

● PSF

Navy: Adm. Wm. D. Leahy

P.F. Navy
Leahy folder
Navy

October 21, 1937.

To President

Memo from Walton Moore-State Dept.

Says British are unwilling to negotiate with respect
to their claim to Canton Island etc.

SEE--Great Britain-Drawer 2--1937

file
PSF Leahy Navy
CONFIDENTIAL

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON 5 March 1939

John F. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
U DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 8-5-66

Signature-

Carl L. Spicer

MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT.

The following despatch has been received this date from
Admiral Lackey who is at Villefranche:*

" An officer of the 24th battalion Chasseurs has informed me confidentially that the French are expecting the Italians to seize Djibouti about ten March and in anticipation the French army will stage maneuvers near the Italian border with intention of crossing if the threat is carried out. The French have been extremely active during the past few days bringing up munition supplies to Villefranche and Menton, the headquarters of the 24th and 25th batt. Chasseurs respectively. Evidence also of Italian activity was obtained by two officers of this squadron who recently drove over the Genoa Milan Venice highway at night and passed no less than five hundred trucks. Italians apparently collecting supplies at or near Genoa. The following points are submitted for departments consideration : 1. There is evidence of intensive preparation for war on french Italian border. 2. That information given by French officer while no doubt given in good faith might be reflection of current rumor in French army. 3. During the period 21 March to 7 April the British have announced the visit of some sixteen warships including 3 battleships and 4 cruisers to French ports near the Italian border. Although these visits are annual occurrences French officers believe them to have some significance. "

William Leahy

DECLASSIFIED

DDO Dtn. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 8-8-66

Signature- *Carl L. Laffan*In reply refer to Initials
and No.NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

20 April 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

My dear Mr. President:

The following quoted despatch was delivered to the Navy Department on 19 April by the Naval Attache of the Netherlands Legation:

"From Foreign Minister, Netherlands
To Netherlands Minister, Washington

Report from Shanghai unverified contents Japan is said to be contemplating, with an eye on the possibility that the European situation will become worse, sending fleet to South China Sea to support demand to be made to the Netherlands for special petroleum concessions."

This despatch does not indicate that the movement is imminent.

We have no information that such a move is contemplated in the near future. We believe that we will know at once if the Japanese fleet moves to the southward.

The consensus of opinion here is that such a move will not be made in the near future unless hostilities commence in Europe.

There are available at the present time in the Philippine Islands to obtain information of such a move

3 Naval amphibian planes
14 twin engined Army planes, 500 miles radius
11 destroyers
6 submarines

It does not appear to me advisable to use these facilities for scouting until more information in regard to the projected move is available.

William D. Leahy

PSF
Wm J. Leahy
Navy

d-v

File
Personal
Confidential

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

29 April 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District at Cavite reports this date that the Intelligence Department of the U.S. Army in the Philippines reports they have received the following information from a reliable French source:

If the attitude of the United States becomes more hostile the Japanese Government has prepared a Naval Demonstration for use against the Dutch East Indies to secure an immediate settlement on the oil situation.

William J. Leahy

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIA 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date - 8-8-66

Signature - *Carl L. Spicer*

1
C
O
P
Y

PSF Leahy Folder
Navy 1-42

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 18, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

In order that my services may be available at any time to the national defense, I beg to tender herewith my resignation as Ambassador to France.

I beg you to accept, Mr. President, my appreciation of the high honor you have conferred upon me by appointing me to this important post.

Most respectfully,

(Signed) William D. Leahy

The President,

The White House.

Original in files downstairs

C
O
P
Y

July 24, 1942.

My dear Admiral:-

In calling you to active duty as Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army and Navy, I accept your resignation as Ambassador to France.

In so doing I want you to know first of all of my great satisfaction in the way in which you have carried out an extremely difficult task at an extremely difficult time and, second, that there has been such good agreement in our national policy in respect to France during your Ambassadorship.

In the words of the Navy --
"well done".

Always sincerely your friend,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

Admiral William D. Leahy,
State Department
Washington, D. C.

PSF: Leahy Folder
Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Please ask the Joint Board
to consider this and let me have
a memorandum?

F. D. R.

Secret memo from Mr. Lubin to the Pres.
July 23 re Air Cargo Transport and Snow
Machine.

PSF: Leahy ⁷Folder
Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

This is interesting. You might wish to show it to Marshall and King, but I do not think the authorship should be disclosed without the permission of Donovan.

F.D.R.

Memo to Col. Donovan from David Prescott Barrows.
Subject: An American Front in North Africa.

PRELIMINARY REPORT
SUBMITTED TO INVESTIGATE
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS

To: The President

From: Albert D. Chandler, Chairman

ROBERT R. REYNOLDS, N. C., CHAIRMAN
ELBERT D. THOMAS, UTAH
EDWIN L. JOHNSON, COLO.
JOHN LEE, OKLA.
HARRY H. SCHWARTZ, WYD.
LESTER HILL, ILL.
SHERIDAN DOWNEY, CALIF.
ALBERT B. CHANDLER, KY.
HARRY S. THOMAS, MD.
MON C. WALLGREN, WASH.
HARLEY M. KILGORE, W. VA.
JAMES E. MURRAY, MONT.
WARREN R. AUSTIN, VT.
STILES BRIDGES, N. H.
CHAS. SURREY, S. DAK.
RUFUS C. HOLMAN, OREG.
JOHN THOMAS, IDAHO
HENRY CAROT LOOSE, JR., MASS.

WESLEY E. McDONALD, CLERK

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

September 2, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Supplementing the letter of transmittal included in my report on the Alaskan Military Establishments, I respectfully urge your earnest consideration of the recommendations therein contained.

It is my considered opinion, after reviewing practically every important military post in Alaska, inspecting the premises and equipment, and discussing the situation thoroughly with the men and officers, that due to its strategic location it is imperative that reinforcements including troops, airplanes, and munitions be rushed to this vital area immediately.

Faithfully yours,

A. B. Chandler

Albert B. Chandler
Chairman, Committee to
Investigate Military
Establishments

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
The President
Washington, D. C.

PRELIMINARY REPORT

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS

To: The President of the United States

From: Albert B. Chandler, Chairman, Subcommittee
Investigating Military Establishments

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Letter of Transmittal - - - - -	A
Post Offices - - - - -	B
Commanders - - - - -	C
Report - Preliminary - - - - -	D
1. Resolution, U.S. Senate	
2. Subcommittee and Special Consultant	
3. Findings	
4. Recommendations	
5. Subsidiary Investigation	
Route Traveled - Map - - - - -	E
Recommendations (outline) - - - - -	F
Highway, Edmonton-Fairbanks - - - - -	G
Map NE 1 - Highway and Pipeline - - - - -	H
Map NE 2 - Highway Terminals - - - - -	I
Oil and Pipeline Project, Canol - - - - -	J
Coal Production - Alaskan West Coast - - - - -	K
Agriculture in Alaska - - - - -	L
Strategic Minerals - - - - -	M
Map - Location Minerals - - - - -	N
Morale - Army, Navy, and Civilian - - - - -	O
Civilian Defense - - - - -	P
Status of Troops and Armaments - - - - -	Q
1. Combatant Troops	
2. Antiaircraft Allocation	
3. Antiaircraft	
4. Airplane Status - Aircraft	
5. Airplanes - Confidential Minimum	
6. Infantry Allocation	
7. Regiment - Old and New Types	
8. Field Artillery Allocation	
9. Engineers Allocation	
10. Harbor Defense Allocation	
11. Weather Report - Kodiak	
12. Alaska trip - Itinerary-Personnel-Time	
Map - U.S., Canada, Alaska, Japan - - - - -	R

Letter of Transmittal

Washington, D. C.
September 1, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to a resolution passed by the United States Senate on July 23, and amended on July 30, 1942, the Subcommittee to Investigate Military Establishments has just completed an inspection of the Alaskan and Pacific Coast areas, and I am herewith submitting a preliminary report.

There are approximately 47,250 combat troops in the Alaskan area (about 63,000 including the headquarters companies) - 268 planes of all types and conditions - in 18 posts. Many of the airfields are still incomplete.

The Edmonton-Fairbanks Airfield Service Highway route is approximately 50% complete - shipping is inadequate, and the winter storms are from 60 to 80 days away.

The Japs are rapidly fortifying the Island of Kiska. The planes we have on the ground are reported to be slower and less maneuverable than the Japs' Zeros, and the longer we delay offensive action against them the more expensive it is going to be in men and materials to dislodge them.

There is no question, in my judgment, of the extreme importance of the Alaskan territory and Siberia as strategic points in any offensive against Japan - and likewise for Japan to use against us.

It is, in the judgment of the Committee, very bad - but can be remedied very quickly and effectively by the addition of troops, planes, and equipment. Certain minimum additions are suggested.

The President

September 1, 1942

cont'd.

Therefore, I have submitted a very brief statement of findings and recommendations, together with the necessary supporting data and information, which in the judgment of the Committee can put us in a position to recapture that part of American soil currently held by the Nazi powers, and launch an offensive against the Mainland of Japan at the proper time.

Faithfully yours,



Albert B. Chandler,
Chairman, Subcommittee
Investigating Military
Establishments

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
Washington, D. C.

Post Offices

ARMY POST OFFICES

ALASKA

935-Annette Island
936-Chilkoot Barracks
937-Fort Greely (Kodiak)
938-Ladd Field (Fairbanks)
939-Fort Mears (Dutch Harbor)
940-Fort Ray (Sitka)
941-Fort Raymond (Seward)
942-Fort Richardson (Anchorage)
943-Yakutat Landing Field
944-Fort Randall (Cold Bay)
945-Cordova
946-Junesau
947-Nome
948-Fort Glenn (Umnak)
949-Fort Morrow (Port Heiden)
971-Bethel
972-Big Delta
973-Galena
974-Lazy Bay
975-Naknek
976-Tetlin
977-Valdez
978-Igushik
979-Moses Point
985-Skagway
987-Whittier
990-Gulkana
991-McGrath

Commanders

ROSTER OF POST COMMANDERS, ALASKA DEFENSE COMMAND

<u>STATION</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>COMPONENT</u>
Annette Island	Christenson, Ellis G.	Lt. Colonel	INF	NG
Bethel	Fuller, Gray C.	Lt. Colonel	CE	NG
Big Delta	Tate, Sidney F. Jr.	Captain	CE	NG
Chilkoot Bks.	Redling, William N.	Captain	INF	NG
Cordova	Womeldorff, Virgil L.	Lt. Colonel	CE	RES
Galena	Anderson, Sherman B.	Captain	CE	NG
Fort Glenn	Ladd, Jesse A.	Brig. General	USA	RA
Fort Greely	Corlett, Charles H.	Brig. General	USA	RA
Gulkana	Terry, James K.	Captain	INF	NG
Juneau	Riegle, Roy W.	Lt. Colonel	INF	NG
Ladd Field	Hart, John V.	Colonel	AC	RA
McGrath	Islas, Eugene F.	1st Lieutenant	CE	RES
Fort Mears	Colladay, Edgar B.	Brig. General	USA	RA
Fort Morrow	Kotzebue, Leon L.	Lt. Colonel	INF	RA
Moses Point	Clark, Chester A.	Lt. Colonel	CAV	RES
Naknek	Rafter, Edwin J.	Lt. Colonel	INF	NG
Nome	Dudley, Wolcott K.	Lt. Colonel	INF	RA
Fort Randall	Jones, Lloyd E.	Brig. General	USA	RA
Fort Ray	Copeland, John E.	Colonel	INF	RA
Fort Raymond	Chamberlain, Charles M.	Colonel	INF	RA
Fort Richardson	Hood, John H.	Colonel	CAC	RA
Valdez	Walther, William	Major	INF	NG
Yakutat	Colvin, Eugene T.H.	Lt. Colonel	CAC	NG

Report - Preliminary

PRELIMINARY REPORT

Subcommittee to Investigate Military Establishments

To: The President of the United States

From: Albert B. Chandler, Chairman, Subcommittee Investigating
Military Establishments

The Subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee to Investigate Military Establishments was set up under the following Congressional resolution, passed on July 23, 1942, and amended July 30, 1942:

Investigations of Military
Establishments by Military
Affairs Committee

RESOLVED, That the Committee on Military Affairs, or any subcommittee thereof duly appointed by the chairman of the committee, hereby is authorized to visit, for the purposes of inspection, any part of the Military Establishment in the Western Hemisphere between July 1, and December 31, 1942, the expenses incurred in pursuance thereof, not to exceed \$3,000, to be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate....

amended to enable one expert to accompany the committee or subcommittee on any such visit.

Subcommittee

Official Members of the Subcommittee and staff:

Senators:

Albert B. Chandler, Chairman
Mon C. Wallgren
Rufus C. Holman

Special Consultant:

George W. Malone

Special Assignment

Through special assignment by the full committee to investigate the Military Establishments of Alaska and the Pacific Coast, the Committee left Spokane, Washington, by special plane on August 10th, returning to

Seattle August 23rd, during which interval practically every point of special interest to the Military, Naval and Civilian war program in Alaska were visited, including Edmonton and Whitehorse, Canada, along the airplane ferry route and service highway presently under construction, including Fairbanks, Nome, Anchorage, Cold Bay, Umnak, Kodiak Island, Juneau, and Sitka, traveling approximately 8,000 miles.

Work of the Committee

The Committee investigated and gave special attention to the Military and Naval installations - manpower - equipment - transportation of supplies, and plans for future operations.

An inspection of each port was made, including many personal conferences with the men and officers, including the flying corps on the line at Umnak who are carrying the currently limited offensive. Records of troop, airplane, equipment, and munitions strength of each post were noted.

Findings

As a result of such inspections and conferences the following specific findings and recommendations are vital and necessary to any successful offense against Japan from that area, and to prevent further invasion and fortification of their current position on American soil:

1. The imperative and vital need for a completely unified and responsible command for the Alaskan and Pacific Coast areas.
2. The immediate recognition of the commanding position of the territory of Alaska in the necessary offensive and defensive actions controlling the Western Hemisphere, together with the necessary men and supplies to utilize it as such.
3. The recognition of Alaska as the shortest route between the Japanese and American Mainlands, -- as the vital airplane ferry route to Asia, -- and unless properly garrisoned immediately a real threat to the further invasion of American soil by the Nazi Powers, and to our Northern shipping.
4. The recognition and full realization that Alaska and Siberia are the key to the most effective offensive that this Nation can launch against the Japanese Mainland.

5. That Japan is actively setting up effective fortifications on American soil at Kiska, and that further delay in dislodging them from this American outpost will inevitably result in greater losses of men and equipment.

Recommendations

As a result of the above findings it is imperative and vital to the safety of this Nation that the following recommendations be put into effect without delay:

1. Establish a single unified command over Alaska and the Pacific Coast, charged with full responsibility of the planning and execution of any necessary offensive and defensive actions within the area, subject only to a general policy affecting other areas, in the interest of a coordinated and effective use of the area and personnel.
2. Immediately divert sufficient airplanes, manpower, and equipment into the area, not only adequate to repel any attacks -- but to take the offensive at the earliest possible time and dislodge the Japanese troops from the American Islands near the Alaskan Mainland.
3. Rush additional heavy construction equipment to the area to assure completion of the necessary airfields, roads, and improvements ahead of winter storms.
4. Review the method of unloading supply ships in the Alaska area, with particular reference to the necessity for such ships being unloaded by soldiers inexperienced in such work with the resulting delay, and the method of letting hauling contracts in the San Francisco Bay area - together with the necessity for an Army truck pool in that area, resulting in an evident duplication of hauling facilities. It is imperative that the most efficient use be made of the limited shipping capacity to maintain the required number of troops in the area.

Subsidiary Investigations

The Committee inspected and observed the progress of many other matters and projects subsidiary and necessary to the Alaskan Military and Naval combat program, to which special attention should be directed:

1. The highway to service the ferry route airfields and other transportation improvements.
2. The oil development and pipeline construction for air fuel supply.
3. Possibility of coal production on the West Coast to supply fuel to certain outlying posts.
4. Possibility of an increased agricultural production in such areas as the Matanuska project near Anchorage.
5. Possibilities of development of an an immediately increased production of the strategic minerals, including chromite, tungsten, antimony, nickel and tin.
6. Army, Navy and Civilian morale -- including mail service, censorship, furloughs, civilian travel and supplies for personal convenience for both troops and civilians.
7. Closer attention to the equipment needed by State Defense Councils working in cooperation with the Military and Naval authorities.

Supporting Data

Full supporting data has been obtained and is herewith submitted for the record, including an itinerary of the inspected area.

General

There are many miscellaneous matters needing attention - most of them the result of a fast growing organization and might be termed growing pains.

One of the most important of these is the shipping problem. It is well known that the personnel in any sector is, in the last analysis, controlled by the supply line - shipping.

The number of ships for any area is naturally limited - therefore, it is expedient that the most efficient use be made of such shipping capacity as is available. Several things slow them down. The most important are:

1. Ships arriving at Alaska ports must wait until a company of soldiers can be organized to unload them. Unloading a ship is a business - the crew

must understand what comes out first. Most of the soldiers in the area are from the South - the Cornbelt and the intermountain states - they know nothing about unloading ships.

For some reason the ships crew is not allowed to assist in the unloading - they are well paid, while the soldiers get a minimum of pay. This should be worked out.

2. In loading the ships in the San Francisco area - one of the principal shipping points - full use is not made of the transportation facilities in the region - as a result, we are advised that the Bay area drayage costs are excessive - that a pool of Army trucks is being requested to do such hauling - as a result the approximately 1000 pieces of privately owned hauling equipment available in the area will be duplicated in the Army truck pool, with the consequent double requirements of rubber supplies.

Also that the peacetime requirement of an Interstate Commerce Commission permit is adhered to in bidding on hauling for the Government (required by the Navy), and that to secure such a permit a showing must be made to the I.C.C. This is all right when the public is to be served, but merely complicates an already bad situation when such hauling is to be done only for Government departments. This matter should be thoroughly investigated.

Another matter is that of placing highly paid civilian labor alongside men with soldiers pay in difficult situations such as the Alaskan area. The Committee is informed that civilians drawing \$10.00 to \$15.00 per day are working in the same camps with soldiers drawing the regular Army pay on the same jobs.

The Committee saw soldiers driving tractors, bulldozers and other large construction equipment for Army pay, and doing a magnificent job. Their only "squawk" was that the civilian pay was several times as much without the discipline to which they are subjected.

These are two examples of things which will inevitably occur in a fast growing organization, and which must be ironed out to prevent ultimate serious "bottlenecks" in winning the war.

Cooperation

Full cooperation of the Military, Naval, and Civilian authorities was had throughout the area, and special commendation should be extended to them for such cooperation, and for the overall efficient work and progress that has been made under great handicaps, of lack of personnel, materials, and the unusual barriers due to the weather and terrain.

Many other matters can and will be brought to your attention by this Committee through the proper channels, but it is imperative that the vital points covered by the four specific recommendations be adjusted without loss of time.

Respectfully submitted,

A. B. Chandler.

Albert B. Chandler, Chairman
Subcommittee Investigating
Military Establishments

Route Traveled - Map

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY

MAP OF ALASKA

Compiled by Alaskan Branch from all available
authentic sources, chiefly from maps of the
U. S. Geological Survey and the U. S. Coast
and Geodetic Survey

Scale 5000000
Approximately 80 miles to inch

0 50 100 150 200 Miles
0 50 100 150 Kilometers

Edition of 1940



Recommendations (Outline)

RECOMMENDATIONS

The reasons and the imperative necessity for immediate action in carrying out the recommendations made by the Committee are so clear and obvious to the observer on the ground that any further explanation seems unnecessary.

Recommendation No. 1 - There is a definite policy long understood between the Military and Naval forces determining under a stated set of conditions and circumstances just which arm of the Service is in responsible command. The immediate responsibility of subordinates does not change in any case -- since such responsible command merely shifts between the heads of such Military and Naval command as the battle becomes a predominant sea or land action -- however, the important thing is that under the present arrangement no one man or staff is solely responsible for results in the planning and execution of the necessary offensive and defensive actions within the area -- and only ultimate confusion and inefficiency can result from such divided responsibility.

Recommendation No. 2 - The present airpower in the area is sadly deficient even for the adequate defense of the area, to say nothing of necessary offensive action. There are very few planes in the area and many of these have been operated beyond the standard number of hours without an engine overhaul. Some types in common use are slow and unwieldy. Warning of the approach of attacking planes may be picked up from 60 to 150 miles by radar. However, assuming the maximum distance there would not be time to assemble planes from other fields. The longer that positive and effective action is delayed against the Island of Kiska, the more effective their fortifications will become and the more expensive in men and munitions it will be to capture. Even now recent air pictures show definite progress in the construction of an airfield on this Island -- but pontoons on the "Zero" fighters used by the Japs indicate it is not yet useable. There should be an immediate mobilization of planes, men, and equipment sufficient to utilize the strategic position of the Alaska territorial and Siberian areas for an offensive against the Japanese Mainland. In this manner the gateway to the Northern shipping and the Air Ferry Route would be protected.

Recommendation No. 3 - There is a limited time to complete the construction of airfields, roads, and other necessary construction in connection with an efficiently operated post. Additional heavy construction equipment, including bulldozers, carryall earth moving equipment, and tractors are immediately necessary if the work is to be completed ahead of the heavy winter storms.

Recommendation No. 4 - It is imperative that the most efficient use be made of our limited shipping capacity. Delay, unnecessary expense, and duplication of facilities are being incurred, which could be largely eliminated by proper coordination. A delay of a few days, or of a few hours by each supply ship in service results in a failure to deliver needed supplies - and cuts down the number of troops that can be maintained in an important area.

Highway, Edmonton-Fairbanks

Number 1

EDMONTON-FAIRBANKS HIGHWAY

Service Airline Ferry Route

The new construction on the road to service the airfields on the Ferry Route from Edmonton to Fairbanks really starts from Dawson Creek on the south and extends to Big Delta on the north, with an estimated length of approximately 1,550 miles.

Of this total mileage about two-third, or slightly over 1,000 miles, was either completed or under construction as of August 20, 1942. The portions of the road completed or under construction are indicated on the accompanying white print map.

In general the Public Roads Administration is working behind the Military forces, widening and otherwise improving portions of the road. The Public Roads Administration forces are also assisting in maintaining certain portions of the "Pioneer" road, and, in some cases, they are aiding in the construction of the "Pioneer" road. Locations along which the Public Roads Administration forces are working are indicated in red on the white print map.

The "Pioneer" road being constructed by the Military forces is, in fact, a well drained and graded road, of sufficient width to allow in general, two-way traffic. The original plan was to have the "Pioneer" road constructed by the U.S. Army Engineers and the graded, surfaced road in its final location to be built by the Bureau of Public Roads. The Bureau of Public Roads is, however, assisting in the completion of the final road.


An estimate secured from the U.S. Army Engineers shows the "Pioneer" road completed by December 1, 1942, and to be ready for use immediately thereafter. There is no time estimate on the completion of the final construction and surfacing by the Bureau of Public Roads.

Map Number 1 shows the status of the construction by the U.S. Army Engineers and the Bureau of Public Roads and is self-explanatory.

Map Number 2 shows the topography in more detail, together with the Northern and Southern terminal points of the road.

Map NE 1 - Highway and Pipeline

Map No 1



Map NE 2 - Highway Terminals



Oil and Pipeline Project, Canol

Number 2

THE CANOL OIL AND PIPELINE PROJECT

The "Canol" Pipeline Project involves construction of a four-inch pipeline from the wells at Norman Wells to the town of Whitehorse, and another four-inch pipeline from Skagway on Tidewater to Whitehorse, as noted on the inclosed map.

The status of the project is that additional wells are being drilled at Norman Wells, northwest of the town of Whitehorse. Surveys of the pipelines are being pushed to completion, equipment and materials are being assembled, and it is expected that the Skagway-Whitehorse Pipeline will be completed this winter.

The pipeline from Norman Wells to Whitehorse and from Whitehorse to Skagway is shown on Map Number 1 under Edmonton-Fairbanks Ferry Route Highway.

Two wells were recently brought in by the U.S. Army Engineers - producing 500 and 350 barrels per day respectively, and drilling is being continued in the belief that a well producing 1,000 barrels daily can be found.

Coal Production - Alaskan West Coast

Number 3

COAL PRODUCTION ON THE ALASKAN WEST COAST

Brigadier General Lloyd E. Jones at Fort Randall (Cold Bay) has sent out an exploration party to determine the possibility of securing the coal supply on the West Coast of Alaska, south of Nome, for the Military and Naval posts in the area.

The Committee was informed that the prospects are favorable, although further development work will have to be done to determine the feasibility of the enterprise.

Coal is now being shipped largely from Seattle to supply the Military and Naval posts, and considerable transportation space could be saved and devoted to transporting other supplies if a satisfactory coal supply could be located within the area.

The exploration work should be encouraged until it is determined definitely whether or not a suitable supply of fuel can be obtained from this source.

Agriculture in Alaska

Number 4

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN ALASKA

Alaska has never produced the necessary farm products to feed its population as the following two tables will show:

VALUE OF SPECIFIED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
SHIPPED FROM STATES TO ALASKA, 1939
U.S. Department of Commerce; STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1940, P.620

Meat and Meat Products	\$2,190,000
Eggs	544,000
Milk, condensed, evaporated, dried	423,000
Butter and cheese	657,000
Fodders and feeds	104,000
Potatoes, white	143,000
Vegetables, canned	407,000
Malt liquors	597,000
Total	\$5,065,000

VALUE OF SPECIFIED PRODUCTS SOLD
FROM ALASKA FARMS, 1939
Sixteenth Census of the U.S. 1940
AGRICULTURE IN ALASKA

Milk and cream	\$ 306,987
Potatoes	43,203
Eggs	40,523
Vegetables	22,930
Greenhouse products	13,095
Poultry	7,197
Fruits and berries	4,613
Hay	1,625
Nursery stock	1,320
Total	\$441,092

The Matanuska Valley Contains a
larger Part of the Agricultural
Development in the Area

There is approximately 6,000 acres under cultivation, 4,000 of which are under the supervision of the Alaska Rural Rehabilitation Corporation, with 2,000 acres in the hands of other owners. There are approximately 190 farmers

Number 4, cont'd. #2

in the entire area, with 140 of these operating under the management of the Corporation.

The following yields per acre were secured in the Valley in 1941, the data taken from the Matanuska Agricultural Experiment Station:

Wheat	29.8 bushels per acre
19B Barley	21.6 " " "
Victory Oats	41.3 " " "
Oat-pea hay	1.82 tons " "
Oat-pea ensilage	7.61 " " "

The number of livestock in the Valley is noted in the following table:

MATANUSKA VALLEY LIVESTOCK ESTIMATES

Livestock:	Estimated No.	
	<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>
Beef Cattle	100	120
Sheep	1000	1300
Hogs	350	350
Horses	160	140
Goats	40	40
(Tractors	36	40)

In addition to the Matanuska Valley the following areas are considerable available for agricultural production:

Tanana Valley

Cultivated lands in the Tanana Valley probably total less than 1000 acres.^{8/} The Valley contains about 7000 square miles in bench and bottom land between the Goodpastor River and the Yukon but less than half of this has even potential agricultural value. Farming, developed entirely on the basis of private initiative, is much less extensive than in the Matanuska Valley, where a government colonization project is responsible for most of the development. In the Tanana Valley, as in the Matanuska, land is not at present the limiting factor to agricultural expansion.

^{8/} Harry Slattery, in THE PROBLEM OF ALASKAN DEVELOPMENT, estimated 600 plus acres in 1939.

Number 4, cont'd. #3

Kenai Peninsula

In the "Homer area" on Kachemak Bay, Kenai Peninsula, is located one of the most promising agricultural areas in Alaska, with thousands of acres of open or sparsely wooded land of good quality. Although it is estimated ^{9/} that 5,000 acres can be cultivated without any clearing, only 80 acres were under cultivation in 1941. Lack of suitable transportation facilities between the farming and market areas virtually rules out expansion here to meet the war situation.

Other areas

Other slightly developed or potential agricultural areas in Alaska, including the Susitna, Copper River, Kuskokwim and Yukon Valleys, are either so isolated or so little known that no expansion of crop production during the war is practicable.

What Alaska Can Produce
Vegetables

Potatoes, the hardy root crops, cabbage and certain of the fresh green vegetables such as lettuce, celery, cauliflower, onions, peas and beans, grow well in both the Matanuska and Tanana Valleys. Farmers in the valleys could, if assured of a market, of extra farm laborers at harvest time, and of sufficient storage space, produce this year on land already available all the potatoes hardy root crops and cabbage required to feed both the military^{10/} and civilian population in the Railbelt area for a full year, or until another harvest in 1943. Sufficient perishable vegetables could be grown, in addition, to satisfy the local market for the comparatively short period these vegetables are in season in Alaska.

These data are included since any increased production of agricultural products to be consumed within the area would relieve the transportation system to that extent.

^{9/} By Rice and Irwin in AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS IN HOMER AREA, 1941
^{10/} As of today. If Army forces in this part of Alaska should be increased very materially, the need for these foods would soon be beyond the ability of local producers to supply. But every pound of food produced in Alaska will mean one pound less will have to be shipped in.

Strategic Minerals

Number 5

STRATEGIC MINERALS

The following areas are noted under the several strategic and critical minerals where investigations have been or are in progress by the Geological Survey:

Antimony:

- Cleveland Peninsula (2), about 20 miles north of Ketchikan, Southeastern Alaska; no production, small showings of ore.
- Tok River (16), a tributary to Tanana River, north of Alaska Range in east-central Alaska; small amount of development.
- Fairbanks (23), in central Alaska; widespread showings of ore and small amounts shipped in past.
- Kantishna (24), on northern slopes of Alaska Range; this has been the principal antimony producing district of Alaska.
- Sleitsmut (29), in central part of Koskokwim Valley in western Alaska; considerable antimony ore associated with the mercury ores but none recovered for sale.

Chromium:

- Red Bluff Bay (7), on east coast Baranof Island; a small amount of chrome ore shown but no development.
- Claim Point (17), on west coast Kenai Peninsula near southern tip; good grade ore, some shipments made in past and development now in progress.
- Red Mountain (18), a short distance north of Seldovia on west coast Kenai Peninsula; considerable showings of good grade ore, no production but developments in progress.
- Knik Valley (19), short distance north of Anchorage; low grade ore, no production reported.
- Eagle (20), in extreme eastern Alaska near Yukon River; showings of high grade ore but no development reported.

Number 5, cont'd.

Copper:

Fidalgo Bay (13), on eastern coast Prince William Sound; former producing mines that have long lain dormant.

Iron:

Kasaan (3), on eastern coast Prince of Wales Island, southeastern Alaska; a former copper producing district, some of whose ore shows high iron content.

Lead-Zinc:

Groundhog Basin (4), old mining camp a short distance east of Wrangell in southeastern Alaska; long dormant, may afford significant amounts of lead and zinc ore.

Mercury:

Seventymile (21), in extreme east central Alaska; a district in which mercury ore has been reported but no significant developments undertaken.

Sleitzut (29), in central part of Kuskokwim Valley; the principal mercury producing district in Alaska and one that appears likely to afford considerable increased output.

Georgetown (30), in central Kuskokwim Valley, west of Sleitzut; in which are numerous scattered localities at which mercury ores have been reported but only little prospected.

Bluff (31), on the south-central coast of Seward Peninsula; low grade mercury ores have long been known but not productively developed.

Molybdenum:

Muir Inlet (12), an arm of Glacier Bay, southeastern Alaska, where extensive signs of molybdenum mineralization have been recognized but not yet developed.

Rock Creek (15), in the southern flanks of the Alaska Range, near the head of the Copper River; showings of ore but no production.

Number 5, cont'd. #2

Nickel:

- Punter Bay (5), on west coast of Admiralty Island about 20 miles southwest of Juneau; small amount of low grade nickel ore not developed.
- Snipe Bay (6), on west coast of Baranof Island, 60 miles south of Sitka; a small amount of low grade nickel ore.
- Mirror Harbor (8), on northwest coast of Chichagof Island, southeastern Alaska; small amount of high grade ore and larger amounts of low grade, no production.
- Bohemia Basin (9), on Yakobi Island about 80 miles west of Juneau; considerable showings of low grade ore, no production.
- Yakobi Island (10), small island off northwest coast of Chichagof Island lying along prolongation of structure of Mirror Harbor and Bohemia Basin areas.
- Spirit Mountain (14), in Chugach Mountains, east of Copper River; some high grade ore but amount probably small, no productive developments.

Tin:

- Hot Springs (25), in eastern Yukon-Tanana region of central Alaska, from which a small production of tin minerals have been made at frequent intervals.
- Morelock Creek (26), near Yukon River in central Alaska; showings of tin minerals have been recognized but no shipments made.
- Gold Hill (27), near Yukon River in central Alaska west of Tanana; showings of tin minerals have been recognized but no shipments made.
- Ruby (28), near Yukon River in Western central Alaska; a small production of tin minerals has been made from area at frequent intervals.
- Lost River (34), in western Seward Peninsula, in which lodes and placers have in the past afforded small shipments of tin minerals.
- Ear Mountain (35), in western Seward Peninsula, in which lode and placer deposits of tin have been recognized but from which no shipments have been made.

Number 5. cont'd. #4

Anikovich (36), in western Seward Peninsula; a district in which for a time two dredges were mining tin but in which there has been no active mining in progress recently.

Potato Mountain (37), in extreme western Seward Peninsula; a district in which placer tin mining was in progress in the past but in which recently there has been no active mining in progress.

Cape Mountain (38), in extreme western Seward Peninsula; the most productive of all Alaska tin areas but at best affording only small amounts of placer tin; lodes known but undeveloped.

Tungsten:

Nyder (1), near head of Portland Canal in southeastern Alaska; at present producing small amounts of tungsten concentrates from lode deposits.

El Nido (11), near northern part of Chicagof Island, southeastern Alaska; showings of tungsten minerals recognized but no shipments and no developments directed specifically at production of tungsten ore.

Fairbanks (22), in central Alaska; tungsten minerals widely distributed in district and some ore shipped from its lodes in past and new developments now in progress.

Nome (32), on southern coast of Seward Peninsula; lode and placer showings of tungsten ore known and some shipments made from them in the past.

Due to the extreme shortage of the vital strategic and critical minerals, the possibility of securing such minerals in the Alaskan area is being investigated at this time by the U.S. Geological Survey and such investigation should be prosecuted with all possible speed.

Map - Location Minerals

MAP OF ALASKA

Compiled by Alaskan Branch from all available
authentic sources, chiefly from maps of the
U. S. Geological Survey and the U. S. Coast
and Geodetic Survey

Scale 1:500,000
Approximately 100 miles to 1 inch

1:500,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles

0 10 20 30 40 50 Kilometers

1:500,000



Morale - Army, Navy, and Civilian

Number 6

ARMY, NAVY, AND CIVILIAN MORALE

The Army, Navy, and Civilian morale is affected by many things, including mail service, censorship, furloughs, civilian travel, and supplies for personal convenience for both troops and civilians.

Mail Service and Censorship

In connection with the mail service, the following resolution was passed by the Alaskan War Council, and is self-explanatory.

RESOLVED:

The Alaska War Council asserts that the censorship, insofar as it denies to residents of Alaska news which has already been made public and passed by official censorship in the United States, is working an unnecessary hardship on the Alaskan people. The Council recommends that this practice be discontinued, and that Alaskan newspapers be not prohibited from publishing news dispatches originating in the United States or abroad which have been published or passed for publication in the states.

The censors' practice of clipping newspapers in Seattle before transmitting them to Alaska is without justification, indicates a great waste of time and government money, serves no useful purpose, and tends to impair the morale of residents of Alaska.

The waste of energy and time now spent by censors in preventing this news from reaching Alaska is, moreover, nullified by the ability of Alaskans to tune in on long and short wave radio broadcasts from outside in which the same news is transmitted.

The Council brings this matter specifically to the attention of the various censorship agencies and requests them to advise the Council what action will be taken to rectify this unwarranted discrimination.

Furloughs

It was noted through conversations with the men and officers of the posts that in most cases no definite system of granting furloughs to the men had been put into effect. In general, it seemed to be the consensus of opinion that it would be feasible to allow a maximum of 10% of the personnel on furlough at any one time and that the date of such furlough would start from the time of arrival in the states, or whatever the destination might be. In any case, the Committee was impressed with

Number 6, cont'd. #2

the necessity of some definite system being worked out in granting such furloughs.

Civilian Travel and Supplies

There has been considerable delay in handling the civilian travel, although it seemed to have improved recently. Supplies for the men, ordinarily furnished through the canteens, were very scarce, most of the canteens having very little on their shelves. This should and no doubt will be improved with added transportation available at a later date.

Civilian Defense

Number 7

CIVILIAN DEFENSE

Civilian Defense and its coordination with the Military and Naval forces is extremely important on the Pacific slope, with special reference to the states of California, Oregon, and Washington. The matter was discussed by telephone with the three governors in this area. All expressed the opinion that cooperation with the Military and Naval forces had been satisfactory, but that additional equipment is necessary.

A conference was held with Mr. E. F. Scattergood of the California State Council of Defense, at which time the general problems of the area were reviewed.

The principal problem is in the securing of the needed equipment and using this state as an example, and only to indicate the necessity and importance of such organizations, the following list is included to show the equipment allocated, estimated additional allocation needed, and the equipment that has been received.

Report of Protective Equipment Allocated and
Delivered to California up to August 26, 1942,
and Estimate of Necessary Additional Equipment
Based on O.C.D. Formula (Cal.S.C.A. Bulletin No. 40)

	<u>Equipment Allocated</u>	(Estimated) <u>Additional Allocation Needed</u>	<u>Equipment Received</u>
Medical Team Equipment	718	298	None
Casualty Station Equip.	360	149	None
Stretchers	2896	1208	None
Cots (Folding Canvas)	8707	3485	None
First Aid Pouches	11607	-	None
Arm Bands	315914	80000	49852
Steel Helmets (General)	82826	118814	75470
Steel Helmets (Firemen)	1141	-	None
Coats (Firemen)	4715	15613	None

Number 7, cont'd. #2

	<u>Equipment Allocated</u>	(Estimated) <u>Additional Allocation Needed</u>	<u>Equipment Received</u>
Gas Proof Capes	99060	53400	None
Pants (Firemen)	4690	15638	None
Trailer Pumps	461	115	None
Skid Mount Pumps	262	65	None
Front Mount Pumps	210	52	None
Extinguishers (Pump Tank)	180080	45020	None
Ladders	None	-	1286
Firemen's Boots	4590	15738	None
Gas Masks	253314	4,830000	253,314
Protective Clothing	6758	13570	6,758
Chlorinated Lime (drums)	600	175	700

The Committee believes that an investigation should be made of this request without loss of time, so that if it is determined that such equipment is required in the area it can be furnished immediately.

Status of Troops and Armaments

STATUS (1 August 42)

COMBATANT TROOPS

	INF	FA	AA	COAST DEFENSE	ENGINEER	TOTAL
<u>BERING SEA:</u>						
*Moses Point	385	126	40	—	194	745
Nome	909	429	551	—	185	2074
Bethel	293	—	—	—	339	632
<u>ALEUTIANS - PENINSUAL:</u>						
Fort Glenn	3108	644	2009	409	1533	7703
Fort Mears	3121	49	3088	853	177	7288
Fort Randall	3224	441	1961	366	696	6688
Fort Morrow	870	—	179	—	249	1298
Naknek	563	—	—	—	399	962
<u>GULF OF ALASKA:</u>						
Fort Greely	3065	763	1802	1195	171	6996
Fort Raymond	1091	—	382	218	250	1941
Valdez	389	—	—	—	25	414
Cordova	378	—	—	—	409	787
Yakutat	304	—	—	311	—	615
<u>SOUTHEAST ALASKA:</u>						
Chilkoot Barracks	427	—	—	—	—	427
Juneau	324	—	—	—	215	539
Fort Ray	1011	—	372	533	52	1968
Annette Island	191	—	210	—	—	401

STATUS (1 August 42)

COMBATANT TROOPS

(CONTINUED)

	INF	FA	AA	COAST DEFENSE	ENGINEER	TOTAL
<u>INTERIOR</u>						
Fort Richardson	2408	813	1620	--	512	5353
Ladd Field	191	--	206	--	48	445
McGrath	53	--	--	--	49	102
Galena	53	--	--	--	101	154
Big Delta	53	--	--	--	153	206
Gulkana	106	--	--	--	151	257
TOTAL	22,132	3,139	12,380	3,885	5,714	47,250

* Not added - Now enroute from other A.D.C. Stations.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ALLOCATION

ALASKA

Fort Glenn (Umnak)	1 Regiment
Fort Greely (Kodiak)	1 Regiment
Fort Mears (Dutch Harbor)	2 Regiments
Nome	3 Batteries (1 gun, 2 Automatic Weapons)
Fort Randall (Cold Bay)	1 Regiment
Fort Ray (Sitka)	2 Batteries (1 gun, 1 Automatic Weapons)
Fort Raymond (Seward)	2 Batteries (1 gun, 1 Automatic Weapons)
Fort Richardson, (Anchorage)	1 Regiment

ORGANIZATION AND ARMAMENT

COAST ARTILLERY REGIMENT (ANTI-AIRCRAFT)

Regimental Headquarters
Headquarters Battery
1st Battalion (Gun) - Batteries A, B, C, and D. Each battery armed with four 75mm or 90mm antiaircraft guns.

2nd Battalion (Automatic Weapon) - Batteries E, F, G, H. Each battery armed with eight 37mm or 40mm antiaircraft guns and eight 50 caliber antiaircraft machine guns.

3rd Battalion (Searchlight) - Batteries I and K. Each equipped with ten complete searchlight units and six detector units.

PROPOSED INCREASE

ANTI-AIRCRAFT

	<u>REQUIRED</u>	<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>INCREASE</u>
Moses Point	2 Automatic Weapons	20mm Navy Guns	432
Nome	Comp. Battalion	1 Gun; 2 Automatic Weapons	150
Bethel	1 Automatic Weapons	None	216
Morrow	Comp. Battalion	1 Automatic Weapons	751
Naknek	2 Automatic Weapons	None	432
Valdez	2 Automatic Weapons	None	432
Cordova	2 Automatic Weapons	None	432
Yakutat	Comp. Battalion	Canadian	908
Juneau	Comp. Battalion	None	908
Annette	Comp. Battalion	Canadian	908
Richardson	2 Regiments	Regiment	2024
Ladd Field	Comp. Battalion	Comp. Battery	702
Whittier	Comp. Battalion	None	908
Excursion Inlet	Regiment	None	2024
Raymond	Comp. Battalion	2 Batteries	601
Ray	Regiment	2 Batteries	1652
TOTAL			13480

ALASKA AIRCRAFT STATUS

August 6, 1942

A-Total on hand. B-Number in commission. C-Ready in one week. D-Not ready in one week.

TYPE & MODEL	A	B	C	D
<u>Bombers (M)</u>				
B-18	12	10		2
B-25	1			1
B-26	27	18	6	3
A-29	7	5		2
<u>Totals</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>
<u>Bombers (H)</u>				
B-17	6	3	2	1
B-24	15	12	3	
LB-30	1	1		
<u>Totals</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>Total Bombers</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>9</u>
<u>Fighters</u>				
P-36	12	9		3
P-38	21	19		2
P-39	51	46	3	2
P-40	48	43	2	3
P-43	1			1
<u>Totals</u>	<u>133</u>	<u>117</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>11</u>
<u>R.C.A.F.</u>				
Kittyhawks	7	5	2	
Bolingbrokes	15	10		5
<u>Totals</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>
<u>Total Combat</u>	<u>234</u>	<u>191</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>25</u>
<u>Photographic</u>				
A-29	6	5		1
<u>Transports</u>				
C-39	1	1		
C-40	1	1		
C-47	5	5		
C-53	5	4	1	
C-60	2	2		
AT-7	6	6		
OA-14	1	1		
YC-64	2	1		1
<u>Totals</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>Liaison</u>				
L-1	5	2		3
L-4	2	2		
<u>Totals</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>4</u>		<u>3</u>
<u>Total Misc Aircraft</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>

AIRCRAFT STATUS (by unit)
14 August 42

UNIT	FIGHTER	MEDIUM BOMBER	HEAVY BOMBER	PLANE TYPE
11th Fighter Squadron	28			3 P-36; 25 P-40
18th Fighter Squadron	26			5 P-36; 21 P-40
54th Fighter Squadron (attached)	21			P-38
42nd Fighter Squadron	17			P-39
56th Fighter Squadron (attached)	17			P-39
57th Fighter Squadron (attached)	16			P-39
73rd Bombardment Squadron		16		2 B-18; 14 B-26
77th Bombardment Squadron		13		1 B-18; 12 B-26
406th Bombardment Squadron (attached)		2		B-18
111th Canadian Fighter Sqdn (att)	7			P-40
36th Bombardment Squadron			7	6 B-17; 1 LB-30
404th Bombardment Squadron (att)			6	B-24
27th & 38th Prov. Bomb. Sqdn. (att)			13	B-24
TOTAL	132	31	26	

AIRCRAFT STATUS (by station)
14 August 42

STATION	FIGHTER	MEDIUM BOMBER	HEAVY BOMBER
Fort Glenn	45		7
Fort Randall	23	16	
Elmendorf Field	29	15	13
Nome	18		4
Fort Greely	17		2
TOTAL	132	31	26

AIRPLANES

Confidential Minimum Estimated Needs

<u>Planes</u>	<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>No. in Squadron</u>
375	25	Pursuit	25
96	8	Heavy Bombers	12
64	4	Medium Bombers	16
72	3	Dive and Torpedo Bombers	24
52	4	Nansport	13
13	1	Photo Snapping	13

Air Base Personnel	-	16 bases
Present	2000	
Needed	<u>3000</u>	
Total	5000	

18 AIRPORTS

Anchorage
Annette Island (Ketchikan)
Bethel
Cold Bay
Cordova
Fairbanks
Galena
Gulkana
Juneau
Kodiak
McGrath
Moses Point
Naknek
Nome
Northway (Tetlin)
Post Lortheider
Umnak
Yukutat

INFANTRY ALLOCATIONALASKA

	RIFLE COMPANIES	HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANIES	ANTITANK COMPANIES
Annette Island	2	$\frac{1}{4}$	—
Bethel	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	—
Big Delta	1/3	—	—
Cordova	1	3/4	—
Galena	1/3	—	—
Fort Glenn (Umnak)	9	3	1
Fort Greely (Kodiak)	9	3	1
Gulkana	2/3	—	—
Juneau	2	$\frac{1}{4}$	—
Ladd	1	—	—
McGrath	1/3	—	—
Fort Mears (Dutch Harbor)	9	3	1
Fort Morrow (Port Heiden)	3	1	1/3
Moses Point	1	3/4	—
Naknek	2	$\frac{1}{2}$	—
Nome	3	1	1/3
Fort Randall (Cold Bay)	9	3	1
Fort Ray (Sitka)	3	1	1/3
Fort Raymond (Seward)	3	1	1/3
Fort Richardson (Anchorage)	9	3	1
Valdez	1	$\frac{1}{4}$	—
Yakutat	1	$\frac{1}{4}$	—

PROPOSED INCREASE

INFANTRY

	REQUIRED	PRESENT	INCREASE
Moses Point	Battalion	1 3/4 Companies	648
Nome	Regiment	Battalion	2264
Bethel	Battalion	1 1/2 Companies	715
Morrow	Regiment	Battalion	2264
Naknek	Battalion	2 Companies	470
Valdez	Battalion	1 1/4 Companies	644
Cordova	Battalion	1 3/4 Companies	655
Yakutat	Battalion	1 1/4 Companies	729
Juneau	Battalion	1 1/4 Companies	709
Annette	Battalion	1 1/4 Companies	842
Richardson	2 Regiments	Regiment	3297
Ladd Field	Battalion	1 Company	842
McGrath	1 1/4 Companies	Platoon	209
Galena	1 1/4 Companies	Platoon	209
Big Delta	1 1/4 Companies	Platoon	209
Gulkana	1 1/4 Companies	2 Platoons	156
Whittier	Battalion	None	1033
Excursion Inlet	Battalion	None	1033
TOTAL			16928

NOTE - No increase provided above for Glenn, Mears, Randall, Greely, Raymond, nor Ray.

INFANTRY NOTES

1. An infantry regiment consists of:
 - 1 Regimental Headquarters.
 - 1 Headquarters Company.
 - 1 Service Company.
 - 1 Antitank Company.
 - 9 Rifle Companies (3 in each of 3 battalions).
 - 3 Heavy Weapons Companies (1 in each of 3 battalions).
2. Regimental Headquarters - 5 Off. 28 EM - Commander, staff and band.
3. Headquarters Company - 6 Off. 167 EM - Intelligence and Communications personnel.
4. Service Company - 9 Off. 143 EM - Staff, supply and transportation personnel.
5. Antitank Company - 6 Off. 179 EM - Each man armed with a rifle or pistol. Subdivided into three platoons of 4 antitank guns each. Normal procedure is to attach one platoon to each infantry battalion as reinforcing weapons.
6. Rifle Company - 6 Off. 217 EM - Basic combat unit. Each man armed with a rifle or pistol. In addition, the company has added firepower of 8 automatic rifles, 2 light machine guns and 3-60mm mortars.
7. Heavy Weapons Company - 6 Off. 205 EM - Each man armed with a rifle or pistol. Subdivided into two platoons, each having 4 heavy machine guns (30 cal); one platoon of four .50 cal. machine guns and one platoon of four 81mm mortars.
8. A new type infantry regiment is being formed (none yet in Alaska) which is patterned after the German. Chief difference is that the three battalions of the regiment are now more self-contained as independent fighting units. Each has its own integral communications and antitank guns.

The regimental fire power is greatly increased with no increase in personnel. A sixteenth company (Cannon Company) has been added. It has self-propelled guns and gives the regimental commander artillery fire under his own control instead of having to ask higher headquarters as formerly.

Comparative armament listed below:

<u>Armament</u>	<u>Old Type Regiment</u>	<u>New Type Regiment</u>
Rifle, cal. .30, 1903	---	203
Rifle, cal. .30, M1	2099	1600
Carbine, cal. .30	---	1128
Pistol, cal. .45	1181	213
Rifle, automatic	125	189
Machine gun, light	18	18
Machine gun, heavy	24	24
Machine gun, .50 cal	12	10
Antitank gun, 37-mm	12	24
Mortar, 60-mm	27	27
Mortar, 81-mm	12	18
Howitzer, 75mm	---	6
Howitzer, 105mm	---	2
Officers	123	143
Enlisted Men	3325	3323

FIELD ARTILLERY ALLOCATIONS

ALASKA

Fort Glenn (Umnak)	3 Batteries (75mm gun)
Fort Greely (Kodiak)	3 Batteries (155 mm Howitzer) 1 Battery (75mm Howitzer)
Fort Morrow (Port Heiden)	1 Battery (75mm gun)
Moses Point	1 Battery (75mm gun)
Nome	1 Battery (75mm gun)
Fort Randall (Cold Bay)	2 Batteries (75mm gun)
Fort Richardson (Anchorage)	3 Batteries (155 mm Howitzer) 2 Batteries (105 mm Howitzer)

Note - Each battery consists of four guns of the indicated caliber.

ENGINEERS ALLOCATION

ALASKA

Bethel	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	Companies (Construction)
Big Delta	$\frac{1}{2}$	Company (Construction)
Cordova	1	Company (Construction)
Galena	$\frac{1}{2}$	Company (Construction)
Fort Glenn (Umnak)	1	Company (Construction)
	6	Companies (Aviation)
Fort Greely (Kodiak)	1	Company (Combat)
Gulkana	$\frac{1}{2}$	Company (Construction)
Juneau	1	Company (Construction)
Ladd Field (Fairbanks)	$\frac{1}{2}$	Company (Construction)
McGrath	1	Company (Construction)
Fort Mears (Dutch Harbor)	1	Company (Combat)
Fort Morrow (Port Heiden)	1	Company (Aviation)
Moses Point	1	Company (Construction)
Nome	1	Company (Combat)
Fort Randall (Cold Bay)	3	Companies (Combat)
Fort Raymond (Seward)	1	Company (Topographical)
	1	Company (Combat)
Fort Richardson (Anchorage)	1	Company (Camouflage)
	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	Companies (Construction)
	2	Companies (Aviation)

HARBOR DEFENSE ALLOCATIONS

ALASKA

Annette	1 Battery
Fort Glenn (Umnak)	2 Batteries
Fort Greely (Kodiak)	6 Batteries
Fort Mears (Dutch Harbor)	3 Batteries
Nome	1 Battery
Fort Randall (Cold Bay)	2 Batteries
Fort Ray (Sitka)	2 Batteries
Fort Raymond (Seward)	1 Battery
Fort Richardson (Anchorage)	1 Battery
Yakutat	1 Battery

Note - Each battery consists of four 155 mm guns and is also equipped with a seaward searchlight section.

WEATHER REPORT

Kodiak - (Fort Greely)

	Temp. F.	Rain	Snow	Hrs. of Sun	Hrs. of Fog	Ven. Rate Per Month Per 1000 Per Annum	ADC RATE
Nov. 1941	14°-99° 32.7°	.18"	3.45"	138	1	2.31	7.2
Jan. 1942	29.5°-335° 36.58°	13.27"	.23"	36	7.3	5.78	
Feb. 1942	31°-48° 38.4°	7.76"	1.10"	92	25	6.61	7.3
Dec. 1941	18°-45° 32.7°	4.34"	2.26"	90.5	---	7.05	12.4
Mar. 1942							3.1
Apr. 1942	Weather statistics discontinued Feb. 28, 1942					5.33	8.6
May 1942	Per instruction ADC					4.30	4.6
June 1942						4.40	2.4
July 1942						3.68	

PERSONNEL - ITINERARY - TIME
Spokane-Canada-Alaska- San Francisco

Capt. H. T. Myers	Pilot
Lt. J. R. Hawley	Co-Pilot
Lt. E. F. Smith	Co-Pilot
T/Sgt. C. A. Horton	Radio Operator
T/Sgt. F. A. Winslow	Aerial Engineer

A. B. Chandler	Chairman
R. C. Holman	
M. C. Wallgren	

G. W. Malone	Special Consultant
--------------	--------------------

<u>8/10/42</u>	<u>P.W.T.</u>	<u>8/17/42</u>	
Dept. Spokane	12:05	Dept. Cold Bay	10:50
Arr. Edmonton	14:35	Arr. Kodiak	13:40
<u>8/11/42</u>	<u>M.W.T.</u>	<u>8/18/42</u>	
Dept. Edmonton	10:15	Dept. Kodiak	14:15
Arr. Watson Lake	15:10	Arr. Anchorage	15:55
<u>8/12/42</u>	<u>Youkon Time</u>	<u>8/19/42</u>	
Dept. Watson Lake	09:20	Remained at Anchorage	
Arr. White Horse	10:50	<u>8/20/42</u>	
Dept. White Horse	12:45	Dept. Anchorage	10:10
Arr. Fairbanks	15:40	Arr. Juneau	14:00
<u>8/13/42</u>		<u>8/21/42 8/22/42</u>	
Remained at Fairbanks		Remained at Juneau	
<u>8/14/42</u>		<u>8/23/42</u>	
Dept. Fairbanks	09:20	Dept. Juneau	12:00
Arr. Nome	12:20	Arr. Everett	17:00
Dept. Nome	14:50	<u>8/24/42</u>	
Arr. Anchorage	18:40	Dept. Everett	10:45 P.M.
<u>8/15/42</u>		Arr. San Francisco	2:30 P.M.
Dept. Anchorage	10:40		
Arr. Naknek	12:30	<u>8/21/42</u>	
Dept. Naknek	13:00	Dept. Juneau	10:10 A.M.
Arr. Cold Bay	15:05	Arr. Sitka	12:00 M.
<u>8/16/42</u>		Dept. Sitka	4:50 P.M.
Dept. Cold Bay	09:00	Arr. Juneau	5:15 P.M.
Arr. Umnak	10:45		
Dept. Umnak	17:40		
Arr. Cold Bay	19:35		

Total flying time - approximately 45 hours-20 minutes
Estimated 180 miles per hour - 8,160 miles

Map - U.S., Canada, Alaska, Japan



PSF Navy Leahy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Will you see if the Joint Board has a copy of this report? If not, suggest that they get one and take the matter up. Will you return this report for my files?

F.D.R.

Preliminary report Subcommittee to investigate military establishments.

PSF
Navy
Leahy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1942.

file
Confidential
Leahy folder
1-42

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

A copy of the attached report was sent to me by Senator Chandler. It is now under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

When completed, the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be submitted to you.

Very respectfully,

William D. Leahy

PSF: *See also folder*
61-42

Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F.D.R.

Memorandum from the Board of Economic Warfare, Sept. 29th re: vulnerability of lengthened German transport lines in the East.

Also Confidential copy No. 86 from Board of Economic Warfare re: Japan's Shipping Position.

*PSF Leahy folder
-42 Navy*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

What would you think of sending
this to the President of Portugal,
and a copy of it to Dr. Salazar?
Perhaps that would be more regular.

F. D. R.

Letter from the President
to Dr. Salazar, Prime Minister of
Portugal, re dispatching American
Forces to French Possessions in
North Africa.

PSF: Leahy folder
1-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS
ADMIRAL WM. D. LEAHY

To speak to me about.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Copy of Secret let to Admiral Leahy from Donald Nelson 11/18/42 re Leahy's communication of 11/16 with enclosures consisting of communication from Leahy on behalf Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Chairman of the Army and Navy Munitions Board and Tab "A" accompanying same, re priorities.

~~SECRET~~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECEMBER 1, 1942.

MISS TULLY

THIS MATTER HAS NOW BEEN RECONCILED
AND IT CAN BE FILED.

RM

HARRY L. HOPKINS

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 21 1973

~~SECRET~~

COPY

18 November 1942

Dear Admiral Leahy:

This will acknowledge receipt of your communication of November 16, with attached enclosures consisting of a communication from yourself on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Chairman of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, and Tab "A" accompanying the same.

While I have not yet had an opportunity to examine these thoroughly, I take the liberty of making certain general comments:

1. You are cognizant of several definite directives sent me by the President laying particular emphasis on certain programs and pursuant to which, as matters now stand, I have no alternative but to see that these programs are elevated to a priority position definitely senior to others. I have in mind the President's recent instructions that the aircraft program be carried out regardless of its affect on other programs. I have received somewhat similar instructions from him with respect to escort vessels and merchant shipping. I cannot reconcile these instructions from the President with the suggested priorities set forth on Tab "A". You will realize that it is impossible for me to accept from any other source instructions in conflict with those received from the President.
2. Examination of Tab "A" indicates that, so far as military items are concerned, it aims at obtaining a balanced force. This calls for equality of priority rating, generally speaking, of all items in like categories, but, as I have indicated above, this is at variance with the President's instructions to me to place particular emphasis on several special programs. It may be that under these circumstances you will wish to discuss the subject with the President and I will be very glad to join you in such discussion with a view to clarification.
3. I must point out certain other respects in which I am compelled to take issue with the provisions of Tab "A"; namely, the inclusion of priorities for civilian and for export items as well as for new facilities and other construction, maintenance and repair. It may be that the priority ratings specified for these fields are simply the suggestions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army and Navy Munitions Board, and do not indicate any assumption of authority or responsibility in these fields by them. As you know, both authority and responsibility in these fields have been clearly

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-16-78
By *PA* Date MAY 21 1973

C O P Y

-2-

delegated to me by the President, and while I am prepared to consider Tab "A" as a basis for discussion, I do not wish this action by implication to be construed as a surrender by me of any authority or responsibility in those fields.

4. The letter from yourself on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Mr. Richard contains the following statement: "No additional ratings should be issued in the categories from AAA through AA-3 inclusive, nor should any allocations of materials be made, which are prejudicial to production of the end items or facilities covered thereby, without the concurrence of the Army and Navy Munitions Board." While I value the advice of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, I cannot and will not surrender to them the exercise of the priority power which the President has conferred upon me. I have given instructions that consultation with the Army and Navy Munitions Board shall be had on all matters relating to priorities. Where they do not concur, arrangements exist for appeal. Such arrangements have existed for many months past and so far as I know have operated to the satisfaction of all concerned. At any rate, I have not been advised of any appeals.

Sincerely yours,

~~SECRET~~

Donald M. Nelson

William D. Leahy
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-13-72
By *RT* Date MAY 21 1973

~~SECRET~~

P.S. Leachy folder
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES

Do you think this needs
any further answer? If not,
please return for my files.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Secret Memo 1/8/43 to the Pres.
re X Number One Group Program
signed by Admiral Leahy, Chief of
Staff to the Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 1972

PSF: Leahy folder
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Will you speak to me about
this?

F.D.R.

Memo from the Secy. of the Navy to the Pres.
with attached corres re: Aircraft program
revision of. dated May 7 (confidential)

T-106

BF Leahy folder 2-43
Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

I do not believe in astrology
but in view of December 1941 and June
1942, how about a special precautionary
measure to go out today.

F.D.R.

Letter, 5-30-43, to Miss Tully from
Prime Minister Mackenzie King, dictated
at Montreal, P.Q. enclosing a letter to
Mackenzie King, May 19th, from Ralph E.
DeLury of the Dominion Observatory, Ottawa,
with his enclosed note giving dates
selected by the Japanese for major opera-
tions, determined by astrological
deduction.

(1732)

hms

PSF: Leahy folder

2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you ask the Secretary
of State if he thinks this is
all right?

F. D. R.

Secret memorandum for the President from Admiral W. D. Leahy, 9/7/43, in re visits of civilians to theaters of operations. Attached are drafts of directives for the President's signature to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy reading "In the future it is desired that you refer such requests as you may receive from civilians, who are not agents of the War or Navy Departments, who desire to visit theaters of operations to the Joint

(over)

(177)
Chiefs of Staff for their approval. In the event that exception is taken to the decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the matter will be referred to me for final action". These directives have not been signed by the President.

September 1, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADJUTANT GENERAL

Will you see the Secretary

of State if he thinks this is

all right

F. D. D.

General Headquarters for the President from
Admiral E. E. Ladd, W. J. L., in a letter of
reference to the Secretary of the President's
staff of the President for the President's
signature to the Secretary of the President's
Secretary of the Navy regarding the Navy
it is desired that you refer such requests as
you may receive from Admiral Ladd, who are not
of the Navy Department, to the Secretary
of the President of the Navy for the Navy
to visit the Secretary of the Navy for the Navy

(over)

(171)
hms

PSF: *Leahy folder* 2-43
Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F.D.R.

Transmitting copy of memorandum which the President received from Hon. Robert E. Sherwood, under date of 9/7/43, in re the new Combined Chiefs of Staff proposal No. 310/2 for propaganda committees.

*The original of this copy was sent as enclosure
to memorandum to Admiral Leahy
hms*

Memo to the President

Sept. 7, 1943

From: Robert E. Sherwood

General Deane has shown Elmer Davis and me the new Combined Chiefs of Staff proposal No. 310/2 for propaganda committees. We have studied this closely, and it has our agreement. We hope it will be approved and put into effect, as machinery like this for the coordination of propaganda policy is most urgently needed.

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
WASHINGTON

September 7, 1943

MEMORANDUM

To: The President
From: Robert E. Sherwood

1. I have cabled our Lisbon office to get another set of those Nazi cartoons--and any similar choice morsels that they can dig up--and send them to our London office which will deliver them to No. 10 Downing Street.

*filed
C.W.I. folder
2-43*

2. General Deane has shown Elmer Davis and me the new Combined Chiefs of Staff proposal No. 310/2 for propaganda committees. We have studied this closely, and it has our agreement. We hope it will be approved and put into effect, as machinery like this for the coordination of propaganda policy is most urgently needed.


MRS.



T-142

PSF: *Leahy folder*
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

 September 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

To speak to me about.

F.D.R.

Letter to the President, 9-10-43, from Mr. Churchill, re C.C.S. 310/2 (Propaganda). Attached is memo (SECRET) 9-10-43 from Secy., Joint Chiefs of Staff re Propaganda Committee, enclosing mimeographed copy of C.C.S. 310/2. Also attached is a Report, 9-10-43 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Pres. and Prime Min. re QUADRANT.


DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 1977

T-143

PSF; Leahy folder 2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1943.


MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Will you speak to me about
this?

F.D.R.

For paper, addressed to the Prime Minister, 9-8-43, signed "A.C." stating that Mr. Lyttleton and the Allied Supplies Executive recommend a tripartite, U.S.-United Kingdom-Soviet agreement for exchange of information re military material, subject to an escape clause.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 1972

T-153

PSF. Leahy folder 2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Will you be good enough to
take this up with the Joint Staff?
I want to see the reply before it
is sent. Please return enclosure.

F.D.R.

Most Secret telegram from Phillips,
London, 9-28-43, requesting, if possible,
the President's views in re to a token
American military participation in event
of an expedition into Norway following
German withdrawal.

PSF; Leahy folder
2-48

file
revert

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

I think the Joint Staffs should
always remember that Russia should
not be overlooked when any agree-
ments are made.

F. D. R.

Re message to General Eisenhower
from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in
regard to a military agreement intended
to be entered into by him as Commander
in Chief of the Allied Forces, and by
Badoglio on behalf of the Italian Govern-
ment, concerning the organization and
employment of members of the Italian forces
under control as prisoners of war of the
Governments of the British Commonwealth
of Nations and the United States, dated
January 4, 1944.

~~C~~
O
P
Y

PSF: Leahy folder
2-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Please tell the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they are exceeding their authority in declining to send forward the authorization for Soviet representation unless French representation is also authorized. I had already authorized Soviet representation, but I have not yet made any decision on French representation.

The Soviet representation should go through at once. You might tell the Soviet Ambassador that I have directed that the Soviet representation be carried out. I cannot understand this action on the part of the Combined Staffs.

F.D.R.

COPY TO ADMIRAL LEAHY

(Orig. filed - Hull folder 2-44)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 11, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will recall that on December 30 I sent you a memorandum (copy attached) on the question of Soviet and French representation on the Allied Control Commission in Italy. You had previously approved of Soviet representation on the Control Commission, and we have so instructed the United States representative on the Advisory Commission where the question was raised.

In order to have the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean authorized to accept Soviet representation, it is necessary to have instructions to that effect sent him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Upon our requesting the Combined Chiefs of Staff, through the War Department, to take this action, we have been informed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff, on the motion of the British Chiefs of Staff, declined to send forward the authorization for Soviet representation unless French representation is also authorized.

The Soviet Ambassador has just called upon me and stated that his Government was at a loss to understand the delay in granting Soviet representation on the Control

Commission.

Commission. I informed him that this was entirely agreeable to this Government but that the authorization was held up in the Combined Chiefs of Staff because of the matter of French representation.

In order to avoid any further delay in carrying out our wishes with regard to Soviet representation, I would suggest that you may wish to send a telegram in the sense of the attached draft to Prime Minister Churchill.

C.H.

Attachments:

Copy of memorandum
dated December 30, 1943.

Draft telegram to
Prime Minister Churchill

Commission. 1 July 1945

COPY

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL FROM
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

British representatives on Combined Chiefs of Staff, under instructions from their Government, decline to authorize Soviet representation on Allied Control Commission for Italy in the form to which we have both agreed, unless request for French representation is also authorized. The Soviet Government informs us that they are at a loss to understand why their representation is still not authorized. In order to avoid further delay in granting Soviet representation, suggest you have instructions sent to British members of Combined Chiefs of Staff to authorize instructions on Soviet representation without waiting for final decision on French representation.

You may recall that I have already had up this question of French representation with you and have not yet received your final reply on the subject. But let us not in any event delay any further on the Soviet request as I feel the Soviets cannot understand the delay.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Our representative further reports that the British and the Soviet members of the Advisory Council have already committed themselves to recommending the acceptance of a French representative on the Control Commission.

C. H.

PSF: *Leahy folder* 2-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
Personal*

January 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

I think you should look into this personally. As far as I know, the papers have never been received at the White House.

F. D. R.

Letter addressed to General Watson, dated January 8, 1944, from S. Welles re memorandum known either as the "Dossier Mornay" or the "Dossier Girard" which was supposed to have been submitted to the President.

PSF; Leahy folder 2-44

File
Secret

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 23, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

To speak to me about in the
morning.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

AUG 21 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I enclose a copy of a letter dated August 17, 1944 from Admiral Leahy, transmitting a telegram of July 10, 1944 from S.H.A.E.F. recommending the issuance at the proper moment of simultaneous orders of the day to the troops under the command of Marshal Stalin and Generals Eisenhower and Wilson to the effect that the final battle has begun and that "all is up" for Germany.

I see no objection to this proposal from the political point of view and consider it primarily a military matter. If you approve the proposal, you will no doubt wish to take it up with Churchill and Stalin.

Enclosure:

From Admiral Leahy,
August 17, 1944,
with enclosure.

PSF; Adm. Leahy folder
2-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Do you think any of these
need answers?

F. D. R.

Message No. 791 from the
Prime Minister to the President,
dated Oct. 5, 1944.

Two messages to the
President from Ambassador Harriman,
dated Oct. 5, 1944.

Copies of this memo filed - Churchill folder,
1-44
Russia folder,
1-44

PSF: Leahy
NAVY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 17, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Is there anything I should
do about this?

F.D.R.

[Original filed in PSF: Navy]

September 21, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


The Future of the Combined Boards

There is transmitted herewith a copy of a policy document on the future of the Combined Boards for your information in the event that this question, on which you have previously corresponded with Mr. Churchill, may arise for current discussion. This document has been approved by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy and is intended to serve as an instruction to a United States committee for conversations on the future of the Combined Boards with a British committee.

CH

Enclosure:

Secret document
no. EGMFP D-54/44,
dated September 20,
1944.

By  Date MAR 1 1977

ECHFP D-54/44
September 20, 1944

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICY
Committee on Wartime Trade Controls

THE FUTURE OF THE COMBINED BOARDS

It has been and is the long term objective of this Government to work toward an expansion of private international trade on a multilateral basis without discrimination or undue restriction. Wartime trade controls and governmental participation in trade have been introduced for the purpose of effective prosecution of the war in all its phases. All such controls and governmental participation cannot be eliminated as soon as the war ends. Steps should be taken, however, to set limitations on such controls, consistent with the solution of major national and international problems arising during the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy. Among other things, this calls for a reexamination of the scope of operations of the Combined Boards.

Present Work of the Combined Boards

The three boards in question--the Combined Food Board, the Combined Raw Materials Board, and the Combined Production and Resources Board--were set up to secure the most efficient disposition, in the light of war needs, of the resources of the non-Axis world. All supplies and facilities were to be regarded as a pool and related to total requirements. As a result, almost every Board recommendation has foreign trade implications. New trade patterns have been set up. Export and import markets have been established which often do not coincide with a preestablished or normal basis. Such dislocations are, of course, inevitable in wartime.

Recent Examination of the
Future of the Boards

Preliminary discussions concerning the Combined Boards were brought to a head when on July 20, 1944, Sir Ronald Campbell addressed a letter to the Under Secretary, requesting the opinion of this Government on the future of the

Combined

Combined Boards. This letter has been acknowledged and copies sent to the U.S. members of the three Boards mentioned above, with the suggestion that the U.S. members meet with their British and, in appropriate cases, Canadian colleagues in order to obtain a preliminary statement of the recommendations of those immediately concerned with the operation of the Boards. Sir Ronald Campbell's inquiry has underlined the urgency of reaching a judgment with respect to the American position. The lack of a clear definition of the future status and of the proper sphere of current operations of the Combined Boards has led to uncertainty on the part of the operating officials.

Preliminary Position of the United States
concerning Membership on the Boards

Abolition of the Boards, so long as war needs exist, cannot be considered. Direct enlargement of membership has been considered, but seems inadvisable at this time because of reasons of security, because the primary responsibility for meeting supply problems must fall upon the United States and the British Empire, and because working relations cannot now be readily established with a large group of countries. It may become advisable, however, to place on certain important committees of the Boards representatives of other countries when their peculiar position as important producers or consumers should be taken into account. This has already been done on occasion, and in the future consideration should be given to the principles and methods by which added representation may be given.

Preliminary Position of United States
concerning Scope of Operations

It is believed that the scope of operations of the Boards should be redefined. Put in the most general terms, the Boards should restrict their allocation recommendations to cases of (1) items which are in short supply and which are needed for direct war purposes or for the maintenance of essential civilian economies, related to the war and

to

to the transitional period, and (2) to items the transportation of which involves so substantial a use of shipping that uncontrolled movements might lead to undue waste of shipping facilities. The Boards should themselves be able to decide what items, within these limits, they consider will require their recommendation of future allocations. In deciding upon what items are not in short supply, the Boards should appraise what would be the net annual global position, after the removal of allocation recommendations. But even in the case of a short item, the Boards should recommend allocations of only that part of the supply which is necessary for the war effort, or the maintenance of essential civilian economies, related to the war and to the transitional period, and should not feel it necessary to recommend allocations of the total supply in all countries. They should keep in mind that, so far as is consistent with the prosecution of the war and the adjustment of scarcities in the transitional period, the area of free movement of commodities and products in international trade should be progressively enlarged.

This position is taken because it is believed that the Boards were set up to handle specific war problems and, by the very nature of their organization, are not designed to handle other than wartime problems. In the period of war mobilization the control mechanisms upon which the Boards relied were directed toward a limited common objective. As the war supply problems ease, the need for the type of combined economic operation carried on by the Boards decreases. The Boards have been appropriately limited in membership. As more nations become free, this limitation will increase concern about United States - British Empire domination. In the near future it will not be easy to justify United States - British Empire decisions concerning the allocation of supplies of other nations. Furthermore, the dislocation of trade patterns, occasioned by the war and made effective through the Boards, creates opportunity for discriminatory national advantage. Within the British Empire differences of opinion, which are suppressed in wartime, will arise and it will not be to the interest of the United States to become involved unnecessarily in these disputes, as it would if it remained a senior partner on the Boards.

However,

However, it is felt that informal consultation and interchange on common industrial and agricultural production problems of a technical nature may be useful in the transition to peace as well as in war. Therefore, the Boards with their statistical and technical staffs and background of experience may continue to act as convenient forums for such informal discussion and interchange.

Corollaries of the Preliminary
United States Position

This position that the Boards should restrict their activities to questions of short supply and transportation has a number of corollaries. It means:

- (a) That the Boards should not recommend allocations of long supply items, except when transportation considerations make them necessary.
- (b) that the Boards should not use allocation recommendations of items in short supply to increase exports of long supply items;
- (c) that the Boards should not make recommendations for the purpose of controlling foreign prices of items in long supply, or of items in short supply that are not necessary to the war or to essential civilian economies;
- (d) that the Combined Boards should not recommend allocations of capital goods for export for long-term reconstruction and industrialization, except where such goods are both in short supply and an allocation is necessary to meet direct war needs or to maintain essential civilian economies in the transitional period;
- (e) the several member governments would be generally expected to advise the appropriate personnel of the other member governments in advance of effecting substantial cutbacks in procurement or development procedures in third countries.

Transitional Surpluses

If the scope of the Boards' operations is to be gradually contracted, the question arises as to what steps need to be taken to handle transitional problems, particularly those of surplus commodities. It is recognized that the Combined Boards have statistical and technical facilities

concerning

concerning many commodities and products, and these should be maintained in operation. It is recognized also that the problems of transitional surpluses can be advantageously studied by the technical staffs of the Combined Boards.

Although the Boards are inadequately constituted to deal with surplus situations, the problem of surpluses will come before the technical staffs dealing with commodities. The exchange of information between the technical staffs should be continued as long as the Boards continue in existence or until some international mechanism is established to deal with post-war commodity problems. The United States officers of the Combined Boards, with the assistance of other interested agencies, should draw up and submit a statement of findings to the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy for the Committee's consideration and recommendation of action where surpluses are found. Until the United States position is established United States members of the Boards and the technical staffs should not undertake to formulate solutions of surplus problems with the representatives of other nations.

*PSF: Leahy folder
2-45*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

TO READ AND FILE.

F.D.R.

Secret memo, 3-3-45 from Acting Secretary
Jos. C. Grew, enclosing telegram 3-2-45
from Amb. Harriman re Polish conversations.

PSF; Adm. Leahy folder 2-45-

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

TO READ AND FILE.

F.D.R.

Originals of attached handed to Adm. Leahy,
3-12-45.

~~SECRET~~

March 6, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Negotiations in Moscow Commission
on Poland

I believe you may be interested in reading in full the enclosed telegram from Harriman in which he describes the completely intransigent attitude now being displayed by Molotov in the Polish negotiations.

JOSEPH C. GREW,

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram
no. 636 from Moscow,
March 6, 1945.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date MAR 1 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 6, 1945

SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT

These current developments in foreign affairs may be of interest to you:

POLISH CONVERSATIONS. Molotov, Harriman and Clark Kerr met again during the night of March 5 but found no agreement possible in regard to the invitations to Polish leaders. Molotov brushed aside all arguments and firmly maintained the position that only those Poles acceptable to Warsaw could be invited. He refused to invite the five men from within Poland originally named by the President at Yalta and refused to consider the suggestion that any Pole named by any Commissioner be invited. He indicated that Sapieha was not truly democratic and refused to consider inviting Mikolajczyk. Two counter proposals made by Molotov covered a prior invitation to the Warsaw Poles in order to obtain information about other Poles and a limitation of invitations to Warsaw representatives and four other Poles acceptable to Warsaw. Both Harriman and Clark Kerr refused to consider these proposals. Molotov at one time raised the question of the wording of the communique but dropped this matter when Harriman explained our interpretation. Harriman informed Molotov that he knew the President would be shocked to learn of Molotov's obstruction of the Commission's work and pointed out that Stalin had agreed to the inviting of Sapieha and Witos at Yalta. Molotov replied that communique was "anchor" for Commission's work and that no other Yalta conversations had any bearing

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date MAR 1 1972

on

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

on the subject. Clark Kerr raised the question of a British mission going to Poland and Molotov stated that he could not now raise this question with the Warsaw government because of Eden's recent "offensive remarks" about that government in Parliament. The meeting closed with the understanding that Molotov's position would be reported to the American and British Governments. Previously Harriman had expressed the belief that Clark Kerr is handicapped because he is given no discretion by British Foreign Office. Harriman considers that British are viewing Commission's work more from point of view of Parliament debate than urgent need of making progress.

The Department has informed Harriman that it agrees that Mikolajczyk should be persuaded to abandon the conditions laid down by him for his acceptance of an invitation to Moscow but feels that the matter should not be raised until the Commission has decided upon the list of Poles to be invited.

RUMANIAN DEVELOPMENTS. Since National Peasant and National Liberation Party leaders refuse to enter a government in which majority of cabinet posts are held by Communist-dominated NDF, Groza is now attempting to form a cabinet in which half the places will be held by NDF. Political tension continues and General Schuyler's request for an effective ACC meeting has been turned down. Berry understands that the King feels that he cannot change the mandate given to Groza since it was based upon consultations with all party leaders. If a proper cabinet cannot be formed the King will again consult party leaders with the idea of surrendering his prerogatives.

PORTUGUESE ATC NEGOTIATIONS. Although Salazar has again refused to accept the American position in regard to the secrecy of meteorological equipment and operations, the Embassy believes that there is some slight hope that a practical arrangement may be worked out.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Dec. 1-11-72
MAR 1 1972
By J. Schauble Date

TURKISH

TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR. Kirk reports that AFHQ is giving consideration to the possibility that Turkish troops might be used on the Italian front. If so, start would be made with one division which would be built up to at least a corps.

CURRIE MISSION. Currie reports that he has obtained from the Swiss entirely satisfactory concessions on safehaven matters, including blocking decrees, a census of assets, refusal to purchase German gold and consultation with governments concerned before blocking controls are removed. These concessions will be recommended by Swiss delegation to Federal Council. Economic and transit negotiations are continuing and Swiss appear to be willing to make considerable concessions despite disappointment over coal decision. Currie has assured Swiss that we will furnish coal as soon as possible.

SWISS BOMBINGS. The Legation at Bern has been informed that General Marshall is personally greatly concerned over recurrent accidental bombings of Swiss territory by American aircraft and has therefore ordered General Spaatz immediately to proceed to Bern to consult with Swiss authorities as to the best method of handling these incidents.

JOSEPH C. GREW

Acting Secretary