions	[Summary of Conclusions]	2	01/16/2003	P1/b1; P3/b3; P5;
036a	Memorandum	Memorandum for the President - To: POTUS - From: Condoleezza Rice	2	N.D.	P1/b1; P5;
036b	Letter	[Letter]	2	N.D.	P1/b1; P5;

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036c	Letter	[Letter]	2	01/16/2003	P1/b1; P5;
037d	Memorandum	[Memorandum] - To: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs - From: Executive Secretary	2	01/15/2003	P1/b1;
038a	Memorandum	Memorandum for the President - To: POTUS - From: Condoleezza Rice and David Hobbs	2	N.D.	P5;
039a	Memcon	Summary Memorandum of Conversation	6	01/13/2003	P1/b1; P5;
040	Memorandum	[Memorandum] - To: Gary Edson - From: Pam Quanrud	1	01/14/2003	P1/b1;
040a	Memorandum	[Memorandum]	1	N.D.	P1/b1; P3/b3;
040b	Summary of Conclusions	[Summary of Conclusions]	3	01/14/2003	P1/b1; P3/b3; P5;

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FRC ID:

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OA Num.:

NSC 0935

NARA Num.:**FOIA IDs and Segments:**

2014-0090-F

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0578

January 23, 2003

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE

THROUGH: DANIEL FRIED *DF*FROM: KURT VOLKER *DF*SUBJECT: President's Telephone Call with NATO Secretary
General Lord Robertson

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding briefing material for his telephone call with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson on Friday, January 23, 2003.

Concurrence by: Kori Schake *KS*RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 1/23/13

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4(B), Sept. 11, 2006

By NH NARA, Date 6/16/14

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0300562
RECEIVED: 22 JAN 03 14

32

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: RICE

DOC DATE: 22 JAN 03
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCALL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMO FOR TELCALL W/ PRES OF RUSSIA 23 JAN 03

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 28 JAN 03 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: QUANRUD

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FRIED

NSC CHRON

QUANRUD

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEAH

CLOSED BY: NSMCR

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4(B), Sept. 11, 2006
By NH NARA, Date 7/7/14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 0300562

32a

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 RICE
002 PRESIDENT
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 03012214 FOR DECISION
Z 03012217 FOR INFORMATION
X 03012411 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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By NH NARA, Date 7/7/14

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSEPROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0562URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARSBYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 11/12/70

SEQUENCE TO INITIAL/DATE DISPOSITION

HAINES _____

WEDDERIEN _____

LOEWER _____

PRAY _____

SCHULTE _____

EDSON _____

HADLEY _____

RICE _____

SITUATION ROOM _____

WEST WING DESK _____

RECORDS MGMT. _____


A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

05/10/70 10:10

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE

922

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0562

32e

January 22, 2003

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE

THROUGH: DANIEL FRIED *DF*

FROM: PAMELA QUANRUB *PQ*

SUBJECT: Briefing Memorandum for the President's Telephone
Call to Russian President Vladimir Putin

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum and talking points for the
President's telephone call to President Putin on January 23, 2003.

Concurrences by: Mike Green *MG*, John Rood *JR*, Frank Klotz *FK*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: 01/22/13

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The George W. Bush Library

FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Draft	[Briefing]	2	01/22/2003	P1/b1; P5;

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COLLECTION:

National Security Council - European Affairs

SERIES:

Bekkering, Michelle - Chron Files

FOLDER TITLE:

January 2003 [4]

FRC ID:

35172

OA Num.:

NSC 0935

NARA Num.:

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2014-0090-F

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Draft	[Briefing]	2	01/23/2003	P1/b1; P5;

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Draft	[Talking Points]	1	N.D.	P1/b1; P5;

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0530

January 21, 2003

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE

THROUGH: DANIEL FRIED 

FROM: PAM QUANRUD 

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for Telephone Call to Russian
President Putin

Attached at Tab I is a schedule proposal for the President's
telephone call to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Concurrences by:  Michael Green, John Rood

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Schedule Proposal

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Memorandum	[Memorandum] - To: Condoleezza Rice - From: Badley A. Blakeman	1	01/23/2003	P1/b1;

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 21, 2003

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE

THROUGH: DAN FRIED *DF*

FROM: MATT BRYZA *MB*

SUBJECT: Presidential Greeting for President
Shevardnadze's 75th Birthday

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a greeting commemorating President Shevardnadze's 75th birthday.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Birthday Greeting for President Shevardnadze

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT: Greetings in Honor of the 75th Birthday of
President Shevardnadze of Georgia

Purpose

To commemorate President Shevardnadze's 75th birthday.

Background

President Shevardnadze will celebrate his 75th birthday on January 25. The attached letter conveys your birthday greetings and encourages President Shevardnadze to stay the course on counterterrorism and political and economic reform.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Birthday Greeting to President Shevardnadze

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
Vice President's
Chief of Staff

*Presidential
Small Bull
letterhead*

His Excellency
Eduard Shevardnadze
President of Georgia
Tbilisi

Dear Mr. President:

Congratulations on the occasion of your 75th birthday. You have made profound contributions to some of the most significant events of the latter part of this three-quarters of a century. This includes laying the foundation of an independent and democratic Georgia that could become a cornerstone of peace, prosperity, and freedom in the Caucasus. I wish you continuing health, strength, and wisdom as you strive to complete this important mission, and look forward to deepening our cooperation on counterterrorism and advancing Georgia's political and economic reforms.

Sincerely,

George W. Bush

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Memorandum	[Memorandum] - To: Steve Hadley - From: Pam Quanrud	1	01/17/2003	P1/b1;

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Memorandum	[Memorandum]	1	N.D.	P1/b1; P3/b3; 50 USC 403g, sec 6.

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Summary of Conclusions	[Summary of Conclusions]	2	01/16/2003	P1/b1; P3/b3; P5; 50 USC 403g, sec. 6

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 21, 2003

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE

THROUGH: DANIEL FRIED *DF*

FROM: JOE WOOD *JW*

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister Gul of Turkey

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a letter to Prime Minister Abdullah Gul of Turkey. Marc Grossman and General Casey have cleared the draft letter.

The NSC received the incoming correspondence on January 17, 2003.

Concurrence by: Eric Edelman, Pam Quanrud, Elliott Abrams *EE/PQ/EA*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum in Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Prime Minister Gul
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Memorandum	Memorandum for the President - To: POTUS - From: Condoleezza Rice	2	N.D.	P1/b1; P5;

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 0300476
RECEIVED: 17 JAN 03 12

37

TO: SCHULTE

FROM: HOFMANN, K

DOC DATE: 23 JAN 03
SOURCE REF: 200301236

KEYWORDS: ITALY
FOREIGN TRAVEL

GERMANY

PERSONS: RUMSFELD, D

SUBJECT: FORN TRAVEL APPROVAL FOR SEC DEF RUMSFELD TO ITALY & GERMANY
6 - 9 FEB 03

ACTION: RECD STATE COMMENTS

DUE DATE: 23 JAN 03 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VOLKER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

FRIED

NSC CHRON

VOLKER

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWL

CLOSED BY: NSEML

DOC 4 OF 4

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4(B), Sept. 11, 2006
By NH NARA, Date 7/7/14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 0300476

37a

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 VOLKER
001 STATE
002 RICE
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004

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 03011712 CONCURRENCE TO EXEC SECRETARY
Z 03011712 COMMENTS/CONCURRENCE
Z 03011718 FOR DECISION
X 03012013 PRAY SGD MEMO
X 03012409 RECD STATE COMMENTS

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

001 030115 HOFMANN, K

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4(B), Sept. 11, 2006
By NH NARA, Date 7/7/14

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL

S/S: 200301236

Date: January 23, 2003

FOR: Gregory L. Schulte
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: Mr. Karl Hoffman
FROM: Col. James A. Whitmore
DATE: January 23, 2003
SUBJECT: Travel request of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to travel to Italy and Germany February 6-9, 2003 to meet with counterparts, and as appropriate, senior government officials, and to meet with U.S. troops.

WH Referral Date: January 15, 2003

ID# (if any): 0300476

Attached item was sent directly to the Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

☐ A draft reply is attached.
☐ A translation is attached.
☐ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
☐ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
☒ We have no objection to the above proposed travel.
☐ Other (See remarks.)

Office of the
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4(B), July 21, 1997
By NH NARA, Date 7/7/14

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 0300476

REFERRAL

DATE: 17 JAN 03

MEMORANDUM FOR: HOFMANN, K

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRAY, J

SOURCE: WHITMORE, J

DATE: 15 JAN 03

SUBJ: FORN TRAVEL REQUEST FOR SEC DEF TO ITALY & GERMANY ON 7 - 9 FEB

REQUIRED ACTION: ~~COMMENTS/CONCURRENCE~~

DUE DATE: 01 FEB 03

COMMENT:

FOR

John W. Ficklin

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

REC'd in PMU
on 1/17 AT 6:30 PM
HEW

Withdrawal Marker

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Memorandum	[Memorandum] - To: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs - From: Executive Secretary	2	01/15/2003	P1/b1;

**This marker identifies the original location of the withdrawn item listed above.
For a complete list of items withdrawn from this folder, see the
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet at the front of the folder.**

COLLECTION:

National Security Council - European Affairs

SERIES:

Bekkering, Michelle - Chron Files

FOLDER TITLE:

January 2003 [4]

FRC ID:

35172

OA Num.:

NSC 0935

NARA Num.:

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2014-0090-F

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0394

January 27, 2003

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE

THROUGH: DANIEL FRIED *DF*

FROM: LISA TEPPER *LT*

SUBJECT: Kosovo Benchmarks Report

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he approve the Congressionally mandated report on the progress made in achieving the Kosovo benchmarks (Tab A) and Message to Congress regarding the report (Tab B). Department of Defense prepared the report, which was coordinated through the interagency process. This submission covers developments from June 15 through December 31, 2002.

The NSC received the incoming correspondence on January 15, 2003.

Concurrences by: Kori Schake, Jock Scharfen, Robert Wilkie, Mike Anton *3/1/03*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Report to Congress
Tab B Message to Congress
Tab C Copy of Regulations
Tab D Incoming Correspondence
Tab II Press Points

Withdrawal Marker

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Memorandum	Memorandum for the President - To: POTUS - From: Condoleezza Rice and David Hobbs	2	N.D.	P5;

**This marker identifies the original location of the withdrawn item listed above.
For a complete list of items withdrawn from this folder, see the
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet at the front of the folder.**

COLLECTION:

National Security Council - European Affairs

SERIES:

Bekkering, Michelle - Chron Files

FOLDER TITLE:

January 2003 [4]

FRC ID:

35172

OA Num.:

NSC 0935

NARA Num.:**FOIA IDs and Segments:**

2014-0090-F

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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KOSOVO BENCHMARKS

INTRODUCTION

Section 1212(a) of Public Law 106-398, The Floyd D. Spence, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (the Act), requires that "The President shall develop militarily significant benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the withdrawal of the U.S. military presence in Kosovo." Pursuant to Section 1212(b) of the Act, I am providing a report prepared by my Administration to Congress on progress in Kosovo toward achieving such militarily significant benchmarks. The report details developments from June 15 to December 31, 2002.

The Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers of NATO took important decisions during their Spring 2002 ministerials regarding a regional approach in the Balkans, including Kosovo. As a result of those decisions, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) was scheduled to be reduced from 36,000 as of June 2002 to 32,000 by December 2002, and 29,400 by June 2003. In fact, KFOR actual troop strength has already dropped below the level of committed troop contributions. More recently, NATO Heads of State noted the Joint Operations Area Implementation Update at the Prague Summit in November 2002, and called for exploration of options for further rationalization and force restructuring.

BACKGROUND

The benchmarks measure progress in achieving a sustainable peace in Kosovo. The objectives and tasks were drawn from several important documents: the NATO Operation Plan for Kosovo (OPLAN 10413); United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 (1999); the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between KFOR and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Republic of Serbia; and the Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (the Undertaking).

Significant progress has been made in Kosovo since the establishment of KFOR and the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR has completed several military tasks specified in OPLAN 10413 and UNSCR 1244. The remaining tasks are of a continuous or recurring nature and provide for the unimpeded operation of UNMIK, freedom of movement for minorities, and the safe return of displaced persons and

refugees. KFOR efforts have helped UNMIK to make substantial progress in implementing UNSCR 1244: reconstruction is well-advanced, free and fair elections held three times, more than 5,200 multi-ethnic Kosovo police trained and deployed, and a new constitutional framework for provisional self-government promulgated.

Security challenges remain in the form of ethnically oriented, political extremist and criminally motivated armed groups who threaten to compromise these accomplishments, both through their actions in Kosovo and to a lesser extent in southern Serbia and Macedonia. Rather than Yugoslav and Serbian forces posing a continued risk, these internal factors are now the primary threat to public security within Kosovo. KFOR and UNMIK will have to continue to cooperate over the coming months to deter and disrupt the activities of these groups, and continue to ensure stability in Kosovo and, by extension, the surrounding region. Increased refugee and IDP returns, problems with the continued ethnic division of North Mitrovica, potential International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indictments, arrests of high-profile Kosovar political or criminal figures, demarcation of the Kosovo-Macedonia border, and decentralization of political power will present additional challenges. Kosovo's greatest challenge now is the development of governmental, economic, social, and security infrastructures capable of providing a safe, secure, and prosperous environment for all its inhabitants.

PROGRESS REVIEW

The benchmarks depict progress on four overarching tasks and related objectives that will allow for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Kosovo. They are: Military Stability; Public Security; Border and Boundary Issues; and, War Crimes.

1. Task: Military Stability

Objectives:

- Withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian Security Forces from Kosovo.
- Demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovar-Albanian groups.
- Deterrence of renewed hostilities, maintenance and, where necessary, enforcement of the cease-fire.

Progress on these objectives and the benchmarks associated with them has been very good. FRY forces have withdrawn from Kosovo and have adhered to all military agreements, the Kosovo Liberation Army has been demilitarized and there are no ongoing hostilities in Kosovo.

Benchmarks:

a. The cease-fire has been maintained and FRY has adhered to the MTA

The rampant ethnic cleansing and the killing of spring 1999 is now history and neither party to the conflict has resumed military action. FRY forces left Kosovo as called for in the MTA. In 2001 and 2002, NATO oversaw reductions in the Air Safety Zone (ASZ); in 2001 FRY forces returned to the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) in southern Serbia as part of a political agreement to end fighting between government forces and ethnic Albanian groups in southern Serbia. This benchmark is essentially accomplished although both the ASZ and GSZ remain under KFOR authority.

b. KLA has been demilitarized and transformed in compliance with the Undertaking

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) ceased to exist on September 20, 1999. Many former KLA members entered the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), now a civil emergency response force, or the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). This benchmark is essentially accomplished.

c. Establishment of the KPC and low incidence of officer non-compliance

The KPC was created in 1999 out of demobilized KLA troops. UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 authorizes the KPC to engage in disaster response, search and rescue, and infrastructure rebuilding activities. The KPC is permitted no role in law enforcement, security or defense. KFOR and UNMIK jointly supervise the KPC. Authorized strength is 5,000 members; by the end of 2002 just under 2,000 had moved from active to reserve status. Ten percent of the KPC positions are reserved for ethnic minorities, although to date only some 100 Serbs and other minorities have joined. In 2002 UNMIK budgeted 11.16 million for KPC salaries, operating expenses and capital outlays. The United States has funded additional training for first aid, land navigation, fire

fighting, and other activities. A goal of the United States and UNMIK for 2003 is to further reform the KPC through functional and structural changes.

One of the primary purposes for the establishment of the KPC was to provide transparency to the process of demilitarizing the KLA. While some individual members of the KPC are involved in supporting extremism and organized crime, since the KPC was established, documented non-compliance has declined from 35 incidents per month to as few as 4 per month, to include such incidents as illegal possession of weapons and ammunition, and celebratory gunfire. Though additional work remains to be done to further professionalize the KPC as a civilian organization and broaden its ethnic and gender base, this benchmark is essentially accomplished.

d. FRY and Kosovars participate in the Joint Implementation Commission

The Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) was established in accordance with the MTA and given two key mandates: ensure compliance with the MTA, and demilitarize the KLA. JICs have been established at two echelons -- at KFOR Headquarters and at each of the five Multinational Brigades (MNBs). Meetings between KFOR, Yugoslav Army (VJ), FRY Ministry of Interior Police (MUP), UNMIK CIVPOL, FRY JIC, International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and Border Police occur on a regular basis. Agendas range from administrative issues such as ID cards to security issues such as VJ/MUP manned contact points on/near the administrative boundary. The JICs have facilitated training for the KPC in first aid, fire fighting, land navigation, identification of unexploded ordnance, construction, and humanitarian relief. This benchmark is essentially accomplished.

e. End of Offensive Activities by armed groups

Large armed groups are no longer active in Kosovo proper, but ethnic Albanian armed groups (EAAGs) in southern Serbia and in Macedonia have used Kosovo as a supply route and base for recruiting and fundraising. KFOR and UNMIK police have been active in apprehending members of these groups and their supporters, and the United States Government has repeatedly reminded Kosovo's political leaders and the KPC that any support for the insurgents' activities is not

acceptable. This benchmark is essentially accomplished although it requires continued monitoring.

2. Task: Public Security

Objectives:

- Establishment and maintenance of a secure environment for the operation of UNMIK, the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the safe return of a considerably increased number of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in 2003.
- Ensure protection and freedom of movement for KFOR, UNMIK, and other International Organizations (IOs).
- Transfer responsibility for public safety and order when either UNMIK or newly elected Kosovar authorities can take responsibility for this function.

Significant progress has been achieved toward the benchmarks related to these objectives, but continued progress in the area of public security will require a strong continued commitment by the international community to provide resources for rule of law and other security programs.

Benchmarks:

a. UNMIK safely conducts its mission

UNMIK has regional administrations in each KFOR MNB, headed by an international administrator and staffed by a mixture of international and local staff. Additionally, there are UNMIK offices in each of Kosovo's 30 municipalities. UNMIK success stories include promulgation of the Constitutional Framework, holding of municipal elections twice and province-wide elections once, registration of and distribution of ID cards to nearly one million Kosovars, and issuance of over 345,000 travel documents recognized in 29 countries. In all UNMIK endeavors (except North Mitrovica) -- from travel to governance -- UNMIK has been able to safely conduct its mission.

b. IOs travel without disruption of their activities

Travel in Kosovo by IOs is generally unimpeded. Serb residents in northern Kosovo sporadically established roadblocks in Serb majority areas, but alternative routes were available to IOs with little or no disruption of their activities. This benchmark is essentially accomplished.

c. Humanitarian relief delivered

Humanitarian relief was one of the original UNMIK pillars, led by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but as humanitarian needs abated, the UNMIK humanitarian pillar ceased operations in June 2000. UNMIK has institutionalized the delivery of goods and services to Kosovo's neediest populations through a system of Centers for Social Work. These centers ensure poor, isolated and/or minority communities have the goods and services they require. This benchmark is essentially accomplished.

d. Initial demining efforts accomplished and responsibility transferred to requisite civilian authorities

Since June 1999, over 20,000 mines, 13,000 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO), and 6,700 cluster bomb units (CBU) have been located and destroyed. Over 25 million square meters of land have been cleared and returned to use. There have been 16 different international demining organizations involved in mine awareness activities; and mine awareness has been incorporated into the Kosovo school system curriculum. While KFOR's mandate is concerned only with minefields that impede its mission, KFOR soldiers continue to mark newly discovered minefields for demining by accredited civilian agencies. Also, the KPC has been trained to conduct emergency explosive ordnance disposal services and is primarily responsible for UXO deactivation or destruction. The overall result of this concentrated effort has been a drastic reduction in mine/UXO/CBU-related casualties although lethal incidents sometimes still occur. In light of these operating procedures, this benchmark is essentially accomplished.

e. Elections held in secure environment

Local assemblies and governments have been established in all of Kosovo's 30 municipalities, including most Serb-dominated ones in the north. Kosovo municipal elections in 2000 and again in 2002 were in accordance with international standards as were Kosovo-wide elections in 2001. Overall voter turnout within Kosovo has been high but with a downward trend. The absence of significant election-related violence indicates a general stabilization of the political environment in Kosovo. UNMIK Police, KPS, and KFOR worked together to help ensure these first-ever

democratic provincial elections were not marred by any significant violence. In spring 2002, the Assembly elected a President and a Prime Minister to head Kosovo's provisional government which will continue until new elections in 2004. This benchmark is essentially accomplished.

f. Parallel institutions dissolved and pose no threat to KFOR and/or UNMIK authority

The fledgling Kosovo provisional government is working to govern the province with less assistance from UNMIK, KFOR, and the international community (IC). Programs to train government leaders and bolster efforts at effective administration have helped the provisional government to assume increased responsibility and demonstrate increasing effectiveness. However, the slow pace of legislation to date and remaining international influence in areas not reserved to UNMIK remain problematic; considerably more needs to be done to ensure effective self-government at both the Kosovo and municipal levels and to achieve UNMIK benchmarks in the rule of law, returns, the economy, and other areas. Particularly in North Mitrovica, and elsewhere throughout Kosovo, UNMIK needs to implement its plan for decentralization to ensure effective administration and rights for Serbs and other minorities at the sub-municipal level. At the same time, Serbian parallel institutions primarily in the areas of health, education, and judiciary and law enforcement, need to cease functioning to allow UNMIK to fully establish their authority under UNSCR 1244. While this is occurring, UNMIK acknowledges the continued need for Belgrade to supplement the salaries of health care workers and educators as an incentive for them to remain in Kosovo.

g. KFOR transfers criminal cases to UNMIK/Kosovo Transitional Government for investigation, prosecution, and detention; and sufficient civilian prisons and detention facilities are established

UNMIK judicial officials and UNMIK CIVPOL and KPS, conduct all criminal investigations in Kosovo. When KFOR apprehends a suspect, he/she can be turned over to UNMIK for action under the Special Representative's "executive detention" authority pending UNMIK (or local) criminal charges being filed. Under his own authority, COMKFOR can confine individuals on the basis that they pose a threat to

a safe and secure environment. KFOR maintains detention facilities for individuals at Camp Bondsteel. UNMIK maintains eight detention facilities Kosovo-wide and one prison near Ishtok in northwest Kosovo.

h. Adequate court system for criminal cases transferred to UNMIK

Since June 1999, UNMIK has established a Kosovo supreme court, five district courts, 18 municipal courts, 23 "minor offenses courts," one "high court of minor offenses," one commercial court, and 13 prosecutor's offices. While UNMIK has appointed more than 400 local judges and prosecutors, only 320 are currently working in those positions. Additionally, a total of 28 international judges and prosecutors are assigned to the district courts and the supreme court. Trials are conducted in all five district courts, the supreme court, and lower courts. Thus, there is an embryonic court system in place; however, concerns continue over the ability of the criminal courts to apply the law fairly due to the inexperience of many of the judges and prosecutors, suspected intimidation, and the outdated socialist criminal code still applicable in Kosovo. Judicial training conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-run Kosovo Judicial Institute is beginning to address this problem. Some cases referred by KFOR to UNMIK are difficult to prosecute due to evidentiary problems. KFOR soldiers are not trained criminal investigators, and often the information gathered by KFOR is classified. As a result, some criminal cases are dismissed by UNMIK due to a lack of prosecutable evidence. UNMIK and KFOR are working together to resolve these issues and UNMIK has made many notable arrests and convictions in 2002. Adequate witness protection is a problem as well.

i. Core KPS police training is completed and effective

The OSCE administers the Kosovo Police Service School, which has graduated over 5,200 Kosovar police trainees. Graduate trainees go on to complete field training and assume independent patrol responsibilities (with UNMIK police oversight). The operational control of two police stations has been turned over to the KPS. Advanced training phases are being conducted at the KPS School to create specialized capacities, including training supervisors, criminal investigators, forensics specialists,

traffic officers, and close protection specialists. The United States is initiating further specialized training in areas such as civil disorder management and advanced criminal investigations. Anti-Serb violence has shown an overall downward trend, although serious periodic incidents continue to mar progress and freedom of movement remains problematic without KFOR escort. UNMIK police and KPS have assumed full responsibility in Pristina, Prizren, Gniljane, and Peja regions and share responsibility with KFOR in Mitrovica. This benchmark is essentially accomplished although the KPS requires further expansion, experience, and training.

- j. UNMIK and KPS assume primacy for tactical police responsibilities; and, UNMIK Special Police Unit and KPS are capable to respond to civil disturbances.

UNMIK Police, working with KPS, has assumed full primacy in Pristina, Prizren, Gjilan, and Peja regions; and shares primacy with KFOR in Mitrovica, where they have begun to assert more authority to address the remaining challenge from members of violent "bridge gangs." UNMIK generally has been able to handle civil disturbances through the use of its Special Police Units (SPUs) that react to any civil disturbances throughout Kosovo. KPS has assumed primary responsibility for patrol functions. As part of two agreements with KFOR, UNMIK police have taken on greater responsibility for border functions and the roving patrols of patrimonial sites, and other infrastructure sites.

- k. Some displaced persons and refugees able to return home safely

Displaced Kosovo Albanians began returning to their homes in June 1999, concomitant with the entry of NATO forces into Kosovo. To date, over one million people have returned and begun rebuilding their lives. By contrast, significant difficulties remain in the area of minority returns. More than 200,000 Serbs, Roma, and other minorities remain displaced outside of Kosovo, most in Serbia. While modest progress has been made to date, and in 2002 returns outpaced departures for the first time, UNMIK anticipates that there will be a significant increase in international community facilitated returns beginning in spring 2003. Continued KFOR cooperation with UNHCR and UNMIK will play a key part in making these returns safe and sustainable.

Freedom of movement remains a problem for many Serbs and Roma who remain in Kosovo, most of whom live in difficult circumstances in isolated enclaves. Most require KFOR escort each time they venture out to ensure their safety; however, for others freedom of movement has improved significantly and KFOR has removed a number of fixed checkpoints, particularly in the MNB-E area.

3. Task: Border and Boundary Issues

Objectives:

- Monitor international and provincial boundaries.
- Inhibit traffic of persons or materials supporting insurgency and illegal goods.
- Transfer border responsibilities to local authorities.

Benchmarks:

- a. The FRY respects the Ground and Air Safety Zones as stipulated in the MTA and at the discretion of the KFOR commander

The Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) and Air Safety Zone (ASZ), 5- and 25- kilometer "buffer zones" respectively around Kosovo, were established to prevent boundary incidents or reentry into Kosovo by FRY security forces. The FRY has respected the zones from their inception. Following the change of government in Yugoslavia and a concomitant improvement in the relationship with NATO and KFOR, FRY security forces were allowed to reenter the GSZ in the spring of 2001. Reentry was conducted successfully and in a professional manner. Similarly, the Air Safety Zone was reduced to 10-kilometers and in Fall 2002 to 5-kilometers. This benchmark is essentially accomplished.

- b. Illegal border crossings inhibited; and UNMIK or indigenous border service in place to monitor provincial and international border crossings

Kosovo's boundaries are generally unmarked and in many areas lie in rough, mountainous terrain. Attempts to demarcate the Kosovo-Macedonia border under the 2001 FRY-Macedonia Border Treaty in the near future could be particularly problematic as inhabitants traditionally have crisscrossed the borders freely. UNMIK established five

official border crossing points, including the Pristina airport, where UNMIK police control immigration and collect tariffs. KFOR actively supports UNMIK in this role, regularly patrolling borders and employing monitoring technology. Also, a border-crossing section of the KPS has been established. Net assessment of combined efforts is that illegal border crossings have been significantly reduced, although much remains to be done. The installation at the airport and border points of entry of a positive identification and tracking system remains a high priority.

4. Task: War Crimes

Objective:

- Full cooperation of the international security presence with the ICTY.

The objective of this benchmark is of an ongoing nature for the international community, continuing until the work of the ICTY is completed. ICTY chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte has said publicly on several occasions that there will be indictments of senior former KLA figures in Kosovo. UNMIK is investigating possible prosecutions as well, and at the end of 2002 an UNMIK court consisting of three international judges convicted and sentenced five former KLA figures for war crimes against other Kosovar Albanians.

Benchmark:

a. KFOR assists and supports ICTY

KFOR actively supports the collection of evidence by ICTY, and provides area security for exhumations. The United States deployed two FBI forensic investigative teams to Kosovo at a cost of \$5 million, and provided an additional \$8.5 million for ICTY investigative costs associated with Kosovo war crimes. In November 2002, SACEUR noted that NATO remains committed to supporting efforts to bring persons indicted for war crimes to justice and has stated that the physical presence of NATO in the Balkans is continuing to help deter hostilities. Should the ICTY issue indictments for Kosovars, KFOR will be called upon to help manage large and possible violent demonstrations that will almost certainly result, and might need to assist in the apprehension and transfer of indicted individuals.

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

Pursuant to section 1212 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Public Law 106-398, I hereby submit a report, prepared by my Administration, on the progress made in achieving the militarily significant benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the withdrawal of the United States military presence in Kosovo.

The term "militarily significant" relates to tasks and objectives significant from a military standpoint that once accomplished, would allow for withdrawal of military forces from Kosovo. In the establishment of the Kosovo benchmarks, four critical tasks for NATO forces were identified: military stability, public security, border/boundary issues, and war crimes/support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Objectives for these tasks were drawn from United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, the NATO Operations Plan, the Military Technical Agreement, and the Kosovo Liberation Army Undertaking.

I anticipate that KFOR -- and U.S. participation in it -- will gradually reduce in size as public security conditions improve and Kosovars assume increasing responsibility for their own self-government.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Oct. 30

DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND ENERGY—APPROPRIATIONS

For Legislative History of Act, see Report for P.L. 106-398 in U.S.C.C. & A.N. Legislative History

Section

For Signing Statement of Act, see Statement for P.L. 106-398 in U.S.C.C. & A.N. Legislative History

Section

An Act To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Incorporation
by reference.

SECTION 1. ENACTMENT OF FISCAL YEAR 2001 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT.

The provisions of H.R. 5408 of the 106th Congress, as introduced on October 6, 2000, are hereby enacted into law.

1 USC 112
note.

SEC. 2. PUBLICATION OF ACT.

In publishing this Act in slip form and in the United States Statutes at Large pursuant to section 112 of title 1, United States Code, the Archivist of the United States shall include after the date of approval an appendix setting forth the text of the bill referred to in section 1.

Approved October 30, 2000.

SECTION 1.

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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 4205 (S. 2549) (S. 2550):

HOUSE REPORTS: Nos. 106-616 (Comm. on Armed Services) and 106-945 (Comm. of Conference).

SENATE REPORTS: No. 106-292 accompanying S. 2549 (Comm. on Armed Services).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 146 (2000):

May 17, 18, considered and passed House.

July 13, considered and passed Senate, amended.

Oct. 11, House agreed to conference report.

Oct. 12, Senate agreed to conference report.

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 36 (2000):

Oct. 30, Presidential statement.

* ENDNOTE: The following appendix was added pursuant to the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of this Act.

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Sec. 1123. Extension of authority for tuition reimbursement and training for civilian employees in the defense acquisition workforce.

Subtitle D—Other Benefits

Sec. 1131. Additional special pay for foreign language proficiency beneficial for United States national security interests.

Sec. 1132. Approval authority for cash awards in excess of \$10,000.

Sec. 1133. Leave for crews of certain vessels.

Sec. 1134. Life insurance for emergency essential Department of Defense employees.

Subtitle E—Intelligence Civilian Personnel

Sec. 1141. Expansion of defense civilian intelligence personnel system positions.

Sec. 1142. Increase in number of positions authorized for the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service.

Subtitle F—Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay and Early Retirement Authority

Sec. 1151. Extension, revision, and expansion of authorities for use of voluntary separation incentive pay and voluntary early retirement.

Sec. 1152. Department of Defense employee voluntary early retirement authority.

Sec. 1153. Limitations.

TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER NATIONS

Subtitle A—Matters Related to Arms Control

Sec. 1201. Support of United Nations-sponsored efforts to inspect and monitor Iraqi weapons activities.

Sec. 1202. Support of consultations on Arab and Israeli arms control and regional security issues.

Sec. 1203. Furnishing of nuclear test monitoring equipment to foreign governments.

Sec. 1204. Additional matters for annual report on transfers of militarily sensitive technology to countries and entities of concern.

Subtitle B—Matters Relating to the Balkans

Sec. 1211. Annual report assessing effect of continued operations in the Balkans region on readiness to execute the national military strategy.

Sec. 1212. Situation in the Balkans.

Sec. 1213. Semiannual report on Kosovo peacekeeping.

Subtitle C—North Atlantic Treaty Organization and United States Forces in Europe

Sec. 1221. NATO fair burdensharing.

Sec. 1222. Repeal of restriction preventing cooperative airlift support through acquisition and cross-servicing agreements.

Sec. 1223. GAO study on the benefits and costs of United States military engagement in Europe.

Subtitle D—Other Matters

Sec. 1231. Joint data exchange center with Russian Federation on early warning systems and notification of ballistic missile launches.

Sec. 1232. Report on sharing and exchange of ballistic missile launch early warning data.

Sec. 1233. Annual report of Communist Chinese military companies operating in the United States.

Sec. 1234. Adjustment of composite theoretical performance levels of high performance computers.

Sec. 1235. Increased authority to provide health care services as humanitarian and civic assistance.

Sec. 1236. Sense of Congress regarding the use of children as soldiers.

Sec. 1237. Sense of Congress regarding undersea rescue and recovery.

Sec. 1238. United States-China Security Review Commission.

TITLE XIII—COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION WITH STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Sec. 1301. Specification of cooperative threat reduction programs and funds.

Sec. 1302. Funding allocations.

Sec. 1303. Prohibition on use of funds for elimination of conventional weapons.

Sec. 1304. Limitations on use of funds for fissile material storage facility.

Sec. 1305. Limitation on use of funds to support warhead dismantlement processing.

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SPONSORED EFFORTS TO WEAPONS ACTIVITIES.

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“(2) as part of any such conveyance or provision of equipment, install such equipment on foreign territory or in international waters.

“(b) AGREEMENT REQUIRED.—Nuclear test explosion monitoring equipment may be conveyed or otherwise provided under subsection (a) only pursuant to the terms of an agreement between the United States and the foreign government receiving the equipment in which the recipient foreign government agrees—

“(1) to provide the United States with timely access to the data produced, collected, or generated by the equipment;

“(2) to permit the Secretary of Defense to take such measures as the Secretary considers necessary to inspect, test, maintain, repair, or replace that equipment, including access for purposes of such measures; and

“(3) to return such equipment to the United States (or allow the United States to recover such equipment) if either party determines that the agreement no longer serves its interests.

“(c) REPORT.—Promptly after entering into any agreement under subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the agreement. The report shall identify the country with which the agreement was made, the anticipated costs to the United States to be incurred under the agreement, and the national interest of the United States that is furthered by the agreement.

“(d) LIMITATION ON DELEGATION.—The Secretary of Defense may delegate the authority of the Secretary to carry out this section only to the Secretary of the Air Force. Such a delegation may be redelegated.”

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

“2555. Nuclear test monitoring equipment: furnishing to foreign governments.”

SEC. 1204. ADDITIONAL MATTERS FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON TRANS- FERS OF MILITARILY SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY TO COUNTRIES AND ENTITIES OF CONCERN.

Section 1402(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65; 113 Stat. 798) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(4) The status of the implementation or other disposition of recommendations included in reports of audits by Inspectors General that have been set forth in a previous annual report under this section pursuant to paragraph (3).”

Subtitle B—Matters Relating to the Balkans

SEC. 1211. ANNUAL REPORT ASSESSING EFFECT OF CONTINUED OP- ERATIONS IN THE BALKANS REGION ON READINESS TO EXECUTE THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY.

Section 1035 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65; 113 Stat. 753) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking “Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,” and inserting

"Not later than April 1 each year (but subject to subsection (c))."

(2) in subsection (b), by striking "The report in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting "Each report";

(3) in subsection (d), by striking "the report" and inserting "a report"; and

(4) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(e) **TERMINATION WHEN UNITED STATES MILITARY OPERATIONS END.**—(1) No report is required under this section after United States military operations in the Balkans region have ended.

"(2) After the requirement for an annual report under this section is terminated by operation of paragraph (1), but not later than the latest date on which the next annual report under this section would, except for paragraph (1), otherwise be due, the Secretary of Defense shall transmit to Congress a notification of the termination of the reporting requirement."

SEC. 1212. SITUATION IN THE BALKANS.

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT OF NATO BENCHMARKS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM KOSOVO.**—The President shall develop, not later than May 31, 2001, militarily significant benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the withdrawal of the United States military presence in Kosovo. Congress urges the President to seek concurrence among member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the development of those benchmarks.

(b) **COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL-MILITARY STRATEGY.**—(1) The President—

(A) shall develop a comprehensive political-military strategy for addressing the political, economic, humanitarian, and military issues in the Balkans; and

(B) shall establish near-term, mid-term, and long-term objectives in the region.

(2) In developing that strategy and those objectives, the President shall take into consideration—

(A) the benchmarks relating to Kosovo developed as described in subsection (a); and

(B) the benchmarks relating to Bosnia that were detailed in the report accompanying the certification by the President to Congress on March 3, 1998 (printed as House Document 105-223), with respect to the continued presence of United States Armed Forces, after June 30, 1998, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, submitted to Congress pursuant to section 7 of title I of the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act (Public Law 105-174; 112 Stat. 63).

(3) That strategy and those objectives shall be developed in consultation with appropriate regional and international entities.

(c) **SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON BENCHMARKS.**—Not later than June 30, 2001, and every six months thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the progress made in achieving the benchmarks developed pursuant to subsection (a). The President may submit a single report covering these benchmarks and the benchmarks relating to Bosnia referred to in subsection (b)(2)(B).

(d) **SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY.**—Not later than June 30, 2001, and every six months thereafter so long as United States forces are in the Balkans, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the progress being made

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PREHENSIVE STRATEGY.—Not later

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Congress a report on the progress being

in developing and implementing a comprehensive political-military strategy as described
 in subsection (b)(1)(A).

SEC. 1213. SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON KOSOVO PEACEKEEPING.

(a) REQUIREMENT FOR PERIODIC REPORT.—The President shall submit to the
 specified congressional committees a semiannual report on the contributions of
 European nations and organizations to the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. The first
 such report shall be submitted not later than December 1, 2000.

(b) CONTENT OF REPORT.—Each report shall contain detailed information on the
 following:

(1) The commitments and pledges made by the European Commission, the
 member nations of the European Union, and the European member nations of the
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization for—

(A) reconstruction assistance in Kosovo;

(B) humanitarian assistance in Kosovo;

(C) the Kosovo Consolidated Budget;

(D) police (including special police) for the United Nations international
 police force for Kosovo; and

(E) military personnel for peacekeeping operations in Kosovo.

(2) The amount of the assistance that has been provided in each category, and the
 number of police and military personnel that have been deployed to Kosovo, by each
 organization or nation referred to in paragraph (1).

(3) The full range of commitments and responsibilities that have been undertaken
 for Kosovo by the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organization for
 Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the progress made by those organiza-
 tions in fulfilling those commitments and responsibilities, an assessment of the tasks
 that remain to be accomplished, and an anticipated schedule for completing those
 tasks.

(d) SPECIFIED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In the section, the term
 “specified congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and
 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on International Relations,
 and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

Subtitle C—North Atlantic Treaty Organization and United States Forces in Europe

SEC. 1221. NATO FAIR BURDENSARING.

(a) REPORT ON COSTS OF OPERATION ALLIED FORCE.—The Secretary of
 Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the
 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on the costs to
 the United States of the 78-day air campaign known as Operation Allied Force
 conducted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the period from March 24
 through June 9, 1999. The report shall include the following:

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WASHINGTON, DC 20301


JAN 15 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR The Executive Secretary, National Security Council

SUBJECT: Kosovo Benchmarks Report (U)

The Kosovo Benchmarks Report for the second half of 2002 is attached. This report is submitted to provide the President the opportunity to report to Congress in compliance with Section 1212 (a) of Public Law 106-398, The Floyd D. Spence, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.

OSD/NATO Policy drafted the report in coordination with NSC Staff (Lisa Tepper, 202-456-9151) and received interagency coordination reviews. Should you wish to discuss any aspects of this report, the DoD point of contact is Lt Col Joe Shannahan, 703-692-4505.


James A. Whitmore
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

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INTRODUCTION

Section 1212 (a) of Public Law 106-398, The Floyd D. Spence, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (the Act), requires that "The President shall develop militarily significant benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the withdrawal of the United States military presence in Kosovo." Pursuant to Section 1212 (b) of the Act, and as certified thereunder on [DATE], I am providing this report to Congress on progress in Kosovo, during the second half of 2002, toward achieving such militarily significant benchmarks.

The Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers of NATO took important decisions during their Spring 2002 ministerials regarding a regional approach in the Balkans, including Kosovo. As a result of those decisions, KFOR was scheduled to be reduced from 36,000 as of June 2002 to 32,000 by Dec 2002, and 29,400 by June 2003. In fact, KFOR troop strength has already dropped below 29,000 as a result of undersourcing of troop requests and individual decisions to reduce troop contributions. More recently, NATO Heads of State noted the Joint Operations Area Implementation Update at the Prague Summit in November 2002, and called for exploration of options for further rationalization and force restructuring.

BACKGROUND

The benchmarks measure progress in achieving a sustainable peace in Kosovo. The objectives and tasks were drawn from several important documents: the NATO Operation Plan for Kosovo (OPLAN 10413); United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 (1999); the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia; and the Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (the Undertaking).

Significant progress has been made in Kosovo since the establishment of KFOR and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR has completed several military tasks specified in OPLAN 10413 and UNSCR 1244. The remaining tasks are of a continuous or recurring nature and provide for the unimpeded operation of UNMIK, freedom of movement for minorities, and the safe return of displaced persons and refugees. KFOR efforts have helped UNMIK to make substantial progress in implementing UNSCR 1244: reconstruction is well-advanced, free and fair elections held three times, more than 5,200 multi-ethnic Kosovo police trained and deployed, and a constitutional framework for provisional self-government promulgated.

Security challenges remain in the form of ethnically oriented, political extremist and criminally motivated armed groups who threaten to compromise these accomplishments, both through their actions in Kosovo and to a lesser extent in southern Serbia and Macedonia. Rather than Yugoslav and Serbian forces posing a continued risk, these internal factors are now the primary threat to public security within Kosovo. KFOR and UNMIK will have to continue to cooperate over the coming months to deter and disrupt

the activities of these groups, and continue to ensure stability in Kosovo and, by extension, the surrounding region. Increased refugee and IDP returns, problems with the continued ethnic division of North Mitrovica, potential ICTY indictments, arrests of high-profile Kosovar political or criminal figures, demarcation of the Kosovo-Macedonia border, and decentralization of political power will present additional challenges. Kosovo's greatest challenge now is the development of governmental, economic, social and security infrastructures capable of providing a safe, secure and prosperous environment for all of its inhabitants.

PROGRESS REVIEW

The benchmarks depict progress on four overarching tasks and related objectives that will allow for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Kosovo. They are: Military Stability; Public Security; Border and Boundary Issues; and, War Crimes.

1. Task: Military Stability

Objectives:

- Withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian Security Forces from Kosovo.
- Demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovar-Albanian groups.
- Deterrence of renewed hostilities, maintenance and, where necessary, enforcement of the cease-fire.

Progress on these objectives and the benchmarks associated with them has been very good. FRY forces have withdrawn from Kosovo and have adhered to all military agreements, the Kosovo Liberation Army has been demilitarized and there are no ongoing hostilities in Kosovo.

Benchmarks:

a. The cease-fire has been maintained and FRY has adhered to the MTA

The rampant ethnic cleansing and the killing of spring 1999 is now history and neither party to the conflict has resumed military action. FRY forces left Kosovo as called for in the MTA. In 2001 and 2002 NATO oversaw reductions in the Air Safety Zone (ASZ); in 2001 FRY forces returned to the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) in southern Serbia as part of a political agreement to end fighting between government forces and ethnic Albanian groups in southern Serbia. This benchmark is essentially accomplished although both the ASZ and GSZ remain under KFOR authority.

b. KLA has been demilitarized and transformed in compliance with the Undertaking

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) ceased to exist on September 20, 1999. Many former KLA members entered the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), now a civil emergency response force, or the Kosovo Police Service. This benchmark is essentially accomplished.

c. Establishment of the KPC and low incidence of officer non-compliance

The KPC was created in 1999 out of demobilized KLA troops. UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 authorizes the KPC to engage in disaster response, search and rescue, and infrastructure rebuilding activities, but the KPC is permitted no role in law enforcement, security or defense. KFOR and UNMIK jointly supervise the KPC. Authorized strength is 5,000 members; by the end of 2002 just under 2,000 had moved from active to reserve status. Ten percent of KPC positions are reserved for ethnic minorities, although to date only some 100 Serbs and other minorities have joined. In 2002 UNMIK budgeted 11.16 million for KPC salaries, operating expenses and capital outlays. The US has funded additional training for first aid, land navigation, fire fighting and other activities. A U.S. and UNMIK goal for 2003 is to further reform the KPC through functional and structural changes.

One of the primary purposes for the establishment of the KPC was to provide transparency to the process of demilitarizing the KLA. While some individual members of the KPC are involved in supporting extremism and organized crime, since the KPC was established, documented non-compliance has declined from 35 incidents per month to as few as 4 per month, to include such incidents as illegal possession of weapons and ammunition, and celebratory gunfire. Though additional work remains to be done to further professionalize the KPC as a civilian organization and broaden its ethnic and gender base, this benchmark is essentially accomplished.

d. FRY and Kosovars participate in the Joint Implementation Commission

The Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) was established in accordance with the MTA and given two key mandates: ensure compliance with the MTA, and demilitarize the KLA. JICs have been established at two echelons - at KFOR Headquarters and at each of the five Multinational Brigades (MNBs). Meetings between KFOR, Yugoslav Army (VJ), FRY Ministry of Interior police (MUP), UNMIK CIVPOL, FRY JIC, International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and Border Police occur on a regular basis. Agendas range from administrative issues such as ID cards to security issues such as VJ/MUP manned contact points on/near the administrative boundary. The JICs have facilitated training for the KPC in first aid, fire fighting, land navigation, identification of unexploded

ordnance, construction, and humanitarian relief. This benchmark is essentially accomplished.

e. End of Offensive Activities by armed groups

Large armed groups are no longer active in Kosovo proper, but ethnic Albanian armed groups (EAAGs) in southern Serbia and in Macedonia have used Kosovo as a supply route and base for recruiting and fundraising. KFOR and UNMIK police have been active in apprehending members of these groups and their supporters, and the U.S. government has repeatedly reminded Kosovo's political leaders and the KPC that any support for the insurgents' activities is not acceptable. This benchmark is essentially accomplished although it requires continued monitoring.

2. Task: Public Security

Objectives:

- Establishment and maintenance of a secure environment for the operation of UNMIK, the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the safe return of a considerably increased number of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in 2003.
- Ensure protection and freedom of movement for KFOR, UNMIK, and other International Organizations (IOs).
- Transfer responsibility for public safety and order when either UNMIK or newly elected Kosovar authorities can take responsibility for this function.

Significant progress has been achieved toward the benchmarks related to these objectives, but continued progress in the area of public security will require a strong continued commitment by the international community to provide resources for rule of law and other security programs.

Benchmarks:

a. UNMIK safely conducts its mission

UNMIK has regional administrations in each KFOR MNB, headed by an international administrator and staffed by a mixture of international and local staff. Additionally, there are UNMIK offices in each of Kosovo's 30 municipalities. UNMIK success stories include promulgation of the Constitutional Framework, holding of municipal elections twice and province-wide elections once, registration of and distribution of ID cards to some one-million Kosovars, and issuance of over 345,000 travel documents recognized in 29 countries. In all UNMIK endeavors (except North Mitrovica) – from travel to governance – UNMIK has been able to safely conduct its mission.

b. IOs travel without disruption of their activities

Travel in Kosovo by IOs is generally unimpeded. Serb residents in northern Kosovo sporadically established roadblocks in Serb majority areas, but alternative routes were available to IOs with little or no disruption of their activities. This benchmark is essentially accomplished.

c. Humanitarian relief delivered

Humanitarian relief was one of the original UNMIK pillars, led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but as humanitarian needs abated, the UNMIK humanitarian pillar ceased operations in June 2000. UNMIK has institutionalized the delivery of goods and services to Kosovo's neediest populations through a system of Centers for Social Work. These centers ensure poor, isolated and/or minority communities have the goods and services they require. This benchmark is essentially accomplished.

d. Initial demining efforts accomplished and responsibility transferred to requisite civilian authorities

Since June 1999, over 20,000 mines, 13,000 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO), and 6,700 cluster bomb units (CBU) have been located and destroyed. Over 25 million square meters of land have been cleared and returned to use. There have been 16 different international demining organizations involved in mine awareness activities and mine awareness has been incorporated into the Kosovo school system curriculum. While KFOR's mandate is concerned only with minefields that impede its mission, KFOR soldiers continue to mark newly discovered minefields for demining by accredited civilian agencies. Also, the KPC has been trained to conduct emergency explosive ordnance disposal services and is primarily responsible for UXO deactivation or destruction. The overall result of this concentrated effort has been a drastic reduction in mine/UXO/CBU-related casualties although lethal incidents sometimes still occur. In light of these operating procedures, this benchmark is essentially accomplished.

e. Elections held in secure environment

Local assemblies and governments have been established in all of Kosovo's 30 municipalities, including the Serb-dominated ones in the north. Kosovo municipal elections in 2000 and again in 2002 were in accordance with international standards as were Kosovo-wide elections in 2001. Overall voter turnout within Kosovo has been high but with a downward trend. The absence of significant election-related violence indicates a general stabilization of the political environment in Kosovo. UNMIK Police, KPS, and KFOR worked together to help ensure elections were not marred by significant violence. In spring 2002, the Assembly elected a President and a Prime Minister to head Kosovo's provisional

government which will continue until new elections in 2004. This benchmark is essentially accomplished.

f. Parallel institutions dissolved and pose no threat to KFOR and /or UNMIK authority

The fledging Kosovo provisional government is working to govern the province with less assistance from UNMIK, KFOR, and the international community (IC). Programs to train government leaders and bolster efforts at effective administration have helped the provisional government to assume increased responsibility and demonstrate increasing effectiveness. However, the slow pace of legislation to date and remaining international influence in areas not reserved to UNMIK remain problematic; considerably more needs to be done to ensure effective self-government at both the Kosovo and municipal levels and to achieve UNMIK benchmarks in the rule of law, returns, the economy and other areas. . Particularly in North Mitrovica, and elsewhere throughout Kosovo, UNMIK needs to implement its plan for decentralization to ensure effective administration and rights for Serbs and other minorities at the submunicipal level. At the same time, Serbian parallel institutions primarily in the areas of health, education and judiciary and law enforcement need to cease functioning to allow UNMIK and to fully establish their authority under UNSCR 1244. While this is occurring, UNMIK acknowledges the continued need for Belgrade to supplement the salaries of health care workers and educators as an incentive for them to remain in Kosovo.

g. KFOR transfers criminal cases to UNMIK/Kosovo Transitional Government for investigation, prosecution, and detention; and sufficient civilian prisons and detention facilities are established

UNMIK judicial officials, and UNMIK CIVPOL and KPS, conduct all criminal investigations in Kosovo. When KFOR apprehends a suspect, he/she can be turned over to UNMIK for action under the Special Representative's "executive detention" authority pending UNMIK (or local) criminal charges being filed. Under his own authority, COMKFOR can confine individuals who pose a threat to a safe and secure environment. KFOR maintains a U.S. run detention facility at Camp Bondsteel. UNMIK maintains 8 detention facilities Kosovo-wide and one prison near Ishtok in NW Kosovo.

h. Adequate court system for criminal cases transferred to UNMIK

Since June 1999, UNMIK has established a Kosovo supreme court, five district courts, 18 municipal courts, 23 "minor offenses courts," one "high court of minor offenses," one commercial court, and 13 prosecutor's offices. While UNMIK has appointed more than 400 local judges and prosecutors, only 320 are currently working in those positions. Additionally, a total of 28 international judges prosecutors are assigned to the district courts and the Supreme Court. Trials are

conducted in all five district courts, the Supreme Court and lower courts. Thus, there is an embryonic court system in place; however, concerns continue over the ability of the criminal courts to apply the law fairly due to the inexperience and perceived bias of many of the judges and prosecutors, suspected intimidation, and the outdated socialist criminal code still applicable in Kosovo. Judicial training conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-run Kosovo Judicial Institute is beginning to address this problem. Some cases referred by KFOR to UNMIK are difficult to prosecute due to evidentiary problems. KFOR soldiers are not trained criminal investigators, and often the information gathered by KFOR is classified. As a result, some criminal cases are dismissed by UNMIK due to a lack of prosecutable evidence. UNMIK and KFOR are working together to resolve these issues, and UNMIK has made many notable arrests and convictions in 2002. Adequate witness protection continues to be a serious problem as well.

i. Core KPS police training is completed and effective

The OSCE administers the Kosovo Police Service School, which has graduated over 5,200 Kosovar police trainees. Graduate trainees go on to complete field training and assume independent patrol responsibilities (with UNMIK police oversight). The operational control of two police stations has been turned over to the KPS. Advanced training phases are being conducted at the KPS School to create specialized capacities, including training supervisors, criminal investigators, forensics specialists, traffic officers and close protection specialists. The US is initiating further specialized training in areas such as civil disorder management and advanced criminal investigations. Anti-Serb violence has shown an overall downward trend, although serious periodic incidents continue to mar progress and freedom of movement remains problematic without KFOR escort. UNMIK police and KPS have assumed full responsibility in Pristina, Prizren, Gnjilane and Peja regions and share responsibility with KFOR in Mitrovica. This benchmark is essentially accomplished although the KPS requires further expansion, experience and training.

j. UNMIK and KPS assume primacy for tactical police responsibilities; and, UNMIK Special Police Unit and KPS are capable to respond to civil disturbances

UNMIK Police, working with KPS, has assumed full primacy in Pristina, Prizren, Gjilan and Peja regions; and shares primacy with KFOR in Mitrovica, where they have begun to assert more authority to address the remaining challenge from members of violent "bridge gangs." UNMIK generally has been able to handle civil disturbances through the use of its Special Police Units (SPUs) that react to any civil disturbances throughout Kosovo. KPS has assumed primary responsibility for patrol functions. As part of two agreements with KFOR, UNMIK police have taken on greater responsibility for border functions and the roving patrols of patrimonial sites, and other infrastructure sites.

k. Some displaced persons and refugees able to return home safely

Displaced Kosovo Albanians began returning to their homes in June 1999, concomitant with the entry of NATO forces into Kosovo. To date, over one million people have returned and begun rebuilding their lives. By contrast, significant difficulties remain in the area of minority returns. More than 200,000 Serbs, Roma and other minorities remain displaced outside of Kosovo, most in Serbia. While modest progress has been made to date, and in 2002 returns outpaced departures for the first time, UNMIK anticipates that there will be a significant increase in international community facilitated returns beginning in spring 2003. Continued KFOR cooperation with UNHCR and UNMIK will play a key part in making these returns safe and sustainable.

Freedom of movement remains a problem for many Serbs and Roma who remain in Kosovo, most of whom live in difficult circumstances in isolated enclaves. Most require KFOR escort each time they venture out to ensure their safety; however, for others freedom of movement has improved significantly and KFOR has removed a number of fixed checkpoints, particularly in the MNB-E area.

3. Task: Border and Boundary Issues

Objectives:

- Monitor international and provincial boundaries.
- Inhibit traffic of persons or materials supporting insurgency and illegal goods.
- Transfer border responsibilities to local authorities.

Benchmarks:

a. The FRY respects the Ground and Air Safety Zones as stipulated in the MTA and at the discretion of the KFOR commander

The Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) and Air Safety Zone (ASZ), five- and 25-kilometer “buffer zones” respectively around Kosovo, were established to prevent boundary incidents or reentry into Kosovo by FRY security forces. The FRY has respected the zones from their inception. Following the change of government in Yugoslavia and a concomitant improvement in the relationship with NATO and KFOR, FRY security forces were allowed to reenter the GSZ in the spring of 2001. Reentry was conducted successfully and in a professional manner. Similarly, the Air Safety Zone was reduced to 10-kilometers and in fall 2002 to five kilometers. This benchmark is essentially accomplished.

b. Illegal border crossings inhibited; and UNMIK or indigenous border service in place to monitor provincial and international border crossings

Kosovo's boundaries are generally unmarked and in many areas lie in rough, mountainous terrain. Attempts to demarcate the Kosovo-Macedonia border under the 2001 FRY-Macedonia Border Treaty in the near future could be particularly problematic as inhabitants traditionally have crisscrossed the borders freely. UNMIK established five official border crossing points, including the Pristina airport, where UNMIK police control immigration and collect tariffs. KFOR actively supports UNMIK in this role, regularly patrolling borders and employing monitoring technology. Also, a border-crossing section of the Kosovo Police Service has been established. Net assessment of combined efforts is that illegal border crossings have been significantly reduced, although much remains to be done. The installation at the airport and border points of entry of a positive identification and tracking system remains a high priority.

4. Task: War Crimes

Objective:

- Full cooperation of the international security presence with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

The objective of this benchmark is of an ongoing nature for the international community, continuing until the work of the ICTY is completed. ICTY chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte has said publicly on several occasions that there will be indictments of senior former KLA figures in Kosovo. UNMIK is investigating possible prosecutions as well, and at the end of 2002 an UNMIK court consisting of three international judges convicted and sentenced five former KLA figures for war crimes against other Kosovo-Albanians.

Benchmark:

a. KFOR assists and supports ICTY

KFOR actively supports the collection of evidence by ICTY, and provides area security for exhumations. The U.S. deployed two FBI forensic investigative teams to Kosovo at a cost of \$5 million, and provided an additional \$8.5 million for ICTY investigative costs associated with Kosovo war crimes. In November 2002, SACEUR noted that NATO remains committed to supporting efforts to bring persons indicted for war crimes to justice and has stated that the physical presence of NATO in the Balkans is continuing to help deter hostilities. Should the ICTY issue indictments for Kosovars, KFOR will be called upon to help manage large and possibly violent demonstrations that will almost certainly result, and might need to assist in the apprehension and transfer of indicted individuals.

PRESS POINTS ON THE
KOSOVO BENCHMARKS REPORT TO CONGRESS

This report:

- fulfills the requirement for the President to report to Congress on militarily significant benchmarks to achieving a sustainable peace in Kosovo in accordance with The Floyd D. Spence, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2001;
- updates information as of December 31, 2002;
- highlights that KFOR has completed several military tasks and that KFOR efforts have helped UNMIK to make substantial progress in implementing UNSCR 1244;
- reports NATO agreement to reduce KFOR force levels from 36,000 as of June 2002, to 29,400 by June 2003, with U.S. troops remaining at between 10 and 15 percent of the total force; and
- concludes that NATO's regional approach to the Balkans -- with a view towards providing smaller, lighter, more mobile forces -- has allowed a continued reduction in KFOR levels with no weakening of NATO engagement.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0363

January 14, 2003

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE

FROM: DANIEL FRIED *DF*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between Condoleezza Rice and Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, Diplomatic Counselor to the President of the French Republic

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation between Condoleezza Rice and Maurice Gourdault-Montagne on January 13, 2003.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 1/14/13

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4(B), Sept. 11, 2006
By NH NARA, Date 6/16/14

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Memcon	Summary Memorandum of Conversation	6	01/13/2003	P1/b1; P5;

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COLLECTION:

National Security Council - European Affairs

SERIES:

Bekkering, Michelle - Chron Files

FOLDER TITLE:

January 2003 [4]

FRC ID:

35172

OA Num.:

NSC 0935

NARA Num.:

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2014-0090-F

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Memorandum	[Memorandum] - To: Gary Edson - From: Pam Quanrud	1	01/14/2003	P1/b1;

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Memorandum	[Memorandum]	1	N.D.	P1/b1; P3/b3; 50 USC 403g, Sec. 6

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Bekkering, Michelle - Chron Files

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Summary of Conclusions	[Summary of Conclusions]	3	01/14/2003	P1/b1; P3/b3; P5; 50 USC 403g sec 6.

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