

• PSF

State Dept. : Cordell Hull

1943

Hull folder
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~Secret~~

February 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What should we do about
this?

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Secret message to Davis and Sherwood undated from Carroll re report in Algiers that Giraud is considering appt. of Lemaigre Dubreuil to high post such as Sec. Gen. of the High Commissariat. Protests - thinks not good idea, etc. Memo for the P. x 2/4/ "I showed the attached cable to Harry and he believed I should show it to you. It is from Wallace Carroll, Chief OWI rep. in London." Bob Sherwood

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972

*file PST = Hull folder
personal*

March 23, 1943.

Dear Cordell:-

Apropos of our conversation the other afternoon, I wish you would explore, with the British, the question of what our plan is to be in Germany and Italy during the first few months after Germany's collapse.

I think you had better confer with Stimson about it too.

My thought is if we get a substantial meeting of the minds with the British that we should, then, take it up with the Russians.

As ever yours,

Honorable Cordell Hull,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

(936)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I suggest that a paraphrase
of Moscow - 271, April 8, 7 p.m.
be sent to Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden.

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of
this memorandum to the Secretary of State.



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 12, 1943.

Hull folder 2-43

*file
personal*

Memorandum for the President

With further reference to our conversation over the telephone last evening in regard to whether we and the democrats in Congress should, in effect, agree with the republicans in the House of Representatives in an effort to prevent other amendments that they might amend the resolution continuing for another three years the Trade Agreements policy by reducing the length of time from three to two years, I feel today as I did last evening that it would not be in the best interest of the cause of international cooperation, especially in the post-war world, and especially with respect to the economic and commercial side, for the Executive Department and its associates in the House of Representatives to make any concession on this point, but to resist the proposed reduction from three to two years, and let the responsibility rest on the opposition.

This would on its face be a hostile amendment and definitely a backward step with respect to the general movement in support of international cooperation, political, economic, et al. I inferred from your comment last evening that this likewise is your view.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE *PSF*

THE SECRETARY

May 12, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I wish to call your attention to the attached memorandum setting forth possible points which Dr. Benes will most likely discuss during his present visit.

C.H.

RECEIVED
MAY 15 1943
THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

file personal

MEMORANDUM

May 11, 1943.

Eu - Mr. Atherton:

PA/D - Mr. Dunn:

U - Mr. Welles:

In his telegram no. 3, May 1, 7 p.m. (file no. 860F.001/131) Mr. Biddle reports his conversation with Dr. Benes, setting forth the things Dr. Benes intends to discuss during his approaching visit to Washington. These are:

1. He expects to "clarify the juridical position" of his Government with special reference to the denunciation of "Munich";
2. He will disclose Moscow's attitude toward postwar Czechoslovakia;
3. He will ask the President's support in approaching the Vatican, with a view to establishing relations between his Government and the Vatican.

On the first point, we know that Dr. Benes feels that this Government is not sufficiently convinced of the "legality" of his Government. Using precisely the same technique as resulted in recognition during the last war, the Czechoslovak Government has established its status in stages. The final stage seems to have been attained by having obtained from the British, the U.S.S.R. and the Fighting French formal declarations repudiating the Munich agreement. This means, according to Dr. Benes' argument, that everything that transpired at Munich or afterward, if prejudicial to Czechoslovak interests, was accomplished under duress. (This matter was discussed in some detail in my memoranda of May 1

and

and May 6 concerning the status of the Sudetenland).

Dr. Benes may inquire whether this Government would not be willing to make a declaration similar to those issued by the British and Fighting French, or, as in the case of the U.S.S.R., authorize him to make a formal announcement in the matter. The following reasons suggest that it would be better for this Government not to accede to such a request:

1. This Government was not a party to the Munich agreement, and is under no obligation to participate in its formal repudiation;

2. The declarations of repudiation are being used by the Czechoslovak propaganda agencies (a) to establish clear title to all territories included within Czechoslovakia before 1938 and thus move the question of boundaries into the forefront of discussion; (b) to complicate thereby the relations with the Polish Government, in view of Poland's occupation of the Teschen area; and (c) to retract Dr. Benes' resignation after Munich and assert his tenure of office as "morally" uninterrupted (his term would have expired in December 1942) and to substantiate his recent continuance in office as equivalent to a re-election for another seven year term.

These are all questions in which this Government need not become involved. It is suggested that if Dr. Benes raises this question he could be informed that while this Government has not considered it necessary or appropriate to make any formal statement with regard to the Munich settlement, it has taken note of the repudiation of Munich by the Czechoslovak Government and other interested governments; and that the Department has taken the necessary steps to see that any administrative acts on the part of agencies of this Government which might have bearing on the Munich agreement should be reviewed in a sense non-prejudicial to the interests of Czechoslovakia.

On the second point (discussing "Moscow's attitude toward postwar Czechoslovakia") we can suppose that this means that Dr. Benes will deliver a refutation of the popular charge that he is an "agent of Moscow".

The

The third point, that Dr. Benes will request the President's support in approaching the Vatican, is worth careful reflection. He speaks of the "maintenance of equilibrium" and the "re-establishment of relations between Prague and the Vatican" since the end of the war "would undoubtedly find Russian influences strong in Central Europe".

Does this mean that he is now embarking on a policy of re-insurance? That having supported the Soviet cause in all his recent diplomacy and having already given everything that would be useful to the Soviet Union, he now has become uneasy lest the Russians treat his Government much as they have the Poles? For him to turn to Rome at this juncture is a dangerous policy, and our involvement in it might give rise to awkward misunderstandings.

He says that this is not a new project, --that he discussed it with Cardinal Hinsley two years ago. The Cardinal "did not consider the time then ripe to approach the Vatican in the matter".

There is no indication of any subsequent conversations with the Cardinal, who died just a few weeks ago.

In this connection it may be useful to review briefly the relations between the Czechoslovak Government and the Vatican. They have never been cordial, and a concordat was never negotiated.

Soon after the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic an anti-Papal nationalistic church was started, which involved a sharp controversy with Rome. Nevertheless relations with the Vatican were established in 1921, but there followed a period of fruitless negotiation, growing out of the Czechoslovak request that the boundaries of dioceses be newly delimited to accord with the country's geographical frontiers, and the claim advanced by both the Vatican and the Czechoslovak Government to the right to nominate archbishops and bishops. Then followed (1925) an unpleasant incident when the Nuncio left Prague and remained absent for two years, because of the Government's official participation in the John Huss celebration (this was repeated in 1933).

In 1927 a modus vivendi was drawn up, at Rome's

initiation,

initiation, but eight years elapsed before an understanding could be reached on some of the points in dispute, and in fact another two years passed before a supplement to the modus vivendi was promulgated (1937) in order to make it really effective. By this time, of course, the Sudeten question had become acute, and the Hungarian agitation in Slovakia was increasing, with the result that some of the further negotiations foreseen in the agreement were never completed. This almost continuous state of tension, throughout the history of the Republic, involving property claims, political considerations (the authority and property interests of Hungarian, German and Polish bishops) and a nationalistic people which, though predominantly Catholic, shows little ardor for Rome, is then the background against which Dr. Benes would like to persuade the President to approach the Vatican in his behalf.

Would it not be better for him after his return to London from Moscow, to renew his conversations with the Catholic hierarchy at London?

Hull folder
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

██████████
May 31, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What would you think of sending Bill Phillips to Canada on the condition that if the Indian matter is reopened in a satisfactory way he would at once go to India as Special Representative? I am sure he would be very acceptable to Canada where he once was stationed.

What do you think of Dick Patterson for New Zealand?

F. D. R.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972

MAY 27 1943

WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 19, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Bob Jackson phoned me this afternoon; said he understood that there was a possibility that you would appoint a career man to Canada instead of Dick Patterson.

He wanted me to ask you -- if that is the final decision -- could we let him know so he can give Dick a chance to withdraw his name and "save his face".

I told him I didn't think any decision had been reached.

MMH

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972

Hull folder 2-43

file



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 31. 1943

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Reference is made to a memorandum dated May 18, 1943, from Lieutenant Colonel Chester Hammond, Assistant to the Military Aide, transmitting, at your direction, copies of two messages from General Hurley regarding the Middle East, and stating that you desire a recommendation from this Department relative thereto.

Two memoranda are transmitted herewith which contain the recommendations requested.

CH

Enclosures:

Two memoranda,
May 22 and 27, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAR 6 1972

Gen. Hurley's report is filed Gen Concer "H," dt 3-43.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION**NE**ENCLOSURE
TO

Letter drafted _____

ADDRESSED TO

The President

had been accustomed. This is explained by the unpleasant
fact that during the present war Middle Eastern countries have fought against

May 27, 1943

Comments on General Hurley's Telegram of
May 5, 1943 from Cairo regarding General
Conditions in the Middle East and the
Palestine Question

Part I of General Hurley's report contains a brief statement of the high regard in which the United States is held in the Middle East, and of the unfavorable manner in which the countries which have been influential in that area in the past, principally Great Britain and France, are regarded by the native populations.

General Hurley raises no specific questions and makes no recommendations. However, in pointing out that "conditions of war require continuance at this time of certain policies of conquest and imperialism," but that "these must eventually be in complete conflict with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms," he implicitly raises the question of American policy in the Middle East after the war.

The peoples of the Middle East were bitterly disappointed and disillusioned at the arrangements made in their regard after the last World War, considering them to be in clear violation of President Wilson's principles and of specific commitments made to them by Great Britain and France. While some progress toward the political and economic liberty of the Near East was made in the following two decades, the concessions made were granted slowly and grudgingly and for the most part were obtained through the use or threat of force. The dominant western Powers looked principally to their own short-term political and economic interests; they failed to devote themselves to the task of building sound, free nations in the Middle East, and they did little for the common man.

Consequently, at the outbreak of war in 1939 the Middle Eastern peoples, generally speaking, were morally disaffected from the Allied cause, and inclined to believe that if Nazi influence should come to prevail it could hardly be worse than the type of domination to which they

had

had been accustomed. Thus is explained the unpleasant fact that during the present war no independent Middle Eastern country has fought against the Axis.

The Middle Eastern peoples now feel sure that the Axis will lose the war. They believe that unless the United States, whom they admire and respect, plays a far larger part in determining the working relationships between the Middle East and the West than it has done in the past, the old policies of imperialism and exploitation will be resumed.

The use of Middle Eastern territories, natural resources, labor, and industries are vital in the present war; are vital to any adequate scheme for maintaining peace; and will be vital in any future war. We do not wish to have to operate again among indifferent, sullen, or hostile local people who are ill-fed, disease-ridden, and illiterate.

The following general recommendations are made in the light of General Hurley's report and the foregoing discussion:

1. No commitment or promise of any kind should be made by us which we do not intend or cannot reasonably expect to keep. Our existing basic commitment, the Atlantic Charter, should of course be honored completely.
2. In political matters, it should be our policy to assist in maintaining and, where necessary, furthering the independence of Near Eastern peoples. We should not remain silent when developments occur which threaten these objectives.
3. In economic matters, we should seek to extend and to strengthen American trade and economic interests on the basis of fair give-and-take.
4. We should place ourselves in a position to give the Middle Eastern countries all reasonable assistance in economic and cultural matters.
5. We should assume our proper share of responsibility in maintaining peace in the Middle East and preserving it as against external aggression.

Part II of General Hurley's report deals with the Palestine problem. He is convinced that this question is the one which most interests the Middle East at this time. He considers official Zionist policy to be imperialistic in character, and produces evidence to show that the Arab and other Moslem peoples fear the Zionists for this reason. General Hurley also states that the opinion is widespread that the British Government opposes the establishment of a Jewish political state in Palestine but that the United States Government is forcing the British to acquiesce in the establishment of such a state. British propaganda along this line is stated by General Hurley to be distinctly helpful to British relations with the Arabs. It is correspondingly damaging to our own relations. The French in Syria are using the same line of propaganda to their own advantage and to our detriment.

General Hurley's observations are fully supported by reports which the Department has been receiving from its representatives in the Middle East for the past two years, and more recently by reports which the War Department has received from its intelligence officers on the spot.

The concensus of opinion in the Middle East of responsible American and British officials is that the Zionist program for a Jewish political state in Palestine is an imperialistic program which is bitterly opposed by the Arab peoples, including the Arab majority in Palestine itself. The program has no basis or justification in the Balfour Declaration, or the Mandate, and could be carried into effect and maintained only by force, in clear violation of the Atlantic Charter. If this Government should have anything to do with giving effect to such a program, we should incur the enmity of the Arab peoples, whose friendship is vital to us.

We believe that the issuance of a statement on the Palestine problem along the lines of the one which the President has recently approved for discussion with the British and possibly other governments, will go far toward removing the uncertainties and doubts regarding our position which now prevail in the Middle East.

General Hurley believes that the Palestine problem is too much for the British to handle by themselves and that

we should take a hand. The Department has given a great deal of anxious and careful thought to this problem. It is recommended that the Arabs and Jews first endeavor to reach a friendly settlement between themselves, by their own efforts. If this endeavor is unsuccessful, our influence should be exerted toward a solution, reached after full consultation with both Arabs and Jews, based squarely on the Atlantic Charter.

In general, the statements made by General Hurley regarding Iranian economic difficulties, the reasons therefor, the position of American troops and advisers, and the respective attitudes of the Iranians, British and Russians toward each other, are in substantial accord with numerous previous reports received by the Department.

General Hurley expresses the opinion that the opposing aspirations of Great Britain and the Soviet Union in Iran may bring them into open conflict. There is, of course, no doubt that Great Britain and Russia have special interests in Iran and that these interests are, in some respects conflicting. This has been true for at least the past 100 years. Whether this state of affairs will ultimately result in a head-on clash would seem to depend primarily upon the success of the Moscow and London Governments in arriving at a satisfactory over-all agreement with regard to their respective interests in all parts of the world. However, the Department feels that everything possible should be done to smooth the way for such an agreement with respect to Iran and is currently doing all that it can to bring about closer cooperation between the British, Russian, and American authorities in Iran.

The Department is surprised to note the statements on pages 9 and 10 of the telegram that American civil and military officers in Iran appear to be supporting the Soviet Union as opposed to Great Britain. It is true that our representatives have differed with the British on a number of occasions and that we have had fewer disagreements with the Russians in Iran. This seems to be due primarily, however, to the fact that until recently we have had less contact with the Soviet authorities, who have held themselves aloof from the efforts made by the

British

May 22, 1943

Comments on General Hurley's Telegram of
May 13, 1943 from Cairo regarding
Conditions in Iran

In general, the statements made by General Hurley regarding Iranian economic difficulties, the responsibilities therefor, the position of American troops and advisers, and the respective attitudes of the Iranians, British and Russians toward each other, are in substantial accord with numerous previous reports received by the Department.

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British

British and American Governments to resolve the numerous economic and political problems which have arisen during the past year and a half. Despite the differences of opinion mentioned, we have achieved reasonably satisfactory cooperation and understanding with the British authorities, and there is nothing in the numerous reports received by the Department which indicates that our Legation is in any way favoring Russian interests as against the British. The instructions which the Department has sent our Minister have emphasized the importance of securing good relations with both the British and the Russians. As regards the attitude of the American military authorities, the Department of State has no information.

General Hurley suggests that the President should take strong action to meet the existing situation in Iran, as a step toward unity among the United Nations and the ultimate establishment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. This suggestion is substantially in accord with a statement of policy prepared for its own use by the Department of State on January 23, 1943, the salient points of which are as follows:

"1) The past and present attitudes of Great Britain and Russia toward Iran, together with the current weakness of the Iranian Government and disorganization of the country's internal structure, justify fears that Iran may prove a danger point when we come to the post-war settlement.

"2) The best hope of avoiding trouble in this regard lies in strengthening Iran to a point at which she will be able to stand on her own feet and in assuring both of the interested Great Powers that neither one need fear the acquisition by the other of a predominant position in Iran.

"3) The United States is the only nation which may be able to render effective assistance to Iran without rousing the fears and opposition of Great Britain or Russia, or of the Iranians themselves.

"4) Since we have a vital interest in the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the establishment of foundations for a lasting peace throughout the world, it is to the advantage of the United States to exert itself to see that Iran's integrity

and

and independence are maintained and that she becomes prosperous and stable.

"5) Therefore, the United States should adopt a policy of positive action in Iran with a view to facilitating not only the war operations of the United Nations but also a sound post-war development of the country which would eliminate the need or excuse for the establishment of any sort of 'protectorate'."

This statement of policy has been transmitted to the American Legation at Tehran for its guidance, and our Minister has expressed his entire agreement with it. The specific measures by which this policy may be implemented are, necessarily, dependent upon circumstances and, especially, upon the success of the United States in convincing not only the Iranian Government and people but also the Soviet and British Governments of the disinterestedness of American policy in Iran.

Finally, General Hurley makes four specific recommendations:

1. That Iran be assured that America insists that the principles of the Atlantic Charter do apply to Iran. Such assurance has been implicit in a number of communications which this Government has made to the Iranian Government. Furthermore, in the preamble of a draft agreement recently submitted to the Iranian Government to establish the status of American armed forces in Iran, it is stated that "Both the Government of the United States of America and the Imperial Iranian Government have declared their adherence to the principles of the joint declaration made on August 14, 1941 by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, known as the Atlantic Charter." It may also be recalled that the preamble of the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance of January 29, 1942 refers specifically to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. However, if further assurance is considered necessary, there would seem to be no objection to a specific statement by this Government along the lines suggested by General Hurley. It might be well to have such a statement made jointly by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

2. That

2. That Iran be permitted to join the United Nations in a declaration of war against the Axis.

So far as the Department is aware, the Iranian Government as such has never expressed a desire to join the United Nations, although personal wishes of this sort have been voiced by the Shah and one or two high officials. By telegram no. 66 of February 5, 1943 the Department informed the American Minister at Tehran that it perceived no objection to an Iranian declaration of war, provided the position of the Iranian Government with respect to its own people would not thereby be weakened. The views expressed in this telegram are still those of the Department.

3. That the American and British Legations be raised immediately to the status of Embassies. The Department feels that this might be beneficial, as it would give our representative equal standing with the Soviet Ambassador at Tehran and indicate our positive interest in Iran.

4. That American and British Ambassadors compatible to each other and able to understand and promote British-American-Russian cooperation be appointed to Iran. The Department, of course, fully appreciates the importance of having at Tehran a chief of mission who is able to work with the Soviet and British representatives. Our present Minister has done an exceptional piece of work in Iran under extraordinarily difficult circumstances and enjoys an enviable standing among the foreign representatives at Tehran. It is felt that his transfer to another post should be made only after careful consideration and only if a man of outstanding ability were available to replace him. The Department expects to order Mr. Dreyfus to the United States for consultation within the next few months, and it is believed that any action on General Hurley's recommendation might well be postponed until there has been an opportunity to discuss the situation with the Minister in person.

PSE Hull folder
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

When do you think I can use
this at a press conference?

F.D.R.

Memorandum for the President, 6-3-43,
from Cordell Hull, returning his ltr.
5-11-43, with enclosed draft statement
on poison gas together with FDR memo,
5-21-43.

Hull

*Hull folder
2-43*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

I think this statement on
poison gas is excellent, but suggest
it be given out soon after the Prime
Minister leaves. Let me know when the
opportunity is ripe for good publicity.

F.D.R.

Letter to the President, 5-11-43, from
Cordell Hull, enclosing, in accordance
with the President's request, a draft
statement with respect to use of poison
gas by any of our enemies - statement is
titled, "Statement by the President on
Gas Warfare".

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BF Hull folder

2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Will you get me a draft of
this speech, prepared in the State
Department, and send up to me this
afternoon?

F.D.R.

Letter, 5-29-43, to the President
from Cordell Hull stating that the
United Nations Conference on Food and
Agriculture will adjourn on June 3rd; a
special train will bring delegates to
Wash. on June 4th. The delegates could
meet the Pres. on Friday evening or the
following Monday. Mr. Hull says he can
have a draft made of a short speech if the
Pres. so desires. Penned notation -"C.H.
OK FDR".

BF Hall folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE. YOU MIGHT
CONSULT GENERAL MARSHALL WHO IS
JUST BACK FROM ALGIERS.

F. D. R.

Cable June 7, 1943 from Murphy, Algiers
Re invitation extended to Gen. Giraud
to proceed to the U.S.A. and recommends
that General de Gaulle also be invited.

PSF: Hull folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
Husmond*

June 14, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Tell Murphy in reply to his No. 1068, June ninth, that until things are very much clearer in North Africa there is no need to discuss recognition by us in any form. This includes engagements or promises.

F. D. R.



*file
personal*

BF Hull folder 2-43

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1943.

Memorandum for the President

Some days ago I recommended for the position of Ambassador to Russia Mr. W. Averell Harriman.

It has been my understanding that Mr. Harry Hopkins is not well physically. If he should be well enough to accept this position, he would be my first recommendation, from the standpoint of general equipment and capabilities.

CH

PSF Hull folder
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 24, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The enclosed came yesterday morning from Churchill. I do hope that you can go this Autumn. I honestly think it would do a great deal of good.

Please return for my files.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972

(1297)

hm

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*BSF
Hull*

June 24, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

J. VAN NESS PHILIP:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F.D.R.

ENCLOSURE

Transmitting copy of letter which the President received from Hon. Sumner Welles under date of 6/21/43, in re copy of report from Mr. J Van Ness Philip in re progress on the Inter-American Highway in Mexico. Original of letter retained for our files.

(1186)

O
P
Y

PSF: *Miller*
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 7, 1943.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Replying to your letter of May 26th in regard to a proposed relaxation of the existing system of quarterly quotas of petroleum products for Sweden, I have referred the question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose report is quoted herewith:

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Increase in Petroleum Products Quotas to Sweden.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the military aspects of the letter which the Secretary of State sent to you on 26 May 1943 with reference to the above subject.

From the best information available it appears that in January, 1943, the Swedish reserves of petroleum products amounted to approximately 90,000 tons. Their quarterly consumption is approximately 15,000 tons. Sweden is therefore able to build up her reserves at the rate of 15,000 tons per quarter provided the 30,000-ton quarterly import continues. On this basis Sweden's reserve stocks in October should exceed 120,000 tons.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these amounts are adequate to meet the military needs of Sweden and that any relaxation of the blockade of the Axis Powers in Europe is contrary, from the military point of view, to the best interests of the Allied Nations.

Unless considerations aside from military dictate otherwise, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff recommend that negotiations with Sweden should be conducted with a view to limiting the petroleum imports to 30,000 tons per quarter."

It is my opinion that there is no serious objection to permitting Sweden to build up its reserve stock to 120,000 tons by October, 1943, provided that competent supervision of such petroleum products give us reasonable assurance that they are not used for the benefit of the Axis Powers.

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable,
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

FEB 19 1974
By N. J. Stewart Date

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

5 June 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Increase in Petroleum Products
Quotas to Sweden.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the military aspects of the letter which the Secretary of State sent to you on 26 May 1943 with reference to the above subject.

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Unless considerations aside from military dictate otherwise, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff recommend that negotiations with Sweden should be conducted with a view to limiting the petroleum imports to 30,000 tons per quarter.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

W.D. Leahy
WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.



DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
MONTREAL, QUEBEC, CANADA
1974

Swedish oil

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

JCS
JRD

5 June 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Increase in Petroleum Products
Quotas to Sweden.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the military aspects of the letter which the Secretary of State sent to you on 26 May 1943 with reference to the above subject.

From the best information available it appears that in January, 1943, the Swedish reserves of petroleum products amounted to approximately 90,000 tons. Their quarterly consumption is approximately 15,000 tons. Sweden is therefore able to build up her reserves at the rate of 15,000 tons per quarter provided the 30,000-ton quarterly import continues. On this basis Sweden's reserve stocks in October should exceed 120,000 tons.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these amounts are adequate to meet the military needs of Sweden and that any relaxation of the blockade of the Axis Powers in Europe is contrary, from the military point of view, to the best interests of the Allied Nations.

Unless considerations aside from military dictate otherwise, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff recommend that negotiations with Sweden should be conducted with a view to limiting the petroleum imports to 30,000 tons per quarter.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Distribution:
Admiral Leahy ✓

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

Subject: Increase in
quotas for the
increase in
the total chief of staff

~~SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM


WSP

Date 2 June 1943

To: General DEANE

Subject: Increase in Petroleum Products
Quotas to Sweden.

1. Returned.
2. The attached is being circulated
to the Joint Administrative Committee for
necessary action as J.A.D.C. 17/D.



C.B. GARY,
Secretary,
Joint Administrative Com.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

2 June 1943.


[REDACTED]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE:

Subject: Furnishing Oil to Sweden.

Enclosures: Letter from Sec. of State to
Admiral Leahy, dated 26 May
1943 w/encl.

Attached hereto is a letter which Admiral Leahy received from the Secretary of State together with a letter which the Secretary of State has written to the President regarding furnishing of oil to Sweden.

Admiral Leahy desires, as a matter of urgency, that you give him your comments and recommendations in so far as the military aspects of this situation are involved. He particularly wishes to avoid political, economic, or other aspects. Admiral Leahy desires your reply not later than Friday, 4 June 1943.


JOHN R. DEANE,
Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974





DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 26. 1943

My dear Admiral Leahy:

I enclose herewith a letter dated today addressed by me to the President in regard to Sweden.

There now seem to be good prospects for obtaining an agreement from the Swedes looking to action by them to stop German "leave" and war material traffic through Sweden. In that regard the Swedes are, however, desirous of having sufficient petroleum stocks on hand for their armed forces before taking such action which they believe, and I think not without reason, will result in strong German counter action.

In my letter to the President I ask for his authority to deal with this specific problem. In as much as the development of Sweden-Germany relations may be rapid and require quick action on our part I have also asked the President for his general authority to deal with developments as I deem in our overall interest subject to your views on matters pertaining to actual military operations, without having to go back to him for specific directives.

I should appreciate your passing along my letter to the President with your comments thereon.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure:

To the President.

Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy.



MAILED 1000
MAY 24 1943
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENTAL OFFICE



Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

Eu

ENCLOSURE

TO "

Letter drafted **5-24-43**

ADDRESSED TO

Admiral William D. Leahy

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 26. 1943

My dear Mr. President:

On November 20 and November 30, 1942 you authorized me to inform the Swedish Government that this Government had decided upon the policy of granting Sweden a quarterly oil quota of 30,000 tons for the exclusive use of the armed forces of Sweden, on the condition that the Swedish Government would release the two Norwegian ships then in Göteborg and would give assurances that the twenty-one Swedish ships then the subject of negotiations in London will be chartered to the Maritime Commission; that the Swedish Government should in addition be informed that we had in mind other concessions from them in exchange for the continuation of the new oil quota and that you expected they would agree to these concessions to the maximum extent possible under the circumstances, the concessions being those referred to in the resolution of the Board of Economic Warfare adopted November 12, 1942. You also asked that

The President,

The White House.

that the Swedes be informed of your hope that Swedish military and air stocks of oil would be built up as rapidly as possible; and you directed me to proceed with negotiations to obtain the concessions referred to in collaboration with the Board of Economic Warfare and the British Government.

The Swedish Government has already given us a number of the concessions we desire and American representatives are now in London negotiating, together with the British, with Swedish representatives with respect to the remaining concessions which we desire. Present indications are that a satisfactory agreement will be reached in these negotiations.

With respect in particular to the desired concession relating to transit through Sweden of German leave troops and war materials, our negotiators have just reported urgently that the Swedes seem inclined to agree secretly to a formula looking to the stopping of this transit traffic through action of the Swedish Government by a specified date, probably this fall. The Swedes have pointed out, however, that such action on their part would certainly result in the Germans closing the "Göteborg traffic" by which Sweden imports products, including petroleum, from the Western Hemisphere. In the Swedish view the crux of this important matter, as far as timing of Swedish action

is concerned, is possession by Sweden of sufficient oil to enable it to sustain for as long as possible what could amount to a condition of siege by Germany, and possibly even a German attack. The Swedes make the general reservation that, if faced with the real threat of an overwhelming German attack as a result of their action in this matter, they might not under circumstances then prevailing be able to proceed to stopping the traffic on the agreed date, but that in such an event we would be free to review other obligations to them undertaken by us.


I hold strongly to the view that it is to our interest to relax the existing system of rigid quarterly quotas and to permit the Swedes to import petroleum products from the Caribbean area to the limit of their shipping capacity (estimated at not more than 45,000 tons of petroleum a quarter) between now and the date which we would agree with the Swedes that they would stop the German transit traffic. Some question has arisen, however, whether it would be possible, under a literal interpretation of your previous directives to me, to permit the Swedes to do so. I should like, therefore, to have your authority to instruct our negotiators in London that, in return for appropriate Swedish concessions, they may agree to such measures as may be necessary on behalf of this Government to permit the

Swedes

Swedes to import in Swedish tankers as much petroleum as possible prior to the agreed date for Swedish action with respect to the German transit traffic.

On the basis of past experience in handling the problems arising from day to day in regard to this entire matter it would be most useful also to have your general authority, in the interests of flexibility and expedition, to resolve any occasional differences of viewpoints on policy - of which the foregoing is a more or less typical example - among interested agencies of the Government, except for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in matters dealing with military operations, in such manner as I deem, under developing circumstances, in our overall interests.

Faithfully yours,



Major William B. Lewis,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy.

Enclosure

My dear Admiral Leahy:

May 26, 1943

I enclose herewith a letter dated today addressed by me to the President in regard to Sweden (Appendix).

There now seem to be good prospects for obtaining an agreement from the Swedes looking to action by them to stop German "leave" and war material traffic through Sweden. In that regard the Swedes are, however, desirous of having sufficient petroleum stocks on hand for their armed forces before taking such action which they believe, and I think not without reason, will result in strong German counter action.

In my letter to the President I ask for his authority to deal with this specific problem. In as much as the development of Sweden-Germany relations may be rapid and require quick action on our part I have also asked the President for his general authority to deal with developments as I deem in our overall interest subject to your views on matters pertaining to actual military operations, without having to go back to him for specific directives.

I should appreciate your passing along my letter to the President with your comments thereon.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosure:

To the President.

Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy.

Enclosure

...please, and the ...
...the ...
...the ...
...the ...

Handwritten scribble

Appendix

May 26, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

On November 20 and November 30, 1942 you authorized me to inform the Swedish Government that this Government had decided upon the policy of granting Sweden a quarterly oil quota of 30,000 tons for the exclusive use of the armed forces of Sweden, on the condition that the Swedish Government would release the two Norwegian ships then in Göteborg and would give assurances that the twenty-one Swedish ships then the subject of negotiations in London will be chartered to the Maritime Commission; that the Swedish Government should in addition be informed that we had in mind other concessions from them in exchange for the continuation of the new oil quota and that you expected they would agree to these concessions to the maximum extent possible under the circumstances, the concessions being those referred to in the resolution of the Board of Economic Warfare adopted November 12, 1942. You also asked

~~that~~

The President,
The White House.

APPENDIX Appendix

that the Swedes be informed of your hope that Swedish military and air stocks of oil would be built up as rapidly as possible; and you directed me to proceed with negotiations to obtain the concessions referred to in collaboration with the Board of Economic Warfare and the British Government.

The Swedish Government has already given us a number of the concessions we desire and American representatives are now in London negotiating, together with the British, with Swedish representatives with respect to the remaining concessions which we desire. Present indications are that a satisfactory agreement will be reached in these negotiations.

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~~to~~

PSF Hall folder
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 29, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I wish you would read these figures in regard to Swedish shipping carrying iron ore to Germany. In view of this, I wish you would reconsider the sending of fuel oil to Sweden. Don't you think so? Please return enclosure.

F. D. R.

Memo from Admiral to the President, dated June 26, 1943, re "Axis Shipping in Northern European Waters.

(1320)
O
P
Y

Hull folder
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 29, 1943

My dear Mr. Secretary:

There has just come to my attention a BOC Airgram No. 60 of June 15, 1943, from the Combined Committee for French North and West African Civil Affairs, relative to "Property Changes under German Rule - Tunisia".

The conditions described in this airgram are additional evidences of the extremes to which the Axis powers have gone to wreck their vengeance upon innocent inhabitants of occupied territories.

I should appreciate it if you would notify the representatives of the United States Government in North Africa that the conditions described in BOC Airgram 60 come within the accepted and announced policy stated by the United Nations last December not to recognize property transfers made by inhabitants of occupied territories under the duress of the Axis powers.

Our representatives should also be instructed to notify the French authorities in North Africa that this Government looks with disfavor upon any attempt at foreclosure or collection of interest on mortgages incurred as a result of levies made by the Axis powers.

I should appreciate your keeping me informed of such actions as are taken by our representatives and of any changes in the situation that may occur.

Sincerely,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

DECLASSIFIED

U.S. [redacted]
BRITISH [redacted]

By Authority of State Dept. letter 1-12-72 *labe*

and British Govt. telegram 1-13-72

By Jd Date MAR 3 1972

COMBINED COMMITTEE FOR FRENCH NORTH AND WEST AFRICAN CIVIL AFFAIRS

The following communication was received 19 June, 1943.

*Mr. Burt
Mr. Hollenberg
Mr. Cowles
Mr. Cochard
Mr. Simmons
Mr. Trayer
Mr. Mitchell (4)
Mr. O'Boyle (3)
Mr. Wagonstein
Mr. Handley
Mr. Sanderson
Mr. Coy
Mr. Van Breda
Mr. Rayon*

BOC Airgram 60, 15 June, 1943

From: NAEB, Finance and Control Division

To: CCNA and Secretary of Treasury

Subject: Property Changes under German Rule - Tunisia

1. Tunis, as the first sizeable city recaptured from Nazi occupation, offers a realistic indication of the problems which will arise in the return of property and the indemnification of discriminated groups who have suffered at Nazi hands. Our preliminary study of this matter, presented herewith, is based primarily on the treatment accorded to Jewish people in Tunis and was gleaned from conferences with the heads of Jewish groups and other persons in Tunis. Exact figures are not available at present.

2. There are about 90,000 Jews in Tunisia as a whole. About 80,000 are descendants of people who have been in the country 2,000 years. They are not subjects of the French, but of the Bey. There are about 5,000 - 6,000 Italian Jews, sent to Tunisia as colonists about 150 - 200 years ago, who have remained subjects of Italy. Lastly, there are about 5,000 Jews who are French subjects.

3. Shortly after the arrival of the Germans in Tunisia on about 8 November, 1942, the Nazis commenced to requisition buildings of the Jews for use as offices and dwelling houses. A typical case is the following: A middle class Jewish family in Tunis was notified one evening in early December that they would have to evacuate their apartment the next morning, since it was to be taken over by Italian officers as a residence. The family, more fortunate than many, packed up most of its belongings during the night and moved out the next morning. After 8 May with the departure of the Italians, the family returned. In many cases in which houses were requisitioned for use by the Germans or Italians, damage was done to fixtures and furniture. Rugs, hangings, furniture, etc. were taken. The Nazis also requisitioned the vehicles owned by Jewish people and obliged them to turn in their radios, refrigerators, firearms, etc. Many of these requisitioned vehicles were damaged and some were sent to Europe. Most of the radios, refrigerators, etc. were sent to Europe. The total cost of this phase of Nazi oppression was estimated at about 30,000,000 francs. While some of the requisitioned vehicles have been found and returned, there is, as yet, no program developed for compensation for losses incurred as the result of this type of activity.

"THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, U.S.C. 50: 31 and 32. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW."

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State Dept. letter 1-17-72

and British Hist. Files 1-13-72

By WJ Date MAR 3 1972

U.S. ~~SECRET~~
~~BRITISH~~

4. On 6 December, 1942, the Council of the Jewish community in Tunis received an order from the German authorities to produce 2,000 workers, under an arrangement whereby food, clothing, wages, etc. were to be paid for by the Jews. At the cost of an additional 1,000 laborers a 24-hour extension was obtained. On 9 December, 1942, the request not having been complied with, a reign of terror commenced, in which synagogues and schools were broken into, Jews beaten and threatened, and obliged to march long distances. At this point the Jewish Community organized itself and set up services for drafting laborers, feeding, clothing and paying them, as well as supplying them with transportation and medical aid. About 4,000 workers were obtained, and put at work at the airport and harbor in Tunis, at Bizerta, Matour, Enfidaville, and Cheylus, all points of nearly constant Allied air attacks. The Jews also had to act as policemen, to insure that the workers remained at their jobs despite heavy bombings and maltreatment.

5. The Jewish Community was obliged also to shoulder the financial burden of caring for Jewish refugees who came to Tunis from Bizerta and similarly destroyed cities as well as those who lost their homes by other means.

6. The funds to meet the expenses referred to above including the costs of feeding and care for the labor gangs were obtained by the Jewish Community by imposing a capital levy of 10-15% upon the property of its members. Mortgages, sales, etc. were resorted to to raise these funds, which were estimated at 60,000,000 francs. At the present time, these mortgages are still outstanding, and in the hands of banks principally.

7. On 22 December 1942, the Germans imposed a levy of 20,000,000 francs on the Jewish Community to "pay" for the Anglo-American bombings of non-Jewish property, for which the Jews were said to be responsible because they were friends of the Allies. The head of the Jewish Community endeavored, without success, to raise these funds at the private banks in Tunis, and was obliged to appeal to the Government for aid. The latter authorized the Caisse Fonciere, a semi-public institution, to advance these funds in the form of a loan at 8% interest, with commissions and carrying charges running it up to about 12%. The loan was secured by mortgages on Jewish estates, those in the country being insisted upon because there was less danger from bombing. The Caisse Fonciere received the funds from the Bank of Algeria, Tunis Branch, and we have been advised that payment was made in Bank of France notes. It was said that these Bank of France notes were subsequently distributed among the Arab and Italian followers of the Nazis. The former head of the Jewish Community has recently approached the Government in Tunisia with a view toward adjusting or deferring the payment of this loan which the Jews are not in a position to meet at present. The Caisse Fonciere threatened

U.S. ~~SECRET~~
BRITISH ~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of *State Dept. letter 1-12-72*
and British Govt. telegram 1-13-72

By *JL* Date MAR 3 1972

foreclosure and a six months interest payment of 1,800,000 francs is due. At first the Government was said to have advised the head of the Jewish Community to repay the loan, with interest, and to place a claim against the Germans after the war. The latest indications were that the French authorities had not yet reached a definite decision of the question but were thinking in terms of a moratorium.

8. On 15 February, 1943, the Germans, because many of the forced Jewish laborers were leaving the work camps, imposed a fine of 3,000,000 francs on the Community. This fine was paid without resort to the banks, by the sale of jewels, etc. belonging to individual members of the Community.

9. On the basis of present estimates, the measures taken by the Germans and Italians against the Jews in the Tunis area, from 8 November, 1942 to 8 May, 1943 cost the latter about 100,000,000 francs. No indemnification or relief measures have yet been taken by the French, and, insofar as the bulk of the problem is concerned, none appears to be contemplated.

10. From the fact that this memorandum is confined largely to the Jews, it should not be inferred that this class stood alone in regard to discrimination. The case of the Jews is probably the most glaring, because the great majority of them could not be considered enemies of the Nazis or Italians in the technical sense. Furthermore, there appears to have been more physical hardships, and the imposition of fines seems to be an additional measure of oppression. However, vehicles, houses, factories, etc. were requisitioned from the French in Tunis. Machinery was taken away, and forced labor was at least threatened, if not in fact realized. We are canvassing this side of the picture more fully at the present.

11. Likewise, a counterpart of this story which we will canvass if the matter of increments to Italians and Arabs as the result of this discrimination. Rumors as to these matters have reached us, but it is, of course, more difficult to develop this side of the problem.

12. We are also studying the question of real property transfers made during the occupations and endeavoring to obtain as much information as possible on this score.

13. We should appreciate your views on the problems. In this connection, reference might be made to the United Nations Declaration on property transfers.

ACTION: Treasury, State
DISTRIBUTION "A"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 26, 1943

Grace -

Will you please see that
the President gets this?

Lube

7899-10-10073
AVGSHUACADON
THE WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 26, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: MR. LUBIN

The attached cable from Algiers describes one of the most damnable situations I have ever heard of. It is worthy of very careful reading.

Would it be possible to have the State Department bring pressure upon the French Committee immediately in order to relieve what appears to be an unbearable situation?

The State Department might notify the French Committee that the United Nations refuse to recognize as valid any sale or mortgage incurred by the Jewish residents of North Africa to meet levies made by the Germans and Italians.

The State Department should also be asked to notify the French that we do not countenance the pressure now being exercised by the French banks upon those Jews who were forced to mortgage their properties at high interest rates in order to meet levies imposed by the Axis. It is certainly beyond reason to believe that these banks would be permitted to foreclose on loans made under the conditions described in the attached cable.

I am attaching herewith a draft of a letter that might be sent to the Secretary of State in the event that you can see your way clear to taking some action in this matter.

Have a copy made
of this for file & then
send out - GBT

file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON


August 6. 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I appreciate the expression of approval in your letter of July 30, 1943 with reference to the cables sent by the Department to the Consulate at Algiers and by the GCNA to the NAEB, regarding steps that may be taken to relieve the hardships caused by acts of dispossession by the enemy in Tunisia.

Regarding your request for information as to what has been done under cable COB 769, I attach for your information a copy of the paraphrase of BOC 927, a cable from the Field Headquarters of the North African Economic Board, received on July 26. This is the only information thus far received, and I shall see to it that you are promptly informed of any further reports.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:

Paraphrase copy of
BOC 927, July 24, 1943.

The President,

The White House.

"THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, U.S.C. 50; 51 AND 52. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW."

U. S. [REDACTED]
BRITISH [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of *State Dept letter 1-12-72*

and British Govt telegram 1-13-72

By *JS* Date MAR 3 1972

COMBINED COMMITTEE FOR FRENCH NORTH AND WEST AFRICAN CIVIL AFFAIRS

The following communication was received 26 July 1943.

P A R A P H R A S E

BOC 927, W-5615/3901, 24 July 1943 (Treasury A-55)

From: FRAED
To: CCNA
Subject: United Nations Declaration - Property Losses in Tunisia
Ref: OCB 763; State 1275

Given below is the French position on Tunisian property losses and on application of United Nations declaration.

1. We have been advised by the French authorities that the necessity for approval of United Nations declaration by the Comité Français De La Liberation Nationale still exists. However, they feel it will be done rapidly.
2. Arrangements for provisional moratorium on mortgage loans to Jewish communities in Tunisia will be made by French authorities, after such approval and as first application of declaration. This will be done until a program for the disposition of these claims is worked out.
3. At present a plan for administering and financing a war damage compensation program is being studied by the French authorities. Cases arising under the United Nations declaration will be included in this. This is felt by the French to be a matter of extreme delicacy and one which must be considered carefully.
4. The significance of this program for economic warfare purposes is acknowledged by the French authorities.

ACTION: Treasury
DISTRIBUTION: "A"

7-26-521

(1386)

PSF: Hull folder
2-43

July 3, 1943.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Replying to your letter of 16 June 1943 in regard to the construction of a port in Liberia, I have consulted the Secretary of the Navy on this question. He recommends that construction of the port be proceeded with as practicable, and that as an initial step a survey be made, under direction of the Navy Department, to determine its location.

The Secretary of the Navy desires that provision be made in the port for establishment of an outlying base for submarines. *and patrol* It is suggested that you communicate directly with him in regard to further procedure with the project.

The interest of the Navy Department is associated with the security of South America, particularly Brazil, but the value of a port in Liberia is largely dependent upon continued use by the United States of Ascension Island and Dakar and the air fields at those places. Please be guided by the above considerations in future conversations by the Department of State with interested countries.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Secretary of State

(Orig. comes filed - Nov. folder 2-43)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(sc) L 11-7/EF 39

3 July 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I have referred your confidential memorandum dated 23 June 1943 to the General Board for a reconsideration of the subject of a port in Liberia. The General Board has reconsidered this matter and has recommended that a survey be made, under direction of the Navy Department, to determine the best site, that plans for a port be prepared, and that the work be proceeded with as practicable.

I enclose herewith a copy of the General Board's memorandum on this subject, and a suggested letter to the Secretary of State.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ James Forrestal,
Acting.

The President,
The White House.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO 1146 6200.9 (9/27/89)

Date- 7-6-70

Signature- J. D. [unclear]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(SC)L11-7/EF39
Serial 021800A

June 21, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

I am returning herewith the letter, dated June 16, 1943, from the Secretary of State, together with a suggested reply thereto, and a copy of a memorandum from the General Board.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Roosevelt

The President,
The White House.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 7-6-70

Signature- *Frank Roosevelt*

June 21, 1943.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Replying to your letter of June 16, 1943, in regard to the construction of a port in Liberia, I have consulted the Secretary of the Navy on this question and he has advised that the site for such a port and the construction thereof should be determined primarily with regard to commercial considerations. The interests of the Navy in this connection are general in nature and not such as to require special consideration as regards the particular site selected.

The Secretary of the Navy agrees as to the practicability and the advisability of furnishing naval engineers to be associated with the survey as to the best location for such a port and in its subsequent development. A primary interest of the Navy is that vessels of the Navy and military aircraft should have free access to the port and to Liberian territory for military purposes as occasion may arise.

I suggest that any further communication with respect to the detail of engineers for the purpose of making a survey be taken up directly with the Secretary of the Navy.

Very sincerely yours,

The Secretary of State.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM 1-1-43
(SC) 171-1-43

(C O P Y)

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DAR 5200.9 (8/27/88)

ATD

Date- 7-6-76

G.B.No. 439
(Serial No. 244)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21 June 1943

Signature-

J. D. [unclear]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

SUBJECT: Development of a Port in Liberia.

Reference: (a) SecNav Confidential Memo (SC)L11-7/EF39 Serial 021400A
of 19 June 1943.

1. The General Board has held a meeting and discussed this project and has also examined the files of various offices of the Navy Department which have hitherto considered the matter.
2. So far as the present war is concerned, there appears to be no important need of a port in Liberia for naval purposes. There are enough other ports on the African Coast to which the Navy has free access.
3. Under normal peacetime conditions the Navy's interest in a port in Liberia would be of a general nature, i.e., first, in having free access to a port on the African Coast, without ordinary special diplomatic requirements, and second, in the improvement of any facilities for the export of important strategic raw materials produced in Liberia.
4. Of all possible sites for a port in Liberia there is none which offers outstanding advantages, so far as location is concerned, for purely naval purposes.
5. In the opinion of the Board, therefore, it appears that the development of a Liberian port should be undertaken with primary regard for commercial interests, - i.e., the location of Liberia's principal raw resources, transportation facilities within the country, and the costs involved in the construction of a suitable port. The Board does not foresee the need for construction of any special naval facilities in connection with the proposed development.
6. The Bureau of Yards and Docks is prepared to assign naval engineers to assist in the selection and development of this project and the Board is of the opinion that it would be wise from the naval point of view to have naval engineers associated with it.
7. The Board transmits herewith a proposed letter to the Secretary of State for the President's signature involving the foregoing considerations.

(Signed) A. J. HEPBURN

Chairman General Board

RECEIVED
JUN 16 1943
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 16, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

In view of your recently expressed interest in the construction of a port in Liberia, particularly for naval purposes, and the apparent absence of adequate data upon which to base a decision as to where the port should be located, engineering and other technical factors considered, we are of the opinion that it would be advisable to have an official survey made as the first step in determining the site which would best serve our naval purposes and the economic needs of Liberia. Naval considerations would seem to require that the survey should be conducted by the Navy Department, and under these circumstances we would like to recommend that the Navy Department, which has already expressed an interest in seeing a port constructed in Liberia, be directed to conduct the survey.

While

The President,
The White House.

While the above suggestion might eventually involve the sending of two or three naval engineers to Liberia for a study on the spot, it is not anticipated that the undertaking would represent any serious burden on the Navy Department. A certain amount of material is already available both in the Navy Department and in this Department which might assist the Navy in reaching a decision. In any case, this Department does not feel qualified to select the site and would find it difficult to proceed with discussions with the agencies of the Government which might finance the project until this point, as well as the cost factor, is satisfactorily settled.

The Office of Lend-Lease Administration included a provisional estimate in its budget for the fiscal year 1944 of \$6,000,000 for allocation to Liberia for the possible construction of a port and for other purposes, and a lump sum appropriation embracing this amount along with funds for certain other uses has been approved by the Congress. The amount estimated for a port and access roads is \$5,000,000 and was based on data obtained by this Department from both official and private sources, but this information is inconclusive, and the actual cost might be expected to vary upward or downward, depending
upon

upon the location and the size of the port works, as determined upon.

If the amount needed should not be considerably in excess of the figure indicated, it is anticipated that port revenues would cover amortization within a reasonable period of time, provided the economic development program envisaged by the Department should also be carried forward. This program would involve a loan by the Export-Import Bank to private American interests of from two to three million dollars, to be repaid, of course, during a specified time. It is our opinion that both projects should go forward simultaneously if the objectives which the Department has in mind are to be successfully achieved. Thus managed, and unless unforeseen factors arise, there should be no ultimate cost to this Government, as both projects should pay for themselves, and meanwhile many advantages, commercial, strategic, and political, would accrue to this country as well as to Liberia. Up to the present, Liberia has remained a backward country, not because of the lack of natural resources but because of the lack of a port and American capital, other foreign capital having been largely excluded by the policies of this and the Liberian Governments.

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concerning you.
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May we receive an indication whether you wish action
to be taken along the above lines? President Barclay is
planning to return to Liberia about June 18 and has
expressed a desire to be informed of the attitude of
this Government toward the port project before he leaves
this country.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

CORDELL HULL

THE GOVERNMENT
WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE
MATTER OF THE
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WAS RECORDED IN THE
NAVY DEPARTMENT

-4-

476

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 18, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. CORDELL HULL

I have referred your letter
in regard to a port in Liberia to
the Navy Department. I agree with
you that they should make a survey.
You can tell this to the President
of Liberia.

#

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this
memorandum to the Secretary of State.

1602

Admiral Leahy
said this is OK.

Hull folder 2 - v3
Original returned to State
8/11/43 *right*

August 10, 1943

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is submitted herewith a draft of a telegram which it is proposed to send to London in connection with the secret negotiations now in progress between the British Government and the Prime Minister of Portugal. The conditions set forth in London's telegram no. 4285 of June 29, 1943 are as follows:

- (1) That at the close of hostilities British troops would be withdrawn from Bracken, and
- (2) That Portuguese sovereignty will be maintained over all Portuguese colonies.

In lieu of the assurances concerning "the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty over all Portuguese colonies", it will be observed that in the attached draft telegram a phraseology has been substituted to indicate the undertaking of this Government to respect Portuguese sovereignty over all Portuguese colonies.

There is attached a copy of a communication addressed to

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAR 3 1972

to the Department by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 9, 1943, upon which the second paragraph of the draft telegram is based.

C.H

Enclosures:

1. Draft telegram. .
2. From Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 9, 1943.

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F. D. R.

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Original Released to State
8/11/43
WGH

August 10, 1943

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON.

U. S. URGENT.

~~SECRET~~ FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

Your 5051, August 4, 4 p.m. and 4285, June 29, 10 p.m.

With regard to the British assurances, this Government is ready to communicate to the Portuguese Government (1) its concurrence in the undertaking to withdraw troops upon the termination of hostilities and (2) its agreement to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonies.

With regard to the other conditions laid down by Dr. Salazar, our Chiefs of Staff, with the President's approval, have indicated to the British Chiefs of Staff that while appreciative of the delicacy of conversations now in progress between the British and the Portuguese, nevertheless any agreement restricting facilities in Bracken to British aircraft is unacceptable to this country and would not be in harmony with the Trident Agreement. They have further indicated the vital importance that Bracken facilities be accorded air ferry, transport and military operations for

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date MAR 3 1972

Volume 10, 1

Apr 18/1919
L. J. ...

this country. Obviously this would necessitate adequate protective and ground maintenance personnel.

Hull.

F. D. R.

1666
- 248H

COPY

*Original, initialed and indicated
returned to Sec of State 8/31/43 PSF
248H*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Hull folder
2-43*

THE SECRETARY

August 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The War Department and General Barker, Deputy Chief of Staff of COSSAC in London, have requested the temporary assignment for a few months of Mr. William Phillips to assist with respect to political and civilian aspects of the planning now being undertaken for Allied military operations against the continent.

As you know, the British Government has already appointed Charles Peake, who has been the Foreign Office official dealing with the French Committee situation, to assist from the British viewpoint.

While it would not seem advisable to have Mr. Phillips give up his present assignment to New Delhi at this time, I see no reason why, if it meets with your approval, he should not be given leave of absence from his New Delhi appointment and asked to proceed to London for a few months work in connection with this operational planning.

CH

OK

/s/ F.D.R.

PSF *Hull folder 2-43*
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
August 30, 1943
file
Planned

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As a sample of what I told you today, I am sending you excerpts from one of Drew Pearson's broadcasts.

C H

EXCERPTS FROM DREW PEARSON'S BROADCAST SUNDAY,
AUGUST 29, 1943.

STATE DEPARTMENT

Allied relations with Russia, already at the brink of the precipice, have been made worse as a result of Sumner Welles' forced resignation. This leaves the State Department with no important executive friendly to Russia. Mr. Hull and his chief assistants, Adolf Berle, Jimmie Dunn, Breckinridge Long, would really like to see Russia bled white and the Russians know it. That is why Stalin is so suspicious. He blames the anti-Russian clique with the fact that he was not consulted when the Allies drew up the surrender terms for Italy. He also blames this anti-Russian clique for keeping his ambassador to the exiled governments cooling his heels for two solid months in London and not permitting him even to speak to the French exiled government in North Africa. This is why the Russians are going ahead with their own peace plans for Europe, thumbing their nose at us and setting up their own governments in Italy and Germany.

WHITE HOUSE

President Roosevelt when he returns to Washington from Quebec will go into the vitally important Russian situation immediately. He plans to ask Sumner Welles to

go to Russia to lay the ground work for a long desired conference of the Big Three -- Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. London reports that Stalin has finally agreed to that conference. The thing that brought him around probably was a definite guarantee at Quebec of the second front in Western Europe. But before the conference takes place, Roosevelt wants the man he trusts most on foreign affairs to lay the ground work very carefully and work out all the details of what they are going to talk about. Foreign Minister Eden is ready to fly there immediately. This may be the most important conference for post-war peace in all history.

PSF *Hand folder
file
personal*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

You might send word to
Murphy to tell Catroux and
others that it is silly and
unfair of them to make false
interpretations.

F. D. R.

(1672)

Ames

Original of this letter, together with original of telegram, a copy of which is attached returned to the Secy State

9/2/43
hmo

PSF
Hull folder 2-43

C.H.
O.K.
F.D.R.

September 1 1943

My dear Mr. President:

We have had before us an indication of the desire of His Royal Highness, Prince Abdul Ilah, the Regent of Iraq, to visit the United States. Other things being equal, I feel sure that his visit would be welcome. Iraq has declared war against the Axis Powers, is a member of the United Nations, and important American economic and cultural interests exist in Iraq. Relations between the two countries are very friendly.

However, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying draft telegram to the American Minister Resident at Baghdad, I believe that a visit of the Iraqi Regent would be inadvisable at this time. As you know, the Zionists have already reacted against the forthcoming visit of two Saudi Arabian princes, and I feel sure that if their visit were closely followed by the ^{arrival of the} head of another Arab royal family, a strong outcry would occur. Moreover, King Ibn Saud would doubtless be displeased if the visit

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The President,
The White House.

of two of his sons were almost immediately followed by a visit from the head of the Hashemite House in Iraq, which Ibn Saud regards with great suspicion.

The argument that it would be unwise to subject the Regent to the dangers of a transatlantic crossing in wartime is also valid. It is true that the Regent is going to travel by air to visit England. However, the journey across the Atlantic presents special hazards, particularly since the circuitous winter route would have to be followed. Since the decease of King Feisal and the tragic death of the young King Ghazi, the Royal Family of Iraq, which is the chief stabilizing influence in that young and inexperienced country, has been seriously weakened. Should anything happen to the Regent, serious results could be expected.

I should be glad to know whether you approve the dispatch of the attached telegram.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hall

Enclosure:

**Draft of telegram to
Baghdad.**

August 31, 1943

AMERICAN LEGATION

BAGHDAD

Your A-11, February 17; A-14, February 14; and
378, August 30, 5 p.m.

We have given much thought to the advisability of a visit by the Regent to the United States at this juncture. For your strictly confidential information we have come to the conclusion that his visit to this country in the near future would be inadvisable because: (1) two Saudi Arabian princes are expected to come here for a visit early in October, and certain susceptibilities would be aroused by a close-following visit by this additional Arab royalty; (2) a transatlantic air journey has its dangers and from the point of view of the war effort and the internal situation in Iraq it would be most unfortunate should anything happen to the Regent.

Accordingly, you should inform the Prime Minister that in any but the most unusual circumstances the President would be delighted to receive a visit from the Regent. After most careful consideration, however, it is felt that it would be

-2-

unwise to risk a transatlantic crossing in time of war by the Regent. This consideration has particular force since the long, circuitous winter route from England involving a considerable number of landings would have to be followed for some months to come. The President is, of course, thoroughly aware of the high and heavy responsibilities of the head of the Ruling House of Iraq. Should the Regent still have a desire to visit this country when conditions become more settled, the President would be very glad indeed to know of it.

NE:GPH:BLS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

file

September 4, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach translation of a letter dated August fifth from the Argentine Foreign Minister and a copy of my reply of August thirtieth. It is proposed to release this exchange of letters to the press on September eighth or ninth upon the delivery of my reply to the Argentine Foreign Minister by our Chargé in Buenos Aires.

CA

PSF Hull folder 2-45

TRANSLATION

Buenos Aires, August 5, 1943

Mr. Secretary of State:

Coinciding with Ambassador Armour's trip to the United States, I have thought it desirable to place myself in direct contact with you, in order to set forth confidentially to your friendly Government the situation of the new Argentine Government established as the result of the military movement of June 4, particularly with reference to the international position of this country. I do so with the full approval of the President of the Nation and in the hope that, by this means, his views may also be made known to President Roosevelt.

The military movement which has just overthrown the Government of Señor Castillo assumed power as an inevitable consequence of the atmosphere of corruption that unfortunately had penetrated the political and administrative life of the country. The unanimous approval with which the renovating work of the new Government is being followed, is the best justification of the movement. The Government has complete control of the situation, supported

by

To the Secretary of State
Mr. Cordell Hull,
WASHINGTON.

by all sound opinion in the country and fully upheld by the armed forces. But there is one factor which carries decisive weight in the work that it is doing: I refer to the international situation and to the problems of foreign policy with which the Republic is confronted.

Due to lack of adequate information, or to other causes the origin of which I do not know, there has been created with respect to the situation of neutrality of the Argentine Republic an atmosphere which is prejudicial to good relations with the countries of America and especially with that great friendly nation (the United States). Thus the rumor has spread that General Ramírez, the armed forces and the men who form this new Government profess a markedly totalitarian ideology or, at the least, that we look upon the Axis powers with great sympathy. I can affirm, and I beg that you, Mr. Secretary, accept this affirmation as the word of a man of honor, that such assumptions are absolutely false. The Argentine nation, its armed forces and the men in its Government, base their acts on the firmest democratic convictions. We are men of America: Our historic tradition is very clear and it will not be modified now or in the future by the adoption of dictatorial systems of government that are repugnant to our consciences as free men, as men who, today as in the past, feel indissolubly linked with the other inhabitants of this continent, of profoundly democratic origins.

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The situation of neutrality that the Argentine Republic has had to observe up to now, has not been understood. Moreover, it has given rise to suspicious comments. In judging that neutrality it has been forgotten, against all the evidence, that Argentine ships are operating exclusively in the service of the allied nations and particularly of the American countries, extending, by the decision of this new Government, to the very zone of operations proclaimed by Germany. There have also been forgotten the Argentine decrees granting the status of "non belligerency" exclusively to one of the belligerent parties. There have likewise been disregarded the protests made by Germany, Italy and Japan after the secrecy of their official communications with their Embassies here was prohibited, while the other countries continue to have the free use of their cables.

It is difficult to ignore the collaboration that the Argentine Republic is giving to the cause of the allied nations, under the conditions of a neutrality which, more than tolerant, is of an evidently benevolent character. This current of collaboration is even more effective in the field of our exports, placed at the almost exclusive service of the Allied cause and of the American countries, in so doing many times depriving our country of articles necessary for its own defense.

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The effort that Argentina is making should be understood. It is not fair to forget that this new Government has sprung from a revolutionary movement which was planned and carried out in order to overthrow a Government that did not understand the reality of internal and foreign policy. But the change, particularly with reference to foreign policy, could not be effected in a violent manner because our country was not ready for it. In this connection, it should not be forgotten that the Argentine Republic has been living and is still living in an atmosphere of peace, work and comparative abundance, - that our people are influenced by the ties of kinship of numerous foreign colonies, - that there exists fear of the communist danger, the propagation of which in our country has corrupted even the most genuinely democratic institutions such as Acción Argentina and the Junta de la Victoria. It should be recalled that, on the other hand, the Government that was overthrown maintained its neutrality even during the most critical period of our relations with the Axis countries, as undoubtedly was the case with the repeated torpedoing of Argentine ships and the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor.

This situation, Mr. Secretary, cannot be abruptly changed by a revolutionary Government that must reconstruct the country, which is corrupted in its administration and
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in its educational and social institutions. The changes can be brought about only as rapidly as the internal situation may permit. The spirit in which they have been begun in the international position of the country is clear and evident, and deserves to be noted in a friendly way and without bias by your Government.

Argentine sentiment, eminently American, firmly opposed to totalitarian régimes, is on the side of the United Nations in its material and spiritual action. But you, Mr. Secretary, citizen of a country that venerates freedom of conscience, will acknowledge that it is not possible, without preliminary preparation, to force the Argentine conscience with a view to leading it coldly and without any immediate motive to the breaking of relations with the Axis. The war having reached its present stage, when defeat is inexorably drawing closer to the countries of the Axis, this unexpected rupture would furthermore put Argentine chivalry to a hard test. Let it suffice to recall the judgment which Italy merited when, in a similar situation, it took its position against defeated France.

I cannot fail to point out to you, Mr. Secretary, the concern with which I view future possibilities if, because of the persistence in the present lack of comprehension, Argentina should continue to be denied the

materials

materials that it needs in order to increase its production and to arm itself in order to fulfill, should the case arise, its obligations for continental defense. It is of particular interest to recall that some time ago the Argentine Republic offered to increase shipments of fuels and heavy oils to American countries, for which purpose it sought from the United States the shipment of the machinery essential in order to increase its productive capacity. Unfortunately, thus far, this request has not been heeded, no recognition being made of the sacrifice at which our country is extending its assistance to friendly countries in order to supply them so far as possible with the much coveted fuel. Petroleum production has decreased because of the deterioration of the equipment, and our reserves have diminished considerably. Today, in order to compensate for this shortage, we find it necessary to burn in the boilers of factories and plants millions of quintals of corn, wheat and linseed. With the aid of the United States, Argentina could burn its own petroleum, keeping that wealth of grain to supply the allied nations and to form a reserve stock that would make it possible to feed the European peoples threatened with hunger.

The Government of General Ramirez will spare no effort to fulfill the obligations contracted. But, as I have
already

already said, it will not be able to do so without a cause to justify it. To act otherwise would afford grounds to believe action is being taken under the pressure or threat of foreign agents, and this would not be tolerated by either the people or the armed forces of the country.

I believe that in this long letter I have explained to you, Mr. Secretary, the real situation of the Argentine Republic with respect to its sentiments of deep friendship and solidarity with the American countries. I do not doubt that in contemplating the situation from the high position that the Government of President Roosevelt occupies in the world, it will be appreciated that it is not just to maintain the attitude of suspicion assumed towards a country such as ours, which has shown unmistakably its feelings of friendship and frank support for the countries that are fighting for freedom. I cannot believe that it is desired to eliminate the action of Argentina within the concert of American nations, on the basis that our neutrality - which is only theoretical - places us in an equivocal position with respect to the rest of the countries of this continent.

I can affirm to you, Mr. Secretary, that the Axis countries have nothing to hope for from our Government and that public opinion is daily more unfavorable to them. But this evolution would be more rapid and effective for

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the American cause if President Roosevelt should make a gesture of genuine friendship toward our people; such a gesture might be the urgent provision of airplanes, spare parts, armaments and machinery to restore Argentina to the position of equilibrium to which it is entitled with respect to other South American countries.

This general and sincere picture of the Argentine situation will explain to you, Mr. Secretary of State, the obstacles - up to now insurmountable - encountered by this Government in fulfilling the last part of its original objectives. On the basis of the loyal understanding that we reciprocally owe to each other, I wish to rely on the spirit of good will with which we shall be heard, which would be a concrete proof of the friendship that this Government is seeking in its present difficult initial period. Moreover, Ambassador Armour, who has penetrated with intelligent and friendly understanding into all the aspects of our complicated internal situation, and who was the confidential recipient of these thoughts, personally expressed by His Excellency the President of the Nation, will be able to convey to you, Mr. Secretary, a more complete personal impression, obtained directly from the present reality of the life of our country.

I am very happy on this occasion to renew to you, Mr. Secretary, the assurance of my cordial and friendly consideration.

(Signed) SEGUNDO R. STORNI

August 30, 1943

My dear Mr. Minister:

I have received your letter of August 5, in which you were good enough to inform me regarding the situation of the new Argentine Government established as the result of the military movement of June 4, particularly with reference to the international position of Argentina. I note that your letter has the full approval of the President of Argentina and I have been pleased to make the views expressed therein known to President Roosevelt.

It is profoundly satisfactory to note your statement that the people of your country feel themselves indissolubly linked with the other inhabitants of this continent of profoundly democratic origins. This statement will be most welcome to the citizens of the United States actively engaged at the cost of tremendous sacrifices in lives and materials in a war for the survival of the principles so eloquently described by you. I feel sure that in the same spirit it will be warmly greeted by the peoples of all of the other republics of the Hemisphere which have taken measures essential to the defense of our continent against a menace now happily being overcome by the joint efforts of the friends of freedom everywhere.

However, it is with regret that my Government and the people of the United States have been forced to the conclusion that the undoubted sentiments of the Argentine people have not been implemented by action called for by the commitments freely entered into by their Government

in common

His Excellency
Vice Admiral Segundo Storni,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina,
Buenos Aires.

in common with the governments of the other twenty American republics.

Your Excellency is, of course, fully familiar with those commitments. As they particularly affect the present world conflict, they are based upon Resolution XV adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at Habana in July of 1940. That Resolution provides that any attempt on the part of a non-American state against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American state shall be considered as an act of aggression against the states which signed this declaration. The act of aggression contemplated in this Declaration took place on December 7, 1941. In January of 1942 the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics met at Rio de Janeiro to consider the measures which they should adopt for common defense. A Resolution recommending the break of diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany and Italy was adopted. The wording of that Resolution was the subject of prolonged discussion and the text finally agreed upon was fully responsive to the views expressed by the Argentine Government. I believe it desirable to quote the Resolution in full:

"BREAKING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

"I The American Republics reaffirm their declaration to consider any act of aggression on the part of a non-American State against one of them as an act of aggression against all of them, constituting as it does an immediate threat to the liberty and independence of America.

"II The American Republics reaffirm their complete solidarity and their determination to cooperate jointly for their mutual protection until the effects of the present aggression against the Continent have disappeared.

"III The American Republics, in accordance with the procedures established by their own laws and in conformity with the position and circumstances obtaining in each country in the existing continental conflict, recommend the

breaking

of Republics of the Americas in
response to the attack on
those countries by the Axis
powers. The American Republics
are united in their common
purpose of maintaining
the peace and stability of
the Western Hemisphere.

breaking of their diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany and Italy, since the first-mentioned State attacked and the other two declared war on an American country.

"IV Finally, the American Republics declare that, prior to the reestablishment of the relations referred to in the preceding paragraph, they will consult among themselves in order that their action may have a solidary character."

With the exception of Argentina, all of the American Republics have severed diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany and Italy and of these twenty republics thirteen are at war with the Axis powers.

Resolution V, adopted by the Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Rio de Janeiro, stipulated by unanimous agreement the immediate adoption of any additional measures necessary to cut off for the duration of the present Hemispheric emergency all commercial and financial intercourse, direct or indirect, between the Western Hemisphere and the nations signatory to the Tri-Partite Pact and the territories dominated by them. The Argentine representative at the Meeting adhered to this Resolution with the following reservation:

"The Argentine Delegation requests that it be recorded in the minutes, as well as at the end of this draft resolution, that the Argentine Republic agrees with the necessity of adopting economic and financial control measures with regard to all foreign and domestic activities of firms or enterprises which may, in one way or another, affect the welfare of the republics of America or the solidarity or defense of the Continent. It has adopted and is prepared to adopt further measures in this respect, in accordance with the present resolution, extending them, however, to firms or enterprises managed or controlled by aliens or from foreign belligerent countries not in the American Continent."

The Argentine

The Argentine Government has failed to effect the severance of financial and commercial relations called for by Resolution V. Moreover, financial transactions of direct benefit to the enemies of the United Nations have been authorized by agencies of the Argentine Government.

Resolution XVII adopted at Rio provided for a concerted effort to discover and combat subversive activities. It is notorious that Axis agents in Argentina have been and are engaging in systematic espionage which has cost the United Nations ships and lives. Vicious propaganda aimed at the United Nations appears in publications which are supported by subsidies from Axis sources. These publications have benefited by a Government decree which enables them to receive supplies of newsprint at favorable prices through the intervention of the Argentine Ministry of Agriculture.

Resolution XL adopted at the Rio de Janeiro Meeting recommended that each American republic adopt the necessary and immediate measures to close all radiotelephone and radiotelegraph communications between the American Republics and the aggressor States and all territories subservient to them, except in so far as official communications of the American Governments are concerned. Argentina is the only one of the twenty-one American Republics now permitting radiotelephone and radiotelegraph communications with Japan, Germany and Italy.

The above summary of certain of the inter-American commitments freely entered into by Argentina, together with the twenty other American republics, furnishes a convincing expression of the reason why the situation of neutrality which Your Excellency states the Argentine Republic has had to observe up to now has not been understood.

It is, of course, a matter solely within the competence of the Argentine Government to judge the degree to which Argentine public opinion which you state is firmly opposed to totalitarian regimes will support a foreign policy designed at the very least to reduce the assistance which Argentina's present position has rendered and is continuing to render those regimes. Nor can I pass upon the question of the nature of the motive which you believe would be necessary to enable the Argentine Government to fulfill the obligations it has contracted. I must, however, express my astonishment at your statement that for the Argentine Government to fulfill those obligations would afford grounds

to believe

With regard to the petroleum negotiations, it may be pointed out that Argentina, thanks to its natural resources, the production of which has increased during the war period, and to its ability to import, has enjoyed during the past year and a half far greater oil supplies for the consumption of its civilian population than have the neighboring republics. Those republics have received extremely limited supplies made possible through cooperative action in which the Government of the United States and of the producing republics other than Argentina have participated. Considerable hardship and sacrifice has resulted owing to the serious shortage of ocean-going tankers. Thus, while the Argentine people were enjoying gasoline supplies equivalent to about seventy per cent of their normal civilian requirements, the peoples of Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile and, in general, other republics were receiving only approximately forty per cent of normal civilian requirements. Argentine assistance would have been of great value during this very difficult period.

The negotiations to which your letter refers have been concerned with the provision of materials and supplies to enable the future production of the Argentine oil fields to be maintained and even to be increased. The lack of these materials has not in any way affected the ability of Argentina to cooperate with the neighboring republics during the past eighteen months if Argentina had desired to cooperate.

With regard to the matter of arms and munitions, your letter states that the evolution of Argentine public opinion would be more rapid and effective in favor of the American countries if President Roosevelt were to make an open and friendly gesture toward the Argentine people such as would be the immediate supply of airplanes, replacement parts, armaments and machinery, in order to restore Argentina to the position of equilibrium which corresponds to her with respect to other South American countries. In reply, I must point out emphatically that questions of military and naval equilibrium as between American republics are surely inconsistent with the inter-American doctrine of the peaceful settlement of international disputes to which so many practical contributions have been made by Argentine statesmen. In fact, one of the most specific expressions of that doctrine, known as the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, was the work of a distinguished Argentine

Minister

Minister for Foreign Affairs. To furnish arms and munitions for the purpose indicated by Your Excellency would appear to this Government to be clearly inconsistent with the juridical and moral foundations upon which existing inter-American understanding and agreements are based.

I must also recall that it has been frequently indicated to representatives of your Government, including the military and naval officers who visited Washington more than a year ago, that the supply of arms and munitions by the United States to the other American republics is exclusively for the purpose of contributing to the defense of the Hemisphere against possible aggression. In the determination of the contribution which the Government of the United States could make to the preparations for defense of the other nineteen American Republics which jointly determined upon the need for such defense, the Government of the United States has been guided exclusively by considerations of hemispheric security. Since Argentina, both by its words and its actions, has indicated clearly that the Argentine armed forces will not under present conditions be used in a manner designed to forward the cause of the security of the New World, and, thereby, the vital war interests of the United States, it would be impossible for the President of the United States to enter into an agreement to furnish arms and munitions to Argentina under the Lend-Lease Act.

I have written Your Excellency in this detail since I am sure from the frank and friendly terms in which your letter to me is couched, that you would desire an equally frank and friendly exposition of the views of this Government. I feel that I should be lacking in such frankness, however, were I to leave you under the impression that the Government and the people of the United States have not viewed with deep regret the course followed by the Argentine Government in so far as concerns hemispheric defense since the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Rio de Janeiro. I am in entire agreement with your statement that defeat is inexorably drawing closer to the countries of the Axis. In recognition of that fact the United Nations and those associated with them are devoting their attention in a wide variety of practical and constructive ways to the problems of post-war organization. Thus the failure of the Argentine Government to comply

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with its inter-American commitments has not only resulted in the non-participation of Argentina in the defense of the continent in a most critical period, it is also depriving Argentina of participation in the studies, discussions, meetings and arrangements designed to solve the post-war problems mentioned above.

I am pleased to take this opportunity of extending to Your Excellency the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

Gordell Hull

A true copy of
the signed original.
H-17

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

~~RESTRICTED~~

14 September 1943

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Location of Proposed Port in Liberia.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the recommendation of the Secretary of State that the construction of a port in Liberia be undertaken now with Lend-Lease funds, as outlined in his letter to you of 4 September 1943.

2. As explained in the letter of the Secretary of State, it is contemplated that the port will be located in the estuary at St. Paul River, about five miles north of Monrovia, provided final field surveys verify the preliminary conclusions as to feasibility and costs, now estimated at \$8,665,000 total. Mamba Point, also near Monrovia, is the second choice for the port site. All work should be performed by private contractors since military-naval personnel cannot be assigned without detriment to the war effort.

3. Draft of recommended reply to the letter from the Secretary of State is enclosed.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy
WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

1 incl.

~~RESTRICTED~~

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 5-22-68

Signature- CFS.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14 September 1943

~~RESTRICTED~~

The Honorable
Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The recommendation in your letter of 4 September 1943 for the construction of a port in Liberia, meets with my approval. In concluding your negotiations in this matter with the Liberian Government provision should be made for protection of United States military, air and naval interests in the port with particular reference to our future operational rights there.

Allocation of Lend-Lease funds for this project within the general limitation outlined in your letter is authorized. It is to be understood, however, that the work shall be performed by private contractors since military and naval personnel cannot be assigned without detriment to the war effort.

Very sincerely yours,

s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

JCS
JRD

14 September 1943

~~RESTRICTED~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Location of Proposed Port in Liberia.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the recommendation of the Secretary of State that the construction of a port in Liberia be undertaken now with Lend-Lease funds, as outlined in his letter to you of 4 September 1943.

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For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.**

DJL

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 5-22-67

Signature- C.L.S.

~~RESTRICTED~~

14 September 1943

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The recommendation in your letter of 4 September 1943 for the construction of a port in Liberia, meets with my approval. In concluding your negotiations in this matter with the Liberian Government provision should be made for protection of United States military, air and naval interests in the port with particular reference to our future operational rights there.

Allocation of Lend-Lease funds for this project within the general limitation outlined in your letter is authorized. It is to be understood, however, that the work shall be performed by private contractors since military and naval personnel cannot be assigned without detriment to the war effort.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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DDP Form 8200.0 (9/27/58)

Date- 5-22-62

Signature- CFS

~~RESTRICTED~~

T-130

Hull folder 2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 7, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. CORDELL HULL:

Please speak to me about our publishing the notes of the conversations between Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau in Paris in 1919.

I have a distinct hesitation (a) because Lloyd George is still alive and (b) because notes of these conversations ought not to have been taken down any way.

F.D.R.

T-146

PSF Hull folder 2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

In regard to the publication of the meetings with the Big Four in Paris in 1919, I am still not satisfied that it is advisable at this time. Their publication now would probably result in wholly unwarranted sensational articles. Such articles would, without doubt, come from hostile sources. They would seek to draw untrue conclusions and parallels between 1919 and 1943. I am especially anxious that this wholly preventable result should not occur.

I would suggest that if the Congress asks about the matter that they be told that the President has requested that they be not published until after the war, in order to avoid at this time the reopening of international controversy. They cannot go behind that with any success.

Incidentally, in those meetings of the Big Four in Paris no notes should have been kept. Four people cannot be conversationally frank with each other if somebody is taking down notes for future publication.

I feel very strongly about this and incidentally it is not going to do anybody any harm if we defer publication for a year or two.

F.D.R.

(over)

Memorandum for the President, 9-9-43, from
Cordell Hull, in answer to Pres.' memo, 9-7
re publication of notes of conversations
between Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau
at Paris in 1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In regard to the publication of the
notes with the Big Four in Paris in
1919, I am still not satisfied that it
is desirable at this time. There are
a number of points which would probably result in
wholly unproductive negotiations and
such a result would, without doubt,
lead to new hostile alliances. They would
seek to draw future negotiations and
negotiations between 1919 and 1943. I am
especially anxious that this wholly
unproductive result should not occur.

I would suggest that if the
Government asks about the matter that
they be told that the President has
requested that they be not published
until after the war, in order to avoid
at this time the reopening of inter-
national controversy. They cannot do
behind that with any success.

Incidentally, in those instances of
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have been kept. Four people cannot be
conversational with each other
if somebody is taking down notes for
future publication.

I feel very strongly about this and
incidentally it is not going to be any-
body any more if we defer publication for
a year or two.

Hull folder
2-43

file


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

In your letter of June 29, 1943 you requested me to keep you informed of developments with respect to the fines imposed by the German occupation authorities on the Jewish Community of Tunisia. There is attached a copy of the paraphrase of telegram no. 1513 from Algiers which indicates the current proposals of the French authorities for dealing with the problem. You will observe that the proposed measures would prevent any foreclosure or collection of interest on mortgages incurred as a result of levies made by the occupying authorities, but, on the other hand, would not at this time make an unqualified indemnification for the losses incurred.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:

Paraphrase of telegram no. 1513
from Algiers, September 1, 1943.

The President,

The White House.

COPY

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, Algiers
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: September 1, 1943
NUMBER: 1513

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Murphy and Glasser send the following for the Secretary and Morgenthau.

Reference is made herewith to the Department's telegrams nos. 1289 and 1276.

The following is the proposal made by the Commissariat of Finance for settling the problem of levies, fines, mortgages, et cetera, which the enemy imposed on Jews in Tunisia: loans will be made by the banks to organized Jewish Communities who will give formal acknowledgment of the debt and distribute funds but no property will be pledged by them. The loans are to be of indefinite maturity and the Tunisian Treasury is to guarantee them. The proposal is that the advance will last until such time as it is possible to settle the whole question of levies and fines imposed in both France and Tunisia by the enemy. All charges, including interests, will be paid by the Tunisian Treasury. These advances will be large enough to repay bank loans made previously and to reimburse fully the members of the Jewish Communities who advanced funds to meet the levies imposed by the enemy.

This proposal is to be submitted to Comite. It was stated by us that the conditions were a great improvement over suggestions made previously but we felt it was important that the obligation be assumed in the first instance by the French authorities. There are two objections to this on the part of the French. In the first place they do not wish to commit the French Treasury at this time to an unknown and possibly huge financial burden once France is free. In the second place they fear that, in view of the delicate Arab-Jewish political problem in Tunisia, direct payment of Jewish fines will lead to resentment and demands by the Arabs for financial aid. It has been requested by us that pending your reactions the matter not be referred to the Comite. It is felt by us that we still have a good possibility of achieving unqualified indemnification by the French authorities by continuing to point out advantages to Economic Warfare of our position. An urgent reply is requested.

MCBRIDE

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAR 3 1972

*file
personal.*

*PSF: Hull folder
2-43*

October 14, 1943.

Dear Frances:-

Everybody has orders to let me know, and to let you know, just as soon as we get news of the arrival. From then on it will be the air people and they, too, have instructions.

I do hope you will get a bit of quiet at Hot Springs. We have all had a hectic time.

I am all in favor of chloroforming for certain newspaper men -- not Drew Pearson alone -- but some of the more subtle murderers, like Arthur Krock.

Affectionately,

Mrs. Hull,
The Homestead,
Hot Springs,
Virginia.

WARDMAN PARK

My dear Mr. President:

Cordell told
me you said you would keep
me informed - about his trip
from time to time.

I am going to Hot Springs
to-morrow, Tuesday, and
Should you have anything to
report you will find me there.

Dear Grand
I am just too miserable here
without him, and naturally some-
what worried -

I believe a change will be
the best thing for me.

What a sad hard summer
I have had.

Mr. President can you do
something - about Lew Pearson -
Last night he started on

our new Under Secretary -
He is - a real traitor and - a
danger to our country -

Can the Attorney General, Mr. Biddle
and Edgar Hoover do something
about it.

With affectionate regards -

Francis

Dear Grace -
Would you kindly
give the enclosed to
Mrs. Hull
The President -

Atkins.
Box 101
The Exchange,
Mrs. Hull,

PSF; State Dept. Journal
2-10

*file
this mail
Lehman OK
to take
up
S. G. R.*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Under Secretary of State called up to say that the United Nations business is getting in quite a mess. Very confidentially, he said that Governor Lehman was suspicious of everyone in the State Department and that Lehman was setting up a huge organization with a big corps of publicity people, etc. and Stettinius thinks that someone should talk to him about the whole matter.

Ed Stettinius suggests that he talk to Sam Rosenman and give him the entire background and then have Sam take it up with Governor Lehman. Is this arrangement all right with you?

G.G.T.

THE HOMESTEAD
HOT SPRINGS
VIRGINIA

file
personal
full page
2-43
PSF

Oct. 30th

My dear Mr. President-

I can't tell you how
happy I am this morning to read
you are pleased with the success
of the Moscow Conference.

I know exactly how Cordell must feel
for I have heard him say over and
over, my greatest desire and
pleasure is to - always please the
President. That is and has been
my objective throughout my
service under his direction.

This undertaking was an uncertain
one, and he knew it, but he went
with every fibre in his body ready
for the pull.

And isn't it wonderful that all of
the distinguished men of the group
worked in perfect harmony - and
thought.

I hope it opens the way for the
final seal by you.

I am returning to Washington
to Washington the middle of next
week to be nearer the "codes" -

I visited
Hospital -
are as am
con

THE HOMESTEAD
HOT SPRINGS
VIRGINIA

I visited the wonderful General Ashford
Hospital - at White Sulphur and they
are so anxious to have Mrs. Roosevelt
come and see them - I hope she can go,
and stop over and see my Woodrow
Wilson General Hospital - at Staunton.
She radiates such confidence and
cheer that is most helpful to our
poor shattered boys -

Please take care of yourself for you
are needed above everything else -
in the world to-day -

With love and best wishes -

Your devoted friend
Frances

(Mrs. Cordell Hall)

*PSF Hull folder 2-43
file
personal*

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

WASHINGTON DC

NOVEMBER 30

3-9501

19 43

WHITE SIX FOUR. (B)

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HULLY:

THERE IS A DANGER THAT UNLESS WE MOVE HAEAD IN OUR STUDY OF ON
 POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION PROBLEMS, WE MAY FIND THAT THE AND
 PRESENT SITUATION WILL BECOME JELLED IN THE MINDS OF SOME OF OUR ALLIES
 ALONG LINES THAT MAY NOT PARALLEL YOUR OWN THOUGHTS. I FEEL THEREFORE
 THAT IT IS URGENT AND IMPORTANT FOR US TO MOVE AHEAD IN PREPARING THE
 GROUNDWORK WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL PRELIMINARY TO ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH ENT
 OTHER COUNTRIES. AS A PRACTICAL AND FEASIBLE WAY TO PROCEED WHAT WOULD
 YOU THINK OF A COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF SECRETARY STIMSON, KNOX AND
 MYSELF MEETING TO CONSIDER THE COMPLICATED PROBLEMS INVOLVED. FURTHER
 THAT WE THREE BE AUTHORIZED TO SECURE AN ABLE AND DISINTERESTED MAN SUCH
 AS OWEN D YOUNG OR SOMEONE ELSE OF EQUAL STATURE THAT YOU MAY SUGGEST,
 TO GIVE HIS THOUGHT TO THIS QUESTION AND TO DRAW UP A REPORT AND
 RECOMMENDATIONS TO SUBMIT FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

THESE 12
FOR THE PRESIDENT
WHITE SIX FOUR
H2AW

received at

No. 7

Signal Corps, United States Army

*file
personal*

Received at

3-9501

WASHINGTON DC

NOVEMBER 30

1943

WHITE SIX SEVEN (B)

FROM HULL FOR THE PRESIDENT:

WINANT WOULD CERTAINLY BE A FINE CHOICE. OUR REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COMMISSION WILL HAVE A FULL TIME JOB AND MUCH DETAILED DRAFTING AND DISCUSSION WILL BE ESSENTIAL. I DONT SEE THEREFORE HOW ONE MAN CAN COMBINE THE EXACTING DUTIES OF AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN WITH THOSE OF OUR REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COMMISSION IF THESE TWO IMPORTANT JOBS ARE TO BE EFFECTIVELY DONE. HAVE YOU ANY FURTHER COMMENT OR SUGGESTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, IN OTHER WORDS DO YOU STILL DESIRE HIM TO HOLD BOTH POSITIONS QUERY.

PSF *Full folder 2-43*
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON *file personal*

December 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This I think should be taken up by Winant with Prime Minister Churchill as soon as the latter gets back. It was not brought up in any way at Teheran in my presence.

F. D. R.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 22, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have been informed by the British Embassy that at Tehran, when the question of a joint declaration to the German people on the basis of unconditional surrender arose, Marshal Stalin stated that he thought this would be bad tactics as far as Germany was concerned, and he suggested that the three Governments should work out terms together and make them known generally to the German people. Mr. Eden suggests that this matter should be dealt with as soon as possible by the European Advisory Commission.

As I have no information on this question of a joint declaration, and as I have not been under the impression that the European Advisory Commission would undertake political discussions of this character, I would be glad to have your direction as to whether this matter should be taken up by the London Commission. I would also be glad to know what your views are with regard to avoiding the use of the term "unconditional surrender".

CJH

PSF: ¹⁵⁻¹²⁻⁴⁴ Hull folder 2-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Private

December 31, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I am sending you herewith a copy of a memorandum I sent to Churchill. Thank the Lord I don't have the same trouble with the State Department that he has with his Foreign Office!

F. D. R.

(copy of copy filed - Churchill folder - 1-43)

PSF: Hull

~~SECRET~~

December 31, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN

I have received the enclosed memorandum from the Secretary of State.

When you and I look back eleven months we realize that de Gaulle and his Committee have most decidedly moved forward by "the process of infiltration" -- in other words, here a little, there a little.

This is another example. This puts France on to the Allied Commission for Italy, even though the memorandum says that the French representative will not have anything to say about it. However, he will still be a member of the Commission.

For the life of me I cannot see why France is entitled to anybody on the Allied Control Commission for Italy. His presence there will, as we know from experience, cause controversy and more trouble with the French Committee.

I know what problems you have with your own Foreign Office -- and I wish you and I could run this Italian business. We would not need any help or advice.

I am holding up cabling until I hear from you.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By V. J. Stewart Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The United States member of the Advisory Council for Italy has strongly recommended that a French as well as a Soviet representative be attached to the Allied Control Commission for Italy. The "British formula" which is acceptable to the Soviets and French provides only for token representation by accepting a representative of the U.S.S.R. and France on the staff of the Deputy President of the Control Commission and avoids placing Soviet and French representatives throughout the entire structure of the Control Commission; in other words it provides for a kind of superior "liaison officer".

Our representative further reports that the British and the Soviet members of the Advisory Council have already committed themselves to recommending the acceptance of a French representative on the Control Commission.

Consequently if, after consideration, you perceive no objection, I shall instruct our representative on the Advisory Council to concur in the British formula recommending the acceptance of Soviet and French representatives on the staff of the Deputy President of the Control Commission.



CH

PSF Hull folder 2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file
journal

You may desire to
Consider ^{strongly} requesting the
British not to dramatize
de Gaulle too much re
Darlan, just now
with Battle Critical in Africa

CH

PSF Hull folder 2-43
file
personal



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to the report that General de Bois Boiselle has been appointed Governor General of French West Africa the following data has been obtained from a source deemed reliable.

General de Bois Boiselle is a little over middle age and is an infantry officer. He left France and arrived in Algiers last October in the general entourage of General Giraud. After November 8 of last year as soon as possible General Giraud appointed him to succeed General Koeltz as Commander of the Nineteenth Region which includes Algiers, Constantin and Oran.

General de Bois Boiselle's son is an aviator who is due to arrive shortly in this country for training.

CH