

Safe: Outline Plans for specific
operations: Book III

**OUTLINE PLANS FOR
SPECIFIC OPERATIONS**

BOOK III

**THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES**

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IV. OUTLINE PLANS FOR SPECIFIC OPERATIONS

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**OUTLINE PLANS
FOR
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SARDINIA

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(J.C.S. 289)

May 7, 1943

Pages 1 - 22, incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE OF SARDINIA

Reference: (a) J.C.S. 272
(b) J.C.S. 76th Mtg., Item 1

Note by the Secretaries

The attached report, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for information, in accordance with a request of the Joint Staff Planners. The Plan has not been reviewed by the Joint Staff Planners.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE OF SARDINIA

Report by the Joint War Plans Committee

1. An outline plan for the seizure of SARDINIA is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The concept of the operation (see Chart, Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A") is briefly stated below.

a. To conduct an air offensive from NORTH AFRICA and SICILY in order to reduce Sardinian fixed defenses and air bases, to neutralize air forces in ITALY and CORSICA, and to interdict movement of reinforcements and supplies by air and sea from ITALY proper to SARDINIA. Simultaneously to conduct intensive submarine operations against sea routes between SARDINIA and ITALY.

b. To gain beachheads on the west and southwest coasts of the Island, under limited fighter protection from escort carriers and - at extreme range - from bases in NORTH AFRICA. Simultaneously to carry out diversionary landings with commando troops on other coastal points, and parachute attacks on airfields and vital communications inland.

c. To capture landing fields in the ORISTANO-VILLACIDRO-IGLESIAS area, and to establish shore based support aviation thereon.

d. To advance overland to capture CAGLIARI and the surrounding airdromes, and to land follow-up forces at the port of CAGLIARI.

e. To secure CAGLIARI from a counterattack from the northeast by an advance to the line TORTOLI-LACONI-ORISTANO.

f. To reduce the remainder of the Island in the following order:

(1) Advance to the line OROSEI-NUORO-MACOMER-BOSA MARINA.

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(2) Occupation of the PORTO TORRES-SASSARI-ALGHERO area.

(3) Occupation of the MADDALENA-TERRANOVA area.

g. To consolidate the Island against counterattack by sea or air.

h. To occupy CORSICA, or to neutralize the offensive capability of CORSICA by air and sea action, and commando raids. (Appendix "B")

3. Major forces required.

a. Ground:

4 Infantry Divisions
2 Armored Combat Teams
2 Parachute Regiments.

b. Air:

7 Fighter Groups
5 Bomb Groups.

c. Naval:

3BB
3 CV
6 ACV
10 CA & CL
44 DD
15 SS

4. Availability.

All forces and shipping required should be available in the area after HUSKY.

5. Advisability of the operation.

Since SICILY is the primary strategic prize of the area, the gain resulting from the subsequent occupation of SARDINIA is not commensurate with the cost of the operation and the commitment of a permanent garrison, unless future operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY are envisaged.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE OF SARDINIA

6. Assumptions.

a. The UNITED NATIONS occupy the whole of the North African littoral.

b. SICILY has been occupied and all major resistance thereon has ended. The main units of the Italian fleet are restricted to the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. Anti-submarine operations in the CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN are being actively prosecuted by the UNITED NATIONS.

c. SPAIN and PORTUGAL remain neutral. A German invasion of the IBERIAN PENINSULA is unlikely.

d. French forces in NORTH AFRICA are actively collaborating with the UNITED NATIONS, and are assisting in the defense of the African littoral.

e. The bulk of the German Ground and Air Force is contained on the Russian front.

f. PANTELLERIA has been taken as a subsidiary operation to the SICILY offensive, and UNITED NATIONS convoys have been resumed through the MEDITERRANEAN.

g. TURKEY remains neutral, and there is no indication of a German invasion of TURKEY.

h. There are no indications of a German invasion of the BRITISH ISLES.

i. Operations in the PACIFIC continue as now directed.

7. Mission of the operation.

To seize and hold SARDINIA.

8. Concept of the operation (Appendix "A")

a. To conduct an air offensive from NORTH AFRICA and SICILY in order to reduce Sardinian fixed defenses and air bases, to neutralize air forces in ITALY and CORSICA, and to interdict movement of reinforcements and supplies by air

and sea from ITALY proper to SARDINIA. Simultaneously to conduct intensive submarine operations against sea routes between SARDINIA and ITALY.

b. To gain beachheads on the west and southwest coasts of the Island, under limited fighter protection from escort carriers and - at extreme range - from bases in NORTH AFRICA. Simultaneously to carry out diversionary landings with commando troops on other coastal points, and parachute attacks on airfields and vital communications inland.

c. To capture landing fields in the ORISTANO-VILLACIDRO-IGLESIAS area, and to establish shore based support aviation thereon.

d. To advance overland to capture CAGLIARI and the surrounding airdromes, and to land follow-up forces at the port of CAGLIARI.

e. To secure CAGLIARI from a counterattack from the northeast by an advance to the line TORTOLI-LACONI-ORISTANO.

f. To reduce the remainder of the Island in the following order:

(1) Advance to the line OROSEI-NUORO-MACOMER-BOSA MARINA.

(2) Occupation of the PORTO TORRES-SASSARI-ALGHERO area.

(3) Occupation of the MADDALENA-TERRANOVA area.

g. To consolidate the Island against counterattack by sea or air.

h. To occupy CORSICA, or to neutralize the offensive capability of CORSICA by air and sea action, and commando raids. (Appendix "B")

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9. Geographic Estimate. (Appendix "C" - omitted*)

a. The terrain is generally mountainous with the exception of the CAMPIDANO PLAIN running northwest from CAGLIARI. The Island is but lightly wooded, and there are no major river obstacles. (Appendices "D" & "E" - omitted*)

b. The coast provides only a limited number of landing beaches, of which the most extensive are near CAGLIARI; in the GULF OF ORISTANO at the northwest end of the CAMPIDANO PLAIN; in the GULF OF ASINARA in the northwest of the Island, and in the vicinity of SAN ANTIOCO. Surf conditions may be severe at all beaches except those in the GULF OF ORISTANO, and usually there is an awkward subsidiary obstacle immediately behind the beaches in the form of salt lakes and lagoons. For detail of beaches, see Appendix "F" - omitted*.

c. Once an invasion force has secured a footing inland, there are no major natural obstacles; the few extensive landing beaches are, however, well protected by minefields and fixed defenses, so that the assault is likely to be an expensive operation in personnel and materiel.

d. There are no climatic limitations on the date of any operations, except that prevailing easterly winds are likely to make surf conditions on the east coast impossibly severe between March and October.

e. SARDINIA possesses valuable economic resources in agricultural produce and minerals. (Appendix "E" - omitted*) The most important of the latter is zinc, the supply of which is of vital importance to ITALY.

10. Military estimate. (Appendix "G" - omitted*, except Annex "A" to Appendix "G")

a. Ground forces.

(1) The last intelligence estimate (May 3, 1943) of forces (all Italian) in SARDINIA was:

* Appendices marked "omitted" are available in the office of the Secretariat.

Two Infantry Divisions (Each of two Inf. Regts. and one Blackshirt Legion)
Two Coastal Divisions
One Separate Infantry Battalion
One Sardinian Cav. Regiment
Twelve Bns. Fascist Militia, including three tank bns.
Three Bersaglieri (cyclist) Bns.

(2) Fixed defenses include coast defense and antiaircraft artillery at all main ports. Controlled minefields and anti-submarine nets exist at CAGLIARI and MADDALENA and possibly at other ports. For map see Appendix "J"*

(3) Capabilities for reinforcement of ground forces.

Reinforcement would normally be by sea from CORSICA, from ITALY (where there are now 12 Italian Infantry Divisions) or - for personnel with light equipment - by air transport. Subject to demand for troops for other theaters, particularly for ITALY proper, the garrison could probably be increased by one division from CORSICA in one week, and by 2 additional divisions from ITALY in about six weeks. Attempts at reinforcement by sea would be vulnerable to bombing of both the embarkation and debarkation ports.

(4) The effectiveness of Italian troops defending SARDINIA should be assessed higher than that of those in NORTH AFRICA in view of the fact that they will be fighting for their own homeland.

b. Air forces.

(1) The most recent estimate (May 3, 1943) of AXIS air strength in the MEDITERRANEAN area is: German 1164; Italian 1425; total 2589 planes. It is probable that, due to losses in the battles of TUNISIA and SICILY, AXIS air forces presently available to oppose our landings may be reduced by 500 to 1000 aircraft.

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(2) Capabilities for operation of air forces.

There are certainly nine and possibly as many as eighteen airfields in SARDINIA; only three of these are known to be equipped as airdromes. There are four airfields on CORSICA, and facilities are practically unlimited in ITALY and SOUTHERN FRANCE.

c. Naval forces.

The Italian Navy totals at present (May 3, 1943) 159 vessels (7-BB, 3-CA, 10-CL, 1-CVS, 71-DD, 67-SS). Of this, the effective strength is 120 vessels (6-BB, 2-CA, 5-CL, 1-CVS, 53-DD, 53-SS). The effective strength in smaller vessels will have been considerably reduced in the battle for SICILY. (Major units are assumed to have been restricted to the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN). Some MAS's (fast MTB's) are known to be in Sardinian waters.

d. Probable AXIS strength to be encountered.

Ground (all Italian): Garrison: 2 Inf Divs.
2 Coastal Divs.
Reinforcements: 1 Inf Div in 1 week
1-2 Inf Divs in 6 weeks

Air: 1500 - 2000 aircraft of all types

Navy: Some submarines, destroyers and lighter surface craft, with the possibility of some cruisers.

11. Political estimate.

a. SARDINIA contains a population of about one million, whose standard of living is comparatively low.

b. There is a possibility of enlisting local support in aid of an invasion by making use of a popular patriot, Emilio Lussu, now thought to be in Lisbon.

c. There are no known political factors that will appreciably affect operations.

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12. Forces required for the operation. (Minimum) (Appendix "H"-omitted)

a. Ground forces.

4 Infantry Divisions	59,032
3 Amphibiously trained (1 as floating reserve)	
1 Follow-up	
2 Armored Combat Teams	13,815
1 Amphibiously trained	
1 Follow-up	
2 Parachute Regiments	3,768
6 Commandos	4,800
Supporting units	<u>61,918</u>
Total Ground Forces:	143,333

NOTE: If the garrison of SARDINIA is appreciably reinforced, the above estimates of the forces required must be increased. If one German division were added to the present Sardinian garrison, it is estimated that two additional divisions would be required in the assaulting force. However, substantial reinforcement of SARDINIA is not believed likely, because since SICILY has been occupied by the UNITED NATIONS, ITALY proper would be very vulnerable, and its defense would absorb all available AXIS ground reserves.

b. Air Forces.

4 Fighter Groups (SE)	4,892
3 Fighter Groups (TE)	3,051
1 Light Bomber Group	1,247
3 Medium Bomber Groups	4,668
2 Heavy Bomber Groups	3,338
1 Observation Group	1,150
4 Transport Groups	5,848
Supporting units	<u>4,227</u>
Total Air Combat Personnel	28,421

These air forces are required for operations directly supporting the SARDINIA offensive. Strategic air force missions in the area (antisubmarine, photographic, strategic long-range bombing, and defensive fighter operations) will be performed by UNITED NATIONS air forces in NORTH AFRICA, SICILY, MALTA and the MIDDLE EAST.

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c. Services of supply.

Total Army Service Troops	41,970
Total Air Service Troops	<u>29,153</u>
Total Service Troops	71,123

d. Naval forces. (Estimate by the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces in French North Africa).

3 BB	} - with trained reserve of 140 replacement fighter aircraft and crews.
3 CV	
6 ACV	
10 CA and CL	
4 AA ships	
20 DD fleet type	
24 DD A/S escort	
50 PC A/S escort	
8 DMS	
15 SS	
3 HQ ships	
18 AM	
20 ML	

e. Availability.

Ground forces will be available from forces not involved in HUSKY. Air forces will be available in the MEDITERRANEAN. The naval forces now committed to HUSKY are assumed to be also available for this operation. In general they exceed the forces as set forth by General Eisenhower.

13. Supply.

Assuming a monthly maintenance factor of 1.3 ship tons per man, and 3% personnel replacement, maintenance of the Sardinian force will require:

2 transport sailings per month
29 Cargo ship sailings per month

14. Shipping. (Appendix "I" - omitted)

a. Requirements.

The assault force (including the floating reserve) will require:

9 XAP
23 APA
11 AKA
30 LST
58 LCI
100 LCT

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or any equivalent combination.

The follow-up force will require additionally:

45 LST
13 LCI
60 LCT
16 AK

or any equivalent combination.

b. Availability.

HUSKY requires shipping to lift eight assault divisions whereas this operation requires the lift of three and one half assault divisions. Therefore, assuming losses in HUSKY do not exceed 50%, there will be adequate shipping in the area for this operation. A small amount of replacement shipping becomes available meanwhile.

The shipping combination shown above is one based on craft to be in place for HUSKY.

Due to the necessity for repairing landing craft after HUSKY, and for amphibious training and rehearsal, it is considered that the earliest possible target date for this operation is 10 weeks subsequent to the initiation of HUSKY.

15. Installations influencing the operation. (Appendix "J")

a. SARDINIA.

Installations in SARDINIA appear to be adequate with the possible exception of the ports, whose total theoretical capacity is insufficient for the initial phases of the operation. There are four usable ports (CAGLIARI being by far the most important), all well connected to the main rail and road nets. (Appendix "K" omitted). The railroad net, although not extensive, runs through the center of the island and connects the principal towns. (Appendix "L" omitted). The road net is very good, with three main north and south roads all connected with CAGLIARI; and three east and west roads, one at each end and one in the center of the island. (Appendix "M" omitted). There are certainly nine, and possibly as many as eighteen

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airfields, with three of major importance (Appendix "N" omitted), the Allied use of which would extend effective bomber operations to extreme SOUTHERN GERMANY and the DALMATIAN COAST (Appendix "Q"). There are adequate telephone and telegraph lines, and a few low power radio stations (Appendix "O" - omitted).

b. SICILY.

Allowing for the minimum maintenance requirements for the force occupying SICILY, it is estimated that a maximum of 30,000 troops (one division plus supporting arms) could be mounted from Sicilian ports (Appendix "K" - omitted). However, due to the inevitable dislocation of facilities in SICILY immediately following its occupation, the comparative proximity of Sicilian ports to AXIS air bases in ITALY, and the greater distance from SICILY to the west coast of SARDINIA, it is considered undesirable to mount any part of the Sardinian expedition from SICILY.

Should it be decided to use one or more of the experienced divisions which have taken part in the capture of SICILY, it would be preferable to transfer those units back to NORTH AFRICA, and to mount the whole expedition from there. Such return movements could be combined with the necessary amphibious training or rehearsal.

c. NORTH AFRICA.

Allowing for the minimum maintenance requirements for the permanent garrison in NORTH AFRICA, and assuming that all troops east of TUNISIA are maintained from the MIDDLE EAST, there is sufficient port capacity to mount the whole Sardinian expedition from North African ports, providing that CASABLANCA and other ATLANTIC ports are used (Appendix "K" - omitted).

16. Advisability of the contemplated operation.

a. Advantages.

(1) The operation continues the engagement of AXIS land

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and air forces in the CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN area.

(2) If not already accomplished by the seizure of SICILY, the operation will probably result:

(a) In ITALY withdrawing all of its forces from RUSSIA and the BALKANS for the defense of ITALY proper; or

(b) In GERMANY being forced to divert substantial strength to ITALY to augment the Italian defenses.

Either course will cause a drain on the available German reserves.

(3) Italian morale will be further lowered and ITALY may conceivably sue for a separate peace; encouragement will be given to Balkan countries to resist AXIS occupation. The resultant unrest and insurrection will require an increase in the garrisons in the area.

(4) The UNITED NATIONS will obtain centrally-placed air bases suitable for bombing ITALY, particularly the northern industrial area, and the industrial area of SOUTHERN GERMANY.

(5) The lines of communication through the MEDITERRANEAN will be further improved with resultant decreases in shipping losses.

(6) Provides an essential protective base for future amphibious operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE; and thereby forces GERMANY to reinforce her northern MEDITERRANEAN defenses to counter the threat.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) This operation will require the maintenance of a large static garrison in SARDINIA; contrarily, if the operation were not undertaken, the AXIS garrison of SARDINIA would be immobilized by the mere threat of attack.

(2) The operation would only slightly improve the Allied position over that which obtains after NORTH AFRICA and SICILY have been consolidated, and in so doing absorbs a

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disproportionate amount of Allied resources for the results obtained.

(3) The operation further disperses Allied effort at the expense of the build-up in the UNITED KINGDOM for a cross-channel operation.

(4) The operation will be expensive in personnel, equipment, and shipping due to the probably enemy concentration on the limited port facilities and landing beaches available.

(5) The operation involves a commitment either to:

(a) Neutralize CORSICA by air action, and accept some degree of interference with the use of SARDINIA as an offensive air base; or

(b) To undertake further amphibious operations to occupy CORSICA, and thus obtain full and free use of SARDINIA as an air base.

c. Conclusion.

Since SICILY is the primary strategic prize of the area, the gain resulting from the subsequent occupation of SARDINIA is not commensurate with the cost of the operation and the commitment of a permanent garrison, unless future operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY are envisaged.

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APPENDIX "B"

CORSICA

PART I - APPRECIATION OF A CORSICAN OPERATION

PROBLEM

17. To determine what action should be taken against CORSICA in connection with the capture of SARDINIA.

DISCUSSION

18. With the fall of both SARDINIA and SICILY, GERMANY faces one of two conditions:

a. ITALY is weakened, but still an active power. The threat to ITALY proper is acute. GERMANY cannot permit withdrawal of Italian forces in the BALKANS and RUSSIA. GERMANY, therefore, must bolster the defenses of the Italian mainland. The flow, if any, of troops would, therefore, be from CORSICA to ITALY. This condition is the more probable.

b. ITALY is to all intents and purposes out of the war. Italian forces in the BALKANS and RUSSIA have lost all value for use other than defense of ITALY proper. GERMANY has been forced to replace these troops with those of other AXIS countries. GERMANY cannot then spare the troops required to defend ITALY effectively, and at most expects to fight a delaying action up the Italian Peninsula. However, the Allied threat to GERMANY is not across the ALPS from ITALY, but through SOUTHERN FRANCE. This threat can be most economically neutralized by the basing of the largest possible air force on CORSICA, and the garrisoning of the island with the minimum number of ground troops to effectively defend the island as an air base. This action is relatively cheap insurance against an Allied entry to the continent via Southern France. It is estimated that the probable force GERMANY could provide in this case in CORSICA is one division and 100 - 150 aircraft.

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19. The positive value of CORSICA to the UNITED NATIONS is small once SICILY and SARDINIA have been occupied, unless further amphibious operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY are envisaged. In this case seizure of CORSICA would, of course, be essential in order to protect the lines of communication.

20. The negative value of CORSICA resulting from denial to ITALY could be considerable, however, if full use is to be made of SARDINIA as an advanced air base for a heavy bombing offensive of the industrial areas in NORTHERN ITALY. Neutralization by air from SARDINIA of Italian airfields in CORSICA is no more likely to be permanently successful than AXIS efforts to neutralize MALTA from SICILY, and the only sound alternative is denial of airfields by occupation of CORSICA. Four hundred and eighty AXIS aircraft based on CORSICA (estimated capacity of potential airdromes) would require the bulk of UNITED NATIONS air forces on SARDINIA to be defensive, but could not prevent the use of SARDINIA for forward airdromes, nor to a limited extent for an offensive bomber base. The probable maximum of 150 German aircraft would not seriously interfere with Allied use of SARDINIA.

21. Possession of CORSICA will have no appreciable effect on the security of the West-East MEDITERRANEAN SEA route, once SICILY and SARDINIA are in our hands.

22. Failure of the UNITED NATIONS to occupy CORSICA will reveal to GERMANY that no surface action against SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY is to be initiated; conversely, occupation of CORSICA will immediately force GERMANY to strengthen her NORTHERN MEDITERRANEAN defenses

CONCLUSIONS

23. The immediate strategic value of CORSICA to the UNITED NATIONS lies in the denial of its use by the AXIS to interfere


Appendix "B"

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with use of SARDINIA as an air base for bomber offensive against NORTHERN ITALY, and in creating an immediate threat against SOUTHERN FRANCE and NORTHERN ITALY.

24. Limited use of SARDINIA as an Allied air base cannot be prevented by AXIS troops on CORSICA.

25. The probable size of the AXIS garrison on CORSICA would not permit serious interference with Allied use of SARDINIA as an air base.

26. Seizure of CORSICA is warranted only if GERMANY intends to reinforce CORSICA heavily in air forces, and then only if unhindered use of SARDINIA is deemed essential to the UNITED NATIONS. CORSICA must be occupied prior to an amphibious operation against SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY.

27. Seizure of CORSICA should not be attempted as a preliminary or simultaneous operation to the capture of SARDINIA, as it will divert considerable strength from the main objective and adequate temporary neutralization can be achieved more cheaply by air action alone.

28. Any assault on CORSICA should be made as soon after the fall of Sardinia as possible, before any further reinforcement of the garrison.

29. The Commander of the SARDINIAN expedition should be prepared to occupy CORSICA immediately subsequent to the termination of the Sardinian operation, utilizing the same forces and shipping used against SARDINIA. This operation should be initiated only if it becomes evident that CORSICA is to be appreciably reinforced, and only if at that time full use of SARDINIA as an air base is deemed essential or if future amphibious operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE are contemplated.

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Appendix "B"

PART II - OUTLINE PLAN

30. Assumptions.

- a. The UNITED NATIONS occupy the whole of the North African littoral.
- b. SICILY has been occupied and all major resistance thereon has ended. The main units of the Italian fleet are restricted to the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. Anti-submarine operations in the CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN are being actively prosecuted by the UNITED NATIONS.
- c. SPAIN and PORTUGAL remain neutral. A German invasion of the IBERIAN PENINSULA is unlikely.
- d. French forces in NORTH AFRICA are actively collaborating with the UNITED NATIONS, and are assisting in the defense of the African littoral.
- e. The bulk of the German Ground and Air Force is contained on the Russian front.
- f. PANTELLERIA has been taken as a subsidiary operation to the SICILY offensive, and UNITED NATIONS convoys have been resumed through the MEDITERRANEAN.
- g. Turkey remains neutral, and there is no indication of a German invasion of TURKEY.
- h. There are no indications of a German invasion of the BRITISH ISLES.
- i. Operations in the PACIFIC continue as now directed.
- j. SARDINIA has been occupied by the UNITED NATIONS.

31. Mission of the operation: To seize and hold CORSICA.

32. Concept of the operation (Map - Annex "A").

- a. By air action from SARDINIA, to reduce the fixed defenses and air facilities of CORSICA, interdict movement of reinforcements and supplies to and within the island, and destroy the ports, roads and railroads of the island.

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By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

Appendix "B"

b. To seize vital inland communications and important facilities near AJACCIO with parachute troops.

c. To conduct amphibious and land operations in the following sequence:

Phase I: To land forces in the GOLFE DE SAGONE under air cover from SARDINIA in order to seize the port and airfield at AJACCIO.

Phase II: To land follow-up forces at AJACCIO, and establish land-based aviation on the airfield.

To advance overland to the east coast.

To land forces south of BASTIA, under air cover from AJACCIO.

To advance upon and seize BASTIA.

Phase III: To occupy the remainder of the island.

d. To consolidate the island against counterattack by air or sea.

33. Geographic Estimate.

a. CORSICA is a rugged and poorly developed island, possessing few good harbors and limited communications. The terrain is unsuitable for operation of armored forces. The island is 115 miles north to south, 50 miles east to west.

b. From BASTIA, extending south for sixty miles, there is a narrow coastal plain, fringed by beach and interrupted by lagoons and marshes. Elsewhere the coast is rocky, although very small beaches exist in most of the coves and around the river mouths.

c. The local populations, though not particularly pro-united nations, are definitely anti-Italian, and provide fruitful ground for subversive activities to support an assault.

d. AJACCIO and BASTIA are the only towns of importance.

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Appendix "B"

34. Military estimate (Map - Annex B').

a. There are now (May 3, 1943) one corps of two Italian divisions on CORSICA, which with supporting troops total 46,500 men. It is believed, however, that one of these divisions will be transferred to SARDINIA when that island is attacked. The Italians obtained intact the original French fixed defenses, and very likely have strengthened them. Reinforcement of the garrison would be limited by the port capacities (2800 D.W. Tons per day) to about one division each 10 days. Total garrison of the island would be limited by maintenance considerations alone to four divisions, only two of which could be mobile.

b. The Axis air strength available to defend SARDINIA (estimated at 1500 aircraft, all types) will have been reduced considerably by air action, attendant on the seizure of SARDINIA. Reinforcements by GERMANY from WESTERN EUROPE or RUSSIA is believed unlikely.

c. It is estimated that a maximum of 230 aircraft could be based on existing airdromes in CORSICA with a minimum amount of improvement, and that facilities for a maximum of 480 aircraft could be constructed on the island.

35. Forces required.

a. Ground:

4 RCT, assault loaded, with supporting arms.....	40,000
2 RCT, convoy loaded, with supporting arms.....	20,000
Service troops (estimated).....	30,000
	90,000

b. Air and naval:

There will be sufficient air and naval forces available for the Sardinian operation to fulfill the requirements of a subsequent Corsican operation. The assignment of missions directly supporting the CORSICA assault to portions of the air and naval forces available will be done by the theater commander

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Appendix "B"

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36. Supply.

Assuming a monthly maintenance factor of 1.3 ship tons per man, and 3% personnel replacements, maintenance of the Corsican force will require 13 cargo ship sailings per month.

37. Shipping.

a. Requirements:

Assault loaded: 4 RCT

16 APA) or any equivalent
5 AKA)

Convoy loaded: 2 RCT plus supporting units

35 convoy loaded transports) or any equivalent
50 convoy loaded cargo vessels)

b. Shipping requirements are approximately 40% of those for the Sardinian operation. Therefore, shipping will be available if losses in SARDINIA do not exceed 50%.

38. Installations affecting the operation.

a. There are now believed to be four airfields of sufficient size for limited military use on CORSICA. Additional construction would be very difficult due to the rugged nature of the terrain, except on the BASTIA coastal plain. Probably 17 additional airports could be constructed, with a saturation point of about 480 aircraft on the island.

b. Roads and railroads are inadequate and are susceptible to closure by sabotage against bridges and tunnels. A remarkable network of rough farm and logging roads and donkey trails could be used by lightly equipped forces, but are not suitable for heavy vehicular movements.

c. The only ports of consequence are at AJACCIO and BASTIA, each with a capacity of 800 D.W. tons per day. Minor ports, utilizing lighters for cargo discharge, principally PORTO VECCHIO and BONIFACIO, raise the total port capacity of the island to 2800 D.W. tons per day.

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Appendix "B"

39. Advisability of the operation.

a. Advantages.

The operation continues the engagement of AXIS land and air forces in the CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN.

Provides an essential protective base for future amphibious operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE, and thereby forces GERMANY to reinforce her NORTHERN MEDITERRANEAN defenses to counter the threat.

Denies to the AXIS a base for aerial interference with UNITED NATIONS use of SARDINIA.

b. Disadvantages.

The ability of the AXIS to utilize CORSICA as a base to hinder UNITED NATIONS use of SARDINIA can be sufficiently neutralized by aerial operations. Occupation of the island is not required, therefore, for this purpose.

Garrison requirements to secure the island are extremely heavy compared with the benefits accruing from the occupation. Contrarily, the AXIS will be relieved of the necessity of maintaining a large garrison on the island.

c. Conclusions.

The operations is warranted only if:

It becomes evident that, through reinforcement, the AXIS Corsican strength will be sufficient to interfere seriously with UNITED NATIONS use of SARDINIA; or

The UNITED NATIONS expect to eventually assault amphibiously SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY.

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Appendix "B"

ANNEX 'A' TO APPENDIX 'B'

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INTERMED

GROUND ACTION

Phase I

Phase I

Phase III

Parachute Attack

- SECURITY

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A map of Sri Lanka titled 'STRATEGIC AREA'. It shows the island's coastline with labels for 'INDIA' to the west, 'MALAYSIA' to the south, and 'INDONESIA' to the east. A shaded area in the north-east is labeled 'PROJECT AREA'. Other labels include 'SRI LANKA' and 'TAMIL NADU'.

CORSICA

CORSICA
SPECIAL STRATEGIC MAP
Scale 1:500,000

Scale 1:500,000

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

Standard Deviations (σ^2 and σ^2)

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Q **How long does it take to get a new car?**

Figure 6

10

100

ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "B"

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Red: Present Hostile Strength

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Cop. 30 A/C

800 DWT

5-5.4°
2-3.0°

Cop. 80 A/C
10 A/C

44

Cop. 80 A/C
20 A/C

3-9.4°
8-5.4°
4-4.7°
4-3.7°
4-3.0°
16-3.0° AA


800 DWT

3-6.4°
4-5.4°
2-3.0°
4-3.0° AA


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CORSICA
SPECIAL STRATEGIC MAP
Scale 1:500,000



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ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "G"

18 Btry over
11 Btry und
25 Btry AA
Minefie
A/S Net

204 Coastal

31

over 6
over 3

SECRET - SECURITY

14 Btry o
20 Btry A
Mine fie
A/S N

SARDINIA
SPECIAL STRATEGIC MAP
Scale 1:750,000

LEGEND

MILITARY CRYPTIC

POLYGRAPHIC PROJECTION

25

GERMAN:

456 L.R. Bomb
72 Bomb - Rec
156 Dive Bomb
432 Ftr
24 Army Co-op
24 Coastal

ITALIAN:


230 Rec - Bomb
130 Torp Bomb
680 Ftr
155 Army Co-op
230 Coastal
6 BB
2 CA
5 CL
1 AVP
53 DD
53 SS

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| | |
|-----------|------------|
| 14 Btry | over 6" |
| 20 Btry | AA over 3" |
| Minefield | |
| A/S Net | |

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ANNEX "J"



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Date: 1-24-24


SECURITY

~~SECRET~~

- SECURITY

ANNEX "Q"

DISTANCES - SARDINIA



DODECANESE

SECRET
336-1
(J.C.S. 296)

May 7, 1943

Pages 1 - 10, incl.

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OUTLINE PLAN FOR SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF THE DODECANESE

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

BRIEF
OF
OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE
AND OCCUPATION OF THE DODECANESE

Report by the Joint War Plans Committee

1. A complete outline plan for the seizure of and occupation of the DODECANESE is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. Concept of the operation.

An amphibious operation, two-thirds in ship-to-shore transportation, one-third in shore-to-shore transportation, launched from bases in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN for the purpose of capturing the DODECANESE.

Phase I. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over RHODES and SCARPANTO.

Phase II. Airborne and amphibious landing operations against RHODES and SCARPANTO to secure airdromes and a port.

Phase III. Continuing operations to seize RHODES.

Phase IV. Further operations to seize and occupy the entire archipelago.

3. Major forces required.

a. Air - 2,783 aircraft

1,200 Bombardment aircraft; 600 Fighter aircraft; 600 Troop Carrier aircraft; 320 Carrier based aircraft; and 63 miscellaneous aircraft.

b. Ground

1 Airborne Division; 3 Infantry Divisions.

c. Naval

4 BB, 6 CV, 22 CA & CL, and 70 DD.

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4. Conclusions.

a. Advantages

(1) Permits operations against AXIS lines of communication through the AEGEAN.

(2) Contains present German air forces in the BALKANS, and might cause diversion of additional units from the Russian front.

(3) Has a beneficial moral effect on TURKEY.

(4) Acquires air bases for:

(a) Strategic bombing operations as far north as PLOESTI and the DANUBE.

(b) Land-based fighter support for landing operations against CRETE.

(5) Encourages subversive activities in the BALKANS.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Is a difficult amphibious operation out of effective tactical range of land based UNITED NATIONS fighter aircraft.

(2) Is impossible to advance into the BALKANS without additional amphibious operations in the face of strong AXIS opposition.

(3) Does not contribute materially to the collapse of ITALY.

(4) Will not seriously dislocate German strategic plans, nor provide any substantial diversion of strength from the Russian front.

c. Other pertinent remarks.

A direct assault on the DODECANESE would be an expensive operation. Even though an invasion of EUROPE via the AEGEAN and GREECE were envisaged, the results to be obtained would not be commensurate with the cost. This is true since an invasion of the BALKANS via GREECE could be mounted from SICILY, thus eliminating the necessity of an operation against CRETE and/or the DODECANESE.

ENCLOSURE "A"

OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF THE DODECANESE

5. Statement of the problem.

To prepare an outline plan for the seizure and occupation of the DODECANESE.

6. Assumptions.

a. HUSKY is successfully completed by mid-August, 1943.

b. The bomber offensive against AXIS installations on the continent is increasing in intensity and will seriously reduce the AXIS war potential.

c. GERMANY'S operations against RUSSIA in 1943 will not be decisive, and RUSSIA will remain an important factor in the war.

d. A cross-channel operation will not be feasible in 1943 unless the Military power of GERMANY has disintegrated appreciably.

e. An invasion of the BRITISH ISLES or of TURKEY is not considered an AXIS capability. An AXIS invasion of the IBERIAN PENINSULA is improbable. SPAIN, PORTUGAL, and TURKEY remain neutral.

f. The Battle of the ATLANTIC remains serious in its shipping implications.

g. UNITED NATIONS commitments in the PACIFIC and Asiatic areas and to RUSSIA remain substantially as now planned.

7. Mission of the operation.

To seize and occupy the DODECANESE, in order to provide bases for further operations against the BALKANS or CRETE.

8. Concept of the operation. (See Map, Appendix "A")

An amphibious operation, two-thirds in ship-to-shore transportation, one-third in shore-to-shore transportation, launched from bases in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN for the purpose of capturing the DODECANESE.

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Phase I. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over RHODES and SCARPANTO.

Phase II. Airborne and amphibious landing operations against RHODES and SCARPANTO to secure airdromes and a port.

Phase III. Continuing operations to seize RHODES.

Phase IV. Further operations to seize and occupy the entire archipelago.

9. Terrain estimate.

a. General.

All the islands in the DODECANESE are mountainous. Only the two largest, RHODES and KOS, have stretches of fairly flat land. Except on RHODES and SCARPANTO, where there are coastal plains, the mountains rise direct from the water's edge. The coasts are irregular and indented by numerous bays, at the head of most of which there are small sand beaches which are suitable for landings.

Winds. In winter the prevailing winds are from the north and may raise a heavy sea among the northern islands.

Visibility is good as a rule. Fog is rare.

Temperatures are moderate to warm.

Precipitation comes chiefly in the winter, almost no rain falling from May to October.

b. RHODES.

This, the easternmost island in the Aegean Sea, is the largest and most important of the DODECANESE. It is approximately 46 miles long and has a maximum breadth of 15 miles. It is about 260 miles west of CYPRUS. There are numerous stretches of sandy beaches around the island that are suitable for landings. It has a good road net. There is only one port, the city of RHODES, which is situated on the extreme northern tip of the island. The island is well supplied with water, although in summer almost all of the rivers are dry.

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c. SCARPANTO.

SCARPANTO, lying some 30 miles southwest of RHODES, is 30 miles long and has a maximum breadth of 6 miles. Few landing beaches exist in the northern three-fourths of the island, but several are to be found on the southeast and southwest coasts. The only roads are in the southern part of the island. There are no ports of importance. The streams are dry during the summer. The northern part of the island is arid, but abundant springs and wells can be found in the south.

d. Conclusion.

The climatic conditions will have little effect upon operations against the DODECANESE. The terrain favors the defense.

10. Estimate of the enemy forces. (See Maps, Appendices "A" and "B")

a. Air.

(1) The present AXIS air strength in GREECE, CRETE, and the DODECANESE consists of an air force of all types numbering approximately 333 planes. (May 4, 1943).

(2) Under assumption a, it is estimated that an additional 1329 aircraft of all types could be moved into this area. This includes AXIS reinforcement from the central MEDITERRANEAN only.

(3) The airdromes in GREECE, CRETE, and the DODECANESE will support any force the AXIS can deploy. The size of the force that will actually be employed will depend upon the importance the AXIS attaches to the DODECANESE.

b. Ground.

It is estimated that the Italians have 35,000 men on RHODES, comprising one infantry division, reinforced, and coast defense units, and 3,000 men on SCARPANTO. In the remainder of the DODECANESE there is one infantry division

~~SECRET~~

plus a regiment. The total Italian forces in the DODECANESE number approximately 50,000 men. It is not believed that there will be any material strengthening of the larger garrisons beyond the concentration of troops now scattered on smaller islands.

c. Naval forces.

It can be expected that miscellaneous local defense craft and submarines will be encountered.

11. Estimate of UNITED NATIONS forces required.

a. Air.

| | |
|--|--------------|
| Air Force | 2,783 a/c |
| Heavy Bombers | 350 |
| Medium Bombers | 550 |
| L/D Bombers | 300 |
| Fighters (exclusive
of carrier based a/c) | 600 |
| Troop Carrier | 600 |
| Photo Reconnaissance | 13 |
| Observation | 50 |
| | <u>2,463</u> |

75% of the above air force is ready for combat.

| | |
|---------------|------------|
| Carrier based | <u>320</u> |
| Total | 2,783 |

There are two methods of furnishing fighter cover for this operation; one, by the use of carrier-based aircraft; two, if carrier-based aircraft cannot be furnished, 22 groups (1600 P-38 airplanes) will be required in order to maintain 150 airplanes continuously over the landing operations.

b. Ground forces.

Assault force

One Airborne Division
Three Infantry Divisions (Amphibiously trained)
One Armored Battalion (Medium)

T

c. Naval forces.

(1) Covering force (IONIAN SEA).

4 Battleships
2 Carriers
8 Cruisers
20 Destroyers

(2) Naval attack force.

(a) Escort group.

40 PC's and SC's
18 Destroyers

(b) Fire support group.

Fire support comparable to that which could be provided by:

20 Destroyers
10 Cruisers (10,000 ton U. S. type)

(c) Air support group.

4 Carriers
4 Cruisers
12 Destroyers

(d) Control, salvage, and minesweeper group.

Miscellaneous vessels as required.

12. Political and economic estimate.

a. Political.

The DODECANESE ISLANDS are governed by an Italian governor. Practically all of the people are of Greek birth although they are now Italian subjects. There is some dissatisfaction with Italian administration.

The Greeks feel that they have a legitimate claim on both the islands and the population. TURKEY is also interested in the DODECANESE because they were formerly Turkish territory. It is doubtful that there would be much aid given an invading force by the population.

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FEB 19 1974

b. Economic.

Any invading force must plan to bring all of its supplies with it.

13. Supply.

a. Shipping required for the assault force. (Combat loaded).

3 Headquarters Ships
30 APA
10 AKA
65 LST
43 LCI (L)

b. Shipping required for the follow-up forces (Service elements, convoy loaded).

30 Transport sailings (15 ships assuming 14 day turn round)
21 Cargo sailings (11 ships assuming 14 day turn round)

c. Monthly maintenance. (Convoy loaded).

3 Transport sailings (2 ships assuming 14 day turn round)
11 Cargo sailings (6 ships assuming 14 day turn round)

14. Installations and conditions influencing the operation.

a. Port capacities.

The port capacities are unknown, but are certain to be inadequate. The island of RHODES contains the only port of any importance in the archipelago.

b. Landing beaches.

The beaches appear to be sufficient for the planned operation.

c. Coast defenses.

RHODES. Numerous coast defense guns ranging in caliber from 3 to 14 inches dominate all approaches to the island.

SCARPANTO. Numerous coast defense guns dominate the southern approaches to the island.

d. Airfields.

There are 3 airdromes on RHODES and one each on SCARPANTO, KOS, LEROS, and SAMOS. These installations are sufficient for the operation of a strong defensive air force in the DODECANESE.

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e. Anti-aircraft defense.

Specific data covering anti-aircraft defense is not available, but it is assumed that ample defense is provided for existing airdromes.

f. Railway systems.

There are no railroads of any kind in the DODECANESE.

g. Highway systems.

There is an adequate highway system on RHODES and a fair road net in the southern part of SCARPANTO. Generally, the road net is sufficient to support the economy of the islands but would be a restricting factor in Military operations.

h. Wire and radio systems.

The major islands of the DODECANESE provide telephone communications between all important villages on the islands. Radio stations are found on the principal islands.

i. Health.

Generally speaking, the DODECANESE has a healthful climate. Diseases typical of the eastern MEDITERRANEAN are to be found in the DODECANESE.

15. General conclusions.

a. Advantages.

(1) Permits operations against AXIS lines of communication through the AEGEAN.

(2) Contains present German air forces in the BALKANS, and might cause diversion of additional units from the Russian front.

(3) Has a beneficial moral effect on TURKEY.

(4) Acquires air bases for:

(a) Strategic bombing operations as far north as PLOESTI and the DANUBE.

(b) Land-based fighter support for landing operations against CRETE.

(5) Encourages subversive activities in the BALKANS.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Is a difficult amphibious operation out of effective tactical range of land based UNITED NATIONS fighter aircraft.

(2) Is impossible to advance into the BALKANS without additional amphibious operations in the face of strong AXIS opposition.

(3) Does not contribute materially to the collapse of ITALY.

(4) Will not seriously dislocate German strategic plans, nor provide any substantial diversion of strength from the Russian front.


c. Other pertinent remarks.

A direct assault on the DODECANESE would be an expensive operation. Even though an invasion of EUROPE via the AEGEAN and GREECE were envisaged, the results to be obtained would not be commensurate with the cost. This is true since an invasion of the BALKANS via GREECE could be mounted from SICILY, thus eliminating the necessity of an operation against CRETE and/or the DODECANESE.

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
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APPENDIX B

CRETE

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340-1
(J.C.S. 300)

May 7, 1943

Pages 1-10, incl.

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OUTLINE PLAN FOR SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF CRETE

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

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BRIEF
OF
OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF CRETE

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. An outline plan for the seizure and occupation of CRETE is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. Concept of the operation (See Chart, Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A").

An amphibious operation, two-thirds in ship to shore transportation, one-third in shore to shore transportation, launched from bases in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN for the purpose of capturing CRETE.

Phase I. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over CRETE.

Phase II. Amphibious and airborne landing operations on CRETE to secure airdromes and ports.

Phase III. Further operations to seize and occupy the entire island.

3. Major UNITED NATIONS forces required.

a. Air. - 2,783

1,200 Bombers; 600 Fighters (land based); 600 Troop Carriers; 320 Carrier based aircraft; and 63 Miscellaneous aircraft.

b. Ground.

1 Airborne Division; 7 Infantry Divisions.

c. Naval.

4 BB, 6 CV, 22 CA & CL, 85 DD.

4. Conclusions.

a. Advantages.

(1) Denies use of air and submarine bases to the AXIS, thereby improving the security of shipping in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN.

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(2) Renders an AXIS advance southward into EGYPT or eastward into the LEVANT impossible as long as the UNITED NATIONS hold CRETE.

(3) Has a beneficial moral effect on TURKEY.

(4) Is a step towards opening the AEGEAN.

(5) Acquires air bases for:

(a) Strategic bombing operations as far north as PLOESTI and the DANUBE.

(b) Land-based fighter support for landing operations against the DODECANESE and the PELEPONNESUS.

(6) Encourages subversive activities in the BALKANS.

(7) Contains present German Air Forces in the BALKANS and might cause diversion of additional units from the Russian Front.

(8) Permits operations against the AXIS lines of communication through the AEGEAN.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Is a difficult amphibious operation out of effective tactical range of land-based UNITED NATIONS fighter aircraft.

(2) Is impossible to advance into the BALKANS without additional amphibious operations in the face of strong AXIS opposition.

(3) Does not contribute materially to the collapse of ITALY.

(4) Will not seriously dislocate German strategic plans, nor provide any substantial diversion of strength from the Russian Front.

c. Pertinent remarks.

A direct assault on CRETE would be an expensive operation. Even though an invasion of EUROPE via the AEGEAN and GREECE were envisaged, the results to be obtained would not be commensurate with the cost. This is true since an invasion of the BALKANS via GREECE could be mounted from SICILY, thus eliminating the necessity of an operation against CRETE and/or the DODECANESE.

ENCLOSURE "A"

OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF CRETE

Statement of Problem.

5. To prepare an outline plan for the seizure and occupation of CRETE.

6. Assumptions.

- a. HUSKY is successfully completed by mid-August, 1943.
- b. The bomber offensive against AXIS installations on the Continent is increasing in intensity and will seriously reduce the AXIS war potential.
- c. GERMANY'S operations against RUSSIA in 1943 will not be decisive, and RUSSIA will remain an important factor in the war.
- d. A cross-channel operation will not be feasible in 1943 unless the military power of GERMANY has disintegrated appreciably.
- e. An invasion of the BRITISH ISLES or of TURKEY is not considered an AXIS capability. An AXIS invasion of the IBERIAN PENINSULA is improbable. SPAIN, PORTUGAL, and TURKEY remain neutral.
- f. The Battle of the ATLANTIC remains serious in its shipping implications.
- g. UNITED NATIONS commitments in the PACIFIC and Asiatic areas and to RUSSIA remain substantially as now planned.

7. Mission of the operation.

To seize and occupy the island of CRETE, in order to provide a base for further operations against the BALKANS, and to make the lines of communication in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN more secure.

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8. Concept of the operations. (See chart, Appendix "A")

An amphibious operation, two-thirds in ship to shore transportation, one-third in shore to shore transportation, launched from bases in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN for the purpose of capturing CRETE.

Phase I: The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over CRETE.

Phase II: Amphibious and airborne landing operations on CRETE to secure airdromes and ports.

Phase III: Further operations to seize and occupy the entire island.

9. Terrain estimate.

a. CRETE consists largely of a maze of rocky mountains among which are a very few plains. It is 164 miles long and from $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 35 miles wide. The country is generally semi-arid and from May to September has an almost desert-like climate. The vegetation is sparse, affording little concealment except in the olive groves.

The coast of CRETE is well suited for defense because of its generally rocky nature, lack of good anchorages, and paucity of good roads and other exits. The principal landing beaches are along the north coast.

b. Climate.

The climate of CRETE is Mediterranean and is characterized by mild, intermittently rainy winters and hot dry summers.

c. Conclusions.

The terrain generally favors the defense. Autumn wind and surf conditions favor amphibious operations.

10. Estimate of the enemy forces. (See charts, Appendices "A" and "B")

a. Air.

(1) The present AXIS air strength in GREECE, CRETE, and the DODECANESE consists of an air force of all types numbering approximately 333 planes. (May 4, 1943.)

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(2) Under assumption a it is estimated that an additional 1329 aircraft of all types could be moved into this area. This includes AXIS reinforcement from the central MEDITERRANEAN only.

(3) The airdromes in GREECE, CRETE, and the DODECANESE will support any force the AXIS can deploy. The size of the force that will actually be employed will depend upon the importance the AXIS attaches to this area.

b. Ground.

It is estimated that by July 1, 1943 there will be in CRETE:

| | | |
|---|---|-------------------|
| One Italian Infantry Division, Reinforced | - | 30,000 men |
| One German Motorized Division |) | |
| One German Infantry Division |) | - 50,000 men |
| One Luftwaffe Field Division |) | |
| AA, Coast Defense and Service Troops) | | |
| Total AXIS Forces | | <u>80,000 men</u> |

It is estimated that the AXIS will withdraw their garrisons on the smaller Aegean Islands into CRETE, the GREEK mainland, and the larger islands in the DODECANESE. The AXIS will not further reinforce CRETE, since the forces probably would be considered sufficient to hold the island.

c. Naval.

It can be expected that miscellaneous local defense craft and submarines will be encountered.

11. Estimate of UNITED NATIONS forces required.

a. Air.

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Air Force | 2783 |
| Heavy Bombers | 350 |
| Medium Bombers | 550 |
| L/D Bombers | 300 |
| Fighters (exclusive of carrier-based a/c) | 600 |
| Troop Carrier | 600 |
| Photo Reconnaissance | 13 |
| Observation | <u>50</u> |
| | 2,463 |

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75% of the above air force is ready for combat.

| | |
|---------------|------------|
| Carrier based | <u>320</u> |
| Total | 2,783 |

There are two methods of furnishing fighter cover for this operation. One, carrier based aircraft; two, if carrier based aircraft cannot be furnished, 22 groups (1600 P-38 airplanes) will be required in order to maintain 150 airplanes continuously over the landing operations.

b. Ground.

Assault force

One Airborne Division

Three Infantry Divisions (Amphibiously trained)

Follow-up force

Four Infantry Divisions

One Armored Regiment (Medium)

c. Naval forces.

(1) Covering force (IONIAN SEA)

4 Battleships

2 Carriers

8 Cruisers

20 Destroyers

(2) Naval attack force

(a) Escort group

40 PC's and SC's

18 Destroyers

(b) Fire support group

Fire support comparable to that which could be provided by:

20 Destroyers

10 Cruisers (10,000 ton U.S. type)

(c) Air support group

4 Carriers

4 Cruisers

12 Destroyers

(d) Control, salvage and minesweeper group

Miscellaneous vessels as required.

d. Naval forces (Follow-up).

15 additional DD's for follow-up convoys.

12. Political and economical estimate.

a. Political.

CRETE is ruled by an AXIS Military Government. The Italians now occupy the easternmost province and the Germans the remainder of the island, including the principal towns. Guerrilla activities of Cretan patriots are widespread and backed by the entire population. It is to be assumed that their sympathies would be with the UNITED NATIONS in case of invasion.

Turkish reaction to an invasion of CRETE would be favorable. GREECE would welcome the liberation of Greek soil.

b. Economic.

CRETE has no economic value to the AXIS. In general, food is insufficient for the population, and food for any large number of troops must be supplied from outside.

13. Supply.

a. Shipping required for the assault force. (Combat loaded)

3 Headquarters Ships
30 APA
10 AKA
65 LST
43 LCI(L)

b. Shipping required for the follow-up force. (Convoy loaded)

62 Transport sailings (31 ships assuming 14 day turn around)
47 Cargo sailings (24 ships assuming 14 day turn around)

c. Monthly maintenance. (Convoy loaded)

6 Transport sailings (3 ships assuming 14 days turn around)
17 Cargo sailings (9 ships assuming 14 days turn around)

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14. Installations and conditions influencing the operation.

a. Port capacities.

The following shows the rated capacity for the ports of the island:

| | |
|----------------|-------------------|
| CANEA | 200 tons per day |
| SOUDA BAY area | 1000 |
| RETIMO | 500 |
| CANDIA* | 550 |
| KHERSONISOS | 150 |
| SAN NICOLAO | 500 |
| SITELA | 100 |
| IERAPETRA | 100 |
| TYMPAKI* | 100 |
| SAN GALENI* | 100 |
| PALIOKHORA | <u>100</u> |
| Total | 3400 tons per day |

Of this total, the assault should gain two or three ports with a probable combined capacity of 750 tons per day. It appears therefore that the bulk of the supplies and personnel must be landed over the beaches.

b. Beaches.

The beaches appear to be sufficient for the planned operation. The beaches are exposed to a heavy surf during the rather infrequent gales and storms.

c. Coastal defenses.

Exact data on the coast defenses is not at hand. It is reasonable to assume that all landing beaches are heavily protected by coast defense installations.

d. Airfields.

There are eight airdromes and a minimum of nine fighter strips on the island. Five of the fields are along

*Indicates ports captured in the assault.

the north coast, two on the south coast, and one in the eastern interior of the island. The fighter strips are well dispersed along the south coast. So far as landing fields and installations are concerned, the AXIS can operate a strong defensive air force from CRETE.

e. Anti-aircraft defenses.

There are 8 or more AA Battalions on the island. This would appear to be sufficient to furnish anti-air defense to the airdromes.

f. Railroads.

There are no railroads on CRETE.

g. Roads.

The road system consists of a single lateral road along the north coast with a limited number of branches southward. There is no south coast road and though the island is 164 miles long, only four roads cross from the north to the south coast. There are a number of roads into the interior. The Germans seem to have concentrated on improving the existing system rather than creating new roads.

h. Wire and radio system.

The island is well covered by land wire and radio nets.

i. Health.

Generally speaking, CRETE has a healthful climate, but diseases typical of the eastern MEDITERRANEAN are to be found.

j. Water.

There is sufficient water on CRETE.

15. General conclusions.

a. Advantages.

(1) Denies use of air and submarine bases to the AXIS, thereby improving the security of shipping in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN.

(2) Renders an AXIS advance southward into EGYPT or eastward into the LEVANT impossible as long as the UNITED NATIONS hold CRETE.

(3) Has a beneficial moral effect on TURKEY.

(4) Is a step towards opening the AEGEAN.

(5) Acquires air bases for:

(a) Strategic bombing operations as far north as FLOESTI and the DANUBE.

(b) Land-based fighter support for landing operations against the DODECANESE and the PELEPONNESUS.

(6) Encourages subversive activities in the BALKANS.

(7) Contains present German Air Forces in the BALKANS and might cause diversion of additional units from the Russian Front.

(8) Permits operations against the AXIS lines of communication through the AEGEAN.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Is a difficult amphibious operation out of effective tactical range of land-based UNITED NATIONS fighter aircraft.


(2) Is impossible to advance into the BALKANS without additional amphibious operations in the face of strong AXIS opposition.

(3) Does not contribute materially to the collapse of ITALY.

(4) Will not seriously dislocate German strategic plans, nor provide any substantial diversion of strength from the Russian Front.

c. Pertinent remarks.

A direct assault on CRETE would be an expensive operation. Even though an invasion of EUROPE via the AEGEAN and GREECE were envisaged, the results to be obtained would not be commensurate with the cost. This is true since an invasion of the BALKANS via GREECE could be mounted from SICILY, thus eliminating the necessity of an operation against CRETE and/or the DODECANESE.



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APPENDIX B

DODECANESE & CRETE

339-1
(J.C.S. 299)

May 7, 1943

Pages 1 - 12, incl.

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SECURITY

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF CRETE
AND THE DODECANESE

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

BRIEF
OF
OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF CRETE
AND THE DODECANESE

Report by the Joint War Plans Committee

1. An outline plan for the seizure and occupation of CRETE is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. Concept of the operation. (See Chart, Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A").

An amphibious operation launched from bases in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN for the purpose of capturing CRETE and the DODECANESE.

Phase I. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over RHODES and SCARPANTO.

Phase II. Airborne and amphibious landing operations against RHODES and SCARPANTO to secure airdromes and a port.

Phase III. a. Continuing operations in RHODES and SCARPANTO.
b. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over CRETE.

Phase IV. Amphibious and airborne landing operations against CRETE to secure airdromes and ports.

Phase V. Further operations to seize and occupy the remainder of CRETE.

Phase VI. Further operations to seize and occupy the DODECANESE archipelago.

3. Major UNITED NATIONS forces required.

a. Air. - 2,783

1,200 Bombers; 600 Fighters (land based); 600 Troop Carriers; 320 Carrier based aircraft; and 63 Miscellaneous aircraft.

b. Ground.

1 Airborne Division; 10 Infantry Divisions.

c. Naval.

4 BB, 6 CV, 22 CA & CL, 85 DD.

4. Conclusions.

The capture of the DODECANESE and CRETE would be an expensive operation, involving as it does an assault on the DODECANESE out of the effective tactical range of land-based fighter aircraft. Even though an invasion of EUROPE via the AEGEAN and GREECE were envisaged, the results to be obtained would not be commensurate with the cost. This is true since an invasion of the BALKANS via GREECE could be mounted from SICILY thus eliminating the necessity for an operation against the DODECANESE and CRETE.

The possibilities of a simultaneous assault on the DODECANESE and CRETE were examined. It was found that the capture of CRETE and the DODECANESE by a single operation would be nothing more than a simultaneous execution of the separate plans for the capture of these two positions. Furthermore, a simultaneous operation would sacrifice the advantages to be gained by having previously acquired bases in the DODECANESE from which land-based fighter protection could be provided for the assault on CRETE.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION
OF CRETE AND THE DODECANESE

5. Statement of the problem

To prepare an outline plan for the seizure and occupation of CRETE and the DODECANESE.

6. Assumptions

a. HUSKY is successfully completed by mid-August, 1943.

b. The bomber offensive against AXIS installations on the Continent is increasing in intensity and will seriously reduce the AXIS war potential.

c. GERMANY'S operations against RUSSIA in 1943 will not be decisive, and RUSSIA will remain an important factor in the war.

d. A cross-channel operation will not be feasible in 1943 unless the military power of GERMANY has disintegrated appreciably.

e. An invasion of the BRITISH ISLES or of TURKEY is not considered an AXIS capability. An AXIS invasion of the IBERIAN PENINSULA is improbable. SPAIN, PORTUGAL and TURKEY remain neutral.

f. The Battle of the ATLANTIC remains serious in its shipping implications.

g. UNITED NATIONS commitments in the PACIFIC and Asiatic areas and to RUSSIA remain substantially as now planned.

7. Mission of the operation

To seize and occupy CRETE and the DODECANESE in order to provide bases for further operations against the BALKANS.

8. Concept of the operation (See Chart, Appendix "A")

An amphibious operation launched from bases in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN for the purpose of capturing CRETE and the DODECANESE.

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Phase I. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over RHODES and SCARPANTO.

Phase II. Airborne and amphibious landing operations against RHODES and SCARPANTO to secure airdromes and a port.

Phase III. a. Continuing operations in RHODES and SCARPANTO.

b. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over CRETE.

Phase IV. Amphibious and airborne landing operations against CRETE to secure airdromes and ports.

Phase V. Further operations to seize and occupy the remainder of CRETE.

Phase VI. Further operations to seize and occupy the DODECANESE archipelago.

9. Terrain estimate

a. The DODECANESE

(1) General.

All of the islands are mountainous, only the two largest, RHODES and KOS, having large stretches of fairly flat land.

(2) RHODES.

This is the largest and most important island in the DODECANESE. It is approximately 46 miles long and 15 miles wide. It lies 260 miles west of CYPRUS.

(3) SCARPANTO.

SCARPANTO is 30 miles long and varies from 2½ to 6 miles in width. It lies 30 miles southwest of RHODES.

b. CRETE

CRETE consists largely of a maze of rocky mountains among which are a very few plains. It is 164 miles long and from 7½ to 35 miles wide. The IRAKLION (CANDIA) area lies about 125 miles west of SCARPANTO, and about 190 miles from the center of RHODES.

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c. Climate.

The climate of the DODECANESE and CRETE is Mediterranean, being characterized by mild intermittently rainy winters and hot dry summers. Visibility is good as a rule, and fog is rare. The terrain generally favors the defense. The best wind and surf conditions prevail in the autumn.

10. Estimate of enemy forces. (See Charts, Appendices "A" and "B")

a. Air.

(1) The present AXIS air strength in GREECE, CRETE, and the DODECANESE comprises 333 planes of all types.

(May 4, 1943)

(2) Under assumption a, it is estimated that an additional 1329 aircraft of all types could be moved into this area. This includes AXIS reinforcement from the central MEDITERRANEAN only.

(3) The airdromes in GREECE, CRETE, and the DODECANESE will support any force the AXIS can deploy. The size of the force that will actually be employed will depend upon the importance the AXIS attaches to the area.

(4) It must be assumed that the AXIS will, if possible, divert the necessary aircraft from other theaters to replace losses sustained in the DODECANESE operation.

b. Ground.

(1) DODECANESE.

It is estimated that the Italians have 35,000 men on RHODES, comprising one infantry division, reinforced, and coast defense units, and 3,000 men on SCARPANTO. In the remainder of the DODECANESE there is one infantry division plus a regiment and miscellaneous units. The total Italian forces in the DODECANESE comprises some 50,000 men. It is not believed that there will be any material strengthening of the larger garrisons beyond the concentration of troops now scattered on smaller islands.

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(2) CRETE.

It is estimated that by July 1, 1943, there will be
in CRETE:

| | |
|---|----------------|
| 1 Italian Infantry Division, Reinforced | - 30,000 men |
| 1 German Motorized Division |) |
| 1 German Infantry Division |) |
| 1 Luftwaffe Feld Division |) - 50,000 men |
| AA and Coast Defense units |) |
| Service Troops |) |

Total AXIS forces 80,000 men

(3) It is estimated that the AXIS will withdraw their garrisons on the smaller AEGEAN islands into CRETE, the Greek mainland, and the larger islands in the DODECANESE. The AXIS will not further reinforce CRETE since they will probably consider the forces sufficient to hold the island.

c. Naval.

It can be expected that miscellaneous local defense craft and submarines will be encountered.

11. Estimate of UNITED NATIONS forces required.

a. Air.

| Type | The DODECANESE | CRETE |
|---|----------------|-------|
| Heavy Bombers | 350 | 96 |
| Medium Bombers | 550 | 399 |
| L/D Bombers | 300 | 228 |
| Fighters (exclusive of carrier based a/c) | 600 | 450 |
| Troop Carriers | 600 | 416 |
| Photo Reconnaissance | 13 | 13 |
| Observation | 50 | 50 |
| Total land-based a/c | 2,463 | 1,652 |
| Carrier based a/c | 320 | -- |
| Total air forces | 2,783 | 1,652 |

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Notes: (1) The above are not separate air forces, and the DODECANESE force can be used again for the CRETE operation provided losses are replaced, by types, to give the required total of 1,652 aircraft.

(2) For each force 75% of the above aircraft is considered ready for combat.

(3) The static defense of the DODECANESE is provided for in the Crete force.

(4) There are two methods of furnishing fighter cover for the DODECANESE operation; one by the use of aircraft carriers, and the other, if carriers cannot be furnished, by using 22 groups (1600 P-38 airplanes) in order to maintain 150 airplanes continuously over the landings. For the CRETE operation, with airdromes on RHODES and SCARPANTO in UNITED NATIONS control, there is no need for carrier borne fighter cover for the landings.

b. Ground.

| <u>Assault forces</u> | <u>DODECANESE</u> | <u>CRETE</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|--|-------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Airborne Division | 1 | (1) | 1 |
| Infantry Divisions
(Amphibiously trained) | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| Armored Battalion (Medium) | 1 | - | 1 |
| <u>Follow-up forces</u> | | | |
| Infantry Divisions | - | 4 | 4 |
| Armored Regiment (Medium) | - | 1 | 1 |

(1) It is assumed that sufficient replacements of personnel and transport aircraft will be available in the area to allow the same airborne division to be used in both the DODECANESE and the CRETE operations.

(2) In the case of the DODECANESE operation, the whole force is combat loaded and therefore shown under assault forces.

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~~SECRET~~c. Naval.

| | <u>DODECANESE</u> | <u>CRETE</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|---|------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| (1) <u>Covering force (Ionian Sea):</u> | | | |
| Battleships | 4 | (4) | 4 |
| Carriers | 2 | (2) | 2 |
| Cruisers | 8 | (8) | 8 |
| Destroyers | 20 | (20) | 20 |
| (2) <u>Naval attack force:</u> | | | |
| (a) <u>Escort group</u> | | | |
| PC's and SC's | 40 | (40) | 40 |
| Destroyers | 18 | (18) | 18 |
| (b) <u>Fire support group</u> | | | |
| Cruisers (10,000 ton U. S. type) | 10 | (10) | 10 |
| Destroyers | 20 | (20) | 20 |
| (c) <u>Air support group</u> | | | |
| Carriers | 4 | - | 4 |
| Cruisers | 4 | - | 4 |
| Destroyers | 12 | - | 12 |
| (d) <u>Control, salvage and minesweeper group</u> | | | |
| | Miscellaneous vessels as required. | | |

d. Naval forces (Follow-up)

| | | | |
|------------|---|----|----|
| Destroyers | - | 15 | 15 |
|------------|---|----|----|

(1) The same covering force used for the DODECANESE can be used again for CRETE.

(2) Although in the naval attack force the same escort and fire support group can be used in both operations, any losses sustained in the DODECANESE operations must be made good.

12. Political and economic estimatea. DODECANESE.

(1) The people are largely of Greek origin, and although now Italian subjects, are mildly dissatisfied with the present regime. Little aid should be expected by an invading force from the local population.

3 ~~SECRET~~

b. CRETE.

The island is under military government. The Italians now occupy the easternmost province, and the Germans the remainder. Guerrilla activities are widespread and backed by the entire population. An invading force could expect considerable local assistance.

c. General.

(1) Any force operating in the DODECANESE or CRETE must plan to bring all supplies with it.

(2) Turkish and Greek reaction to an invasion of the DODECANESE and CRETE would be favorable.

13. Supply.

a. Shipping required for assault forces (combat loaded).

| | <u>DODECANESE</u> | <u>CRETE</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|--------------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Headquarters Ships | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| APA | 30 | 30 | 60 |
| AKA | 10 | 10 | 20 |
| LST | 65 | 65 | 130 |
| LCI (L) | 43 | 43 | 86 |

b. Shipping required for follow-up forces (convoy loaded).

| | <u>DODECANESE</u> | <u>CRETE</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|--------------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Transport sailings | 30 (15) | 62 (31) | 92 (46) |
| Cargo sailings | 21 (11) | 47 (24) | 68 (34) |

c. Monthly maintenance (convoy loaded).

| | <u>DODECANESE</u> | <u>CRETE</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|--------------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Transport sailings | 3 (2) | 6 (3) | 9 (5) |
| Cargo sailings | 11 (6) | 17 (9) | 28 (14) |

Note: Figures in brackets denote the actual ships required assuming for both the DODECANESE and CRETE operations:

(1) A fourteen-day turn around.

(2) Complete transfer of follow-up forces in one month.

5 [REDACTED]

14. Installations and conditions influencing the operation.

a. Port capacities.

The port capacities in the DODECANESE are unknown but are certain to be inadequate. The only port of any importance is RHODES. The total capacity of the ports in CRETE is 3400 tons per day. Of this total, the assault should gain two or three ports with a probable combined capacity of 750 tons per day. In each case therefore it is clear that a large portion of the supplies and personnel must be landed over the beaches.

b. Beaches.

For both the DODECANESE and CRETE the landing beaches appear to be sufficient for the operation as planned.

c. Coast defenses.

In the case of RHODES and SCARPANTO, there are numerous coast defense guns dominating all approaches to the islands. Exact data is not available for CRETE but it is reasonable to assume that all landing beaches are heavily protected by coast defense installations.

d. Airfields.

In the DODECANESE there are three airdromes on RHODES, and one each on SCARPANTO, KOS, LEROS, and SAMOS. On CRETE there are eight airdromes and at least nine well dispersed fighter strips. So far as landing fields and installations are concerned, the AXIS can operate a strong defensive air force from both the DODECANESE and CRETE.

e. Anti-aircraft defenses.

In the DODECANESE it is assumed, and in CRETE it is known, that there is ample anti-aircraft defense for the airdromes.

f. Railroads.

There are no railroads either on the DODECANESE or on CRETE.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

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g. Roads.

On RHODES and SCARPANTO, the limited road system would be a restricting factor in military operations. On CRETE the road system consists of a single lateral road along the north coast with a limited number of branches leading to the south coast.

h. Wire and radio systems.

Wire and radio systems exist on RHODES, SCARPANTO, and CRETE.

1. Health.

In the DODECANESE and CRETE the climate is generally healthful, but diseases typical of the eastern MEDITERRANEAN are to be found.

15. General conclusions.

a. Advantages.

(1) Permits operations against AXIS lines of communication through the AEGEAN.

(2) Contains present German air forces in the BALKANS and might cause diversion of additional units from the Russian front.

(3) Has a beneficial moral effect on TURKEY.

(4) Encourages subversive activities in the BALKANS.

(5) Acquires air bases for:

(a) Strategic bombing operations as far north as PLOESTI and the DANUBE.

(b) Land-based fighter support for landing operations against the PELEPONNESUS.

(6) Renders an AXIS advance southward into EGYPT or eastward into the LEVANT impossible as long as the UNITED NATIONS hold CRETE.

(7) Denies use of air and submarine bases in CRETE to the AXIS, thus improving the security of shipping in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN.

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(8) Is a step toward opening the AEGEAN.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Necessitates a difficult amphibious operation against the DODECANESE out of effective tactical range of land-based UNITED NATIONS fighter aircraft.

(2) Is impossible to advance into the BALKANS without additional amphibious operations in the face of strong AXIS opposition.

(3) Does not contribute materially to the collapse of ITALY.


(4) Will not seriously dislocate German strategic plans, nor provide any substantial diversion of strength from the Russian front.

c. Pertinent remarks.

The capture of the DODECANESE and CRETE would be an expensive operation, involving as it does an assault on the DODECANESE out of the effective tactical range of land-based fighter aircraft. Even though an invasion of EUROPE via the AEGEAN and GREECE were envisaged, the results to be obtained would not be commensurate with the cost. This is true since an invasion of the BALKANS via GREECE could be mounted from SICILY thus eliminating the necessity for an operation against the DODECANESE and CRETE.


The possibilities of a simultaneous assault on the DODECANESE and CRETE were examined. It was found that the capture of CRETE and the DODECANESE by a single operation would be nothing more than a simultaneous execution of the separate plans for the capture of these two positions. Furthermore, a simultaneous operation would sacrifice the advantages to be gained by having previously acquired bases in the DODECANESE from which land-based fighter protection could be provided for the assault on CRETE.

APPENDIX A

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By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

FEB 19 1974



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APPENDIX B

HEEL OF ITALY

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(J.C.S. 301)

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

May 7, 1943

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Pages 1-12 incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OUTLINE PLAN FOR SEIZURE OF THE HEEL OF ITALY

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

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BRIEF
OF
OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE OF THE HEEL OF ITALY

Report by the Joint War Plans Committee

1. An outline plan for the seizure of the Heel of ITALY is contained in Enclosure "A."

2. The concept of the operation (see chart, Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A") is briefly stated below.

a. To conduct an air offensive from SICILY and TUNISIA in order to reduce all airdromes south of the TARANTO - CASTELLABATE line. Simultaneously to conduct commando raids along the MEDITERRANEAN coast of ITALY.

b. To gain beachheads in the TARANTO and GALLIPOLI regions of the Heel by means of amphibious operations under limited carrier-borne fighter cover.

c. To extend the bridgehead, seize airfields in those areas, and establish land-based support aviation.

d. Capture and occupy TARANTO and the BARI - METAPONTO line.

3. Major forces required.

a. Ground.

6 Infantry Divisions; 1 Armored Division; 1 Airborne Division; 1 Motorized Division; and 1 Parachute Brigade (2 Regiments).

b. Air.

6 Fighter Groups; 8 Bomber Groups; 9 Troop Carrier Groups; and 1 Observation Group.

c. Naval.

3 BB, 3 CV, 2 ACV, 10 CA & CL, 20 DD, 15 SS.

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4. Conclusions.

a. Advantages.

(1) The operation continues pressure on the AXIS in the MEDITERRANEAN region, thereby decreasing AXIS forces available for deployment in RUSSIA or in western EUROPE.

(2) It provides advanced bases, bringing the PLOESTI oil fields and DANUBE RIVER traffic within effective heavy bomber range.

(3) It can be accomplished by UNITED NATIONS forces in the MEDITERRANEAN area.

(4) It contributes directly toward the elimination of the Italian Navy as a factor in the MEDITERRANEAN.

(5) Successful accomplishment will stiffen Spanish neutrality and will be an added factor to induce TURKEY to join the UNITED NATIONS.

(6) It establishes a base for further operations against AXIS forces in the Balkans.

(7) It offers an opportunity for active assistance to guerillas in YUGOSLAVIA and GREECE.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) The initial landing cannot be supported by land-based fighters.

(2) Support by carrier aircraft brings the carriers within effective range of enemy shore-based aircraft and motor torpedo boats, and exposes them to submarine attack.

(3) The Heel cannot in itself be regarded as a major bridgehead for reentry into the Continent.

(4) The AXIS reaction to the operation may be an advance through SPAIN.

(5) The lodgement will depend on vulnerable lines of communication.

c. Advisability of the operation.

The operation should be undertaken only if the use of aircraft carriers is feasible and if the collapse of Italy is imminent.

ENCLOSURE "A"OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE OF THE HEEL OF ITALY5. Assumptions.

- a. The UNITED NATIONS hold the North African littoral and SICILY. Convoys have been resumed through the MEDITERRANEAN.
- b. SPAIN remains neutral and the likelihood of a German invasion of IBERIA is decreasing.
- c. RUSSIA continues to contain the bulk of the 'AXIS' air and ground forces.
- d. There are no indications of an AXIS invasion of the BRITISH ISLES.
- e. The situation in the eastern Mediterranean is unchanged and TURKEY remains neutral.
- f. UNITED NATIONS naval strength in the MEDITERRANEAN is adequate for neutralizing the Italian Navy.
- g. GERMANY will reinforce ITALY sufficiently to conduct effective delaying actions, and will hold a suitable defensive line in northern ITALY.
- h. ITALIAN morale and will to fight is of a low order.

6. Mission.

To establish a lodgement on the Heel of ITALY.

7. Concept (See chart, Appendix "A")

Phase I. An air offensive from SICILY and TUNISIA, with particular emphasis to complete and sustain neutralization of all airdromes south of the TARANTO-CASTELLABATE line. Commando raids along the MEDITERRANEAN coast of ITALY. Intensification of propaganda and psychological warfare.

Phase II. Amphibious operations under limited carrier-borne fighter cover against the TARANTO and GALLIPOLI regions of the Heel, to establish a bridgehead.

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Phase III. Extension of the bridgehead, seizure of airfields in those areas and the establishment of land-based support aviation.

Phase IV. Capture and occupation of TARANTO and of the BARI-METAPONTO line.

8. Physiographic estimate (Appendix "B" - omitted*)

a. Terrain.

The HEEL OF ITALY is a plain, 50 - 300 feet high. It is rocky, almost devoid of streams, and broken by sink holes, fissures (as much as 50 feet deep) and low cliffs which parallel the ADRIATIC coast.

The LE MURGE area is almost streamless, with thinly wooded hills which rise to 1200 - 1600 feet.

b. Climate.

Unusual weather, such as would impede military operations, is comparatively rare. The Heel is relatively dry and climatically is similar to southwestern CALIFORNIA.

9. Estimate of enemy forces (Appendix "C" - omitted*, except Chart, Annex "A" to Appendix "C")

a. Ground.

At present, an Italian corps of two infantry divisions, and coast defense and anti-aircraft units are located southeast of the BARI-METAPONTO line.

German troops are now used to protect air fields, tunnels, power stations, supply depots, ports, and rail centers of strategic importance. After the seizure of SICILY, it is likely that GERMANY will reinforce ITALY with 5 divisions of which one will be located in the Heel.

Initially, therefore, no more than 3 divisions will be deployed in the area.

* Appendices marked "omitted" are available in the office of the Secretariat.

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The extent to which GERMANY will support ITALY remains highly speculative. At present, it is estimated that she could release 5 or 6 divisions from AXIS occupied territory. It is unlikely that she will transfer any divisions from the Russian front so long as the situation there remains critical. Probably no more than one of these divisions will be allocated to the Heel.

The following are therefore the maximum ground forces that would initially be encountered in the contemplated operation:

- 3 - Italian divisions
- 1 - German division
- 4 - Total

This total can be established within a few days after the decision to do so is made.

b. Air.

The current estimate of AXIS combat air strength in the MEDITERRANEAN area is:

- 1164 - German
- 1425 - Italian
- 2589 - Total airplanes

It is probable that, due to losses in the battles of TUNISIA and SICILY, AXIS air forces presently available to oppose our landings may be reduced by 500 to 1000 aircraft. It is considered that in a two-month period of time from the completion of the battle of SICILY most of the German fighter and some of the bomber losses will be replaced. Italian ability to replace air losses is practically non-existent. It is, therefore, considered that a net AXIS loss of 400 to 800 aircraft will result from the Tunisian and Sicilian battles, leaving from 1800 to 2200 AXIS aircraft to oppose the operation against the Heel of ITALY.

c. Naval.

The Italian Navy consists of 7 BB, 3 CA, 10 CL, 1 AVP, 71 DD, and 67 SS. Overhaul and damage should reduce the effective force to about 5-6 BB, 2 CA, 5 CL, 1 AVP, 53 DD, and 53 SS.

Following the capture of SICILY, the Italian Navy may be divided on either side of ITALY, and will retire to its northern bases as far beyond air attack as possible. Its will to fight will be reduced and it is doubtful whether major units will be exposed to battle unless absolutely forced to do so by German pressure.

10. Estimate of UNITED NATIONS forces required (Appendix "D" - omitted)

a. Ground.

(1) Initial assault forces

| | |
|---|---------------|
| 3 Infantry Divisions (amphibiously trained) | 44,274 |
| 1 Armored Division (amphibiously trained) | 13,832 |
| 1 Parachute Brigade (to be withdrawn later) | 3,822 |
| 1 Airborne Division (to be withdrawn later) | 7,970 |
| Supporting troops | <u>71,787</u> |
| Total | 141,685 |

(2) Follow-up forces

| | |
|----------------------|---------------|
| 3 Infantry Divisions | 44,274 |
| 1 Motorized Division | 14,758 |
| Supporting troops | <u>37,100</u> |
| Total | 96,132 |

(3) Army Service Forces

| | |
|--------------|---------------|
| | <u>73,779</u> |
| Total ground | 311,596 |

(4) Availability.

It is estimated that the forces required will be available in SICILY and NORTH AFRICA after the Sicilian operation is completed.

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b. Air.

Combat:

| | |
|-------------------|--------------|
| 3 Ftr Gp SE | 3669 |
| 3 Ftr Gp TE | 3051 |
| 2 Bomb Gp H | 3338 |
| 3 Bomb Gp M | 4638 |
| 2 Bomb Gp L | 2478 |
| 1 Bomb Gp D | 1323 |
| 1 Obs Gp | 882 |
| 9 Tr Car Gp | 13158 |
| Supporting units | <u>7643</u> |
| Total | 40180 |
| Air Service Units | <u>57868</u> |
| Total air units | 98048 |

Substantially the above forces will be available in the MEDITERRANEAN area after HUSKY.

c. Naval

| | |
|------------------|------------------|
| 3 BB | 30 DD A/S escort |
| 3 CV* | 50 PC A/S escort |
| 6 ACV | 15 SS |
| 10 CA & CL | 3 Hq Ships |
| 4 AA Ships | 20 AM |
| 20 DD fleet type | 8 DMS |

Final decision as to the size of the covering force required for the operation will depend upon the number of enemy ships in the ADRIATIC-eastern MEDITERRANEAN area.

Availability.

The naval forces now committed to HUSKY are assumed to be also available for this operation. In general, they exceed the forces set forth above.

* With trained reserves of 140 planes and crews.

11. Political and economic estimate.

a. Political.

Although the inhabitants of the Heel area are considered to be more loyal to the existing regime than those of the western part of southern ITALY, no serious political problems should be involved in an occupation of this area. In fact, friendliness to American forces may well be anticipated.

b. Economic.

ITALY, as a whole, would prove to be an economic liability if she were occupied by the UNITED NATIONS. Provided general commitments based on political considerations are avoided, occupation of the Heel should impose no serious drain on UNITED NATIONS resources. Little, if any, food, fuel, or other important supplies could be secured from the area.

12. Supply and shipping requirements (Appendix "F" - omitted)

a. Supply.

Other than the danger that there may be a deficiency of water, no unusual supply requirements are anticipated.

Monthly supply estimates are based on 3% replacement in personnel, and 1.1 ship tons per man for maintenance.

b. Shipping.

The following shipping, or its equivalent in smaller types, will be required:

(1) Assault phase:

| APA | AKA | AK |
|-----|-----|----|
| 53 | 23 | 6* |

* These ships carry cargo of the armored division which is moved in the Follow-up Phase.

(2) Follow-up phase:

Based on an initial lift of the combat elements of two divisions, the following convoy loaded shipping is required:

20 AP,

14 AK (does not include the 6 AK shown in the assault phase).

(3) Maintenance, monthly:

6 AP and 34 AK.

The basis for the computations and the effect of port capacities are discussed in Appendix "F" - (omitted).

c. Availability.

HUSKY requires shipping to lift 8 assault divisions whereas this operation requires the lift of four assault divisions, one or two of which may be shore to shore. Therefore, assuming that losses in HUSKY do not exceed 50%, there will be adequate shipping in the area for the operation. A small amount of replacement shipping becomes available meanwhile.

13. Installations influencing the operation (Appendix "G" - omitted, except charts, Annexes "A" and "C" to Appendix "G").

a. Air facilities.

There are 11 airdromes, 2 seaplane bases, and 1 landing field in the Heel, with a saturation point of 450 aircraft normally, 700 in emergencies.

b. Beaches.

Beaches suitable for landing exist near TARANTO and GALLIPOLI. The TARANTO beach is 15 miles long; the two at GALLIPOLI total three miles. Approaches and exits are adequate.

c. Ports.

The estimated total port capacity of the Heel (7850 DW tons per day) is ample to maintain the occupying force.

d. Roads and railroads.

Adequate road and railroad systems are in the area for the operation. They are unusually vulnerable to air attack and sabotage because of the numerous bridges and tunnels.

e. Water supply.

Water supply for the entire area is primarily dependent on the easily destroyed Apulian aqueduct from the north. The occupying force must be prepared to import sufficient water to meet not only its own needs, but also those of the local populace.

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f. Defensive installations.

Extensive fixed defenses, including harbor defense and AA guns, balloon barrages, booms, anti-submarine nets and mines are found in the area, particularly near TARANTO, GALLIPOLI, BRINDISI, and BARI.

14. General conclusions.

a. Advantages.

(1) The operation continues pressure on the AXIS in the MEDITERRANEAN region, thereby decreasing AXIS forces available for deployment in RUSSIA or in western EUROPE.

(2) It provides advanced bases, bringing the PLOESTI oil fields and DANUBE RIVER traffic within effective heavy bomber range.

(3) It can be accomplished by UNITED NATIONS forces in the MEDITERRANEAN area..

(4) It contributes directly toward the elimination of the Italian Navy as a factor in the MEDITERRANEAN.

(5) Successful accomplishment will stiffen Spanish neutrality and will be an added factor to induce TURKEY to join the UNITED NATIONS.

(6) It establishes a base for further operations against AXIS forces in the Balkans.

(7) It offers an opportunity for active assistance to guerillas in YUGOSLAVIA and GREECE.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) The initial landing cannot be supported by land-based fighters.

(2) Support by carrier aircraft brings the carriers within effective range of enemy shore-based aircraft and motor torpedo boats, and exposes them to submarine attack.

(3) The Heel cannot in itself be regarded as a major bridgehead for reentry into the Continent.

[REDACTED]

(4) The AXIS reaction to the operation may be an advance through SPAIN.

(5) The lodgement will depend on vulnerable lines of communication.

c. Conclusions.

(1) This operation should be considered as a follow-up for HUSKY if:

(a) Further UNITED NATIONS advances in the MEDITERRANEAN are decided upon.

(b) The situation in the western BALKANS offers an opportunity for exploitation.

(2) A decision to implement this operation should be based on the situation which exists at the time with respect to:

(a) The imminence of an Italian collapse;

(b) The feasibility of employing aircraft carriers in the operation.

If the situation is favorable as to both, the operation has considerable merit. If both are unfavorable, particularly the feasibility of employing aircraft carriers, seizure of the Heel should be preceded by an operation to secure airdromes at COTORNE and MILETO.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

LIST OF APPENDICES

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| Appendix "A" - chart- Concept of operation | 13 |
| " " "B" - Geographic factors | Omitted |
| " " "C" - Enemy forces (only chart, Annex "A" to Appendix "C", included) | 14 |
| " " "D" - Troop basis for proposed operation | Omitted |
| " " "E" - Analysis of factors effecting on Italian collapse | Omitted |
| " " "F" - Shipping requirements | Omitted |
| " " "G" - Installations affecting the operation. (only charts, Annexes "A" and "C" to Appendix "G", included) | 15 |

* Appendices marked "Omitted" are available in the office of the Secretariat.

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By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

For more information, contact the author at shirley@shirleydavis.com.



~~SECRET~~ - SECURITY

20 Italian Dive
5 - 6 German Dive
Several Armored Trains

16 6*
36 3* AA
Wires
A/S Net
Booms

| | |
|-----------------|---------|
| 6 | 15" |
| 6-9 | 12" |
| 6 | 12" How |
| 21 | 6" |
| 1 | 4" |
| 4 | 4" AA |
| 6 | 3.9" AA |
| 16 | 3" AA |
| Balloon Barrage | |
| Mines | |
| Booms | |

| | |
|------|---------------|
| 4 6* | Torpedo Tubes |
|------|---------------|

2 12*
4 9.2*
8 8* or 11* Now
18 6*
8 4.7*
8 under 4.5*
14 ?
46 3*-6* AA
4 3* AA
18 under 3* AA
9 ?
Balloon Barrage
Mines
A/S Nets
Booms

German: 456 L.R. Bomb
72 Bomb Rec
156 Dive Bomb
432 Fir
24 Army Co-op
24 Coastal

Italian: 230 New Bomb
130 Torp Bomb
680 Pfr
155 Arty Co-op
230 Coastal

Naval (Italian Effective Strength):

6 NB
2 CA
5 CL
1 AVP
53 DO
53 SS

Diagram of a rectangular box with an 'X' inside, representing a 10x10 grid.

ITALY (SOUTH)
SPECIAL STRATEGIC MAP

Scale 1:1,500,000

Figure 1 consists of two horizontal lines representing DNA. The top line is labeled 'DNA probe' and has a scale bar above it with markings at 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, and 80. The bottom line is labeled 'PCR products' and has a scale bar above it with markings at 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, and 110. Both lines have several vertical tick marks indicating specific positions.

Lambert (Lambert Data Project)
Standard Algebra 17 and 18
Lambert, IL 60139

LEGEND

| | | | |
|---------------------------|---|-----------------|--|
| Types of First Experience | ● | Right 1st Class | |
| — — Second — | ● | Right 2nd Class | |
| — — Third — | ● | Right 3rd Class | |

... **Grade Task** ... **Grade Task** ...
 ... **Grade Task** ... **Grade Task** ...
 ... **Grade Task** ... **Grade Task** ...

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
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
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SECURITY

ANNEX A
APPENDIX G. INSTAL-
LATIONS AFFECTING THE OPER-
ATION.



SECURITY



BURMA

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May 10, 1943

Pages 1 - 15, incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OUTLINE PLAN FOR A REVISED "ANAKIM"

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

OUTLINE PLAN FOR A REVISED "ANAKIM"

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. An analysis of possible plans and an outline of the plan recommended for UNITED NATIONS operations in BURMA in 1943-44, provided ANAKIM as originally conceived cannot be completely executed in the next dry season, is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The minimum acceptable objectives of operations in BURMA are to maintain pressure on JAPAN, to retain the initiative in the area, and to maintain and improve the flow of supplies and munitions to CHINA in order to insure her continuance in the war.

3. The concept of the operation (See map, Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A") recommended to accomplish these objectives is briefly stated below:

a. Phase I. (1 November 1943).

- (1) Advance into upper BURMA.
- (2) Capture AKYAB, and RAMREE ISLAND.

b. Phase II.

- (1) Simultaneous amphibious assault (1 December 1943⁴³) on:

- (a) SANDOWAY and GWA, with the object of capturing airfields.

- (b) The coast opposite BASSEIN, to open way for overland advance to capture BASSEIN and airfields in the area.

- (2) Secure BASSEIN RIVER for logistic support through BASSEIN.

c. Throughout both phases:

- (1) Carry out an air offensive in BURMA.
- (2) Conduct naval operations in the PACIFIC to hold the Japanese Fleet.

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4. The forces required and comments on availability are indicated below:

a. Air: ⁴²⁴~~XXX~~ U. S. combat aircraft - can be made available by diverting 1 heavy (35 airplanes) and 1 medium (57 airplanes) bomber groups from north AFRICA after HUSKY.

⁵⁷⁶~~XXX~~ British combat aircraft - a deficiency of 90 heavy bombers and 120 fighters must be met.

b. Ground: 13 Chinese divisions, 7 British divisions and 6 assault brigades - available but equipment needed for 2 assault brigades.

c. Naval: 4 BB, 3 CV, 6 ACV, 4 CA, 6 CL, 5 CL (AA), 57 DD, 30 DE and 10 AMS - DMS - British can provide all but 1 CV, 2 CA, 5 CL (AA), 30 DD and 27 DE.

5. Degree of meeting required objectives

This operation will engage Japanese forces in both UPPER and LOWER BURMA, will establish an air base system in BURMA for a coordinated air offensive, and secure a lodgement at BASSEIN, second largest Burmese port, from which exploitation may be continued in the succeeding dry season to secure complete control of the IRRAWADY supply routes into north BURMA. While this operation would "maintain pressure on Japan" and "retain the initiative in the area," the flow of supplies to CHINA would be limited to the capacity of the route through INDIA and north BURMA. However, by the capture of RANGOON and the opening of the IRRAWADY in the succeeding dry season campaign, the large capacity of the routes north from RANGOON would be made available.

6. Conclusions

a. The operation as outlined can be conducted in the 1943-44 dry season.

b. Its accomplishment can be effected only if a decision is made without delay, and a maximum of force and effort applied to surmounting logistical and other difficulties.

ENCLOSURE "A"

OUTLINE PLAN FOR A REVISED "ANAKIM"

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

7. To prepare an outline plan for operations in BURMA in 1943-44, provided ANAKIM as now planned is beyond the capabilities of the UNITED NATIONS.

DISCUSSION

8. Assumptions

a. ANAKIM as originally conceived cannot be completely executed in the 1943-44 dry season.

b. The forces available will be limited to those now in the area plus those which it is estimated can be moved to the area, equipped and trained in time, with a maximum of effort and coordination. (It should be noted that such forces will be less than those considered necessary in the original ANAKIM plan).

9. Objectives

a. Maintain pressure on JAPAN.

b. Retain initiative in the area.

c. Maintain and improve the flow of supplies and munitions to CHINA in order to insure her continuance in the war.

10. Possible UNITED NATIONS courses of action

a. Plan A (N. BURMA-AKYAB-RAMREE) -- Occupation of northern BURMA and capture of AKYAB and RAMREE ISLAND.

b. Plan B (N. BURMA-AKYAB-RAMREE-ANDAMANS) -- Occupation of northern BURMA and capture of AKYAB, RAMREE ISLAND, and the ANDAMANS.

c. Plan C (N. BURMA-ARAKAN-BASSEIN) -- Occupation of northern BURMA, capture of ARAKAN air fields, and seizure of a lodgement near BASSEIN.

S [REDACTED]
d. Plan D (N. BURMA-ARAKAN-IRRAWADY-BHAMO) -- Occupation of northern BURMA, capture of ARAKAN air fields, seizure of lodgement near BASSEIN, and securing the IRRAWADY.

11. Analysis of Plan A (N. BURMA-AKYAB-RAMREE)

a. Concept of the operation

(1) Burmese Coast

(a) Capture of the airfield at AKYAB by British forces, followed by the capture of RAMREE ISLAND. Simultaneously there should be a naval demonstration in the BAY OF BENGAL to convince the Chinese that we have control of the waters in the area.

(2) Upper BURMA

(a) A British advance toward PAKOKKU and MANDALAY from their present positions in the IMPHAL - CHINDWIN RIVER - CHIN HILLS area.

(b) A Chinese (Ramgarh Force) advance from LEDO to MYITKYINA.

(3) YUNNAN

(a) Chinese advance from YUNNAN to the line MYITKYINA - BHAMO - LASHIO. Junction with Chinese Forces from the LEDO area. Advance to the south and southwest joining the British at MANDALAY.

b. Degree of meeting required objectives (Paragraph 9)

This course of action, if successful, would maintain limited pressure on Japanese forces, furnish added security to our airfields in INDIA, ASSAM, and YUNNAN, permit the establishment of airfields closer to targets in lower BURMA, and facilitate the opening of a supply road connecting INDIA (LEDO) with the BURMA road. However, the flow of supplies and munitions to CHINA would not be materially improved because the capacity of the new land route would be hardly equal to the requirements of troops in the area. Furnishing supplies

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and munitions to these troops over such a limited route is much more difficult than for the Japanese with their better developed routes from southern BURMA. This course of action is rejected.

12. Analysis of Plan B (N. BURMA-AKYAB-RAMREE-ANDAMANS)

To the operations for Plan A is added the capture of the ANDAMANS. If this added operation is successful, it would provide an air and sea base for operations against Japanese shipping in the BAY OF BENGAL. The limited air and naval facilities to be secured, difficulties in their expansion, and vulnerability to attack from numerous Japanese air bases do not warrant assuming the cost of the operation. The logistical difficulties of the north BURMA operations in getting supplies to CHINA was discussed in Plan A. This course of action is rejected.

13. Analysis of Plan C (N. BURMA-ARAKAN-BASSEIN)

a. Concept of the operation (See Map, Appendix "A")

(1) Phase I. (1 November 1943).

(a) Advance into UPPER BURMA as in Plan A.

(b) Capture AKYAB and RAMREE ISLAND as in Plan A.

(2) Phase II.

(a) Simultaneous amphibious assault (1 December 19⁴³~~44~~)

on:

1. SANDOWAY and GWA with the object of capturing airfields.

2. The coast opposite BASSEIN to open way for overland advance to capture BASSEIN and airfields in the area.

(b) Secure BASSEIN RIVER for logistic support through BASSEIN.

(3) Throughout both phases:

(a) Carry out an air offensive in BURMA.

(b) Conduct naval operations in the PACIFIC to hold the Japanese Fleet in those waters.

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b. Degree of meeting required objectives (Paragraph 5)

This operation will engage Japanese forces in lower BURMA as well as in north BURMA, establish an air base system in lower BURMA for a vigorous air offensive, and secure a lodgement at BASSEIN, second largest Burmese port, from which exploitation aimed at control of the IRRAWADY may be continued in the succeeding dry season. While this course of action would maintain pressure on the Japanese and retain the initiative, especially through air action, the provision of supplies to CHINA would be limited to the capacity of the route through INDIA and north BURMA. The large additional capacity of the routes from RANGOON could be made available by the capture of RANGOON and the opening of the IRRAWADY in the succeeding dry season campaign.

c. A thorough examination indicates that the requirements of this operation in air, ground, and naval forces, aircraft, assault shipping, and landing craft, and ports and port facilities can be met provided prompt and decisive action is taken. Comments on the feasibility of this operation follow:

(1) Chances of success of the Chinese advance from YUNNAN will be increased if the Chinese are convinced that the UNITED NATIONS intend to carry out an effective campaign and if logistic support is adequate.

(2) The AKYAB assault can be supported by aircraft based on CHITTAGONG and COX'S BAZAAR. The RAMREE assault must be supported by carrier-based aircraft.

(3) The UNITED NATIONS air offensive will seriously interfere with Japanese counter operations in north BURMA and the ARAKAN region, especially because of the vulnerability of the railroad, river, and two primary roads which are the main supply routes from RANGOON north.

(4) The vulnerability of the ARAKAN assault to Japanese air attack will be offset in great measure by the preliminary action of our superior air force, the provision

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of two carriers at each landing, and shore based support from bases (if established in time) at AKYAB and on RAMREE ISLAND.

(5) Logistic support of the ARAKAN airfields will be difficult, but not insurmountable. The port of BASSEIN will be of great assistance especially after control of the BASSEIN RIVER is obtained.

(6) The UNITED NATIONS can afford to risk the heavy materiel and personnel losses to be expected. Early provision for combating and controlling malaria must be made.

d. This course of action is accepted.

14. Analysis of Plan D (N. BURMA-ARAKAN-IRAWADDY-BHAMO)

A careful analysis of the forces required for this operation indicates that they cannot be furnished prior to the 1943 dry season. This plan is therefore rejected.

15. Details of the accepted plan (Plan C - N. BURMA-ARAKAN-BASSEIN)

a. Concept of the operation

See paragraph 13 a, and map, Appendix "A".

b. Japanese forces

(1) Ground and air forces

The Japanese ground forces occupying BURMA total 4 infantry divisions, 1 armored regiment, and approximately 132 fighters, 132 bombers, and 36 observation type planes. The 33d Division, with its headquarters at MANDALAY, controls the CHINDWIN RIVER valley. The 56th Division, with its headquarters at LASHIO, is disposed along the BURMA-CHINA border. The 55th Division, with its headquarters at AKYAB, is now in contact with British forces in the vicinity of MAUNGDAW and BUTHIDAUNG. The 18th Division, with its headquarters at MANDALAY, is deployed as follows:

1 combat team, vicinity of KENG TUNG

1 combat team, MANDALAY

1 combat team, MYITKYINA

The general reserve for the Jap Forces in BURMA is located in the vicinity of RANGOON. Estimated strength, one-half division plus one tank regiment.

(2) Reinforcement of ground and air forces

The Japanese capability of reinforcing this area is considerable because of the existing lines of communication across INDO-CHINA, THAILAND, and the MALAYAN PENINSULA, and the sea route through the STRAITS OF MALACCA to RANGOON.

For Japanese ground force reinforcement, there will be available 3 weak Thai divisions in the KENG TUNG area of BURMA, 1 division in INDO-CHINA, and 2 divisions in MALAYA. There have also been reliable reports of the formation of a Burma Independence Army, allegedly numbering 40-50,000. The diversion to BURMA, of Japanese forces from MANCHURIA, CHINA, or the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC would depend upon the situation existing at the time. Japanese reinforcements would probably be limited to increasing the forces in BURMA to 9 divisions.

Through the construction of a system of airdromes and airfields the Japanese are capable of rapidly concentrating air forces from other areas to support their troops in BURMA. However, the availability of air units is dependent upon the situation existing in the other areas at the time. They are capable of increasing the number of operational aircraft in BURMA from 300 to 650 within a period of 45 days.

(3) Naval forces

In view of naval operations to be conducted in the PACIFIC, the most likely Japanese course of action would

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be to retain their major naval forces in the PACIFIC and send a striking force into the INDIAN OCEAN area.

c. UNITED NATIONS forces required:

(1) Air

Air forces at present allocated for BURMA and CHINA are not sufficient to meet the requirements. The UNITED STATES can augment its air forces in the area by one heavy and one medium bombardment group from north AFRICA, after HUSKY (Appendix "B").

Provided British air forces are increased to meet their present indicated deficiencies of about 90 heavy bombers and 120 fighters, the air forces will meet the requirements of the plan.

REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY MAJOR COMBAT UNITS,
U.S.A.A.F. AND BRITISH

| | U. S. (INDIA and CHINA) | | BRITISH*** | |
|------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|--------------|---------|
| | Requirements | On Hand
and
En Route | Requirements | On Hand |
| Heavy Bombers* | 70 | 69** | 96 | 10 |
| Lt. and Medium Bombers | 114 | 90** | 128 | 205 |
| Fighters | 240 | 273 | 352 | 230 |

* One heavy bomber group in CHINA not included.

** Deficiency can be met by diversion of one heavy (35 airplanes) and one medium bomber group (57 airplanes) from north AFRICA after completion of HUSKY.

*** 1/3 British airplanes in INDIA considered available, except for heavy bombers. Information is not available on the number of British airplanes en route.

(2) Ground

| <u>Requirements</u> | | <u>Availability</u> |
|-----------------------------|--|---------------------|
| Operation from YUNNAN | - 10 Chinese Div. | Available. |
| Operation from LEDO | - 3 Chinese Div. | Available. |
| Operation from IMPHAL | - 3 British Div. | Available. |
| Capture AKYAB | - 1 Div.
1 Assault Bde.* | Available. |
| Capture RAMREE | - 1 Div.
1 Assault Bde.* | Available. |
| Capture SANDOWAY and
GWA | - 1 Div.
2 Assault Bdes.* | Available. |
| Capture BASSEIN | - 1 Div.
2 Assault Bdes.* | Available. |
| TOTAL | - 13 Chinese and 7 British
Divs., 6 Assault Bdes. | |

* Equipment for two assault brigades on hand for training. Four assault brigades now trained. Equipment on order for 4 assault brigades. Orders should be placed for equipment for 2 assault brigades.

(3) Naval

| | <u>Covering
Force</u> | <u>Escort
Force</u> | <u>British
estimate
they can
assign</u> | <u>Balance
to be
provided</u> |
|-----------|---------------------------|-------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| B B | 4 | | 2 | |
| O B B | | | 2 | |
| C V | 3 | | 2 | 1 |
| A C V | | 6 | 6 | |
| C A | 4 | | 2 | 2 |
| C L | | 6 | 7 M & 6 L | |
| C L (A A) | | 5 | | 5 |
| D D | 27 | 30 | 27 | 30 |
| D E | | 30 | 3 | 27 |
| AMS-DMS | | 10 | 33 | |
| S S | | | 13 | |

CONCLUSIONS

16. A revised ANAKIM to be conducted in the next dry season with the objectives of occupying north BURMA, capturing the ARAKAN air fields, and securing a lodgement near BASSEIN is a suitable, feasible, and acceptable operation. Its accomplishment can be effected only if a decision is made without delay, and a maximum of force and effort applied to surmounting the logistical and other difficulties brought out in this study.

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APPENDIX A



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APPENDIX "B"

AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS FOR REVISED ANAKIM

I. Proposed unit flow into INDIA (U.S.A.A.F.)

| <u>Groups</u> | <u>Apr.</u> | <u>1943
July</u> | <u>Oct.</u> | <u>Jan.</u> | <u>1944
Apr.</u> | <u>May</u> | <u>Grand
Total</u> | <u>Unit
Equip-
ment</u> | <u>R</u> |
|----------------------|-------------|----------------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------|------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|----------|
| Heavy Bombers | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 48 | |
| Medium Bombers | 3/4 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 48 | |
| Light & Lt. D/B | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Fighters | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 300 | |
| Observation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Photo Reconnaissance | 1/2 | 1/2 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 3/4 | 39 | |
| Troop Carrier | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 52 | |
| Night Fighters | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1/4 | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 | 24 | |

To implement revised ANAKIM, it is recommended that one heavy (35 airplanes) and one medium (57 airplanes) bomber be diverted to the INDIA - CHINA theater on the completion of HUSKY. This group is in addition to units listed in paragraph III. British aircraft in INDIA and CEYLON as of April 26, 1943, is as indicated in paragraph III.

[illegible]

III. R.A.F. airplanes in INDIA and CEYLON as of April 26, 1943.
(Information is not available as to proposed British future allocations)

INDIA

| Type | No. of
Squadrons | Service-
able | Service-
able in
two weeks | Service-
able in
over two
weeks | Total |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|--|-------|
| <u>BOMBERS</u> | | | | | |
| Heavy | 1 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 10 |
| Medium | 2 | 43 | 23 | 19 | 85 |
| Light T.E. | 5 | 115 | 42 | 53 | 210 |
| Light S.E. | 8 | 60 | 125 | 190 | 375 |
| Torpedo T.E. | 2 | 20 | 14 | 7 | 41 |
| <u>G.R.</u> | | | | | |
| Heavy | - | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Light T.E. | 2 | 34 | 18 | 18 | 70 |
| <u>FLYING BOAT</u> | | | | | |
| T.E. | 3 | 14 | 2 | 0 | 16 |
| <u>FIGHTER</u> | | | | | |
| S.S. | 13½ | 320 | 160 | 170 | 650 |
| M.S. Day | 3 | 20 | 15 | 8 | 43 |
| M.S. Night | 1½ | 9 | 2 | 2 | 13 |
| <u>P.R.U.</u> | | | | | |
| S.S. | 1 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 8 |
| M.S. | - | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| <u>OBSERVATION
AND LIAISON</u> | | | | | |
| | 1 | 23 | 8 | 14 | 45 |
| TOTAL | 42 | 675 | 413 | 482 | 1570 |

CEYLON

| | | | | | |
|--------------------|----|----|----|---|-----|
| <u>BOMBER</u> | | | | | |
| Torpedo T.E. | 2 | 9 | 11 | 1 | 21 |
| <u>G.R.</u> | | | | | |
| Heavy | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 7 |
| Light T.E. | 1 | 7 | 5 | 0 | 12 |
| <u>FLYING BOAT</u> | | | | | |
| T.E. | 4 | 24 | 5 | 5 | 34 |
| <u>FIGHTER</u> | | | | | |
| S.S. | 3 | 50 | 14 | 1 | 65 |
| TOTAL | 11 | 94 | 36 | 9 | 139 |

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WITHIN AVAILABLE MEANS



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ADDENDUM

to

J.C.S. 303

OUTLINE PLAN FOR A REVISED "ANAKIM"

Memorandum by the Secretaries

1. This addendum to J.C.S. 303, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

Add to J.C.S. 303 the attached Enclosure "B" and Appendices "A" and "B" thereto.

2. This study after approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be issued as an Addendum to C.C.S. 218 at such time as may be considered desirable.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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ENCLOSURE "B"OUTLINE PLAN FOR AN ANAKIM WITHIN AVAILABLE MEANS1. Problem

To prepare an outline plan for operations in BURMA during the next dry season (1943-44) within the capabilities of available UNITED NATIONS forces and equipment.

2. Assumptions

a. That air and ground forces cited as "resources now in sight," at the NEW DELHI Conference, will be ready for the operations.

b. That deficiencies found indispensable to mounting the operations as hereinafter set up will be within the foreseeable capabilities of the UNITED NATIONS to provide without detracting from the earliest defeat of GERMANY.

c. That the UNITED STATES will create effective diversion in the PACIFIC.

3. Objectives

Provided Revised ANAKIM (Enclosure "A") is beyond UNITED NATIONS means, the objectives which are considered to be the minimum that can be accepted for the BURMA theater are:

a. Maintain pressure on the Japanese forces in the area.

b. Retain the initiative by such offensive action as will cause Japanese countermeasures and deny them freedom of action in BURMA.

c. Insure that the means at hand are actively employed to best advantage to keep JAPAN from further expansion, and from consolidating and exploiting her current holdings in BURMA.

d. Secure an area in upper BURMA that is suitable for the development of an all weather route between ASSAM and CHINA.

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4. The concept of the operation (See Map, Appendix "A" to Enclosure "B") recommended to accomplish these objectives.

a. Phase I. (1 November 1943).

(1) British advance toward PAKAKKU from present positions in the IMPHAL - CHINDWIN RIVER - CHIN HILLS area.

(2) Advance from LEDO to MYITKYINA by Chinese (RAMGARH Force).

(3) Chinese advance from YUNNAN to the line MYITKYINA - BHAMO - LASHIO. Junction with LEDO forces, advance to the south and southwest joining the British at MANDALAY.

(4) Advance down the MAYU PENINSULA toward AKYAB.

b. Phase II.

(1) Simultaneous amphibious assaults (1 December 1943):

(a) On AKYAB and RAMREE with the object of capturing airfields.

(b) Up the AN CHAUNG RIVER to seize AN, and the TAUNGUP RIVER to seize TAUNGUP and the airfield.

c. Phase III. (Follow Phase II as soon as tactical situation will allow).

(1) Advance inland from AN toward NGAPE - MAGWE in order to join with the upper BURMA Force.

(2) Advance inland from TAUNGUP toward PROME in order to join with the upper BURMA Force.

(3) Construct and improve overland communication toward each objective.

d. Throughout all phases,

(1) Conduct an air offensive in BURMA.

(2) Conduct naval operations in the PACIFIC to hold the Japanese Fleet in those waters.

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5. The forces required and comments on availability are indicated below:

a. Air

Same as for Revised ANAKIM (Enclosure "A").

b. Ground

13 Chinese divisions, 7 Indian divisions, 1 British division, and 4 assault brigades - available.

c. Naval

2 BB, 2 CV, 6 ACV, 2 CA, 4 CL, 3 CL(AA), 36 DD, 20 DE, and 10 AMS - DMS -- British can provide all but 3 CL(AA), 9DD, and 17 DE.

d. Status of equipment and miscellaneous personnel is shown in Appendix "B".

6. Degree of meeting required objectives.


This course of action, in addition to the operations in upper BURMA outlined in Enclosure "A", after capturing supporting air bases, requires advance over the ARAKAN YOMAS. The advance from AN is over a well used pack trail, and from TAUNGUP via a one way dry weather road. Each route would require considerable road construction, but such is considered within the capabilities of the forces employed. Passage over the YOMAS will permit joining with the forces in upper BURMA, and securing the IRRRAWADDY from PROME to MYITKYINA. The establishment of good overland communications to PROME and MAGWE would facilitate the assault on RANGOON in the next dry season, or possibly during the monsoon period of 1944 due to the good overland communications from PROME to RANGOON. Airfields are established closer to targets in lower BURMA than are now available in the CHITTAGONG area.

7. Conclusions as stated in Enclosure "A" are applicable.

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Enclosure "B"



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APPENDIX "B" TO ENCLOSURE "B"

STATUS OF EQUIPMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS PERSONNEL

1. Air.

a. U. S. Army Air Force requirements will be met by the diversion of one heavy and one medium bomber group from North AFRICA at the completion of HUSKY.

b. Provided British air forces are increased to meet their present indicated deficiencies of about 90 heavy bombers and 120 fighters, the air will meet the requirements.

2. Specialized equipment for across beach operations.

a. On hand for: 2 Indian Divisions.

1 British Division.

b. On order for: 2 Divisions.

4 Assault Brigades.

c. Total on hand and on order for: 5 Divisions.

4 Assault brigades.

3. Landing craft available (INDIA).

| <u>Type</u> | <u>No.</u> | <u>Lift each</u> | <u>Total lift</u> |
|----------------------|------------|------------------|-------------------|
| LCA | 180 | 35 | 6300 |
| LCA (in 10 LSI) | 120 | 35 | 4200 |
| LCS | 20 | Crew only | -- |
| LCM | 120 | 100 | 12000 |
| LCM (in 10 LSI) | 20 | 100 | 2000 |
| LCP | 101 | 13 | <u>1313</u> |
| Total lift available | | | 25813 |

4. Assault shipping available (INDIA).

| <u>Type</u> | <u>No.</u> | <u>Lift each</u> | <u>Total lift</u> |
|-----------------------|------------|------------------|-------------------|
| LSI | 10 | 1500 | 15000 |
| MT Ships | 30 | 100 | 3000 |
| LSD or G | 5 | 195 | <u>975</u> |
| *Total lift available | | | 18975 |

* There is a deficiency of 56000 troop spaces in assault shipping which will have to be supplied from outside INDIA.

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5. Naval elements and special troops.

The deficiencies in naval elements, R.A.F. parties, ancillary, and administrative units would be considerably less than envisaged in ANAKIM, and could no doubt be made available in the numbers required.

6. Major items of transportation, equipment, and stores listed by NEW DELHI Conference as not available (Appendix "B" to USB 23).

| <u>Item</u> | <u>No. required per Conference</u> | <u>Remarks</u> |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| Buoy vessels | 2 | Not essential to operation. |
| Heave-up boats | 8 | Not essential to operation. |
| Mooring boats | 2 | Not essential to operation. |
| Dredger (2 grab hopper) | 1 | Not essential. One suction type dredger is already available. |
| Harbor tugs | 8 | 3 will be available and will probably be sufficient for the limited operation. |
| Lighter tugs | 4 | Some type of tug is essential. |
| Ramped cargo lighters | 35 | Highly essential. |
| Floating crane (60-ton) | 1 | Not essential to operation. |
| Works barges | 8 | Not essential to operation. |
| Water barges | 8 | Not essential. Use landing craft and cans initially. Ample water all over Burma. |
| Hopper barges | 2 | Not essential to operation. |
| Twin screw creek steamers | 15 | 5 will be available and should be sufficient for the limited operation. |
| Paddle steamers | 12 | 4 may be available and should be sufficient for the limited operation. |
| River flats (300-tons) | 50 | 9 will be available and should be sufficient for the limited operation. |
| Cargo flats (120-tons) | 46 | 23 will be available and should be ample. |
| River salvage craft | 1 | Not essential to operation. |
| M. G. locomotives (Garrett) 24 | | 12 available if allocated. There will be none required initially. |
| M.G. locomotives (Shunting) 30 | | None required initially. |

7. Shipping requirements.

With the reduction in the scale of the operation, it is believed that shipping now allocated would be sufficient to mount the operation.

8. Medical personnel and equipment.

Deficiencies in medical personnel and equipment will be materially reduced and, with the assistance of the UNITED STATES, should not present any considerable problem.

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STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE SEIZURE
AND OCCUPATION OF THE TOE OF ITALY

Note by the Secretaries

The attached report, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION
OF THE TOE OF ITALY

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. A strategic analysis to determine the merits and possibilities of an operation, subsequent to HUSKY, to seize the Toe of ITALY with the forces then available is contained in Enclosure "A."

2. The concept of the operation (See chart, Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A") is briefly stated below:

a. After preliminary air bombardment, to assault and seize bridgeheads and airfields in the Gulfs of S. EUFEMIA and SQUILLACE AREAS by means of amphibious operations and air-borne troops.

b. Extend the bridgeheads and organize defensive positions along the line PAOLA-ACRI-ROSSANO and destroy the enemy to the south of this line.

3. Major forces required.

a. Ground.

6 Infantry Divisions, 1 Armored Division, 1 Airborne Division, 1 Motorized Division, 1 Parachute Brigade.

b. Air.

6 Fighter Groups, 8 Bomber Groups, 6 Troop Carrier Groups, and 1 Observation Group.

c. Naval Forces.

As required by the existing situation.

d. Availability of forces.

Unless removed for use elsewhere, forces will be available after HUSKY.

4. Conclusions.

This course of action is rejected. By comparison with other limited operations (DODECANESE, Heel of ITALY, or SARDINIA and CORSICA), this course of action can not be supported, and the conclusions of J.C.S. 293, "Limited Operations in the Mediterranean 1943-44," are reaffirmed. (These conclusions can be found in paragraph 10 of Enclosure "A.")

ENCLOSURE "A"

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION
OF THE TOE OF ITALY

5. Problem.

Determine the merits and possibilities of an operation subsequent to HUSKY to seize the Toe of ITALY with the forces then available.

6. Assumptions.

It is assumed that:

a. Maximum air operations from the UNITED KINGDOM against GERMANY will continue, and that build-up continues in the UNITED KINGDOM for the defeat of GERMANY to be attained by operations initiated in 1944 from the UNITED KINGDOM.

b. TURKEY.

(1) Remains neutral.

(2) Becomes an active UNITED NATIONS ally.

c. SPAIN continues neutral.

d. ITALY continues as an active AXIS participant.

e. GERMANY resumes the offensive against RUSSIA, assumes the defensive on other fronts, and intensifies the war of attrition against UNITED NATIONS shipping. No final decision is reached on the Russian front.

f. JAPAN remains on the strategic defensive and consolidates her gains.

7. Enemy dispositions, capabilities, and intentions, 1943.

a. GERMAN capabilities with regard to ITALY are as follows:

(1) Defend the whole peninsula, (2) defend the APPENINES near ROME, (3) defend north ITALY along the line of the PO RIVER, (4) defend the German and French frontiers, (5) conduct a step-by-step defensive, calculated to prolong the campaign, making maximum use of Italian forces.

b. The Tunisian Campaign, now in final stages, has disclosed that AXIS air defense in TUNISIA has virtually collapsed.

c. The HUSKY operation may disclose the final intention of GERMANY to assist ITALY both in the air and with ground forces. Assuming determined defense, it is estimated that when this operation is completed the AXIS can have evacuated 1 German air field division, 1 German division (less heavy equipment), and 1/2 Italian semi-motorized division, to the Toe of ITALY.

d. The UNITED NATIONS air attack on the Italian Mainland, if concentrated on aircraft production centers, shipping concentrations, transportation, and strategic industry centers, is certain to reduce to a large extent the Italian capabilities for resistance. The extent of this reduced capability and the effects on Italian morale cannot be assessed soundly.

e. It is now estimated that German capabilities to reinforce ITALY by ground forces without withdrawal from the Russian front is limited to 5 divisions. Of these, it is improbable that more than one German division would be sent to the Toe of ITALY, and it could begin to arrive in the Toe in 36 hours from MUNICH. The forces now in the Toe are the Italian 212 Coastal Division in the CATANZARO area and the Italian 104 semi-motorized Division in the NICASTRO area. ITALY will probably reinforce the Toe following the loss of SICILY. Forces are available for its defense, and it is estimated that the three divisions near ROME could be in the Toe in one week providing maximum rail and road capacities are still available. There are 14 divisions in ITALY, of which 3 are semi-motorized, and none are armored. Italian troops in FRANCE, CROATIA, and SLOVENIA (11 divisions) can be

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recalled quickly by rail. Considerable time would be required for the return of other Italian troops in the BALKANS, and since other AXIS troops would be required to replace them, it is doubtful if GERMANY would permit this.

f. The estimate of AXIS air forces in the MEDITERRANEAN, after HUSKY, is that 1800-2200 aircraft may be available to oppose an operation against the Toe of ITALY. Italian ability to replace air losses will be practically nil, but GERMANY will have had time to replace most of her fighter losses and some of the bomber losses. German intent to maintain this maximum air force in ITALY will depend upon her pressing need in other theaters and her final decision with regard to the defense of ITALY.

g. Naval opposition will be difficult to estimate. It is assumed that the Italian surface forces will have withdrawn to northern bases as far away from air attack as possible and may be divided between the ADRIATIC and the western MEDITERRANEAN. The submarine force will probably remain an effectively contending force. The will to fight of the Italian Navy will be reduced and its action will largely depend on German pressure. The "E" boat forces will have been committed against HUSKY, and those remaining will probably be based beyond radius of their effective use against our operations to seize the Toe.

8. General concept of operations. (See chart, Appendix "A")

PHASE I. An air offensive from SICILY and TUNISIA to:

(a) neutralize naval opposition and all airdromes south of the GULF OF SALERNO - GULF OF TARANTO line, (b) interrupt rail and road communications to the Toe of ITALY, and (c) punish troop concentrations and defense installations in the MERIDIONALE area (CATANZARO, NICASTRO, COSENZA, and CATRONE). Diversionary air operations over widespread areas. Commando raids along the TYRENIAN and IONIAN SEA coasts. Psychological and propaganda warfare.

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PHASE II. Amphibious operations ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore from bases in north AFRICA and SICILY, with air support based in SICILY, to establish bridgeheads in the GULFS OF SAINT EUFEMIA and SQUILLACE. Artillery bombardment from SICILY to reduce defenses of REGGIO. Parachute and airborne troops to facilitate the seizure of air bases.

FINAL PHASE. Extension of the bridgeheads and organization of defensive positions along the line PAOLA-ACRI-ROSSANO. Occupation of the pinched-off portion of the Toe.

9. Forces required.

a. Ground.

(1) Initial assault.

- 3 inf. div. (amphib.)
- 1 armored div. (amphib.)
- 1 para. brig. (to be withdrawn)
- 1 air div. (to be withdrawn)

(2) Followup.

- 3 inf. div.
- 1 motorized div.
- supporting troops.

(3) Army service forces.

b. Air.

- 6 fighter groups
- 4 B (L) groups
- 4 B (M) groups
- 1 obs. group
- 6 transport groups

c. Naval forces.

As required by the existing situation.

d. Availability.

Unless removed for use elsewhere, these forces will be available after HUSKY.

General strategic considerations.

10. The advisability of an operation against the Toe of ITALY, following HUSKY, must be assessed with respect to the over-all MEDITERRANEAN picture for 1943-44. J.C.S. 288, "Invasion of the European Continent from Bases in the MEDITERRANEAN in 1943-44" concludes that the ultimate decisive invasion of the Continent should not be made from the MEDITERRANEAN region. J.C.S. 293, "Limited Operations in the Mediterranean in 1943-44", concludes that:

"a. Although the timing aspect is most discouraging, operations against the Heel of ITALY are most likely to compel the dispersion of AXIS forces and to divert forces from the Russian front.

"b. Operations against the DODECANESE are most likely to induce TURKEY to enter the war as an ally.

"c. Being of moderate size, and, in general, the least objectionable operation strategically speaking, operations against SARDINIA and CORSICA will be the most acceptable if political pressure impels "doing something" during the period between a successful HUSKY and a ROUNDUP.

"d. Operations against the Heel of ITALY would best satisfy a situation whereby a limited-scale operation might force ITALY out of the war.

"e. The decision as to which of the three acceptable operations (Heel of ITALY, DODECANESE, SARDINIA and CORSICA), if any, will be conducted subsequent to a successful HUSKY, must be delayed as long as possible. This will permit more reliable assessment of the several motives that may impel additional operations in the MEDITERRANEAN."

11. Operations against the Toe of ITALY were not considered in J.C.S. 293. It is necessary, therefore, to determine by analysis the acceptability of operations against the Toe, as compared to operations against the DODECANESE, Heel of ITALY, or SARDINIA and CORSICA, for the specific purposes stated in the several conclusions to J.C.S. 293, quoted above.

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12. Toe vs. DODECANESE. It is evident that operations against the DODECANESE are more likely to induce TURKEY to enter the war as an ally than are operations against the Toe of ITALY.

13. The problem then reduces itself to comparing the acceptability of operations against the Toe of ITALY with operations against:

a. The Heel of ITALY to:

(1) Compel the dispersion of AXIS forces, and, if possible, to divert AXIS forces from the Russian front, or

(2) Take advantage of a situation whereby a limited-scale operation might force ITALY out of the war; and

b. SARDINIA and CORSICA, to satisfy political pressure to "do something" during the period between a successful HUSKY and a ROUNDUP.

14. Toe vs. Heel.

a. Assuming determined enemy resistance, operations against the Toe of ITALY are more likely to succeed than operations against the Heel, due to the fact that adequate land-based air support can be provided from Sicilian bases. The losses in the Heel operation might be excessive. Either operation would continue the attrition of AXIS forces, especially air, and probably cause GERMANY to show her intention, or lack of intention, to keep ITALY in the war, by such Military operations as may be required. On the other hand, unless conducted as a preliminary to operations against the Heel, the seizure of the Toe of ITALY by the UNITED NATIONS would have little strategic significance. The forward range of our heavy bombers would not be increased materially by the seizure of the Toe; the Heel would place our Heavy Bombers within effective range of PLOESTI. Nor would the seizure of the Toe in any way increase our Post-HUSKY control of central MEDITERRANEAN waters, whereas the seizure of the Heel would yield the

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TARANTO facilities for our use. The operation against the Toe, moreover, would not represent any threat to the BALKANS. Of more significance, despite our initial intentions, either operation might lead to a long and indecisive campaign of major proportions on the peninsula of ITALY. Being inconsistent with the basic MEDITERRANEAN strategy recommended in J.C.S. 288/1, this eventuality must be avoided if possible.

b. It has been shown that the seizure of the Toe of ITALY would involve some 9 divisions. Having the Toe, the seizure of the Heel by amphibious operations would probably require using an additional 7 to 9 divisions. Thus, the total ground forces, 16 to 18 divisions, involved in operations in southern ITALY would exceed the 11 divisions that it is estimated will become available after a successful HUSKY. Operations against the Toe are, therefore, unacceptable as a preliminary to operations against the Heel.

c. Assuming that HUSKY is completed by mid-August, 1943, operations against either the Toe or the Heel could not be initiated prior to October. By that time it is more than likely that the major 1943 offensives in RUSSIA will have been launched. It is wishful thinking, therefore, to believe that any operation, following HUSKY, within UNITED NATIONS capabilities in the MEDITERRANEAN in 1943, will cause important diversion of AXIS forces (air or ground) from the more decisive battles that may then be taking place in RUSSIA. Reasoning, however, on the dubious assumption that such a diversion of AXIS forces might be accomplished, or adding the assumption that the situation in RUSSIA is so critical that a bold and risky operation must be undertaken, the more decisive operation against the Heel of ITALY (as compared to the Toe) would be the more acceptable.

d. Assuming a situation whereby a limited-scale operation might force ITALY out of the war necessarily presupposes that

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GERMANY does not intend to hold ITALY by such Military action as may be required. In such circumstances, it can be assumed that the resistance of the Italian Military forces to our invasion will be of a low order. This would obviously reduce immeasurably the hazards of conducting amphibious operations against the Heel. It follows, logically, that the choice would then rest between two feasible operations (Toe or Heel) both of which are within the 1943 capabilities of the UNITED NATIONS in the MEDITERRANEAN. It has been shown that possession of the Heel offers strategic advantages that far exceed those for the Toe. Therefore, under the circumstances assumed -- a tottering ITALY -- operations against the Heel of ITALY (as compared to the Toe) would be the more acceptable.

15. Toe vs. SARDINIA and CORSICA.

a. National and international pressure on the UNITED NATIONS political leadership may demand "doing something" against the European AXIS, in addition to the air bombardment offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM, during the extended period between a successful HUSKY and a ROUNDUP. In this event, there are two separate circumstances in the MEDITERRANEAN area that might obtain: ITALY might or might not be on the verge of collapse or surrender.

b. If she were on the verge of collapse, it was concluded above that UNITED NATIONS operations against the Heel of ITALY would be more acceptable than operations against the Toe. Under these circumstances, operations against SARDINIA and CORSICA should not be considered.

c. If, however, following HUSKY, ITALY is not on the verge of collapse (or GERMANY has reinforced ITALY) and political pressure requires "doing something", J.C.S. 293, "LIMITED OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-44," has concluded that "being of moderate size and, in general, the least

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objectionable operation strategically speaking, operations against SARDINIA and CORSICA will be the most acceptable." Although operations against the Toe were not considered in J.C.S. 293, the conclusion remains sound, because, under the conditions assumed:

(1) The strategic advantages of seizing only the Toe of ITALY are insignificant.

(2) Such operations might develop into a long and indecisive campaign of major proportions.

(3) Seizure of the Toe followed by operations on the Heel of ITALY would require forces in excess of those available in the MEDITERRANEAN after HUSKY.

(4) While avoiding the risks and undesirable possibilities inherent in any operations against the Italian mainland, the seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA would have the added advantages of:

(a) Increasing the security of the lines of communication through the western MEDITERRANEAN.

(b) Providing advanced air bases for bombing northern ITALY and southern GERMANY.

16. Conclusions.

The foregoing analysis finds, by comparison with other acceptable courses of action (DODECANESE, Heel of ITALY, or SARDINIA and CORSICA), that offensive operations by the UNITED NATIONS against the Toe of ITALY, following HUSKY, are not acceptable, and, therefore, should not be undertaken.


The conclusions of J.C.S. 293, "LIMITED OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-44" (paragraph 10 above) remain sound.

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APPENDIX A



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
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APPENDIX B

CRETE

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(J.C.S. 300)

May 7, 1943

Pages 1-10, incl.

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OUTLINE PLAN FOR SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF CRETE

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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BRIEF
OF
OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF CRETE
Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. An outline plan for the seizure and occupation of CRETE is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. Concept of the operation (See Chart, Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A").

An amphibious operation, two-thirds in ship to shore transportation, one-third in shore to shore transportation, launched from bases in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN for the purpose of capturing CRETE.

Phase I. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over CRETE.

Phase II. Amphibious and airborne landing operations on CRETE to secure airdromes and ports.

Phase III. Further operations to seize and occupy the entire island.

3. Major UNITED NATIONS forces required.

a. Air. - 2,783

1,200 Bombers; 600 Fighters (land based); 600 Troop Carriers; 320 Carrier based aircraft; and 63 Miscellaneous aircraft.

b. Ground.

1 Airborne Division; 7 Infantry Divisions.

c. Naval.

4 BB, 6 CV, 22 CA & CL, 85 DD.

4. Conclusions.

a. Advantages.

(1) Denies use of air and submarine bases to the AXIS, thereby improving the security of shipping in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN.

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(2) Renders an AXIS advance southward into EGYPT or eastward into the LEVANT impossible as long as the UNITED NATIONS hold CRETE.

(3) Has a beneficial moral effect on TURKEY.

(4) Is a step towards opening the AEGEAN.

(5) Acquires air bases for:

(a) Strategic bombing operations as far north as PLOESTI and the DANUBE.

(b) Land-based fighter support for landing operations against the DODECANESE and the PELEPONNESUS.

(6) Encourages subversive activities in the BALKANS.

(7) Contains present German Air Forces in the BALKANS and might cause diversion of additional units from the Russian Front.

(8) Permits operations against the AXIS lines of communication through the AEGEAN.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Is a difficult amphibious operation out of effective tactical range of land-based UNITED NATIONS fighter aircraft.

(2) Is impossible to advance into the BALKANS without additional amphibious operations in the face of strong AXIS opposition.

(3) Does not contribute materially to the collapse of ITALY.

(4) Will not seriously dislocate German strategic plans, nor provide any substantial diversion of strength from the Russian Front.

c. Pertinent remarks.

A direct assault on CRETE would be an expensive operation. Even though an invasion of EUROPE via the AEGEAN and GREECE were envisaged, the results to be obtained would not be commensurate with the cost. This is true since an invasion of the BALKANS via GREECE could be mounted from SICILY, thus eliminating the necessity of an operation against CRETE and/or the DODECANESE.

ENCLOSURE "A"

OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF CRETE

Statement of Problem.

5. To prepare an outline plan for the seizure and occupation of CRETE.

6. Assumptions.

a. HUSKY is successfully completed by mid-August, 1943.

b. The bomber offensive against AXIS installations on the Continent is increasing in intensity and will seriously reduce the AXIS war potential.

c. GERMANY'S operations against RUSSIA in 1943 will not be decisive, and RUSSIA will remain an important factor in the war.

d. A cross-channel operation will not be feasible in 1943 unless the military power of GERMANY has disintegrated appreciably.

e. An invasion of the BRITISH ISLES or of TURKEY is not considered an AXIS capability. An AXIS invasion of the IBERIAN PENINSULA is improbable. SPAIN, PORTUGAL, and TURKEY remain neutral.

f. The Battle of the ATLANTIC remains serious in its shipping implications.

g. UNITED NATIONS commitments in the PACIFIC and Asiatic areas and to RUSSIA remain substantially as now planned.

7. Mission of the operation.

To seize and occupy the island of CRETE, in order to provide a base for further operations against the BALKANS, and to make the lines of communication in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN more secure.

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8. Concept of the operations. (See chart, Appendix "A")

An amphibious operation, two-thirds in ship to shore transportation, one-third in shore to shore transportation, launched from bases in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN for the purpose of capturing CRETE.

Phase I: The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over CRETE.

Phase II: Amphibious and airborne landing operations on CRETE to secure airdromes and ports.

Phase III: Further operations to seize and occupy the entire island.

9. Terrain estimate.

a. CRETE consists largely of a maze of rocky mountains among which are a very few plains. It is 164 miles long and from $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 35 miles wide. The country is generally semi-arid and from May to September has an almost desert-like climate. The vegetation is sparse, affording little concealment except in the olive groves.

The coast of CRETE is well suited for defense because of its generally rocky nature, lack of good anchorages, and paucity of good roads and other exits. The principal landing beaches are along the north coast.

b. Climate.

The climate of CRETE is Mediterranean and is characterized by mild, intermittently rainy winters and hot dry summers.

c. Conclusions.

The terrain generally favors the defense. Autumn wind and surf conditions favor amphibious operations.

10. Estimate of the enemy forces. (See charts, Appendices "A" and "B")

a. Air.

(1) The present AXIS air strength in GREECE, CRETE, and the DODECANESE consists of an air force of all types numbering approximately 333 planes. (May 4, 1943.)

(2) Under assumption a it is estimated that an additional 1329 aircraft of all types could be moved into this area. This includes AXIS reinforcement from the central MEDITERRANEAN only.

(3) The airdromes in GREECE, CRETE, and the DODECANESE will support any force the AXIS can deploy. The size of the force that will actually be employed will depend upon the importance the AXIS attaches to this area.

b. Ground.

It is estimated that by July 1, 1943 there will be in CRETE:

| | | |
|---|---|-------------------|
| One Italian Infantry Division, Reinforced | - | 30,000 men |
| One German Motorized Division |) | |
| One German Infantry Division |) | - 50,000 men |
| One Luftwaffe Field Division |) | |
| AA, Coast Defense and Service Troops) | | |
| Total AXIS Forces | | <u>80,000 men</u> |

It is estimated that the AXIS will withdraw their garrisons on the smaller Aegean Islands into CRETE, the GREEK mainland, and the larger islands in the DODECANESE. The AXIS will not further reinforce CRETE, since the forces probably would be considered sufficient to hold the island.

c. Naval.

It can be expected that miscellaneous local defense craft and submarines will be encountered.

11. Estimate of UNITED NATIONS forces required.

a. Air.

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Air Force | 2783 |
| Heavy Bombers | 350 |
| Medium Bombers | 550 |
| L/D Bombers | 300 |
| Fighters (exclusive of carrier-based a/c) | 600 |
| Troop Carrier | 600 |
| Photo Reconnaissance | 13 |
| Observation | <u>50</u> |
| | 2,463 |

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75% of the above air force is ready for combat.

| | |
|---------------|------------|
| Carrier based | <u>320</u> |
| Total | 2,783 |

There are two methods of furnishing fighter cover for this operation. One, carrier based aircraft; two, if carrier based aircraft cannot be furnished, 22 groups (1600 P-38 airplanes) will be required in order to maintain 150 airplanes continuously over the landing operations.

b. Ground.

Assault force

One Airborne Division

Three Infantry Divisions (Amphibiously trained)

Follow-up force

Four Infantry Divisions

One Armored Regiment (Medium)

c. Naval forces.

(1) Covering force (IONIAN SEA)

4 Battleships

2 Carriers

8 Cruisers

20 Destroyers

(2) Naval attack force

(a) Escort group

40 PC's and SC's

18 Destroyers

(b) Fire support group

Fire support comparable to that which could be provided by:

20 Destroyers

10 Cruisers (10,000 ton U.S. type)

(c) Air support group

4 Carriers

4 Cruisers

12 Destroyers

(d) Control, salvage and minesweeper group

Miscellaneous vessels as required.

d. Naval forces (Follow-up).

15 additional DD's for follow-up convoys.

12. Political and economical estimate.

a. Political.

CRETE is ruled by an AXIS Military government. The Italians now occupy the easternmost province and the Germans the remainder of the island, including the principal towns. Guerrilla activities of Cretan patriots are widespread and backed by the entire population. It is to be assumed that their sympathies would be with the UNITED NATIONS in case of invasion.

Turkish reaction to an invasion of CRETE would be favorable. GREECE would welcome the liberation of Greek soil.

b. Economic.

CRETE has no economic value to the AXIS. In general, food is insufficient for the population, and food for any large number of troops must be supplied from outside.

13. Supply.

a. Shipping required for the assault force. (Combat loaded)

3 Headquarters Ships
30 APA
10 AKA
65 LST
43 LCI(L)

b. Shipping required for the follow-up force. (Convoy loaded)

62 Transport sailings (31 ships assuming 14 day turn around)
47 Cargo sailings (24 ships assuming 14 day turn around)

c. Monthly maintenance. (Convoy loaded)

6 Transport sailings (3 ships assuming 14 days turn around)
17 Cargo sailings (9 ships assuming 14 days turn around)

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14. Installations and conditions influencing the operation.

a. Port capacities.

The following shows the rated capacity for the ports of the island:

| | |
|----------------|-------------------|
| CANEA | 200 tons per day |
| SOUDA BAY area | 1000 |
| RETIMO | 500 |
| CANDIA* | 550 |
| KHERSONISOS | 150 |
| SAN NICOLAO | 500 |
| SITELA | 100 |
| IERAPETRA | 100 |
| TYMPAKI* | 100 |
| SAN GALENI* | 100 |
| PALIOKHORA | <u>100</u> |
| Total | 3400 tons per day |

Of this total, the assault should gain two or three ports with a probable combined capacity of 750 tons per day. It appears therefore that the bulk of the supplies and personnel must be landed over the beaches.

b. Beaches.

The beaches appear to be sufficient for the planned operation. The beaches are exposed to a heavy surf during the rather infrequent gales and storms.

c. Coastal defenses.

Exact data on the coast defenses is not at hand. It is reasonable to assume that all landing beaches are heavily protected by coast defense installations.

d. Airfields.

There are eight airdromes and a minimum of nine fighter strips on the island. Five of the fields are along

*Indicates ports captured in the assault.

the north coast, two on the south coast, and one in the eastern interior of the island. The fighter strips are well dispersed along the south coast. So far as landing fields and installations are concerned, the AXIS can operate a strong defensive air force from CRETE.

e. Anti-aircraft defenses.

There are 8 or more AA Battalions on the island. This would appear to be sufficient to furnish anti-air defense to the airdromes.

f. Railroads.

There are no railroads on CRETE.

g. Roads.

The road system consists of a single lateral road along the north coast with a limited number of branches southward. There is no south coast road and though the island is 164 miles long, only four roads cross from the north to the south coast. There are a number of roads into the interior. The Germans seem to have concentrated on improving the existing system rather than creating new roads.

h. Wire and radio system.

The island is well covered by land wire and radio nets.

i. Health.

Generally speaking, CRETE has a healthful climate, but diseases typical of the eastern MEDITERRANEAN are to be found.

j. Water.

There is sufficient water on CRETE.

15. General conclusions.

a. Advantages.

(1) Denies use of air and submarine bases to the AXIS, thereby improving the security of shipping in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN.

(2) Renders an AXIS advance southward into EGYPT or eastward into the LEVANT impossible as long as the UNITED NATIONS hold CRETE.

(3) Has a beneficial moral effect on TURKEY.

(4) Is a step towards opening the AEGEAN.

(5) Acquires air bases for:

(a) Strategic bombing operations as far north as PLOESTI and the DANUBE.

(b) Land-based fighter support for landing operations against the DODECANESE and the PELEPONNESUS.

(6) Encourages subversive activities in the BALKANS.

(7) Contains present German Air Forces in the BALKANS and might cause diversion of additional units from the Russian Front.

(8) Permits operations against the AXIS lines of communication through the AEGEAN.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Is a difficult amphibious operation out of effective tactical range of land-based UNITED NATIONS fighter aircraft.

(2) Is impossible to advance into the BALKANS without additional amphibious operations in the face of strong AXIS opposition.

(3) Does not contribute materially to the collapse of ITALY.

(4) Will not seriously dislocate German strategic plans, nor provide any substantial diversion of strength from the Russian Front.

c. Pertinent remarks.

A direct assault on CRETE would be an expensive operation. Even though an invasion of EUROPE via the AEGEAN and GREECE were envisaged, the results to be obtained would not be commensurate with the cost. This is true since an invasion of the BALKANS via GREECE could be mounted from SICILY, thus eliminating the necessity of an operation against CRETE and/or the DODECANESE.