

DECLASSIFIED

Map Room
Box 38

~~SECRET~~

COPY NO. 27

To: B.A.D. Washington

From: Admiralty

Dated: March 7th, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE

NOV 7 1973

IMMEDIATE

Following for Joint Staff Mission from
Chiefs of Staff No. (W) 109.

Following is draft received from Australia
proposed Directive to Supreme Commander Anzac Area. Begins.

The Governments concerned are the Governments
of U.S.A., U.K., Australia and New Zealand and any other
Government hereafter included. For the sake of convenience
the above Governments are referred to in this Directive as
ANZAB Governments.

The Area:

1. The Anzac area should embrace
 - (i) The present Anzac area
 - (ii) The whole of Australia and its territory, New Zealand and Islands within boundary present Anzac area to the extent not included in (i).
 - (iii) An area to the West and Northwest of Australia including Timor, Arbon, the whole of New Guinea and sea area within agreed distance of the coast, the West of Australia or as may subsequently be determined.
 - (iv) The sea area to south of Australia.

Force

2. You have been designated as Supreme Commander of Anzac Area and all operationally trained armed forces afloat, ashore and in the air of ANZAB Governments which are or will be stationed in area.
3. No Government will materially reduce its armed forces stationed in your area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its force in your area except after giving to other Governments and to you timely information pertaining thereto.

Strategic Concept and Policy.

4. The basic strategic concept for conducting war in Anzac Area lies in an immediate change on part of United Nations to a positive offensive strategy and plan must be formulated to provide for security of Australia, Zealand and (partly) territories and to ensure freedom of action for offensive operations on part of United Nations against Japan.

The piece meal employment of forces should be minimized. Your operations should be so conducted as to further preparations for offensive.

5. The general strategic policy should be related from the outset to future major offensive operations and with this in view should be directed to secure Australia and New Zealand not only to maintain their integrity but also to form bases for offensive action on the part of United Nations to defeat Japan. The immediate problems that confront you are:

- (i) To secure lines of communication from U.S. to Australia and New Zealand by holding New Caledonia and Fiji.
- (ii) To prevent the further southward movement of the enemy into Australia, either from New Britain via New Guinea or from Timor through Darwin or down the West coast.
- (iii) Decide to maintain essential communications within the area. When these have been secured it will be possible to plan offensive operations in light of situation then prevailing including that in Western Pacific. In event of failure to hold New Caledonia and Fiji it will be a primary necessity to ensure integrity of North Island of New Zealand.

The Duties, Responsibilities and Authorities of Supreme Commander.

6. You will co-ordinate in Anzac Area strategic operations of all armed forces of ANZAB Governments, assign them strategic missions and objectives, and where desirable arrange for formation of task forces for execution of specific operations and appoint any officer irrespective of seniority or nationality to command such task forces.
7. You will allocate within area the forces and equipment that are available or which may become available.
8. You are authorized to require from Commanders of Armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in discharging your responsibility as Supreme Commander.
9. You are authorized to control the issue of all communique's concerning forces under your command.
10. Your channel of communication with ANZAB Governments upon any matters relating to your mission is through Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington.
11. The Commanders of all sea, land and air forces within your area will be immediately informed by their respective Governments that from a date to be notified all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with provisions of this directive will be considered by such Commanders as emanating from their respective Governments.
12. In the unlikely event that any of your immediate subordinates after making direct representations to you still consider that obedience to your orders would jeopardise national interest of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in Anzac Area he has the right subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own Government before carrying out orders. Such appeal will be prepared by most expeditious method and copy of appeal will be communicated simultaneously to you.

13. You are not authorized to transfer from territories of any of ANZAB Government land forces of that (?Government) without consent of local commander or his Government.

14. Your authority and control with respect to various operations of Anzac Area and to forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through local commanders. Interferences are to be avoided in administrative processes of Armed forces of any of the ANZAB Governments, including freedom of communications between them and their respective Governments. Alterations or revisions in basic tactical organization of any force will not be made except in the case of urgent necessity. Each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and should normally be retained as national components in task force. You will give effect to principle delegation of authority of local commander and in accordance with this principle it is no part your duty to control details of actual operations.

On Assumption of Command and Staff.

15. Your staff will include officer forces of ANZAB Governments. You are empowered to communicate immediately with commanders of (?every) force with a view to obtaining Staff Officers essential for your earliest possible assumption of command.

16. You will report to Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington, when you are in a position effectively to carry out the essential functions of Supreme Command so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.

Superior Authorities.

17. As Supreme Commander of Anzac Area you will always be responsible to ANZAB Council through Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington as administrative authorities constituted for the purpose of ANZAC AREA.

18. On all important matters outside jurisdiction of Supreme Commander of Anzac Area the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington as specially constituted for purpose of Anzac Area will be the agency through which recommendations and communications may be submitted to ANZAB Council for decision. Among chief matters on which decisions will be required are -

- (a) Provision of reinforcements
- (b) Major change in policy
- (c) Departure from Supreme Commander's directive.

19. This directive is to be read with the Agreement between ANZAB Governments concerning machinery for higher direction of war in Anzac Area.

Ends. Our comments if any follow.

T.O.C. 1902A/7

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

COPY NO. 28

To: C.Z.M.

Rptd: C-in-C Eastern Fleet
S.O. China Force
Combined Chiefs of Staff,
Washington
COMSOWESPAC

From: ABDACOM

Dated: 25th February, 1942.

IMPORTANT

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 147-72
BY RT. DATE

NOV 7 1973

H.M.S. TRUANT and H.M.S. TRUSTY hereby
detached from this command to command of C-in-C E.F.

2. Spare submarine gear in this area should
be loaded aboard these vessels for transportation to
Colombo. Either H.M.S. TRUSTY or H.M.S. TRUANT should
however upon leaving Java be prepared for immediate
patrol in Malacca Strait as ordered by C-in-C Eastern
Fleet.

3. Keep C-in-C Eastern Fleet informed.

T.O.O. 0510Z/25

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

COPY NO. 27

TO: Troopers London for C.O.S.
Britman Washington for C.O.S.
Armindia
New Delhi
Mideast Cairo
Burmaray
Rangoon - pass MC CBN
Army Melbourne for C.O. (Group left out)

Defender Wellington
C. in C.E.F.
ACH Darwin
General Kandy
General MacArthur
(Britman please pass)
IMPCON Durban

FROM: ABDACOM

No. OPX 12353 of 25th February, 1942.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MOST IMMEDIATE.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE

NOV 7 1973

Instructions have been received for the dispersal of ABDACOM Headquarters. It will cease to operate from 0430 hours GMT 25th February. British forces will be under operational control of the respective Dutch Commanders from that hour. Commanders of British forces in JAVA will be Army Maj-Gen. SITWELL, Air. AVMMALTBY, and Commodore COLLINS remains CCF. Senior British Naval Officer will be Rear Admiral PALLISER who remains on Admiral HELFRICH's staff. Each of the above officers has been authorised to communicate direct with his own Ministry. As the Senior Officer AVH Maltby will be the channel of communication on questions of main policy affecting more than one service and in such matters has been authorised to communicate with Chiefs of Staff London. Telegraphic addresses, Maj.-Gen. SITWELL, BRITGEN, JAVA; AVH MALTBY, BRITAIR, JAVA; Rear-Admiral PALLISER, BRITADMIRAL, JAVA; Commodore COLLINS remains BRITNAVY, BATAVIA.

T.O.C. 0100/25

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

COPY NO. 22

To: British Army Staff,
Washington for
Combined Chiefs of Staff,
War Office, London for
Chiefs of Staff,
G.H.Q. INDIA for Viceroy

From: ABDACOM, BATAVIA

No. 02418 of 25th February, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-12-73
BY RT. DATE **NOV** 7 1973

IMMEDIATE

General Wavell to-day discussed with Governor General text of draft communique as in your D.B.A. 25 of 23/2. Governor General agreed with text, he strongly urged that issue of communique should NOT be delayed longer than strictly necessary. To hold it until staff had arrived at destination (see your D.B.A. 26) would involve delay of about a week and in light of conditions here and to allay rumours this most undesirable.

He requested that announcement should be allowed to appear in local press morning 27th repeat 27th local time.

General Wavell agreed and it will be made at that time. General Wavell considers that the question of safe transit of staff will be adequately covered as they should by then be well out to sea. Censorship will be applied here to prevent news leaving the island and NO broadcast will be allowed until after it has been broadcast from LONDON.

Restricted Distribution

U.S. Chiefs of Staff


✓
COPY NO. 27

To: British Army Staff,
Washington
(Please pass to
General MacArthur)

From: ABDACOM

No. 02397 of 25th February, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973


IMPORTANT

For MACARTHUR from WAVELL.

You presumably have been informed of
decision to dissolve ABDA Headquarters which is
being put into effect to-day.

I deeply regret having been unable to
maintain area or assist your gallant defence but
I think we have struck enemy air forces and
shipping some heavy blows.

All good luck to you and I hope we may
meet some time.

Restricted Distribution

U.S. Chiefs of Staff

COPY NO. 26

To: TROOPERS B.A.D. Washington,
Army Melbourne,
Burma Army,
Armidia,
Defender Wellington,
C-in-C East Indies,
ACH Darwin.

From: ABDACOM

No: 02328 dated 25th February, 1942.

IMMEDIATE

Intelligence No. 24

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE

NOV 7 1973

80 to 100 ships various unspecified types reported to Jolo 20/2. Recce aircraft shot down in Macassar Strait at about 02° South 0716Z/24 reported Fleet to northward. 7 transports seen at Macassar 0342Z/24 two definitely sunk by bombing. One light cruiser, 7 destroyers, 6 transports, 4 submarines in position 06° 33' South 117° 45' East at 0330Z/24. This party had already been attacked by submarine which sank one, probably sank another.

2. Assumptions. Transports seen are troopships. Fleet reported by aircraft came from Jolo.

3. Conclusions. Landing party originally about one Regiment can arrive Bali dawn 25/2 followed possibly by one more Regiment, main body at least two Divisions could be off Central Java dawn 27/2.

4. Ships at Muntok unchanged or slightly increased. 5 unescorted merchant vessels sighted West of Pontianak 0600Z/24.

5. Estimate of enemy plan as in my No.191(1) para. 5 tentative timing as above.

T.O.O. 1725/24

Advance copies to AGWAR and OPNAV

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

COPY NO. 27

TO: British Army Staff, Washington,
G.H.Q. India
G.H.Q. Burma

FROM: ABDACOM

No. 02381 of 25th February, 1942.

~~SECRET~~
IMMEDIATE.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

Closing down CPX Army M/T services 1030
GMT 25 February.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

COPY NO. 27

To: Washington for C.C.O.S.
London for C.O.S.

From: ABDACOM Batavia

NO: 02253 of 24 February, 1942.

~~TOP SECRET~~
IMMEDIATE

C.C.O.S. 21

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-78
BY RT, DATE

NOV 7 1973

It is now confirmed that enemy has landed in Dutch Timor near Koepang and also in Portuguese Timor.

2. I have therefore given ACHDARWIN authority to do what may be possible to evacuate Australian and Dutch Troops from Portuguese Timor.

3. Staff conversations regarding their relief by Portuguese troops are now academic and I have broken them off.

4. Will endeavour to get Major Nogueira to Colombo.

5. Portuguese Government will NO doubt decide whether to turn back their reinforcements or let them proceed.

T.O.O. 0420Z/24

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

49

COPY NO. 27

TO: War Office London
British Army Staff Washington
Army Melbourne

FROM: ABDACOM

No. OPX 02284 of 24th February, 1942.

~~TOP SECRET~~
IMMEDIATE.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE

NOV 7 1973

Personal for DMI War Office, DMI War Department,
DMI Melbourne.

Special sources indicate a new force arriving
Bali morning 25th February. Composition at least one
cruiser, five destroyers, six transports, eleven
unidentified units. Comment one cruiser, four
destroyers, three transports which left Macassar
afternoon 23rd February could form part of this force.

2. Staff Officer associated with third airborne
division who arrived Kuching before attack on
Palembang now at latter place. Also air squadron
associated on same occasion with third airborne
division. Comment indicates possibility of airborne
attack on Java originating from Palembang.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

COPY NO. 26

To: Troopers London
B.A.D. Washington
Army Melbourne
Armindia
Burmarry
C-in-C E.I.
Defender Wellington
ACHDARWIN

From: ABDACOM

No: 02197 23 February, 1942.

~~SECRET~~
IMPORTANT

Intelligence No. 23

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE NOV 7 1973

Aerodromes in Sumatra, Palembang I in use by 40 aircraft, Palembang II not in use and obstructed, Lahat not reconnoitred thought not in use.

2. Shipping at Muntok four less than yesterday possibly accounted for by movement up river. This traffic seen going on in morning but may have been interrupted later by ship sinking across river. Anambas force as before.

3. Shipping at Bali. No further report from Soembawa.

4. Thirteen warships, five transports at Macassar, 22nd February.

5. Enemy broadcast admits landing Portuguese Timor claims self defence and that troops will be withdrawn from Portuguese territory as soon as allies expelled.

6. Comparative inactivity may well be due to preparations for next step with which force at Macassar probably connected. Unable yet asses probable timing.

T.O.O. 1705/23

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION
U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

MOST IMMEDIATE.

MESSAGE.

IN.

Time. 0655

Date. 23/2

FROM. ABDACOM

T.O.O.
Batavia 0540Z/
23.

TO Combined C O S War Office.
British Army Staff, Washington,
for Combined C O S.

CIPHER.

Number. 02132 of 23/2.

CCOS 20.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

Incontinuation my CCOS 19.

I agree with Governor General's reason for early dispersal of ABDACOM. Am therefore arranging provisionally to close this Headquarters at 0900 hrs 25/2 and disperse mainly to COLOMBO. As this will become known locally directly we move if NOT before, it is most urgent that form of statement referred to in paras. 4 and 5 of CCOS 19 should be settled and communicated to me at once, am arranging to leave senior officers with suitable staff in charge as follows. Brig. Sitwell in charge of four British and Australian Land Troops. Latter have also Brig. Blackburn to represent Australian interests. Commodore Collins in charge British Naval Forces. A.V.M. Maltby in charge R.A.F. The above will be under Operational Control of Dutch Commanders of their respective Services. A.V.M. Maltby as the senior will be the channel for communication on all Main Policy questions affecting British Forces in JAVA.

Restricted Circulation.

~~SECRET~~
U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

COPY NO. 70

TO: Troopers
Britman
Army Melbourne
Arindia
Burnarmy
ACH Darwin
Defender Wellington
C. in C.E.I.

FROM: ABDACOM

No. 02070 of 22nd February.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 147-73
EXPIR. DATE NOV 7 1973

IMPORTANT.

INTELLIGENCE NO. 22.

Enemy air strength has been displaced southward. RECCE combined with evidence of Darwin raid indicate probable heavy bomber distribution one squadron Bali, four Kendari, three Ambon, one Rabaul, with unknown number Palembang area. One additional squadron for each Bali, Kendari and Ambon very probably came from Balikpapan.

2. My No. 19 para. 4. Ships south of Muntok still there. Anambas Islands force (my No. 21 para. 3) also still in place less one transport and one tanker.

3. Report from Civil Officer Soembawa total of six ships approaching east north and west coasts early 22nd February.

4. Comment. In view of exposure to air attack presumed ships at Muntok being held for definite purpose in near future, possibly for re-embarkation part of Palembang force. Comment on Soembawa report reserved until facts confirmed.

T.O.C. 1700/22.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

MESSAGE

IN

IMMEDIATE

Received

From: ABDACOM

Time: 1730 hrs

To: Britmen Washington for Combined C O S. Date: 22 Feb

War Office for C O S.

Cipher

No: 02003 of 22 Feb. CCOS 18.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

One of the principle factors in Japanese success has been long range fighter which has enabled them to escort their bombers over distances quite impossible for us and thus to attack in daylight distant objectives also to attack at long range our aircraft on the ground frequently causing us severe loss.

We have NO means of retaliation.

Also our reinforcement problem has been greatly complicated by short range of our fighters.

Are we doing anything to develop long range type?

Restricted circulation.

~~J. [redacted]~~

U.S. Chiefs of Staffs

N
27
COPY NO. _____

To: Combined Chiefs of Staff,
Washington,
Chiefs of Staff, London

From: ABDACOM, Batavia

No. 01996 of 22nd February, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-12-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973


MOST IMMEDIATE

C.C.O.S. 17. Reference D.B.A. 19,
paragraphs 1 and 2.

In order to continue resistance in JAVA
to utmost additional fighters essential at once.
Am ordering LANGLEY at utmost speed to JAVA to
unload fighter aircraft. This may enable us to keep
going until arrival aircraft from INDOMITABLE but
in absence of continual and increasing flow of
fighters and bombers this is likely only to gain
certain time but is in accordance with your
instructions that every day is of value.

Restricted Distribution

U.S. Chiefs of Staff

N

COPY NO. 76

To: Troopers Britman
Army Melbourne
Armindia
Burmarmy
ACH Darwin
Defender Wellington
C. M. C. East Indies.

From: ABDACOM

No. 01962 21/2.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-75
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

IMPORTANT.

Intelligence No. 21.

1. My No. 20 only to London, Washington and Melbourne stated enemy landed dawn 20/2 South East of Koepang. No further information.
2. Convoy mentioned in my 19 paragraph 2 sighted today. Still no shipping at Bali.
3. Escort for Palembang expedition is still at Anambas Islands presumed waiting for another convoy. Includes 2 Mogami class, 1 Ratagi class, 1 Natori class, 2 large transports may be landing craft carriers, and 2 tankers.

T.O.O. 1845/21.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION plus
U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

COPY NO. 35

To: War Office, London;
British Army Staff, Washington;
Army Headquarters, Melbourne.

From: AEDACCM, Batavia.

Dated: 21st February, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE

NOV 7 1973

MOST IMMEDIATE.

No. 01867 of 21st February, 1942.
Intelligence No. 20.

Japanese landed from 6 transports about
2300Z/19 February south coast of Timor near Bacoen
12 miles south west of Koepang.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION, plus
U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

COPY NO. 76

TO: British Army Staff, Washington
for Combined C.C.S.
War Office, London, for C.C.S.

FROM: ABDACOM, Batavia

NO. 01864 of 21st February, 1942.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

C.C.O.S. 16.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE

NOV 7 1973

1. As result heavy losses yesterday fighter strength in Java now reduced to less than 40. Medium and dive bombers approx. 30, heavy bombers 10. Obvious that above force can only hope to fight for few more days at most. No more fighters can reach from east and consignment from INDOMITABLE cannot arrive in time. Reinforcements of heavy American bombers from India has been stopped from Washington and would in any case have been insufficient.

2. There are signs that Japanese are completing preparations for invasion of Java which obviously we can do little to prevent. Once Japanese are landed ground forces in Island can do little to check advance.

3. Situation of Imperial and American troops in Island as follows. There are approximately 6000 R.A.F. and R.A.A.F. personnel unarmed and surplus to fighting units and about 1400 American, these I am endeavouring to evacuate forthwith. There will remain approximately 3000 to 4000 R.A.F., 5500 British (squadron 3 ~~Group~~ indecipherable⁷, anti-aircraft units and miscellaneous) 3000 Australians (including one M.G. and one pioneer battalion) belonging 7th. Australian Division, about 700 Americans, (mostly artillery) and ABDA headquarters (about 250 officers 400 other ranks).

4. I am having stock taken of shipping available in Island should evacuation of above be ordered by you as from time when they can contribute nothing further

effective to defence. Doubtful whether shipping for full numbers is available in Island.

5. Immediate decisions required on following

- (a) Destination of Australian Divisions and Corps Headquarters.
- (b) Whether arrangements should be made to hold Dutch shipping for eventual evacuation as in paragraph 3 above. Dutch are willing to hold shipping if it is policy to evacuate, otherwise they are anxious to sail merchant shipping to Allied Ports for safety.
- (c) Policy regarding these Headquarters.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

COPY NO. 31

To: Troopers, London
D.A.D., Washington
Army Melbourne, Armindia,
Burnarmy, C. in C. East Indies,
Defender Wellington, ACH Darwin.

From: ABDACOM

Dated: February 20th, 1942.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 01808 20/2

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE

NOV 7 1973

INTELLIGENCE NO. 19

Enemy withdrew all ships from vicinity Bali daylight 20 February, presumably owing air attacks. Has landed force about one regiment and believed his fighters operating from aerodrome.

2. Convoy estimated seventeen ships includes two cruisers sailed south from vicinity Sindjai (Celebes) about 0700 /20. Destination could be either Bali or Timor.

3. Unconfirmed Dutch report landing west of (Dili?) early 20 Feb. Treat with reserve pending confirmation. Two cruisers observed south of Ator 1935/ 19 Feb. May have been part of escort for carrier and detached westward on news of our striking force off Bali.

4. Nineteen ships in river near Palembang. These include seven barges south of Muntok several in Banka Strait.

5. Comment. Possibly enemy plan

(A) Occupation of Koepang or Dili).

(B) Reinforcement of Bali and collection of small force at Oosthaven.

(C) Diversions at each end of Java.

(D) Main attack on North Central coast of Java.

Step (A) may be omitted and force for (D) not yet in sight. Possible that (B) has been delayed by results of our air attacks.

T.O.C. 1800Z/20

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

Advance copies sent to OPNAV and AGWAR.

49

COPY NO. 75

To: Troopers London
BRITMAN Washington
Army Melbourne
ARMINDIA
Burmaray
DEFENDER Wellington
C. in C. East Indies
ACH Darwin

From: ADDACOM

Dated: 20th February, 1942

HOT IMMEDIATE.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY NT, DATE

NOV 7 1973

Following is a repetition of my 1730/19.

Begins Secret. Intelligence No. 18. Enemy at
Bali landing N.E. and South of DENPASA from total of 3
ships and one landing craft carrier.

2. Attacks today on BULTENZORG and BANDOENG
indicate aerodrome in PALLIBANG area now in use.
3. Enemy occupies BANDJERMASIN but no activity
on aerodrome 18 Feb. Probable however that he will wish
to use this base before launching direct attack on Java.

T.O.O. 0540Z/20

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

COPY NO. 27

To: British Army Staff Washington
for Combined Chiefs of Staff
RPTD: War Office London for C.O.S.

From: ABDACOM

No. 01623 19th February, 1942.

IMMEDIATE

C.C.O.S. No. 14

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 147-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

Your DBA 17. I have always recommended that Burma should be under complete control India and still do so. Main reason given for inclusion ABDA Area was to maintain touch between Generalissimo and S.W. Pacific. Presume that with progress of events, Generalissimo's visit to India and conclusion of agreement there this reason no longer has same validity. Difficulty of visiting Burma from here increased by loss Sumatra. Recommend therefore that Burma revert to India. Have discussed question with Brett from point of view of operation American bomber force from Burma and he agrees with control by India.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

COPY NO. 27

TO: B.A.D. Washington

FROM: Admiralty

DATED: 19th February, 1942

IMMEDIATE.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

Following from Chiefs of Staff to General
WAVELL, No. (S.W.P.) 23. Repeated Joint Staff Mission.

Your 01581 dated 18th February.

Earliest date on which H.M.S. INDOMITABLE
could fly off to JAVA is 8th March. Decision whether
Hurricanes will be disembarked CEYLON instead will be
taken 3rd March at latest.

2. This telegram has been sent to ABDACOM.

T.O.C. 1316A/19

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

~~23~~
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COPY NO. 27

To: War Office
M.A. China, British Army Staff,
Washington,
Army Melbourne.

From: ABDACOM

No. 1494 18th February, 1942.

Tokyo broadcast 16/2 Lieut. Gens
Tsukada (Osamu) Chief of Staff to Terauchi. Muta-
guchi (Renya) wounded Singapore 10/2.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

COPY NO. 31

To: Troopers
Britman Washington
Army Melbourne
Armindia
Burmarmy
Defender Wellington
C-in-C E. Indies
Arch Darwin

From: ABDACOM

01567 of 18th February, 1942.

~~SECRET~~
MOST IMMEDIATE

Intelligence No. 17.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE

NOV 7 1973

Force of four cruisers, two transports
sighted 0110 2/18, last seen 0700 2/18, position
seven degrees thirty minutes south, 116 degrees 34
minutes east, making 15 knots course towards Bali.
Presumed for occupation aerodrome there.

T.O.O. 1540/18

Advance copies sent to OPNAV and AGWAR.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

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COPY NO. 29

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: War Office for C.O.S.
British Army Staff Washington
for Combined C.O.S.

From: ABDACOM.

No. 01581 18th February, 1942.

C.C.O.S. No. 13.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

Reference War Office 71398 MO 1 of 18/2 *

Am concerned at resolution E. Was counting on
fighter aircraft ex H.M.S. INDOMITABLE as essential
reinforcement for defence of Java. Had understood
they would arrive by end February. Can I have firm
date?

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF.

* Reference not received but has been
requested most immediately.

COPY NO. 27

To: Troopers
Britman Washington for OPNAV
C-in-C E.I. for C-in-C E.F.,
A.C.N.B.
N.Z.N.B.

From: ABDACOM

01365 of the 17th February, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE

NOV 7 1973

Following from M.A. Chungking.

Begins.

Chinese state they have confirmation

NISSIN and sister battleship commissioned 3rd Dec., 1941.

T.O.O. 1540/17

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

COPY NO. 28

To: British Army Staff, Washington
for Combined C.O.S.
War Office for C.O.S.

From: ABDACOM

Dated: 17th February, 1942.

MOST IMMEDIATE

C.C.O.S. 11

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE

NOV 7 1973

NO. 01322.

No intention of using INDOMITABLE as part
of striking force ABDA Area. Request she may proceed
at once with existing programme transporting Hurricanes.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF.

49

COPY NO. 9

To: War Office
British Army Staff Washington for OPNAV
and ACWAR CWR Melbourne (Army please pass)
Rptd: Defender Wellington Arminia Burmarry.

From: Abdacon.

Dated: 17th February, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 147-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

IMPORTANT

No. 01325.

Issue of standard censor stamp one of many measures required to bring all American British and Australian forces in N.E.I. to common standard of security. Stamps now being issued will be used by American Army and Naval units British Army and R.A.F. and Australian Army and R.A.A.F. while in N.E.I. stamps now with units will be retained for possible use elsewhere. New stamp consists three sets of two parallel lines length 30.8 MM enclosing two spaces depth 11.5 MM and 9.9 MM. In top space letters A. B. D. A. In middle space censor. Underneath bottom lines number of stamp 8 letters ABDA 5.0 MM high. Letters censor 4.0 MM high. Figures 5.5 MM high each stamp has individual flaw repeat flaw on record here. Sample imprints of stamps will be sent you earliest air opportunity.

Intelligence Staffs
U.S.

49

COPY NO. 22

To: British Army Staff, Washington
for C.C.O.S.
Rptd. War Office, London for C.O.S.

From: ABDACOM

Dated: 16th February, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE NOV 7 1973

~~MOSS~~
No. 01310.

C.C.O.S. 10. Reference your message DBA 14
dated 10/2.

In view of COMPIANZAC 1158Z/13 to COMHINCH it
appears undesirable to mine TORRES STRAIT.

If it is eventually (decided*) to proceed
with project mines will have to be provided by
AUSTRALIA. ABDA area could provide J2 Dutch
minelayers at short notice and H.M.S. ABDIEL later.

{Cipher office note:- *word in parentheses was not
transmitted.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

49

COPY NO. 26

To: Troopers, London
Britman, Washington
Army, Melbourne
Armindia
Burmarmy
C-in-C E. Indies
Defender, Wellington
Ach, Darwin.

From: ABDACOM

No. 01446 of 16th February,
1942.

IMPORTANT

Intelligence No. 16.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

My No. 15 last sentence. Evidence now available shows bombers came from KENDARI, flyingboats probably from AMBON.

2. Special sources indicate displacement southward of enemy air strength associated with increasing importance of KENDARI base. Comment. When established KENDARI with subsidiary bases at MACASSAR and BANDJER-MASIN will probably feed operations to South and South ? (1 corrupt group). AMBON principally reconnaissance base for BANDA and TIMOR Seas. Increasing enemy activity over islands in Southern chain indicates next step may not be long delayed.

T.O.O. 1755/17

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

49

COPY NO. 98

To: British Army Staff, Washington, for
Combined C.O.S.; War Office, London,
for C.O.S.

From: ABDACOM, Batavia.

NO: 01276 of 16th February 1942.


IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

C.C.O.S. 9

In the light of information received
today have ordered back to Darwin convoy which is
en route from Darwin to Koepang with one Australian
battalion, one battalion U.S. Artillery. Australia
informed.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. Chiefs of Staff

(49)

COPY NO. 27

TO: Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington
Rptd: Chiefs of Staff, London

FROM: ABDACOM.

DATED: 16th February, 1942.

MOST IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

No. 01316. 16/2

Reference DBA 15 Feb. 12th. Your 1931

part 2 (DBA 9) dated February 4th on receipt read
as follows:

Quote. United States carrier could be made available
for ferrying these fighters at any rate before return
of HMS Indomitable with next load of Hurricanes due
end of February. Unquote.

(Presume words not repeat not were omitted in transmis-
sion).

Assumed from foregoing that U.S. carrier could be used.
Nevertheless urgent need for fighters in this area and
difficulty of transportation makes it most important
to ship fly-off P-40's by carrier from the U.S.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

49

COPY NO. 35

TO: Troopers London
B.A.D. Washington
Army Melbourne
Armidia
Delhi
Burmarmy Rangoon
C. in C. East Indies
Colombo
Defendor Wellington
ACH Darwin

FROM: ABDACOM

No. 01315 of 16th February.

IMPORTANT.

INTELLIGENCE No. 15.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

Enemy attacked DJAMBI simultaneously with attack in PALEMBANG 15th February. Following aerodromes now available to enemy PALEMBANG 1, DJAMBI PALEMBANG 2 and LA'LAT last 2 not repeat not yet occupied. 30 heavy bombers and 30 fighters reported on P 1 16th February.

2. Darwin Koepang convoy sighted by flying boat 15th February bombed 16th February by three squadrons bombers one squadron flying boats. Further evidence excellent reconnaissance service and speed in mounting attacks. Presumed aircraft came from AIRON.

T.O.C. 2030/16

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

49

COPY NO. 25

To: Washington for Combined Chiefs of Staff.
London for Chiefs of Staff.
Prime Minister Australia.
Army Australia.

From: ABDACOM. No. 01226 of 15th February, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-78
BY RT. DATE

NOV 7 1973

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following just received from SINGAPORE.

" Owing to losses from enemy action, water, petrol, food and ammunition practically finished. Unable therefore to continue the fight any longer. All ranks have done their best and are grateful for your help. "

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

COPY NO. 22

TO: War Office for C.O.S.
British Army Staff, Washington
for C.C.O.S.

FROM: ABDACOM

No. 01257 of 15th February.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

C.C.O.S. 8.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

Reliably reported enemy captured PALEMBANG and aerodrome this morning from the sea by movements up river. Our airforce based on PALEMBANG II (40 miles S.W. of PALEMBANG) continue to put out maximum effort. Our naval forces may gain contact today north-west of BANKA. But above NOT likely to do more than delay and reduce scale of attack. There is now practically nothing to prevent enemy overrunning South SUMATRA since all available Dutch troops had been concentrated for defence PALEMBANG. After operating today our airforce at PALEMBANG II will be withdrawn to JAVA. Two ships containing squadron 3rd. HUSSARS one Australian Pioneer Battalion (less unit equipment), one Australian M.G. Battalion (less machine guns) just arrived COOTHAVEN. These cannot be unloaded in time for any useful action and have been diverted to DATAVIA.

2. Held conference with Governor-General Admiral HELFRICH and General TER POORTEN on above situation and outlined my views on defence of JAVA without Southern SUMATRA. See my C.C.O.S. 7. In particular discussed our air resources which are about 75 fighters, 40 medium bombers plus 20 Dutch Glen Martins, 14 American dive bombers and 20 American B-17s. The above figures will be reduced by today as casualties NOT yet known; reinforcements expected in next fortnight approximately 20 American fighters, 10 American dive bombers, 50 Hurricanes, 8 American B-17.

3. Governor-General stressed absolute necessity of defence of JAVA and provision of maximum reinforcements land, sea and air. He is making urgent representations to his government. He is under NO illusions as to difficulty of problem and effect that air attack on ports may have on entry of Australian Divisions.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S. C.O.S.

49

~~SECRET~~
COPY NO. 22

RECEIVED

From: ABDACOM, Batavia
To: British Army Staff, Washington.
Time: 1900 hours
Date: 14 February

NO: 01207 of 14th February, 1942. I M M E D I A T E

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

No suitable photographic aircraft and no photographic supplies in this area. As result impossible to obtain accurate information on enemy activity. Can you make available at least two photographic reconnaissance units as soon as possible.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

(Confirmation of repetition to London is being obtained.)

49

COPY NO. 22

RECEIVED

From: AEDACOM · Batavia

Time: 0825 hrs.

To: British Army Staff,
Washington.

Date: 14th February

NO. 01165 of 13th February, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DAT NOV 7 1973

For Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington.

Your 1931R/4 para. G. ☒ DEB 9

Request confirmation of date of return of
INDOMITABLE with next load of Hurricanes.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

(Confirmation of repetition to London is
being obtained.)

49

COPY NO. 22

NAVAL MESSAGE

T.O.O. 1037A/13

IN

Received: 13/2/42

Time: 1042

Addressed: ABDAFLOAT

REPEATED: B.A.D. Washington 245
Captain on Staff, Colombo

From: Admiralty N17e

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE

NOV 7 1973

Official communiques claim 7 Japanese
Cruisers sunk to date but in no instance has class
of ship been indicated. To facilitate assessment
of casualties and present strength of Japanese Fleet
your estimate class of all ships sunk or damaged to
date and in future would be appreciated.

T.O.O. 1037A/13

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

COPY NO. 26

To: Britman, Washington
for Combined Chiefs of
Staff,

Troopers for Chiefs
of Staff.

From: ABDACOM.

Dated: 13th February, 1942.

MOST IMMEDIATE
C.C.O.S. Y

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

Number 01156.

1. Unexpectedly rapid advance of enemy on Singapore and approach of escorted enemy convoy toward South Sumatra necessitates review of our plans for defence of N.E.I. in which South Sumatra plays most important part. Much already done there in improvement of aerodromes, anti aircraft and ground defence preparation of bomber and fighter forces. With more time and the arrival of 7th Australian Division earmarked for South Sumatra strong defence could be built up. But ground not yet fully prepared. By Naval and Air action we shall do utmost to delay and defeat this new move but land defence is weak and may not long withstand attack if it lands in strength. If Singapore falls enemy air and land forces will be available not only to attack Burma but also to reinforce southerly action.

2. Based on experience of unloading facilities here leading infantry brigade 7th Australian Division will not be operative until about March 8th, whole division March 21st. We shall probably know before bulk of division arrives whether we must change our present plans and divert it.

3. If Southern Sumatra is lost prolonged defence of Java becomes unlikely. Limited port facilities will be subject to air attack and disembarkation of reinforcements

(49)

could be badly interfered with. Garrison is weak for size of island. 6th Australian Division at present planned to reinforce Java but not effective before end of March. 7th Australian Division if diverted from South Sumatra would be available for Java on approximate dates of second paragraph.

4. From air aspect defence of Java is a hard matter; without Southern Sumatra it is formidable. Fighter defence over next 3 weeks amounts to 1 squadron Dutch Buffaloes, 2 squadrons P.40's and 3 Hurricane squadrons now in Sumatra. Medium bombers now number about 40 modern aircraft. Considerable losses in aircraft must be expected during next few days in defence of Sumatra. Heavy bombers now Java about 17 B.17's and 6 L.B.'s. Even with air reinforcements in view, it is likely that our air forces will waste more quickly than they can be replaced.

In Java we should be operating from limited number of airfields without depth. Our limited air force is not engaged merely in a straight duel with enemy air force. It has also to attack enemy shipping and is unable to protect our own.

5. If Singapore goes Malacca Straits are open to Japanese but this does not directly affect the Java and South Sumatra problem. If South Sumatra goes we lose the Sunda Straits which lead to Batavia. Sourabaya has already suffered from air attack. Only port on south coast of Java is Tjilatjap of very limited capacity. Naval forces are already forced to use this as base which further reduces its capacity for reinforcements. Naval view is that loss of South Sumatra would render the reinforcement and maintenance of Java almost impossible.

6. It is clear that retention of South Sumatra essential for successful defence of Java. With resources available we shall do our best to hold off attack until reinforcements arrive. The situation does not at present demand change in plans but it may be forced on us. If that were so the

destination of the Australian Corps would be first consideration for it contains the great majority of fully-trained and equipped Australian troops.

7. From purely strategic aspect there are advantages in diverting 1 or both divisions to Burma or Australia. But any abandonment of the Dutch East Indies would obviously have most serious moral and political repercussions. We must reinforce Sumatra until it is clearly useless to do so. Subsequent reinforcement of Java would probably be unprofitable.

8. We shall continue with present plans until the situation enforces change. This message gives warning of serious change in situation which may shortly arise necessitating complete reorientation of plans.

DISTRIBUTION

Restricted
U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

COPY NO. 28

To: Troopers,
Britman,
Army, Melbourne,
Defender, Wellington,
Burmarmy,
ACH Darwin,
Armindia
C. in C. East Indies.

From: ABDACOM.

Dated: 11th February, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

IMPORTANT

Number 01063, dated 11th February.

1. Balikpapan convoy has moved but no sign of it at Macassar morning 10th February.
2. Anambas Island force increased to 14 warships and 30 small boats. Indications some concentration air strength Kuching including possibly part airborne division mentioned by my number 1, paragraph 3; also an air group from Malaya and unidentified air command. Comment Kuching and Sinkawana well placed for support Banka operation.
3. Photographs 9th February show three probable submarines at Penang.

T.O.O. 2345/11

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION
J.I.C.

(49)

COPY NO. 76

TO: Troopers
BRITMAN Washington
Army Melbourne
Defender Wellington
BURMARMY
General Singapore
ACH Darwin
Arrindia
C in C.E.I.

FROM: ABDACOM

No. 01014 of 10th February.

IMPORTANT.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

Intelligence No. 9.

Enemy landed 9th February at MACASSAR and points on south and east coasts now in control of town. Thorough demolition confirmed.

2. ANAMBAS ISLAND force now known to be base for enemy force ordered to be North of BANKA and BILLITON on 13th February. (Note. These two names not completely recovered but considered most probable.)

3. Analysis enemy air activity indicates one if not two carriers operating area FLORES Sea BANDA Sea. One of these probably correct read possibly hit of SINDJAI 9th February.

T.O.O. 1800/10

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S. C.O.S.
J.I.C.

(49)

COPY NO. 25

TO: A.C.N.S.
OPNAV
N.Z.N.B.
C. in C.E.F.
C. in C.E.I.
ADMIRALTY

FROM: ABDACOM

No. 00975 of 10th February

IMMEDIATE.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 147-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

A bomber aircraft en route Darwin - Malang
was attacked by 3 Japanese fighters at 1000/9 in a
position 280 degrees Darwin 200 miles. The fighters
may have come from an aircraft carrier based on
AMBOH and operating in the BANDA SEA or NORTHERN
TIMOR SEA.

T.O.O. 1000/10

Advance copies sent to Code Room and D.O.O.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

J.I.C.
U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

COPY NO. 26

NAVAL MESSAGE

T.O.O 2005/7

Received: 10/2/42

Time : 0825

IN

Addressed: OPNAV, pass to
AGNA, &
BRITMAN for
Combined COS
COH 16 pass to
MACARTHUR

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE

NOV 7 1973

From : ABDACOM

1. Reference para. 1 INFO 12. MARBLEHEAD and HOUSTON have reached harbour.
2. AMBON: reported that island almost entirely in enemy hands although some guerilla fighting continues.
3. Nine B-17s took off to attack enemy warships reported south of Celebes but failed to find target. Yesterday an enemy bomber was shot down by P-40s enroute Surabaya from Darwin.
4. Yesterday there were minor air attacks on Billiton and shipping at Makassar and Koepong causing negligible damage. Heavier attack by bombers and fighters on Palembang one caused slight damage to six aircraft on the ground. Ten Hurricanes took off to intercept. Three are missing. One enemy fighter damaged. Today seven bombers escorted by fighters attacked docks at Surabaya and Catalinas on water. No report of damage.

T.O.O. 2005/7

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF
J.I.C.

COPY NO. 25

To: British Army Staff,
Washington; for Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

Repeated: War Office, London, for
Chiefs of Staff.

From: C. in C.S.W. Pacific,
Batavia.

Dated: 9th February, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE

NOV 7 1973

IMMEDIATE

No. 00945.

Reference your DBA 9 of 4th February.

Request U.S. carrier bring P.40s to
N.E.I. from America. Pilots and mechanics to be on
board. Aeroplanes to fly off carrier. Mechanics
land either in N.E.I. or Australia. Athens will
bring crated aircraft. Langley is being used to
bring assembled P.40s from Australia. Hammondsport
should return to U.S.

T.O.O.

DISTRIBUTION:

Restricted, plus
U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

COPY NO. 15

To: War Office, London, for
Chiefs of Staff; British
Army Staff, Washington,
for Combined Chiefs of
Staff.

From: C. in C. S.W. Pacific,
Batavia.

Dated: 9th February, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

IMMEDIATE

No. 00961 of 10th February, 1942.

General Wavell goes Singapore by air
tonight. Return probably February 11th.

DISTRIBUTION:

Restricted plus
U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY NT, DATE NOV 7 1973

From: Abdacon, Batavia

To: All concerned. Colombo pass to
C. in C. E.F. area.

Immediate

No: 60799 of 5th. February 1942.

Received
2315 hrs
5 Feb. Cipher

Reference para. 1 of Information No. 18, damage to U.S.S. Marblehead and Houston confirmed as considerable and many casualties. Ships were part of Dutch-American force taking position for attack into Makassar strait.

2. In three ships sunk or beached result air attack February 2nd. and 3rd. Banks area following equipment (~~xxxx~~ interalia) lost. Ten heavy, 8 light A.A. guns, considerable quantity A.A. ammunition and general D.F. equipment, all for Palembang and Pakenbaroe.

3. Thirteen P.40's being ferried from Darwin to Sourabaya, were attacked by unspecified number of zero fighters and 31 bombers while refuelling at Bali, 8 took off and of these one destroyed, one missing. Remaining five destroyed on ground. Only one pilot lost. At least three enemy destroyed.

4. Sourabaya attacked today by 22 bombers, considerable damage to naval base and unspecified number of Catalinas destroyed.

5. Yesterday express train wrecked carrying British A.A. personnel Priok (Batavia) to Sourabaya, 12 including 3 officers, killed, 52 injured.

6. At least one carrier reported at Ambon by air reconnaissance reporting Catalinas shot down.

7. Samarinda. Dutch troops after making contact with enemy recce. Sanga Sanga withdrew and took up position along Kahakam river (north west of Samarinda).

Distribution

Restricted circulation
J.I.C.
U.S. Chiefs of Staff

47

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 14722
BY RT. DATE

NOV 7 1973

From: ABDACOM.

To: All concerned.

No. 00757 of 4 Feb.

IN
Received.
Time. 0840 hrs.
Date. 5 Feb.

CIPHER.

Information No. 12, to 1200Z/4,

1. U.S.A. ships MARBLEHEAD and HOUSTON were damaged by air attack this morning East of MADURA Island. The extent of the damage is NOT yet known but is considerable and both ships are proceeding to harbour.

2. Yesterday BALAI (near ASAHAN in SUMATRA) was bombed and slight damage caused to railway station while further attack was made on KOTA BAROE (LAUET Island) and town is in flames.

3. Reference para. 2 of Information No. 11, in addition to damage previously reported, the (erecting) shop at MAOSPATI (MADIOEN) and 10 aircraft were damaged. At SOURABAYA several houses were destroyed and 31 civilians killed. (Number 11) 9 Dutch 1 American fighters, 4 B17's and 12 Naval aircraft on ground or water. Enemy losses: 3 certain, (1 by anti-aircraft) plus 4 possible.

4. A corrupt message received at Dutch H.Q. on 3 Feb. from AMBONG indicated that resistance was continuing.

Restricted circulation

J.I.C.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

47

COPY NO. 24

To: War Office for Chiefs of Staff.
BRITMAN WASHINGTON for Combined
Chiefs of Staff,
(pass AGWAR and OPNAV).
MELBOURNE for Chiefs of Staff.
DEFENDER WELLINGTON.
BURMAH RANGOON.
GENERAL SINGAPORE.
COMD. PHILIPPINES.
MACHIN.
F.O.J., C.Z.M.
C. in C., A.F.

From: ABDACOM

No. 00684 of 2nd February, 1942.

INFORMATION No. 10 to 12002/2.

1. Last night targets at BALIKPAPAN were attacked by three L.B.30's. One aircraft sank medium sized transport outside the harbour, other two failed to find shipping targets and bombed BALIKPAPAN causing large fires. Today 7-B 17's sank one transport and probably another in same area. 4 Cruisers 17 transports and 8 flying boats were seen in area. All aircraft returned safely.
2. Some further attacks yesterday on shipping in BANKA Straits and various places on BANKA Island. Particulars lacking but believed ineffective. Otherwise enemy air activity negligible. An enemy aircraft was shot down by Dutch reconnaissance machine patrolling BALIKPAPAN area.
3. Weather conditions make air operations speculative for both sides.
4. No news from AMBON.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION plus
U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF.
J.I.C.

49

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE

From: ABDACOM.

IN
Received.
Time. 0549
Date. 2/2/42.

To : War Office for Chiefs of Staff;
British Army Staff, WASHINGTON for
Combined Chiefs of Staff, pass AGWAR
and OPNAV; MELBOURNE for Chiefs of Staff;
Defender WELLINGTON; Burmarmy; General,
SINGAPORE; Commander PHILIPPINES; MACHIN;
Flag Officer, JAVA; C.Z.M.; C.-in-C.
Asiatic Fleet.

CIPHER.

No : 00653 1 Feb.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 147-73
BY RT, DATE NOV 7 1973

Information No. 9, to 1200Z/1. Para.1.

1. BALIKPAPAN. Enemy have reached point 20 kilometres south east of SAMARINDA. All Dutch aircraft removed from SAMARINDA II but believed that aerodrome not yet demolished. Tin mines at BAIKHA and BILLITON were partially put out of action.

2. Yesterday enemy aircraft attacked shipping in LIANTOK road (BAIKHA) and hit one K.P.M. ship which had to be beached. Today attacks were made on (a) shipping near KOEPANG by 10 bombers and fighters without result and PENFOEI aerodrome was ineffectively attacked. (b) WAINGAPOE (SOEMBA Island) by 18 fighters and bombers. NO Military damage.

Restricted circulation.

J.I.C.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

IMMEDIATE

MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

From: ABDACOM.

IN
Received.
Time. 2230 hrs.
Date. 31 Jan.

To: War Office for Chiefs of Staff;
British Army Staff, WASHINGTON for
Combined Chiefs of Staff, pass AGWAR CIPHER.
and OPNAV; MELBOURNE for Chiefs of Staff;
Defender WELLINGTON; Burnarmy; General.
SINGAPORE; Commander PHILIPPINES; LACHIN;
Flag Officer, JAVA; C.Z.M.; C-in-C.
Asiatic Fleet.

No. 00606 of 31 Jan.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

INFORMATION No. 8, to 1200Z 31 Jan.

1. ALBON. O.C. reported attack on all sides, heavy bombardment by naval guns and bombing by aircraft. Aerodrome and wireless telegraphy stations demolished and communications now cut.

2. BALIKPAPAN. Enemy advancing towards SAMARINDA and have reached SOENGEI TIREN (31 kilometres South of SAMARINDA).

3. 6 B.17's left MALANG today to attack BALIKPAPAN but bad weather obscured the target. One enemy fighter was shot down. All our aircraft returned.

4. Jan. 30 light scale air attack on SABANG, landing ground in BORNEO and a wireless telegraphy station in South East CELEBES caused little damage. 7 enemy fighters attacked PENFOEI aerodrome (KOBANG) and one Hudson was destroyed on the ground. Qantas flying boat lost in area approximate time of attack but NOT known if due to enemy action.

Restricted circulation.

J.I.C.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

From: ABDACOM JAVA

Time: 12 2230

To : ALL CONCERNED

Date: 30 Jan 42

No. : 00559 of 30 Jan 42.

CIPHER.

IMMEDIATE.

Communique AMBON. (Information No.7 to 1200Z/30.)

3 cruisers, 6 destroyers and 4 transports appeared off the island this morning, and after a preliminary air attack 13 bombers and fighters, landings started. NO further news. Enemy air activity 29th negligible.

Ref para 2c of Information No.6, b-17's dropped a number of 100 lb bombs on KUANTAN aerodrome. Many fires were started. All aircraft returned safely.

N.W.BORNEO. Air recce sighted enemy moved up KAPOESE river in small boats. Dutch naval aircraft raide with MG's. NO reports from land forces.

Restricted circulation - J.I.C., U.S.Chiefs of Staff.

47

TO: All concerned,

FROM: ABDACOM.

IMMEDIATE.DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973No. 0054/4? Dated: 29/1
(?Information No. 6)

The enemy have landed BUTONG Island
S.E. of CELEBES.

2. Yesterday 3 B 17's from Palembang
attacked the aerodromes at KUALA LUMPUR. All returned
safely but bad visibility prevented observation of
results. To-day's attacks were carried out as
follows:-

(a) On shipping at KENDARI by one LB 30 without
observed results.

(b) On shipping at BALIKPAPAN by 4 B 17's. No
hits obtained. 8 enemy fighters shot down, 1
B-17 destroyed.

(c) By 4 B 17's on KUANTAN aerodrome, No
report yet available.

3. 2 Dutch fighters destroyed on ground at
SAMARINDA, there little damage was caused in general
air attacks yesterday.

4. N.W. BORNEO. MEMPAWAN (50 kilometres South of
SINGKAWAK) was occupied yesterday by enemy.
PONTIANAK was bombed, little damage.

5. Ref. para. 2 of information No. 5, orders
reached Hudsons too late to attack carrier yester-
day. It has NOT since been sighted.

6. 22 enemy ships sighted to-day in MOLUCCA
Straits, steering 160 degrees. Destination possible
AMBON. Another convey expected in same position
30 Jan. destination possible KENDARI.

(Original received indecipherable)

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

J.I.C.
U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

IMMEDIATE

~~**SECRET**~~

FROM. ABDACOL, Batavia.

Received. 0247

Date. 29/1.

CIPHER.

- TO. War Office, for Chiefs of Staff,
British Army Staff, Washington
for Combined Chiefs of Staff,
pass AGWAR and OPNAV,
Melbourne for Chiefs of Staff,
Wellington, Burma, Singapore,
Commander Philippines, Machin,
P.O.J., C.Z.H., C in C A.F.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE

NOV 7 1973

No. 00465 of 28/1.

Information Number 5 to 1200Z/28.

1. All Hurricanes from Indomitable reported landed safely.
2. Aircraft Carrier reported off LENDARI. Hudsons from KOEPANG ordered to attack. No news.
3. Following are main enemy air attacks Jan. 27th.
 - (A). BANDJERMASIN by 6 fighters.
7 Glenn Martins destroyed 2 damaged.
 - (B). ENHAIHAVEN. (PADANG) by 7 bombers. 2 vessels and several barges sunk considerable damage to godowns and offices.
4. N.W. BORNEO. Enemy landing Jan. 27th. Pemang proceeded.
Combined N.E.I. and British-Indian force out flanked from KUCHING and forced to withdraw. SINGKUNWANG II aerodrome in enemy hands.
5. Submarine K 18 reached base safely (See Information No. 3 para. 1)

Time of Origin 21 hrs.

Restricted Circulation J.I.C.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

IMMEDIATE

~~**TOP SECRET**~~

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

MESSAGE.

From: ABDACOM.
To: All concerned.
00425 of 27 Jan.

IN.
Received.
Time. 0112 hrs.
Date. 28 Jan.
CIPHER.

Information summary No. 4. T.O.O. 1299Z/27.

5 B-17s attacked enemy shipping BALIKPAPAN today. 1 large transport was left sinking, another on fire while a cruiser was straddled. 2 enemy fighters destroyed, 1 damaged. Our aircraft returned safely. Also sighted in harbour were 6 destroyers and 15 other vessels.

Para. 2. 2 U.S. bombers from JAVA successfully delivered quarter million (250,000) rounds S.A.A. to DEL MONTE (MINDANAO) and returned to DARWIN with 43 key personnel.

Restricted circulation

J.I.C.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

7
X

IMMEDIATE

MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

IN

24

From: ABDACOM BATAVIA.
To: War Office for C.O.S.
Washington for C.C.O.S.
pass to AGWAR and OPNAV
Melbourne for C.O.S.
Wellington
Burma
Singapore
Comd Phillipines.
F.O.J. C.Z.H. C in C A F

Received
Time 1950
Date 26/1

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY NT, DATE NOV 7 1973

No. 00381 of Jan 26.

Information No 3 to 1200 Z/26.

1. Dutch submarine K.18 reported having made successful attacks on cruiser and destroyer Macassar Strait. Damaged by depth charges unable submerge proceeding base own steam.

2. Yesterday air attacks made on Samarinda 11 by total 81 aircraft. On Halong (Ambon) by 9 on Namlea by 24. At Samarinda direct hit on operations room severed all communications, runway hit but three quarters serviceable. NO damage to our aircraft, bombers away attacking convoy as reported para 1(d) in Information 2. At Halong damage to buildings and large fires started.

3. Today's attacks were made by enemy fighters on aerodromes at Parepare, Macassar, Bima, Koepang, Dilli, Ambon, Namlea. Damage so far reported. Bima petrol depot destroyed. Namlea one Hudson and Ambon three Hudsons destroyed.

4. B.17 reported missing para 1(c) Information 2 now safe.

J.S.M. (30).

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION
J.I.C.
U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

Mr. H. D. Wall

From: Abdacon

To : War Office, London, for Chiefs of Staff,
British Army staff, Washington, for Combined C.O.S.,
pass Agwar and Opnav,
C.O.S. Australia, Melbourne, for C.O.S.,
C.O.C. New Zealand Military Forces, Wellington,
C.O.C. Army in Burma, Rangoon,
C.O.C. Malaya, Singapore,
Commander, Philippines,
C in C A.P.

IMMEDIATE

Received
2220 hrs
25 Jan

Information No. 2 to/1200Z/25.

Originator's number: 00347 25 January.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO 14723
BY RT, DATE NOV 7 1973

1. Further attacks made convoy Makassar Strait.

(a) By U.S. submarine Sturgeon night 22/23, one large cruiser, aircraft carrier hit and believed sunk.

(b) Yesterday by Dutch bombers from Samarinda II. One large transport capsized. Direct hits on one destroyer one transport.

(c) Today by 3 B.17s from Malang. One large transport sunk in river at Balikpapan. One direct hit cruiser outside harbour. Full reports not yet received. One B.17 missing, 3 crash landed in east Java.

(d) Today by Dutch bombers from Samarinda II. Total 4 direct hits on 2 cruisers and one transport. One Dutch bomber shot down.

2. Fuller report reference night attack on convoy by American destroyers (see information No. 1). Action lasted over one hour. Forty eight torpedoes fired, 5 known hits. Many gun hits close range enemy destroyers and transports. Total damage impossible to estimate. Our only damage one shell deckhouse destroyer Ford, 4 wounded.

(3) U.S. and Australian A/S units have sunk one large enemy submarine probably one small off Darwin.

(4) Enemy landed Balikpapan night 23/24 January. Enemy landed 24th. January near Kendari, garrison in action. Believe aerodrome still our hands.

(5) Several attacks last few days by enemy aircraft shipping west coast Sumatra. One steamer containing internees sunk.

(6) Samarinda II again attacked yesterday afternoon 3 enemy fighters. Three bombers burnt out on ground. Two enemy aircraft shot down by light A/A, 1 by Dutch fighters. Two of our fighters missing.

(7) Thirty six mixed enemy bombers/fighters attacked

Sheet Two Information No. 2. 25th. January

Ambon yesterday. Considerable damage barracks. Presence of carrier indicated.

(8) Single enemy aircraft attacked Manlea, Lawcei, Sorong and Manorivari in Eastern Archipelago. Little damage done.

Information No. 2 ends. Propose to issue communiques as necessary based on these information reports about 24 hours later. This should ensure recipients of reports receiving news first.

J.S.M. (30)

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION plus
J.I.C.
U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~
IMMEDIATE.

MESSAGE

IN

Received
Time 01c8
Date 25/1

19

From ABDACOM BATAVIA.

To War Office for Chiefs of Staff
British Army Staff Washington for C.O.S.
pass to OPNAV and AGWAR.
Melbourne for C.O.S.
Wellington
Burma
Singapore
Comd. Philippines (Washington pass)

No. 00320 of Jan 24.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE NOV 7 1973

Propose to start periodical perhaps daily information
telegrams to cover operations which would NOT be covered by
normal Sitreps from Burma Singapore and P.I. Addressees will be
same as for this telegram. Will Washington arrange that AGWAR
and OPNAV always receive immediate copies. If desired
Washington pass to Ottawa. Reports will be sent secret. NO
nil reports. Intelligence sent separately.

Following is first of series.

Information No. One to 1200Z/24.

Three attacks made on enemy convoy MACASSAR STRAIT:

One by Dutch bombers from SAMARINDA 11 yesterday evening.
Total 12 direct hits on 8 Warships and transports. NO aircraft
lost.

Two by cruiser MARBLEHEAD and five Destroyers last night.

Five or six transports sunk NO loss to ourselves.

Three by seven B17's from MALANG dawn today. One transport
sunk one on fire. Five attacking enemy fighters shot down
NO loss to ourselves.

Para. 2. During air attack today on SAMARINDA 11 two
enemy aircraft shot down by Dutch fighters one by A/A for
loss of one Buffalo and one civil aircraft shot down taking off.

G Ops 4
G Ops USWD 2 (one for AGWAR)
J S M 15
Naval Signals 1 (pass to Opnav)

Restrepo
+ J.I.C.
U.S. C.O.S.