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Navy Dept.

Jan. - Mar. 1940

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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January 4, 1949.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

This is the study made by General Board on super-battleship -- which I mentioned several days ago.

Admiral Stark is opposed to this ship because of the disadvantages outlined in paragraph 7 (Page 5) of the attached report.

If asked in Congressional hearings, Admiral Stark will not defend the acquisition of such a proposed ship.

Respectfully request that the President return attached to me when the President no longer desires to retain.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

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G.B.No. 420-6
(Serial No. 1911)

~~SECRET~~

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DOD Doc. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

75-1
BF Navy
Gen Board
navy - 1939

Date- 12-2-69

DEC 27 1939

From: Chairman General Board;
To: Secretary of the Navy.

JWR

SUBJECT: Battleship Design - Ship X.

Reference: (a) Secret letter of the SecNav of 20 November, 1939.

1. The General Board has given careful consideration to the question contained in reference (a) as to "whether a ship similar to Ship X has sufficient merit as a military weapon to warrant inclusion in a scheme of national defense for the United States either as a part of or in addition to the fleet."

2. On 5 December, 1939, Mr. William Francis Gibbs presented to the General Board plans of his firm, Gibbs & Cox, Inc., for a capital ship (Ship X) of about 62,000 tons standard displacement designed to carry a main battery of twelve 16-inch 45-caliber guns at a speed of between 34 and 35 knots. In his remarks, Mr. Gibbs explained the outstanding features of the design and outlined his conception of the purpose and employment of such a ship.

3. Examination of the proposed plans for this vessel does not disclose any feature in her design which the Board considers impracticable, and her construction is believed to be feasible. General comments regarding the principal features of the design as presented are:

HULL

1. Displacement: About 62,000 tons, standard.
2. Beam: 126 feet.
3. Draft: About 36 feet at full load.
4. Length: Approximately 1,005 feet.

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Room 2055

27 DEC 1939

ROUTE TO: 10 + 11

On File N (SC) BB/51-1

Doc. No. 20230

Copy No. 2 of 3

Comment: Consideration of these factors shows that with respect to displacement, beam, and length, the ship is considerably larger than any existing capital ship, while the draft remains approximately the same. Greater tonnage properly utilized should result in increased gun power and speed, and better protection - the inherent qualities of a capital ship. In considering dimensions of such a heavy ship, the effect of restrictions at home and in outlying areas

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G.B.No. 450-6 (Serial No. 1911)

as to harbors and waterways, base facilities, and docks available have received and must continue to receive due consideration. The draft of battleships has not materially increased for a number of years, having approached the limit (about 35 feet) compatible with the facilities of existing harbors and waterways.

ARMAMENT

1. Main Battery: 12 16-inch 45-caliber guns mounted in four triple turrets on centerline, two forward and two aft.
2. Secondary Battery: (a) 26 5-inch 38-caliber double guns mounted in twin turrets.
(b) Several 1.1-inch and 50-caliber machine guns.

Comment: The strength of this battery is approximately thirty-three per cent greater than that of any capital ship under construction by the United States and is probably superior to the battery of any ship in existence or under construction for any power in the world.

PROPULSION

1. Speed: Full speed of not less than 34 knots on full load displacement.
2. Endurance: 26,000 miles at 15 knots.
3. Shaft horsepower: 500,000.

Comment: Speed of the proposed ship is approximately one to two knots greater than that of our latest battleships under construction. Her endurance is considerably greater at all speeds and affords great scope and variation of operation.

The great horsepower (500,000) necessitates provision of large machinery spaces which, although subdivided as far as practicable, necessarily extend over a great length of the ship. The subdivision of power into six engine units, driving six propeller shafts, tends to reduce the chances of serious loss of motive power, but because of the necessity for running shafts aft from the forward engine units this immunity is somewhat reduced thereby and depends to some extent upon the location in the ship of the sustained damage. Since high speed is subject to material reduction from minor derangement or damage, the cost of the extra knot or two in maximum speed of the subject ship is obtained at an excessive displacement cost.

PROTECTION

1. Armor: The armor provided is slightly lighter than armor now being provided in our latest capital ships under construction.
2. Compartmentation: It is apparent that the subdivision of the ship has been designed with a special view to the attainment of as complete protection as is practicable, by subdivisions with intact bulkheads against underwater damage, and for localizing damage so far as is possible.

Comment: As stated above, the armor protection is somewhat lighter than in our latest capital ships which is none too heavy now and indicates that an insufficient percentage of the increased tonnage has been utilized for this purpose.

Security against underwater damage is somewhat adversely affected by the additional number of large spaces necessary for machinery, magazines, and handling rooms, and by the fact that restrictions on draft prevent the extension of compartmentation in depth to include an additional bottom for the greater protection of these spaces. This is the price paid for greatly extended engineering plants and magazine areas and is important when considering the use of tonnage and funds in the building of a super-capital ship. The over-all protection and immunity from damage from projectiles, bombs, torpedoes, and mines show little or no relative improvement over our latest heavy ships under construction and not as much as might be expected in the normal development of a capital ship of such greatly increased displacement. This ship is not considered less vulnerable to serious and perhaps fatal damage than the battleships now building.

Special Features

Comment: There are features in the Ship X involving multiple rudders, propellers, engine units, detail of hull design, and other matters which are distinctly advantageous, most of which have been incorporated in capital ships now under construction and under design.

Flight Deck and Hangar: A flight deck, hangar, and appurtenances have been provided for the operation of about 36 planes; it is estimated that about 1,700 tons has been utilized for this purpose. Due to the length of the ship this flight deck, about 400 feet in length, has been made practicable without interference with the mounting of the main battery, but the placement of the secondary battery and fire control

towers has had to be adjusted. The availability of 36 planes under many conditions would be advantageous. However, as in aircraft carriers, the operations required for the proper handling of planes will in many situations detract from freedom of action essential to security and necessary to the most effective use of gunpower. This effect becomes more pronounced when Ship X operates as part of or in close cooperation with the battle line in fleet action. While a flight deck on a capital ship may not be detrimental to her effectiveness, Ship X would be improved as to efficiency of battery, fire control, tactical maneuverability and security by the omission of the flight deck.

4. In outlining his conception of the employment of ships similar to Ship X, Mr. Gibbs stressed the operations of such a ship in areas far removed from support, preying on enemy maritime activities, and interrupting his sea-borne lines of communication. This conception calls for employment of Ship X or of fast capital ships in what is known as cruiser warfare and the counter to such employment would require considerable dispersion of an opposing fleet into task groups capable of protecting convoys and of coping with the capital ships so employed. However, the disruption of essential enemy commerce cannot be effectively attained without the support afforded by the establishment of naval power in superior force in the area concerned.

Our present program includes four capital ships now underway adaptable to this specific purpose as well as to more general use. These four ships have a speed of 33 knots and mount nine 16-inch guns each, on a standard displacement of 45,000 tons. For all practical purposes they embody a speed and power of survival comparable to Ship X. They can be effectively used:

- (a) in the battle line,
- (b) in dealing with enemy battle cruisers detached from the battle line,
- (c) in countering, in cooperation with other types, fast and powerful enemy ships operating on the lines of communication or on commercial routes,
- (d) in the conduct of raiding or striking force operations in advanced areas.

5. In addition to the considerations which must be given to the navigational restrictions of great size there are to be added those which involve maneuvering with (not necessarily in) the battle line, the size of target presented for attack (by gun, bomb, torpedo, mine) and the number of targets presented for attack. Greatly increased

displacements must be viewed with a practical eye to ensure that manifest advantage obtains in some units of great tonnage over more units of somewhat less tonnage. Some twelve years' experience with the LEXINGTON and SARATOGA (displacing about 45,000 tons loaded) clearly demonstrates many of the difficulties inherent in size and emphasizes that the capital ship may not be greatly increased in size over those now planned without seriously compromising the continuity and effectiveness of its operations under wartime conditions.

6. During the recent hearing, the point was raised that the construction of ships generally similar to Ship X would afford the United States a means of bringing its economic strength to bear in the support of political and naval policies. This is one way of exerting economic pressure of this kind but there is another way wherein like pressure can be applied by outbuilding potential enemies in numbers composed of the latest approved types. From a purely naval point of view, having due consideration for the strategic and tactical elements involved, the General Board is of the opinion that the latter course is the better one to follow in respect to ships of a strength, capability, and all around usefulness commensurate with requirements of operations against potential enemies.

7. The pros and cons as to Ship X include:

Advantages

- (1) Renders existing ships individually inferior.
- (2) Makes use of U.S. economic strength to exert political pressure on probable opponents.
- (3) Size makes localization of damage more probable, although increased machinery spaces and magazines nullify this advantage to some degree.
- (4) Speed enables choice of position and range over most existing capital ships.
- (5) Endurance provides great mobility.
- (6) Planes enable search of adjacent areas.

Disadvantages

- (1) Restricted ability to use many harbors of strategic importance.
- (2) Requires special ways to build; special drydocks for service.
- (3) Inability to use Panama Canal until new locks are completed.
- (4) Attainment of three more 16-inch guns and two knots in speed - as compared with 45,000-ton 33-knot ships - requires 17,000 tons additional displacement (38 per cent) and at least one-third increase in cost.
- (5) Presents greater target areas to torpedoes, bombs, mines, and guns without commensurate increase in defensive power.
- (6) Difficult to coordinate tactically with other types of battleships, especially with regard to flight operations.

8. The Board has had battleship design for new construction under study for many years, and particularly of late, has considered the displacements necessary to incorporate essential military characteristics in capital ships carrying from ten to twelve 16-inch guns at various speeds above 27 knots. These studies indicate that a ship with twelve 16-inch guns and a high degree of immunity against all forms of attack would require a standard displacement of at least 52,000 tons, even if the speed were limited to 27½ knots. A speed requirement of 34 knots with such a battery and corresponding protection involves a material increase in tonnage, estimated as even greater than that of Ship X, and possibly as high as 70,000 tons standard displacement. Consideration of any ship of such size must take fully into account the very practical questions involved in its access to harbors and waterways, docks and other servicing facilities, existing and prospective.

9. The General Board considers that Ship X fails to meet the optimum immunity characteristics which should be embodied in a ship of 62,000 tons standard displacement. Ship X, as designed, does not have sufficient merit as a military weapon to warrant inclusion in any scheme of national defense at this time.

10. The Board is of the opinion that the present building policy and program which embody, for all possible tasks, appropriately related types progressively improved and developed with full consideration of new ideas and demands, are correct under existing and clearly foreseeable conditions. The present general plan for future capital ship construction, based on the expected needs of the U.S. Fleet, involves not only the earliest practicable completion of four or more fast battleships but the construction as replacements, of more heavily armed and better protected battleships of maximum practicable speed. The Board recommends that steps be taken to remove permanently limitations on displacement of capital ships to the end that we may be free to build such ships embodying satisfactory characteristics as to armament, armor and other protection, and speed to meet the needs of national defense.

J. W. GREENSLADE

✓ Copy to C.N.O.

Acting

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-18-59

Signature- *Carl J. Spicer*

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L RP.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 4, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

The reasons which prompted the recommendation to Congress to amend the war time procurement law in such a way as to give the President the same powers during a national emergency were:

(a) Routine planning on the part of War Plans Division Office of the Chief of Naval Operations which, among other things, involved a check-up on war time legislation.

(b) This check revealed nothing new in this respect, as the war time powers are still in existence, the peace time emergency powers having lapsed on March 1, 1918, but as a precautionary measure, particularly as many wars in this day and age are of the undeclared variety, the legislation is desirable.

(c) This legislation could just as well have been submitted last year, and it was mere coincidence that it was announced yesterday. As a matter of fact, it is in keeping with that part of the President's message (referred to by Mr. Ditter this morning) which said we must look ahead.


(d) As stated by you this morning, in answer to another question, we do not, of course, feel that the imminence of war approaches what it was on March 4, 1917, when the original law was enacted. The requested amendment was not prompted by any sudden developments or turn in world affairs, but was, instead, the result

L RP.

of consideration of the question of what the President's powers should be during a real emergency, and it was thought out three months ago. In 1917 the President had only one month to exercise these powers before war was declared.

Any attempt on the part of the press to make anything else out of this will be contrary to your statements to the appropriations committee and representatives of the press today.

Very respectfully,


W. B. WOODSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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may*

January 9, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON

President Quezon has agreed, in despatch to Thornycroft Company (England), to waive contractual delivery of two motor torpedo boats just completed for the Commonwealth Government. He makes the proviso, however, that Thornycroft complete two similar vessels by the end of this year as replacement.

This leaves the gate wide open for negotiations between Finnish Embassy in London and Thornycroft.

Minister Procope has been advised of the situation.

J. J. Callaghan
J. J. CALLAGHAN.

*For the President
Encl*

PSF
file *navy*
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1940.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The subject matter of the attached memorandum from the Office of Naval Intelligence will probably be of interest to the President.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- *[Signature]*

In reply refer to No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

Op-16-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12 January, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

From: Op-16
To: Op-10
Op-11
Op-13
Op-38
Naval Aide.

The following is quoted from a letter of the British Naval Attache, dated 10 January, 1940:

"I am informed by the Admiralty that they have received confirmatory reports that the Battleship "DEUTSCHLAND" and a German Cruiser of the "KONIGSBURG" Class have both been seen suffering from external damage forward, and it is presumed that the cause was striking their own minefields.

"There are indications that the Battleship "ADMIRAL SCHEER" has left Germany for a long cruise."

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- JHE

Bode
H. D. Bode,
By direction.

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In reply address not the signer of
this letter but Bureau of Aeronautics,
Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

Refer to No. Aer-PL-EMN
L1-1(40)
VV

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS
WASHINGTON

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-27-59

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

RESTRICTED

January 16, 1940.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Number and Types of Navy Airplanes scheduled to be
delivered during calendar year 1940.

Number	Type	Month	Manufacturer
16	Fighter - F2A	May	Brewster
16	" "	June	"
11	" "	July	"
2	Fighter - F4F	February	Grumman
10	" "	June	"
10	" "	July	"
10	" "	August	"
12	" "	September	"
18	" "	October	"
19	" "	November	"
3	Transport - GB-1	February	Beechcraft
3	" JRF-1	January	Grumman
1	" R3D	March	Douglas
2	" "	April	"
4	" "	July	"
4	Utility - J2F-4	January	Grumman
5	" "	February	"
5	" "	March	"
4	" "	April	"
4	Training - N3N	February	Naval Aircraft Factory
10	" "	March	" " "
20	" "	April	" " "
20	" "	May	" " "
20	" "	June	" " "
20	" "	July	" " "
20	" "	August	" " "
20	" "	September	" " "
16	" "	October	" " "
3	Adv. Training - SNJ	March	North American
10	" "	April	" "
10	" "	May	" "
10	" "	June	" "
3	" "	July	" "
12	" "	August	" "
13	" "	September	" "

Aer-PL-EMN

L1-1(40)

VV

~~RESTRICTED~~ M E M O R A N D U M

SUBJECT: Number and Types of Navy Airplanes scheduled to be delivered during calendar year 1940.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Manufacturer</u>
1	Observation- Scout -OS2U	February	Vought
4	" "	March	"
22	" "	April	"
27	" "	May	"
24	" "	June	"
24	" "	July	"
22	" "	August	"
20	" "	September	"
10	" "	October	"
2	Scout-Bomb- ing - SBC-4	February	Curtiss
12	" "	April	"
12	" "	May	"
9	" "	June	"
1	" SBD-1	March	Douglas
6	" "	April	"
14	" "	May	"
16	" "	June	"
14	" "	July	"
18	" "	August	"
17	" "	September	"
18	" "	October	"
17	" "	November	"
18	" "	December	"
1	" SB2U-3	March	Vought
12	" "	April	"
18	" "	May	"
16	" "	June	"
10	" "	July	"
10	" "	August	"
18	" "	September	"
18	" "	October	"
18	" "	November	"
17	" "	December	"
1	" SBN	May	Naval Airc. Factory
3	" "	August	" " "
4	" "	September	" " "
5	" "	October	" " "
4	" "	November	" " "
4	" "	December	" " "

Aer-PL-EMN

L1-1(40)

VV

~~RESTRICTED~~ MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Number and Types of Navy Airplanes scheduled to be delivered during calendar year 1940.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Manufacturer</u>
3	Patrol-Bomb-		
	ing - PBM	March	Martin
3	" "	April	"
5	" "	May	"
5	" "	June	"
3	" "	July	"
1	" "	August	"
1	" PB2Y	May	Consolidated
1	" "	July	"
1	" "	August	"
1	" "	September	"
1	" "	October	"
1	" "	November	"
1	" PBY-5	July	"
2	" "	August	"
4	" "	September	"
7	" "	October	"
12	" "	November	"
12	" "	December	"

Experimental Planes

1	Fighter XF5F	March	Grumman
1	" XFL	April	Bell
1	" XF4U	May	Vought
1	Training XN5N	September	Naval Airc. Factory
1	Patrol-		
	Bombing XPBM-1	March	Martin
1	" XPBM-2	June	"
1	Scout-		
	Bombing XSB2A	August	Brewster
1	" XSB2C	June	Curtiss
1	Scout-Obs. XSQ 2U-1	February	Vought
1	" XSQ 3C-1	January	Curtiss

Aer-PL-EMN
L1-1(40)
VV

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M E M O R A N D U M

SUBJECT: Number and Types of Navy Airplanes scheduled to be
delivered during calendar year 1940.


Recapitulation

Totals by Types

Fighters	127
Scout-Bombing	335
Observation-Scouting	154
Scout-Observation	2
Patrol-Bombing	66
Training	151
Advanced Training	61
Utility	18
Utility-Transport	3
Transport	10
Total	<u>927</u>

Estimates are predicated on ordering following planes with
supplemental 1940 funds not later than 15 February, 1940:

81 SB2U-3
27 F4F
25 SNJ



S. M. Kraus,
Captain, U.S.N.,

By direction Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 19, 1940.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY MORGENTHAU:

The President says you can have this, but you are held responsible that you get it back for his confidential files, as these are the only copies made and he wants to retain them.

Sincerely,



EDWIN M. WATSON
Secretary to the President.

Enclosures.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- JML

I. What are the needs of our Army and Navy in the field of aviation for 1940 and 1941?

II. How many airplanes and engines, if any, could be diverted to the French and English for immediate delivery?

III. Ask for an explanation of the French and English proposed buying program.

IV. Would it be possible to have Pratt-Whitney or Curtiss-Wright license an experienced Company to manufacture their engines, the company to be located somewhere in the Mississippi Valley, as both Pratt-Whitney and Wright are on the Atlantic Coast?

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Materiel Plan. Sec.
1/16/40

UNDELIVERED AIRPLANES, ENGINES, PROPELLERS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1939
(ARMY, NAVY, COMMERCIAL AND FOREIGN)

	<u>Airplanes</u>	<u>Engines</u>	<u>Propellers</u>
<u>United States</u>			
Air Corps:			
Combat	1865	---	----
Training	1500	---	----
Miscellaneous	<u>24</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>----</u>
Total Military	3389	5222	4283
Navy:			
Combat	958.4	---	----
Training	<u>55.0</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>----</u>
Total Navy	1013.4	1431	1667
Commercial	<u>861.5</u>	<u>4504</u>	<u>1084</u>
Total U. S.	5263.9	11,157	7034
<u>Foreign</u>			
British Empire			
Combat	282	---	----
Training	<u>734</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>----</u>
Total	1016	2305	865
France:			
Combat	1231.5	---	----
Training	<u>243.0</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>----</u>
Total	1474.5	6275	7583
All other Foreign:			
Combat	364	---	----
Training	<u>128</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>----</u>
Total	492	823	508
Total Foreign	<u>2982.5</u>	<u>9403</u>	<u>8956</u>
Grand Total	8246.4	20,560	15,990

Source: Materiel Division Statistical Report
12/31/39

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Date- 4-7-70

Signature- *JAL*

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Mary

January 16, 1940.

Deliveries by Months - Calendar Year 1940.

January

3 Transport	Grumman	
4 Utility	"	
1 Scout-Observation	Curtiss	Total 8

February

2 Fighter	Grumman	
3 Transport	Beechcraft	
4 Training	Naval Aircraft Factory	
1 Observation-Scout	Vought	
2 Scout-Bombing	Curtiss	
1 Scout-Observation	Vought	Total 18
5 Utility	Grumman	

March

1 Transport	Douglas	
5 Utility	Grumman	
10 Training	Naval Aircraft Factory	
3 Advanced Training	North American	
4 Observation-Scout	Vought	
1 Scout-Bombing	Douglas	
1 Scout-Bombing	Vought	
4 Patrol-Bombing	Martin	
1 Fighter	Grumman	Total 30

April

2 Transport	Douglas	
4 Utility	Grumman	
20 Training	Naval Aircraft Factory	
10 Advanced Training	North American	
22 Observation-Scout	Vought	
12 Scout-Bombing	Curtiss	
6 " "	Douglas	
12 " "	Vought	
3 Patrol-Bombing	Martin	
1 Fighter	Bell	Total 92

May

16 Fighter	Brewster	
20 Training	Naval Aircraft Factory	
10 Advanced Training	North American	
27 Observation-Scout	Vought	
12 Scout-Bombing	Curtiss	
14 " "	Douglas	
18 " "	Vought	
1 " "	Naval Aircraft Factory	

Navy

May(cont'd)

5 Patrol Bombing
1 " "
1 Fighter

Martin
Consolidated
Vought Total 125

June

16 Fighter
10 "
20 Training
10 Advanced Training
24 Observation-Scout
9 Scout-Bombing
16 " "
16 " "
6 Patrol-Bombing
1 Scout-Bombing

Brewster
Grumman
Naval Aircraft Factory
North American
Vought
Curtiss
Douglas
Vought
Martin
Curtiss Total 128

July

11 Fighter
10 "
4 Transport
20 Training
3 Advanced Training
24 Observation-Scout
14 Scout-Bombing
10 " "
3 Patrol-Bombing
2 " "

Brewster
Grumman
Douglas
Naval Aircraft Factory
North American
Vought
Douglas
Vought
Martin
Consolidated Total 101

August

10 Fighter
20 Training
12 Advanced Training
22 Observation-Scout
18 Scout-Bombing
10 " "
3 " "
1 Patrol-Bombing
3 " "
1 Scout-Bombing

Grumman
Naval Aircraft Factory
North American
Cought
Douglas
Vought
Naval Aircraft Factory
Martin
Consolidated
Brewster Total 100

September

12 Fighter
20 Training
13 Advanced Training
20 Observation-Scout
17 Scout-Bombing
18 " "
4 " "
5 Patrol-Bombing
1 Trainer

Grumman
Naval Aircraft Factory
North American
Vought
Douglas
Vought
Naval Aircraft Factory
Consolidated
Naval Aircraft Factory
Total 110

Navy

October

18 Fighters
16 Trainers
10 Observation-Scout
18 Scout-Bombing
18 " "
5 " "
8 Patrol-Bombing

Grumman
Naval Aircraft Factory
Vought
Douglas
Vought
Naval Aircraft Factory
Consolidated Total 93

November

19 Fighters
17 Scout-Bombing
18 " "
4 " "
13 Patrol-Bombing

Grumman
Douglas
Vought
Naval Aircraft Factory
Consolidated Total 71

December

18 Scout-Bombing
17 " "
4 " "
12 Patrol-Bombing

Douglas
Vought
Naval Aircraft Factory
Consolidated Total 51

*file
Confidential*

*TSF Navy
Navy
1*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 20, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached gives the information on the conversion of destroyers for plane carrying and for seaplane tenders.

Because of the narrow beam of destroyers, it was found impracticable to make any sort of deck arrangements that would permit the handling and stowage of more than one seaplane, (SOC Type), on board a destroyer.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

In reply, address not the signer of this letter, but Bureau of Construction and Repair, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR
WASHINGTON, D. C.

GT

Refer to No.

19 Jan. 1940.

MEMORANDUM

For: Captain Callaghan.

1 DD - NOA (plane carrying destroyer)

Under conversion at Philadelphia Navy Yard, completion 7 May 1940. (Has been delayed by plane handling machinery procurement.) Carries 1 SOC type seaplane; plane recovery sled; crane for hoisting plane on board and 1500 gallons aviation gasoline. Two after torpedo tubes and after 4" gun removed. In all other respects retains destroyer characteristics.

2 DD - CHILDS and WILLIAMSON (Small seaplane tenders)

Completed conversion at Philadelphia in April 1939 to small seaplane tenders. CHILDS operating Hawaiian waters, WILLIAMSON Alaskan waters. Boilers removed from No. 1 boiler room and space converted to stowage 30,000 gallons gasoline and bunk room for aviation personnel. Can accommodate 30 aviation officers and corresponding enlisted personnel for one seaplane squadron of 12 boats. All torpedo tubes and torpedoes and 2 - 4" guns removed. 4 - 50 calibre A.A. machine guns installed.

In addition small seaplane tenders.

1 DD - GEORGE E. BADGER at Philadelphia, completion 26 January 1940.

4 DD (CLEMSON, GOLDSBOROUGH, HULBERT and W. B. PRESTON) at Navy Yard, New York - scheduled for completion beginning 30 April, last one 26 May 1940.

William

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF Navy

file
Confidential


January 24, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

For the President's information I am forwarding tables showing the tonnage involved in the expansion program now in the process of undergoing hearings in the House. The President will note from the headings in red pencil that there have been two reductions in the proposed program of construction since the initial bill was introduced. The initial program is outlined in the table labeled "PROGRAM 'C'."

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN.

PROGRAM "C"

UNUSED COMBATANT SHIP TONNAGE
AVAILABLE FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION

24 January 1940

Total Tonnage
Available 1/7/40
Provided H.R. ~~8026~~ 7665
is Enacted - Exclusive
of 1941 Budget

	Available Tonnage 1 July 1940 Including 1941 Budget	Tonnage Included in 1941 Budget	Available Tonnage 1 July 1940 Excl. 1941 Budget	Additional Tonnage in H.R. 7665 Modified	
BATTLESHIPS	132,500	90,000	42,500	-	42,500 1
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	20,400	20,400	-	75,000	75,000 3
CRUISERS	102,999	20,000	82,999	192,000	274,999 17
DESTROYERS	75,430	13,600	61,830	60,000	121,830 68
SUBMARINES	<u>22,456</u>	<u>9,600</u>	<u>12,856</u>	<u>45,000</u>	<u>57,856</u> 26
TOTAL	353,285	153,600	* 200,185	372,000	572,185 125
TOTAL EST. COSTS. (C&M & A, A&A)	1,013,600,000	405,400,000	* 613,200,000	✓ 1,090,000,000	* 1,703,200,000

x excludes me (1) BB & \$90,000,000

x 1st year appropriation about \$26,000,000

PROGRAM "D" *1st modification*
UNUSED COMBATANT SHIP TONNAGE
AVAILABLE FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION

22 January 1940

	Available Tonnage 1 July 1940 Including 1941 Budget	Tonnage Included in 1941 Budget	Available Tonnage 1 July 1940 Excl. 1941 Budget	Additional Tonnage in H. R. 8026	Total Tonnage Available 1/7/40 Provided H.R. 8026 is Enacted - Exclusive of 1941 Budget
BATTLESHIPS	132,500	90,000	42,500	-	42,500 /
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	20,400	20,400	-	75,000	75,000 3
CRUISERS	102,999	20,000	82,999	110,000	192,999 10
DESTROYERS	75,430	13,600	61,830	-	61,830 27
SUBMARINES	<u>22,456</u>	<u>9,600</u>	<u>12,856</u>	<u>33,000</u>	<u>45,856</u> 30
TOTAL	353,285	153,600	* 200,185	218,000	418,185 73
TOTAL EST. COSTS. (C&M & A, & S)	1,018,600,000	405,400,000	* 613,200,000	✓ 510,100,000	* 1,123,300,000

* includes one (1) BB & \$90,000,000

* 1st year appropriation about \$26,000,000

PROGRAM "E"

2nd modification

UNUSED COMBATANT SHIP TONNAGE
AVAILABLE FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION

24 January 1940

	Available Tonnage 1 July 1940 Including 1941 Budget	Tonnage Included in 1941 Budget	Available Tonnage 1 July 1940 Excl. 1941 Budget	Additional Tonnage in H.R. 8026 Modified	Total Tonnage Available 1/7/40 Provided H.R. 8026 is Enacted - Exclusive of 1941 Budget
BATTLESHIPS	132,500	90,000	42,500	-	42,500 1
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	20,400	20,400	-	75,000	75,000 3
CRUISERS	102,999	20,000	82,999	71,000	153,999 5
DESTROYERS	75,430	13,600	61,830	-	61,830 27
SUBMARINES	<u>22,456</u>	<u>9,600</u>	<u>12,856</u>	<u>21,000</u>	<u>33,856</u> 22
					<u>63</u>
TOTAL	353,235	153,600	*200,135	167,000	367,135
TOTAL EST. COSTS (C&M & A, A&A)	1,013,600,000	405,400,000	*613,200,000	✓372,750,000	*985,950,000

* includes one (1) BB & \$90,000,000

* 1st year appropriation about \$27,400,000

For the President -

E.M.W.
E.M.W.

*file
confidential
Harry*

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

War Department Message Center,
Room 3441, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

Jan 22 - 1940

50 WVT MR 71 WD

*The President - This will please you*GENL MARSHALL ENROUTE MARCH TO BIGGSFIELDS 955A JAN29
1940

ADMIRAL STARK

NAVY DEPT WASHINGTON D C

JOINT ARMY NAVY OPERATIONS GREAT SUCCESS, HIGHLY INSTRUCTIVE TO ARMY
AIR, AND WARNING SERVICE, AND TO OUR TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, AND
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, STOP MOST PRACTICAL AND REALISTIC EXERCISE FOR
ARMY IN MY EXPERIENCE AND MOST GRATIFYING AND COMPLETE COOPERATION
WITH NAVY FLEET AND DISTRICT ONE COULD HOPE FOR STOP THE
ARMY IS DEEPLY INDEBTED (TO YOU PERSONALLY AND) TO FLEET
OFFICIALS AND NAVY DISTRICT COMMANDER FOR MAKING THIS VITAL TRAINING
POSSIBLE

G C MARSHALL

346 P
1940 JAN 22 19RECEIVED
NAVY COR

*Am passing on
(last reference to me)
to Jc + Com 11 and 12 - that is
Hapburn + Dajars*

31 XRS

Room 2050

Post Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file personal Navy

7 February 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Admiral Stark asked me to see that the attached papers were returned to the President and to convey his thanks to the President for having made the papers available to him.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 1, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL STARK:

I do not know whether George
Marshall has shown you this or not.
I think it is the prize communications
joke --

STARK•STORK•BIRD•BYRD.

Please return for my files.

F.D.R.

P S F Navy

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

January 29, 1940.

MEMORANDUM for General Watson:

Dear Watson:

I described to the President the other night at Fort Myer the incident of an unusual error which had deflected a message of appreciation sent by me from a plane in California, to Admiral Stark in the Navy Department, to Admiral Byrd in the Antarctic. Apparently in being relayed to the War Department Message Center, an operator read Stark as Stork, and stork being a bird, Admiral Byrd received the message in Little America.

I attach Admiral Byrd's reply, which I just received this morning.

I think this is possibly the world's greatest error, measured in terms of miles, considering the distance separating Admiral Stark from Admiral Byrd.


G.C. MARSHALL

encl.

PSF Newry

NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

RECEIVED AT ROOM 2629
DI 2900—EXT. 87—197

NPM 3230 Z NING 291100X HOLT GR 58

ROUTED

~~FROM THE COMNAVSTA
ADIRONIA MARINE DEPARTMENT~~

1940 JAN 29 12 08

UNITED STATES ANTARCTIC SERVICE 29TH 1100 GCT

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 4-7000

WAR DEPARTMENT

FOR GENERAL G C MARSHALL YOUR 0955 OF 20 JAN IS HEREWITH ACK-
NOWLEDGED AND HAS BEEN CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THOSE UNDER
MY COMMAND X YOUR EXPRESSIONS ARE HEARTILY RECIPROCATED X AS
WE BUCK THE ICE OF ANTARCTICA ALL HANDS JOIN ME IN SENDING CORDIAL
GREETINGS FROM THE US ANTARCTIC SERVICE TO THE ARMY R E BYRD;

1155 AE MX 29JAN.

COMMANDING OFFICER

Col. Ward

Message Telephoned
Time 7:38 a.m.
By PK

3
General Marshall
DEPARTMENT
OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300.

General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to The President,
The White House.

COPY

PSF Navy

TO ADMIRAL STARK

JOINT ARMY AND NAVY OPERATIONS GREAT SUCCESS HIGHLY INSTRUCTIVE TO ARMY AIR AND WARNING SERVICE AND TO OUR TRANSPORTATION SERVICE AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCE STOP MOST PRACTICABLE AND REALISTIC EXERCISE FOR ARMY IN MY EXPERIENCE AND MOST GRATIFYING AND COMPLETE COOPERATION WITH NAVY FLEET AND DISTRICT ONE COULD HOPE FOR STOP THE ARMY IS DEEPLY INDEBTED TO YOU PERSONALLY AND TO FLEET OFFICIALS AND NAVY DISTRICT COMMANDER FOR MAKING THIS VITAL TRAINING POSSIBLE

G.C. MARSHALL

From: OPNAV

To: CINCUS
COM 11, 12, 13

Date: 22 January 1940

IT AFFORDS THE DEPARTMENT GREAT PLEASURE TO SEND YOU THE FOLLOWING QUOTATION JUST RECEIVED BY DESPATCH FROM GENERAL MARSHALL QUOTE JOINT ARMY AND NAVY OPERATIONS GREAT SUCCESS HIGHLY INSTRUCTIVE TO ARMY AIR AND WARNING SERVICE AND TO OUR TRANSPORTATION SERVICE AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCE STOP MOST PRACTICABLE AND REALISTIC EXERCISE FOR ARMY IN MY EXPERIENCE AND MOST GRATIFYING AND COMPLETE COOPERATION WITH NAVY FLEET AND DISTRICT ONE COULD HOPE FOR STOP THE ARMY IS DEEPLY INDEBTED TO FLEET OFFICIALS AND NAVY DISTRICT COMMANDER FOR MAKING THIS VITAL TRAINING POSSIBLE

From: OPNAV

To: GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
CHIEF OF STAFF US ARMY

Date: 22 January 1940

YOUR FINE MESSAGE HAS BEEN RELAYED TO THE FLEET THE DEPARTMENT IS GRATIFIED THAT THE ARMY FEELS THIS EXERCISE WAS SO WELL WORTH WHILE AND I AM SURE THE NAVY BENEFITED EQUALLY BY THIS EXPERIENCE MY DEEP APPRECIATION TO YOU PERSONALLY FOR YOUR VERY THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE
H.R. STARK

UNITED STATES ANTARTIC SERVICE 29th JANUARY 1940
FOR GENERAL G C MARSHALL YOUR 0955 of 20 JAN IS HERewith
ACKNOWLEDGED AND HAS BEEN CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THOSE UNDER
MY COMMAND X YOUR EXPRESSIONS ARE HEARTILY RECIPROCATED X AS
WE BUCK THE ICE OF ANTARCTICA ALL HANDS JOIN ME IN SENDING CORDIAL
GREETINGS FROM THE US ANTARCTIC SERVICE TO THE ARMY R E BYRD

TO ADMIRAL RICHARD E BYRD

LITTLE AMERICA ANTARCTICA

YOUR GENEROUS ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF MY RADIO MUCH APPRECIATED
HOWEVER MINE WAS SENT FROM AIRPLANE IN CALIFORNIA ON CONCLUSION
OF LARGE ARMY NAVY JOINT MANEUVER AND WAS ADDRESSED TO ADMIRAL
STARK STOP EVIDENTLY AN OPERATOR GOT STORK FOR STARK AND THEN WENT
OFF THE DEEP END TO BIRD AND SO TO THE ANTARCTIC STOP BEST OF LUCK

MARSHALL

ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF

PS F Navy

PSF Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 7, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL STARK

Your memorandum of February fifth in regard to releasing newer ships from neutrality patrol and the OMAHA is approved.

F. D. R.

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

5 February 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

When the neutrality patrol was first started we froze all vessels then in the Atlantic. Later we released the new submarines to go to the Pacific for their regular stations in the Fleet.

In view of the fact that Ellis now has 62 old destroyers with him and 16 more due by 1 April, making a total of 78, I should like now to unfreeze new destroyers and send them to the Fleet.

In new destroyers we now have 5 with Ellis and 13 more going. If you approve unfreezing these boats it is proposed to send the 5 that have been operating in the neutrality patrol since its inception to the Fleet some time in March. The 13 coming now we may want to melt into the patrol temporarily and then shove them West depending on the general situation as they become available.

The Antilles Detachment we propose to keep in the Guantanamo area until about 1 March, then return them to their former stations in the neutrality patrol organization.

I would also like to unfreeze the OMAHA, one of the old CLs; and the ST. LOUIS and HELENA upon completion of their final trials, and likewise send these vessels to their regular stations in the Fleet if the general situation does not materially change by the time they are ready. Anticipated dates of readiness are:

OMAHA	- 20 June 1940
ST. LOUIS	- 1 June 1940
HELENA	- 6 May 1940

The appended table showing the ships in commission in the Atlantic may be of interest in the above general connection.

HRS

Total in Atlantic in commission	In Atron	In SPERON	In FORTY-T	Fitting out for recom- missioning	Shake- down	To be completed and commissioned by 1 Jan '41 or before
3 BB + Wyoming	3 + Wy ⁰	0	0	0	0	0
1 CV (Ranger)	1	0	0	0	0	1 (Wasp)
5 CA	5 +	0	0	0	0	0
2 CL (new)	1 +	0	0	0	1	0
2 CL (old)	1 +	0	1	0	0	0
2 PG	0	2	0	0	0	0
18 DD (new)	5 +	0	0	0	5	8
71 DD (old)	62	6	2	φ 16 (In Pac.)	1 *	1 (NOA)
7 SS (new)	0	0	0	0	7	
# 20 SS (old)	0	#	0	0	0	0
<u>132</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>φ 16</u>	<u>14</u> * Eng. Exp.	<u>10</u> Same as those now fitting out & on shakedown
less	<u>φ 16</u> <u>94</u> <u>8 +</u> <u>86</u>	# 6 in C.Z. 10 in full comm. at New London 4 in reduced comm. at New London				

NRS

0 0 4 1 1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 8, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

On our next 500 planes can
we give a large part of engine
orders to the smaller companies
and not to the three big ones?
This to spread the load.

Will you talk this over
with Towers?

F. D. R.

PSF Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1940.


MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I talked with Admiral Towers concerning the procurement of aircraft engines from the smaller companies. The attached memo from Admiral Towers gives the gist of his comments.

As I see it, the smaller companies are not in a position, basically, to turn out engines of powers suitable for our combat planes. They have neither the experience nor the equipment to go into production of the larger powers required. Even if the larger companies could be induced to turn over their engines for counterpart manufacture by the smaller companies, these latter have not the essential equipment to handle.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN.

Refer to No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS
WASHINGTON

JHT-GB

9 February 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

SUBJECT: Procurement of Aircraft Engines from the Smaller
Companies.

1. The smaller companies, with one exception, manufacture nothing but small engines which have a military application only in training planes. As we are required by law to manufacture 10% of our planes and engines at the Naval Aircraft Factory and this percentage represents approximately the total training plane requirements, there is little likelihood of our being in the market in the near future for any of the small engines.

2. The one exception mentioned above is the Ranger Engineering Division of the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation, Farmingdale, L.I., which manufactures an intermediate size engine. This bureau has given a great deal of encouragement to that company and now has under test two different models of observation planes equipped with the Ranger engine. We expect to place an order within the next few weeks for approximately 140 observation planes equipped with Ranger engines. Our remaining procurement for the current fiscal year, amounting to some 75 planes, will be of types which require large engines not obtainable from any of the small companies. We are scheduled to procure an additional 100-150 observation planes during the fiscal year 1941 and it appears that these also will be of a type equipped with Ranger engines.

3. Summarizing, of our next 500 planes at least 140 will be equipped with engines from one of the smaller companies, and it is quite probable that more of this type will be ordered early in the fiscal year 1941.

4. I would like to point out that the big companies are big because they have developed and produced satisfactory engines of the large horsepowers required for most of the current military types, and the small companies are small because they have not. I feel that we have done everything within reason to encourage the various reputable small companies to develop large types. For example, we have contracts for experimental engines of large types with five different small companies, but this experimental development takes a long time and I see little prospect of pulling the small companies into big business on big engines for at least two

Memo. for Captain Callaghan

-2-

SUBJECT: Procurement of Aircraft Engines from the Smaller
Companies.

years. We have done all we can to encourage the placing of contracts for parts by the big companies with the little companies, and I feel that this is the manner in which the little companies can be of the most service in the near future.


J. H. Towers

PSF Navy



TREASURY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The correspondence transmitted with your memorandum of February 12th is returned herewith.

The statements contained in the memorandum from the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department, confirm studies that have been made by the Treasury.

In connection with the matter of engines, it appears from investigations that I have personally made of the Pratt and Whitney and Wright plants that their production for the year of 1940 is fully obligated. If any engines are to be had for any program such as that being presently studied for Norway they will have to be taken from some of the orders at present on the books of these companies.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, which appears to read "H. Morgenthau Jr.", is written above the typed name.

Secretary of the Treasury.

PSF Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR H. M. Jr.

The enclosed relates to Navy
airplane engines. Please read and return
with any suggestions you may care to make.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PS F Navy


WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS
WASHINGTON

January 19, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR General Watson.

In compliance with telephone request there is attached a letter to the Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Jr., containing the information requested.

For and in the absence of
The Chief of the Air Corps,



Ira C. Eaker,
Lieut. Colonel, Air Corps,
Executive.

Incl.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-27-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL


- (1) R-775, 255 HP.
- (2) Inverted air-cooled 6-440, 180 HP.
- (3) R-670, 220 HP (this motor also used by Ordnance Department for tanks).
- (4) 125 HP motor (Ryan Trainer).
- (5) R-680, 220 HP.
- (6) Warner Super Scarab, 165 HP.
- (7) Figured on the basis of 1000 man-hours (P & W require 849).

Source: Production Data Estimates.

The above is purely a rough estimate. A detailed study is being made to determine accurate information. This study will take some little time, and will be furnished to you as soon as completed.

Very truly yours,

For and in the absence of
The Chief of the Air Corps,


Ira C. Eaker,
Lieut. Colonel, Air Corps,
Executive.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1940.


MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum from Admiral Stark represents the final information after an exhaustive investigation and conference between representatives of the interested departments.

A number of different plans were investigated in arriving at the conclusion given in Admiral Stark's memorandum.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN.

PSF Navy

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

27 January 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Both the Coast Guard (Admiral Waesche) and the Maritime Commission (Admiral Land) state that from their standpoint a refuge on Georges Bank is unnecessary. If one were built, it would have to be constructed to withstand winter gales with the corresponding heavy expenditure.

Jerry states that these laid up ships have been earmarked for possible use by the Navy or by commerce in time of emergency or war. He states that in fact right now he is being pressed by the lumber, cement, coal, grain and cotton interests for the use of these ships.

H.R.S.

PSF Navy
Callaghan
in hand

Memo for the President from D. J. Callaghan-March 5, 1940

Re: Attached copy of letter to Sec Ickes from Gov Leahy-
Puerto Rico--Feb 27, 1940 re Communists & Nationalists on the Island.
Also attached is memo to Sec Ickes from the President,
asking him to speak to him about the situation.

See: Ickes folder-Drawer 1-1940

COPY

Navy - 116

March 8, 1940.

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS—*(adm. Clerk)*
GENERAL BOARD, U.S. NAVY
JOINT BOARD ARMY-NAVY

I enclose:

1. Orders from Commander-in-Chief setting up board of investigation to inquire into suitability of Cocos Island as an advanced operating area for tender-based patrol planes.

2. Record of proceedings and opinion of said board.

Furthermore, I discussed with the Senior Officers of the Army and Navy at a conference on U.S.S. Tuscaloosa, while transiting the Canal, the special problem of scouting against enemy planes or ships at a considerable distance from the Canal Zone. I think this phase of the general defense of the Canal and of the distant approaches to it should receive special attention by the Navy General Board and by the Army-Navy Joint Board.

I think also that it would be well for the Senior Officers of both Services stationed in the Canal Zone to familiarize themselves by such personal visits as may be desirable to the outlying points where defense patrol plane bases would be located. This covers, of course, not only protected anchorages for Naval planes operating from tenders but also land fields beyond the limits of the Republic of Panama.

It is intended in no way that the United States should acquire or lease in peace time any Islands, anchorages or landing fields because it is believed that in the event of war independent Republics bordering the Carribean would be on the side of the United States in a common defense.

F. D. R.

(original Carbon.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 8, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS
GENERAL BOARD, U. S. NAVY
JOINT BOARD ARMY-NAVY

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F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
Confidential BF
may 1*

March 9, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Admiral Stark suggests that this may possibly explain the "submarine" purported to have attacked the SS SOUTHGATE recently.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

PSF Navy

ORIG COMPATRON 51 081421CR518

8 MARCH 1940

TO COMATRON COMDESRON 31

INFO OPNAV

RESTRICTED ROUTINE

SQUADRON PLANES SIGHTED SCHOOL OF 7 WHALES IN MONA PASSAGE X
SOME VERY LARGE X WHEN BROACHING SUGGESTED PROBABILITY OF HAVING
BEEN MISTAKEN FOR SUBMARINE EMERGING

TOR CODEROOM1600GCT/8

DISTRIBUTION

38 ACTION

111...16...05...FILE..

Dan for President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
confidential
JEP
Navy
Navy*

March 9, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached represents rough draft of
Admiral Stark's estimate of the foreign situation
as it exists today. The Admiral thought perhaps
this might furnish you with "light reading" over
the week-end.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

PSF Navy
1 March 1940

ROUGH INFORMAL ESTIMATE OF THE FOREIGN SITUATION

1. That unless there is a considerable change in the present setup on Germany's frontiers, her population cannot be starved, although they are decidedly pinched for what we call a "balanced ration". Under-nourishment long continued is a military factor, which cannot be disregarded; it tends to undermine the nerves and morale of the entire population.

2. That while the German morale may not be considered enthusiastic, it is determined; that the nation believes it is fighting a defensive war against a challenging England; that the nation is united; that its discipline is excellent and that its army, in leadership and in material, is unsurpassed.

3. That from a material standpoint, Germany has sufficient raw materials on hand, in reserve and available, to keep her going at least until the Spring of 1941. Again, assuming no further political changes, it seems probable she will continue to be able to obtain sufficient quantities of raw materials (with the possible exception of oil) to carry on a long war.

(a) OIL IS VITAL. It appears that there may not be enough oil available unless extensive transportation can be organized from the Baku fields. Such transportation might have to follow inland rivers to escape sea and air threat on the Black Sea. This oil situation is based on the premise that Germany's normal peacetime oil consumption is 6,000,000 metric tons, that her wartime needs will be about double this for large-scale warfare; that the

total output from Roumania is 7,000,000 tons, of which Germany might expect to get 2,000,000 tons; that Germany herself can produce synthetically about 2,000,000 tons, and will get 500,000 tons from Poland, and that the gap (of about 2,000,000 tons per annum on present limited warfare and on large-scale warfare would be about 8 or 10,000,000 tons) must be filled from the Russian fields.

4. That Germany's finances, while perhaps not what we consider good, will probably stand the strain, and perhaps as well or better than will that of France and England.

5. That the probability of an internal blowup (revolution) in Germany is remote.

6. That the war has united all classes of Frenchmen and that the Communist menace has been rendered inarticulate, at least for the present, and that France seems grimly determined to carry on, and that the same appears true of Great Britain.

7. That almost anything may happen in Spain at any time.

8. That Roumania is in a predicament, hardly knowing which way to turn because of fear of Germany on the one hand and probable Allied leanings on the other. Some degree of safety lies in the fact that the Germans realize if they were to invade Roumania, the oil wells would probably be blown up by the Anglo-French oil companies. Roumania would deplore such destruction. The answer seems to be to send Germany all the oil she can. Giving Germany oil might insure against German invasion; it would also seem to invite Allied pressure. It's a ??????? Unquestionably Germany desires peace in the Balkans. Germany certainly doesn't want

Russia in Roumania and might even resist this. In the long view, German eyes are on the Ukraine.

9. That the German and Russian alliance will survive only so long as it serves temporary self-interests.

10. That the Bulgars are an unknown quantity. They are normally supposed to be pro-Slav in sentiment, but they have been badly beaten in the last three wars, and it may be assumed they will stay neutral in this one, if they possibly can.

11. That Hungary, if anything, is pro-German but probably not pro-Nazi. She has strong nationalistic sentiment and, although fearing Germany, also believes Germany appreciates the great difficulty she would have in attempting to subdue and assimilate her.

12. That Yugoslavia is perhaps more neutral and independent at present than any of the other Balkans. The Italian threat and internal political weaknesses undoubtedly have a bearing on this.

13. That Turkey is strongly pro-Ally, but it cannot be said, at least for the present, that she would relish going along with the Allies to the extent of taking action in the Black Sea and the oil districts that would mean war with Russia and Germany.

14. That an attack by Russia on the Balkans might unite Italy and the Balkans (and even Turkey) in a war against Russia. Such an attack by Russia would almost certainly have a bad reaction in Germany, and if this be accepted it would seem self-evident Germany would endeavor to prevent such a spread; even to the point of assisting the Balkans. Germany has no appetite for seeing Russia in control of Roumanian oil, or further Russian penetration to the southwest.

15. That large-scale Allied offensives in the Balkans or Near East appear impracticable unless or until Italy is won over or defeated. Superior German strength, mobility and communications have a good chance of defeating any Allied advance in the Balkans.

(a) Lack of communications will prevent Allied attack on Russia's Baku oil fields except through Turkey and with her support. Such an attack by land and sea on the Baku-Batum pipe line might succeed, but the chances are against this if Germany would support defending Russians. Also as previously noted (see Par. 13), Turkey's ready support of such an undertaking does not appear likely.

(b) Opening the Bosphorus to Allied men-of-war might bring strong German pressure on Turkey, possibly even attack on the Dardanelle-Bosphorus. Turkey will hesitate seriously to open the Straits.

(c) Allied forces in Near East probably have purely defensive mission re Suez, Mosul oil fields and Turkey.

16. That it cannot be foretold with any degree of accuracy at this time how far propaganda from the Axis and Anti-British powers may succeed in embarrassing England in her Indian, African and Far East interests. In this connection also, Germany is using every propaganda means possible to cause disaffection in France.

17. That the British and French finances are being subjected to heavy strain; though just how severe it is, and how long they can stand it, and what they can do in way of exchange to recoup is beyond my knowledge. This situation - (like oil to Germany - see

Par. 3) might become such a serious factor as even to incline the Allies to seek peace. I wonder sometimes if a quick face-saving peace might not be jumped at by both belligerents. This is not an enthusiastic war--and possible developments are not pleasant to contemplate by either party. If the bomb at Munich had done its intended work, it is possible that peace negotiations might have been undertaken with at least some prospects of arriving at an early adjustment.

18. That successful attack by either belligerent on the fortified Western Front is considered highly improbable.

19. That a violation by the Allies of Belgian or of Swiss soil to get at Germany is highly improbable, unless the Germans should first violate one; and that violation by the Germans, at least an early violation, is very questionable.

20. That an open attack by the Allies through the Scandinavian Peninsula is improbable, and that the neutrality (at least on the surface) of this Peninsula will probably continue, unless Russia should make further incursions beyond Finland. Then anything might happen - surprise by either side is possible, depending on future developments.

(a) That the Scandinavian Peninsula while desiring to maintain neutrality are through force of circumstances at present pro-Ally. 21. That Italy, because of lack of raw materials and her

aspirations, will probably continue neutral, at least until she finds she can diagnose who is going to win the war; and that, while exercising this neutrality, she will, where she can without detriment to herself, favor Germany; that Italy, as a neutral, will find herself under increasingly difficult pressure from both belligerents; the outcome of this situation cannot be forecast at

this time.

22. That sinkings of merchant ships, both Allied and neutral, are averaging about two and a half million tons a year (and increasing) of which approximately one and one-half millions are British; that the ability of the British to launch new merchant ships may be roughly estimated at one and a quarter million tons, plus or minus a quarter million tons; that the building ability of France may be estimated roughly at not greatly in excess of 500,000 tons a year.

23. That the shipping situation in Britain, while not yet serious, is not a comfortable one and will bear close watching. It may develop into a serious situation. Finances here may play, as always, an important role in its ability to stimulate building and to buy neutral ships.

24. That the convoy system, while necessary in order to reduce sinkings, has the effect of greatly reducing the number of ship days; or in other words, it amounts from a practicable standpoint to a considerable actual decrease in tonnage.

25. That Germany will make every effort to avoid friction with the United States which might endanger our neutrality.

26. That no one can predict at this time just how much greater pressure on British shipping can be exercised by Germany, but it would appear that damage from the air might greatly exceed in the future what it has to date.

(a) That increased destruction from the mine is also a possibility, but perhaps not a probability.

(b) That it appears sinkings from submarines may not

greatly increase over the present average, though coordination of this branch with the air might have some additional damaging effects.

27. That the monthly loss of the Germans in submarines has averaged probably somewhere between 5 and 9, with perhaps 7 about as good a guess as any (6 months war).

28. That to date the Germans in new submarine construction have not kept up with their submarine losses; though information indicates a submarine building capacity of perhaps as high an average as ten a month.

29. That Germany has air superiority, but that its continuance is doubtful. However, loss of this superiority need not be a major factor.

30. That the Americas, other than British and French possessions, are likely to continue neutral.

31. That Japan, though hard-pressed, may seize any favorable opportunity with which she thinks she can get away to increase her hold in the Western Pacific.

32. That Japan has overstretched herself and probably must (if the Chinese resistance continues and such appears likely) considerably liquidate her positions in China and that she is not in a position to increase her holdings in China, though she might occupy outlying islands, largely by naval action, if the cost is little.

33. That Japan's position at home is not good, either in morale or in industrial life.

34. That if the foregoing is accepted, and if Germany can

obtain sufficient oil, ~~the Allies have an extremely tough job on their hands and that their success is far from a foregone conclusion--even if better than 50-50.~~

(a) That the problem confronting both belligerents of maintaining the morale of hundreds of thousands of men in idleness on the Western Front may become an acute problem with the advantage going to that side which has the better discipline.

(b) That under all the above circumstances it would seem logical for Germany, at least for the present, to strive to force England to seek peace by crippling her commerce, and that we may look for greatly intensified effort against not only British commerce, but neutral commerce around the British Isles, such intensification to come through the combined efforts of air, submarine, and mine against surface ships, and perhaps ultimately against British port facilities and dock yards. This last, that, is against port facilities and dock yards, Germany may hesitate to start, because it might invite reprisals in air attacks as for example in the Ruhr; so that for the present, Germany may confine herself to action on the sea, on the outcome of which the final decision may rest.

(c) That as noted in Par. 17, if a quick face saving device suddenly presented itself it might offer an opportunity for a negotiated peace, but none appears in sight,- and the present outlook indicates a long war.

(d) That either oil or finances, or both, may be deciding factors, and perhaps to this should be added morale. Any one or any combination of these could bring on peace without a definite military

decision having been reached. This statement regarding finances is made advisedly for, so far as I know, there is no case on record to date where finances have either prevented a nation going to war, or have been an immediate cause for stopping a war.

H.R.S.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*File to
Confidential
Navy* BF

March 13, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached report indicates progress
as of March 1, 1940, on vessels under construc-
tion for the Navy.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR - BUREAU OF ENGINEERING
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MARCH 10, 1940

RESTRICTED
VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, UNITED STATES NAVY - JOINT REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF MARCH 1, 1940

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Completion			
		HULL		MACHINERY				As per		reported	
		Mar. 1: 1940	Gain for	Mar. 1: 1940	Gain for			Date of contract	Mos. to	contract or	building by
		Month	Month	Month	Month			contract	to	or	building
		TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	Laid	Launched	or order	Bld. order	yard	
<u>BATTLESHIPS</u>											
BB55: NORTH CAROLINA	New York	68.8	2.5	48.8	3.8	10/27/37	-	8/ 1/37	49	9/ 1/41 : 10/15/41	
BB56: WASHINGTON	Philadelphia	61.0	3.9	35.7	2.5	6/14/38	-	8/ 1/37	52	12/ 1/41 : 1/15/42	
BB57: SOUTH DAKOTA	W.Y.S.B. Corp.	16.7	2.7	3.0	0.7	7/ 5/39	-	12/15/38	52	4/15/43 : 4/15/43	
BB58: INDIANA	NNSB& DD Co.	9.7	1.9	9.2	2.2	11/20/39	-	12/15/38	52	4/15/43 : 4/15/43	
BB59: MASSACHUSETTS	B.S.Co. (Quincy)	16.2	3.5	-	-	7/20/39	-	12/15/38	55	7/15/43 : -	
BB60: ALABAMA	Norfolk	5.7	2.3	7.6	1.6	2/ 1/40	-	4/ 1/39	52	8/ 1/43 : 8/ 1/43	
BB61: IOWA	New York	-	-	-	-	-	-	7/ 1/39	49	8/ 1/43 : 3/ 1/44(a)	
BB62: NEW JERSEY	Philadelphia	-	-	-	-	-	-	7/ 1/39	52	11/ 1/43 : 6/ 1/44(a)	
<u>AIRCRAFT CARRIERS</u>											
CV7: WASP	B.S.Co. (Quincy)	98.0	1.7	98.9	1.4	4/ 1/39	4/ 4/39	9/19/35	40+	1/25/39 : 5/ 1/40	
CV8: HORNET	NNSB& DD Co.	19.5	2.2	21.3	0.6	9/25/39	-	4/10/39	34	2/10/42 : 2/10/42	
<u>LIGHT CRUISERS</u>											
CI51: ATLANTA	Fed. SB&DD Co.	4.1	1.6	5.5	1.6	-	-	4/25/39	36	4/25/42 : 4/25/42	
CI52: JUNEAU	Fed. SB&DD Co.	4.0	1.6	4.8	1.8	-	-	4/25/39	38	6/25/42 : 6/25/42	
CI53: SAN DIEGO	B.S.Co. (Quincy)	3.1	1.1	3.3	3.3	-	-	4/25/39	39	7/25/42 : -	
CI54: SAN JUAN	B.S.Co. (Quincy)	3.1	1.1	3.3	3.3	-	-	4/25/39	41	9/25/42 : -	
CI55: CLEVELAND											
CI56: COLUMBIA											

- (a) An extension in the building period of at least 6 months will be required on each vessel, the exact amount not now determinable.

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Date- 2/13/59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

RESTRICTED

March 10, 1940

Sheet 2.

Ss

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion:			
		HULL		MACHINERY		As		As per	
		Gain		Gain		reported		by	
		Mar. 1: 1940	Month:	Mar. 1: 1940	Month:	Keel	Date of	Mos.: contract	to or building
		TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	Laid	Launched	or order	Bld. order yard
<u>SUBMARINES</u>									
SS197: SEAWOLF *	Portsmouth	Completed 15 February, 1940							
SS198: TAMBOR	Elec. Boat Co.	95.6	2.8	91.0	4.8	1/16/39	12/20/39	8/ 2/38	29 : 1/ 2/41: 6/17/40
SS199: TAUTOG	Elec. Boat Co.	91.5	4.0	83.1	5.7	3/ 1/39	1/27/40	8/ 2/38	31 : 3/ 2/41: 8/19/40
SS200: THRESHER	Elec. Boat Co.	81.2	7.0	73.5	6.2	4/27/39	-	8/ 2/38	33 : 5/ 2/41: 10/14/40
SS201: TRITON	Portsmouth	53.7	8.1	30.9	15.0	7/ 5/39	-	9/ 1/38	30 : 3/ 1/41: 12/ 1/40
SS202: TROUT	Portsmouth	46.7	5.1	20.5	4.6	8/28/39	-	9/ 1/38	32 : 5/ 1/41: 2/ 1/41
SS203: TUNA	Mare Island	41.3	3.9	47.2	4.4	7/19/39	-	11/ 1/38	30 : 5/ 1/41: 3/ 1/41
SS204: MACKEREL	Elec. Boat Co.	39.1	6.9	33.9	6.8	10/ 6/39	-	6/15/39	23 : 5/15/41: 5/15/41
SS205: MARLIN	Portsmouth	2.4	0.3	-	-	-	-	7/ 1/39	27 : 10/ 1/41: 10/ 1/41
SS206: GAR	Elec. Boat Co.	28.0	4.2	10.9	2.3	12/27/39	-	6/15/39	25 : 7/15/41: 7/15/41
SS207: GRAMPUS	Elec. Boat Co.	26.0	4.4	10.9	2.3	2/14/40	-	6/15/39	27 : 9/15/41: 9/15/41
SS208: GRAYBACK	Elec. Boat Co.	24.2	2.6	10.9	2.3	-	-	6/15/39	29 : 11/15/41: 11/15/41
SS209: GRAYLING	Portsmouth	18.2	5.8	1.4	0.8	12/15/39	-	7/ 1/39	25 : 8/ 1/41: 8/ 1/41
SS210: GRENADIER	Portsmouth	11.2	1.8	-	-	-	-	7/ 1/39	29 : 12/ 1/41: 12/ 1/41
SS211: GUDGEON	Mare Island	27.2	6.3	2.8	0.8	11/22/39	-	7/ 1/39	27 : 10/ 1/41: 10/ 1/41
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

* Commissioned 12/1/39.

March 10, 1940

Sheet 3.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:				:Date of Completion:					
		: HULL :		: MACHINERY :		: As :		: As per :			
		: Gain :		: Gain :		: contract :		: reported :			
		: Mar. 1: 1940	: Month: 1940	: Mar. 1: 1940	: Month: 1940	: Keel	: Date of	: contract	: by		
		: 1940	: Month: 1940	: Month: 1940	: Month: 1940	: contract	: to or	: building	: yard		
:DESTROYERS		: TOTAL:	: TOTAL:	: TOTAL:	: TOTAL:	: Laid	: Launched	: or order:	: Bld. order	: yard	
DD415: O'BRIEN **	:Boston	:86.5	: 5.5	:95.0	: 1.5	: 5/31/38	:10/20/39	: 1/12/37	: 33	:10/12/39	: 4/15/40
DD416: WAIKE	:Boston	:95.0	: 5.0	:94.0	: 1.5	: 5/31/38	:10/20/39	: 1/12/37	: 35	:12/12/39	: 6/ 1/40
DD417: GARRIS	:Norfolk	:97.6	: 3.3	:96.7	: 2.0	: 6/ 7/38	: 6/ 1/39	: 1/12/37	: 33	:10/12/39	: 4/30/40
DD418: ROE *	:Charleston	:98.0	: 0.7	:95.0	: 2.3	: 4/23/38	: 6/21/39	: 1/12/37	: 33	:10/12/39	: 3/15/40
DD419: WAINWRIGHT	:Norfolk	:94.2	: 2.4	:94.7	: 2.6	: 6/ 7/38	: 6/ 1/39	: 2/12/37	: 34	:12/12/39	: 5/31/40
DD420: EUCK	:Philadelphia	:87.7	: 1.3	:83.4	: 2.4	: 4/ 6/38	: 5/22/39	: 2/12/37	: 33	:11/12/39	: 7/ 1/40
DD421: BENSON	:B.S.Co. (Quincy)	:32.1	: 2.5	:72.8	: 5.3	: 5/16/38	:11/15/39	: 9/30/37	: 32	: 5/30/40	: 8/ -/40
DD422: MAY6	:B.S.Co. (Quincy)	:74.5	: 3.5	:68.7	: 4.9	: 5/16/38	-	: 9/30/37	: 34	: 7/30/40	:10/ -/40
DD423: GLEAVES	:Bath Iron Wks.	:84.5	: 4.5	:73.4	: 6.7	: 5/16/38	:12/ 9/39	: 9/30/37	: 34	: 8/ 2/40	: 6/11/40
DD424: NIBLACK	:Bath Iron Wks.	:77.0	: 4.7	:75.1	: 6.7	: 8/ 8/38	-	: 9/30/37	: 36	:10/ 3/40	: 8/15/40
DD425: MADISON	:Boston	:66.5	: 5.5	:55.0	: 3.5	:12/19/38	:10/20/39	:12/30/37	: 34	:10/30/40	: 5/ 1/40
DD426: LANSDALE	:Boston	:65.5	: 5.5	:54.0	: 3.5	:12/19/38	:10/20/39	:12/30/37	: 36	:12/30/40	:11/ 1/40
DD427: HILARY P. JONES	:Charleston	:65.6	: 5.5	:40.3	: 7.0	:11/16/38	:12/14/39	:12/30/37	: 34	:10/30/40	:10/30/40
DD428: CHAS. F. HUGHES	:Puget Sound	:73.2	: 5.5	:54.0	: 4.3	: 1/ 3/39	-	:12/30/37	: 34	:10/30/40	:10/30/40

* Commissioned January 5, 1940

** Commissioned March 2, 1940

38

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:						Date of Completion:			
		HULL		MACHINERY				As		As per reported	
		Mar. 1 for 1940	Month 1940	Mar. 1 for 1940	Month 1940	Keel Laid	Date of contract	Mos. to order	contract building	contract building	contract building
:DESTROYERS (continued)		:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
DD429: LIVERMORE	: Bath Iron Works	: 65.5	: 6.6	: 57.7	: 3.7	: 3/6/39	: -	: 8/15/38	: 28	: 12/15/40	: 11/ 1/40
DD430: EBERLE	: Bath Iron Works	: 60.1	: 5.6	: 55.7	: 5.5	: 4/12/39	: -	: 6/15/38	: 30	: 2/15/41	: 12/30/40
DD431: PLUNKETT	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	: 76.9	: 5.9	: 73.0	: 5.7	: 3/ 1/39	: -	: 8/17/38	: 30	: 2/17/41	: 8/ 1/40
DD432: KEARNY	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	: 74.4	: 6.1	: 69.4	: 5.7	: 3/ 1/39	: -	: 8/17/38	: 32	: 4/17/41	: 9/ 1/40
DD433: GWIN	: Boston	: 43.5	: 5.0	: 27.0	: 6.0	: 6/ 1/39	: -	: 10/ 1/38	: 29	: 3/ 1/41	: 3/ 1/41
DD434: MEREDITH	: Boston	: 42.5	: 5.0	: 25.5	: 5.5	: 6/ 1/39	: -	: 10/ 1/38	: 31	: 5/ 1/41	: 5/ 1/41
DD435: GRAYSON	: Charleston	: 31.9	: 4.9	: 18.2	: 3.5	: 7/17/39	: -	: 10/ 1/38	: 30	: 4/ 1/41	: 4/ 1/41
DD436: MONSSEN	: Puget Sound	: 43.1	: 4.6	: 20.0	: 2.9	: 7/12/39	: -	: 10/ 1/38	: 29	: 3/ 1/41	: 3/ 1/41
DD437: WOOLSEY	: Bath Iron Works	: 21.1	: 6.3	: 30.9	: 7.5	: 10/ 9/39	: -	: 6/15/39	: 24	: 6/15/41	: 6/15/41
DD438: LUDLOW	: Bath Iron Works	: 20.4	: 6.1	: 25.2	: 4.4	: 12/18/39	: -	: 6/15/39	: 26	: 8/15/41	: 8/15/41
DD439: EDISON	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	: 12.7	: 2.6	: 27.3	: 8.3	: -	: -	: 6/15/39	: 24	: 6/15/41	: 6/15/41
DD440: ERICSSON	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	: 12.7	: 2.6	: 22.2	: 5.6	: -	: -	: 6/15/39	: 26	: 8/15/41	: 8/15/41
DD441: WILKES	: Boston	: 18.0	: 4.5	: 11.0	: 2.5	: 11/ 1/39	: -	: 7/ 1/39	: 24	: 7/ 1/41	: 7/ 1/41
DD442: NICHOLSON	: Boston	: 17.5	: 4.0	: 11.0	: 2.5	: 11/ 1/39	: -	: 7/ 1/39	: 26	: 9/ 1/41	: 9/ 1/41
DD443: SWANSON	: Charleston	: 12.1	: 1.9	: 4.6	: 1.0	: 11/15/39	: -	: 7/ 1/39	: 26	: 9/ 1/41	: 9/ 1/41
DD444: INGRAHAM	: Charleston	: 10.5	: 1.7	: 3.5	: 0.4	: 11/15/39	: -	: 7/ 1/39	: 28	: 11/ 1/41	: 11/ 1/41

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion:			
		HULL		MACHINERY		As		As per	
		Gain		Gain		contract		reported	
		Mar. 1: 1940	for Month	Mar. 1: 1940	for Month	Moel	Date of contract to	Mos. contract to	or building
		TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	Laid	Launched	or order	Bld. order yard
<u>DESTROYER TENDERS</u>									
AD14 :DIXIE	:N.Y.S.B. Corp.	:35.3	: 3.6	:32.3	: 4.2	: 3/17/38	: 5/27/39	:12/27/37	: 34 :10/27/40: 5/ 1/40
AD15 :PRAIRIE	:N.Y.S.B. Corp.	:55.5	: 1.5	:57.4	: 2.9	:12/ 7/38	:12/ 9/39	:10/14/38	: 24 :10/14/40:10/14/40
<u>MINESWEEPERS</u>									
AM55 :RAVEN	:Norfolk	:35.5	: 4.3	:35.5	: 4.6	: 6/23/39	-	: 9/ 1/38	: 24 : 9/ 1/40: 9/ 1/40(a)
AM56 :OSPREY	:Norfolk	:35.3	: 4.3	:35.6	: 4.6	: 6/23/39	-	: 9/ 1/38	: 25 :11/ 1/40:11/ 1/40(a)
<u>REPAIR SHIP</u>									
AR5 :VULCAN	:N.Y.S.B. Corp.	: 9.9	: 2.4	: 3.2	: 1.1	:12/26/39	-	: 8/ 1/39	: 32 : 4/ 1/42: 4/ 1/42
<u>SUBMARINE TENDER</u>									
AS11 :FULTON	:Maro Island	:23.3	: 3.2	:35.6	: 6.0	: 7/19/39	-	: 9/ 1/38	: 36 : 9/ 1/41: 9/ 1/41(a)
<u>FLEET TUGS</u>									
AT65 :SEMINOLE	:B.S.Co. (S.I.)	:98.8	: 4.4	:97.3	: 4.4	:12/16/38	: 9/15/39	: 8/15/38	: 20 : 4/15/40: 3/ 7/40
AT66 :CHEROKEE	:B.S.Co. (S.I.)	:93.7	: 5.5	:91.5	: 2.9	:12/23/38	:11/10/39	: 8/15/38	: 22 : 6/15/40: 5/ 3/40
<u>SEAPLANE TENDERS</u>									
AV4 :CURTISS	:N.Y.S.B. Corp.	:56.3	: 1.3	:57.1	: 5.2	: 4/25/38	-	:12/27/37	: 38 : 2/27/41: 2/15/41
AV5 :ALBEMARLE	:N.Y.S.B. Corp.	:40.7	: 1.6	:39.7	: 3.1	: 6/12/39	-	:10/14/38	: 32 : 6/14/41: 6/14/41
<u>SEAPLANE TENDERS</u>									
AVP10:BARNEGAT	:Puget Sound	: 9.1	: 1.9	:23.7	: 2.7	:10/27/39	-	: 9/ 1/38	: 27 :12/ 1/40: 1/ 1/41(a)
AVP11:BISCAYNE	:Puget Sound	: 9.1	: 1.9	:23.7	: 2.7	:10/27/39	-	: 9/ 1/38	: 30 : 3/ 1/41: 3/ 1/41
AVP12:CASCO	:Puget Sound	: 4.1	: 1.2	: 3.6	: 1.7	-	-	: 7/ 1/39	: 24 : 7/ 1/41: 7/ 1/41
AVP13:MACKINAC	:Puget Sound	: 4.1	: 1.2	: 3.6	: 1.7	-	-	: 7/ 1/39	: 27 :10/ 1/41:10/ 1/41
<u>MINELAYER</u>									
CM5 :TERROR	:Philadelphia	-	-	-	-	-	-	: 9/ 1/39	: 36 : 9/ 1/42: 9/ 1/42(a)

(a) Reports from various sources indicate a delay may be involved. Amount of delay not determined.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:						Keel Laid	Launched	or order	Days	Date of Completion	
		HULL		MACHINERY		As							
		Gain		Gain		As per reported							
		Mar. 1: for 1940	Month: 1940	Mar. 1: for 1940	Month: 1940	contract: by	building						
		TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL					order	Yard		
<u>SUBMARINE CHASERS</u>													
PC449:	Luders Mar. C. Co.	95.0	3.0	65.0	10.0	7/10/39:	-	7/ 1/39:	300	4/26/40:	4/26/40		
PC450:	Am. Car & F. Co.	97.0	10.0	80.0	20.0	8/ 9/39:	-	6/10/39:	270	3/ 8/40:	4/ 5/40		
PC451:	Defco B&M Works	75.0	7.0	25.0	10.0	9/25/39:	-	6/15/39:	360	6/10/40:	6/10/40(a)		
PC452:	Defco B&M Works	26.0	7.0	3.0	3.0	-	-	10/19/39:	360	10/13/40:	10/13/40		
PTC1:						(c):			210-	(c):			
to 12:	E. B. Co. Elco Works:	12.0	2.0	7.0	2.0	3/ 1/40:	-	12/13/39:	300	7/10/40:	7/10/40(c)		
<u>MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS</u>													
PT1	Miami S. E. Corp.	97.0	2.0	67.5	-(b):	7/12/39:	8/16/39:	6/ 8/39:	165	11/20/39:	6/15/40		
PT2	Miami S. E. Corp.	97.0	2.0	66.6	-(b):	8/12/39:	9/30/39:	6/ 8/39:	165	11/20/39:	6/15/40		
PT3	Fisher Boat Works:	97.0	2.0	93.7	-(b):	8/ 1/39:	-	6/ 8/39:	195	12/20/39:	5/15/40		
PT4	Fisher Boat Works:	97.0	2.0	79.7	-(b):	8/ 5/39:	-	6/ 8/39:	215	1/ 9/40:	5/15/40		
PT5	Higgins Ind. Inc.	95.0	2.0	65.0	-(b):	8/ 1/39:	-	6/10/39:	175	12/ 2/39:	7/ 1/40		
PT6	Higgins Ind. Inc.	98.0	3.0	93.9	-(b):	8/23/39:	-	6/10/39:	230	1/26/40:	4/15/40		
PT7	Philadelphia	41.6	2.5	2.4	-	8/29/39:	-	-	-	-	-		
PT8	Philadelphia	32.6	12.9	57.7	-	12/29/39:	-	-	-	-	7/ 1/40		
PT10:										(c):			
to 20:	E. B. Co. Elco Works:							12/13/39:	300-	10/8/40:	-		
									390				

(a) Those vessels delayed due to late engine deliveries.

(b) Machinery progress recalculated.

(c) First vessel only, balance scheduled for delivery at uniform intervals thereafter.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

P&F Navy
3-13-40

The Chairman
Committee on Naval Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Chairman:

The bill H. R. 8921 "Providing for the reorganization of the Navy Department, and for other purposes," was referred to the Navy Department by your Committee with request for views and recommendation.

The purpose of this bill is as stated in its title.

As Secretary of the Navy, I was recently called upon to testify before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Naval Affairs upon this important question of reorganization of the Navy Department. At that time I presented my views and submitted the reorganization steps I recommended.

The plan I offered proposed that there be created for the nonmilitary functions of the Naval Establishment ashore, a central agency in the Navy Department to be called the Office of Shore Activities, to parallel the Office of Naval Operations wherein should be centralized the military functions ashore and afloat. With such an arrangement, and only with such an arrangement, can the Secretary of the Navy be assured that he will obtain both the military and the nonmilitary viewpoints on any given subject, and having them can properly perform his duty of making executive decisions and formulating policies.

Subsequent testimony and some articles in the press have served to high-light the issue at stake, namely, whether the Office of Naval Operations is to dominate all activities of the Navy Department, or whether the technical, industrial, nonmilitary and business branches of the Navy Department shall be ac-

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corded the consideration and authority which their importance warrants.

I can fully appreciate the insistence by Operations and the Line that the military requirements of the Navy should be given first consideration in reaching decisions as to policy and procedure. With this concept I find no fault, provided only that the technical and industrial possibilities or limitations be given concurrent and equal consideration. In case of conflict, decision should rest with the Secretary of the Navy. My proposal is in accordance with this principle.

Your attention is invited to the attached clipping from the Washington Post of March 17, 1940, which I submit as part of this record. I consider this article an excellent factual and dispassionate exposition of the situation. It is significant that an outsider, a writer connected neither with the Congress nor with the Navy Department, should have so clearly and effectively stated the case. I welcome the fact that the public is being informed of the conditions, because in the last analysis it is the public which should and will eventually determine the conduct of public affairs.

I repeat what I pointed out in my letter of January 3, 1940, that there are several schools of thought on this subject. One school feels that the Chief of Naval Operations should be the executive head of the Navy, through whom all matters must flow to the Assistant Secretary and the Secretary of the Navy. This idea should, in my opinion, be rejected because it means that the actual control of the Navy will rest with the military and not with the civilian heads. Another school believes that the work of the Navy Department logically falls into two classes, and that there should be a coordinating agency for each in the Department under the Secretary. I hold to this latter school of thought.

I am therefore not in agreement with Section 2 of H. R. 8921 which not only charges the Chief of Naval

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Operations with the "operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war" (as does the present law), but in addition charges him with

..."the coordination and general direction of all other operations of the Naval Establishment, except that in the case of activities which are otherwise industrial in character, such coordination and general direction shall be limited to the military operating features thereof."

This language, taken in conjunction with the present law that

"All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary, and shall have full force and effect as such",

and taking further into consideration his being the ranking officer in the Navy Department, gives practically unlimited authority to the Chief of Naval Operations. The only limitation is in regard to industrial activities, but even there the Chief of Naval Operations is to control their "military operating features". The term "industrial" is itself limiting as compared with "non-military", as it connotes factory work only.

Such a broad grant of power to any one officer of the Navy Department will seriously impair the authority of the Secretary.

The civilian Secretary should jealously guard the authority granted him by law, and any delegation of that authority for administrative purposes should be safeguarded by checks and balances such as are inherent

in the organization of our national government. My proposal furnishes exactly the check and balance required by establishing the Office of Shore Activities to check and balance the Office of Naval Operations.

In the hearings on the Act of August 29, 1916, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt (now President) stated he believed the authorization of a Chief of Naval Operations was the most material step that had taken place in the history of the Navy toward a perfect organization, but thought the organization would perhaps require some modification as further experience should prove to be necessary. He did not believe it was necessary or advisable to specify in the law that the Chief of Naval Operations should have authority to issue orders to the extent as provided for in the original draft, as he thought it would give the Chief of Naval Operations power not only over operations, but over all other various activities of the Department which were not the concern of the Chief of Naval Operations in any way. (Underscoring supplied.) Mr. Roosevelt further indicated plainly that the Chief of Naval Operations should be limited to "the things military, and not the business or industrial end". (from Capt. A. W. Johnson's Brief History of the Organization of the Navy Department, pamphlet #284, page 2324).

The purpose of the Office of Shore Activities is precisely to provide a central agency in the Department to care for all other various activities of the Department which are not the concern of the Chief of Naval Operations in any way as Assistant Secretary Roosevelt so ably put it.

Section 3 of H. R. 8921 creates a Special Assistant Secretary of the Navy who shall be charged "with coordinating the industrial activities of the naval shore establishment". This simply means that two persons are provided to divide the work heretofore performed by one. The volume of work justifies the appointment of

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an additional assistant Secretary, but the additional assistant will be as impotent to deal adequately with the situation as I and my Assistant Secretary predecessors have been. The stated grant of power to "coordinate the industrial activities" is mere surplusage. The Secretary of the Navy has for years had the authority to assign such duties to the Assistant Secretary, and in effect has done so. But one man cannot do that work by himself. Neither can it be satisfactorily done by the suggested device of merely ordering officers to assist him. That has been tried for eighteen years with the present Shore Establishments Division and has proved insufficient. He needs a usable legal tool, an organization, to do the work under his direction, similar to, but not nearly so large as, the legalized organization under the Chief of Naval Operations. I have recommended such a tool and called it the Office of Shore Activities. It might be called the Shore Establishments Division. The trouble with the present Shore Establishments Division has been its lack of legal status.

No such agency is provided in H. R. 8921. I recommend that such an office be included substantially as I advocated before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Naval Affairs recently. Without the establishment or legalizing of such an office, I am convinced that no worthwhile betterment of the conduct of the nonmilitary business of the Navy Department is possible.

I have closely followed the reorganization hearings and have studied the transcript of testimony carefully. As a result it has been evident to me that certain changes in language might well be made in the draft of the proposal I originally submitted. Such changes are for the purpose of conserving the power of the Secretary by limiting the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Shore Activities to issue orders in their own right. Specifically, the duties of both these officers should be confined to coordination, instead of coordination, direction and administration, and they should be authorized to issue directives rather than orders.

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Another reason for the changes is to avoid possible conflict of authority as between these officers on the one hand and the chiefs of bureaus on the other hand.

Under Section 1 (e) relating to the new Bureau of Ships, no provision has been made for the heads of the major divisions thereof to be given the rank of rear-admiral with the pay of the lower half while so serving. One reason why Chiefs of bureaus have for years been given the rank of Rear Admiral is so that a specially qualified officer of the rank of commander or captain may be appointed chief without the necessity of limiting the other officers in the bureau to his subordinates in rank. Each major division in the proposed bureau of ships is as large or larger in respect of volume, character and importance of work, and as to money involved, as many of the bureaus were a few years ago. Hence this argument is logically applicable to the heads of the major divisions of the Bureau of Ships. Making them rear admirals with the pay of the lower half while holding office will cost little or nothing in money. It is therefore recommended that the chiefs of the major divisions of the Bureau of Ships be given the rank of rear admiral with the pay of the lower half while so serving.

Aside from this point, I am in agreement with the remaining provisions of Section 1 of H. R. 8921 which establishes a Bureau of Ships and I earnestly recommend this new bureau be established.

I disagree with Section 2 for the reasons already given.

Subject to my remarks herein I am in agreement with Section 3 authorizing a Special Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

I agree with Sections 4 and 5.

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In conformity with all the foregoing, I attach hereto marked "A" a draft of a bill which the Navy Department strongly recommends be substituted for H. R. 8921.

A B I L L

Providing for the reorganization of the Navy Department and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following changes are hereby made in the organization of the Department of the Navy:

(a) The Bureau of Construction and Repair, the Office of the Office of the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, the Bureau of Engineering, and the Office of the Chief of the Bureau of Engineering are hereby abolished.

(b) The functions of the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the functions of the Bureau of Engineering are hereby transferred to and consolidated under one bureau to be known as the Bureau of Ships, with a Chief of Bureau at the head thereof. The duties of the Bureau of Ships shall be assigned by the Secretary of the Navy and performed under his authority and the orders of the Chief of the Bureau of Ships shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary of the Navy, and shall have full force and effect as such.

(c) The Chief of the Bureau of Ships shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of four years, from among the officers of the active list of the Navy who are qualified and experienced in naval engineering or naval architecture. The Chief of the Bureau of Ships shall have the same rank and shall be entitled

to the same pay, allowances, and privileges of retirement as are now or may hereafter be prescribed by or in pursuance of law for other Chiefs of Bureau in the Navy Department.

(d) An officer on the active list of the Navy who is qualified and experienced in naval engineering or naval architecture shall be detailed as Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ships. He shall, while so serving, have the rank of rear admiral and shall receive the highest pay and allowances of that rank: Provided, That nothing herein shall operate to deprive the incumbents in office as the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and repair and the Chief of the Bureau of Engineering on the effective date of this Act of the rank, pay, allowances or retirement privileges to which they may be entitled under existing law.

(e) Officers on the active list of the Navy who are qualified and experienced in naval engineering or naval architecture may be detailed as heads of the major divisions in the Bureau of Ships. Not more than four such officers may, while so serving, have the rank of rear admiral and receive the pay and allowances of the lower half of that grade.

(f) The Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ships and the heads of the major divisions thereof shall perform such duties as may be assigned them by the Chief of the Bureau of

Ships or other competent authority. The Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ships and the heads of the major divisions of that bureau shall succeed to the duties of the Chief of Bureau during his absence or disability, or in the event of a temporary vacancy in that office, in such order as may be directed by the Secretary of the Navy.

(g) The Chief of Naval Operations shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet, with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, and with the coordination of the military functions which are not otherwise prescribed by law, of the Naval Establishment, ashore and afloat. These duties shall be assigned by the Secretary of the Navy, performed under his authority, and the directives of the Chief of Naval Operations shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary of the Navy and shall have full force and effect as such.

(h) Section 4 of the Act approved June 24, 1926 (44 Stat. 767; U.S.C., title 5, sec. 421a), entitled "An Act to authorize the construction and procurement of aircraft and aircraft equipment in the Navy and Marine Corps, and to adjust and define the status of operating personnel in connection therewith", is hereby repealed.

(i) To aid the Secretary of the Navy there shall be in the Department of the Navy a Special Assistant Secretary

who shall be appointed by the President, from civil life, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Special Assistant Secretary of the Navy shall be charged with the departmental administration of the industrial activities of all naval shore establishments. He shall also perform such additional duties as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy or required by law and shall succeed to the duties of the Secretary of the Navy during his absence or disability or in the event of a temporary vacancy in that office next after the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. The compensation of the Special Assistant Secretary of the Navy shall be at the rate of \$9,000 per annum.

(j) There shall be in the Department of the Navy as a part of the organic organization thereof an Office of Shore Activities, with a Director of Shore Activities as its head. The Office of Shore Activities shall, under the direction of the Secretary or an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the coordination of the non-military functions on shore of the Naval Establishment which are not otherwise prescribed by law. Its duties shall be assigned by the Secretary of the Navy, performed under his authority, and the directives of the Director of Shore Activities shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary of the Navy, and shall have full force and effect as such.

(k) The Director of Shore Activities, who shall be qualified in the management and administration of industrial activities and civilian personnel, shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the officers of the active list of the Navy for a term of four years, or from civil life to serve during the pleasure of the President. If the Director of Shore Activities be a naval officer, he shall, while so serving, have the rank and be entitled to the pay and allowances of a Vice Admiral. He shall be entitled to the same privileges of retirement as are now or may hereafter be prescribed by or in pursuance of law for the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy Department (Act of June 22, 1938). If the Director of Shore Activities be a civilian, his compensation is hereby fixed at the rate of \$8,500 per annum.

(l) All records and property (including office equipment) of the Bureau of Engineering and the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and all the personnel used in the administration and functions of such bureaus are hereby transferred to the Bureau of Ships for use in the administration and functions transferred or provided by this Act: Provided, That any personnel transferred by this section found by the Secretary of the Navy to be in excess of the personnel necessary for the administration of the Bureau of Ships shall be retransferred under existing law to other positions in

the Government service, or separated from the service: Provided further, That whenever the employment of any person is terminated by a reduction of personnel as a result of the reorganization effected by this Act, such person shall thereafter be given preference, when qualified, whenever an appointment is made in the executive branch of the Government, but such preference shall not be effective for a period longer than twelve months from the date the employment of such person is so terminated: And provided further, That any transfer of personnel under the authority of this Act shall be without change in classification or compensation, except that this requirement shall not operate after the end of the fiscal year during which the transfer is made to prevent the adjustment of classification or compensation to conform to the duties of which such transferred personnel may be assigned.

(m) The unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations or other funds available for use in connection with the exercise of any function transferred to the Bureau of Ships shall be transferred to that Bureau for use in connection with the exercise of the functions so transferred.

SEC. 2. All laws or parts of laws so far as they are inconsistent with or in conflict with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

76TH CONGRESS
3D SESSION

H. R. 8921

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 13, 1940

Mr. DARDEN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs

A BILL

Providing for the reorganization of the Navy Department, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 That the following changes are hereby made in the organi-
4 zation of the Department of the Navy:

5 (a) The Bureau of Construction and Repair, the Office
6 of the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, the
7 Bureau of Engineering, and the Office of the Chief of the
8 Bureau of Engineering are hereby abolished.

9 (b) The functions of the Bureau of Construction and
10 Repair and the functions of the Bureau of Engineering are
11 hereby transferred to and consolidated under one bureau to

1 be known as the Bureau of Ships, with a Chief of Bureau
2 at the head thereof. The duties of the Bureau of Ships shall
3 be assigned by the Secretary of the Navy and performed
4 under his authority and the orders of the Chief of the Bureau
5 of Ships shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary
6 of the Navy, and shall have full force and effect as such.

7 (c) The Chief of the Bureau of Ships shall be appointed
8 by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
9 Senate, for a term of four years, from among the officers of
10 the active list of the Navy who are specially qualified and
11 experienced in naval engineering or naval architecture. The
12 Chief of the Bureau of Ships shall have the same rank
13 and shall be entitled to the same pay, allowances, and
14 privileges of retirement as are now or may hereafter be
15 prescribed by or in pursuance of law for other Chiefs of
16 Bureau in the Navy Department.

17 (d) An officer on the active list of the Navy who is
18 specially qualified and experienced in naval engineering or
19 naval architecture shall be detailed as Assistant Chief of
20 the Bureau of Ships. He shall, while so serving, have the
21 rank of rear admiral and shall receive the highest pay and
22 allowances of that rank: *Provided*, That nothing herein
23 shall operate to deprive the incumbents in office as the Chief
24 of the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Chief
25 of the Bureau of Engineering on the effective date of this

1 Act of the rank, pay, allowances, or retirement privileges
2 to which they may be entitled under existing law.

3 (e) Officers on the active list of the Navy who are
4 specially qualified and experienced in naval engineering or
5 naval architecture shall be detailed as heads of the major
6 divisions in the Bureau of Ships.

7 (f) The Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ships and the
8 heads of the major divisions thereof shall perform such duties
9 as may be assigned them by the Chief of the Bureau of
10 Ships or other competent authority. The Assistant Chief of
11 the Bureau of Ships and the heads of the major divisions of
12 that bureau shall succeed to the duties of the Chief of Bureau
13 during his absence or disability, or in the event of a temporary
14 vacancy in that office, in such order as may be directed by
15 the Secretary of the Navy.

16 (g) All records and property (including office equip-
17 ment) of the Bureau of Engineering and the Bureau of Con-
18 struction and Repair, and all the personnel used in the ad-
19 ministration and functions of such bureaus are hereby trans-
20 ferred to the Bureau of Ships for use in the administration
21 and functions transferred or provided by this Act: *Provided,*
22 That any personnel transferred by this section found by the
23 Secretary of the Navy to be in excess of the personnel neces-
24 sary for the administration of the Bureau of Ships shall be
25 retransferred under existing law to other positions in the

1 Government service, or separated from the service: *Provided*
2 *further*, That whenever the employment of any person is
3 terminated by a reduction of personnel as a result of the
4 reorganization effected by this Act, such person shall there-
5 after be given preference, when qualified, whenever an ap-
6 pointment is made in the executive branch of the Govern-
7 ment, but such preference shall not be effective for a period
8 longer than twelve months from the date the employment
9 of such person is so terminated: *And provided further*, That
10 any transfer of personnel under the authority of this Act shall
11 be without change in classification or compensation, except
12 that this requirement shall not operate after the end of the
13 fiscal year during which the transfer is made to prevent the
14 adjustment of classification or compensation to conform to
15 the duties of which such transferred personnel may be
16 assigned.

17 (h) The unexpended balances of appropriations, alloca-
18 tions, or other funds available for use in connection with the
19 exercise of any function transferred to the Bureau of Ships
20 shall be transferred to that Bureau for use in connection with
21 the exercise of the functions so transferred.

22 SEC. 2. The Chief of Naval Operations shall, under the
23 direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the
24 operations of the fleet, with the preparation and the readiness

1 of plans for its use in war, and with the coordination and
2 general direction of all other operations of the Naval Estab-
3 lishment, except that in the case of activities which are other-
4 wise industrial in character, such coordination and general
5 direction shall be limited to the military operating features
6 thereof.

7 SEC. 3. To aid the Secretary of the Navy there shall be
8 in the Department of the Navy a Special Assistant Secretary
9 who shall be appointed by the President, from civil life, by
10 and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Special
11 Assistant Secretary of the Navy shall be charged with coor-
12 dinating the industrial activities of the naval shore establish-
13 ments. He shall also perform such additional duties as may
14 be prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy or required by
15 law and shall succeed to the duties of the Secretary of the
16 Navy during his absence or disability or in the event of a
17 temporary vacancy in that office next after the Assistant
18 Secretary of the Navy. The compensation of the Special
19 Assistant Secretary of the Navy shall be at the rate of
20 \$10,000 per annum.

21 SEC. 4. Section 4 of the Act approved June 24, 1926
22 (44 Stat. 767; U. S. C., title 5, sec. 421a), entitled "An
23 Act to authorize the construction and procurement of air-
24 craft and aircraft equipment in the Navy and Marine Corps,

1 and to adjust and define the status of operating personnel in
2 connection therewith", is hereby repealed.

3 SEC. 5. All laws or parts of laws so far as they are in-
4 consistent with or in conflict with the provisions of this Act
5 are hereby repealed.

70TH CONGRESS
3d Session

H. R. 8921

A BILL

Providing for the reorganization of the Navy
Department, and for other purposes.

By Mr. DARDEN

MARCH 13, 1940

Referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs

Who Shall Rule Navy? Question Stirs Back-Stage Struggle for Power

Modernizing Plan Raises Old Issues

Tug-Of-War Again
Between Military
And Civilians,
Staff and the Line

By John G. Norris

Behind the scenes of the rather dull and sparsely attended public hearings on naval reorganization now underway on Capitol Hill, there is real drama—the drama of the never-ending clash of groups of men seeking greater power.

There is also the important issue of modernizing the century-old Navy Department to meet the problems of a modern war, but this is the rope with which the tug-of-war is being fought. It is the age-old struggle of line against staff and civilian vs. military for control of the Navy.


This is not to say that the contest for power represents a clash of selfish interests—it is much less so than such fights usually are. The forces at work all feel that their plan for running the Navy is the best and that proposed by others is worse.

The line and the staff of the Navy—the sailors and the technical men—have been at it for years. The ship operators maintain they should have the final say on all matters in the Navy because theirs is the ultimate responsibility—victory or defeat in battle. On the other hand, staff—constructors, engineers and other staff officers contend the former, lacking specialized knowledge, should not be allowed to run their departments.

The civilian vs. military control issue arises only under a strong-minded Secretary of the Navy. For the usual political appointee is that post fixed it expedient to follow his ranking adviser on most questions. Few try to become the actual leader of the Navy, and those that do usually come forward with a reorganization plan to transfer the reins of power.

Found Admirals Running Show

Secretary Charles Edison is one of the few. He came in as Assistant Secretary and found the admirals running the show under the aging Secretary Claude A. Swanson. He was bound off from practically all matters except those specifically referred to him, and he didn't like it. He got Secretary Swanson to designate him "coordinator of shipbuilding," when he pointed out that under the divided control, construction of warships was lagging. And after a time, he came forward with another proposal—consolidation of the bureau handling shipbuilding.




completed, in fact, by Edison's order, but could be undone by a future Secretary.

Later, just this week in fact, he took away some of the functions of the Bureau of Ordnance over the objections of its chief and put them into the new Shipbuilding Bureau. The subcommittee is headed by Representative Darden (Democrat), of Virginia, and composed of the chairman and ranking minority member of the full Naval Committee, Representative Vinson, of Georgia, Mass., of Minnesota; Cole (Republican), of New York, and Jacobson (Democrat), of Iowa. From the start it became apparent that the views of the Navy's ranking line officers would be amply represented in the subcommittee's council. The admiral's usually testifying so far have been largely non-committal as to Secretary Edison's plan, but from the questions of the committeemen, it was even that opponents of his proposals had had their private sayings.

Vinson Flatly Opposes Plan

The most powerful single figure on the committee, Vinson, soon came out flatly against Edison's pro-

The old conflict within the Navy—civilian heads versus admirals—has broken into the open again. Top-ranking Navy line officers want to see Admiral Harold R. Stark (below), chief of naval operations, extend his scope to handle the Navy's industrial side together with fleet movements (right). Navy Secretary Charles Edison (center, above) wants to streamline the service but not at the expense of greater Stark power. He's shown with Representatives Cole (left), of New York, and Mass., of Minnesota, both on a special House naval subcommittee considering Navy changes.



5th Battalion, Marine Reserve, To Have Two Paid Drill Nights

Companies Basing in Washington
To Add Wednesday Exercises;
Schedule All of Combat Subjects

Authority for two paid drill nights per week for the next eight weeks for the Fifth Battalion Marine Corps Reserve, have been announced by the Major General Commandant.

The companies basing in Washington, including the band and special troops, will drill on Wednesday evenings in addition to the usual Tuesday evening formations.

The schedule for the additional drills will consist entirely of combat subjects, including musketry, scouting and patrolling. Company E, at Alexandria, will drill on Thursdays and Fridays, and Company F, at Rockville, will drill on Mondays and Tuesdays.

Col. Joseph C. Fagan, U. S. M. C., recently appointed director of the Marine Corps Reserve, in an official communication to all Reserve units, stated, "It is my desire to improve the Marine Corps Reserve, and this can be accomplished only if I enjoy the confidence and frank cooperation of Reserve personnel. I feel sure this will be forthcoming."

Lieut. Col. William C. James and Maj. William B. Onley, U. S. M. C., representing Col. Joseph C. Fagan, director of the Marine Corps Reserve, have completed their inspection of personnel, quarters and equipment of the Marine Reserve.

Sheltering Society To Install Officers

The Hebrew Travelers Sheltering Society will meet tonight at the Jewish Community Center to install officers.

The home of the society, which last year gave needy transients some 5,500 meals and 2,400 lodgings, is 407 Massachusetts avenue northwest.

Service Sidelights

Army and Navy Terms
Made Simple for
The Civilian

By J. G. N.

At the urging of several of our faithful civilian readers, we are publishing below a glossary of Army and Navy terms which are in more or less common use throughout the services and are largely so much gibberish to the uninitiated.

Due to the insistence of the copy desk, we believe we have so far failed to slip into Army

Navyese. Patriotic Americans who are knowledgeable of our defense forces elsewhere, however, report great difficulty in understanding the language.

This is true, they say, not only in talking with service friends about military problems (they speak English in discussing sports, the movies and other more important things), but in reading service magazines and attending Congressional hearings. For Congressmen, it seems, get as bad as the military and naval men, after they have served on the defense committees awhile.

So here are a few of the more common and less intelligible expressions in every day Army and Navy lingo (a complete list would require a book):

A-A—Automatic artillery.
A-A-R—Browning automatic rifle.
Bridghead—establish a—Get control of a bridge or defile in advance lines, by throwing up fortifications or troops on the side nearest the enemy.

Dog-robbet—A soldier who acts as an officer's servant.
Duff-Swagger, randy (Army).
Clinch—pragmatism ("sinker"), the commander-in-chief of the United States fleet.

Commanding—Commander of the battle force.
File as "an Army file" or "Navy file"—an Army or Navy officer.

Pay—Pay increase for every five years of service.

E. D. O.—A naval officer assigned in engineering duty only; that is, a specialist who does not go to sea.

Flag officer—An admiral, vice admiral or rear admiral.

G-I—Division of the general staff handling intelligence, hence Army intelligence.

Gold brick—An officer or soldier with an easy job, all assignments as sides, adjutants, chiefs, etc., etc., etc.



J. G. NORRIS

BSF Navy

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DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (8/27/58)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- JvD

19 March 1940

~~Confidential~~

MEMORANDUM

file

Moore and McCormack of New York City has just received, by cable, instructions from Moscow to the following effect:

(a) To divert into Baltimore the S.S. TEXAS which sailed yesterday from New York for Vladivostok loaded with brass, copper and tin.

(b) To cease loading the S.S. Eastern Guide now in New York with brass, copper and tin, unload, and load with machinery and hold in port.

(c) Hold two ships in port now in Seattle loaded with grain which were to have been despatched to Vladivostok.

Source - absolutely reliable.

A fair inference from the foregoing information is that the Russians anticipate an early application of the British blockade against Russia.

~~Confidential~~ A further speculative surmise might be that the Russians know they are about to make some move sufficiently offensive to the British to insure that a British blockade would be imposed against Russia.

a

*file
personal*

*RF Navy
Navy*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

Admiral Stark's aide left
the following message from Admiral Stark.
The Admiral did not know whether it was
important enough, but thought perhaps you
might want to pass it along to the President:

"The Navy advised the Coast
Guard that the S. S. Marutania
has obtained clearance for the
canal zone via St. George's,
Bermuda."

get

Personal

*PSF
Hany
r*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mon 19 40

FROM CAPTAIN JAMES

Information confirmed that
MAURETANIA sails 8 pm Wednesday for Bermuda
and that QUEEN MARY sails 8 am Thursday for
Trinidad.

This information received from Coast
Guard.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 21, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I am attaching a memorandum received yesterday from Admiral Furlong on the President's suggested torpedo nets for tender lying at anchor in outlying or exposed anchorage.


The Bureau of Ordnance is extremely interested in this problem and will prosecute a solution of this with vigor. They have already made a number of tests with torpedo nets at Newport, but these tests have not proven entirely satisfactory so that they are in the process of redesigning nets in the light of experience from abroad as well as results of the tests made.

The present nets under manufacture for trial are along the lines developed abroad and are surprisingly heavy. Each panel of the net is comprised of what practically amounts to a suit of mail, the net being made up of rings of very strong No. 4 gauge steel wire, each ring being 16 inches in diameter, and each ring itself comprising four strands of the aforementioned wire, twisted into a rigid structure.

Previous tests indicate that nets of lighter material will not stop the progress of a 3600 pound torpedo travelling at 30 knots. On tests, these torpedoes have gone right through the nets and reached their mark.

The attached is a preliminary study of the situation with more information to follow as additional developments occur.

Respectfully,



D. J. CALLAGHAN.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

Date-4-7-70

Signature- 

IN REPLY ADDRESS
BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT
AND REFER TO NO.

(AB)


NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF ORDNANCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. March 19, 1940

TORPEDO PROTECTION FOR TENDERS IN EXPOSED ANCHORAGES

Torpedo war head, 484 lbs. TNT will cause serious damage to tender type hull if it detonates 63 feet from the ship.

Airplane tender CURTIS; 527'x69'x20'9" draught
Submarine tender FULTON; 530'x73'x20'6" draught.



Torpedo nets abeam (ab, cd) 720' long by 30' deep.

One torpedo net weights 103,380 lbs.

Resistance offered by one net assuming 2 knot current is 10,000 lbs. - this requires 200 shaft horse power - 65 ft. Yard Tug.

If 3 knot current, resistance is 22,400 lbs. - requires 600 SHP
80'x60' tug.

The 20 net tenders we are asking Congress for in 1941 are 1000 SHP, and 146' long.

Four net tenders and aircraft tender could divide material, buoys and nets,
20 panels, 72'x30', on going to sea.

Four of these net tenders or 4 standard 110' Navy tugs of 1000 SHP could be sent
with the aircraft tender.

British tests claim 50% efficiency for 1 line of nets.

Suggestion looks good and could be tested in Minecraft off Pearl Harbor after
we have procured nets.

No 4 gauge steel
wire 16" diameter

W.R.F.
W.R. Furlong.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

FILE EN/A3-1(400314c)
L RP.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 22, 1940.

Sir:

There is transmitted herewith for your consideration and recommendation to the President the recommendation the Navy Department proposes to make to the Chairman, Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, in connection with the bill H. R. 8921 "Providing for the reorganization of the Navy Department, and for other purposes."

Information is requested as to whether or not the proposed recommendation is in accord with the program of the President.

Very respectfully,

CHARLES EDISON.

The Director
Bureau of the Budget
Executive Office
of the President
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures (3).

TSF
navy
1

March 26, 1940.

Memorandum for the President from Dan Callaghan

Re: Navy maintaining daily schedule of radio communication
with Admiral Byrd and can transmit messages regardless
of location of flagship, etc, etc.

For the above memo and radio message of Adm. Byrd's to
Mrs. Roosevelt of March 18, 1940 and the ^Roosevelts Radio
message to him of March 27, 1940.

See: Antarctic folder-Drawer 2-1940