

PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY'S FILE

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FOOD

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The most critical immediate deficiency in Northwest Europe is food. The world is faced with an approaching crisis in the attempt to provide sufficient food to the areas liberated from enemy control to keep the populations on even a minimum subsistence basis.

Even though France produced sufficient food to meet her minimum requirements in most categories, the internal distribution facilities are so inadequate that for some time, particularly in the South, food will have to be imported.

In Belgium and Holland the food problem is acute, especially in the presently occupied area of Holland. With the liberation of the congested population of Eastern Holland and the uncovering of displaced United Nations nationals in Germany, a colossal feeding problem will be presented.

The attached schedule reflects the requirement for food, which General Eisenhower's Headquarters have stated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the months March to August, both inclusive. This is based on a program of the minimum necessary to prevent disease and unrest in order not to prejudice military operations. Requirements for June are double those of March, and in view of recent military developments the requirements which it was anticipated would be needed in June are, in fact, needed now. The increase is in part attributable

to the necessity of caring for displaced United Nations nationals found in Germany.

In addition to the military requirements, which are set forth in the attached schedule, the National Governments each have their individual food requirements which are supplemental to and over and above the basic military requirements. All of these figures are in the possession of the Foreign Economic Administration and the Foreign Shippers Committee. In view of the fact that these figures change from week to week no attempt is made to state them in this report.

If the Yalta agreement is interpreted as to require the feeding of displaced Soviet civilians on the U.S. Army ration scale, I believe it may become necessary to treat all displaced United Nations nationals on the same basis, because of the administrative difficulty in segregating Soviet citizens in one camp from all other nationalities in the same camp. This would result in an increase in the requirements stated of over 60,000 tons a month, which in view of existing world shortages would be difficult of fulfillment. While it might be possible to establish entirely separate camps for Soviet citizens, the increase in the food requirements would still be a substantial factor. In view of these difficulties, the military leaders in the field are trying to work out the maximum ration for all displaced persons which availability of supplies will permit.

The seriousness of the food problem is emphasized by the fact that the current military shipping and supply situation does not permit meeting even the present military requirements for civilian feeding. SHANF was able to import only 200,000 tons against the March requirements

of more than 300,000 tons. The military have never been able to establish on the Continent or in the U.K. adequate food reserves to meet unforeseen contingencies, and any unexpected or unphased demand creates a situation of gravity. Only a part of SHAEF'S inability to meet requirements has been due to shipping difficulties. For some time supply sources available of the U.S. and the U.K. have not been able to meet requirements in the essential items of meat, milk, fats and edible oils. Apparently these requirements cannot be met without making deeper inroads into the U.S. and U.K. civilian economics.

Except for relatively small amounts of wheat and flour, present British commitments to furnish food to SHAEF have been met and the stocks which the British considered available have been exhausted. Until the present negotiations between the British and the U.S. on the subject of the British stockpile are completed, I believe, from my conversations with them, that it is unlikely that substantial additional amounts will be released by the British. Regardless of the disposition to be made of the U.K. foodstocks, the source for the bulk of food supplies, as between the U.S. and the U.K., must be the U.S.

Normal European food surplus areas, such as Eastern Germany, Rumania and Hungary, are, or will be under Soviet control.

Based on evidence now at hand it seems to me that the only sources from which any large additional supplies can be obtained to prevent extreme privation in the liberated areas are:

- 1) Any food surpluses which the Russians might have in the territory they control in Eastern Europe.
- 2) Increased production of food in the U.S. and other food producing countries, including the encouragement of fishing activities by the countries of North West Europe.

3) Additional tonnages of food which might be obtainable from the Argentine.

4) Finally, to decrease the U.S. and U.K. civilian ration.

Recommendations.

I recommend the following:

1) The demands of all combatants on U.S. food supplies should be reexamined and reapportioned with a view to making available additional quantities to the liberated countries of Northwest Europe. This should include a re-examination of the needs and demands of our own armed forces, the U.K., the U.S.S.R., and our own civilian population at home.

2) The U.S.S.R. has now occupied parts of Europe which can produce great quantities of food which are in short supply. I recommend that a technical mission be sent to the U.S.S.R. to examine the extent to which these food supplies of Eastern Europe (other than Germany and Austria, which are within the jurisdiction of the European Advisory Commission) can be shipped to the deficit areas of Western Europe.

3) The combined military authorities should be given a directive instructing them to provide for all displaced persons on the maximum scale possible in the light of availability of supply.

4) The minimum essential requirements for all countries which are related directly or indirectly to the production, processing and transportation of food should be accorded such a priority as will assure their delivery at the earliest moment in order that the full potential of indigenous production and utilization of food may be realized. This is particularly true in connection with

Denmark from which surplus food supplies in important quantities should be immediately forthcoming.

5) Every possible assistance should be given to the countries of N.W. Europe, particularly Norway, to encourage fishing activities; and their requirements for fishing gear and equipment to maintain and expand their fishing fleets should be accorded the highest possible priority consistent with competing demands. Expansion of production may be necessary to make such supplies available in sufficient quantities and, if so, should be undertaken as soon as possible.

6) Since the allocation of civilian supplies to liberated countries will in all probability cut into the ration of the American consumer, we should embark immediately upon a widespread official and public campaign to educate the American people on the gravity of the needs of our allies in liberated Europe. Conversely, there is no adequate knowledge or understanding by the ordinary civilians in those liberated areas of what the Americans and British have done for the civilian population of those countries. Nor do they realize that Americans are not rolling in meat and butter at home. We should improve the transmission abroad of the story of the American war effort and of the further sacrifices which we are being asked to accept in order to improve the lot of our allies.

A. FRANCE

Metropolitan France was about 80% self-sufficient in food production before the war. Breadgrains and feed were imported in large quantities especially from North Africa and Indo-China. Ground nuts and edible oils were imported from West and North Africa and early vegetables and wine from african colonies. Raw sugar was imported from Madagascar and the West Indies.

Livestock production was one of the most important branches of agriculture and contributed the bulk of meat and dairy products for home consumption.

The general calorie level in France before the war was an average of 3,000 per capita.

1. Under German Occupation.

The agricultural pattern in France was drastically changed during the German occupation. Not only was France thrown upon her own resources upon the Continent by the complete elimination of imports, but the Germans laid heavy imposition on the French for food. Production decreased as a result of shortages of labor, fertilizers and reduced feed imports. The following table indicates the changes in the overall French food supply position up to the last year of German occupation:

Estimated Production, Trade in and Available Supplies of Principal Foods, Pre-War and 1943-44 (thousand metric tons)

Commodity	Production		Net Trade*		Available Supplies	
	Pre-War	1943	Pre-War	1943-44	Pre-War	1943-44
Wheat & Rye	8,500	7,000	+135	-578	8,635	6,422
Other grain	6,830	5,170	+917	-550	7,347	4,620
Potatoes	15,700	17,000	+ 75	-400	15,775	16,600
Sugar	815	500	+115	- 34	930	416
Meat	1,718	1,135**	+ 37	-152	1,745	943
Fats	253	329**	+255	- 2	508	327

* Plus means net imports; minus means net exports including German requisitions.

** 1943-44

German controls over food collection and distribution were not effective. This was due in part to the fact that illegal channels of food distribution were developed for the purpose of getting food to the French people rather than having it go to the Germans. The net result of this was that legal rations were low, the volume of black market trading considerable, and distribution uneven. Black market trading became firmly established as a profitable and patriotic activity. This fact has had important consequences for food control since the liberation of France.

2. The Situation After Liberation.

Destruction of food stocks, growing crops, farm buildings and equipment, and food processing facilities occurred mainly in the Normandy region where the fighting was heaviest. In terms of France as a whole, the military destruction of food, of food production and processing facilities was very small.

The most serious damage in France from the food supply standpoint was the widespread devastation of transport facilities. This included farm horses taken by the Germans, autos, buses and trucks taken away or destroyed, railway rolling stock moved or destroyed and marshalling yards and other rail facilities destroyed. The destruction of bridges blocked both rail and canal traffic and tied up rolling stock and barges. Threshing of grain and its collection, and the movement of food to the cities and deficit areas was a problem of the first magnitude. The heavy demands made by military traffic through France intensified transport difficulties.

The inadequacy of transportation led to failure to preserve sufficient quantities of meat during the peak season so that the meat ration became uniformly unavailable. Paris, for example, has gone (and is still going) for weeks at a time without any meat. Large surpluses of certain commodities developed in producing areas while large marketing areas would

be in critical short supply or entirely without these commodities. Despite high production, potatoes had to be rationed because of inability to transport them to the consumption centers.

The short supply of fats is seriously aggravated by the inability to distribute fats which are available. In fact, the low ration of 250 grammes per month is not being met at the present time.

Receipts of milk in Paris today have only reached a level of 350,000 litres, which compares to a peace time daily rate of 1,000,000 litres.

a) The 1944 Harvest and its Utilization

The 1944 crop was reasonably good though somewhat below that of 1943.

Difficulties in utilizing the 1944 crop began on the farm with shortages of labor, draft animals, power, fuel for tractors and threshers and such supplies as milk cans, repair parts for machinery and equipment. The grain crop was substantially all harvested at the time of liberation, but threshing lagged below schedule because of lack of electric power, coal and Diesel fuel. The potato crops suffered by lack of labor and by lack of transport to move the potatoes to market before they spoiled. Sugar beet lifting was delayed and transport for moving the beets to factories was inadequate. There was insufficient coal to refine all of the sugar beet which was transported to the factories. Of the total beet crop of 4,800,000 tons, at least 2,000,000 tons were not processed. Instead they were used as livestock feed or allowed to spoil. Sugar production reached a total of only 300,000 tons and alcohol 700,000 hectograms as compared with the 1943 production of 553,000 tons of sugar and 1,700,000 hectograms of alcohol.

The rate of production of dairy products and meat continues to suffer from lack of imported feed supplies such

as oil cakes, from the reduction in animal numbers that has taken place, and from the fact that dry weather late in 1944 reduced the yields of hay and pastures. Milk production for 1944 is estimated at 72,000,000 hectolitres as compared with 80,000,000 hectolitres in 1943. This in turn has reduced production of butter, cheese and condensed milk. Meat production for 1944/5 is estimated as 870,000 tons as compared with 920,000 tons for 1943/4.

b) Deficit Areas.

There are two primary deficit regions of France which depend upon the flow of food supplies from other areas of France. One is the Paris area, and the other is Southern France.

When Paris was liberated the supply of food available in Paris was sufficient for not over 48 hours. To meet this critical situation about 11,000 tons of Civil Affairs supplies were delivered to Paris by plane and truck during the first month. The daily average receipts of food in Paris from all sources has risen from a low of 1,135 tons per day in August to 7,051 tons per day in March.

Southern France specializes in production of wine and vegetables, but falls far short of meeting its own needs of most of the staple foods. Movement of supplies from central and northern France has been strictly limited by lack of transport. Although the French Government agreed in October that it would be responsible for moving 45,000 tons of wheat from the north to the Mediterranean area, lack of rail transport prevented its doing so.

3. Civil Affairs Imports

Civil Affairs imports from D-day to the end of the year 1944 in Northern France were 21% of advance estimates of requirements and in Southern France 75% of advance estimates of requirements.

In northern France the small percentage imported compared with the advance estimate is in part explained by the fact that the 1944 crop became available about the time of liberation and that local food supplies were depended upon to meet immediate needs. Critical shipping shortage and port reception and clearance capacities were other important factors.

The total civil affairs food imports from D-day to February 28 were 239,937 tons. An additional 119,000 tons were scheduled to be received in March and April.

The SHAHF estimate of requirements are 70,305 tons a month for April and May. These are predicted upon the amount of food which SHAHF estimates will be required to bring the average calorie level to 2,000 per person in order to prevent disease and unrest.

A table setting forth the military estimates of food requirements for France from January to August 1945 to provide a 2,000 calorie level is attached as Annex 1.

4. Rations and Consumption Level.

Food controls in France have never been very effective. During occupation by the Germans, evasion of controls and black market practices were patriotic. Since liberation many of the well-established evasive practices have continued.

The legal rations actually distributed in Paris provided 1,450 calories in October, 1,380 in November, 1,330 in December and 1,340 in January. A significant part of the total food consumption has obviously been outside the rations. Consumption in addition to rations includes non-rationed foods, packages from country relatives, black market supplies of rationed foods and institutional meals (factory canteens, school lunches and aid to the unemployed).

No reliable information is available as to the total consumption of foods from all sources. The best estimate is that the average diet of the non-farm population is just under 2,000 calories a day.

5. The Current Crop Year

a) Bread Grains: The French Minister of Agriculture estimates that 5,704,000 tons of bread grains should be available for non-producer food consumption. This is 78% of estimated total production. It seems extremely unlikely that such a collection of grain from farms can be realized. This would involve collections of 370,000 tons in excess of the previous year from a crop of about the same size. Collections to date have been running far below the rate for last year. This is due in part to delays in threshing and lack of transport to move the grain to market.

There is also reason to believe that farmers will hold back more grain than normally because of the prospects of a short crop in 1945, anticipation of a currency exchange program, fear of inflation and lack of consumer goods. There is also some reluctance on the part of officials to press as hard as they might.

It is estimated that deliveries may fall short of requirements by as much as 500,000 tons.

b) Potatoes: The potato supply available to non-producers for the year is estimated as 3,900,000 tons. Consumption so far has been limited by shortage of transport to move potatoes to deficit areas. Supply is just about sufficient to continue the present rate of consumption until the new crop begins to be harvested in August.

c) Sugar: The past crop year's production (285,000 tons to date) only began to reach consumers in January. Requirements are estimated at about 46,000 tons per month so domestic supplies can be expected to last only through June unless supplemented by imports.

The French authorities have indicated their intention to reduce the target for sugar beets planting for 1945 to 375,000 hectares as compared with 1944 target of 500,000 hectares because of the outlook for fertilizer and labor for growing beets and coal for processing. This is serious in terms of the continued tight world sugar situation and the shipping shortage.

a) Meat: Collections planned to meet non-producer rations are 51,000 tons per month for April, May and June after which they increase to 74,000 tons by August. This reflects the normal seasonal increase in slaughter of grass fed cattle. If these collections are realized and meat distribution is well controlled it would be possible to maintain a ration of at least 300 grammes per week during the season of lowest production and 450 grammes at August level. Meat slaughter, however, has been below expectations and control of supplies is inadequate with a large black market existing. Meat rations have been reduced from 350 grammes weekly, which was maintained until mid-winter, to 150-200 grammes at present.

e) Dairy products: The milk supply in European areas has so far been limited by transport rather than production. Milk production, however, has continued to decline as a result of lack of imported protein feeds.

The collection and control of butter has proved troublesome. Margarine production from the 1944 oilseed crop is being used to supplement butter in order to support the current slender fat ration of 250 grammes, or roughly 8 ounces, per month. The oilseed crop was disappointing. The heaviest producing areas are Normandy and Brittany, where fighting occurred in harvest time and resulted in considerable destruction. The areas are expected to yield only 24,000 tons of oil of which 8,000 tons will be used by producers.

G. Agricultural Supplies:

The war damage to agricultural machinery was not as great as had been anticipated. France has ample planting capacity in excellent working conditions to produce enough to meet her

own needs, with the exception of tractors and a few special items. Fuel and transportable power to get industry going is the primary need. A shortage of pesticides had been anticipated, but considerable German stocks for treatment of grain seed have been found.

There is an urgent need for Spring wheat seed to offset reduced Fall seeding due to bad weather. This is most important in terms of the 1945 grain crop.

Fertiliser and feed are urgently needed.

7. Fishing.

Arrangements were made to reopen fishing on the coast of the Cherbourg peninsula about July. The area was extended as the French coast was cleared of Germans.

While fishing boats and gear were in poor condition many of the boats were fit to go out as soon as motor fuel was available. Motor fuel allocations have been made to the extent possible and a valuable addition to the supply of protein food has resulted. At first the fish were either consumed in areas and cities near the coast or processed for future distribution. With the improvement in transportation, however, approximately 60% of the catch is being distributed fresh to the large inland centers. The average monthly catch for all of France will probably reach 7,000 tons in April and this figure will increase substantially with enlargement of fishing limits and with the return of French fishing boats now in the service of Great Britain.

Arrangements have been made by the Army and Navy authorities to permit French herring boats to fish in Belgian waters. This has so far supplied 4,000 tons of herring for French consumption.

B. BELGIUM

The food position of Belgium is unique in that the country is primarily industrial with less than one fifth of the population engaged in farming. Belgian agriculture before the war was characterized by livestock production and the very intensive use of most of the arable land for the production of livestock feed. Belgium imported roughly half of her food supply. Among the important items imported are cereals, meats, fats and oils.

1) The German occupation.

During the German occupation Belgium was forced to live almost entirely on her own resources, though in 1943-1944 the Germans permitted imports of 100,000 tons of grain, 20,000 tons of fruit, and some seed potatoes. On the other hand the Germans drew upon Belgian supplies for small quantities of meat, fish, sugar and pulses. The Belgians were forced to reduce their hog and poultry numbers drastically to free more grain for human consumption. They increased the production of potatoes, sugar beets, and oil seeds.

The following table indicates the changes which took place during the period of occupation.

Estimated Production, Trade In and Available Supplies
of Principal Foods, Pre-war and 1943-44 (000 metric
tons)

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Production</u>		<u>Net Trade*</u>		<u>Available Supplies</u>	
	<u>Pre-war</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>Pre-war</u>	<u>1943-44</u>	<u>Pre-war</u>	<u>1943-44</u>
Wheat, rye & mixed grain	871	829	41,139	4100	2,010	929
Barley and oats	704	473	4,559	- 20	1,163	453
Potatoes	2,400	2,500	4 37	4150	2,437	2,650
Sugar	206	208	4 31	- 25	237	183
Meat	340	165**	4 25	- 4	365	161
Fats	72	48**	4 71	--	143	48

* Plus means net imports; minus means net exports including German requisitions.

** 1943-44

2) The situation after liberation.

Fortunately liberation came prior to the harvest and there was very little destruction of crops. Accordingly, there were sufficient indigenous supplies of most foods to meet the Belgian minimum needs for a few months. Widespread loss and destruction of transport facilities, however, created a serious problem of internal assembly and distribution of foodstuffs. But the distances that food must be moved in Belgium are substantially less than in France, and consequently the internal food transport problem, while serious, has been less acute.

a) 1944 Harvest.

Crop production in Belgium was well maintained during the war. The 1944 harvest was about the same as that for the previous year, but there were certain important changes in utilization which are shown in the following table:

Net Quantities of Principal Crops Available for Human Consumption in Belgium after Deduction of Seed, Feed, and Waste, pre-war, 1943-44 and 1944-45 Consumption years (000 metric tons)

<u>Crop</u>	<u>Pre-war</u>	<u>1943-44</u>	<u>1944-45</u>
Wheat, rye & mixed grain	261	705	611
Sugar beets	1,401	1,620	1,970
Potatoes	1,363	1,408	1,020
Pulses	N.A.	31	26
Oil Seeds	N.A.	30	29

Production of most grains has been maintained at about the prewar level but reduction in use for animal feeding has increased the quantity available for human food from both the 1943 and 1944 crops. The reduction for the 1944 crop as

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compared with that for 1943 results from greater non-food use rather than from a decline in production. Sugar beet production was actually increased in 1944. Production of potatoes, pulses, and oil seeds was reduced.

Physical facilities for harvesting, threshing, transport, and processing 1944 crops were seriously restricted but all crops, with the exception of sugar beets, were taken care of without unusual waste. The major problem has been that of getting farmers to release as much of their products as utilization plans contemplated. There have been several reasons for this. Prior to the liberation, instructions were broadcast to the farmers to delay the harvest and threshing so that the Germans could not requisition products for their own use. The food collection organization established under German control was dissolved at the time of liberation. There was, therefore, a break in the enforcement of food controls and the Government has not been strong enough since the liberation to enforce unpopular control measures. Another disturbing factor was the program to reduce the volume of the circulating media which was unpopular with the farmers and added to their disinclination to make products available to the local markets. Of an estimated broad grain crop of 929,000 tons, the Belgian Government expects that not over 400,000 tons will be collected for commercial use. Last year 530,000 tons were collected from a crop of about the same size. The excessive farm retentions are probably being used in part to feed livestock for sale at high prices in black markets. There is also a strong desire on the part of the farmers, as well as the Government, to rebuild

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the depleted livestock herd.

Sugar beet production was sufficient for the manufacture of about 250,000 tons of sugar. Transport difficulties and lack of coal for the operation of sugar mills will, however, reduce production far below this figure. The latest estimate is 160,000 tons. Production last year was 200,000 tons.

b) Livestock

Preliminary estimates indicate that the number of milk cows at the beginning of the year was about 5% lower than a year earlier, although the total number of cattle was higher. With the continued shortage of protein feed, milk production will probably be slightly lower this year than last year. The main result of this reduction will be a decrease in butter production. Since the number of cattle and hogs is at least as large as a year ago, meat production may be expected at about the same levels as for the preceding year, although more young animals will be kept on the farms to build up livestock numbers. All livestock production is at a level considerably below that of prewar years.

3) Civil Affairs Imports.

Civil Affairs imports were in limited quantity until the port of Antwerp was opened in December. Until that time supplies for Belgium had to come into the country through the badly congested ports of France. They were then moved by truck to Belgium at a time when facilities were being strained to their utmost in order to support military operations. As a result only 6,790 tons of food were imported into Belgium from D-day to December 31st, 1944. Of this total 1,500 tons were flour, 1,300 tons meat and fish, and 1,000 tons pulses.

Even after the port of Antwerp was opened it was impossible for some 60 days to bring in any appreciable amount of food supplies. A critical food situation developed in January and February as a result of the continued stringent shipping conditions; the Ardennes offensive with the consequent loss of food supplies; and the severe weather conditions in December and January. Emergency measures were taken and over 100,000 tons of food supplies were brought in quickly. SHAEF believes that the current flow will be adequate to meet the military target. The SHAEF requirements figures are attached as annex 2.

4) Rations and Consumption Level.

From the time of liberation until January, 1945, rations were gradually improved as the restoration of internal distribution facilities permitted. Distribution of rationed foods, excluding milk, averaged 1,535 calories per day for the non-farm population, in December, 1,575 calories in January and February, and 1,767 calories in March. This compares with 1,375 calories for January, 1944. In February, 1945, rations were reduced, but the back-log of unused fat ration coupons was made good so that the total consumption of food distributed against rations was not reduced.

There is a flourishing black market in food in Belgium. Considerable quantities of food are obtained from the black market and from unrationed commodities in addition to the legal rations. No satisfactory estimates of total food consumption are available, but the national diet is probably not over 1,850 to 1,900 calories. From the physical condition of the people it would appear that it cannot be far from 2,000 calories per person per day.

5) The Current Crop Year.

There are two staple food crops, potatoes and sugar, of which production was estimated as sufficient to last through the consumption year. Bread grains and vegetable oil, however, have already been nearly all consumed and dependence will be mainly on imports until the next crop is harvested. Other commodities that will have to be supplemented by imports are meat, dairy products and pulses.

A total of 76,000 tons of grains per month are necessary to maintain a 400 gram basic daily bread ration. The total supply available from domestic sources was estimated at 4,00,000 tons. By January 1st, 200,000 tons of this had been used. The local supply, therefore, has been supplemented by imports and this will have to continue. The Civil Affairs program calls for 54,000 tons a month through May and then the full requirement of 76,000 tons a month in June, July and August.

The monthly requirements of fats and oils to meet the 2,000 calorie diet are about 7,500 tons. The domestic supply of vegetable oil was exhausted in January. Remaining domestic resources are current butter production and about 650 tons per month of beef fat and lard.

Meat requirements to meet the 2,000 calorie diet are 11,400 tons per month. Domestic sources are estimated as capable of supplying 4,600 tons per month.

Monthly cheese requirements are 2,600 tons, of which 1,200 can be supplied from domestic production.

Pulse requirements are 4,100 tons and domestic supplies were exhausted in February. The entire supply must be imported.

The monthly requirement of milk is 32,500 tons, of which it is expected 24,250 tons can be met from domestic production. The deficit is to be made up from imports in the form of evaporated milk.

6) Agricultural Supplies.

Since Belgium has a highly developed and diversified industrial economy she has been able to meet most of her agricultural requirements. Upon liberation diesel fuel was the most critical farm supply item. Some difficulty has developed in regard to vegetable seeds. These requirements, however, along with the other urgent requirements for potato seeds, milk cans and binder twine are set forth either in the Civil Affairs import program or the Belgian National Government program.

7) Fishing.

The Belgian fishing fleet was in good condition and reasonably well supplied with gear at the time of liberation. Arrangements were made for its operation in time for the winter herring season, which extends from December 1st to March 1st. The herring run was exceptionally favorable and the total catch reached 37,000 tons by March 1st. Unfortunately, the Belgian fish processing facilities could not be fully utilized and a very small quantity of the catch was preserved.

It is expected that the catch of other fish will average 4,000 to 7,000 tons per month, depending upon the extension of fishing limits and the number of Belgian fishing boats released by Great Britain.

C. LUXEMBOURG

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is a sparsely populated country which, before the war, produced food supplies in a volume which fell only slightly short of the country's requirements, except for sugar and vegetable oils. Most of the concentrates and feed grains for livestock were imported but bread grain and meat imports were small. There was some export of potatoes.

1. Under German Occupation

During the German occupation Luxembourg was treated as a part of the German Reich so far as its food economy was concerned. Rationing was at the German scale and production adjustments were attempted in line with German policy. The whole organization of supplies was under the Reich Food Estate.

Supply of feed for livestock was sharply reduced under the German occupation. Cattle population was maintained but hog population was cut drastically. Both meat and milk production fell off. The 1943 grain crop was at about the pre-war level. The potato crop was smaller than usual. Oil seed production was introduced by the Germans as a new enterprise. Vegetable production was increased.

2. The Situation After Liberation

Luxembourg was liberated quickly without much destruction. The front line was stabilized, however, approximately along the eastern border of the country for many weeks during fall and early winter. As a result a strip of territory just inside the eastern border was essentially an area of military operations and most of the crops in this part of Luxembourg were lost. For the remainder of the country the food situation was reasonably satisfactory. There was sufficient bread grain, meat and potatoes, milk and vegetables. Fats were short. Sugar was brought in from Belgium in exchange for some surplus meat animals. Control over food supplies was generally

good.

Imports of about 4,000 tons of food a month had been planned by Civil Affairs but the situation was so favorable during the fall and early winter that this plan was not carried out. The Ardennes offensive which began December 16th, completely changed this situation. The northern half of Luxembourg was overrun by the German forces. The population moved out of this area ahead of the offensive, taking a considerable part of the meat and work animals. The result of this movement was an increase in the number of people to be fed from the food resources of central Luxembourg and an addition to the livestock numbers with no addition to the feed supply.

The second liberation of northern Luxembourg left behind widespread destruction. This was an important grain area and grain that had been threshed was mostly removed or destroyed. It is probable that nearly half of the commercial grain supply of Luxembourg was lost. Most of the potatoes were destroyed. Loss of vegetables and fruit was heavy. The livestock that was not moved out was killed or taken by the Germans.

Production in northern Luxembourg will be very low for the remainder of the crop year. There is an acute shortage of seed, draft animals and various supplies needed for the spring planting season. There are also many land mines which will interfere with farm work until removed.

3. Civil Affairs Imports.

Programmed imports for the remainder of the crop year are presented in Annex 3. In tonnage these imports amount to about 40% of the food supply necessary to maintain an average 2,000 calorie diet for the non-farm population. In calories the imports would provide a still higher proportion. Roughly speaking the programmed food imports represent the quantities needed to make up that part of the domestic food resources lost as a result of the Ardennes offensive.

4. Rations and Consumption Level.

In December, prior to the Ardennes offensive, the legal normal consumer ration was estimated to provide about 1575 calories per day. The average for non-farm consumers was somewhat higher. Since that time the situation in the northern part of the country has been too chaotic for any average figure to be presented as significant.

5. Agricultural Supplies.

The farmers of Luxembourg were reasonably well provided with essential supplies prior to the Ardennes offensive. The Germans when they withdrew from this area in January, took every available draft animal with them. Approximately 2400 horses were lost. Tractors are being supplied in an attempt to make up for this loss. Binder twine and supply materials are also needed and have been programmed. A very serious seed shortage exists and an attempt to meet this is being made by drawing on other liberated countries and from stocks in the U.K.

D. THE NETHERLANDS

Domestic production of food in the Netherlands before the war was equivalent to about two-thirds of consumption. There was an important livestock industry producing meat and dairy products for export but largely dependent upon imported feed. The main crops produced were cereals, potatoes, sugar-beets and specialized horticultural crops. Grain, sugar and vegetable oils were imported for home consumption.

1. The German Occupation.

During the German occupation, the Netherlands was cut off from imports of both food and feed and had to manage almost entirely on her own resources. The area in cultivated crops was extended by 20%. Bread grain production increased slightly and potato and vegetable production more substantially. Livestock production declined drastically. In spite of this the Germans took some meat and butter as well as considerable quantities of fruit, vegetables and potatoes. The German control over food supplies and their distribution was well organized. The drastic wartime adjustments in production and net trade are shown in the following table:-

Estimated Production, Trade In and Available Supplies of
Principal Foods in the Netherlands, Pre-War and 1943-44
(thousand metric tons)

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Production</u>		<u>Net Trade**</u>		<u>Available Supplies</u>	
	Pre-War	1943	Pre-War	1943-44	Pre-War	1943-44
Wheat and Rye	910	973	4610	-19	1,520	954
Other grain	487	385	4245	-26	732	359
Potatoes	2,650	4,464	-330	-360	2,320	4,104
Sugar Beets	1,567	1,460	--	--	1,567	1,460
Meat	400	148*	-39	-43	361	105
Fats	138	80*	-28	-9	125	71

* 1943-44.

** Plus means net imports; minus means net exports, including German requisitions

In 1944, an inundation of extensive areas of low lying farm land began partly as a result of not continuing to pump out drainage water and partly as a result of allowing both fresh and

salt water to come in and through the dykes and sluices. About forty five percent of the total area of the country including most of the best agricultural land is susceptible to flooding. About 10% of the farm land was flooded before the 1944 harvest season and most of the crops in this area were lost. This is estimated to have reduced 1944-45 food production by 15 to 20%.

2. The Situation in the Liberated Part of the Netherlands.

An area populated by about 2 million people, nearly 20% of the total population of the country, was liberated in September and October 1944. The area uncovered includes an important part of the country's agriculture and none of the larger cities. Normally deficient in bread grains it should have been about self-sufficient as a result of wartime adjustments in production and consumption. It is normally a surplus producing area for potatoes and sugar. Before the war it had a surplus of dairy products and of pork, but livestock production, especially pork, has been sharply reduced. The 1944 crop was a fairly good one with the exception of certain areas in the west where inundation occurred and very little of it, except the oil seeds, was taken by the Germans.

Practically all of the usable trucks and cars were taken by the Germans in their retreat. Food collection quickly came to a standstill. Many cattle were killed during the military operations and milk could not be moved to creameries and consumption fell off. Coal was not available and flour mills could not be operated for lack of power. All movement by rail and barge was halted for an extended period. Such surpluses as existed in some parts of the country could not be moved to other parts where they were needed. The extreme length of supply lines from French ports prevented assistance during the early period of liberation. By the end of 1944 only about 15,000 tons of imported food had been turned over to the Dutch authorities and hence the population has depended mainly on indigenous supplies.

3. Rations and Consumption Levels in Liberated Holland.

Rations providing about 1700 calories per head per day had been generally maintained until July 1944 for the non-farm consumer. In October, the level fell to about 1,000 calories; in November it rose to 1,100 calories and in December when imported supplies began to arrive through Antwerp rations were raised to 1,500 calorie level. In January, further increases were possible bringing the level up to about 1,700 calories and the ration scale now in effect produces an average of 1,875 calories. The black market has been curtailed in the liberated Netherlands and, consequently, little food is available except through legal sources.

4. The Occupied Areas.

The most heavily populated area including the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the Hague lies to the west of the Zuider zee and at this writing is still occupied by the Germans. It is normally dependent for food upon the surplus producing areas of eastern Holland. In the fall of 1944 a strike by the Dutch railway workers tied up the rail traffic and the Germans refused to move food into the deficiency area in anything like adequate volume. The flooding destroyed a considerable part of what production there was in this region. The food supply problem in this area will be the most critical one to be faced in Northwest Europe.

5. The Military Plans.

For planning purposes, the Netherlands has been divided into four parts. The liberated portion is known as area A. That portion of the occupied area which is the heavily populated Northwest deficit region is designated area B and the food surplus producing Northeast region, area C. Area B is subdivided into the eastern portion called B1 and the western portion called B2. Area B2 includes nearly 40% of the population of the entire country and it is in this area that the most critical food shortages exist at the present time and for which the largest volume of imports will be required after liberation.

Starvation conditions presently exist in the B2 area and it is alleged that the official rations in the cities have fallen to as low as 320 calories a day. In view of transport difficulties and the distance from surplus food areas it is improbable that official rations have been substantially supplemented for the consumption of the urban population in larger centers. In order to provide emergency food in the B2 area, a stockpile of 44,000 tons of food, sufficient to feed the entire population for 21 days, is being built up south of the present front line. By the end of this 21 day period, it is anticipated that west Dutch port facilities will have been sufficiently restored that food supplies may be brought in directly to the large port cities. Hence, a stockpile of the size sufficient to allow of a 2,000 calorie diet for the population of the B2 area is being established in the U.K. for immediate movement when the ports open. This stockpile will include emergency rations for 60 days and supplies for the following 30 day period.

For the remainder of occupied Holland, areas B1 and C, which are normally self-sufficing or surplus producing, it is assumed in the planning that all surplus will have been removed or destroyed by the Germans and that the entire non-farm population will have to be completely fed on imported food.

The total military import program for all of the Netherlands for the first eight months of 1945 is shown in Annex 4. This includes the special emergency programs for which stockpiles have been created and the continuing flow of supplies to the areas already liberated and for the remainder of the country after the emergency period.

6. Agricultural Supplies.

There is an urgent need in the Netherlands for farm machinery. Tractors, disc plows and fur plows are being provided from the U.K. under the Netherlands Civilian Import Program. About

250,000 grain and flour sacks are being turned over to the Dutch authorities. Shipments of binder twine for the 1945 harvest will arrive in the country in May.

While the country normally produces vegetable seeds for export the seed growing regions are still occupied by the Germans and seeds are being imported from the U.K. and France for the spring planting in the liberated areas.

7. Fishing.

Fishing was opened in the West Schelde Estuary in early January and in the lower East Schelde Estuary by the end of the same month. Catches in the West Schelde have been small and the fish is being consumed fresh in the towns near the coast.

Arrangements have been made with the Belgians to permit a limited number of Dutch boats to fish in Belgian waters.

Six large Dutch trawlers based in England are fishing in English waters and landing their catch in Holland. Of the catch, 40% is being processed and the balance distributed there.

The Dutch shell fish industry in the East Schelde is now operating at 33% of capacity. It is expected that 5,000 tons of oysters and 12,000 tons of mussels will be collected this year.

E. DENMARK.

Denmark is a surplus producer of foodstuffs. Its agriculture was organized prior to the war with a view to the most efficient production of meat and dairy products. Practically all of the grains produced, including the breadgrains, wheat and rye were used as feed for livestock. In addition, there were large imports of oilcake and corn for animal feeding. Breadgrains for human consumption were largely imported. In terms of calories, however, Danish imports were more than counterbalanced by exports.

1. Under German Occupation.

Denmark has managed to maintain her pre-war calorie intake and has also exported significant quantities of meat and dairy products, fish and potatoes. Denmark's agriculture is highly mechanized and has been dependent upon supplies of fuel from Germany. This has been supplied by the Germans during occupation in order that they might benefit from Danish surpluses.

The output of meat and dairy products for the calendar year 1944 has appreciably increased over 1943. It is unlikely, however, that a high output of pork and bacon will be maintained during 1945 in view of the decline since 1943 by almost one-third of the pig population and, in particular, of breeding sows.

It should be noted that the ability of Denmark to export depends in a large measure upon available supply of power for refrigeration, slaughter houses, refineries and so on, and on liquid fuel for tractors and farm machinery. At the present time imports of lubricants, diesel oil and gasoline have practically ceased. Because of the shortage of fuel and lubricants transport has been reduced to a small fraction

of its normal operation. Power plants and gas works have instituted strict rationing.

SHAEE's estimate of Denmark's ability to export critical foodstuffs in the first six months after liberation is:-

Butter	34,000 Tons
Cheese	1,300 "
Eggs	6,400 "
Bacon & Pork	50,000 Tons
Fish	53,000 "
Beef & Veal	17,000 "
Milk Products	40,260 "

2. Imports Needed.

It is the judgment of the SHAEE Mission to Norway that in order to secure the potential available exports from Denmark it will be necessary to import those minimum requirements to Denmark which have a direct relation to the production of food. The proposed SHAEE import program for the six months following the liberation of Denmark totals 1,622,000 tons of all commodities. Of these it is an estimate of the SHAEE Mission that 660,200 bear a direct relation to the production, processing and transportation of food. An additional 626,113 bear an indirect relation to the production of food. A breakdown of these requirements will be found in Tab 6 which is a report on Denmark.

Norway is sparsely populated and natural conditions are generally not favorable for agricultural production. Most of the agricultural area produces feed and the country's production is predominately a livestock enterprise. Only 3% of the total area is cultivated and there is intensive farming of small plots.

Norway had to import all her sugar, nearly all bread and feed grains, vegetable oil seeds for the manufacture of margarine, and oil cake for livestock as well as some potatoes. On balance Norway produced less than half her food requirements, in terms of calories, and depended upon imports of food stuffs and feed stuffs more than any other country on the Continent.

Supplies of fish were abundant resulting in high consumption, exports and an extensive industry for the manufacture of herring oil and meal. Pre-war Norway exported approximately 700,000 tons of fish a year.

I. The German Occupation.

During the German occupation fishing production has fallen from 1,000,000 tons to 790,000 tons and, of that amount 500,000 tons was shipped to German occupied territories, leaving 200,000 tons for domestic consumption. In return for this export of fish, the Germans provided other food products necessary to maintain a minimum diet in Norway. Under the German ration program approximately 2,200 calories per day per head was provided with extra rations for those engaged in heavy industry. As a practical matter, this calorie program has not been met. During the past three or four months food scarcity has been severe.

Farm production has suffered considerably

During the past five years. No fertilizers have been imported to Norway and the productivity of the land has decreased acutely. Animal population has been reduced due to shortage of animal fodder and the killing of animals due to the shortage of food.

The most recent information in Norway indicates that the food situation in 1944-45 is declining from that of 1943-44. This results from both lower production and reduced imports. In addition transport difficulties are hampering distribution. The current fruit and vegetable harvest have been reported as poor. The milk situation, adversely affected by lack of cattle fodder, has become considerably worse since the end of 1944. It has been difficult to maintain the milk ration for children and the sick. Even the skim milk ration for adults has not been honored for some time.

2. Supply Plans for Norway.

The CHAEP Mission to Norway has developed in cooperation with the Norwegian Government, a comprehensive supply program for Norway for the first six months after liberation. The national program as developed calls for the importation of 300,000 tons of food supplies for the first six months. The amount of this which is presently available through military sources is about 70,000 tons against the first three months' requirements.

FINMARK

The liberation of Finnmark created an emergency demand for relief supplies. CHAEP released 1,000 tons of food supplies and this together with 2,200 tons of supplies procured by the Norwegian Government from civilian sources were shipped to Finnmark during the winter months. These supplies will provide for the

10,000 people in Finnmark for four months. The requirements for the next six months, approximately 10,000 tons, are now being procured by the Norwegian Government.

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G. GERMANY

Agricultural production had expanded and reached a high level in Germany before the war. About 85% of the nation's food supply came from domestic resources, the main deficits being in fats and oils.

According to summary findings of an ad hoc Committee on German Food Supplies, composed of personnel from the Food and Agriculture Branches of the U.S. Group C. C. and the British Element of the Control Commission and advisory British and American civilian personnel, Germany's food position throughout the first five years of war remained satisfactory. The decline in total agricultural output was held within relatively narrow limits and comprehensive farm and distribution control regulated production and utilization to such an extent that an even higher output of ultimate food energy was secured than before the war. Moreover, imports and requisitions from other countries added from 10% to 15% to the home food supply.

The level of caloric intake in 1943-44 was placed at 2,600 calories for the total population as compared with 2,850 before the war. Farm consumption in 1943-44 approximated a level of 3,300 and non-farm 2,300 caloric. As in other countries, composition of the diet has changed in the direction of more bread grains, potatoes and vegetables, and less of other foods, particularly liquid milk, fats and oils and meats, but not to the same extent.

In 1944-45, Germany faced a considerably more difficult situation. Domestic production of food has somewhat declined and takings from other countries are greatly curtailed. Home production in 1945 is likely to decline further in view of the cumulative effect of shortages of basic agricultural requisites (particularly the increasingly curtailed supply of nitrogen and phosphoric fertilizer) over the war years. My personal observation of the

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result of military operations in agricultural areas west of the Rhine leads me to believe that German food production in 1945 will be substantially less than normal. Hundreds of farmers have been evacuated. Farm machinery and animals have been carried away. I do not believe either the manpower or implements of production can be replaced in 1945. As a result much of Germany's normally productive land will be idle in the next crop year.

Regional problems complicate the German food situation; Northwest and Southern Germany are food deficit areas, to which the East supplies substantial surpluses of bread, grain and flour, potatoes and refined sugar and from which livestock, fats and fish, for example, were exported to the East. Grave food problems will arise if these areas have to exist on their own resources.

SHANP has estimated import requirements of wheat for the feeding of civilians in the German area occupied by the British and American forces will be a total of 175,000 tons a month for the months of June, July and August. As in other areas, for which SHANP has a responsibility for the importation of food supplies, however, these supplies will not be called forward or distributed by SHANP unless it becomes necessary as a matter of military necessity to do so. The maximum amount of food which will be provided to the normal German civilians (as distinguished from heavy workers) from all sources will be approximately 1500 calories per head per day. This compares with the SHANP minimum target of 2000 calories per head per day for civilians of the liberated countries.

II. DISPLACED PERSONS

The total number of displaced persons which it is estimated will be uncovered in Germany is approximately 7,000,000. Of this quantity it is estimated that there will be approximately 3,300,000 in the Russian zone of occupation and 3,700,000 in the U.S. and U.K. zones. In addition it is estimated there will be uncovered a total of approximately 1,100,000 in Austria.

The feeding of displaced persons has been planned by the military authorities on the same basis as for the population for liberated areas, that is a 2,000 calories ration. The following table indicates the monthly import requirements of food which have already been presented by SHAN to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval:-

January	25,000
February	18,116
March	27,271
April	30,492
May	38,003
June	56,527
July	50,164
August	37,405
September	25,516
October	50,500
November	50,000
December	

German indigenous resources are to be used to the maximum and preference is to be given to displaced persons over the needs of German civilians. The additional requirements have been estimated on the basis that 25% of the food required for feeding displaced persons in Germany will be obtained from German resources.

Under agreements signed separately at Yalta by the U.S. and U.K. governments with the Soviet Union, all Soviet citizens liberated by forces under U.S. and U.K. command and all U.S. and U.K. citizens liberated by forces under Soviet command are to be provided with "adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention". It should be noted that the agreements cover all Soviet citizens, including prisoners of war as well as displaced persons, and that the agreements provide

that "the basis fixed for civilians shall so far as possible be the same as that for privates."

The effect of the agreement is difficult to measure at this time inasmuch as the precise interpretation of its terms is still under study, but more especially because no definitive directive has yet been forwarded to the military authorities in the field.

Present SHAF estimates of the supply implications of the Yalta agreements, on the hypothesis that the Soviet citizens should be provided the same diet as an American or British private soldier, are that approximately 90,000 tons of food would be necessary in addition to present requirements. Prior to the Yalta agreements it was an essential part of the military planning to deal with the displaced persons on an international-United Nations basis. If this planning is disrupted by giving a broad interpretation to the Yalta agreements, and if similar agreements are not made for the benefit of countries other than the USSR, grave administrative difficulties will arise. If all displaced persons are to be fed the same diet as a private soldier, SHAF estimates that approximately 330,000 tons of food additional to that presently required would be necessary to maintain the increased ration.

I. THE U.S. IS A NOT TILL SUPPLIER OF FOOD.

The extent to which the U.S. is in a position to furnish any supplies of foods to the liberated areas of Northwest Europe is not discussed in this paper in view of the current negotiations in Washington during which the level at which the U.S. food stockpiles will be maintained will be agreed.

It is evident, however, that the U.S. cannot be looked upon as a source of continuing supply of foodstuffs, and that any contribution which is made will have to result from the

lowering of the present U.K. stock level. It is equally clear that any contribution which the U.K. may make from its present stockpiles will be a non-recurring one and will not be significant in terms of the total requirements of the Northwest European countries.

ANNEX 1

TABLE VII - MILITARY IMPORTS OF FOOD REQUIRED FOR FRANCE
January - August 1945 (Net long tons)

Commodity	January	February	March ^X	April ^X	May	June	July	August	Total Delivery	Total for Shipment ^{XXX}
Wheat	34,706	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	---	---	---	154,706	173,646
Rice	---	---	---	---	---	3,000	3,000	3,000	9,000	10,800
Canned meat	6,334	7,775	7,334	7,334	7,334	6,750	6,750	6,750	56,361	66,175
Fats and oils	5,165	5,600	5,165	5,165	5,165	5,200	5,200	5,200	45,860	53,632
Cheese	420	---	420	420	420	---	---	---	1,680	2,061
Pulses	528	---	500	500	500	---	---	---	2,028	2,434
Sugar	6,007	5,750	6,010	6,010	6,010	10,000	10,000	10,000	59,787	69,444
Coffee	3,238	3,587	3,238	3,238	3,238	---	---	---	16,639	18,979
Canned milk	2,471	5,300	3,971	3,971	3,971	5,000	5,000	5,000	34,684	41,261
Dried m'lk	1,500	1,500	---	---	---	---	---	---	3,000	3,000
Vit chocolate	66	---	500	500	500	2,500	2,500	2,500	9,066	10,879
Dried eggs	447	---	450	450	450	---	---	---	1,797	2,156
Total for delivery	61,662	59,512	58,588	58,588	58,588	32,450	32,450	32,450	394,608	
Allowance for loss 20%	2,862	2,409	11,717	11,717	11,717	6,490	6,490	6,490		
Total for shipment ^{XXX}	64,764	61,921	70,305	70,305	70,305	38,940	38,940	38,940		464,420

^X Requirements for March and April are not the same as the scheduled deliveries for these months shown in Table 1, page 3, since the latter are based on the prospective shipping and stock position.

^{XX} Actual requirements for delivery are increased 20% for all except the S'OLLO area for January and February to cover losses.

^{XXX} These totals are for the period January to August if added to total deliveries prior to 1 January shown in the preceding Table will not equal the figures shown for France for the entire period in Table 1, page 3, because the latter table shows issues for January and February and scheduled receipts for March and April.

BELGIUM

ANNEX - 2

Military Imports of Food Required for
Belgium, January - August, 1945 (net long tons)

Commodity	January	February	March ^a	April ^a	May	June	July	August	Total Delivery	Total for ²²² Shipment ²²²
Wheat	20,000	52,400	52,400	52,400	52,400	76,000	76,000	76,000	457,600	505,200
Flour	1,768	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1,768	1,862
Canned Meat	8,724	8,835	8,835	10,315	10,315	6,768	6,768	6,768	67,328	71,401
Meat & Veg. Stew	202	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	202	202
Fats	2,480	7,026	5,026	5,055	5,055	3,413	3,413	3,413	34,891	36,942
Soup	90	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	90	90
Cheese	1,141	1,227	1,227	1,407	1,407	1,374	1,374	1,374	10,531	11,355
Pulses	210	---	4,200	4,200	4,200	4,100	4,100	4,100	25,110	27,594
Sugar	1,045	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1,045	1,045
Salt	3,026	3,112	3,112	3,457	3,457	6,665	6,665	6,665	36,159	40,159
Evap. Milk	3,386	3,300	3,300	3,300	3,300	3,300	3,300	3,300	26,496	28,496
Coffee	930	1,416	1,416	1,573	1,573	1,504	1,504	1,504	11,420	12,541
Vit Chocolate	48	---	---	---	---	520	520	520	1,608	1,930
Total for Delivery	43,070	77,316	79,516	81,707	81,707	103,644	103,644	103,644	674,248	
Allowance for Loss (20%)	---	---	---	---	---	20,729	20,729	20,729	---	---
Reserve (Br. Zone)	---	---	3,705	16,024	16,984	---	---	---	---	36,713
Total for Shipment	43,070	77,316	83,221	97,731	98,691	124,373	124,373	124,373		773,319

- ^a Requirements for March and April are not the same as the scheduled deliveries for these months as shown in Table I, page 3 since the latter are based on prospective shipping and stock position.
- ²²² Actual requirements for delivery in U.S. Zones are increased by 20 per cent to cover losses. For the British Zone losses are covered by the reserve shown.
- ²²² These totals for the period January to August if added to total deliveries prior to January 1 shown in the preceding table will not equal the figures shown for Belgium for the entire period in Table I, page 3, because the latter table shows issues for January and February and scheduled receipts for March and April.

LUXEMBOURG

ANNEX - 3

Military Imports of Food Required for Luxembourg,
January - August, 1945 (net long tons)

Commodity	January	February	March /	April /	May	June	July	August	Total Delivery	Total for Shipment /
Wheat	500	4,800	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	23,300	27,560
Canned Meat	130	400	300	300	300	300	300	300	2,330	2,790
Fats	160	211	126	126	126	126	126	126	1,127	1,352
Cheese	--	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	280	326
Pulses	150	280	80	80	80	80	80	80	910	1,092
Sugar	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	126	1,008	1,209
Salt	160	160	126	126	126	--	--	--	698	836
Coffee	30	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	394	473
Evap. Milk	50	100	--	--	--	--	--	--	150	180
Vit Chocolate	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	240	288
Dried Eggs	--	10	10	10	10	--	--	--	40	48
Total for Delivery	1,356	6,209	3,890	3,890	3,890	3,754	3,754	3,754	30,477	
Allowance for Loss (20%) /	267	1,242	778	778	778	751	751	751		
Total for Shipment	1,603	7,451	4,668	4,668	4,668	4,505	4,505	4,505		36,572

/ Requirements for March and April are less than the program for these months shown in Table I, Page 3, because the program includes some backlog of unfulfilled requirements of previous months.

// Actual requirements for delivery are increased by 20% to cover losses

NETHERLANDS

ANNEX - 4

Military Imports of Food Required for Netherlands, January - August, 1945 (net long tons)

Commodity	January	Requirements exclusive of B ₂ area				All Netherlands			Requirements Total			
		February	March*	April*	May	June	July	August	Total Delivery	Total for** Shipment	for B ₂ Area Jan-May	Req.***
Uncooked cereal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	480	480
Wheat	-	500	500	500	500	-	-	-	2,000	2,000	-	2,000
Flour	3,461	5,400	6,311	20,695	35,666	84,100	83,100	85,100	321,833	376,293	45,200	421,493
Biscuits	-	4,061	4,061	-	-	18,000	18,000	18,000	62,122	73,413	62,240	135,653
Canned Meat	1,753	1,715	2,769	2,769	2,769	5,400	5,500	5,300	27,975	31,338	32,928	64,266
Meat & Veg. Stew	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,780	6,780
Fats	1,728	1,808	3,301	3,301	3,301	9,300	9,800	9,900	42,239	48,023	9,394	57,418
Dried Eggs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	335	335
Cheese	-	707	707	707	707	2,100	2,100	2,100	9,128	10,388	1,507	11,895
Canned Soup	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,271	3,271
Pulses	2,858	2,292	5,217	5,217	5,217	10,200	10,200	10,200	51,401	58,346	6,382	66,728
Dehydrated Soup	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,972	4,972
Sugar	-	-	1,074	2,019	2,964	11,000	13,300	14,600	44,957	52,757	10,757	63,494
Salt	659	638	1,485	1,485	1,483	5,200	5,200	-	16,146	18,226	5,445	21,671
Coffee	360	519	1,272	1,272	1,272	1,800	1,900	1,800	10,095	11,260	633	11,893
Evap Milk	3,617	635	635	635	635	4,000	3,500	3,200	16,857	19,157	3,247	22,404
Dried Milk	-	970	1,033	1,033	1,033	5,000	4,800	3,500	17,169	19,789	-	19,789
Vit Chocolate	239	535	1,268	1,268	1,268	3,500	3,500	3,500	15,078	17,263	4,493	21,756
Total for Delivery	14,675	19,780	29,631	40,899	56,815	159,600	160,400	155,200	637,000	-	197,957	-
Allowance for Loss (20%)**	479	1,453	1,453	1,453	1,453	31,920	32,080	31,040	-	-	-	-
Reserve (BR. Zone)	-	-	5,415	23,419	25,022	-	-	-	-	53,856	-	53,856
Total for Shipment	15,154	21,233	36,499	65,771	83,290	191,520	192,480	186,240	-	792,186	197,957	990,144

*Requirements for March and April are not the same as the scheduled deliveries for these months shown in Table 1, page 3, since the latter are based on the prospective shipping and stock position.

**Actual requirements for delivery in U.S. Zone are increased 20 per cent to cover losses in transit. For British Zone losses are covered by the reserve shown.

*** These totals for the period Jan-Aug if added to total deliveries prior to 1 Jan shown in the preceding table will not equal the figures shown for France for the entire period in Table 1, page 3, because the latter table shows issues for Jan and Feb and scheduled receipts for March and April.

SENAF FOOD REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPORTATION
(Net long tons)

	March	April	May	June	July	August
France	70,305	70,305 ³	70,305	38,940 ²	38,940 ²	38,940 ²
Luxembourg	4,668	4,668	4,668	4,505	4,505	4,505
Belgium	79,516	81,707	81,707	124,373	124,373	124,373
The Netherlands	81,631	93,100	127,583	191,620	192,480	186,240
Germany (primarily displaced United Nations Nationals)	65,103	111,323	127,900	266,527	260,464	246,605
¹ Reserves (Br. zone)	9,500	41,086	43,578			
Total:	310,923	402,189	455,686	625,865	620,762	599,663

1. - Covers 15% reserve in British zone against losses incident to shipping, transportation and distribution. Similar provision in American zone is already included in requirements above stated for each country.
2. - This figure is exclusive of wheat. Military authorities have planned no wheat import to France after May but French authorities estimate that limitations of internal transport will necessitate an import of an additional 250,000 tons of wheat in Southern France before 1 July, 1945.
3. - SENAF has recommended that the military food programs cease as of April 30 provided that the French can be given "reasonable assurance" of the shipping and supplies required to safeguard against disease and unrest as estimated by SENAF above.

SECRET

COAL

Prepared by Rosenberg Mission
London, England, April 15, 1945

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C O A L

Coal is the key to economic recovery in Northwest Europe. The shortages in the liberated countries are acute, and the present deficiencies will be magnified upon the liberation of Holland, Denmark and Norway. The details concerning the coal situation in Northwest Europe are set forth in the annex to this paper.

1) Rate of Production and Availability.

Present production in France is 65% of its prewar tonnage, in Belgium 49%, and in Holland 30%. Experts believe this production will rise slowly over the next 12 months to about 70%, 60% and 65% respectively at the end of the year.

The amount of coal available in these countries compared to consumption in 1937 (indigenous production plus imports) is 43% in France, 49% in Belgium, and 28% in Holland. Available supplies for Belgium and Holland will rise as rapidly as their indigenous production can be increased, for these countries were formerly virtually self-sufficient.

This will not be true of France, which always imported about 30 million tons to help meet her requirements of 75 million tons. The present off-shore imports to France, which are being brought in by SHALF under military priorities, are at the rate of about 2¹/₂ million tons a year, which together with her own production now gives her about 43% of her pre-war requirements.

Stocks on hand in all three countries are far below minimum stock requirements and coal is hoarded and consumed as rapidly as transport permits.

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2) The U. K. Position.

The coal budget for the U. K. for the coal year 1945-1946 shows a deficit in home requirements alone of 4,200,000 tons. The budget provides for shipments on SHAEF account up to August 31st, 1945, amounting to from 200,000 to 220,000 tons a month. All exports of British coal, except for 1,000,000 tons of waste going to Portugal, Spain and Ireland, will cease after that date in order to conserve all available production for home use.

3) Military Requirements and Imports.

The military are using approximately 700,000 tons of coal a month in Northwest Europe, 400,000 tons of which are being used in France. Military imports into Northwest Europe since January average approximately 225,000 tons a month, the balance being taken from local sources. SHAEF import requirements have been scheduled through August 1945 and the tonnage averaged approximately 290,000 tons a month. This requirement is for France alone, as the requirements for Denmark and Norway have not been phased for shipment. It is expected, however, that coal for these countries will be needed in early summer. The Danish requirements are 157,000 tons a month.

As stated above, U. K. indicated availability of coal against these requirements is 200,000 tons a month until the end of August 1945, at which time it ceases. The only other imports scheduled are 25,000 tons a month from the U. S. through Marseilles.

The SHAEF estimate of the minimum monthly import requirements for the first three months after V-E day is 573,000 tons. This requirement covers France (290,000 tons), Norway (126,000 tons) and Denmark (157,000 tons a month).

4) German Coal.

The future production and transportation of coal in Germany is subject to so many unpredictable and unforeseeable factors that no accurate forecast can be made. The best judgment of the experts investigating the German coal problem is that for several months after the occupation of Germany a production of 30-25% of the average obtained in Germany during the years 1939-1944 is probably the most that can be expected.

Total production of coal in Germany during the first year of occupation will probably be in the neighborhood of 50 to 65 million tons, compared with a pre-war average of about 250 million. It is also estimated that after allowing for the minimum domestic consumption of coal approved for use by the occupying powers, and coal needed for colliery operations, the amount which may be available for export from Germany will be somewhere between 10 and 12 million tons for the first 12 months of operation of the German mines. This would leave for domestic consumption less than 25% of Germany's pre-war domestic consumption. The demands of France, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Belgium against German coal in the first 12 months will probably be of the order of 40 to 50 million tons. There will in addition be the demands of the other European countries.

5) Shipment of Coal from the U. S.

The possible shipment of coal from the U. S. to Europe presents a shipping problem of the first magnitude. It would take 30 ships per month for each 100,000 tons of coal per month delivered to continental European ports, assuming each ship has a two-months turn-round and 7,000 tons cargo-carrying capacity.

6) Essential Mining Supplies.

There will be a large demand for essential supplies to carry on coal mining operations in Europe. Most important of these are oil and lubricants. Many other items, however, are scarce and not readily procured by many countries in Europe even in peacetime. Among others are hoisting cable, power transmitters, bearings, rubber conveyor belting, rubber and asbestos components, and rubber tape, rubber covered cables, and alloy metals.

7) Conclusions and Recommendations.

I have the following observations and recommendations to make concerning the coal situation in Northwest Europe:

A. The governments of the liberated countries of Northwest Europe should be advised immediately of the world coal situation and of the resultant fact that their minimum import requirements cannot be met for the first 12 months after V-E day.

B. Every effort should be made to exploit the coal resources of Europe to the fullest possible degree.

1) The time lag in procurement and delivery of essential mining supplies is seriously affecting the production of coal in Northwest Europe. I strongly recommend that the minimum import requirements for essential mining supplies and maintenance materials be accorded such procurement and shipping priorities as will assure their delivery in Northwest Europe at the earliest possible moment.

2) The maximum production of coal in Germany is imperative if we are to begin to meet the minimum needs of the liberated areas. In order to obtain maximum production of coal in Germany certain political decisions will have to be made. That is to say, the Allied Control Commission

or SHAEP, as the case may be, will have to be prepared to take steps which will include:

- a) Immediate shipment to Germany of those essential mining supplies and maintenance materials which are not presently accessible within Europe. The alternative to importation of certain of these supplies would be to seek to secure them from German production which would involve steps to rehabilitate or maintain important sectors of German industry.
- b) The rehabilitation of German mines which have been damaged by battle action or dereliction.
- c) The rehabilitation and restoration of German transport facilities to the extent necessary to transport mining supplies and workers and the coal which is mined.
- d) The supply of adequate food, clothing and footwear to the German miners to enable them to work.
- e) Provision of electric power necessary to produce coal in Germany even where that involves speedy and active rehabilitation of utilities within Germany.
- f) The use of enforced German labour where necessary.

It is obvious that these steps involve political questions which are not within my province to answer. Failure to take these steps, however, will impose critical and, I believe, insurmountable limitations upon the production of coal within Germany.

3) The U. S. should continue its active advocacy for the immediate establishment of the European Coal Organization.

G. I am convinced that the lack of coal in Europe will be a matter of grave political and economic concern to the governments of the liberated countries. I believe,

therefore, that the possibility of supplying some coal to these countries from the U. S. should be carefully examined. In this connection careful consideration should be given to the possibility of shipping coal during the immediate months after V-E day, when, I am advised, there will be a substantial but temporary easing of the shipping situation.

Prepared by Rosenman Mission
London, England, April 13, 1945.

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A N N E X

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C O A L T A R

A. Production within Northwest Europe.

1. France

- a) Production and Imports
- b) Condition of Mines and Equipment
- c) Pitwood
- d) Labor

2. Belgium

- a) Mining Districts
- b) Rate of Production
- c) Condition of Mines and Equipment
- d) Pitwood
- e) Labor
- f) Power

3. Netherlands

- a) Mining Districts
- b) Rate of Production
- c) Condition of Mines and Equipment
- d) Pitwood
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4. Germany

- a) Aachen Mining District
- b) The Krefeld District
- c) Supplies
- d) Pitwood
- e) Power
- f) Labor
- g) Operating Personnel
- h) Finance
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- 5. Other Areas.
- 6. United Kingdom.
- B. Transportation
 - 1. In General
 - 2. Railroads
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- C. Essential Supplies
- I. Shipping Implications
- F. Organization for Handling the Coal Problem
 - 1. SHMTF
 - 2. London Combined Coal Committee
 - 3. European Coal Organization

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A. PRODUCTION WITHIN WORKING RESERVES.

1. FRANCE

a. Production and Imports.

France is among the world's important coal producers, but even so, in order to meet all her requirements, a third of the coal consumed in peace time is imported. In 1936, for example, out of a total of 75,000,000 tons consumed, 45,000,000 tons were produced in France and 30,000,000 were imported.

There are three main sources from which indigenous coal is produced. They are:

(i) Nord and Pas-de-Calais with production in 1937 of 27,000,000 tons (57%).

(ii) Moselle, 1937 production 6,000,000 tons (13%).

(iii) Center and South France (known as South France for purposes of this report). This area consists of six widely scattered basins. 1937 output 14,000,000 tons (32%).

The types of coal vary greatly, not only from basin to basin, but also within individual basins. They range from high and medium volatile bituminous coals (67% of the total) down to semi-anthracite and anthracite coals (23%). There are also relatively small deposits of lignite. All the available types of coal are in urgent demand and, with the exception of the lignite, they are mined under difficult conditions.

b. Conditions of Mines and Equipment.

(1) The Nord-Pas de Calais was liberated early in September of last year. It was found that the enemy

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had had to retreat too rapidly to do any extensive damage and that, with the exception of two headgears which had suffered from bombing, there was nothing to cause any immediate difficulty. Certain main supplies were, however, urgently needed and the provision of these was arranged.

(ii) In the Moselle Area it was evident last Autumn that the Germans would not be evicted without hard fighting. It was considered probable before retreating they would sabotage the mines and remove key personnel. Steps, therefore, were taken to have sufficient French civilian mining and electrical technicians assembled so that any flooding could be dealt with immediately the mines were uncovered. Since 22nd November, 95 civilian technicians have been assembled from various parts of France, cleared and dispatched to this area. They are under the direction of two officers of the French Sub-Section and out of the six mines uncovered to date, four, though sabotaged, have been saved and are now in production. In addition to sabotaging electrical apparatus, the Germans removed certain essential equipment such as miners' lamps, conveyor belting and haulage locomotives.

(iii) Southern France. These mines were liberated in part by the 7th Army and in part by the FFI. The Germans were evicted so rapidly that they were unable to carry out systematic sabotage.

It was found that the mines, when uncovered, were short of many requirements essential to production. Up to date, 600 tons of emergency mine supplies have been imported and distributed by the Solid Fuel Section of SHAFF. Other consignments amounting to 700 tons have been ordered. Further requisitions are in process of

consolidation.

c. Nitwood

(1) Nord-Pas de Calais Lack of sufficient nitwood was evident upon liberation of the mines. This area depends largely for its supply on the LANDES forests some 500 miles away. To meet the situation it was found necessary to make delivery of indigenous nitwood a Communications Zone, G-4 Division, Solid Fuels responsibility. A target of 1,500 tons a day was established and this was increased on March 1st to 2,500 tons a day. Trucks, tires and gasoline were, in certain cases, made available to nitwood contractors. During November-December 1944 target delivery figures were surpassed with the result that by the end of the year the stocks at the mines have risen from a dangerously low level to 145,000 tons. During January and February of this year the deliveries, as anticipated, fell off due to bad weather conditions and the stocks at the mines in March stood at 127,000 tons. The mines use about 14,000 tons of nitwood a week.

(11) Moselle. Survey made by the French Solid Fuels Sub-Section disclosed the fact that in the forests near the mines there were 30,000 tons of nitwood ready cut. This will be enough to meet requirements for some time. Civilian transport was found in the locality to enable the necessary deliveries to be made.

(111) Southern France The position, though difficult, was not until recently considered acute, as most of the basins have sources of nitwood near at hand. In January, however, the stocks in some of the basins began to drop dangerously low. In consequence, target figures totalling 1,500 tons a day were established and made a Communications Zone, G-4 Division responsibility. The

position is gradually getting better and the stocks today stand at 75,000 tons. The mines use about 7,500 tons of bitwood a week.

d. Labor

In 1938, 215,000 miners produced 41,000,000 tons of coal. The output of the underground worker was 1.02 tons. The output per surface and underground worker was 0.69 tons. In December 1944 the output per underground worker was 0.965 tons. The output per surface and underground worker was 0.418 tons. If production for 1944 had been at the rate of the December production, therefore, the 236,000 miners then employed would have produced 30,000,000 tons.

It is believed that the ton per person production will improve as the mines are rehabilitated, living conditions improved and as additional rations are made available to the miners.

The discovery that liberation was going to increase the hardships and difficulties of living was a big disappointment to labor and has tended to produce discontent. The shortage of food, clothing, boots, and bicycles is serious and the matter is constantly under review. In regard to the food problem, G-5 Division was asked to make an investigation to find out what rations the miners were actually receiving. They reported that in spite of local shortages due to distribution difficulties, the miners are not, in their opinion, undernourished. Some clothing and boots have been distributed and more are to be provided by the Solid Fuel Section of SHAFB.

There appears to be a certain amount of insubordination in some of the mines, together with some FFI interference. The absentee figure is now about 17%

which, under present circumstances, is not considered excessive. The fact that the miners are prepared to work on Sundays to make up for loss in production due to the mines being idle on holidays is also encouraging.

2. MINING

a. Mining Districts

There are two coal-producing fields in Belgium, namely the Campine and South Basin. The South Basin consists of four districts -- Namur, Centre, Charleroi and Liège. All of the low volatile coals are produced in the South Basin, as are 60% of the medium volatile coals, and about 50% of the high volatile coals.

b. Rate of Production

Coal production in Belgium in 1939 was 29,000,000 tons. Under German occupation it dropped in the year 1943 to an estimated 23,700,000 tons. Since liberation, the production has risen from 650,000 tons in October 1944 to 1,030,000 tons in January 1945 and an estimated 1,062,000 tons in February 1945.

The estimated production through June 1945 is as follows:

March	1,200,000 tons
April	1,250,000 "
May	1,322,500 "
June	1,375,000 "

This is probably an optimistic prediction.

The minimum Belgian requirements for coal are estimated by the Belgian Government to be 2 million tons a month and by the SHAEP Mission to Belgium as 1,350,000 tons a month. The true figure is probably somewhere between the two estimates.

Based on estimated production for April the following allocations of coal have been made for the month:

Tons

224,600 transport:

192,500 for railways

16,600 naval

12,000 ports

6,500 compressed gas

3,000 miscellaneous

44,100 Allied armies

40,000 civil population (primarily for cooking)

100,000 central electricity

250,000 gas plants and cooleries

60,000 food industry

121,300 diverse industries, including 36,300 for military production.

18,000 Luxembourg

12,000 reserve

950,000

Coal used at the pit heads is not included in the foregoing schedule.

c. Condition of Mines and Equipment

The Belgian mines received little damage from battle action. This was probably due to the fact that the Germans were forced to withdraw quickly. Much damage was done and caused principally by allied air attacks, and most of this was damage to transportation facilities and switching yards.

Six requisitions for supplies and materials totalling some 2197 tons were placed for procurement with Gen 2 by the JHALP Solid Fuel Section between

November 15th and December 30th. These requisitions covered a six months supply of lubricants, glycerine, hoisting cable, wire, repair parts for air compressors, pneumatic hammers, jacks and ball bearings. Additional requisitions for tyres, medical supplies, cable and wire conveyor beltting are being processed. There are 112 tons of additional supplies which have been requisitioned to cover the period January 1st to March 1st 1945 consisting of finished and semi-finished asbestos bearings and bearing materials.

Up to March 1st approximately 20 tons of supplies have been delivered by the U.S. These consist chiefly of POL glycerine and ball bearings.

The amount of supplies ordered to date is not considered adequate to maintain production. Pressure is constantly being brought to bear upon the Belgian Government to impress upon the Government the seriousness of the problem of having adequate amounts of supplies available.

d. Pitwood.

When Belgium was liberated approximately 60,000 cubic metres of pitwood were in stock. These were distributed so that some mines had only a three day supply while others had sufficient stocks for three weeks normal production. An attempt was made by the military to produce 2,000 tons of pitwood per day from indigenous resources. Only half of this target was reached in October, November and December. As a result of the tactical situation in December, January and February, the chief source of pitwood, the Ardennes, was cut off and this resulted in the discontinuation of operation of some of the mines. As a result of this tactical situation, some pitwood was imported from the U.S. during

the latter part of January, the General Purchasing Agent of Com Z undertook procurement of bitwood in Portugal, and the French released some 30,000 cubic metres for temporary assistance. Stocks on hand in mid-February amounted to 32,100 metric tons which is sufficient for approximately 10 days' production.

The target for March and April is 2,500 tons a day and it is expected that this will be reached only with difficulty. Present bitwood production is approximately 2,000 tons a day. This is sufficient for the mining of 60,000 tons per day of coal.

e. Labor

In 1938, approximately 130,000 persons were employed in Belgian coal mines. In mid-February 1945 the total labor available was 106,000 workers.

During the German occupation of Belgium the Germans had used approximately 25,000 prisoners of war and impressed foreign workers in the mines. The liberation of Belgium and the freeing of these workers accounts in a large part for the shrinkage. It is believed that it will be difficult to bring the labor force back to the total required. Absenteeism is running in the neighborhood of 18%.

Following the liberation of Belgium there was considerable labor unrest. The miners ceased work on liberation in September and it was not until October that any semblance of order was obtained. Efforts to build up the morale of the workers were hampered by lack of transport for them and insufficient food and clothing. In January and February 1945, there were strikes which caused a sharp drop in production. The factors which contributed to the strike were lack of food, clothing and

transport and the failure of the Belgian Government and coal mine operators to recognize a new miners union which was said to have communistic affiliations. These strikes have now been settled by the new government and supplies of food rations and clothing are being made available to the miners by the 21st Army Group and GOW Z.

f. Power.

With a few exceptions, the coal consuming power generating system of Belgium was only slightly damaged by the Germans. The power plant at Gerynon was seriously damaged and this caused a temporary shortage in the Borinage (Bons) district. Power was made available from Belgium to the Dutch coal mines in the South Limburg province of the Netherlands for a short period to relieve the shortage there caused by the demolition by the Germans of Dutch power plants. Subsequently the flow of power was reversed and power was brought into Belgium from the Netherlands when lack of transport due to inadequate coal supply caused power generation difficulties in Belgium.

3. NETHERLANDS

a. Mining Districts.

All of the Netherlands coal is mined in the province of South Limburg. This province is located in the extreme south-eastern part of the country and is bordered on the South and West by Belgium and on the East by Germany. There are 12 producing coal mines in the Netherlands, 8 of which are privately owned and 4 are State owned.

Netherlands coals are classified as follows:

<u>Class</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Volatile</u>	<u>Production</u>
A	Dry and semi-bituminous	up to 10%	9.7%
B	Bituminous	10 to 15%	36.0%
C	Gas Coal	15 to 20%	3.2%
D	Long flame highly bituminous & plus E		51.1%

b. Rate of Production

In 1937 the Netherlands produced 14,300,000 tons, while in 1938 the production figure was 13,500,000 tons. In 1939 production dropped to 12,860,000 tons and in 1943 the production was 12,657,000 tons. Approximately 61% of coal produced in the Netherlands is from State-owned mines and 39% from privately owned mines.

The following table indicates the monthly net pithead tonnages, beginning in October 1944:

October 1944	176,873 tons
November 1944	196,691 "
December 1944	259,378 "
January 1945	314,000 "
February 1945	312,000 "

It is estimated that the monthly production for the period March through June 1945 will be as follows:

March	360,000 metric tons
April	415,000 " "
May	485,000 " "
June	520,000 " "

c. Condition of Mines and Equipment

The province of South Limburg was liberated during the latter part of September 1944. The Germans attempted to cause a complete suspension of the Dutch mining industry following their retreat. There was systematic demolition of all power in excess of that

required for running the mine pumps, and the Germans removed such operational supplies as pit lamps, spare machine parts, retorts, wire, conveyor belting, lubricating oil, fuel oil, food, clothing, trucks, automobiles and medical supplies. While the mines themselves suffered almost no battle damage, the removal of these essential supplies, coupled with the disruption and removal of rail and barge facilities, caused an almost complete cessation of the industry.

A requisition for emergency supplies was submitted in October 1944, and two subsequent requisitions were placed shortly thereafter. These total approximately 605 tons of supplies and were intended to cover a three-month period. Further requisitions for supplies for the period January 1st to March 1st have been placed. Receipts up to January 1st 1945 consist approximately of 40 tons of supplies, the largest part of which was fuel.

d. Pitwood

Normally 40% of pitwood used in the Netherlands mines came from indigenous sources. Of the 60% imported, 50% was supplied by Russia and Finland and 10% by Germany. At the time of the liberation of the Netherlands mines there was sufficient pitwood to produce only an estimated 364,000 tons of coal. Pitwood stocks steadily decreased through February, and as a result directives were issued to 21st Army Group and COM M to deliver and procure the necessary requirements, beginning March 1st. It is expected that the pitwood will come from Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and that some tonnages will be imported from Portugal.

The supply of pitprops is, however, hampered by the lack of sufficient transportation but is improving.

as trucks are made available by 21st Army Group for this purpose.

e. Labor

At the present time there are approximately 36,400 miners employed against an estimated requirement of 41,500. It is not expected that the obtaining of mine labor will be a serious problem, although production has been hampered by miners' strikes resulting from the lack of food, soap and transportation.

Under German occupation Dutch miners received a ration of 4,000 calories a day plus a bonus of gin and cigarettes for extra work and Sunday work. Throughout October, after liberation, the maximum allowance for miners was 1,600 calories a day. As of mid-February, however, the heavy workers' ration has gradually been increased to 3,300 calories a day. This is still below normal requirements. The clothing shortage is serious but is showing a slight improvement.

Coal mining operations in the Netherlands require a capacity of 105,000 kws electrical power. There are five power stations located in the mine area having a total installed capacity of approximately 250,000. The available capacity is somewhat lower due to insufficient boiler facilities. The maximum demand in the province was approximately 135,000 kws during the prewar years, of which 105,000 was consumed by the mines. The Germans destroyed all but 54,000 generating capacity in the area by demolishing the steam turbines. Successful repairs have been made, however, and there is now available sufficient generating equipment to produce approximately 200,000 kws.

4. ORGANY

a) Aachen Mining District

Maximum production in the Aachen District reached the figure of 7,934,000 tons in 1937/8 (coal year ends March 31st). The Germans successfully maintained good production during the war years; the estimated tonnage for 1943/44 being 7,334,000 tons. Aachen is one of the oldest mining districts of Germany but the more desirable seams have been exhausted. The coal produced is chiefly steam grade, but approximately 17% is used in the manufacture of coke. Only a small percentage of the Aachen coal is suitable for locomotive use.

The following mines have been uncovered in the Aachen district:

<u>Ischweiller Bergwerks Verein Group</u>	<u>Others</u>
Anna 1	Carolus Magnus
Anna 2	Karl Alexander
Adolph Berkstein	Sophia Jacoba
Maria	Edmuft (Brown coal)
Ischweiller	
Laurweg	

Four mines, the Anna 1, Anna 2, Adolph Berkstein, and Laurweg mines at Alsdorf and Kohlscheid were the least damaged and were selected for production. The Carolus Magnus and Karl Alexander mines are badly damaged, but are now ready for limited production when labor is available. Maria and Gouloy received severe damage and it will be some time before they can be put into production. Sophia Jacoba was recently uncovered. All personnel have been

removed and the condition of this mine is not known. The Eschweiler mine can be considered as lost. The brown coal mines at Zuknuft cannot be operated as all personnel were removed, in addition to essential equipment. Structures and buildings have received severe damage.

The German Solid Fuels Sub-Section of SHAEP is giving technical advice in respect to the selection of mines to be placed in operation and in operational matters.

b) The Krefeld District

A detachment of the German Solid Fuel Sub-Section has completed a preliminary survey of the Krefeld district which before the war produced about 6½ million tons a year. Underground workings have not been damaged or affected, and pumping is proceeding and production has started at two mines.

About half of the workmen employed at these mines were foreign, all of whom have been evacuated.

The pitwood stocks are low.

c) Supplies

The supply situation is not critical at the moment when considering available personnel and the tonnage of coal that can be produced. Combat troops who have occupied the area have removed many essential items of supply, particularly steel timbers, pitwood, miners' lamps, and electrical parts. Should conditions change and adequate personnel be provided, extensive requisitions for supplies and materials would be submitted to bring these mines up to or near capacity production.

The German Solid Fuels Sub-Section of SHAEP is taking aggressive action in order

to have present supplies safeguarded. They are surveying the supply situation in respect to future tonnage. Fifty-four tons of emergency supplies were requisitioned in December 1944, consisting chiefly of lubricants, explosives and soap.

An additional requisition for six tons of supplies was made in February.

A list of supplies required for the next six months' operations of the Aachen mines is in process of preparation.

d. Pitwood

Pitwood for this district will have to come from local sources. A survey is being made by the German Solid Fuels Sub-Section of SHALF so that proper planning can be completed to insure an adequate supply when needed. The major demand concerned will be given target tonnages for delivery when advisable. At the moment small stocks are at hand but this problem must soon be faced as these stocks are now being depleted.

e. Power

Adequate generating capacity is available for mine operation. Utility officers from G-5 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, have been studying this matter in coordination with the German Solid Fuels Sub-Section. One French electrical engineer with two French electrical technicians familiar with the equipment at the Karl Alexander and Carolus Magnus mines is supervising repairs to generating equipment at these mines. At the same time repairs are being accomplished at Kohlscheid and Alsdorf. Connecting power transmission lines are being rebuilt at the request of Solid Fuels

Section in order to gain maximum efficiency at existing power plants and conserve available coal stocks.

1. Labor.

Formerly the Aachen District mines employed approximately 25,000 workmen. Of this amount it is felt that a maximum of 2,800 can be recruited, and then only when the tactical situation improves. At present there are about 2,300 at work. Only a few additional workmen were obtained during the month of February and no immediate improvement is anticipated. The Germans employed a large number of Prisoners of War and other forced foreign labor; all were removed at the time of the German withdrawal, and are consequently not now available.

A serious problem has been created by the departure of practically all qualified top supervisory officials. None were found at the Carolus Magnus mine. Two remaining at the Karl Alexander mine were removed for security reasons. The largest company in the field, the Eschweiler Bergwerke Verein, had three qualified engineers left by the Germans to maintain the mines of that Company. These were removed recently in the program of de-Nazification of German industry so that no qualified top supervisors are now available for these mines. Three Dutch and three French engineers have been secured by Solid Fuels Section and attached to the German Solid Fuels Sub-Section to assist in the maintenance and operation of mines in the Aachen District. There are few skilled workmen left and a serious problem has thus been created with respect to repair and maintenance.

Awaiting entry into the German Saar are two officers and five enlisted men and twenty-five French civilian engineers of the German Solid Fuels Sub-Section to insure that proper measures are taken to prevent flooding of the mines and to organize available German personnel so that production can be started as quickly as possible. Additional French engineers are being processed so that they may proceed to the German Saar when needed as it is anticipated that the Germans will remove all top supervisory personnel. It is felt that the labor supply problem will be as serious as it is at present in the Aachen district.

The Belgian, French and Netherlands National Authorities have been requested to furnish technical mining personnel for the Ruhr. It is hoped that approximately fifty will be made available.

G. Operating Personnel.

The responsibility for safeguarding and maintaining the mines in the Aachen district rests with the Army Group of this area. Actual supervision is being carried out by military government officers and Civil Affairs detachments. Technical assistance is being provided by the German Solid Fuels Sub-Section. French civilian engineers are in charge of the Carolus Magnus and Karl Alexander mines, subject to the direction of military government officers. The remaining mines are being operated by German officials, also subject to the direction of military government officers.

H. Finance.

Approximately 1,000,000 reichsmarks were found at the mines when uncovered. This money was used to meet the initial payroll under the supervision of Civil Affairs officers. Through the efforts of the Solid

Fuels Section, the Finance Officers, G-5 Division, of the Army in the area has been provided with funds which he will advance to qualified mine officials to meet necessary expenses upon the presentation of proper certificates of necessity. As soon as possible, financial institutions in the Aachen area will be opened and will be provided with necessary funds to be advanced to the German mining companies when needed, and upon presentation of proper certificates by qualified officials.

1. Production.

Production has been limited due to the shortage of labor, lack of adequate supervisory personnel, and the fact that the mines have been located in the combat area. For some time the plants remained under enemy shellfire. Extensive general damage has prevented operation and in addition the tactical situation has limited circulation for security reasons. The German Solid Fuels Sub-Section has assisted in gaining permission from tactical unit commanders and military government officers for workmen to circulate so that they might travel to and from work. Actual production from the mines, Alsdorf and Kottscheid, began about the middle of October 1944, not long after the mines were occupied. Production during the month of September averaged approximately 4,000 tons a week, which tonnage was slightly less than that required to operate the mine power plants. Present stocks were, therefore, gradually depleted.

Net pithead production in the Aachen area is estimated as follows:

December 1944	17,000 metric tons
January 1945	18,000 " "

The stockpile as of February 27th was estimated at approximately 30,000 tons, of which approximately

10,000 tons was used. It is not anticipated that any material increase will result until additional labor can be recruited.

Production has increased since this time, and during the week 21-27 February the tonnage mined was approximately 6,000 tons, which tonnage is 1,000 tons in excess of power plant requirements.

5. THE NETHERLANDS

The minimum monthly imports requirements of areas which must be considered along with France, Norway and Denmark following the cessation of hostilities are estimated by SPAFF to be as follows:

Sweden	250,000 tons
Switzerland	225,000 "
Italy	150,000 "

The annual total of these requirements is approximately 7,000,000 tons.

6. UNITED KINGDOM

The U.K. coal position has been the subject of several independent studies and surveys. The facts which are set forth in these studies will not be repeated in this report. The following papers, however, are among the basic documents which have been assembled by the Mission and reference should be made to them for detailed analysis of the present and the prospective U.K. coal position:

- a. Report on the Coal Situation in Great Britain, 1943-4, 1944-5, by the Services of Supply, TUSA and the Harrison Mission, dated June 17, 1945.
- b. Second Report on the Coal Situation in Great Britain April 1944, prepared by the Mission for

Economic Affairs dated April 29, 1944.

- c. The European Coal Problem in the immediate post war years prepared by the Mission for Economic Affairs dated August 22, 1944.

The views which have been reached in the foregoing reports and which are held by the coal experts in the U.K. today, are that there has been, and will continue to be, a gradual decline in U.K. coal production. This decline will continue over the next few years. It is the opinion of these experts that the present U.K. coal consumption can not be met.

The total coal imports from the U.K. to Northwest Europe from June 1st 1944 to March 1st 1945 were 810,812 tons against SHAEP requirements of 1,336,400 tons. The Ministry of Fuel and Power has now stated that there will be no coal whatsoever available for export from the U.K. after August 1945. The U.K. has been unable to balance its own coal budget and faces at present a 4,200,000 ton deficiency for the next coal year for home consumption.

B. TRANSPORTATION.

1. In General.

The transport of coal in the European Theater is as much a problem as its production. During December 1944 approximately 2,700,000 tons of solid fuels and pitprops were transported in liberated Northwest Europe. This compares with the total tonnage of military supplies (ex solid fuels and POL discharged) imported into the continent during the same period of 3,130,000 tons. Extremely cold weather at the end of December and during the month of January lessened the efficiency of the railroads and immobilized canal traffic because of freezing. An acute transportation shortage resulted and the production of

solid fuels outran the means of transportation from the mines to points of destination.

The situation at the present time is that production and imports of coal on the one hand are about balanced by the availability of the means of transportation on the other. Since it is anticipated that solid fuel production will continue to increase gradually in France, Belgium and Holland during the next several months, much of this increase will have to be stockpiled unless additional transportation can be provided. Additional transportation means principally railroad transport.

2. Railroads.

Railroads carried the bulk of the coal distribution before the war and are doing so at the present time.

For the month of February 1945, 79% of the tonnage of solid fuels and pitwood transported in liberated Northwest Europe were carried by rail, the percentage by countries being as follows: France 83%, Belgium 65%, Holland 59%. The railroads, however, are operating under difficulties of wagon and locomotive shortages and are carrying a high percentage of military traffic. Out of a total of 135,000 open top wagons on the French and Belgian railroads, 70,000 or 53% have been allocated for the transport of solid fuels and pitprops. This allocation was based on the probable maximum number of wagons available rather than on requirements. In order to transport anticipated consumption needs, it is estimated that the daily rail wagon requirements for solid fuels and pitprops will gradually increase from 5,885 in February to 7,775 in June, an increase of 32%. If this figure is to be met, additional wagons and locomotives will have to be imported and, if possible, repairs to indigenous equipment will

have to be increased.

The pattern of coal distribution in pre-war Europe included a good deal of cross-haulings of special purpose coal. Because of the extreme shortage of rail cars this cross-hauling has now been cut to a minimum. For instance, imported coal is now distributed only in the area of France west of the zero longitudinal meridian with the exception of the port of Rouen and a few other localities requiring minor amounts of coal. Coal imported into Marseilles is used at the port and along the Line of Communication as far north as Lyons. The French authorities have been co-operative in holding down on wasteful cross-hauling of solid fuels.

3. Canals and Motor Transport.

Great destruction was caused to the inland waterways by the retreating Germans through the systematic sabotage of dams and locks. Much repair work has been done on the canals by both the Army Engineers and the local authorities, and canal systems of France, Belgium and Holland are fast returning to normal operation. It is not anticipated, however, that the percentage of tonnages that can be transported on the inland waterways will increase greatly from now on because of the shortage of barges and tugs compared to pre-war numbers. In February, it is estimated that the canals carried about 15% of the tonnage of solid fuels and pitprops in North-west Europe; 10% in France, 17% in Belgium, and 28% in Holland. Every effort is being made to increase the use of inland waterways so as to relieve the pressure on the railways.

Truck transport of solid fuels is only used for local distribution and does not play an important part in

the large movements. Through the co-operation of Communications Zone and 21st Army Group, however, some trucks, tires, and POL have been made available to the local authorities for the collection of pitprops and their transport to railheads and sidings.

C. ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES

Constant consideration must be given to the problem of procuring essential current supplies without which coal cannot be produced.

Coal mines require a multitude of both common and highly specialized items, few of which are carried in normal military stocks. Many items are required at a more or less uniform rate, depending on the tonnage of coal mined, conditions of mining, and local practice. The most essential among these are pitwood, explosives, oil, and lubricants. Many other items, the demand for which is difficult to estimate far in advance, are scarce and not readily procurable in many countries in Europe even in peace time. Among these may be listed hoisting cables, power transmission and rubber conveyor belting, other rubber and asbestos compounds, friction and rubber tape, rubber covered cables, and alloy metals for many uses.

Channels for procurement of supplies required for mine operation were established on October 11th, 1944. Determination of supply requirements in conjunction with the National Governments concerned became a function of Solid Fuels Section. The initiation of orders for the procurement of supplies and equipment not available at the mines nor available from national resources became a function of Solid Fuels Section. Procurement and delivery

of mine supplies became a Communications Zone responsibility.

During the period October 1st, 1944 to March 1st, 1945 a total of 6,631 metric tons of mine supplies (excluding mine timber) have been ordered. Of this amount, 3,665 metric tons, or 55%, consists of lubricants. The balance is made up of orders for belting for conveyor systems, pneumatic hose for compressed air-driven mine equipment, clothing and medical supplies for miners, repair parts for mine machinery, and miscellaneous expendable supplies. An estimated total of 1,074 tons of mine supplies, or 16% of those ordered, have been received. Standard petroleum products and lubricants are being secured from continental Army stocks. Special petroleum products such as turbine, steam cylinder, and transformer oils are being imported. Other materials are also being imported.

The following table shows metric tonnages requested by months and imports received originating from these requests.

Tons Requested by Months

Area	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Total	Rec'd to Mar 1 1945
Northern FRANCE	425	585	164	1,270	330	2,784	665
NETHERLANDS	69	595*	1	10	83	758	121
BELGIUM	-	1,874 ⁺	313	10	102	2,299	288
Southern FRANCE	-	-	532 ⁺	198	-	730	-
Western GERMANY	-	-	54	-	6	60	-
Total by Months	494	3,054	1,064	1,498	521	6,631	1,074

* Three months' requirements of all supplies.

+ Six months' requirements of POL, delivery called for on a monthly basis.

© Three months' requirements POL and clothing.

In process of compilation and not included in the above tonnages are mine supply requirements for the six months period following March 1st, 1945 for French, Belgian, Netherlands and uncovered German mines.

As an indication of the quantities of material required over the next six months period the requisition for Pas-de-Calais, France, now in preparation totals approximately 27,000 net tons, of which 22,000 tons consists of steel pitprops, arch roof supports, steel plates and other structural shapes. Other items consist of both finished products and raw materials from which finished products will be manufactured in Europe. The amount of material requested is screened to furnish the minimum requirements needed to maintain the present operations without allowance for rehabilitation or extension.

Supply requests from the Netherlands have been received in an orderly manner because the Netherlands National Government early established a central agency within the country to:

- a. Secure estimates of needs from all mines and
- b. Handle receipts and make allocations of supplies received.

The French submissions have been slow because the Central National Agency established in France to prepare requisitions has been unable to perform its function, principally because of lack of direct contact with the mines.

The Belgian agencies have been unable to establish a Central Agency with which the Solid Fuels Section can deal on supply matters. Their requests have been, and continue to be, received piecemeal.

Piecemeal requisitions are unsatisfactory because

the principal part of the industrial items required from the United Kingdom and United States plants are allocated some months ahead. It is, therefore, necessary that requests for industrial equipment and tools be in the hands of supply agencies in the United Kingdom or United States preferably six months ahead of need. This enables supply agencies in the UK/US to put in requests for mine supplies with the knowledge that these represent the total needs for the period stated.

For these reasons the Solid Fuels Section continues to submit "emergency" requisitions for France and Belgium.

D. SHIPPING IMPLICATIONS.

SHAEP estimates the minimum import requirements of coal for Norway, Denmark, Holland and France to be 573,000 tons a month. (The National governments minimum estimates are materially larger). Of this tonnage, 200,000 tons are locomotive coal.

The cost of shipping coal from the U.S. to Europe is the full time employment of 30 ships per month for each 100,000 tons of coal on the basis of an estimated two-months turn-around and 7,000 tons cargo capacity per ship.

It is clear that it is highly improbable that there can be any substantial shipments during either the European or Japanese war, except possibly during the first two or three months after VE-Day.

E. ORGANIZATION FOR HANDLING THE COAL PROBLEM.

1. SHAEP.

The responsibility for the coal problem in SHAEP is concentrated in Solid Fuel Section of G-4, Supreme Headquarters which was constituted in September 1944.

The Section was created to provide Supreme Headquarters with a central control of Solid Fuels for both Military and Civil use both by the exploitation of continental coal deposits and by importation. Sub-Sections of the Solid Fuel Section are operating in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.

As the magnitude of the coal program increased it became obvious that the relation between the military agencies and the National Government required clarification. As a result of a meeting in Paris with the French in September, 1944, a "Working Party" was formed in France upon which sit all interested military, as well as the representatives of those departments of the French Government concerned with the Solid Fuel problems. Similar working parties have been formed in Belgium and the Netherlands. There are no civilian representatives from the United States or U.K. on these working parties, either as members or as observers, although such representation has been requested by the civilian agencies.

2. LONDON COMBINED COAL COMMITTEE.

The Combined Coal Committees in London and in Washington were established in August and September 1943 respectively as Sub-Committees of CMWB and CMB. The terms of reference of the London Coal Committee are to report to the London Committee of the Combined Production and Resources Board and to the Minister of Fuel and Power on:

- a) The requirements of coal for overseas operational purposes and for conquered and liberated territories where the responsibility to ensure supplies rests with the British Empire or the U.S.A.
- b) Requirements of coal mining machinery to facilitate

the output of coal within the British Empire.

c) The sources and means of supply to meet (a) and (b).

3. EUROPEAN COAL ORGANIZATION.

In December 1944 it was proposed that there should be established a European Coal Organization. It was suggested that the European Coal Organization operate either as a Sub-Committee of the proposed European Economic Committee or that it be closely connected with it. The purpose of the organization would be to bring about the most effective distribution of coal and mining equipment on the Continent and the coordination of shipments from overseas.

Meetings with the British, Russians and French are now being held in London in the attempt to formally establish this organization. There has been general agreement that a European Coal Organization should be set up to coordinate European requirements and supplies in relation to world shortages of coal, mining labor and equipment. Final agreement, however, has not yet been reached as to the method by which such an organization will function. The question of whether the organization is to have executive and administrative powers, as favoured by the U.K. and the French, or whether it would be purely advisory, as favoured by the U.S. and the Russians, has been the subject of extensive discussion. A further factor which has been the primary obstacle to the formal organization of the ECO is the position which the Russians have taken concerning the disposition of German coal. The Russians have insisted that a statement be included in the terms of reference which would give priority to reparation demands. The other participants in the discussions have taken the

position that this would be inappropriate in such a document. The Russians have also raised the question of membership of the Polish Lublin Committee, which is unacceptable to the U.S. and the U.K.

In order to get on with the vitally important work proposed for the European Coal Organization the U.S., U.K., and French representatives are now discussing the possibility of establishing a Northwest European Coal Committee, inviting the Russians to sit in as observers or members as they may choose.

The establishment of some European committee to deal with the coal problem is considered by the American and British coal experts to be absolutely essential so that the maximum utilisation of coal, equipment and labor can be achieved.

Prepared by Rosenman Mission
London, England, April 15, 1945.

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AVAILABLE. EVERY TECHNICAL
EFFORT HAS BEEN TAKEN TO
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INTERNAL TRANSMISSION

Prepared by Rosenman Mission,
London, England, April 15, 1945

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INTERNAL TRANSPORTATION

INTRODUCTION

The two most critical limiting factors upon the rehabilitation of Northwest Europe and its return to economic stability are coal and internal transport.

The Northwest European countries have relied for the internal distribution of supplies upon railroads, inland waterways and motor transport. It is generally true to say that the order of importance of inland transportation facilities in France and Belgium is 1) railroads, 2) inland waterways and 3) motor transport. In Norway, Denmark and Holland the order of importance is 1) waterborne transport, 2) highway transport and 3) railroads.

I have personally observed the internal transport conditions in France, Belgium and in the presently liberated area of Holland. Because they are still occupied by the enemy, it was not possible to obtain first-hand information about the transport situation in Norway, Denmark and occupied Holland. However, the condition of transport found in the areas already liberated is indicative of what may be expected in areas still occupied by the Germans.

It can be stated generally that all of the liberated areas are extremely short in all three methods of internal transport. Our own bombing and artillery fire has created substantial damage to railroad facilities. Similar damage to bridges and other inland waterway installations has seriously affected the capacity of the barge lines.

In their withdrawal, the Germans carried out extensive demolition of railroad bridges and maintenance facilities and locks and bridges across the canals. Moreover the Germans, during the

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period of occupation, removed very substantial numbers of locomotives, railroad cars, canal barges and motor trucks from the areas which they occupied.

Even the small amount of transportation equipment available in Northwest Europe after liberation has been capable of use by the local governments on only a very limited scale. This has resulted from the over-riding military priority for the use of all forms of inland transport for the movement of troops and supplies.

SHAEP and Headquarters Communication Zone, U.S. Army, advise me that VE-Day may not result in any significant decrease in the military use of inland transport facilities, although it is not capable of definite ascertainment at this time. Moreover they indicate that there may in fact be some increase in the use by the military of inland transport facilities due to the requirements for the re-deployment of troops and supplies. In the case of the American army, this will particularly affect France. Present plans for the re-deployment of American troops not required for the occupation of Germany contemplate that they will be re-deployed through France. During this period there will continue to be a constant burden upon French inland transport for the movement of troops and supplies. A similar burden will no doubt be cast upon Belgian, and to some degree Dutch, facilities in order to accomplish the re-deployment of British and Canadian forces.

In an attempt to evaluate the existing and potential inland transport situation, I have discussed the problem with transport experts at SHAEP headquarters, with the transportation representatives of the various SHAEP country Missions and with the interested Government officials in the various countries. The information which I have obtained is detailed below.

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RAILROAD TRANSPORT

Railroad transport is in the main the basic method for internal distribution in the countries which I have studied. The shortage of coal for locomotive power constitutes a definite limitation on the rapidity with which rail transportation can approach pre-war levels. This problem I have discussed in detail in my report on the coal situation. In this report I propose to limit my discussion to the railroad situation and to the condition of physical plant and equipment.

1. Condition of Ways and Structures.

A. France.

At the end of 1939 prior to the German occupation of France, there were in operation by the French railways 26,377 miles of permanent way. On 15 September, 1944, which, for practical purposes, was the earliest date Allied forces could commence rehabilitation of French railways, there were in operation 11,313 miles of way. By 1st March, 1945 sufficient restoration of the French railway system had been accomplished by the French, supplemented to a very large extent by military railway and engineering troops, so that there were then in operation 24,564 miles of permanent trackage.

In other words, by 1st March 1945 a 93% of restoration of railroad ways in France had been accomplished. In effecting this restoration the Allied authorities reconstructed 14,282 miles of mainline track and 850 miles of sidings. Although the trackage actually restored to operation is approximately 93% of pre-war trackage, the complete use of these ways has not been restored by an equivalent percentage. This is largely because of the temporary character of the reconstruction of bridges and tunnels accomplished by the military authorities.

As the result of allied bombing or German demolition,

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there were 1,005 railway bridges and tunnels badly damaged or destroyed. Of these there have now been repaired and returned to service 595. However, as stated above, the restoration has been in almost all cases of a temporary and emergency character, e.g. the use of wooden bridges rather than steel and the replacement of double-tracked bridges with single-track structures. However it is fair to say in conclusion that, so far as railroad ways are concerned, the facilities restored are more than adequate to carry any traffic which present and potential power and rolling stock can handle within the immediate and foreseeable future.

B. Belgium.

Prior to the German occupation, the Belgian railway system included 3,064 miles of permanent way. By the 1st March 1945, 2,926 miles of permanent way were again in operation. Rehabilitation of the Belgian railway trackage required construction or repair of 2,370 miles of mainline tracks and approximately 500 miles of sidings. As a result of allied bombing or German demolition, the number of bridges and tunnels badly damaged or destroyed was 358, of which 295 have been repaired and restored to service.

The physical situation and the capacity of the Belgian railroad ways is in comparable condition to those in France. As in France, it appears that in Belgium the condition of railroad ways should not be a limiting factor upon the ability of the Belgian railways to handle such cargo as may be anticipated in the foreseeable future.

C. Holland.

As only a very limited area of Holland has now been liberated, an overall picture of the condition of railroad ways in Holland as a whole is not available. It is fair to say, however, that the railroad way conditions in Holland can be

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expected to be worse than those which prevail in France and Belgium, and therefore will require greater reconstruction effort. The demolition experience in Belgium and France was between 10 and 15% on track, 75% on major bridges and 10% on small bridges. In the liberated area of Holland the demolition experience on track has varied from 10-85%, but the bridge demolition was approximately 100%. In liberated Holland all railway bridges except one were badly damaged or destroyed.

D. Norway and Denmark

Presently available information indicates that no substantial destruction of railroad ways and structures has taken place to date in either Norway or Denmark. There is always the possibility - perhaps the probability - that damage may be suffered prior to actual liberation.

III Locomotives.

A. France.

Prior to German occupation, the total locomotives on French railways were 16,575, of which 14,693 were serviceable. As a result of German withdrawals and allied bombing, this amount prior to allied liberation dropped to a total of 11,700, of which only 7,613 were serviceable. It will be seen from these figures that the serviceable locomotives in France were reduced during the German occupation by nearly 50%. At the present time, as a result of restoration and allied imports, the total of the locomotives in France is 14,712, of which 9,479 are serviceable. It is apparent that to bring the power of French railroads back to pre-war levels will require an additional 5,000 locomotives. Moreover, many of the locomotives now in operation are very old and inefficient in their operation, and require continuous heavy maintenance

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in order to keep them in operation.

B. Belgium.

Prior to the war the total number of locomotives available on Belgian railroads was 3,500; of these, the Germans removed 1,000. Of the 2,500 remaining, only approximately 1,500 are in working order; and only approximately 25% of the 1,000 bad order locomotives are capable of repair. In Belgium, approximately 113 locomotives are now under construction under contracts initiated by the Germans. Delivery is expected to begin at the rate of approximately 10 locomotives a month some time during the summer of 1945, but delivery cannot be completed before 1946. It follows from the foregoing that between 2,000 and 2,500 locomotives will be required in Belgium to restore the power to pre-war level. The physical condition of the locomotives now operating in Belgium is somewhat better than the condition of French locomotives, and less maintenance will be required to keep locomotives now operating in continuous operation.

C. Holland.

Detailed information as to the comparative locomotive situation of Dutch railroads as between now and pre-war is not available, and will not become available until after the liberation. However, the extensive demolition practised by the Germans in Holland and the large scale removals from Holland of motor transport and barge equipment indicate that similar practices will have been followed in the case of rail equipment, and that a very real shortage of locomotive power may be anticipated.

D. Norway and Denmark.

Locomotives available in Denmark are at approximately pre-war levels. However, Denmark has no indigenous coal with

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which to fire its locomotives, nor does it have indigenous petroleum to lubricate them. It is anticipated that existing resources of coal and petroleum will expire in Denmark on July 1st. Thereafter the operation of her railroads will depend upon importation of these items.

So far as Norway is concerned, the Germans during occupation have added to the locomotive population. However, operation of Norwegian railroads will be dependent entirely on the importation of coal, lubricants and bearings, none of which are locally obtainable.

III. Railroad Cars.

A. France.

Prior to German occupation French railroads had a total of 466,509 railroad cars, of which 404,116 were serviceable. Upon liberation, these totals had been reduced, as a result of military operations and German withdrawals, to a total of 203,560 cars, of which only 173,926 were serviceable. At the present time, due to repair of French equipment and allied importations, the total number of cars on French railroads is 260,583 of which 194,201 are serviceable. It is apparent from the foregoing that the serviceable cars on French railroads are to-day less than 50% in amount of those available prior to German occupation.

B. Belgium

Prior to German occupation the aggregate number of railway cars on Belgian railroads was approximately 90,000. Today there are slightly in excess of 60,000 cars operating on Belgian railroads, of which about 19% are now currently in repair shops. The percentage of cars under repair was stated to be normal and covers all types of repairs from light running repairs to heavy reconstruction types.

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C. Holland.

As was the case with respect to locomotives, no detailed information as to the car situation in Holland is available. It is expected by the military authorities that, due to heavy German withdrawals of equipment, car shortages in Holland will be proportionately higher than those found to exist in France and Belgium.

D. Norway and Denmark.

The railroad car situation in both Norway and Denmark is substantially as favorable as was the case before the war. In Norway, although there has been some decrease in passenger equipment, there have been increases in the number of freight cars in operation.

IV. Maintenance Facilities.

A. France and Belgium.

Facilities for the maintenance of locomotives and cars in both France and Belgium suffered substantially from allied military bombing and in a lesser degree from German demolition.

Although the facilities have been substantially reduced for the reasons indicated, in both countries existing facilities are adequate to maintain equipment currently available. One of the serious difficulties in maintenance presented during the past winter was the fact that round houses and shops, although in working condition under moderate weather conditions, were not completely operational during the winter months because of destruction of roofs and lack of coal. Repair to roofs during the summer months should increase the efficiency of round houses and other maintenance facilities. Subject to repair of roofs and provision of heat, the capacity of French locomotive maintenance facilities is substantially restored to pre-war levels. The

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capacity of car repair shops in France has not been as completely restored. Prior to German occupation large car repair shops in France had a capacity of 742,100 hours. Their present capacity is approximately 270,000 hours. Small car repair shops in France had a pre-war capacity of approximately 1,000,000 hours, which now is limited to approximately 1,250,000 hours. However, the best estimate available is that French maintenance capacity both for locomotives and cars can be kept abreast of the repair demands which will be placed upon them.

B. Belgium.

The maintenance facilities in Belgium were not subjected to as heavy damage as were those in France. Detailed statistical data by which a comparison of present capacity and pre-war capacity can be made is not available. However, both military and civilian agencies agree that Belgian maintenance facilities presently existing are adequate.

C. Holland.

No definite information is available with respect to railroad maintenance facilities in Holland.

D. Norway and Denmark.

It is understood that railway maintenance facilities in Norway and Denmark are, at least up to the present time, in substantially as good condition as was the case before the war.

V. Impact of Military Requirements on Railroad Transportation Systems in Liberated Areas.

A. France.

Probably the most accurate statistics available to reflect the impact upon the French railroad system of military transportation demands are the figures indicating respectively the military and civilian tonnage carried. In the first few

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months after the beach landings the civilian tonnage carried on the French railroads was very small compared to the military tonnage. This situation resulted from the disturbance caused by the advance of our armies. In February, 1945, after conditions in France had become comparatively stabilized, aggregate tonnage was 8,300,000 tons, of which 5,500,000 tons constituted military supplies and 2,800,000 tons, or 34% of the total, constituted French civilian tonnage. When it is remembered that the overall capacity of the French railroads is somewhat less than 50% of the pre-war normal, it is apparent that the railroad transportation currently available for French civilian needs is in the neighborhood of 15% of the pre-war availability.

B. Belgium

It is estimated that the current total daily carrying capacity of the railway system is approximately 100,000 tons. Today available capacity is divided approximately as follows: 57,000 tons for military traffic, 22,000 tons for coal, 15,000 tons for Belgian civilian traffic and 6,000 tons for Netherlands traffic. When it is remembered that total rail capacity in Belgium is approximately two-thirds of that prevailing before the war, it is apparent that the share in this capacity available for Belgian civil traffic is very small compared to their pre-war availability.

C. Holland, Norway and Denmark.

Since the major part of Holland has not yet been liberated, as is likewise the case with Norway and Denmark, it cannot be said that the allied military make any demands upon their rail systems. This, of course, is not applicable to the relatively small liberated area of Holland where military demands

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are utilizing almost all of the rail capacity available.

INLAND WATERWAYS.

1. Condition of Ways.

A. France and Belgium

The navigable waterway system of France and Belgium consists of a combination of rivers and canals connected with a system of dams and locks. This system aggregates 4,125 miles, of which on March 1st, 1945, 2,438 miles or 59% of the total were in active service. It was expected that there would be heavy demolition of dams and locks by the Germans as they withdrew. Although such destruction was attempted it was comparatively ineffective. A greater problem in restoring the inland waterway system to full capacity was the necessity for removal of many bridges crossing the canals and rivers which were destroyed and which effectively blocked movement on the canals for some period.

Repair to dams and locks is going forward continuously, as well as removal of bridges, sunken craft and other impediments to navigation. It is estimated that the Belgian portion of the France-Belgium internal water-way system is 95% operable. In France the first priority has been given to the rehabilitation of the waterways having the greatest military significance. As a result, the Seine and Rhone sections of the French inland waterway system have been substantially restored. It will be some time before the net-work in the north and north-east will be restored to normal operation. However, both French authorities and army engineers are continuously at work, repairing damage with the result that additions to the waterways are being put into operation each week.

B. Holland.

The principal inland waterways in Holland lie within the area which is still occupied by the Germans. Therefore the

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condition which will be discovered upon liberation is unknown.

C. Norway

In Norway, internal distribution by water is accomplished by coastal shipments rather than by canal or river. As soon as the mines can be cleared, Norway's coastal waterways should be completely operable.

D. Denmark

No problem as to waterways was reported in Denmark.

II. Barge and Coaster Population

A. France, Belgium and Holland

The exact statistics with respect to the present barge population in France, Belgium and Holland, as compared with that existing before the war, are not available. However it is clear that in all three countries there has been a substantial reduction in the barges available for operation.

This results primarily from two causes: (a) withdrawal by the Germans for the use of German waterways and (b) deterioration due to lack of adequate maintenance. The SUMMIT Mission to Belgium estimates that the present barge population is from 50-55% of the pre-war barge population. However, because German withdrawals were concentrated on the larger capacity barges, the present barge population is capable of handling only slightly in excess of 40% of the pre-war traffic. It is fair to estimate that the situation in France is comparable to that of Belgium. German withdrawals of all types of equipment from Holland have been proportionately greater than those in France. As a result, it is probable that the barge population of Holland will be found to have been reduced to an even greater extent than was the case in France and Belgium.

B. Norway and Denmark

In Norway and Denmark the limiting factors will

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not be lack of craft. Here, as is the case with their railroads, the limiting factors are fuel and lubricants. Craft in these areas are powered both by coal and diesel fuel. Neither the materials for power nor those for lubricating purposes are available locally either in Norway or Denmark. As a result, if their internal water transport systems are not to be paralyzed, these materials must be imported.

ROAD TRANSPORT

A. France

The French Government estimates that the truck population of France pre-war was 473,500, which had been reduced by February, 1945 to 137,500.

My own observation throughout France was first, that there were very few cargo-carrying vehicles on the roads and second, that those in operation were old, obviously in a bad state of repair and subject to frequent road failures. No new motor vehicles have been made available for French civilian use between June, 1940 and the early part of 1945.

Moreover the production of essential spare parts and batteries during the period of German occupation was diverted very largely to German military use. The result was an abnormally high mortality of civilian vehicles. This mortality has been accelerated since liberation, because deficiencies in rail transport have caused an increased burden on France's motor transportation facilities. A further limiting factor has been a very great tire shortage.

SHANF advised me that in its opinion the stated French requirement for 100,000 new vehicles was not excessive.

France is beginning production of new trucks on a limited scale. The extent to which this production can be enlarged is dependent upon the amount of coal which can be

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made available for industrial production, necessary imports of raw materials, and improvement in the internal distribution system.

D. Belgium

Comparatively, Belgium's motor transport is in better condition than that in France. Belgium is a much smaller and more compact country than France. In addition to an extensive railway net-work and a large canal system, Belgium is served by an extensive system of inter-urban tramways. As a result, Belgium's dependence upon truck transport is comparatively less than that of France. In 1938 Belgium had a truck population of 77,600. In late February, 1945 this had shrunk to approximately 37,600, of which approximately 6,000 were not in operation due to lack of tires. SHA's transportation people estimate Belgium's requirements for trucks at 10,000 3-ton vehicles.

E. Holland

The highway transport problem in Holland is extremely acute. My own observation in liberated Holland indicates that there is almost total absence of motor transport, removal by the Germans having been practically complete.

Distribution of local supplies in the presently liberated areas has been made possible only because of the assignment by 21 Army Group of three military truck companies with 600 vehicles which have devoted their entire time to assisting in the internal distribution of supplies in the area. It is expected that a similar situation will be found in the presently occupied areas. SHA's Headquarters estimated that the number of vehicles which will be required are approximately 12,000. They also stated that, initially, even greater numbers of motor vehicles will be required in order to accomplish essential internal distribution. The additional supplementary vehicles required in the initial stages can probably be provided from military sources on a temporary basis.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. I am deeply impressed with the fact that no substantial economic rehabilitation can take place and that in many areas even a minimum subsistence economy cannot be maintained unless prompt action be taken to improve the internal transportation situation in Northwest Europe as rapidly as possible. I appreciate that immediate and complete rehabilitation is impossible.
2. I recommend, however, that every possible assistance be given the liberated countries not only in according high priorities to their requirements for rolling stock and locomotives but also in their efforts to rehabilitate their railway maintenance and repair shops.
3. Every possible assistance should be given to the liberated areas in allocating raw material for the local production of locomotives and wagons.
4. A survey should be made immediately by the U. S. Army of the number of Army trucks in the theatre which might be available after V-E day for assignment or transfer to the governments of the countries of Northwest Europe.
5. The possibility should be earnestly explored of increasing the rate of reconditioning for their benefit worn-out trucks both in the theatre and in the United States, if the latter is feasible on shipping grounds.

Prepared by Rosenman Mission
London, England, April 15, 1945

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THE UNITED KINGDOM AS AN IMMEDIATE
POST V-E DAY SUPPLIER OF THE LIBERATED
AREAS OF NORTH WEST EUROPE

Prepared by the Roserian Mission
London, England, April 15, 1945

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- C. Coal
- D. Consumers Goods (Other than Food)
- Conclusions

THE UNITED KINGDOM AS AN IMMEDIATE POST VE-DAY SUPPLIER
OF THE LIBERATED AREAS OF NORTH WEST EUROPE

It has become increasingly apparent that supplies of many kinds may not be available in the immediately forthcoming months in sufficient quantities to meet the minimum requirements of the liberated areas of North West Europe. While this applies with particular emphasis to coal, transportation, and high-protein food, still there will also be a dearth of many other products which are needed to maintain health, and reactivate industry.

In this connection much thought has been given to the question whether the United Kingdom will be able to make supplies available in substantial quantities either from (1) stockpiles of food and raw materials previously imported, or from (2) new production of consumers and capital goods.

Discussions in reference to these products which have been stockpiled in the United Kingdom in greater than usual quantities as a precautionary war measure are now taking place at the ministerial level in Washington. It is expected that decisions will there be made.

Therefore, the United Kingdom as an immediate or early post VE-Day supplier of food products and raw materials other than coal will be considered only briefly in this paper.

A. FOOD:

In view of the food stockpile discussion now under way, no attempt will be made to estimate the tonnage which might be made available from the food stockpile to the liberated areas. Nevertheless, it can be stated that the tonnage of certain food products, estimated to be available in June, 1945, substantially exceeds the peace-time reserves. It is estimated that reserves of food products for which the United Kingdom largely depended upon imports were sufficient, in pre-war years, for a three to

three and one-half months supply. It is estimated that in June of this year the stockpile will total about 5,000,000 tons, or a five months supply.

The food stockpile comprehends many items and the quantity available in the stockpile may bear different relationships to normal peacetime stocks for different items. Therefore, it is necessary to study the composition of the stockpile as well as the over-all amount in order to determine possible availabilities for transfer from the stockpile to the Continent.

Perhaps a reserve supply of this quantity is still necessary in view of U-boat warfare, shortages of shipping, irregularities of ship arrivals, and other uncertainties in the situation. If a joint decision is made, however, that the stockpile can be reduced without unnecessary risk, it is generally agreed that this should be done not through direct transfer from the United Kingdom to the Continental countries, but rather through a diversion of shipments from supply sources which otherwise would have gone to the United Kingdom.

In any event, it is probable that the United Kingdom stockpile can be used to a limited extent for direct shipment to the Continent under conditions of grave emergency.

B. RAW MATERIALS:

While the situation varies for particular products, the conclusion appears warranted that substantial quantities of certain raw materials in the United Kingdom stockpile might be made available for Continental use if the difficulties of handling and shipping warrant such transfer rather than direct procurement of supplies from original sources. In addition to pipeline stocks there are in most cases special contingency reserves which the Minister of Production deems necessary to enable him to meet his various obligations. These contingency reserves were set at three months net consumption. This measure was used because, in the opinion

of the shipping people, it takes about three months to correct a supply difficulty in any particular material. Both as the result of the high level of war-time production and the need of assurance that supplies will be available when needed, the stockpile is in excess of peacetime reserves.

Present raw material stocks in total are lower than the aggregate of pipeline stocks plus the three months contingency reserves. For some particular items, however, actual stocks are above the total required amount and, therefore, could be reduced without unnecessary risk. Among these products are cotton, wool, copper and other non-ferrous metals.

However, if a decision is reached during the current negotiations that the stockpile of certain items can be reduced for the benefit of liberated areas, it may be desirable to divert shipments which were destined for the United Kingdom rather than to transfer tonnage in the United Kingdom directly to the Continent.

Nevertheless, it is probable that the United Kingdom will not wish to reduce its stockpile of raw materials as it would be more advantageous to utilize these reserves in manufacturing industries and subsequently to export finished products.

C. COAL:

The United Kingdom as a supply source of coal for liberated countries has been fully treated in the section of this report dealing with coal. It is sufficient to note in this section that the British coal position has gradually deteriorated, and that the delivery of additional tonnage to the Continent would seriously jeopardize transportation, industrial activity, and domestic consumption in forthcoming months in the United Kingdom. In the opinion of coal experts in the United Kingdom, the combination of declining coal production, seriously depleted reserves, and the inability further to decrease British domestic consumption will soon prohibit the continuation of coal exports now being made

through military channels to liberated areas.

D. CONSUMERS GOODS (Other Than Food):

During the war the production of consumers goods in the United Kingdom has been severely curtailed. Early in 1941 it became apparent to officials that the civilian goods industries would have to have their labor supplies cut down, their raw materials supplies curtailed even more severely than formerly, and consequently their production activity even further reduced.

With these considerations in the background the Board of Trade informed the textile industry, the footwear industry, the paper industry, and a considerable number of minor "non-essential" industries that they would be required to concentrate their manufacturing facilities in a suitable number of nucleus firms.

As a result, civilian production was discontinued in thousands of factories and 50,000,000 square feet of factory space was released for other purposes. There was a substantial cut in the production of textiles and clothing. Over 50% of the reduced capacity is used for Government requirements, another 33% for civilian requirements, and the remainder for exports, largely for the Empire.

A substantial increase in the production of consumers goods cannot be expected immediately after VE-Day since it will be some months before a sizeable work force becomes available and can be shifted to the consumers goods industries. The Government's policy is to relax certain controls over manpower; nevertheless, it will retain sufficient power to keep the war industries manned, and to channel the movement of labor from war production into the essential consumers and capital goods industries. Some loss in the total labor availability will however occur since control of certain age groups and women workers will undoubtedly be withdrawn. There will also be a manpower loss from a substantial group of individuals

who, though physically unfit, remained at work through patriotic motives. In the demobilization problem, priority in discharge will probably be given to former workers in the building trades since housing and other physical reconstruction demands will have the highest of all priorities for labor.

Without additional production during the early postwar months it is difficult to see how the United Kingdom can be an important source of supply of consumers goods for the liberated areas. While there would be every desire to furnish such goods to the continent in order to reactivate the export trade, there will be many competitive demands for current output. At certain times during the war, the available volume of particular consumers goods has not been sufficient to maintain established rations. Furthermore, home consumption of many types of consumers goods during the long years of the war has been less than one-half of normal; and stocks in the hands of manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and, particularly, in the hands of consumers, are at a low level.

From the point of view of political feasibility, it is doubtful whether substantial volumes of consumers goods could be exported in view of domestic needs. There is, in addition, a substantial deferred demand from various parts of the Empire which must be met, at least in part. While there may be odd lots of merchandise which will find their way to the Continent, particularly textiles, still the volume of exports will not be great even though some may be dictated by political considerations.

E. CAPITAL GOODS:

There is considerably greater prospect that a substantial volume of capital goods may be made available to the liberated nations in the early months after V-E day.

The capital goods industries were war-inflated rather than war-restricted; and conversion to the production of peacetime

goods in certain instances will not be difficult.

The production capacity for railway wagons was converted to the extent of 80% for military items, but, according to the Ministry of Production, reconversion can take place quickly. In fact, the Ministry already has a program established for deliveries of locomotives and wagons to France in the last quarter of 1945 and the first quarter of 1946.

As for motor vehicles, there is a considerable production of trucks; and the military trucks made in the United Kingdom are more nearly like civilian trucks than their United States counterparts. In addition, there are used vehicles in the United Kingdom available for repair; and a significant number of reconditioned units have already been sent to France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

It is possible, however, to be too optimistic about the likelihood of substantial exports. It must be remembered that many economic facilities in the United Kingdom have not received sufficient repair and replacement during the war period, and that obsolescence has accumulated. The deferred maintenance is strikingly indicated by a recent report that approximately 20% of the United Kingdom's electrical power equipment is inoperative more or less constantly because of needed repairs, as compared to a normal figure of 5%. It is said likewise that flour milling machinery has been worked so incessantly in the war years that certain plants are now incapable of use.

Moreover, throughout the Empire and in other markets normally supplied through the export trade, there is likewise deferred maintenance on capital equipment which originated in the United Kingdom. As in the case of consumers goods, there will be strong competing demands for automotive, railway and electrical equipment, and a host of smaller items which will be needed everywhere for repair and maintenance purposes.

However, long-term self-interest will probably dictate that a certain proportion of the augmented output will go to the liberated nations.

CONCLUSIONS

My conclusions in reference to probable availabilities of products desired by the liberated areas from the United Kingdom are as follows:

(1) The United Kingdom now holds substantial quantities of food and raw materials, over and above normal peacetime reserves. Whether the uncertainties of supply and shipping make reserves of the present size necessary will be decided in current discussions at the ministerial level now in progress in Washington.

(2) The quantities of different products in the stockpile vary greatly in reference to normal peacetime levels. Therefore, supplies of certain products should be available.

(3) The United Kingdom will not, until at least six months to a year after VE-Day, be an important source of supply of consumers goods for the liberated areas of Continental Europe. Nevertheless, small quantities of a miscellaneous variety of goods in odd lots will probably be available.

(4) Significant quantities of capital goods, both new and used, will be available in the United Kingdom for transfer to liberated areas. However, competing demands for repair and replacement of capital goods, both in the United Kingdom and the Empire, particularly in the fields of transportation, communication, and power facilities will offer severe competition to the demands of the liberated areas, and will substantially reduce immediate availabilities.

PUBLIC UTILITIES

Prepared by Rosenman Mission
London, England, April 15, 1945

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PUBLIC UTILITIES

INTRODUCTION

So far as I was advised in consultation both with several public utility experts and the representatives of the various governments involved, no serious problem is presented with respect to water or sewerage systems apart from the effect upon them which may have resulted from damage done to electric power systems and transportation systems. Therefore, in this report on public utilities, I have restricted myself to a discussion of electric power and gas producing facilities.

In general, with the possible exception of Holland, the wide-spread damage to utility systems which had been anticipated by the allied military authorities did not in fact occur. Prior to D-day SHAEF had assembled a group of specially skilled and trained utility experts, some of whom were in uniform and others of whom remained in civilian status. These experts had made careful plans for emergency rehabilitation of electric and gas producing systems.

Two completely equipped oil-powered floating power plants, each of 26,000 kilowatt capacity, were provided in the theater for emergency use in port areas where the most extensive damage was anticipated. Through collaboration with the Central Electricity Board in England, SHAEF accumulated in the United Kingdom a large stock of miscellaneous electrical equipment and maintained it for immediate use on the continent. Stocks of solid fuels, fuel oils and similar operational and maintenance supplies were accumulated and held available upon D-day. The group of commissioned technical experts were to go into communities with the forward elements of the troops in order to accomplish emergency repairs to power plants as fast as possible. For

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example, these officers were in the electric plant at Caen while the city was still under fire. They started working in Paris on the day of liberation and in Brussels on the day after liberation. It was not possible to use the civilian technicians so close to the actual operational front.

These groups of experts provided by SHAEF were limited in numbers. Their main qualification was in their experience and understanding of the most expeditious methods for rehabilitation. Their services were, therefore, utilized in the first instance to supervise the work of the Army engineers; in the latter periods they furnished technical assistance and advice to the civilian utilities people in the countries involved.

By virtue of this advance preparation, it was possible to restore the gas and electricity producing facilities quite rapidly. This resulted in the prevention of what might have been irreparable damage to vital installations dependent for their maintenance and operation on the public utilities, e.g. the coal mines, in which serious flooding was in most instances prevented. It also permitted rapid restoration of utilities essential to the civilian population and a substantial lessening of what otherwise would have been serious difficulties. In the field of utility rehabilitation, the allied military forces have furnished very significant aid in the liberated areas.

A brief discussion of the situation as I found it in each of the countries in question follows:

SITUATION IN FRANCE

1. Electricity

A. Extent of Damage

The overall damage to electrical generating facilities in France as estimated by SHAEF was approximately 20 percent as to Thermal stations, with a resultant reduction in capacity of 880,000 kilowatts, and 10 percent as to Hydroelectric stations, with a resultant reduction in capacity of 380,000 kilowatts.

The Hydroelectric damage was confined almost entirely to the Alp Region. The Thermal damage extended throughout the areas where fighting took place, the greatest damage where the heaviest fighting took place.

B. Extent of Rehabilitation to Date

The restoration of the electric power producing plant in France has been very substantial. It is a significant fact that the electrical generation in France in 1945 will exceed both ⁱⁿ Thermal generation and Hydroelectric generation the kilowatt output of 1938, which was the last normal year before the occupation. In Paris, in March 1945, the consumption of electricity exceeded by 30 percent consumption in the same period in 1938.

C. Future Situation

It is my impression that, so far as France is concerned, there is no serious problem with respect to the production of electric power which is of immediate urgency. Since much of the restoration was of a temporary emergency type, it will be necessary for France during the next few years to receive more than the normal maintenance requirements for her electric power system. However, the present plant seems adequate for the foreseeable future.

II. Gas

A. Extent of Damage

The gas industry of France is made up largely of local plants to serve the local areas. The only grid of gas mains is in the Northern coal fields and is a comparatively small one. Although the overall damage amounted to less than five percent of the aggregate production facilities of the country, some important individual plants in areas where heavy combat took place suffered substantial damage. The principal limiting factor governing the production of gas in France is not the amount of destruction which took place, but the inadequacy of the fuel supply.

Here again, as with all vital industry in France, I was impressed with the over-riding importance of obtaining some solution to France's coal problem. Of course the shortage of internal transport for the distribution of coal was likewise a contributing limiting factor. As a result of this situation, gas production has dropped in France to about 60 percent of normal outside of Paris and about 88 percent of normal within Paris.

B. Rehabilitation to Date

Repairs to damaged gas plants are going forward with reasonable rapidity. The major effort toward rehabilitation of gas production, however, has been in the provision of assistance in the way of transport and fuel. The gas service in Paris was completely terminated on August 20, 1944, due to lack of fuel. Through the assistance of the allied military authorities, within thirteen days some limited service was being made available to 90 percent of the population. This was made possible by the military providing 300 tons of Diesel oil a day. The efforts of the French government supplemented by the assistance of the allied military authorities in improving the coal situation and the internal transport conditions are in fact the important rehabilitation elements in connection with the gas industry. I have described the situation with respect to coal and transport in detail in special tabs covering those subjects.

C. Future Situation

The future of the gas production industry in France depends for the most part upon the future availability of coal for internal transport.

SITUATION IN BELGIUM

I. Electricity

A. Extent of Damage

Of the 31 main electric power producing

plants in Belgium, only about 333,000 kilowatts or approximately 25 percent of the effective capacity suffered war damage. As of March 1945 only 224,000 kilowatts or 17 percent of the effective power capacity is still out of service as a result of war damage. The transmission and distribution system in Belgium suffered only slight damage which has been repaired by the local utilities with military assistance.

In Belgium as in France, the shortage of fuel and transport has directly affected the capacity of the production systems. The solution of this problem is discussed in detail in the coal and transport tabulations included in this report.

B. Rehabilitation to Date

One of the difficulties militating against efficient use of the Belgian distribution system was that the Belgian electric grid had never been completed. This failure of completion was due to deliberate sabotage by the Belgians during the period of German occupation. After liberation, and with military assistance, the work was properly completed.

Until quite recently Belgium was still the center of active operations. Her electrical distribution systems were normally coordinated with those of Germany and France. Under the conditions which have prevailed it is, of course, impossible to use this normal distribution system completely. This loss was replaced to some degree by the use of the two floating power plants which the allied military authorities had provided. The use of these plants, as they are Diesel powered, not only furnished a necessary supplement in kilowatt output, but also provided the output without the ordinary use of coal for that purpose. The coal saving is at the rate of about 600 tons per day for each plant, a total of 1200 tons per day.

C. Future Situation

It is expected that the rehabilitation

of the Belgian electrical power plant can be carried out by use of normal supply channels within a reasonable length of time. Surveys are also being made as to the feasibility of supplementing the Belgian capacity with power imported from Germany or Switzerland. The difficulty in importing power from Switzerland is that Switzerland desires coal in exchange for the power. Here again the European shortage of coal proves to be a limiting factor on industrial rehabilitation. It is expected that, upon the liberation of densely populated areas of Holland, the two floating power plants now in use in Belgium will be diverted to Holland to meet the greater need which will develop.

II. Gas

A. Extent of Damage

Except for the limiting factors of shortage of coal and internal transport for its distribution there seems to be no serious problem presented in the case of the gas utilities in Belgium as no significant damage by the Germans was experienced.

SITUATION IN THE NETHERLANDS

I. Electricity

A. Extent of Damage

Prior to liberation of the Provinces of Gelderland, Zeeland, Nord Brabant and Limburg, the effective capacity of the power plants connected with power supply systems in these Provinces was 450,000 kilowatts. During the operations preceding liberation of these provinces, destruction by the enemy and operational damage reduced this capacity to 120,000 kilowatts, which represented a loss in production capacity of 73 percent. Much of the damage in Holland was suffered by major transformer substations. A substantial part of the damage was so severe that provision for its repair cannot be made while active operations must be supported on the continent. The transmission lines suffered operational damage from shell fire, and their repair

more
has been made/difficult because it has been necessary to remove the mines laid along the transmission lines before permitting access to repair crews.

B. Rehabilitation to Date

The type of destruction in the Netherlands and the necessity for removing the mines along the transmission lines has made it essential that the civilian authorities receive substantial military assistance in the rehabilitation process. By March 1945, the efforts of the local utilities people assisted by the allied military forces raised the effective capacity of the production systems in the liberated area to 227,000 kilowatts, or approximately 50 percent of normal.

Present plans call for a further increase to 296,000 kilowatts, a level of 66 percent of normal by September 1945. The balance of generating equipment is so badly damaged that further repair under present conditions is impossible. In addition to the capacity produced by rehabilitation of existing Dutch plants, plans have been made to provide Holland with an additional 20,000 kilowatts of production from Belgium upon the completion by the military authorities of the Vervan-Roosemeel tideline. The limiting factor militating against the possibility is the availability of the necessary coal.

As the armies move forward into Germany, the military authorities will make repairs to the transmission lines connecting Germany and Holland. It is expected that by September 1945 it will be possible to provide a flow of electric power into Holland from salvaged German power plants of approximately 20,000 kilowatts. With the provision of the additional 40,000 kilowatts from the sources indicated, September 1945 will see the area now liberated with a total effective power capacity of 336,000 kilowatts. Roughly speaking, the normal demands of this area do not exceed 276,000 kilowatts; so it is expected that by September 1945, presently liberated Holland will have obtained a normal production of electricity.

C. Future Situation

The Future of Grounded Holland, with

respect to electric power, is not capable of accurate prediction in the light of facts now obtainable. I was told by everyone with whom I talked, whether civilian or military, that the looting of vital power and industrial plants in Holland far exceeded that in either France or Belgium. The Dutch authorities as well as the military expect to find a serious power situation in the heavily populated areas of Western Holland North of the Great Rivers.

Immediate assistance in this area has been planned by SHAEP, to be provided by moving the floating power plants now operating in Belgium into Holland. Also some stocks of mobile generating equipment have been assembled by SHAEP to be utilized in the areas of greatest emergency.

I believe that after complete German withdrawal Holland will undoubtedly have requirements for electricity producing plants which will be of a high order of urgency. The exact character or amount of these requirements can only be ascertained after examination on the ground.

The utility experts at SHAEP feel quite strongly that solution of the electrical power problem in Holland will rest to a large degree on the amount of power which can be imported from Germany. The same thing is true in Belgium and France, but for different reasons. In Holland it is expected that the shortage of power will result from plant inadequacies; in Belgium and France it will result primarily from a shortage of coal and internal transport. It is the belief of the SHAEP experts that the importation of power from Germany into Belgium and France will to a certain extent ease the already crushing burden which rests upon their coal production and internal transport facilities.

II. Gas

A. Extent of Damage

I was not advised of any serious

deficiencies in the gas production capacity of the Netherlands.

I therefore assume that, subject to facts which may result from an examination on the ground after liberation, no serious problem with respect to gas utilities is presented in the Netherlands.

SITUATION IN NORWAY

I. General Utilities Situation

A. Extent of Damage

The limiting factor with respect to both electric and gas utilities in Norway is, in the main, not the condition of plant but the ability to obtain coal for power and petroleum products for power and lubrication. Although Norway is the scene of extensive Hydroelectric development there are substantial demands in the utilities field for coal and power.

The present information which I was able to obtain is that at the present time gas and electricity plants in Norway are in good shape with the exception of those located in Finnmark and the gas works at Trondheim. What will be their condition on eventual liberation, of course, is now impossible to say.

B. Future Situation

The future of the gas and electric utilities in Norway will vary in direct proportion to the extent to which coal for power and petroleum products for lubrication can be obtained.

Neither of these vital supplies is locally obtainable in Norway, with the exception of small coal deposits in the north, the size of which are completely inadequate to meet the most basic of Norway's minimum coal requirements.

SITUATION IN DENMARK

I. General Utilities Situation

A. Extent of Damage

Denmark's utility situation is analogous

to that prevailing in Norway. The best information available discloses that electric and gas plants have not been damaged. Here again, of course, it is not possible for me to state what the situation will be when liberation has actually taken place.

B. Rehabilitation to Date

Even if the physical condition of the utility plants proves adequate upon liberation, the actual production of gas and electricity which can be expected from them will be dependent entirely on the extent to which imports of coal and necessary lubricants can be obtained. Denmark has no domestic coal or petroleum production.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. As a means of supplementing the electric power production of the liberated areas of North West Europe and conserving their critically limited supplies of coal, the possibility of further exploiting Germany's electric power system, second largest in the world before the war, should be given serious consideration.

Prepared by the Rosenman Mission
London, England, April 15, 1945

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DEPLACED PERSONS

Prepared by the Loosman Mission
London, England, April 15, 1945

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DISPLACED PERSONS

1. RESPONSIBILITY

One of the major problems confronting the Allied Nations is the care and treatment of displaced persons. The scope of this problem is increasing daily as the Allied forces press farther into Germany and uncover more and more of these people who find themselves liberated far from their homes. The effect on the economies of the liberated countries of Europe will be not only the additional supply burden caused by the necessity to house and feed displaced persons but also the administration and movement necessary to their repatriation.

The official definition of displaced persons is: "Civilians outside the national boundaries of their countries by reason of war, who are (1) desirous but unable to return home, or find homes without assistance; (2) to be returned to enemy or ex-enemy territory." Displaced persons are officially distinguished from refugees, who are defined as civilians who are, for reasons related to the war, homeless or distant from their homes in their own countries and require assistance to return to their homes.

Military authorities must of necessity assume initial responsibility for the accomplishment of the Allied objective to repatriate displaced persons and to care for them until repatriation is effected. All of these persons are liberated in forward Army areas and their care and treatment must commence immediately. Moreover, the uncontrolled movement of displaced persons or outbreak of disease among them are potential threats to attainment of the military

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objective. For this reason the care and maintenance of displaced persons has been made a military command responsibility. At the same time it is the military policy to transfer responsibility to appropriate civilian authorities as soon as military conditions permit. At that time UNRRA may be requested to undertake this responsibility.

The general principles under which military planning for displaced persons has proceeded are:

- (a) In interior zones of liberated Allied territory Allied governments have full responsibility for displaced persons, including enemy and ex-enemy nationals uncovered within their countries, except Soviet nationals uncovered after 11 February, 1945*;
- (b) In forward zones military commanders are wholly responsible but may delegate partial responsibility to Allied local authorities as soon as the latter can assume it, except in the case of Soviet nationals uncovered after 11 February, 1945*;
- (c) Allied governments are responsible for their own nationals both in interior and forward zones as soon as they are liberated;
- (d) Military commanders are wholly responsible for United Nations displaced persons uncovered in Germany, and if such displaced persons are temporarily moved out of Germany to countries other than their countries of origin because of military necessity, responsibility for their care and maintenance remains a direct military commitment and may not be delegated to Allied authorities.

*See Section V entitled "Yalta Agreements for the Treatment of Russian Displaced Persons."

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II. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

The total number of displaced persons which it is estimated will be uncovered in Germany is approximately 7,000,000. Of this number it is estimated there will be approximately 3,300,000 in the Russian zone of occupation and 3,700,000 in the U. S. and U. K. zones. In addition it is estimated there will be uncovered a total of approximately 1,400,000 in Austria. Displaced persons include almost every nationality of Europe with the predominate nationals being Russians, Poles and French. The map attached as Appendix A shows the estimated distribution of displaced persons in Germany and Austria and the required flow to effect repatriation. The German policy apparently has been to transplant slave labor as far from their homes as possible. Repatriation can be accomplished as a result only by the criss-crossing of Germany from east to west and west to east.

As of 31 March, 1945 the number of displaced persons uncovered and their location were as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>In known installations</u>	<u>Others estimated</u>
Belgium	26,772	8,000
France	105,041	124,000
Netherlands	7,391*	-
Germany	59,492	-

*6,600 Germans

In addition to the foregoing, very large numbers of displaced persons have been uncovered in Germany since 31 March as a result of the rapid advance of the Allied forces.

A. Administration

The administration and controlled movement of this large population alone presents a major task. The categories into which displaced persons fall are numerous and each category requires special administration. The following list is representative:

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1. Displaced nationals of the United Nations.
2. Persons claiming United Nations prisoner of war or civilian internec status.
3. United Nations expatriates residing in Germany.
4. Neutrals.
5. Enemy and ex-enemy nationals persecuted because of their race, religion or activities in favor of the United Nations.
6. Nationals of ex-enemy nations at war with Germany.
7. Enemy and ex-enemy displaced persons and refugees.
8. Liberated Soviet citizens*.
9. Displaced persons of doubtful nationality claiming United Nations origin.
10. Stateless persons, defined as persons who have been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot after investigation be determined, or who cannot establish their right to the nationality claimed.

Each person must be identified and administered in accordance with the category to which he belongs. Enemy and ex-enemy nationals, except those in category 5, are the responsibility of German authorities acting under the direction and supervision of military commanders. Persons in all the other categories listed will be accorded the same assistance granted to United Nations displaced persons after investigation and establishment of their proper classifications. Responsibility for those persons who are not repatriated rests with the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, but UNRRA has agreed to care for them for a limited period of time.

*See Section V entitled "Yalta Agreements for the Treatment of Russian Displaced Persons."

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I personally visited several displaced persons assembly centers in Germany and was tremendously impressed both with the administrative difficulties in handling this group and with the way in which our Army is meeting the situation. The importance which the Army attaches to this problem is evidenced by the fact that not only have military government personnel been made available for the purpose but also units which would otherwise have been employed with combat troops, such as medical and sanitary units, engineering detachments and truck companies.

Forward operations moving at an unexpectedly rapid pace have uncovered displaced persons faster than planned facilities for their care could be brought forward and installed. As a result military staffs behind the lines have been confronted with the job of providing in a single day facilities for thousands of these people on an emergency basis. This has involved location and appropriate preparation of housing facilities, provision of medical and sanitary services, transportation of the displaced persons, registering them, policing the assembly center and providing food and clothing.

Limitations in numbers of available military personnel have made it essential that the displaced persons care for themselves to the maximum extent possible. The Army has housed the displaced persons to the fullest extent possible in national units, but facilities for this segregation are not always available. The management and administration of each nationality, including the care of their quarters, the preparation of their meals, the maintenance of their clothing and the minor care of the sick, have been delegated to leaders selected from the displaced persons themselves.

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From my own observation in that portion of Germany west of the Rhine I am satisfied that this system of handling the displaced persons is working satisfactorily, although the problem had not, of course, at that time assumed the very large dimensions which must today be facing the military authorities.

B. Supply

The necessity to house and feed displaced persons as well as provide clothing and medical care places a considerable burden on the supply machinery of the United States as the principal residual supplier. The feeding of displaced persons has been planned by the military authorities on the same basis as for the population of liberated areas, that is a 2000-calorie ration. The following table indicates the SHAEF 1945 monthly import requirements of food for displaced persons:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NET LONG TONS*</u>
January	28,000
February	22,102
March	32,725
April	46,190
May	46,780
June	67,832
July	60,557
August	42,726
September	68,316
October	49,508
November	<u>51,988</u>
Total	525,724

German indigenous resources are to be used to the maximum, and preference is to be given to displaced persons over the needs of German civilians. In addition to providing its resources, German authorities will be required by military commanders to pay for all goods, facilities and

* Includes 20% of requirements to cover necessary stock level, losses in transit, etc.

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services for United Nations displaced persons. In addition to food a small amount of clothing and medical supplies will be required, as well as the housekeeping necessities for the displaced persons center.

III. RELATIONSHIP OF UNRRA

UNRRA is authorized by its charter and council resolutions and by an agreement with the Supreme Commander to undertake the care, relief and repatriation of United Nations displaced persons, but it can operate in an Allied country only after agreement with the Allied government concerned. UNRRA cannot undertake the care or repatriation of enemy displaced persons or refugees in Germany, except stateless persons and persons persecuted because of race, religion or activities in favor of the United Nations. In order to facilitate the transfer of full responsibility for United Nations displaced persons, UNRRA staff officers are being attached to all military headquarters at which there are displaced persons staff officers and UNRRA has already been requested to furnish 450 displaced persons teams, of 13 people each, with an expectation that considerably more teams will be required. Until UNRRA takes over sole responsibility, its personnel will act only as agents of the military authorities and under their command. UNRRA recruiting has been slow and continuous pressure has been necessary on the part of the military. The UNRRA teams are required, by agreement, to furnish their own "housekeeping" equipment, including trucks, and in this connection it has also been necessary for the military authorities to lend a great deal of assistance to UNRRA in securing short supply items. Despite such assistance the truck problem has been and still is a serious one, inasmuch as lack of proper equipment has prevented UNRRA from sending to the Army the

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full assistance desired. To date substantially the only vehicles which UNRRA has been able to secure have been reconditioned trucks from the U. S., which have not been adequate. Inasmuch as the handling of displaced persons will devolve at various stages upon the Army, UNRRA and the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees, a clear-cut division of responsibility between these agencies must be established.

IV. EFFECT ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF LIBERATED COUNTRIES

The care, maintenance, movement and repatriation of displaced persons constitutes a drain upon the economic resources of the liberated countries of Europe. In addition to the responsibility for displaced persons in interior zones, and for refugees in their own countries, national governments must assume the burden of maintaining displaced persons uncovered elsewhere after they have been repatriated. Many of such persons will return to their native land diseased or in ill health or without homes or a means of livelihood and under such circumstances will become a charge upon the State. If employment is available displaced persons will provide a potential source of labor, because the majority of them are of the working or agricultural class. However, in the present economic state of the liberated countries it is probable that repatriation may take place before the displaced persons can be absorbed in the economic life of the country. Therefore they represent as much of a potential source of unemployment and consequent liability to the national governments as they do a potential source of labor. Moreover, under present circumstances a great majority of the displaced persons who have been received into assembly centers will remain idle for

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a protracted period of time before they can be repatriated, except for a small minority who may be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the centers in which they are situated. This is particularly true of the Eastern Europeans whose repatriation must await the joining of the U.S./U.K. and Soviet forces. Military plans provide opportunity for employment of displaced persons in military labor battalions and also approved civilian work while awaiting repatriation. This source of labor will be most beneficial not only to the almost stagnant agricultural production of certain parts of Germany but also to the maintenance of the health and morale of the displaced persons and their effectiveness for employment after repatriation.

In addition to the foregoing, the extensive use of transportation facilities for the movement of displaced persons to their homeland will tend to delay full economic recovery.

Finally, the supply requirements put forward by the military authorities will impinge upon the world availability of supplies for national government import programs because of the higher military priority on available supplies.

V. YALTA AGREEMENTS FOR THE TREATMENT OF RUSSIAN
DISPLACED PERSONS

Under agreements signed separately at Yalta by the U. S. and U. K. governments with the Soviet Union, all Soviet citizens liberated by forces under U. S. and U. K. commands and all U. S. and U. K. citizens liberated by forces under Soviet command must be provided with "adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention." Although

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the U. S. military authorities are responsible only for Soviet citizens uncovered by forces under their command, the position of the United States as the principal residual supplier presumably means that the U. S. must fall back on U. S. supplies to implement its agreement. It should be noted that the agreements cover all Soviet citizens, including prisoners of war as well as displaced persons, and that they provide that "the basis fixed for civilians shall be for as possible be the same as that fixed for privatees." It is also stipulated that the fullest possible effect will be given to the provisions of the agreements "subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theaters."

The effect of the agreement is difficult to assess at this time inasmuch as the precise interpretation of its terms is still under study, but more especially because no definitive directive has yet been forwarded to the combined military authorities in the field. Since two bilateral agreements were signed by the U. S. and U. K. governments respectively, their implementation might be said to rest with the U. S. and U. K. theater commanders in the separate zones for which they are responsible. However, SIVAF has undertaken overall administrative control of the care, control and repatriation of all displaced persons so long as the Supreme Commander has responsibility, and SIVAF accordingly has a direct interest in the manner in which the Soviet nationals are to be treated. Furthermore, the administrative difficulties involved in disparity of treatment of any given

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nationality and the effect of such disparity in the handling of other displaced persons make it necessary that the treatment of Soviet nationals be coordinated in the U. S. and U. K. zones by SHAEP. Further complications will arise if other governments request that their displaced nationals receive similar treatment.

The supply implications of the Yalta agreements, if they are to be given the broadest possible interpretation and generalized to cover other than Soviet displaced persons, are very substantial, and the quantities of foodstuffs involved on this basis could be made available only at the cost of other claimants. On the assumption that Soviet citizens should be provided the same diet as a private soldier, SHAEP estimates that for the six-months period beginning April 1st, 1945, an additional 80,000 tons of food would be required for Soviet citizens alone, and if all United Nations displaced persons are to be fed on the same basis an additional 360,000 tons of food would be required for the same period. The difficulties in meeting these additional food requirements are the same as those limiting all expansions of food supply program: the lack of stock-piles on the continent, world supply shortages, and shipping and internal transport shortages.

SHAEP policy at present is that, pursuant to the agreements, Soviet citizens will be fed on the maximum scale possible in the light of availability of supply from time to time, and that, in view of the serious political implications involved, all United Nations displaced persons will be fed on a similar maximum scale.

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SHANF requested Army Groups and Headquarters, Communication Zone, to recommend an adequate scale of feeding for Soviet citizens in the light of present availabilities of supply. The answer received was that under present availabilities the maximum scale that could be provided was a 2000-calorie ration.

In addition to increased food requirements the treatment of Soviet citizens required by the broadest interpretation of the agreements would necessitate additional clothing and transport as well as additional administrative and medical personnel, all of which would affect the ability to meet requirements of the liberated countries.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The military authorities should be given a definitive directive as to the action to be taken to implement the U. S.-U.S.S.R. and U.K.-U.S.S.R. Yalta agreements concerning displaced persons unless there are insuperable political or legal difficulties. This should be addressed to the combined, and not to the separate national, military authorities.

2. This directive should specify that for administrative, supply and transport reasons full endorsement is given to the present SHANF policy of providing for all displaced persons, including Soviet citizens, on the maximum scale possible in the light of availability of supply, and of dealing with all displaced persons on an international-United Nations basis. It is understood that the present ration in the SHANF area for displaced persons is calculated on the basis of 2000 calories a day. All interested parties should be

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promptly advised of this directive.

3. Repatriation of displaced persons should be undertaken as speedily as possible. Persons awaiting repatriation should be employed to the fullest extent possible, primarily in agricultural work and coal mining, but such employment should in no event delay their repatriation.

4. The displaced persons problem is one peculiarly international in character. UNRRA should be encouraged to take as large a measure of responsibility in this field as is compatible with military necessities and with the decisions of each of the liberated countries based on considerations of sovereignty.

5. The respective spheres of action and responsibility of UNRRA and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees should be established as soon as possible by agreement between these two agencies.

Prepared by the Rosenman Mission
London, England, April 15, 1945

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