

1 Pakistan, despite all the stories you have heard  
2 about Mr. Pianczynski having done it, our Ambassador from Poland,  
3 Pakistan was the country that I used -- this was my decision,  
4 not Kissinger's -- he carried it out greatly -- as the bridge  
5 to China. I had developed over the years, over 20 years, a  
6 very close association with major Pakistani leaders and with  
7 President Yahya. I told him that we felt that it was im-  
8 portant that the United States have a contact, that I was  
9 willing to send somebody, and he made a state visit to  
10 China and as a result of that state visit and as a result of  
11 that state visit to China Yahya made, we received a message  
12 that they would receive somebody on a secret basis to discuss  
13 our relationship and a possible presidential visit to China.  
14 This was through Pakistan and so we felt great obligation  
15 to the Pakistani for having done that.

16 Now let's see what the other parts of this puzzle  
17 are because this is sort of a five-legged stool. You have a  
18 situation where the Russians were supporting India. Really  
19 nobody was supporting Pakistan because there was an embargo  
20 on the shipment of arms, as you recall, to Pakistan, but we  
21 were giving moral support to them and also we gave to  
22 the Chinese an assurance privately that if India jumped  
23 Pakistan and China decided to take on the Indians that we  
24 would support them.

As I say, there was much criticism of the fact that we

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1 saved Pakistan at the cost of alienating India.

2 I shall not forget, for example, an editorial -- I  
3 think it was in the New York Times, as a matter of fact --  
4 which said this is a silly foreign policy. After all, there  
5 are only 90 million Pakistani and there are 500 million Indians.  
6 Why aren't we on the side of India.

7 You see, gentlemen, it doesn't make that much  
8 difference. That isn't what matters. Maybe there are only  
9 two million Israelis and maybe there are a hundred million  
10 Arabs, but you don't make policy on the basis of how many  
11 people; it is a question of who is right and what is right and  
12 the right of a small nation to exist, as well as a big one.

13 I have digressed. I will get to your question be-  
14 cause I know you have more.

15 Then what happened was as a result of this criticism  
16 of course I guess the press was making its usual efforts to  
17 get the story -- a shocking development occurred. What it  
18 involved was, and this is the one instance where I did read  
19 a Jack Anderson column. In the Jack Anderson column there  
20 appeared verbatim the discussions that had taken place where  
21 we made the decision with regard to supporting Pakistan as  
22 against India.

23 Kissinger came in, and he is quite an emotional man  
24 at times, and this time he was practically on the ceiling.  
25 He said, this will jeopardize our relations with the Pakistanis,  
it will jeopardize our relations with the Indians -- I mean with

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1 the Chinese and the trip may blow -- you won't go. We have  
2 got to find out how this is leaking out.  
3

4 Well, I put the burden right back on him and I  
5 got Ehrlichman in, too, and I said, now, look at this; Henry  
6 tells me that this is verbatim from a meeting of what is  
7 called the WSAG, the Washington Special Action Group, which  
8 takes up matters, any kind of a crisis; it is verbatim of the  
9 notes, so therefore it had to be somebody who was there and  
10 that meant somebody very much on the inside. Kissinger  
11 thought it was somebody at State because before he became  
12 Secretary of State he thought the State Department was all  
13 bad. It is different if you have the job yourself.

14 I didn't know, but I said to Ehrlichman, I said,  
15 "We have to find out." It was here that the so-called  
16 Plumbers did a remarkable job and despite the terribly wrong  
17 and stupid things they did in the Watergate thing, they  
18 should be well remembered for what they did here.

19 They studied this situation, and when I say "they",  
20 I suppose this was Hunt and Liddy and that crowd, and  
21 Ehrlichman acting as chief man, and what they found -- they  
22 went down every name of the people who were at the meeting  
23 that Anderson had published and they found that only one  
24 man -- you see, they published a column on more than one  
25 meeting -- that only one man, other than Kissinger himself,  
had been present at all meetings. He was a yoeman, Yoeman

1 Radford. I had met him just casually on a plane. I couldn't  
2 even describe him, but he was there. He went on trips. But  
3 Yoeman Radford was a brilliant young man. He took shorthand  
4 and typed at incredible speed. I think he spoke several  
5 languages. But Yoeman Radford was Kissinger's top note-  
6 taker. He had been with Kissinger on his secret trips to  
7 Paris, you know, when we were trying to end the war. He had  
8 been on all of those trips and had been the notetaker and knew  
9 what Kissinger had said and what the other side had said.

10 He knew, for example, that the French government  
11 were responsible for making those trips possible, which would  
12 have been terribly embarrassing to the French government if it  
13 had come out.

14 He also knew what Kissinger said when he met with  
15 Chow En-lai on his visits to China and he also knew, of course,  
16 every discussion that had taken place in the NSC or in WSAG, where  
17 he would be present.

18 Why did he do this thing? Why would he deliver  
19 these top secret documents to Jack Anderson?

20 This investigation, incredibly, to the credit of  
21 Ehrlichman and his group, was concluded in 48 hours. They  
22 got the yoeman in. They found that he and Anderson attended  
23 the same church. They found that the yoeman had a background  
24 of having served in India, that he was violently pro-India and  
25 very emotional about it, and that that was what had motivated

1 him, apparently, to turn over this information.

2 Now what position does that put us in? I suppose  
3 that it could be said that I obstructed justice by not  
4 immediately calling up Kleindienst or Petersen and saying  
5 prosecute him, and, in this case, Anderson. We had them  
6 cold because the yoeman broke down when they gave him a  
7 polygraph. He cried -- I wasn't there, but I got the report  
8 on it -- and virtually admitted his guilt.

9 Well, the other side of the coin: The reason  
10 that we couldn't prosecute and wouldn't was that if we did  
11 he then would expose and could expose these highly con-  
12 fidential exchanges we were having to bring the war in  
13 Vietnam to a conclusion, and particularly the exchange in  
14 China.

15 Let me tell you one thing he could have told them  
16 about China. The Chinese, the initiative there -- so many  
17 of the unsophisticated people think well, isn't it really  
18 great, the United States has now found out that Communists  
19 in China are not all that bad and the Communists in China  
20 have found out that capitalism isn't all that bad. It has  
21 nothing to do with that.

22 I remember when I saw Mao what he said.

23 He said, you know, he said, I suppose that he, Mao, is the  
24 most famous or infamous Communist in the world and that you  
25 are the most famous or infamous capitalist in the world.

1 What brings us together. He said, history brings us together in our interests.

3 Why does China want an interest with the United  
4 States? It has nothing to do with trade or table tennis  
5 or ping pong or all of that. All of those things help a  
6 little, But they want to be sure that the Russians won't  
7 jump them. They know that we can influence the Russians, or  
8 they think we can. That is why the Chinese are for a strong  
9 NATO, even though, generally speaking, that the Communist  
10 line among the NATO countries is to disarm, but not the  
11 Chinese, because they want the Russians tied up on two  
12 fronts. That is why the Russians -- the Chinese, even  
13 when we went to see them the first time and the talking  
14 papers that the State Department boys had prepared, they  
15 said they are really going to take you on about the defense  
16 treaty you have with Japan, and I remember Mao mentioned  
17 it briefly, but only casually, and then Chou En-lai and  
18 I had a long talk about it, and I said to him, Okay, fine,  
19 You want us to get out of here, huh? I said if we do, the  
20 Japanese have three choices: One, they can go into business  
21 for themselves and become nuclear, and they can do it very  
22 fast because they are an economic giant, even though they are  
23 a military pygmy; two, they can make a deal with the Russians,  
24 or, three, they can make a deal with you.

25 Now they are not going to make one with you because

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1 you are not strong enough, so who do you want. Do you want  
2 to have the United States providing the umbrella of defense  
3 for Japan or do you want to have the Russians there or do  
4 you want to have Japan with nuclear power right next to you?

5 From that time on you have never heard a word of  
6 criticism of the U. S. and Japan security treaty from the  
7 Chinese.

8 Now I have digressed, but what I am pointing  
9 out is that Yoeman Radford, while he was not at this dis-  
10 cussion -- by this time he had left -- in the discussions  
11 that Kissinger had with him he had given assurances to the  
12 Chinese in the case the Russians jumped them we would be  
13 on their side. He had said, as you might imagine, he had  
14 spoken very, very frankly about his opinion of the Russian  
15 leaders with whom we were going to have a summit after the  
16 Chinese summit because these things happen in diplomatic  
17 exchanges. Yoeman Radford had all of this information and  
18 if he had been prosecuted, it was my opinion that there was a  
19 very great risk, because of his obvious emotional instability,  
20 that he would blow the whole thing. If he had, if the  
21 China initiative had failed and the Russian initiative would  
22 have failed, the war in Vietnam would have continued for  
23 a while longer than it did.

24 Now after we concluded, we got Radford, we broke  
25 him down -- I should say they did -- and I had to make a decision.