

Map Room Files.

91

BOX 162

5. A4(2) AIR ROUTES: September, 1942 - February, 1945.

AH-3/air bases
ADDRESS REPLY TO
THE BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS

AND REFER TO

Y&D Serial 002987

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



81
SECRET

WS
22 February 1945

Dear Admiral:

Your letter of February 17, 1945, was received late yesterday (February 21). We started to work at once to make a study to determine the feasibility.

As soon as this study has developed I will communicate it to you together with sketches. Without reliable information as to the character of the bottom, we will have to make some guesses.

I will take great care to safeguard the security of this matter.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "B. Moreell".

B. Moreell.

Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N.,
Aide to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

SECRET



AH/Air Base

SECRET

February 17, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL MOREELL

Dear Ben,

On the general subject of air bases for the defense of our shores and also for commercial purposes, the President has raised the question as to whether there are any shoal spots in the Atlantic where we could build an island that would provide a useful field. This is, of course, a variation of the old idea of an anchored floating airdrome.

Hydrographic Office chart #955 of the North Atlantic Ocean indicates a shoal on the Grand Banks in latitude 44 North and about 49 30' West. The depths indicated are 8, 10 and 11 fathoms over a distance of about thirty miles. In view of our experience in GOOSEBERRIES and MULBERRIES on the Coast of Normandy, the President would like to know whether, if the soundings are correct, you consider it a feasible operation to build up an island in that spot big enough to serve as an air base. His inquiry from you is limited to the construction problem alone and he would like your opinion before going into the matter of icebergs, fog and strategic value.

It is, of course, of the utmost importance that no rumor of this idea should get abroad, as Canadian and British interests might try to take a hand if the idea appears feasible. The construction of an island in mid-ocean would, of course, present a new subject for our international lawyers.

Sincerely yours,

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Vice Admiral Ben Moreell, (CEC), USN.,
Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks,
Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

A4/air
FF1/A4-3

Serial 003105

United States Fleet
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

SECRET

24 October 1944.

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Head of the British Royal Air Force Delegation,
Washington, D.C.

Subject: British Activity at Clipperton Island.

Reference: (a) Air Vice Marshal Willock's Sec. Ltr. A, 25,953/44
of 16 October 1944.

1. Receipt of reference (a) is acknowledged. This letter states that you propose to approach the Mexican authorities to obtain permission to operate two landplane transports between Acapulco, Mexico, and Clipperton Island for a period of approximately one month in support of an engineering working party on that island. There is no landplane field on Clipperton Island.

2. Previous correspondence with your office has concerned the survey flight by Catalina aircraft from Mexico, via Clipperton, to the Southwest Pacific. In connection with this flight, certain Navy facilities and materials were made available at Bora Bora, and the Commander, Western Sea Frontier, was given notification that this flight would stop at Clipperton Island which is within that sea frontier. No further operations were discussed.

3. As stated in previous correspondence to your office regarding the survey flight, I consider that this route via Clipperton Island to the Southwest Pacific has no military value in connection with the war against Japan. However, Air Vice Marshal Willock's letter proposes enterprises by your government within an area in which the United States as well as Mexico and France are concerned. I consider that these activities are a matter for discussion and decision between your government and those of the United States and Mexico and the French authorities.

4. Consequently, I am not prepared at present to give United States Navy agreement to the proposals presented by Air Vice Marshal Willock in his letter.

E. J. KING.

C-O-P-Y

AH/air

United States Fleet
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

FF1/A4-3

Serial 003090

23 October 1944.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

Subject: British Activities at Clipperton Island.

Enclosures: (A) Copy of Air Vice Marshal Willock's Sec. Ltr.
A, 25,953/44 of 16 October 1944.
(B) ComInCh and CNO Proposed Reply to Enclosure (A).

1. At the President's direction, the U.S. Navy recently made available at Bora Bora 3,000 gallons of 100 octane gasoline and 100 gallons of aviation lubricating oil for a Royal Air Force seaplane making a survey flight from Mexico to Australia via Clipperton Island and Bora Bora. No other activities were presented or proposed by the British. They were notified that the U.S. Navy considered such an air route as of no military value in connection with the war against Japan.

2. The Royal Air Force now proposes rather extensive activities at Clipperton Island, which is claimed by the French, including preparation of a landing field for Dakotas (Douglas landplane transports) as outlined in Enclosure (A).

3. Since this air route from Mexico to the Southwest Pacific is obviously a post war commercial venture involving policies of our government, as well as being of interest to Mexico and the French, I propose to answer Air Vice Marshal Willock's letter by Enclosure (B). Your comment on this proposed reply is requested.

Admiral, U.S. Navy.

C-O-P-Y

FF1/A4-3

United States Fleet
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

Serial 003090

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Admiral, U.S. Navy.

C-O-P-Y

44/air Buses

Train
freder

file

Brown

File
WS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS

International Civil Aviation

Welch Pogue and I have worked on the proposed answer to the letter of Senators Bailey and Clark about international civil aviation.

There are here attached two drafts, both of which are satisfactory to us; one is very short, the other is longer and sets out the arguments more extensively. Which form is most desirable in the circumstances is a matter for political rather than technical judgment: the President and you are far better able to judge than we.

acab

Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

Enclosures:

Memorandum for the President,
with its enclosures.

Mr. President
I think the long letter better for
public consumption. Their letter to you was
put in Cong. Record. This should be made
public. The short letter is alright I think.

Regraded Unclassified



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

International Civil Aviation

Attached, proposed letter of answer to the letter from Senators Bailey and Clark, dated August 19, 1944, which you referred to Mr. Pogue and myself. This draft is agreed upon by both of us.

AdA
Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

Enclosure:

To Senator Bailey.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

My dear Senator Bailey:

I have read with much interest the letter of August 19, 1944, signed by Senator Bennett Champ Clark and yourself, calling attention to various problems in the field of international air transportation. I agree thoroughly with you that the subject has a profound significance in the post-war world. Your letter specifically requests that "no action be taken regarding international air transport applications for new routes or acquisition of existing services outside the continental United States and Canada until full consideration of Government policy can be had by Congress".

I have understood that since sometime last year the Aviation Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce has been conducting hearings and studying international air transportation questions. It has been obvious for some time that if any important changes were to be made in the existing policies governing international air transportation prescribed under the Civil Aeronautics Act enacted by Congress in 1938, such changes would have to be adopted promptly.

Developments have been such in the international field that it became necessary that this Government make some progress in meeting the problem of post-war air transportation. Congress having made no changes in the Civil Aeronautics Act, it was necessary that the program on this subject be developed in accordance with the policy and procedures now defined by the Congress in that existing law. I understand that you were advised of this program.

Most of the changes in existing policy suggested as possibilities in your letter would require amendments of the present Act so as to provide for a "chosen instrument", that is, one privately owned company to have the exclusive right to all international air transport services conducted

by American citizens. In that part of the Civil Aeronautics Act which declares the policy of the law, the Congress provided that the Civil Aeronautics Board was to consider competition as being in the public interest to the extent necessary to insure the sound development of an air transport system properly adapted to the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the postal service, and of the national defense. I see no occasion to change this policy in the foreign field and believe that wisely regulated competition in our international air transportation services will serve the public interests of this country better than could be expected under a chosen instrument policy.

I do not believe that the American public will be content if progress is to be made in international discussions on almost all other matters of world importance, while those relating to our own interests in international air transportation are to be delayed.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Josiah W. Bailey,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce,
United States Senate.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

My dear Senator Bailey:

I have for answer a letter of August 19, 1944, signed by Senator Bennett Champ Clark and yourself, on the subject of post-war civil aviation. This letter is a request that "no action be taken regarding international air transport applications for new routes or acquisition of existing services outside the continental United States and Canada until full consideration of Government policy can be had by Congress". Your letter suggests that the particular policy under consideration by your Committee is that of creating, by legislation, monopoly of all United States air interests and the placing of these interests in the hands of a single cartel.

It is wholly true, as you suggest, that this is a grave modification of policy requiring most careful consideration.

The interest of the United States in the air is the result of a series of splendid accomplishments. The Wright Brothers succeeded in flying. Countless American engineers and technicians developed the art of producing planes. A group of intrepid flyers demonstrated that planes could cross the oceans and span continents.

Our air arm in transport and in combat is today operating in every quarter of the globe. We are engaged in conquering enemies who tried to close great air spaces, as well as to dominate great land areas. Hundreds of thousands of American boys are taking part in air warfare; thousands have died in that service. Surely the proposed transfer of the American heritage in the air to a single private corporation is of interest to every American.

Can such transfer be made, with justice, to a single private corporation? Would it be wise, in the present growing state of the art, to attempt transfer to a Government-owned or controlled corporation? In view of the world-wide ramifications of so vast an enterprise and its obvious influence on American foreign relations,

what relation must it bear if the project is attempted, to the Government and the public of the United States? What effect can such a transfer have upon the continued development of the aviation industry in the United States, on which we must rely as a powerful and continuing resource in our national defense?

Let me state that having given very careful consideration to this subject, I am unable to see that the proponents of monopoly in American international aviation have made out their case. They have proposed transfer to a private corporation, endowed almost with super-governmental rights. To protect the public and the foreign relations of the country, such a corporation would have to be either Government-owned or so controlled as to give substantially that result. I am not in favor of that. The alternative must be a reasonable division of American aviation. A number of companies will attain the best results of private initiative in a rapidly developing field.

Other countries have tried monopoly; but then other countries believe in cartels. And they have not been conspicuously successful in this cartelized aviation.

I sympathize with your desire that the Executive branch of the Government shall not, so far as possible, create situations which would impair the freedom of the Congress to continue its study and make sound determination in these grave questions. But I am sure you will agree with me that even during your deliberations, the interests of the United States must be protected.

Before the adjournment of the Congress, Senator Clark, Chairman of your Subcommittee on Aviation, was good enough to confer with me. I told him then that, while we were still a long way from Berlin, we had to reckon on the possibility that Germany would be defeated during the summer or autumn, and that the Continent of Europe would thus be reopened to aviation. I said that, as he knew, other countries would be prepared to enter that field almost at once, and that I thought we had to be in a position to take such action as might be necessary for the best interests of the United States, and that these would necessarily be steps taken in conjunction with other countries over which we would wish to

fly, or in which we would hope to land. Senator Clark, who was fully informed of the situation, cordially agreed. I do not think you intended by your letter to place the Executive branch of the Government in a position in which it cannot take all necessary measures.

The tide of events in Europe is now racing towards German disaster. It now seems likely that the problem of extending our air service to other continents will be thrust upon us by events, and that some arrangements will have to be made if great matters are not to go by default.

Your Committee has had this subject matter under examination for a period of considerably more than one year. I am advised that it has not as yet reached the stage of public hearings, which, in view of the seriousness of the issues, you no doubt have in mind, so that the public may have the benefit of hearing the arguments. Hearings, and the legislation which you may recommend, all will require months of time.

Your letter likewise refers to certain proceedings now going forward before the Civil Aeronautics Board arising out of applications of a number of American airlines for authority to enter the field of foreign air transport. You realize, of course, that these proceedings are being conducted under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. That Act was passed by a large majority of both Houses of Congress. It specifically forbids monopoly. It charges the Civil Aeronautics Board as well as myself with certain responsibilities, including, of course, the responsibility to protect and foster the interests of the United States in the framework of its international relations, along the lines of policy legislated by the Congress in that Act. These responsibilities can only be changed by like act of Congress, and I am sure you did not wish to suggest that we should decline to follow the mandate of the Act.

Naturally, anything done under that law is subject to any changed rules or policy which may occur as a

result of change in the law. Every reasonable attempt will be made to assure that, should the Congress decide to change its policy, the change may be effective. I am glad that the arrangements made to keep your Committee fully informed as to the course of events and prospective problems have been satisfactory. As the Executive agencies confront the continuing and pressing day-to-day problems, I know that you and your colleagues will give full cooperation, to the end that the interest of every American in air matters will be fully represented, and that the policy in this field will be directed towards assisting the foundation of an enduring peace.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Josiah W. Bailey,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce,
United States Senate.



14/10
Horn
Dup file
File B

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON 25

September 7, 1944


Dear Mr. President:

The enclosed memorandum on international aviation was prepared by Welch Pogue, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, at my suggestion. It represents the views of the Board, and I might add that they feel very keenly on the subject, and, certainly, the aviation industry is keenly and actively interested.

It occurred to me that you might have occasion to discuss this subject with Prime Minister Churchill at your next meeting.

I think it timely, and that it would be helpful if some general statement or reference to the subject could be made as early as possible.

Sincerely,


Secretary of Commerce

The President
The White House



CONFIDENTIAL

(Draft of 9/6/44)

MEMORANDUM RE INTERNATIONAL AIR RIGHTS

Our problem of international negotiation for air transport agreements has been complicated by the British preference for an international authority having power to allocate routes and fix frequencies of service. Up to now, this Government has opposed British policy on this point. Such an arrangement would be unacceptable to American public opinion. It would probably operate to the disadvantage of this country while benefiting nations with large colonial empires who would be permitted to establish connecting services with their territorial possessions quite independent of the additional routes which might be allocated to them by the international authority. It seems clear that delay in our negotiations with other countries for adequate air rights merely to accommodate the British would be very distasteful to American public opinion.

Under these circumstances, it is believed that if we could reach an immediate satisfactory agreement with the British, the log jam might be broken and prompt progress could be made. The agreement with the British should be that we receive landing rights and other aeronautical privileges called for by the Civil Aeronautics Board's international route pattern, issued June 14, 1944, in all the British Commonwealth and India, and that the British should cooperate in any other quarters where they have influence to see that we obtain such other similar rights in other countries as may be called for by this route pattern. This agreement should also include making available for use by United States air carriers the necessary communications systems. Of course, we should reciprocate on any reasonable basis when we know concretely what routes the British Commonwealth wants.

It is believed that it would be highly desirable for the President to discuss the matter with the British Prime Minister with the view of converting British opposition into support for our bilateral negotiation of air transport agreements. Free access to world markets is one of the basic concepts of the Atlantic Charter which the President and Mr. Churchill jointly drafted.

If such an agreement could be reached with Mr. Churchill, that fact should be reported to the people of the United States as evidence of world leadership in the postwar planning. International aviation is a subject which has great appeal to the people of our country, many of whose friends and relatives have fought in the air force and all of whom firmly expect this nation to maintain its preeminence in air transport development as an instrument for the preservation of the future peace.

A4(a)

SECRET

SANTA MARIA AIRFIELD

Mr. Churchill probably will not raise the question of the second Azores airfield our Army Air Corps is anxious to operate on Santa Maria. The British are in agreement with us that this is a matter for direct negotiation as between us and the Portuguese. The British Ambassador in Lisbon did not mention Santa Maria in communicating to Dr. Salazar the Combined Chiefs of Staff decision respecting Portuguese participation in a Timor expedition.

It would appear unnecessary, and perhaps unwise, for us to take the initiative in reopening with the British any discussion of the airfield now under construction by us in the Island of Santa Maria, or of American use and control of the airfield when constructed.

Should Mr. Churchill raise the question it would be well to make clear to him that the negotiations leading up to the granting of this facility by the Portuguese Government have been conducted directly between the American and Portuguese Governments and have not been related in any way to the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement of August 17, 1943 or to the alliance of 1373; and that our Air Corps expects to operate the field directly. In these negotiations it has been agreed that the guise of an American commercial enterprise, namely Pan-American Airways, would be employed to cover the interest of the American Government in the project. No question of control or utilization of the field for post-war civil aviation purposes is involved.

AH/Pac. Air Base

June 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of The Navy

Referring to your letter dated 19 June transmitting a Report of Investigation by Special Mission of Certain Pacific Islands, the President has this date approved of your recommendation that this report be distributed in a confidential status to the State, War and Navy Departments, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The question as to whether or not copies of this report should be delivered to certain air lines can be taken up at a later date.

/Signed/ William D. Leahy

SECRET
SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

19 June 1944

To: The President.

Subject: Special Mission to Pacific Islands - Report of.

Enclosure: (A) Report of Investigation by Special Mission
of Certain Pacific Islands.

I have the pleasure of forwarding to you a report of the Special Mission, of which Rear Admiral R. E. Byrd, U. S. Navy (Retired), was senior member, upon the investigation of certain Pacific Islands in connection with National Defense and Commercial Air Bases and Routes. This report is very complete and reflects credit on the members of the Mission. Since the investigation was made in the interest of National Defense as well as for Commercial purposes, our allies were not notified regarding this undertaking, and both the investigation and the report have been maintained in a secret category, and it is recommended that it be kept in this category.

The first four volumes of the report form a comprehensive report of the investigation in regard to Commercial Air Bases and Routes. If it is your desire that the airlines, whose officials were assigned to this mission, be furnished copies of the report, it is recommended that they be issued the first four books only with Section V of Book I removed and the words "National Defense (Primarily)" deleted from the covers of all volumes.

The Senior Member, in Book VI, presents a thorough study of the National Defense aspects of the Pacific Ocean, and it is considered that it will be helpful to those you have charged with the duty of negotiating with our Allies for the control of needed strategic islands and other areas. It is, therefore, recommended that this volume be distributed to the State, War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and subject to your approval, it will be so distributed.

James Forrestal
JAMES FORRESTAL

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET
SECRET

19 June 1944

To: The President.

Subject: Special Mission to Pacific Islands - Report of.

Enclosure: (A) Report of Investigation by Special Mission of Certain Pacific Islands.

I have the pleasure of forwarding to you a report of the Special Mission, of which Rear Admiral R. E. Byrd, U. S. Navy (Retired), was senior member, upon the investigation of certain Pacific Islands in connection with National Defense and Commercial Air Bases and Routes. This report is very complete and reflects credit on the members of the Mission. Since the investigation was made in the interest of National Defense as well as for Commercial purposes, our allies were not notified regarding this undertaking, and both the investigation and the report have been maintained in a secret category, and it is recommended that it be kept in this category.

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JAMES FORRESTAL

Pres file
AH

C O P Y

file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

April 20, 1944

OK
JHP

In reply refer to
BA 711.3227/33

Secret

My dear Admiral Leahy:

As you are aware, the American Ambassador to Brazil, assisted by Vice Admiral Jonas Ingram and Major General Robert Walsh, is just about to conclude an agreement with Brazil for our use beyond the termination of hostilities of certain strategic bases and their facilities.

Sooner or later, of course, this agreement will become public knowledge. The setting up of the joint commission provided for in it and the placing into effect of others of its terms will almost immediately reveal the existence of the agreement.

I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments are in accord with us that the agreement with Brazil sets an important model within the general post-war security system and that there is a highly justified public interest in the arrangement. For example, we have been made aware in the past several months of the considerable interest of members of Congress in the preservation of certain of our privileges in the bases developed with United States public funds.

I therefore propose, with your approval, to inform the Chairmen and certain other members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Military Affairs Committees and the House of Foreign Affairs and Military Affairs Committees of this agreement and to furnish them copies on a confidential basis. I shall count on you, if the foregoing meets with your approbation, to participate with me in this measure.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ CORDELL HULL

Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington 25, D.C.

COMINCH FILE

A4/air

WHL
P-

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 14, 1944.

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The President
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Franklin:

I have asked Miss Tully not to send this letter to you unless its nature is such that it comes under the category of recreation. I know that geography and strategy have always meant much to you.

Knowing of your great interest in what islands and other areas we should get control of after the war, I went deeply into the job you gave me in the Pacific and tried to think it through to rock bottom. My study shows that you were right - that you were years ahead of all of us, even those concentrating on the overall aspects of post-war strategy and international air commerce.

Not until I had made a thorough analysis of the whole problem did I fully comprehend the reasons that brought you to consider this matter of such transcendent importance to the future of this nation.

My findings (arrived at objectively, I can assure you) show that you were entirely correct about Clipperton and the strategic and commercial value of certain key islands in the Tuamotu, Marquesas and Society Groups, as well as about the feasibility of new air routes to the Southwest Pacific. There can be no question about this.

I have ended up with five books, but do not let that frighten you since I have boiled it all down into a succinct review for you.

There were 130 islands in the groups that we investigated. You will recall that you asked us to assess these groups and individual islands from the standpoint of national defense as well as air commerce. When I began making the strategic assessment for the

post-war era, it immediately became evident that we could not assess these islands as lone entities, so I had to fit them into the post-war era defense plans (note the plural) of the whole Pacific Ocean.

By post-war era I mean the era that begins at the end of the confused transition period when final world settlements are being made.

I selected this period because I knew that with your foresight you would be interested in the permanent value of islands and other areas throughout the world rather than their temporary value. Regarding this matter of permanent value of islands, we know that defense plans may change with the passage of time, but that the importance of neutralizing or keeping control of certain strategic islands is not so subject to change. Further, we know that as the world continues to shrink, islands once considered unimportant from the security standpoint may in the course of time become threats to our national safety.

Naturally I found this matter of drawing up a post-war era defense plan of the Pacific Ocean a big task. This, of course, could not be done without making sets of assumptions of a common sense and practical nature. I laid down fifty of them which I thought out most carefully and then drew several post-war era defense plans of the Pacific Ocean. Above all I recognized the limitations in order to make a sound realistic report for you.

Incidentally, I do not believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff have yet made any plans for this period.

I found that commerce and political and military strategy will be inextricably entwined and certain key islands of the 130 will be essential to every one of the defense plans we laid down.

A realistic assessment shows that we cannot get all the islands we will require for the ideal plan covering our commercial and strategic needs. However, if we know exactly what we want, there are various ways (which I have covered in the report) in which we can neutralize these islands which from a common sense viewpoint we realize we may not be able to get unrestricted control, or which we may not be able to maintain.

Common sense tells us that we will never be able to achieve the ideal in fortifications in the Pacific. There will be too many limiting factors. Therefore, this matter of neutralizing potentially strategic islands becomes extremely important. In this connection, there is one significant agreement we should attempt to get from the United Nations, namely, that after this war the sovereignty of no island in the Pacific be changed without full agreement from the United States.

As the world continues to shrink, islands once considered unimportant from the security standpoint may become threats to our national safety. Therefore, the permanent commercial and strategic value must be taken into account.


We know that the timing of our efforts to neutralize or control islands or other areas is of the utmost importance. We cannot allow ourselves to be charged with imperialism, aggrandizement or the abandonment of the tenets of democracy in taking islands from our weak or prostrate allies. Nor can we disturb the solidarity with our more powerful allies by aggressive or tactless methods. Nevertheless, in spite of those and other limiting factors in getting control of islands, our study shows that we have ahead of us unparalleled opportunities which may never come again that this war has developed for the United States.

I have my ideas about the timing of our negotiations. Whether I am right or wrong, one thing at least is certain. Whatever procedure or combination of procedures is followed, or however our claims may be timed, it is of the utmost importance that the United States know as soon as possible exactly what air routes, islands, landing fields, strategic areas, etc., are essential for the combined purposes of commerce and political and military strategy, and to know also by careful planning how to get what we need and how to neutralize key islands we cannot get or afford to maintain.

I know that this is your opinion. I am simply giving you a few high spots from our study.

My best to you.

Sincerely,



R. E. Byrd

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Tully.

The President said last night that he would sign the within secret letter if I would send it to him through you.

Will you please present it at your convenience - no great hurry.


WILSON BROWN.

SECRET

February 1, 1944.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As a result of the continuing study of post-war military bases, referred to in my letter to you of 7 January 1944, I desire to supplement that letter and accompanying documents as follows:

- a. The Atlantic Blue Area is extended to include Georgetown, British Guiana, since our rights there are based on a 99-year lease, similar to that of Trinidad.
- b. The European Black Area in the Chart for Period One will not be considered as definitive, but as subject to adjustment to conform to U.S. occupation and enforcement agreements when they shall have been made.
- c. The State, War, and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their studies, plans and negotiations in conformity with my letter, will not limit themselves to the subject of air bases alone, but will consider the related questions of adequate base facilities for naval and ground forces--the whole subject being established for future reference as "U.S. Requirements for Post-War Military Bases." However, in any case where such action is likely to jeopardize acquisition of any of the air base rights contemplated in my letter of 7 January, or cause delay in initiating the negotiations directed therein, these amplifying instructions are not to be construed as requiring simultaneous negotiations for air and naval or ground force base facilities.
- d. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy in matters involving departmental policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be the coordinating agency in regard to the military guidance to be furnished the State Department, in connection with these negotiations.
- e. All the above is subject to the approval of the President. (In President's handwriting)
Very sincerely yours,

s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

SECRET



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET - SECURITY

26 January 1944

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: U.S. Requirements for Post-War
Military Bases.

Enclosure: Proposed Letter from the President
to the Secretary of State

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that instructions in the sense indicated in the Enclosure be given the Secretary of State, supplementing the directive contained in your letter to him dated 7 January 1944, on this subject.

2. Items a and b are minor clarifications.

3. Item c is considered to be the next logical step in the development of post-war military bases and will bring existing conditions into accord with the approved policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that "Post-war military problems should be studied as an integrated whole, rather than as separate problems for the ground, naval, and air forces."

4. Item d will confirm the present concept of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this regard.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

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~~SECRET - SECURITY~~

PROPOSED LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

As a result of the continuing study of post-war military bases, referred to in my letter to you of 7 January 1944, I desire to supplement that letter and accompanying documents as follows:

- a. The Atlantic Blue Area is extended to include Georgetown, British Guiana, since our rights there are based on a 99-year lease, similar to that of Trinidad.
- b. The European Black Area in the Chart for Period One will not be considered as definitive, but as subject to adjustment to conform to U.S. occupation and enforcement agreements when they shall have been made.
- c. The State, War, and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their studies, plans and negotiations in conformity with my letter, will not limit themselves to the subject of air bases alone, but will consider the related questions of adequate base facilities for naval and ground forces--the whole subject being established for future reference as "U.S. Requirements for Post-War Military Bases." However, in any case where such action is likely to jeopardize acquisition of any of the air base rights contemplated in my letter of 7 January, or cause delay in initiating the negotiations directed therein, these amplifying instructions are not to be construed as requiring simultaneous negotiations for air and naval or ground force base facilities.
- d. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy in matters involving departmental policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be the coordinating agency in regard to the military guidance to be furnished the State Department, in connection with these negotiations.

SECRET

Enclosure

SECRET

AH
SECRET 19 January 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The President.

1. Admiral Byrd arrived in Dallas, Texas from Panama about 1 December. He underwent a minor operation which he thought would keep him there about a week, but which in reality kept him about six weeks. He went from Dallas to Boston last week and is at present at his home there. He is expected in Washington momentarily.
2. The report is now completed and will be submitted shortly after Admiral Byrd's arrival here.
3. In talking with Admiral Byrd's Aide, I gained the following impressions:
 - (a) The mission was successful despite the unfortunate gasoline explosion which threatened to disrupt the plans.
 - (b) Several promising routes have been outlined and are recommended in the report.
4. I have further information should it be desired prior to submission of the report.

Very respectfully,

Chester C. Wood
Captain, U.S. Navy
Assistant Naval Aide
To the President

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

4 January, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: U.S. requirements for post-war
air bases.

In your memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject of U.S. requirements for post-war air bases, dated 23 November 1943, the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were approved, subject to specified changes.

These changes have been incorporated in the two maps contained in J.C.S. 570 as Enclosures "A" and "B". If these maps, as so amended, meet with your approval, it is suggested that the attached letter be sent to the Secretary of State.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.



SECRET - SECURITY

7 January 1944

SECRET

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have submitted to me a study showing the locations in foreign territories, in which air bases or aeronautical rights and facilities for the operation of military aircraft are deemed essential to the future military requirements of the United States.

I am forwarding to you that study and accompanying memoranda, and request that the State Department, as a matter of high priority, initiate negotiations with the governments concerned to acquire permanent or long-term benefit of the bases, facilities and rights required, at the earliest possible moment.

It is desired that the State Department should collaborate fully with the War and Navy Departments in this matter. The latter will furnish the State Department such documents, memoranda and knowledge as they may have derived from wartime acquisition or use of any of the bases, facilities and rights in question.

The order of priority, the timing, and the plan of negotiation will be determined by the State Department in each instance. The War and Navy Departments, collaborating with you, will indicate the relative importance of the air bases and facilities, and will prescribe the maxima to be desired and the minima which will be acceptable in each instance.

The optimum arrangements desired in certain instances would be to have the United States own or become long-term lessee of an air base and facilities with the right:

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a. To import, free of duty, materiel, equipment and supplies requisite to the improvement, maintenance, operation and defense of a military air base.

b. To operate military aircraft into and from the base and over surrounding territory without restriction.

c. To install and operate such radio, weather, communication and other facilities as are required for the operation of the air base, aircraft and navigation aids.

d. To maintain such personnel as may be requisite for the operation and defense of the base, facilities and rights.

The acceptable minimum in certain instances may be for the United States to have the right to operate from the base and to install facilities essential to that operation and to defense.

Between these two extremes, the solution applicable in each locality will be governed by the importance of our particular need and a realistic approach to what we can expect to obtain from the sovereign power concerned.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are maintaining a continuing study of this important subject and will submit further recommendations from time to time as circumstances and the military interests of the United States may dictate.

You will note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have purposely excluded consideration of civil aviation requirements, stating that, while inevitably related, the latter are under study by the State Department. I concur in their opinion that it is probable that any policy established in respect to civil aviation will be in accord with, and often strengthen, the military position outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it is obvious that in any case of conflict, sound military requirements must control. Negotiation for the bases, facilities and rights herein designated

as being of military necessity must therefore not be postponed or retarded in deference to considerations of civil or commercial aviation.

Very sincerely yours,

Enclosures:

Memo for the President
from J.C.S., dated 15
November 1943.
J.C.S. - Policy on Post-
war Military Information.
Map - Military Air Base
Requirements - Period I (7).
Map - Military Air Base
Requirements - Period II (7).

SECRET

SECRET SECURITY

15 November, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: U.S. Requirements for Post-War Air Bases

1. At your direction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the broader aspects of the question of military post-war air bases. In this connection they visualize three periods subsequent to the defeat of Germany, in which our military requirements for air bases will be different. These periods will be characterized by:

- a. First period - Enforced peace in Europe and war in the Pacific;
- b. Second period- World-wide peace enforced under the Four Power Agreement, pending establishment of a world-wide organization for collective security.
- c. Third period - Peace maintained by formally established world-wide machinery.

2. In our opinion, the problem of the national or international military requirements for air bases during the third period cannot be solved on a realistic basis at this time. In general, the requirements for bases during the third period must evolve from the experience obtained during the second period and in the light of international developments. We believe, however, that the system of military air bases as proposed for the second period will provide a sound basis upon which to design the system for the third period.

3. Accordingly, there are submitted herewith maps showing the proposed system of air bases for the first and second periods, on which are indicated:

- a. Assumptions on which based.

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SECRET SECURITY

b. Locations (individually or by areas) for required military air bases.

c. Classification of zones, bases and general areas by colors, on a "why necessary" basis.

d. Characteristics of bases as to U.S. military rights.

e. Availability or state of development.

4. We feel that the acquisition of air bases is a matter of the very greatest importance in the future security of the United States and to the retention of our rights in the post-war world. Hence we respectfully request that you direct the State Department to take appropriate action to obtain air bases and rights to the operation of military aircraft in and over foreign territory substantially as outlined on the accompanying maps. The acquisition of the desired rights should be pursued as a matter of high priority, at the earliest times and to the maximum extent deemed practicable in each instance by the State Department and the agencies of the War and Navy Departments which are designated to cooperate with the State Department in these proceedings. A draft of a proposed directive to the State Department is attached hereto as Enclosure "C".

5. In answer to your specific questions as to our future base requirements in Dakar and the West African - Cape Verde area, this area is within the zone of bases required for defense of the Western Hemisphere during both periods. It is proposed that the United States have participating rights in bases in this zone as a member of the United Nations. These rights should remain in force until extended or adequately replaced under the ultimate collective security system. In this area, we should attempt to obtain post-war participating rights, on the basis outlined above, to the following facilities:

a. Yof Field and Eknes (Rufisque) Field at Dakar, the air fields at Casablanca and/or Marrakech and Port Lyautey, Roberts Field in Liberia, selected airfields in the Cape Verde and Canary Islands.

b. Seaplane facilities at Dakar, Casablanca, and/or Port Lyautey, Fishermans Lake in Liberia, and in the Cape Verde and Canary Islands.

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c. The port and naval base facilities of Dakar, Casablanca, the Cape Verde and Canary Islands, and a suitable port in Liberia.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

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SECRET SECURITY

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

POLICY ON POST-WAR MILITARY PROBLEMS

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be represented in important groups concerned with post-war planning, as may be necessary to insure that military considerations may be integrated with political and economic considerations.
2. Post-war military problems should be studied as an integrated whole rather than as separate problems for the ground, naval and air forces.
3. They must be examined from the points of view of national defense, of prospective international military commitments and related national commercial interests. While in the last analysis national security must dominate, we must be prepared to make concessions to the international organization.
4. It should be assumed for the basis of these studies that the Allies have maintained their solidarity, have won the war, have studied and prepared for the post-war problems and are really desirous of cooperating in order to profit by past mistakes in attaining a world economically and politically sound and free of war.
5. Assuming that there will be a period of occupation, rehabilitation and peace enforcement in Europe while we are engaged in defeating Japan, the United States should be prepared with timely plans for its participation in Europe during this period--such plans to give due weight to our military interests and to assure that our commitments in that area do not interfere with the war against Japan.
6. We should be fully prepared for the period after the defeat of Japan with plans for bases to be acquired and for the problems of occupation, disarmament and reconstruction. Such plans should include various assumptions as to the degree of participation by Great Britain, China and the U.S.S.R., until such questions can be decided by negotiations.
7. We should be prepared after the fall of Japan for all military phases of an international gathering, to establish peace and set up the new international machinery. The United States, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. with China in a less degree would dominate this gathering and the machinery it sets up until the new world-wide order is established and in working order.

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
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8. Military commitments during this period should be based on the idea of the three great powers, assisted as may be by China, dividing responsibility among them by zones or otherwise until the formal establishment of an international organization.

9. In both the immediate and the ultimate phases of the international organization, U.S. military commitments should be limited in so far as possible to the Western hemisphere and the Far East.

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MILITARY AIR BASE REQUIREMENTS--PERIOD I

(PEACE IN EUROPE, WAR AGAINST JAPAN)

ENCLOSURE "A" TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT OF 15 NOVEMBER 1943

SUBJECT: "POST WAR AIR BASES" - APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT 23 NOVEMBER 1943.

ASSUMPTIONS--PERIOD I

1. The European Axis has been defeated.
2. The war against Japan is still in progress.
3. The major United Nations maintain their solidarity, but
4. The U.S.S.R. has not entered the war against Japan.
5. Bulk of post-war enforcement in Europe is being performed by European nations.
6. Bulk of U.S. forces being withdrawn from Europe.

LEGEND: Specific site, solid circle; general area, open circle.

BLUE:

- (a) Required for direct defense of U.S., leased areas, and possessions, including Philippines.
- (b) U.S. to have exclusive military rights, except as modified by agreement and for combined operations against Japan.
- (c) Except for Western Pacific, they are generally in existence.

GREEN:

- (a) Reared for defense of Western Hemisphere, in addition to U.S. bases.
- (b) U.S. have military rights on a participating and if necessary, a reciprocal basis, as defined by agreements.
- (c) Deployment not complete--many agreements to be negotiated.

BLACK:

- (a) Required by our occupation and enforcement commitments in Europe.
- (b) U.S. to have adequate military rights, as established by occupation and enforcement agreements.
- (c) Ample facilities available.

RED:


- (a) Additional bases required for conducting war against Japan.
- (b) U.S. to have full military use jointly with Allies.
- (c) Now available in areas under Allied control, others to be developed in areas as occupied.

SECRET

CHIEF OF THE BRANCH OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, 1943
 CHIEF OF THE BRANCH OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, 1943

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

MILITARY AIR BASE REQUIREMENTS-PERIOD II
(PEACE ENFORCED BY MAJOR POWERS)

ENCLOSURE "B" TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT OF 15 NOVEMBER 1943

SUBJECT: "POST WAR AIR BASES"—APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT 23 NOVEMBER 1943

ASSUMPTIONS- PERIOD II

1. Both the European Axis and Japan have been defeated.
 2. The major United Nations have maintained their solidarity, and
 3. Have established some preliminary United Nations' machinery for enforcing the peace—as represented by the Four Powers Pact.
- GREEN:
- (a) Required for defense of Western Hemisphere in addition to BLUE bases.
 - (b) U.S. to have military rights on a participating and, if necessary, a reciprocal basis, as defined by agreements.
 - (c) Development not complete—many agreements to be negotiated.
4. Peace enforcement is accomplished by major powers exercising responsibility on a combined or a regional basis.
 5. U.S. interests will be primarily the Western Hemisphere, and the Central Pacific to the Far East.
- BLACK:
- (a) Required by U.S., as one of the Great Powers enforcing peace, pending a world-wide organization.
 - (b) U.S. to have participating rights in connection with responsibilities as one of the Great Powers enforcing peace.
 - (c) Generally available, and to a considerable extent built by U.S. funds.

NOTE

- (a) Bases outside the above zones will be required by one or more of the Great Powers enforcing peace.
- (b) Extent of U. S. participating rights in such bases to be determined by division of responsibility for enforcement among Great Powers.

WORKS IN THE SERVICE OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OF
LITERATURE IN THE AMERICAN LITERATURE SECTION

Regraded Unclassified

A4 (air base)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Tully.

The original of the President's memorandum of November 23, 1943, with affiliated papers, was sent to the White House by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 22, 1943, in an effort to ascertain if the President had approved and signed the draft letter to Secretary Hull (contained as enclosure "C" of JCS 570/1.

Captain Freseman returned all papers to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 23rd with the note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not complied with the President's directive of November 23rd in correcting the charts.

No action necessary by the White House until corrected papers are received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

G. M. Elsey,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

Shown to Miss
Tully 1230
12/23/43
RE

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

December 10, 1943.

Miss Tully:

President directs this be placed
in his "Current Secret File".

Rigdon.

*Map Room
go hold —*

Handwritten: 100-2

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

November 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Subject: U.S. Requirements for Post-War
Air Bases.

Reference: (a) J.C.S. 570 and 570/1, dated
6 November and 15 November,
1943, respectively.

1. The President notes with satisfaction the very clear and excellent study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the subject. The recommendations are approved except that the area of the Marquesas and Tuamotu groups should be included in the United States' sphere of influence as indicated in enclosure (A) of J.C.S. 570.

2. In map number 03972 (again enclosure (A) of J.C.S. 570), the blue area east of the ~~Samoa~~ Islands should be extended south to latitude 30° and east to the western green border, so as to include the Marquesas - Tuamotu and Society areas.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

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7

I HAVE BEFORE ME J.C.S. 570 AND 570/1

THE SUBJECT IS "U.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR POST-WAR AIR BASES."

ADMIRAL GLASSFORD'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT, DATED 28 OCTOBER, WAS REFERRED BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR STUDY WITH REGARD TO DETERMINING WHAT AREAS IN WEST AFRICA WE SHOULD SEEK TO CONTROL AS AIR AND NAVAL BASES AFTER THE WAR.

J.C.S. 570 IS THE REPORT OF THE JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE ENCLOSING A DRAFT REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT, AND REQUESTING APPROVAL BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE OUTLINE OF THE GENERAL POLICY ON POST-WAR MILITARY PROBLEMS AS PRESENTED IN APPENDIX "B" (PAGE 6).

THE JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS (PAGE 3):

- a. THAT THE PROPOSED MEMORANDUM CONTAINED IN APPENDIX "A" BE APPROVED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND FORWARDED TO THE PRESIDENT.
- b. THAT THE GENERAL POLICY ON POST-WAR MILITARY PROBLEMS OUTLINED AS PROPOSED IN APPENDIX "B" (PAGE 6) BE APPROVED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER PLANNING AND STUDY.
- c. THAT THE JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE CONTINUE ITS STUDY OF THIS PROBLEM WITH A VIEW TO MAKING SUBSEQUENT RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.

IN J.C.S. 570/1 GENERAL ARNOLD PROPOSES AN AMENDMENT TO THE DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT (J.C.S. 570, PAGE 5). THIS AMENDMENT REFERS TO A DRAFT DIRECTIVE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT (PAGE 14) WHICH WILL BE INCORPORATED AS ENCLOSURE "C" TO THE MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

APPROVE THE PROPOSALS OF THE JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE CONTAINED ON PAGE 3 OF J.C.S. 570 AS AMENDED BY J.C.S. 570/1.

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Regarded Unclassified

SECRET - SECURITY

S E C R E T

J.C.S. 570/1

15 November 1943

Pages 13 - 15, incl.

COPY NO. 24

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

U.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR POST-WAR AIR BASES

Reference: J.C.S. 570

Note by the Secretary

The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, proposes that the draft memorandum for the President, shown as Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A" (page 5) of J.C.S. 570 be amended as shown in the Enclosure.

F. B. ROYAL,
Secretary.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

It is proposed that the paragraph following 3 e, beginning "Should the basic plans outlined . . ." be deleted and the following new paragraph be substituted therefor and numbered 4, and the present paragraph 4 be renumbered 5:

"4. We feel that the acquisition of air bases is a matter of the very greatest importance in the future security of the United States and to the retention of our rights in the post-war world. Hence we respectfully request that you direct the State Department to take appropriate action to obtain air bases and rights to the operation of military aircraft in and over foreign territory substantially as outlined on the accompanying maps. The acquisition of the desired rights should be pursued as a matter of high priority, at the earliest times and to the maximum extent deemed practicable in each instance by the State Department and the agencies of the War and Navy Departments which are designated to cooperate with the State Department in these proceedings. A draft of a proposed directive to the State Department is attached hereto as Enclosure 'C'."

A draft of the proposed directive to the State Department to be included as Enclosure "C" to the memorandum to the President is shown on the following pages.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE "C"

DRAFT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Honorable Cordell E. Hull
The Secretary of State
State Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hull:

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have submitted to me a study showing the locations in foreign territories, in which airbases or aeronautical rights and facilities for the operation of military aircraft are deemed essential to the future military requirements of the United States.
2. I am forwarding to you that study and accompanying memoranda, and request that the State Department, as a matter of high priority, initiate negotiations with the governments concerned to acquire permanent or long-term benefit of the bases, facilities and rights required, ~~at the earliest possible moment.~~
3. It is desired that the State Department should collaborate fully with the War and Navy Departments in this matter. The latter will furnish the State Department such documents, memoranda and knowledge as they may have derived from wartime acquisition or use of any of the bases, facilities and rights in question.
4. The order of priority, the timing, and the plan of negotiation will be determined by the State Department in each instance. The War and Navy Departments, collaborating with you, will indicate the relative importance of the air bases and facilities, and will prescribe the maxima to be desired and the minima which will be acceptable in each instance.

5. The optimum arrangements desired in certain instances would be to have the United States own or become long-term lessee of an air base and facilities with the right:

- a. To import, free of duty, materiel, equipment and supplies requisite to the improvement, maintenance, operation and defense of a military air base.
- b. To operate military aircraft into and from the base and over surrounding territory without restriction.
- c. To install and operate such radio, weather, communication and other facilities as are required for the operation of the air base, aircraft and navigation aids.
- d. To maintain such personnel as may be requisite for the operation and defense of the base, facilities and rights.

6. The acceptable minimum in certain instances may be for the United States to have the right to operate from the base and to install facilities essential to that operation and to defense.

7. Between these two extremes, the solution applicable in each locality will be governed by the importance of our particular need and a realistic approach to what we can expect to obtain from the sovereign power concerned.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are maintaining a continuing study of this important subject and will submit further recommendations from time to time as circumstances and the military interests of the United States may dictate.

9. You will note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have purposely excluded consideration of civil aviation requirements, stating that, while inevitably related, the latter are under study by the State Department. I concur in their opinion that it is probable that any policy established in respect to civil aviation will be in accord with, and often strengthen, the military position outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it is obvious that in any case of conflict, sound military requirements must control. Negotiation for the bases, facilities and rights herein designated as being of military necessity must therefore not be postponed or retarded in deference to considerations of civil or commercial aviation.

(7)

SECRET - SECURITY

SECRET

COPY NO. 44

812-1
(J.C.S. 570)

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

6 November 1943

Pages 1 - 12, incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

U.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR POST-WAR AIR BASES

References: a. J.C.S. 183 Series
b. J.C.S. 494

Memorandum by the Secretaries

1. Enclosure "B", a letter from Vice Admiral Glassford to the President, dated 28 September 1943, and the forwarding memorandum from the President's Naval Aide to Admiral Leahy, was referred to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee for study and preparation of a reply.

2. Enclosure "A", the report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee is presented for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. B. ROYAL,
A. J. McFARLAND,
Joint Secretariat.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE "A"

U.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR POST-WAR AIR BASES

References: a. J.C.S. 183 Series.
b. J.C.S. 494.

Report by Joint Strategic Survey Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. a. To prepare a reply to the President indicating the general post-war military air base requirements of the United States;

b. To answer a specific query from the President as to the post-war military base requirements of the United States in the West African area.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. a. The J.C.S. 183 series represents the previous results of the continuing study being made by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee on the question of post-war bases. In J.C.S. 183/5 (Revised), Post-War Military Problems with particular reference to Air Bases, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee outlined a recommended policy on this subject, which is the basis of the present paper. This paper in brief form is attached hereto as Appendix "B".

b. A letter from Vice Admiral Glassford to the President, together with the President's forwarding remarks to Admiral Leahy, requests advice as to the post-war strategic interests of the United States in the West African area (Enclosure "B").

c. In Appendix "C" to J.C.S. 494 (Location of Proposed Port in Liberia), the President states that in discussions with the Prime Minister and the President of Brazil, consideration was given to the leasing of Dakar by the United Nations and the custody thereof by the United States and Brazil, acting as agents of the United Nations.

SECRET

DISCUSSION

3. The proposed reply to the President, attached hereto as Appendix "A", is based on the general discussion included in the J.C.S. 185 series, as well as the President's views concerning status of bases in West Africa (J.C.S. 494).

4. It will be noted that the military air base system as outlined in Appendix "A" is based on two post-war periods - the first characterized by enforced peace in Europe and war against Japan; the second, by world-wide peace enforced by the four great powers, pending establishment of a world-wide organization. Serious consideration has been given to projecting the system into the third post-war period of peace maintained by a formally established world-wide machinery. The Committee feels, however, that there are at present so many unknown factors connected with this third period that the problem cannot be solved on a realistic basis at the present time. However, it is believed that the system of bases proposed for the second period will provide a sound basis on which to build a system for the third period, to meet the requirements of the ultimate international organization.

5. The proposed system is presented in the form of world charts for each of the two periods, with zones and bases indicated on a "why necessary" basis. It is recognized that there will, of necessity, be considerable variation in the status of bases even within the same zone, and to that extent the proposed charts are an over-simplification. However, the problem presented is so extensive and involved that it is considered essential to first set up an acceptable solution in its larger phases and thereafter to meet the more specific problems as they arise.

SECRET

6. The base locations are indicated either specifically or generally on these maps. They are in substantial agreement with the recommendations of the General Board, former recommendations of this Committee, and proposals of the Army Air Forces. However, it should be understood that in certain cases exact locations must of necessity wait for more detailed survey and study. Except for some sites in Canada, Africa and South America no effort has been made to indicate specific sites in continental areas.

7. Although considerations of post-war commercial aviation have not been included in this paper, it is thought that the recommendations contained herein will facilitate decisions by other U.S. agencies concerned with this problem, since it is believed that no conflict exists between the proposed military air base system and the requirements of international commercial aviation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. a. That the proposed memorandum contained in Appendix "A" be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and forwarded to the President.

b. That the general policy on post-war military problems outlined as proposed in Appendix "B" be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a basis for further planning and study.

c. That the Joint Strategic Survey Committee continue its study of this problem with a view to making subsequent recommendations in the light of future developments.

SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. At your direction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the broader aspects of the question of military post-war air bases. In this connection they visualize three periods subsequent to the defeat of Germany, in which our military requirements for air bases will be different. These periods will be characterized by:

- a. First period - Enforced peace in Europe and war in the Pacific;
- b. Second period - World-wide peace enforced under the Four Power Agreement, pending establishment of a world-wide organization for collective security.
- c. Third period - Peace maintained by formally established world-wide machinery.

2. In our opinion, the problem of the national or international military requirements for air bases during the third period cannot be solved on a realistic basis at this time. In general, the requirements for bases during the third period must evolve from the experience obtained during the second period and in the light of international developments. We believe, however, that the system of military air bases as proposed for the second period will provide a sound basis upon which to design the system for the third period.

3. Accordingly, there are submitted herewith maps showing the proposed system of air bases for the first and second periods, on which are indicated:

- a. Assumptions on which based.
- b. Locations (individually or by areas) for required military air bases.

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c. Classification of zones, bases and general areas by colors, on a "why necessary" basis.

d. Characteristics of bases as to U.S. military rights.

e. Availability or state of development.

Should the basic plans outlined in these maps meet with your approval in principle, the appropriate agencies of the War and Navy Departments are prepared to furnish more detailed information and to collaborate with the State Department in initiating whatever negotiations may appear desirable at this time.

4. In answer to your specific question as to our future base requirements in Dakar and the West African area, this area is within the zone of bases required for defense of the Western Hemisphere during both periods. It is proposed that the United States have participating rights in bases in this zone as a member of the United Nations. These rights should remain in force until extended or adequately replaced under the ultimate collective security system. In this area, we should attempt to obtain post-war participating rights, on the basis outlined above, to the following minimum facilities:

a. Yof Field and Eknes (Rufisque) Field at Dakar, the airfields at Casablanca and/or Marrakech and Port Lyautey, and Roberts Field in Liberia.


b. Seaplane facilities at Dakar, Port Lyautey, the Canary Islands and/or Villa Cisneros (Rio de Oro), and Fisherman's Lake in Liberia.

c. The port and naval base facilities at Dakar and Casablanca, port facilities in the Canary Islands and a suitable port in Liberia.

d. Land-based air facilities in the Canary Islands and/or Villa Cisneros (Rio de Oro); failing either of these, Atar, (French West Africa).

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Com-
mander in Chief of the Army

Regarded as Unclassified



MILITARY AIR BASE REQUIREMENTS--PERIOD I

(PEACE IN EUROPE, WAR AGAINST JAPAN)

ASSUMPTIONS - PERIOD I

1. The European Axis has been defeated.
2. The war against Japan is still in progress.
3. The major United Nations maintain their solidarity, but
4. The U.S.S.R. has not entered the war against Japan.
5. Bulk of post-war enforcement in Europe is being performed by European nations.
6. Bulk of U.S. forces being withdrawn from Europe.

LEGEND: Specific site, solid circle; general area, open circle.

BLUE:

- (a) Required for direct defense of U.S., leased areas, and possessions, including Philippines.
- (b) U.S. to have exclusive military rights, except as modified by agreement and for combined operations against Japan.
- (c) Except for Western Pacific, they are generally in existence.

GREEN:

- (a) Required for defense of Western Hemisphere, in addition to BLUE bases.
- (b) U.S. to have military rights on a participating and if necessary, a reciprocal basis, as defined by agreements.
- (c) Development not complete--many agreements to be negotiated.

BLACK:


- (a) Required by our occupation and enforcement commitments in Europe.
- (b) U.S. to have adequate military rights, as established by occupation and enforcement agreements.
- (c) Ample facilities available.

RED:

- (a) Additional bases required for conducting war against Japan.
- (b) U.S. to have full military use jointly with Allies.
- (c) Now available in areas under Allied control; others to be developed in areas as occupied.

ENCLOSURE "A"

Regraded Unclassified



MILITARY AIR BASE REQUIREMENTS-PERIOD II (PEACE ENFORCED BY MAJOR POWERS)

ASSUMPTIONS-PERIOD II

- Both the European Axis and Japan have been defeated.
- The major United Nations have maintained their solidarity, and
- Have established some preliminary United Nations' machinery for enforcing the peace—as represented by the Four Powers Pact.
- Peace enforcement is accomplished by major powers exercising responsibility on a combined or a regional basis.
- U.S. interests will be primarily the Western Hemisphere, and the Central Pacific to the Far East.

LEGEND: Specific site, solid circle; general area, open circle.

BLUE:

- Required for direct defense of U.S., leased areas, and possessions, including the Philippines.
- U.S. to have exclusive military rights, except as modified by agreement.
- In general, they are or will be in existence.

GREEN:

- Required for defense of Western Hemisphere in addition to BLUE bases.
- U.S. to have military rights on a participating and, if necessary, a reciprocal basis, as defined by agreements.
- Development not complete—many agreements to be negotiated.

BLACK:

- Required by U.S., as one of the Great Powers enforcing peace, pending a world-wide organization.
- U.S. to have participating rights in connection with responsibilities as one of the Great Powers enforcing peace.
- Generally available, and to a considerable extent built by U.S. funds.

NOTE

- Bases outside the above zones will be required by one or more of the Great Powers enforcing peace.
- Extent of U.S. participating rights in such bases to be determined by division of responsibility for enforcement among Great Powers.

ENCLOSURE "B"

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

RECOMMENDED POLICY ON POST-WAR MILITARY PROBLEMS

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be represented in important groups concerned with post-war planning, as may be necessary to insure that military considerations may be integrated with political and economic considerations.
2. Post-war military problems should be studied as an integrated whole rather than as separate problems for the ground, naval and air forces.
3. They must be examined from the points of view of national defense, of prospective international military commitments and related national commercial interests. While in the last analysis national security must dominate, we must be prepared to make concessions to the international organization.
4. It should be assumed for the basis of these studies that the Allies have maintained their solidarity, have won the war, have studied and prepared for the post-war problems and are really desirous of cooperating in order to profit by past mistakes in attaining a world economically and politically sound and free of war.
5. Assuming that there will be a period of occupation, rehabilitation and peace enforcement in Europe while we are engaged in defeating Japan, the United States should be prepared with timely plans for its participation in Europe during this period--such plans to give due weight to our military interests and to assure that our commitments in that area do not interfere with the war against Japan.

S E C R E T

6. We should be fully prepared for the period after the defeat of Japan with plans for bases to be acquired and for the problems of occupation, disarmament and reconstruction. Such plans should include various assumptions as to the degree of participation by Great Britain, China and the U.S.S.R., until such questions can be decided by negotiations.

7. We should be prepared after the fall of Japan for all military phases of an international gathering, to establish peace and set up the new international machinery. The United States, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. with China in a less degree would dominate this gathering and the machinery it sets up until the new world-wide order is established and in working order.

8. Military commitments during this period should be based on the idea of the three great powers, assisted as may be by China, dividing responsibility among them by zones or otherwise until the formal establishment of an international organization.

9. In both the immediate and the ultimate phases of the international organization, U.S. military commitments should be limited in so far as possible to the Western hemisphere and the Far East.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7 October 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Admiral Leahy.

The President directed that this should be referred to you with the statement that he, the President, is not so much interested in the financial aspect of the Dakar Mission as he is with the all-important question of making up our minds now what areas in West Africa we should seek to control as air and naval bases after the war. The President wishes to be informed what progress the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made in their study of this subject.

/s/ WILSON BROWN
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

- 8 -

Enclosure "B"

Regraded Unclassified

S E C R E T

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THE AMERICAN MISSION
DAKAR, F.W.A.

28 September, 1943.

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to give you the picture as I see it of our situation in French West Africa as it has developed during the three and one-half months since the establishment of the American Mission, Dakar.

I am ever mindful of what you told me, in June 1943, was my "objective" as your representative in French West Africa.

The degree with which a normal and logical attainment of this politico-strategic objective will be accomplished is measured, in my opinion, by American prestige in the A.O.F., which, in turn, I need hardly emphasize to you, is very largely dependent upon American economic interest in these colonies.

It is becoming increasingly evident to the French that we have little or no interest in the use or purchase of the products of French West Africa. On the other hand, the British are vitally interested. They are in the market for practically all the major products of the A.O.F. and are most active in developing, improving, increasing and purchasing crops. Thus the British naturally stand well with the French from the purchase point of view, while we appear to be somewhat ineffectual and disinterested. Furthermore, the change from the Boisson Government, which was disposed to look most favorably upon us, to the present regime, has not favored us. The Cournarie Government looks more readily to the British than did the old order.

So far as French West Africa is concerned, the British purchase all the surplus edible oil products. This is by far the most important industry. American exclusive interest, such as

S E C R E T

it is, is confined to the lesser products, sisal and mahogany. The U.K. is predominant as a purchaser of A.O.F. products as compared to the U.S. in the approximate proportion to date of one hundred to one.

Very briefly, the position of the U.S. up to the present, with respect to A.O.F. products, namely, sisal, mahogany and cocoa, in regard to which we have been indicated to the French as possible purchasers, is as follows: Our vacillation, consistent delay and over-all attitude of uncertainty have not been lost upon the French by any means. Our position has suffered while that of the British, whose economic relations with the French here have been marked by effective and timely decision based on a definite purchasing policy, has correspondingly improved.

1. SISAL: We have persistently repeated to the French the urgency of our need for sisal and therefore the desirability of increased production. At no time have we been unaware that A.O.F. production costs were materially out of line (higher) with world sisal prices. For a period during the Boisson administration we could, perhaps, have concluded a long-term contract on a satisfactory price basis because of that administration's policy of subsidizing production for export. We missed that opportunity through the failure of Washington to act promptly, and are now confronted with a situation in which our offering price is well below the minimum price that the Government seems willing to accept in view of the desire of the new regime to get away from subsidies and its contention that the high cost of Allied supplies to A.O.F. should be an important factor in the export price structure. The probable result is that we shall not lift from A.O.F. more sisal than the 400 tons we negotiated for under the former regime; also, that equipment and replacement parts needed to increase production will not be forthcoming from us.

S E C R E T

2. MAHOGANY: Since last January we have led the producers and the Government to believe that we would stimulate production through the supply of special trucks and other essential equipment and purchase up to from twenty to twenty-five thousand tons during the ensuing eighteen months. Washington has now decided after all these months of encouragement to cancel this program for the development of mahogany production. Even the purchase of 2,000 tons now available, purchase negotiations for which were authorized some time ago, now seems most unlikely in view of the last minute insistence by Washington on new and unusual shipping conditions.

3. COCOA: While Washington has been most anxious to share with the British in buying up the whole of the 1943-44 A.O.F. crop, it has failed to issue instructions which would permit members of the American Economic group here to go ahead with their British colleagues in firm discussion with the French. The British received such instructions six weeks ago and finally, the other day, were unable to wait longer for us and proceeded alone to discuss with the French conditions agreed to between Washington and London in talks at Washington. At no time has this Mission been consulted or kept currently informed in connection with those discussions. The result is that while we shall probably share on an equal footing with the British in the cost of purchase (also in the utilization of the cocoa) it is the British who have appeared thus far in French eyes to have carried the ball.

It is my impression that our economic agencies in Washington have directed our purchasing policy with respect to the A.O.F. largely from the point of view of the intrinsic value to us of the products in question, without giving consideration to the political aspects or implications of such action. The desire to be joint purchaser with the British of the cocoa crop is the one notable exception. But even this move on our part has not been pressed vigorously. On the contrary we have not been yet instructed with

S E C R E T

regard to joint purchase with the British of the cocoa crop, in spite of repeated requests. The result has been that the British could wait for us no longer and have gone ahead on their own with the French and have completed satisfactorily all details, including price, for the purchase of the entire cocoa crop if necessary. The French would have welcomed our participation and are at a loss to understand why we hold back now and even cause thereby a delay in French-British negotiations which could no longer be deferred.

Thus I wish to emphasize that if we are to look forward to any natural success here it will be necessary to bring our action in the economic field into line with our political requirements in these French colonies. It may be that this is being done at present, but at least I can assure you our present economic relations with the A.O.F. are not such as to contribute to the creation of the politico-strategic structure you told me in June you wished built here.

In the meantime the French appear to like us as Americans and would wish to lean on us. I feel certain they would more than welcome justification in increased reliance on us, based on knowledge that our economic policy, whatever it might be, was substantial and clear cut.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

/s/ WILLIAM GLASSFORD

The President,
The White House.

Washington, D.C.,
August 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE:

Admiral Byrd called at 12 o'clock (noon) to say further that Sir Owen Dixon, the Australian Minister, has just called on him, stating that the President had said something about a survey of Pacific air routes several weeks ago and that other information that had reached him led him (Sir Owen Dixon) to believe that that was what Admiral Byrd was about to do.

Admiral Byrd told The Australian Minister that he did have some orders from Admiral King, the Commander in Chief, but that his orders were of a military nature and he could not discuss them. Admiral Byrd suggested that the Minister see the Secretary of the Navy.

Admiral Brown agreed that the Australian Minister should be directed to the Secretary of the Navy and suggested that the Secretary merely suggest to the Australian Minister to see the President at the next Pacific War Council meeting and discuss it there, and to tell him nothing more concerning the subject of Pacific air routes.

W.T.B.
Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Washington, D.C.,
August 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE:

Admiral Byrd called at 11:15 this date to say that he felt there were several points about his proposed expedition that should be cleared up. The first being that we should make every effort not to let the British know that we are making the survey, and, second, whether the State Department should be informed of the purpose of our activities around the Galapagos and Clipperton Islands.

I told Admiral Byrd that I had heard the President say repeatedly that except for air bases that may be required for national defense, in general his idea of post-war commercial aviation is that the islands of the Pacific should be open to commercial use by all nationalities and that, therefore, I believed that there was no need for any secrecy about what we are doing, but that, on the other hand, we, of course, do not want any publicity. I stated that I thought the State Department should be informed of what we are doing and why.

I further stated that I hoped to be able to inform the General Board what the President wants them to do in considering air bases in the Pacific for national defense as well as for commercial use: and that Admiral Byrd would be sent copies of any reports made by the General Board.

Admiral Byrd said he expects to leave Washington about the 2nd or 3rd and sent his best wishes to the President and regrets that he could not have a talk with him before leaving.

W. J. J.
Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, USN.,
Naval Aide to the President.

COMINCH FILE

AF4-3
FFL/A4-3

Serial: 001683

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 AUG 1943

SECRET
SECRET

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To: Rear Admiral R.E. Byrd, U.S. Navy (Ret).
Subject: Designation of Vessel to Conduct Survey
of Pacific Islands.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of SecNav memo to Admiral King
serial 025900A of 17 August 1943.

1. In accordance with the memorandum directive of the Secretary of the Navy, enclosure (A), the U.S.S. CGMCORD has been designated as the vessel to be used in the survey of Pacific air routes. This vessel will be ready at the Canal Zone on 26 August.

2. In conducting this survey you will be guided by the desires of the President and the Secretary of the Navy as expressed in enclosure (A). Further information is available in the studies of the General Board and the allied correspondence.

R. S. EDWARDS,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
SecNav (less enc.)
Naval Aide to the President ✓

OFFICE
DELIVERY
NO. 19336

COPY**SECRET**THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTONCOPYSECRET(SC) A14-7
Serial 025900A

17 August 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADMIRAL E. J. KING, USN

The survey of the Pacific Islands desired by the President has assumed a sufficiently definite status for you to proceed to carry out his directive.

The following islands should be investigated: Galapagos, Clipperton, Marquesas, and the Tuamotu Archipelago.

If the Board after investigating the above mentioned islands deems it advisable, in order to carry out the President's desire, to survey any additional islands, it should be authorized to do so at its discretion. An example of the additional islands it might turn out to be advisable to survey are the Henderson Group and Easter Island.

What the President particularly desires is an investigation of these islands from the standpoint of post war commercial air routes. However, it is thought that the Board should keep in mind the military and naval considerations.

It is hoped that this survey can be started and completed as soon as practical.

FRANK KNOX.

August 17, 1943.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Assistant Secretary for Air.

Subject: Survey of Commercial and National Defense
Air Bases in the Pacific.

Reference: Secret Memorandum for the President from the
Acting Secretary of the Navy, file (SC)
A14-7, dated 11 August, 1943.

1. The President directs me to acknowledge receipt of your memorandum of 11 August and to say that he wishes you to proceed with the final arrangements for the survey and that he approves the nominations for members of the survey committee as listed in your above referenced memorandum, subject to the following comments:

- (a) The American Export Line should have a representative.
- (b) In addition to Lieutenant Colonel Logan of the Air Transport Command and the Navy aviator to assist with aerial photography, there should be representatives of the Army and Navy to select air sites for national defense purposes as well as for commercial air routes.

2. The President wishes to remind that the final instructions to Admiral Byrd should require search for bases for amphibian planes as well as for land planes.

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Copy to:
Rear Admiral R.E. Byrd, U.S.N.(Ret.)

SECRET
SECRET

August 11, 1943.

Dear Dick,

I will present the Secretary of the Navy's letter to the President at the first opportunity and will ask him to send formal approval of the composition of the board and instructions to proceed.

While I have had no opportunity to discuss this ^{letter} ~~problem~~ with the President, I was present when he expressed to another group the following opinion about the future routes to Australia and New Zealand beyond the present accepted limitation of a safe 2000-mile flying distance:

- (a) From New York to Acapulco to Clipperton to the Marquesas and west via bases now being developed;
- (b) Europe and North Africa to the West Indies to Panama to the Galapagos to the Tuamotus and thence west;
- (c) As a route to be kept in mind but not of present interest because of unfavorable weather conditions and little likelihood of heavy travel - from Chile to Easter Island to Henderson Island and west.

I think the President is not interested in the last named route from Chile but that he is interested in the first two.

I believe that you are correct in accepting as your mission "To prepare a list of islands where air fields should be developed for commercial air routes to Australia and New Zealand."

I have not had an opportunity to show this memorandum to the President but I believe it to express his views and unless you have further instructions from the President I believe that if the Secretary of the Navy bases his instructions on this memorandum it will make possible an early start in the right direction.

Very sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd, U.S.N. (Ret.),
Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.
(Copy to Admiral A. J. Hepburn)

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

SECRET

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Very sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd, U.S.N. (Ret.),
Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.
(Copy to Admiral A. J. Hepburn)

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

SECRET

August 11, 1943.

Dear Dick,

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While I have had no opportunity to discuss this ^{letter} ~~present~~ with the President, I was present when he expressed to another group the following opinion about the future routes to Australia and New Zealand beyond the present accepted limitation of a safe 2000-mile flying distance:

- (a) From New York to Acapulco to Clipperton to the Marquesas and west via bases now being developed;
- (b) Europe and North Africa to the West Indies to Panama to the Galapagos to the Tuamotus and thence west;
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Very sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd, U.S.N. (Ret.),
Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.
(Copy to Admiral A. J. Hepburn)

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

(Sc) A14-7

11 August 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

My dear Mr. President:

Preliminary steps have been taken in line with your recommendation for the establishment of a board to make a survey of post-war air routes in the Pacific.

Admiral Byrd is available to act as senior member of the group of air transport experts appointed to make this study. Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Logan, an officer of the Air Transport Command, has been nominated as the Army representative, and a Naval aviator in addition to Admiral Byrd will be assigned to assist with the aerial photography.

Nominations have been received from the five companies engaged in contract trans-oceanic services which were requested to appoint members to the board. Northeast Airlines proposed Mr. M. H. Anderson; Pan American Airways System nominated Mr. Harold Gatty and Mr. Frank MacKensie for consideration; United Air Lines will send Mr. Ted Johnson; Transcontinental & Western Air will send Mr. J. A. Collins or Mr. Otis F. Bryan; and the American Airlines nominated Mr. William Littleworth.

Mr. S. H. Solomon, Chairman of the Airline Committee on United States Air Policy, was consulted as directed by you concerning the above nominations, and is in complete agreement.

A suitable vessel will be provided for the survey.

If the proposed composition of the board meets with your approval, I will make the final arrangements for this survey. The comments made in your letter of July 29th have been carefully noted and the board will be instructed accordingly.

Yours sincerely,

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN:

Dear Wilson:

When Admiral Dick Byrd makes up his next expedition, the President wishes to have representatives from the airlines go along, the number to be determined by the circumstances and the names to be gotten by contacting the Airlines Committee for United States Air Policy, Carlton Hotel, Washington, D. C. I am also sending a map prepared by the Domestic Airlines for the President. I believe the best place to keep this would be the Map Room.

E. M. W.

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

File
WB.

August 1, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR REAR ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN:

Concerning the Pacific project in question, you have noted from the Secretary's letter that it calls for an O. K. on the plans that have been made by the Navy. To get this O. K. therefore is the first important point to settle so that we can go ahead with the project.

The second important point is to settle the confusion arising from the uncertainty as to just exactly what the President desires.

My own impression checks with yours, namely, that the President wants a comprehensive survey made of the Pacific from the standpoint of post-war security and commercial aviation. In other words, he wants the matter considered from the post-war naval and military aspects as well as the commercial air routes.

I am in consultation with the Army's representative, Colonel Logan, regarding this matter and I am discussing it with him from the Army's angle.

I sincerely hope that I can get something from you concerning this in the next few days. If I get a simple O. K. from you on one of the enclosed memo sheets, I will go ahead along the lines outlined above of your and my impression of what the President desires.

We will carry the ball from there on and get going as soon as possible. There are some important reasons (which I hoped to get a chance to tell you about) why there should be no delay in getting underway and finishing this job as soon as practical.

R. E. Byrd
R. E. Byrd.

*Hope you have a
fine trip*

A 17056

Regraded Unclassified

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 1, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR REAR ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN:

Concerning the Pacific project in question, you have noted from the Secretary's letter that it calls for an O. K. on the plans that have been made by the Navy. To get this O. K. therefore is the first important point to settle so that we can go ahead with the project.

The second important point is to settle the confusion arising from the uncertainty as to just exactly what the President desires.

My own impression checks with yours, namely, that the President wants a comprehensive survey made of the Pacific from the standpoint of post-war security and commercial aviation. In other words, he wants the matter considered from the post-war naval and military aspects as well as the commercial air routes.

I am in consultation with the Army's representative, Colonel Logan, regarding this matter and I am discussing it with him from the Army's angle.

I sincerely hope that I can get something from you concerning this in the next few days. If I get a simple O. K. from you on one of the enclosed memo sheets, I will go ahead along the lines outlined above of your and my impression of what the President desires.

We will carry the ball from there on and get going as soon as possible. There are some important reasons (which I hoped to get a chance to tell you about) why there should be no delay in getting underway and finishing this job as soon as practical.

R. E. Byrd.

(S) A14-7

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

SECRET

11 August 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

My dear Mr. President:

Preliminary steps have been taken in line with your recommendation for the establishment of a board to make a survey of post-war air routes in the Pacific.

Admiral Byrd is available to act as senior member of the group of air transport experts appointed to make this study. Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Logan, an officer of the Air Transport Command, has been nominated as the Army representative, and a Naval aviator in addition to Admiral Byrd will be assigned to assist with the aerial photography.

Nominations have been received from the five companies engaged in contract trans-oceanic services which were requested to appoint members to the board. Northeast Airlines proposed Mr. M. H. Anderson; Pan American Airways System nominated Mr. Harold Gatty and Mr. Frank MacKensie for consideration; United Air Lines will send Mr. Ted Johnson; Transcontinental & Western Air will send Mr. J. A. Collins or Mr. Otis F. Bryan; and the American Airlines nominated Mr. William Littleworth.

Mr. S. H. Solomon, Chairman of the Airline Committee on United States Air Policy, was consulted as directed by you concerning the above nominations, and is in complete agreement.

A suitable vessel will be provided for the survey.

If the proposed composition of the board meets with your approval, I will make the final arrangements for this survey. The comments made in your letter of July 29th have been carefully noted and the board will be instructed accordingly.

Yours sincerely,

A. L. Gates

Acting Secretary of the Navy

*Am Express Line
Army Air
to Navy - National Def.*

SECRET
SECRET

June 30, 1943.

From: The President.
To : The Secretary of the Navy. x18.
Subject: Post War Air Routes from the Panama Canal and
South America to New Zealand and Australia.
Reference: (a) Your Secret Memorandum, (SC) A14-7, Serial
021900A, dated June 19, 1943.

1. I have read with interest the various studies of the General Board, submitted with reference (a), in relation to post war Pacific island problems.

2. The sweeping changes in sovereignty recommended by the Board may not be attainable, and, from an economic point of view, all of the acquisitions recommended may not be desirable. It seems to me important, therefore, that we should make up our minds now which individual islands, because of their geography and location, promise to be of value as commercial airports in the future. After a study of charts and distances, a board of commercial aviation > experts should actually visit the islands we select as having possible value in the future. Could we not spare one of the older Coast Guard cutters from a strictly war mission to this important exploration?

3. I will be much obliged if you will consider, not only the availability of a cutter, but, also the composition of a board. It seems that Admiral Byrd's experience would make him a particularly valuable member or head of the expedition.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

x4351

x249 official

x21-m

Orig sent to Sec. Navy 6-30-43

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

Minister's
file can't be
checked for
memo of 19th
at present.
Attached one
of May 12th
may be useful
to J.B.

x25-I
x48-LP

x666

SECRET
SECRET

June 12, 1943.

C. F.

Navy

From: The President.
To : The Secretary of the Navy. x18

Subject: Post War Air Routes from the Panama Canal x25-I
and South America to New Zealand and Australia. x48-10
x87 x48-7

1. We have discussed the post war air routes from Panama and South America to the westward after the war, and I understand that various committees of the Navy Department are making a specific study of what the route should be and what island bases we should seek to control after the war. It is obvious that we should have all of the facts before final discussions take place.

2. Will you please let me know:-

- (a) What conclusions have been reached?
and
- (b) What islands of the Southeast Pacific will be of special value as air bases?

3. I have particularly in mind the geography of the islands of the Tuamotu Archipelago and the Marquesas. It occurs to me that perhaps air transport experts should visit these islands on whatever craft can be made available without interfering with the war effort.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Secretary of War. (Navy?)

x249 official
x4351

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET
SECRET

June 12, 1943.

From: The President.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Post War Air Routes from the Panama Canal
and South America to New Zealand and Australia.

1. We have discussed the post war air routes from Panama and South America to the westward after the war, and I understand that various committees of the Navy Department are making a specific study of what the route should be and what island bases we should seek to control after the war. It is obvious that we should have all of the facts before final discussions take place.

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FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

June 19, 1943

SECRET

(SC)A14-7

Serial 021900A

SECRET


MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

My dear Mr. President:

Immediately upon receipt of your letter of June 12 dealing with post war air routes in the Pacific, I referred the matter to the General Board and have just received the attached memorandum. In case you may want to look at them, I am also attaching the various letters of reference.

If after looking over these communications you desire me to send a small group of air transport experts to make a quick study of the islands of the Tuamotu Archipelago and the Marquesas, let me know and I will arrange for this survey.

Yours sincerely,



Frank Knox

Attachment

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
GENERAL BOARD
WASHINGTON

ATD

18 June 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

SUBJECT: Post-war air routes from the Panama Canal and South America to New Zealand and Australia.

Reference: (a) The President's Secret ltr. 12 June 1943.
(b) G.B. Secret ltr. GB No. 450, Serial No. 236 of 20 March 1943.
(c) G.B. Secret ltr. GB No. 450, Serial No. 240 of 27 March 1943.
(d) G.B. Secret ltr. GB No. 450, Serial No. 240-A of 6 April 1943.

1. The General Board has made several studies which cover the questions raised in the President's letter, reference (a), concerning island air bases in the Pacific. The result of these studies has been reported in references (b), (c), and (d).

2. The General Board's studies were made in connection with the subject of post-war security, and the possible establishment of an "International Police Force", but upon the assumption that for a considerable period following cessation of hostilities the United States would be singly responsible for policing most of the island areas in the Pacific.

3. Although the matter of post-war commercial aviation was not emphasized in the Board's reports, its recommendations were sufficiently comprehensive to cover all apparent possibilities in that field as well as in that of security.


4. The Board did not consider localized sites for air bases. Detached islands or detached island groups, where possible, were selected as tentative sites. The Tuamotu Archipelago and the Marquesas, mentioned by the President, were recommended by the Board for acquisition. Under post-war conditions the value of a base or bases in these islands for commercial aviation would probably outweigh their importance in the cause of security, although the two functions are interwoven. A detailed examination of these islands, as the President suggests, with a view to determination of the best local sites for commercial as well as military aerodromes could not but be useful in the final discussions.

SECRET

- 2 -

5. There is an interdepartmental Board of which Assistant Secretary Berle of the Department of State is Chairman, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air Gates is the Navy representative, charged with the consideration of post-war commercial aviation. If the suggestion of the President is carried out, it would appear that that Board might well be represented. //

6. The President's letter is returned herewith.



A. J. HEPBURN,
Admiral, U.S.Navy (Retired)

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

June 12, 1943.

From: The President.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Post War Air Routes from the Panama Canal
and South America to New Zealand and Australia.

1. We have discussed the post war air routes from Panama and South America to the westward after the war, and I understand that various committees of the Navy Department are making a specific study of what the route should be and what island bases we should seek to control after the war. It is obvious that we should have all of the facts before final discussions take place.

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3. I have particularly in mind the geography of the islands of the Tuamotu Archipelago and the Marquesas. It occurs to me that perhaps air transport experts should visit these islands on whatever craft can be made available without interfering with the war effort.

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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S E C R E T

G.B. No. 450
(Serial No. 236)
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
GENERAL BOARD
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1943.

From: Chairman General Board;
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Post-war Employment of International Police Force and
Post-war Use of Air Bases.

References: (a) SecNav Secret Ltr. (SC)A14-7 (03300A) of February 10, 1943.
(b) SecNav Secret Ltr. (SC)NA/QH5 (04100A) of February 17, 1943.

1. The directives contained in the references are closely related; they both require that the General Board study certain subjects and recommend policies which the Navy should follow in negotiations with other Government Departments and/or Foreign Governments. The subjects assigned for study are:

(a) Location of Air Facilities for Post-war International Police Force.

(b) Post-war Use of Air Bases.

(c) Air Bases of the Pacific which we should retain after the Close of the War.

In the directives as given, only questions of air facilities were to be considered but it has been impossible to confine these studies to such limits. For example, the policing of sea areas is bound to involve the use of ships as well as aircraft, sometimes independently and sometimes coordinated. Also ground troops will have to be used; they cannot be ignored for they will be required for the security of the bases themselves, if for no other reason. This Board has accordingly kept in mind that it is necessary to consider bases for the ships and facilities for the troops, as well as bases for the aircraft. Furthermore, consideration of post-war commerce both by ships and by air is bound to enter into such a study and this feature has not been disregarded. The policing of the land areas of the several continents and larger islands has not, however, been considered by the Board.

2. Of the United Nations, Britain and the United States already are committed to forcing unconditional surrender upon the enemy nations. Certainly the conditions imposed upon them at the time of their surrender must have as a primary requirement their complete disarmament, leaving them only such forces as are necessary for their internal government. Historical precedent indicates that, subsequent to the disarmament of the enemy

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G.B. No. 450 (Serial No. 236)

nations, the United Nations will each be pressed from within for reduction of their own armaments. Unquestionably the subject of limitation of armaments as between the United Nations also will recur. Foresight, preliminary action and agreement are indicated in order that there will be no wholesale demobilization of the United Nations prior to the fulfillment of conditions imposed upon the enemy nations and prior to the accomplishment of all post-war commitments. It appears that until post-war adjustment has proceeded to considerable length, the armaments of all the principal United Nations will have to remain strong and effective for the purpose of preventing recurrence of world-wide war.

3. When hostilities terminate in Europe, Russia will have its forces in Eastern and Southeastern Europe; while Britain's forces will be spread from India through Africa, the Near East, and on the Continent. The forces of the United States will be disposed in Europe, Africa and in the Pacific area. The United Nations will then be confronted not only with a war to the finish with Japan but also with the enforcement of the terms imposed upon the surrendered nations in continental Europe. After Japan is defeated, the problem of enforcing terms imposed upon that country will devolve on Britain, the United States and China, as well as Russia if that country has joined in the war against Japan.

4. With the complete cessation of hostilities there will arise the question of treaties and, at this stage, it is well to remember that treaties signed by Germany and Japan have meant little to those nations when it has been to their interest to disregard them. The Nine-Power Treaty, the Treaty of Versailles, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact are cases in point. The Board therefore feels that by hastily signing treaties with our former enemies we will merely add to our own obligations without reciprocal benefit. It appears highly desirable to wait until these nations, and the world in general, have become educated to the necessity for a durable peace and to the fact that there is a determination to use force whenever necessary to check, in their inception, all threats to a state of universal good order.

5. Notwithstanding the failure of the League of Nations, the organization of the many nations of the world into an International League has again become a live subject. The various current discussions and proposals generally include improvements to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the establishment of an International Court of Justice and the creation of an International Police Force. A study of the history of the League of Nations clearly shows the difficulties of creating and putting into effect such an international organization. Without skepticism as to the eventual success of some kind of an international organization for collective security, the Board's firm opinion now is that years will elapse before any such league or council can be completely organized and made effective. During that protracted period, flare-ups must be prevented, by some means or in some manner. Rather than to rely on the effectiveness of an untried and untested League of Nations, or even implementation thereof, for enforcing good order in

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G.B. No. 450 (Serial No. 236)

the world during the long post-war interim it is more timely, at this date, to organize much more simply for this purpose.

6. In the preliminary discussions concerning the formation of the original League of Nations, Dr. Charles W. Eliot, the President Emeritus of Harvard University, expressed the following opinion: "Finally, it does not seem to me safe to entrust the preservation of peace for several years after this war is ended to the international bodies proposed in this tentative plan for the organization of the world to prevent war. Until the world has constructive evidence that Germany has abandoned her theory of State, and her policy of domination, and has abolished her military class, I think the peace of the world should be kept by a combination for offensive and defensive purposes of the Entente Allies and the United States, and that this combination should organize and maintain the military and naval forces necessary to prevent a breach of peace. No reduction of armaments will be possible until it is made completely visible to all nations that the peace of the world is going to be preserved by just that combination of powers competent and ready for that job. In my judgment, it is highly desirable to make that combination forthwith."

7. This Board is in full concurrence with Dr. Eliot's pronouncement, as quoted above, and deems it to be singularly applicable to the present situation. In its opinion, the only realistic view which can possibly prevail is that the ultimate organization and establishment of an International Police Force must be approached and developed on the foundation of a combination within the United Nations. However, no reason is seen for abstaining from preliminary discussions and negotiations for the purpose of examining into the establishment of an International Police Force. The bases and facilities for such a Force would be generally the same as those required by a simpler combination within the United Nations. There will be time enough later for minor adjustments in basing facilities because, even if early agreements should be reached covering composition, from what Nations drawn, how supported, controlled, operated, etc., much time will pass before full readiness of such an International Force can be attained. To weld elements from many nations into a force having the international rather than the national viewpoint is something never before attempted. The process will be a long one and undue haste will greatly increase the risk of failure.

8. It appears, therefore, to be most advisable that we, as a Nation, do not now become too closely committed even inferentially to world-wide agreements, the practicability of which may turn out to be slight or non-existent. The Navy must retain a background of realism in all negotiations with other Government Departments, as well as with Foreign Governments. It is submitted that the situation, now and for such period as is clearly foreseeable, calls for effective combination as between Britain, China, Russia and the United States, for the specific post-war purpose of keeping good order over such portions of the

SECRET

G.B. No. 450 (Serial No. 236)

world as involve any danger of outbreaks that might menace the general peace. Any world security organization should be built up slowly and deliberately step by step, based on the experiences of the past and the then current problems. As a practical matter, it appears that if it is to be successful it must be preceded by, and built upon, a realistic working agreement between these four great powers. It seems important, highly important, that such four power combination be effected without undue delay.

9. The problem of policing the high seas reduces to still simpler terms. Of the United Nations, Britain and the United States alone will possess naval forces of preponderant size and strength so that the policing of the sea areas, and smaller land masses, will necessarily devolve upon them. It is fortunate that these two great sea powers have less difficulty in making agreements with each other, and in adhering to them, than is the case with any other nations of the world. Furthermore, though mutual confidence as between the many nations of the world must be a matter of future growth, it is believed that a feeling of confidence in Britain and the United States does prevail throughout the civilized world. Therefore, it is concluded that the first step to meet the approaching situation should be to hold conversations with Britain looking towards a division of responsibility for maintaining order over the water areas of the world. Russia and China should be consulted as regards the areas and questions which directly concern them, and other nations may be brought in as circumstances warrant.

10. In view of the foregoing, and in compliance with the directives contained in the references, the General Board recommends:

(a) Early negotiations with Britain looking toward preliminary agreement upon a division of responsibility for good order over the world's sea areas on the following premises:

(1) The United States, employing such ship, air and ground forces as may be appropriate, to assume responsibility for the Pacific area extending as far South and West as is necessary to thoroughly cover all islands and water areas to the shores of China, except limited contiguous areas naturally under the control of the British Dominions and the Netherlands. In the Atlantic, the United States to assume responsibility for the sea areas west of longitude 25° West.

(2) Britain to assume responsibility for the areas in the Atlantic east of longitude 25° West, of the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, the waters contiguous to the Malay Peninsula extending as far north as Hongkong and of the waters contiguous to the British Dominions.

SECRET

G.B.No. 450 (Serial No. 236)

(3) Britain and the United States each to maintain sufficient naval, air and ground forces ready for use as required, and in such spheres as may be needed, to maintain peace and good order over the seas of the world.

(b) That, at suitable times, these negotiations be broadened to include Russia, China, and the other States of the United Nations in order to secure agreements on the measures planned for the extension of peace and order over the areas which will naturally become their spheres.

(c) That the air and naval bases considered necessary for the accomplishment of the above purposes be acquired by the nations concerned, without regard to sovereignty; such bases to be available for commercial purposes insofar as may be desired.

ANNEX A, (herewith): Sites for Bases.

/s/ THOS. C. HART.

Copy to:
Cominch
VCNO

- The Annex of this paper contains material which should be less widely known than can be the case with the letter proper. The Annex can be withheld by stating that the actual sites for Bases are in the very tentative, planning stage.

6)

March 20, 1943

r bases which, in the opinion of the General Board, will be needed for meeting this nation's probable responsibilities for maintaining good order in certain of the world's oceanic areas. The list is partly in outline and in some cases only a general geographical location is designated. Final choice can be made only after the war, when we know the characteristics of various bases built, acquired, or captured during hostilities. So much effort, blood and treasure will have been spent on such bases that they, rather than new installations, should be utilized if possible. Those expenditures will mostly have been made by ourselves, and any post-war policing will impose upon us an additional heavy year to year burden. Therefore any economic advantages (and they cannot be great) which may accrue from our occupancy of such bases will be wholly justifiable and within our plain rights.

2. Detached islands or detached island groups, where possible, have been selected as sites for bases. In such choice, as opposed to the selection of only a part of a large island, the Board has been influenced by the weight of the following considerations:

- (a) Better natural defensibility;
- (b) Doubt as to future attitude of inhabitants;
- (c) Absence of day by day contact and friction with adjacent alien people;
- (d) Non-association with foreign ideology and culture;
- (e) Ability to govern and direct own sanitation, education, language and ideas.

3. The Board has also kept in mind the necessity for providing bases which will accommodate naval vessels as well as aircraft. Considerations of commerce have been taken into account but have not been the final determinants.

4. In some instances the Board has selected sites outside the proposed spheres of responsibility of the United States. The governing reasons for such selection are as follows:

- (a) To enhance the ability of the United States to enforce law and order in its own spheres;

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ANNEX A to G. B. No. 450 (Serial No. 236)

March 20, 1943

SUBJECT: Sites for Bases.

1. This annex lists the sites for bases which, in the opinion of the General Board, will be needed for meeting this nation's probable responsibilities for maintaining good order in certain of the world's oceanic areas. The list is partly in outline and in some cases only a general geographical location is designated. Final choice can be made only after the war, when we know the characteristics of various bases built, acquired, or captured during hostilities. So much effort, blood and treasure will have been spent on such bases that they, rather than new installations, should be utilized if possible. Those expenditures will mostly have been made by ourselves, and any post-war policing will impose upon us an additional heavy year to year burden. Therefore any economic advantages (and they cannot be great) which may accrue from our occupancy of such bases will be wholly justifiable and within our plain rights.

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- (a) To enhance the ability of the United States to enforce law and order in its own spheres;

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ANNEX A to G.E.No. 450 (Serial No. 236)

2.

(b) To provide bases in geographical positions from which the United States can support other nations in enforcing their responsibilities when required;

(c) To furnish support to the United States in maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere, which the Board is unable to disassociate from the idea of collective world security.

5. Having in mind the foregoing considerations, and in extension of paragraph 10 (a) (1) of the basic letter, the General Board recommends tentative sites for bases as follows:

(a) In the Pacific Area:

(1) To the South, - to cover Panama.

Panama Area

Seymour Island, Gallapagos Islands

Clipperton Island

Magdalena Bay

(2) To the Southwest, - to within easy contact with the British Dominions.

Hawaiian Islands

Johnston Island

Palmyra Island

Phoenix Islands (Canton)

Society Islands (Borabora)

Tonga Islands (Tongatabu)

Marquesas Islands

Samoa Islands

New Hebrides Islands

New Caledonia

Solomons Islands

A Northwestward extension, from the Solomons Islands, will be dependent upon the relationships which exist with Australia after the war; the subject is not within estimate at present.

(3) To the WEST, - to within easy contact with the Netherlands East Indies and China, and to cover the Philippines.

Marshall Islands

Gilbert or Ellice Islands

Wake Island

Marcus Island

Truk Islands

Palau Islands

Guam

Chichi Jima

Halmahera

Sulu Archipelago (as per General Board G.E.No.405, Serial No. 1953 of 28 August 1940)

Ituaba

Batan Islands or Babuyan Islands

Formosa

Shanghai, China, area. (Possibly as a joint project).

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ANNEX A to G.B.No. 450 (Serial No. 236)

3.

- (4) To the Northwest, to within easy contact with Russia.

Aleutian Islands
Paramushiru Jima

- (b) In the Atlantic Area:

- (1) To the Southeast, to cover the Panama Canal, the Caribbean Sea, and to the Bulge of Brazil.

Panama Area
Jamaica
Guantanamo
San Juan
St. Thomas
Antigua
Santa Lucia
Trinidad

Georgetown, (British Guiana)
Belem
Natal
Ascension Island
Bermuda
Bahamas
Dakar (possibly as a joint project)
Liberia

- (2) To the Northeast, - to within easy contact with the British Isles.

Argentina
Greenland
Iceland (possibly as a joint project).

6. As a general principle, the installations on foreign soil which will have been built at United States expense should be used under arrangements and agreements which include their availability for commercial purposes. Existing agreements, not in accordance therewith, are suggested as suitable subject of re-negotiation.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

G.B.No. 450
(Serial No. 240)
SECRET

GENERAL BOARD
Washington

March 27, 1943

From: Chairman General Board.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Post-war sovereignty over certain islands of the North Pacific.

References: (a) General Board Secret ltr. G.B.No. 450 (Serial No. 236) of March 20, 1943.
(b) General Board Confidential ltr. G.B.No. 405 (Serial No. 1953) of August 28, 1940.

1. In reference (a), the General Board submitted certain recommendations concerning bases for post-war use in maintaining peace and good order over the high seas and some small land masses. Those recommendations were made without regard to the sovereignties involved. However, in any projection of thought into similar post-war questions, the state of sovereignty over certain islands of the North Pacific forces itself into the picture. The Board holds certain views on this subject and feels that it is now timely to express them as a matter of record and for future use as required.

2. It is scarcely conceivable that the terms imposed upon Japan as a result of the present war will permit her to remain established in any capacity in the Pacific islands mandated to her after the last war. Her flagrant and deliberate violations of the provisions of Article 4 of the mandate would seem definitely to require that an administration other than Japanese be established. For reasons of our own security, and because we are likely to be committed to the protection of the Philippines after they have become independent, the United States is vitally interested in the form which a readjustment in control of these islands may take.

3. For the same reasons it is undesirable that the Bonin group should remain in Japanese hands. The Bonins are of military importance on account of Port Lloyd; the group links the Japanese homeland with the Marianas and the other islands of the mandate. As long as the Bonins are in Japanese hands they constitute a menace to those islands and to the Philippines as well. It follows that the control of the Bonins, and that of the ostensibly worthless Volcano Islands, should be transferred from Japan and be given to whatever other power is to control the Marianas.

4. That other power is logically the United States. Guam belongs to us and again will be administered by us when it has been wrested from enemy hands. The island is one of the Marianas and, as has been demonstrated in the past, is potentially menaced by the other islands of that group unless the same power controls them all. It follows naturally that the United States should control the entire Marianas group; since the

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G.B.No. 450 (Serial No. 240)

position of the Bonins is such as to dominate the Marianas, the control of the Bonins should also pass to the United States. Because of their geographical position with relation to the Marianas, the Philippines and Hawaii, the same military principle applies in the case of all the islands mandated to Japan; the control of the whole properly belongs to the United States. The same observation applies to Marcus Island and Ituaba Island which are also under Japanese control at present.

5. None of the islands in question possesses natural features of value from other than the military standpoint. Both from the economic and the political standpoints they are a liability to the nation charged with their control and administration. The transfer to the United States of any or all of those islands with all that is implied therein cannot constitute territorial aggrandizement. Japan has frankly referred to them as "unsinkable aircraft carriers" and their severance from her control will be part of her disarmament.

6. The acquirement, by the United States, of the control of the islands presently owned by or mandated to Japan will link the United States with the Philippines for the security of which the United States probably will be responsible. Essential to the fulfillment of this responsibility is the establishment of a permanent United States naval base in the Philippine area. The location of such a base has received much study by many minds over a period of years and numerous recommendations have resulted. After review of these studies, the General Board in 1940, reference (b), recommended that, at a suitable time, steps be taken to reserve the entire Sulu Archipelago (Basilan to Sibutu inclusive) for the occupation and use of the United States after the Philippines become independent. The Board renews this recommendation and suggests that the present might be a propitious time for the initiation of these steps.

7. In connection with future sovereignty over the Japanese islands discussed above, the General Board recommends that planning for post-war conditions provide for United States possession of:

(a) All of the former German islands mandated to Japan by the League of Nations, i.e., the Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas (except Guam).

(b) The Bonin or Ogasawara Group, the Volcano Islands, Marcus Island, and Ituaba Island, at present owned or controlled by Japan.

/s/ THOS. C. HART

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G.B. No. 450
(Serial No. 240-A)
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
GENERAL BOARD
Washington

ATD

April 6, 1943.

From: Chairman General Board.
To : Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Islands in the South Pacific; Change in Status of.

References: (a) General Board Secret ltr. G.B. No. 450 (Serial No. 236) of March 20, 1943.
(b) General Board Secret ltr. G.B. No. 450 (Serial No. 240) of March 27, 1943.

1. In reference (a) the General Board recommended early negotiations with Britain looking toward a preliminary agreement upon division of responsibility for good order over the world's sea areas on the premise (among others) that the United States assume responsibility for the Pacific area. In reference (b) proposal was made that the United States assume entire control of the islands now mandated to Japan in order that the lines of communication across the North Pacific to the Philippines and the Asiatic Coast may be in our hands.

2. This letter concerns the islands in the Central-South Pacific Ocean through which the United States is expected to extend its policing responsibility all the way to the vicinity of the British Dominions in the South Pacific. Such an extension involves very long lines of communication and, while there should be no concern about the security of those lines, it is important that the political situation in the area be simplified in order to facilitate the military task to be performed. The political and administrative situation is extremely complex because several nations have interests therein and there are too many governmental organizations over the small, scattered land masses and their small populations.

3. The simplification of the political and administrative situation can be brought about only through changes in sovereignty or in what amounts to sovereignty. Since the political changes recommended hereinafter will not constitute territorial aggrandizement at the expense of a defeated enemy, the Board is of the opinion that such changes conform to the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. There will be little if any economic value or advantage involved, and the assumption of sovereignty will mean an increased burden of administration. There will be a few cases wherein a financial adjustment may have to be made as incident to a change of sovereignty, where one nation has given up a possession of real value. Such adjustments should not be difficult nor should they amount to very much in comparison with the vast financial adjustments, which must at some future time be made within the United Nations.

4. Existing governmental complexity is best illustrated in the case of the Samoa Islands, a portion of which belongs to this country while the remainder is mandated to New Zealand. The Samoan people have a single language, they

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all have the same customs, ways and means of life, and are closely related by blood. They are, however, divided under the sovereignty of two nations. This interferes with their easy communication with one another, and with the maintenance of language, culture, and blood ties within the group, and with commercial relationships with the outer world. It seems clear that the Samoa Islands should be under the control of one nation and, as the United States in the discharge of its post-war military responsibilities for good order will have to continue its expenditure of money and effort in both subdivisions of these islands, it is logical that the control should be entrusted to this country.

5. To the north and west of Samoa lie various small islands, containing very few people, known as the Line Islands, the Wallis Islands, the Phoenix and Union Groups, the Ellice Islands, and the Gilbert Islands. They all lie within a triangle in the Mid-Pacific Ocean, the apexes of which are Samoa, the Marshall Islands and the Line Islands. Due to their proximity to the Hawaiian Group and the Marshall Islands, it appears highly desirable and reasonable that they should pass to the control of the United States in the future.

6. The possession by France of the many islands scattered over the eastern part of the South Pacific Ocean, with some in the Southwest Pacific Ocean, constitutes a military situation incompatible with the probable responsibilities of the United States in these areas. Furthermore, no one can foresee what the future government of France will be, which of her overseas possessions will remain attached, or how many years it will take for the French State to recover and reorganize into a position sufficiently strong and stable to administer effectively its colonies; France may find it very difficult even to regain its economically valuable hold in Indo-China. The islands in question, the Marquesas, Society, and Tubuai Islands, the Tuamotu Archipelago, and the New Caledonia-Loyalty Islands group, lie in areas detached from other French interests or responsibilities. This detachment is in itself a strong argument against any future continuance of their control by the French. France also has joint authority with Britain in the New Hebrides, still another example of governmental complexity. This Board is therefore of the opinion that all French possessions in the South Pacific, except the interest in the New Hebrides, should pass to the control of the United States. French responsibility in the New Hebrides should pass to Britain, so that only one nation will be responsible for the control of that group. In the case of the New Caledonia colony, the United States would gain territory of economic value for which financial adjustment would be in order.

7. The General Board recommends that, in order to improve and simplify the position of post-war military responsibility with which the United States will be charged, current and future planning be guided towards the attainment of the following objectives:

(a) The transfer to the United States by Britain or the British Dominions of the sovereignty of British Samoa, British Line Islands, Ellice Islands, Gilbert Islands, British Phoenix Islands, and the Union Islands.

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G.B. No. 450 (Serial No. 240-A)

(b) The transfer to the United States by France of the sovereignty of the Marquesas, Society, and Tubuai Islands, the Tuamotu Archipelago, and the New Caledonia Colony which includes the New Caledonia group, the Loyalty group, and the Wallis Islands.

(c) The transfer to Britain by France of its interest in the condominium in the New Hebrides Islands.

/s/ THOS. C. HART
Acting.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE
NAVY
Washington

June 19, 1943

15 June 1943

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(SC)A14-7
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Reference: The President's Secret ltr. 12 June 1943.
(b) C.S. Secret ltr. 22 No. 480, Serial No. 346 of
20 March 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT serial No. 346 of
27 March 1943.

(a) C.S. Secret ltr. 22 No. 480, Serial No. 346-A of

My dear Mr. President:

1. The General Board's report of 12 June 1943 cover the
question of post-war air routes in the Pacific.
I referred the matter to the General Board and have just
received the attached memorandum. In case you may want
to look at them, I am also attaching the various letters
of reference.

2. If after looking over these communications
you desire me to send a small group of air transport
experts to make a quick study of the islands of the
Tuamotu Archipelago and the Marquesas, let me know and I
will arrange for this survey.

3. Although the matter of post-war commercial aviation was
not emphasized in the Board's reports, the reports were
sufficiently comprehensive to cover all apparent possibilities in
that field as well as in that of security.

Yours sincerely,

Frank Knox

4. The Board did not consider localized sites for air bases.
Detached Islands or detached island groups, where possible, were
collected as tentative sites. The Tuamotu Archipelago and the Mar-
quesas, mentioned by the President, were recommended by the Board
for acquisition. Under post-war conditions the value of a base or
bases in those islands for commercial aviation would probably out-
weight their importance in the matter of security, although the two
functions are not mutually exclusive. A detailed examination of these islands,
as the President suggests, with a view to determination of the best
local sites for commercial as well as military purposes could not
but be useful in the final disposition.

Attachment

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DEPARTMENT OF THE
GENERAL BOARD
Washington

ATD

18 June 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

SUBJECT: Post-war air routes from the Panama Canal and South America to New Zealand and Australia.

References: (a) The President's Secret ltr. 12 June 1943.
(b) G.B. Secret ltr. GB No. 450, Serial No. 236 of 20 March 1943.
(c) G.B. Secret ltr. GB No. 450, serial No. 240 of 27 March 1943.
(d) G.B. Secret ltr. GB No. 450, Serial No. 240-A of 6 April 1943.

1. The General Board has made several studies which cover the questions raised in the President's letter, reference (a), concerning island air bases in the Pacific. The result of these studies has been reported in references (b), (c), and (d).

2. The General Board's studies were made in connection with the subject of post-war security, and the possible establishment of an "International Police Force", but upon the assumption that for a considerable period following cessation of hostilities the United States would be singly responsible for policing most of the island areas in the Pacific.

3. Although the matter of post-war commercial aviation was not emphasized in the Board's reports, its recommendations were sufficiently comprehensive to cover all apparent possibilities in that field as well as in that of security.

4. The Board did not consider localized sites for air bases. Detached islands or detached island groups, where possible, were selected as tentative sites. The Tuamotu Archipelago and the Marquesas, mentioned by the President, were recommended by the Board for acquisition. Under post-war conditions the value of a base or bases in these islands for commercial aviation would probably outweigh their importance in the cause of security, although the two functions are interwoven. A detailed examination of these islands, as the President suggests, with a view to determination of the best local sites for commercial as well as military aerodromes could not but be useful in the final discussions.

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5. There is an interdepartmental Board of which Assistant Secretary Berle of the Department of State is Chairman, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air Gates is the Navy representative, charged with the consideration of post-war commercial aviation. If the suggestion of the President is carried out, it would appear that that Board might well be represented.

6. The President's letter is returned herewith.

Enclosure: First copy for London from the Atlantic Council and South America to New England Council.

1. We have discussed the possibility of a voyage to the West Indies and South America to the west coast of Africa and I understand that various committees of the Navy Department are making a specific study of what the route should be and what island bases we should seek to control after the war. It is obvious that we should have all of the facts before final discussions take place.

A. J. HEPBURN,
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

2. Will you please let me know:

(a) What conclusions have been reached?

(b) What islands of the Southeast Pacific will be of special value as air bases?

3. I have particularly in mind the group of the Islands of the Line, the Marshall Islands and the Philippines. It seems to me that perhaps air transport experts should visit these islands on whatever craft can be made available without interfering with the war effort.

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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June 12, 1943.

From: The President.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Post War Air Routes from the Panama Canal
and South America to New Zealand and Australia.

1. We have discussed the post war air routes from Panama and South America to the westward after the war, and I understand that various committees of the Navy Department are making a specific study of what the route should be and what island bases we should seek to control after the war. It is obvious that we should have all of the facts before final discussions take place.

2. Will you please let me know:-

- (a) What conclusions have been reached?
and
- (b) What islands of the Southeast Pacific
will be of special value as air bases?

3. I have particularly in mind the geography of the islands of the Tuamotu Archipelago and the Marquesas. It occurs to me that perhaps air transport experts should visit these islands on whatever craft can be made available without interfering with the war effort.

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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G.B. No. 450
(Serial No. 236)
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
GENERAL BOARD
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1943.

From: Chairman General Board;
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Post-war Employment of International Police Force and
Post-war Use of Air Bases.

References: (a) SecNav Secret Ltr. (SC)A14-7 (03300A) of February 10, 1943.
(b) SecNav Secret Ltr. (SC)NA/QH5 (04100A) of February 17, 1943.

1. The directives contained in the references are closely related; they both require that the General Board study certain subjects and recommend policies which the Navy should follow in negotiations with other Government Departments and/or Foreign Governments. The subjects assigned for study are:

(a) Location of Air Facilities for Post-war International Police Force.

(b) Post-war Use of Air Bases.

(c) Air Bases of the Pacific which we should retain after the Close of the War.

In the directives as given, only questions of air facilities were to be considered but it has been impossible to confine these studies to such limits. For example, the policing of sea areas is bound to involve the use of ships as well as aircraft, sometimes independently and sometimes coordinated. Also ground troops will have to be used; they cannot be ignored for they will be required for the security of the bases themselves, if for no other reason. This Board has accordingly kept in mind that it is necessary to consider bases for the ships and facilities for the troops, as well as bases for the aircraft. Furthermore, consideration of post-war commerce both by ships and by air is bound to enter into such a study and this feature has not been disregarded. The policing of the land areas of the several continents and larger islands has not, however, been considered by the Board.

2. Of the United Nations, Britain and the United States already are committed to forcing unconditional surrender upon the enemy nations. Certainly the conditions imposed upon them at the time of their surrender must have as a primary requirement their complete disarmament, leaving them only such forces as are necessary for their internal government. Historical precedent indicates that, subsequent to the disarmament of the enemy

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nations, the United Nations will each be pressed from within for reduction of their own armaments. Unquestionably the subject of limitation of armaments as between the United Nations also will recur. Foresight, preliminary action and agreement are indicated in order that there will be no wholesale demobilization of the United Nations prior to the fulfillment of conditions imposed upon the enemy nations and prior to the accomplishment of all post-war commitments. It appears that until post-war adjustment has proceeded to considerable length, the armaments of all the principal United Nations will have to remain strong and effective for the purpose of preventing recurrence of world-wide war.

3. When hostilities terminate in Europe, Russia will have its forces in Eastern and Southeastern Europe; while Britain's forces will be spread from India through Africa, the Near East, and on the Continent. The forces of the United States will be disposed in Europe, Africa and in the Pacific area. The United Nations will then be confronted not only with a war to the finish with Japan but also with the enforcement of the terms imposed upon the surrendered nations in continental Europe. After Japan is defeated, the problem of enforcing terms imposed upon that country will devolve on Britain, the United States and China, as well as Russia if that country has joined in the war against Japan.

4. With the complete cessation of hostilities there will arise the question of treaties and, at this stage, it is well to remember that treaties signed by Germany and Japan have meant little to those nations when it has been to their interest to disregard them. The Nine-Power Treaty, the Treaty of Versailles, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact are cases in point. The Board therefore feels that by hastily signing treaties with our former enemies we will merely add to our own obligations without reciprocal benefit. It appears highly desirable to wait until these nations, and the world in general, have become educated to the necessity for a durable peace and to the fact that there is a determination to use force whenever necessary to check, in their inception, all threats to a state of universal good order.

5. Notwithstanding the failure of the League of Nations, the organization of the many nations of the world into an International League has again become a live subject. The various current discussions and proposals generally include improvements to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the establishment of an International Court of Justice and the creation of an International Police Force. A study of the history of the League of Nations clearly shows the difficulties of creating and putting into effect such an international organization. Without skepticism as to the eventual success of some kind of an international organization for collective security, the Board's firm opinion now is that years will elapse before any such league or council can be completely organized and made effective. During that protracted period, flare-ups must be prevented, by some means or in some manner. Rather than to rely on the effectiveness of an untried and untested League of Nations, or even implementation thereof, for enforcing good order in

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G.B. No. 450 (Serial No. 236)

the world during the long post-war interim it is more timely, at this date, to organize much more simply for this purpose.

6. In the preliminary discussions concerning the formation of the original League of Nations, Dr. Charles W. Eliot, the President Emeritus of Harvard University, expressed the following opinion: "Finally, it does not seem to me safe to entrust the preservation of peace for several years after this war is ended to the international bodies proposed in this tentative plan for the organization of the world to prevent war. Until the world has constructive evidence that Germany has abandoned her theory of State, and her policy of domination, and has abolished her military class, I think the peace of the world should be kept by a combination for offensive and defensive purposes of the Entente Allies and the United States, and that this combination should organize and maintain the military and naval forces necessary to prevent a breach of peace. No reduction of armaments will be possible until it is made completely visible to all nations that the peace of the world is going to be preserved by just that combination of powers competent and ready for that job. In my judgment, it is highly desirable to make that combination forthwith."

7. This Board is in full concurrence with Dr. Eliot's pronouncement, as quoted above, and deems it to be singularly applicable to the present situation. In its opinion, the only realistic view which can possibly prevail is that the ultimate organization and establishment of an International Police Force must be approached and developed on the foundation of a combination within the United Nations. However, no reason is seen for abstaining from preliminary discussions and negotiations for the purpose of examining into the establishment of an International Police Force. The bases and facilities for such a Force would be generally the same as those required by a simpler combination within the United Nations. There will be time enough later for minor adjustments in basing facilities because, even if early agreements should be reached covering composition, from what Nations drawn, how supported, controlled, operated, etc., much time will pass before full readiness of such an International Force can be attained. To weld elements from many nations into a force having the international rather than the national viewpoint is something never before attempted. The process will be a long one and undue haste will greatly increase the risk of failure.

8. It appears, therefore, to be most advisable that we, as a Nation, do not now become too closely committed even inferentially to world-wide agreements, the practicability of which may turn out to be slight or non-existent. The Navy must retain a background of realism in all negotiations with other Government Departments, as well as with Foreign Governments. It is submitted that the situation, now and for such period as is clearly foreseeable, calls for effective combination as between Britain, China, Russia and the United States, for the specific post-war purpose of keeping good order over such portions of the

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G.B. No. 450 (Serial No. 236)

world as involve any danger of outbreaks that might menace the general peace. Any world security organization should be built up slowly and deliberately step by step, based on the experiences of the past and the then current problems. As a practical matter, it appears that if it is to be successful it must be preceded by, and built upon, a realistic working agreement between these four great powers. It seems important, highly important, that such four power combination be effected without undue delay.

9. The problem of policing the high seas reduces to still simpler terms. Of the United Nations, Britain and the United States alone will possess naval forces of preponderant size and strength so that the policing of the sea areas, and smaller land masses, will necessarily devolve upon them. It is fortunate that these two great sea powers have less difficulty in making agreements with each other, and in adhering to them, than is the case with any other nations of the world. Furthermore, though mutual confidence as between the many nations of the world must be a matter of future growth, it is believed that a feeling of confidence in Britain and the United States does prevail throughout the civilized world. Therefore, it is concluded that the first step to meet the approaching situation should be to hold conversations with Britain looking towards a division of responsibility for maintaining order over the water areas of the world. Russia and China should be consulted as regards the areas and questions which directly concern them, and other nations may be brought in as circumstances warrant.

10. In view of the foregoing, and in compliance with the directives contained in the references, the General Board recommends:

(a) Early negotiations with Britain looking toward preliminary agreement upon a division of responsibility for good order over the world's sea areas on the following premises:

(1) The United States, employing such ship, air and ground forces as may be appropriate, to assume responsibility for the Pacific area extending as far South and West as is necessary to thoroughly cover all islands and water areas to the shores of China, except limited contiguous areas naturally under the control of the British Dominions and the Netherlands. In the Atlantic, the United States to assume responsibility for the sea areas west of longitude 25° West.

(2) Britain to assume responsibility for the areas in the Atlantic east of longitude 25° West, of the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, the waters contiguous to the Malay Peninsula extending as far north as Hongkong and of the waters contiguous to the British Dominions.

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G.B.No. 450 (Serial No. 236)

(3) Britain and the United States each to maintain sufficient naval, air and ground forces ready for use as required, and in such spheres as may be needed, to maintain peace and good order over the seas of the world.

(b) That, at suitable times, these negotiations be broadened to include Russia, China, and the other States of the United Nations in order to secure agreements on the measures planned for the extension of peace and order over the areas which will naturally become their spheres..

(c) That the air and naval bases considered necessary for the accomplishment of the above purposes be acquired by the nations concerned, without regard to sovereignty; such bases to be available for commercial purposes insofar as may be desired.

ANNEX A,(herewith): Sites for Bases.

/s/ THOS. C. HART.

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NOTE:- The Annex of this paper contains material which should be less widely known than can be the case with the letter proper. The Annex can be withheld by stating that the actual sites for Bases are in the very tentative, planning stage.

March 20, 1943

probable responsibilities for maintaining good order in certain of the world's oceanic areas. The list is partly in outline and in some cases only a general geographical location is designated. Final choice can be made only after the war, when we know the characteristics of various bases built, acquired, or captured during hostilities. So much effort, blood and treasure will have been spent on such bases that they, rather than new installations, should be utilized if possible. Those expenditures will mostly have been made by ourselves, and any post-war policing will impose upon us an additional heavy year to year burden. Therefore any economic advantages (and they cannot be great) which may accrue from our occupancy of such bases will be wholly justifiable and within our plain rights.

2. Detached islands or detached island groups, where possible, have been selected as sites for bases. In such choice, as opposed to the selection of only a part of a large island, the Board has been influenced by the weight of the following considerations:

- (a) Better natural defensibility;
- (b) Doubt as to future attitude of inhabitants;
- (c) Absence of day by day contact and friction with adjacent alien people;
- (d) Non-association with foreign ideology and culture;
- (e) Ability to govern and direct own sanitation, education, language and ideas.

3. The Board has also kept in mind the necessity for providing bases which will accommodate naval vessels as well as aircraft. Considerations of commerce have been taken into account but have not been the final determinants.

4. In some instances the Board has selected sites outside the proposed spheres of responsibility of the United States. The governing reasons for such selection are as follows:

- (a) To enhance the ability of the United States to enforce law and order in its own spheres;

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ANNEX A to G. B. No. 450 (Serial No. 236)

March 20, 1943

SUBJECT: Sites for Bases.

1. This annex lists the sites for bases which, in the opinion of the General Board, will be needed for meeting this nation's probable responsibilities for maintaining good order in certain of the world's oceanic areas. The list is partly in outline and in some cases only a general geographical location is designated. Final choice can be made only after the war, when we know the characteristics of various bases built, acquired, or captured during hostilities. So much effort, blood and treasure will have been spent on such bases that they, rather than new installations, should be utilized if possible. Those expenditures will mostly have been made by ourselves, and any post-war policing will impose upon us an additional heavy year to year burden. Therefore any economic advantages (and they cannot be great) which may accrue from our occupancy of such bases will be wholly justifiable and within our plain rights.

2. Detached islands or detached island groups, where possible, have been selected as sites for bases. In such choice, as opposed to the selection of only a part of a large island, the Board has been influenced by the weight of the following considerations:

- (a) Better natural defensibility;
- (b) Doubt as to future attitude of inhabitants;
- (c) Absence of day by day contact and friction with adjacent alien people;
- (d) Non-association with foreign ideology and culture;
- (e) Ability to govern and direct own sanitation, education, language and ideas.

3. The Board has also kept in mind the necessity for providing bases which will accommodate naval vessels as well as aircraft. Considerations of commerce have been taken into account but have not been the final determinants.

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- (a) To enhance the ability of the United States to enforce law and order in its own spheres;

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ANNEX A to G.B.No. 450 (Serial No. 236)

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(b) To provide bases in geographical positions from which the United States can support other nations in enforcing their responsibilities when required;

(c) To furnish support to the United States in maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere, which the Board is unable to disassociate from the idea of collective world security.

5. Having in mind the foregoing considerations, and in extension of paragraph 10 (a) (1) of the basic letter, the General Board recommends tentative sites for bases as follows:

(a) In the Pacific Area:

(1) To the South, - to cover Panama.

Panama Area	Clipperton Island
Seymour Island, Gallapagos Islands	Magdalena Bay

(2) To the Southwest, - to within easy contact with the British Dominions.

Hawaiian Islands	Marquesas Islands
Johnston Island	Samoa Islands
Palmyra Island	New Hebrides Islands
Phoenix Islands (Canton)	New Caledonia
Society Islands (Borabora)	Solomons Islands
Tonga Islands (Tongatabu)	

A Northwestward extension, from the Solomons Islands, will be dependent upon the relationships which exist with Australia after the war; the subject is not within estimate at present.

(3) To the WEST, - to within easy contact with the Netherlands East Indies and China, and to cover the Philippines.

Marshall Islands	Halmahera
Gilbert or Ellice Islands	Sulu Archipelago (as per
Wake Island	General Board G.B.No.405,
Marcus Island	Serial No. 1953 of
Truk Islands	28 August 1940)
Palau Islands	Ituaba
Guam	Batan Islands or Babuyan Islands
Chichi Jima	Formosa
	Shanghai, China, area. (Possibly
	as a joint project).

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ANNEX A to G.B.No. 450 (Serial No. 236)

3.

(4) To the Northwest, to within easy contact with Russia.

Aleutian Islands
Paramushiru Jima

(b) In the Atlantic Area:

(1) To the Southeast, to cover the Panama Canal, the Caribbean Sea, and to the Bulge of Brazil.

Panama Area
Jamaica
Guantanamo
San Juan
St. Thomas
Antigua
Santa Lucia
Trinidad

Georgetown, (British Guiana)
Belem
Natal
Ascension Island
Bermuda
Bahamas
Dakar (possibly as a joint project)
Liberia

(2) To the Northeast, - to within easy contact with the British Isles.

Argentina
Greenland
Iceland (possibly as a joint project).

6. As a general principle, the installations on foreign soil which will have been built at United States expense should be used under arrangements and agreements which include their availability for commercial purposes. Existing agreements, not in accordance therewith, are suggested as suitable subject of re-negotiation.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

G.B.No. 450
(Serial No. 240)
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GENERAL BOARD

Washington

March 27, 1943

From: Chairman General Board.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Post-war sovereignty over certain islands of the North Pacific.

References: (a) General Board Secret ltr. G.B.No. 450 (Serial No. 236) of March 20, 1943.
(b) General Board Confidential ltr. G.B.No. 405 (Serial No. 1953) of August 28, 1940.

1. In reference (a), the General Board submitted certain recommendations concerning bases for post-war use in maintaining peace and good order over the high seas and some small land masses. Those recommendations were made without regard to the sovereignties involved. However, in any projection of thought into similar post-war questions, the state of sovereignty over certain islands of the North Pacific forces itself into the picture. The Board holds certain views on this subject and feels that it is now timely to express them as a matter of record and for future use as required.

2. It is scarcely conceivable that the terms imposed upon Japan as a result of the present war will permit her to remain established in any capacity in the Pacific islands mandated to her after the last war. Her flagrant and deliberate violations of the provisions of Article 4 of the mandate would seem definitely to require that an administration other than Japanese be established. For reasons of our own security, and because we are likely to be committed to the protection of the Philippines after they have become independent, the United States is vitally interested in the form which a readjustment in control of these islands may take.

3. For the same reasons it is undesirable that the Bonin group should remain in Japanese hands. The Bonins are of military importance on account of Port Lloyd; the group links the Japanese homeland with the Marianas and the other islands of the mandate. As long as the Bonins are in Japanese hands they constitute a menace to those islands and to the Philippines as well. It follows that the control of the Bonins, and that of the ostensibly worthless Volcano Islands, should be transferred from Japan and be given to whatever other power is to control the Marianas.

4. That other power is logically the United States. Guam belongs to us and again will be administered by us when it has been wrested from enemy hands. The island is one of the Marianas and, as has been demonstrated in the past, is potentially menaced by the other islands of that group unless the same power controls them all. It follows naturally that the United States should control the entire Marianas group; since the

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position of the Bonins is such as to dominate the Marianas, the control of the Bonins should also pass to the United States. Because of their geographical position with relation to the Marianas, the Philippines and Hawaii, the same military principle applies in the case of all the islands mandated to Japan; the control of the whole properly belongs to the United States. The same observation applies to Marcus Island and Ituaba Island which are also under Japanese control at present.

5. None of the islands in question possesses natural features of value from other than the military standpoint. Both from the economic and the political standpoints they are a liability to the nation charged with their control and administration. The transfer to the United States of any or all of those islands with all that is implied therein cannot constitute territorial aggrandizement. Japan has frankly referred to them as "unsinkable aircraft carriers" and their severance from her control will be part of her disarmament.

6. The acquirement, by the United States, of the control of the islands presently owned by or mandated to Japan will link the United States with the Philippines for the security of which the United States probably will be responsible. Essential to the fulfillment of this responsibility is the establishment of a permanent United States naval base in the Philippine area. The location of such a base has received much study by many minds over a period of years and numerous recommendations have resulted. After review of these studies, the General Board in 1940, reference (b), recommended that, at a suitable time, steps be taken to reserve the entire Sulu Archipelago (Basilan to Sibutu inclusive) for the occupation and use of the United States after the Philippines become independent. The Board renews this recommendation and suggests that the present might be a propitious time for the initiation of these steps.

7. In connection with future sovereignty over the Japanese islands discussed above, the General Board recommends that planning for post-war conditions provide for United States possession of:

(a) All of the former German islands mandated to Japan by the League of Nations, i.e., the Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas (except Guam);

(b) The Bonin or Ogasawara Group, the Volcano Islands, Marcus Island, and Ituaba Island, at present owned or controlled by Japan.

/s/ THOS. C. HART

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SECRET

G.B. No. 450
(Serial No. 240-A)
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SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
GENERAL BOARD
Washington

ATD

April 6, 1943.

From: Chairman General Board.
To : Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Islands in the South Pacific; Change in Status of.

References: (a) General Board Secret ltr. G.B. No. 450 (Serial No. 236) of March 20, 1943.
(b) General Board Secret ltr. G.B. No. 450 (Serial No. 240) of March 27, 1943.

1. In reference (a) the General Board recommended early negotiations with Britain looking toward a preliminary agreement upon division of responsibility for good order over the world's sea areas on the premise (among others) that the United States assume responsibility for the Pacific area. In reference (b) proposal was made that the United States assume entire control of the islands now mandated to Japan in order that the lines of communication across the North Pacific to the Philippines and the Asiatic Coast may be in our hands.

2. This letter concerns the islands in the Central-South Pacific Ocean through which the United States is expected to extend its policing responsibility all the way to the vicinity of the British Dominions in the South Pacific. Such an extension involves very long lines of communication and, while there should be no concern about the security of those lines, it is important that the political situation in the area be simplified in order to facilitate the military task to be performed. The political and administrative situation is extremely complex because several nations have interests therein and there are too many governmental organizations over the small, scattered land masses and their small populations.

3. The simplification of the political and administrative situation can be brought about only through changes in sovereignty or in what amounts to sovereignty. Since the political changes recommended hereinafter will not constitute territorial aggrandizement at the expense of a defeated enemy, the Board is of the opinion that such changes conform to the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. There will be little if any economic value or advantage involved, and the assumption of sovereignty will mean an increased burden of administration. There will be a few cases wherein a financial adjustment may have to be made as incident to a change of sovereignty, where one nation has given up a possession of real value. Such adjustments should not be difficult nor should they amount to very much in comparison with the vast financial adjustments, which must at some future time be made within the United Nations.

4. Existing governmental complexity is best illustrated in the case of the Samoa Islands, a portion of which belongs to this country while the remainder is mandated to New Zealand. The Samoan people have a single language, they

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all have the same customs, ways and means of life, and are closely related by blood. They are, however, divided under the sovereignty of two nations. This interferes with their easy communication with one another, and with the maintenance of language, culture, and blood ties within the group, and with commercial relationships with the outer world. It seems clear that the Samoa Islands should be under the control of one nation and, as the United States in the discharge of its post-war military responsibilities for good order will have to continue its expenditure of money and effort in both subdivisions of these islands, it is logical that the control should be entrusted to this country.

5. To the north and west of Samoa lie various small islands, containing very few people, known as the Line Islands, the Wallis Islands, the Phoenix and Union Groups, the Ellice Islands, and the Gilbert Islands. They all lie within a triangle in the Mid-Pacific Ocean, the apexes of which are Samoa, the Marshall Islands and the Line Islands. Due to their proximity to the Hawaiian Group and the Marshall Islands, it appears highly desirable and reasonable that they should pass to the control of the United States in the future.

6. The possession by France of the many islands scattered over the eastern part of the South Pacific Ocean, with some in the Southwest Pacific Ocean, constitutes a military situation incompatible with the probable responsibilities of the United States in these areas. Furthermore, no one can foresee what the future government of France will be, which of her overseas possessions will remain attached, or how many years it will take for the French State to recover and reorganize into a position sufficiently strong and stable to administer effectively its colonies; France may find it very difficult even to regain its economically valuable hold in Indo-China. The islands in question, the Marquesas, Society, and Tubuai Islands, the Tuamotu Archipelago, and the New Caledonia-Loyalty Islands group, lie in areas detached from other French interests or responsibilities. This detachment is in itself a strong argument against any future continuance of their control by the French. France also has joint authority with Britain in the New Hebrides, still another example of governmental complexity. This Board is therefore of the opinion that all French possessions in the South Pacific, except the interest in the New Hebrides, should pass to the control of the United States. French responsibility in the New Hebrides should pass to Britain, so that only one nation will be responsible for the control of that group. In the case of the New Caledonia colony, the United States would gain territory of economic value for which financial adjustment would be in order.

7. The General Board recommends that, in order to improve and simplify the position of post-war military responsibility with which the United States will be charged, current and future planning be guided towards the attainment of the following objectives:

(a) The transfer to the United States by Britain or the British Dominions of the sovereignty of British Samoa, British Line Islands, Ellice Islands, Gilbert Islands, British Phoenix Islands, and the Union Islands.

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(b) The transfer to the United States by France of the sovereignty of the Marquesas, Society, and Tubuai Islands, the Tuamotu Archipelago, and the New Caledonia Colony which includes the New Caledonia group, the Loyalty group, and the Wallis Islands.

(c) The transfer to Britain by France of its interest in the condominium in the New Hebrides Islands.

/s/ THOS. C. HART
Acting.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I think the Navy had better do nothing further in regard to understanding with the British about Japanese Mandated Islands in the Pacific -- in view of the fact that I am anxious to clean up the problem of all the islands in the Pacific, and the British would probably be delighted to confine the discussions to the Japanese Mandated Islands.

I think I had better handle the discussions myself without bringing the two Navies into it, though I may later ask for naval advice on the subject of which islands should be made police stations. I think we will have no trouble about arranging for mutual use of the islands.

F. D. R.

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THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

10 March 1943


My dear Mr. President:

The whole question of adequate bases for the use of the Navy after the war has been under discussion now for several weeks. Naturally, I have been following this pretty closely and giving to the subject a lot of thought. As a result of this, I should like to submit this suggestion for your consideration. Would it be out of order or untimely for us to attempt an understanding with the British that they will support and approve after the war, our control and possession of all of the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific and agree to work out with us, an understanding under which we would be assured the possession of a base in Northwest Africa, at a place to be mutually agreed upon by the two powers. At the present time, the exact location need not be determined.

In addition to this, would it likewise be appropriate to enter into an undertaking with the British that all British bases and that all American bases in the Atlantic and Pacific shall be available to each of them for the common defense of both. I know the objections that can be made against entering into any pre-armistice understandings, but this relates itself so closely to our future security and is entered into so exclusively for the common defense of the world against future aggression that I believe the arguments for are obviously far greater than the arguments against. Furthermore, I am rather inclined to think we can get these concessions out of England far more readily and easily now than when the war is over when the British' needs and reliance upon us becomes less.

This may be worth thinking about or it may probably be consigned to the waste basket. I am only led to make the recommendation because it relates itself so closely to Naval activities after the war.

Yours sincerely,



Frank Knox

The President,

The White House.

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December 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY.

The President directed that I show you the attached correspondence.

In addition the President stated that we must keep in mind the peace negotiations and that he visualizes some sort of international police force will come out of the war. Pursuing this thought further, the President stated he wished you to have a study made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the end that when the peace negotiations are upon us we will be decided in our own minds where it is desired that "International Police Force" air facilities be located throughout the world; This plan to be without regard to current sovereignty.

Very respectfully,

John L. McGree,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

Admiral King's memo 12-20-42 "Air routes across the Pacific; Australian Legation ltr. 12-9-42 re: same subject.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN McCREA

Miss Tully handed me the attached memorandum and asked me to tell you that the President said you were to read it and return it to his files. Further, that you were to "push it."

Very respectfully,

TERRY

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON


September 1, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Erection Depot for fighter planes
in the Marquesas.

You questioned me Sunday night regarding the foregoing. Dispatches received from the surveying party in the South Pacific indicate that the Marquesas have no suitable site. The survey is continuing with a view to establishing such a depot in Tahiti or the nearest group of islands to the United States where suitable terrain can be found.

General Arnold hopes that the location problem will be solved and construction started within the next few weeks.


Chief of Staff.

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