

BOX 162. NAVAL AIDE'S FILES (A1-1 to A6)

2. A1-3 BUILDING PROGRAMS (Ships, Aircraft, Public Works, Etc.): July
1942 - January 1945.

A1/Pes
Signed 1/31/46
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

Subject: Proposed Combatant Vessel Construction Program.

I have noted, with interest, your comment in your memorandum of 17 January on this subject. A simple measure of relative strength with the enemy ship for ship, even though it shows a substantial numerical superiority in our favor, is not a sound criterion by which to challenge the proposed program of the Navy Department for the additional 644,000 tons of combatant vessels. The Navy is now engaged in carrying the war to the enemy over a very long supply route with ships operating far from repair bases, in seas where the navigational and meteorological hazards are at the maximum, and a sizeable percentage -- perhaps between one-quarter and one-third -- will be normally under overhaul in the ordinary course of operations. It is also an accepted military axiom that a successful offensive should comprise two or even three times the strength of defending forces.

This war differs from any other in that amphibious operations are indispensable to it and the landing of ground forces is only made possible by the bombardment preparation and continual support of great numbers of combatant ships. Furthermore in such operations ships are subject to loss and damage not only from enemy ships but likewise from land-based aircraft, and our recent experiences have demonstrated that we can expect a greater percentage of this type of fleet casualty as well as losses from mine fields and enemy submarines, as we approach the heart of the enemy stronghold. Indeed the entire Japanese surface fleet could be eliminated without appreciably diminishing this hazard. The proposed building program, therefore, cannot be viewed solely as a mathematical measure of our fleet versus the Japanese fleet, but as an insurance against losses which we may expect to incur as we come to closer quarters with Japan itself. It is proper then to view this as insurance from the point of view of its cost. Assuming that the program were undertaken at once and that it might be possible to cancel it at the end of six months, the demands on the Treasury would be approximately \$33,000,000; at the end of 12 months, approximately \$160,000,000; at the end of 18 months, approximately \$450,000,000; at the end of two years, approximately \$920,000,000; and at the end of 2½ years, approximately \$1,300,000,000. These figures, of course, will be somewhat increased by an indeterminate amount incident to the termination and cancellation of the contracts, which the Navy estimates will be approximately equivalent to the outlay for the program in the quarter next succeeding cancellation.

Since these programs would go into yards already engaged in the production of combatant vessels, they would not involve any appreciable, additional demands upon manpower, but rather depend upon the continued employment of men already on the payrolls.

I am inclined to support the proposal of the Secretary of the Navy.

(S) F.D.R.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

1/31/45
2nd
1/18/45
ECHL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This is the old Navy request for 644,000 tons of additional combat vessels which you have previously indicated your approval and against which the Director of the Budget entered a mild demurrer. The Secretary of the Navy and Admiral King now request you to sign the attached endorsement continuing your support of favorable action.

My impression is that at every stage in the war our building program has looked enormous and possibly too large when it was first planned, and that it has never yet proved to be too much. It seems to me like preparation for war - it is much better to have too much than too little to do the job.

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN.

g
A1

January 29, 1945.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Subject: Construction of the Second Replacement Group
of Eight (8) CVE's of the 105 Class.

Reference: (a) SecNav's Memorandum to the President
dated 14 December 1944 (copy attached).

1. The President has approved the request
contained in reference (a) for the construction of the
second replacement group of eight (8) Aircraft Carriers,
Escort (CVE), of the 105 Class.

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEC 29 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Construction of eight aircraft carriers, escort,
for replacement purposes.

The attached memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy requests your approval of a second group of eight aircraft carriers, escort (CVE), for replacement purposes.

Construction of the first group of eight carriers for replacement purposes was recommended to you by the Secretary of the Navy on December 17, 1943, in order to maintain orderly construction at the plant of the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Company and to permit completions to follow without interruptions. The Chief of Naval Operations directed that construction of these vessels be carried on at the rate of about eight ships per year. The last of this group is now scheduled for delivery early in the calendar year 1946.

If construction of an additional group of eight carriers is approved now, deliveries will probably be made during the period from July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947. These vessels will be of the CIMARRON class, and the eight proposed for construction will cost about \$65,000,000.

It is difficult to appraise the need for these vessels for replacement purposes due to the lack of any sound basis for estimating probable future losses, and it may be that the construction of this second group of eight, in addition to the eight already under construction, will result in an increase in the number of this type to be in commission. However, they are vulnerable to attack not only by surface vessels, but also by aircraft, and losses could exceed present estimates.

The foregoing is a resume of the information available in this office with respect to this program. Whether the construction of the additional carriers now recommended should be approved or not is primarily a military question concerning which I would prefer not to make any recommendation. I do feel that the matter should be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review, as there is no indication in the correspondence that this has been done.

Director

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

December 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

and the continued expense outside attacks
indicate the urgency of accelerated
recommendation for a replacement program
of about 1945.

FOR RECOMMENDATION

The Secretary of the Army has
you have authorized a commitment of eight
to the new program of replacement
of eight 1945 with the
accelerated replacement program.

F. D. R.

Very respectfully,

W. F. Horn

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

December 18, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Second Battle of the Philippines and the continued Japanese suicide attacks indicate the urgency of the enclosed recommendation for a replacement program of eight (8) aircraft carriers, escort (CVE).

The Secretary of the Navy reminds that you have authorized a replacement of eight and he now requests a second replacement group of eight (8) in accordance with the established replacement program.

Very respectfully,

W. Brown
WELSON BROWN.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

14 DEC 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum for the President

My dear Mr. President:

The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations on 31 October 1943 established a replacement program of eight (8) Aircraft Carriers, Escort (CVE) to follow the CVE 105 class program.

You approved my Memorandum serial 0711323-05 dated 17 December 1943 for the construction of the first eight (8) replacement CVE's.

Your approval now is requested of the construction of the second replacement group of eight (8) CVE's of the 105 class which the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations considers should be initiated without delay.

Yours sincerely,

James Forrestal

J. F.
OK
ZMP

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET
SECRET

January 9, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Subject: Combatant Vessel Construction Program.

References: (a) Secretary's Memorandum (SECRET)
to the President, Serial 0035005,
dated 8 Jan 1945.

1. I informed the President this morning of your recommendation to proceed with the construction of approximately 750,000 tons of combatant vessel construction already authorized. The President did not have time to study your recommendation but said that you could inform the Budget that he favored the construction and authorizes you to take it up with the Budget.

2. This memorandum is to confirm a message I have already given to Captain Roper by telephone.

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

8 January 1945

My dear Mr. President:

The enclosed letter deals with the subject which I spoke to you about after Cabinet Friday -- namely, getting appropriations to initiate additional construction under our present legislative tonnage balance of 750,000 tons.

The 18 ships involved of above 7,000 tons, i.e., carriers, heavy cruisers and light cruisers, could be completed it is estimated before the expiration of the calendar year 1947. They would follow on ways made available as our present program runs out. Obviously, the work could be stopped if a turn in the events of the war warranted such action.

It occurs to me that you may want to send a message to Congress on this subject. If so, I can get the material up for you. What I have in mind is that an explanatory note may be desirable to tell why it is we want this additional tonnage in the light of the announced damage inflicted on the Japanese Fleet.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal

The President,

The White House.

Serial 0035005

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

SECRET
SECRET

8 JAN 1945

Memorandum for The President

My dear Mr. President:

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations on 6 January 1945 recommended and I approve of the construction of the following combatant vessel program totaling 644,000 tons to supplement the existing program.

	<u>Type</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Total Tonnage</u>
CVE	Aircraft Carrier, Large	45,000	2	90,000
CV	Aircraft Carrier	27,500	6	165,000
*CVE	Aircraft Carrier, Escort	12,500	* 12	150,000
CA	Heavy Cruiser	17,500	4	70,000
CL(5")	Light Cruiser	7,500	6	45,000
DD	Destroyer	2,500	36	90,000
SS	Submarine (about)	1,889	18	34,000
				<u>644,000</u>

* The above includes eight (8) CVE for which approval was requested in my Memorandum to you, serial 033705 dated 14 December 1944.

There is now available a balance of approximately 750,000 tons of legislative authorization for combatant vessel construction which represents small adjustments in the tonnage of ships already built or building, tonnage made available through cancellations, and tonnage made available as the result of losses which are replaceable under existing law.

Advantage will be taken of the experience gained in the war to improve the designs of the various types to the maximum extent. No radical changes in design are indicated at this time.

Your approval of the above action is requested.

Yours sincerely,

James Forrestal

SECRET

8 JAN 1945

WASHINGTON
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

8 January 1945

FROM: JAMES FORRESTAL

TO: ADMIRAL BROWN

Please speak to me about these
in the morning.

J.F.

2 January 1945 *Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is the agenda of Naval matters I would like to talk with you about:

1. Carl Vinson wants us to ask for appropriations to use up the 750,000 tons unused authorization. His argument is that we may suffer drastic losses as we move into the infighting stage against Japan.

Both Admiral King and I have misgivings on this in view of the very large fleet we have now and the substantial building program as yet unfinished, and also in view of the availability of elements of the British Navy in the Pacific. On the other hand, Mike Robinson points out that getting the appropriations and starting the building program would give us insurance which would not be very expensive.

2. I would like to suggest the termination of Admiral Stark's tour of duty in London as of March 1. Gormley or Hewitt might be available to succeed him.

3. I want to discuss with you the replacement of Admiral Young as head of S. & A.

4. Certain promotions in various Staff Corps.

5. The possibility of giving the Assistant Secretary for Air seniority over the Assistant Secretary by Executive Order. The reason: Di Gates has been here three years and Hensel, of course, is a newcomer. This only has significance, of course, in the event of the absence of both myself and the Under Secretary.

6. Legislation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Carl Vinson proposed this last summer and wanted us to draft a bill. I told him that we could not do so without discussion with you. He proposes giving statutory permanence to the J.C.S.

7. Awards to civilians working for the Navy. This latter I am rather anxious about because it is the only way by which we can give any substantial recognition to civilians who have done exceptional work directly serving the Navy.

8. When Arthur Sulzberger returned from the Pacific he expressed the view very strongly that the interest of the public in the Pacific war would be greatly enhanced by permitting publishers to make the same trip that he did — he came back very greatly impressed with the scale and scope of our operations. I wonder if you would be willing to review your original decision. I do not believe that we would have an avalanche of applicants.

9. I would like to get your wishes on the Under Secretaryship.

10. Review of Naval history.

11. Revision of Navy Regulations.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal.

COPY

*Admiral Brown
for file*

Grew A1

*File
US*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY ICKES.

DEAR HAROLD:

THANK YOU FOR THE CHART
IN REGARDS TO THE GAIN IN TANKER TONNAGE.
THAT IS GREAT WORK.

F. D. R.

*advised
to file*

PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MAY - 2 1944

My dear Mr. President:

During the past year there has been a net gain in the tanker tonnage of the United States tanker fleet of over three and a half million tons. Our total tonnage today stands at about 180 per cent of what it was at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.

The net improvement in the United Nations' position has not been quite so marked, but by last October gains had offset losses and the net addition since then amounts to 2,183,000 tons--giving us a United Nations total tonnage of 13,644,000 tons, or 119 per cent of the prewar position.

I enclose a chart in which these changes are graphically portrayed.

As the tanker fleet has grown, we have kept it continuously loaded with petroleum. No tanker tonnage has been wasted, so far as relates to the availability of oil. I confess to a certain pride in this record.

We have indeed come a long way since the grim days of 1941 and 1942.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Pches

Petroleum Administrator for War.



The President,

The White House.

Enclosure 103.



SECRET



SECRET

A1-1

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Admiral Brown
to file
F-13*

9 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I don't believe General Arnold gave you the figures for planes delivered overseas in January. They are interesting.

883	Heavy Bombers
581	Medium and Light Bombers
1524	Fighters and Fighter Bombers
150	Reconnaissance
106	Transports
37	Utilities and others
<u>230</u>	Gliders

Total 3511

The foregoing represented 64 1/2% of January or 71% of December, total factory deliveries to the Army Air Forces. In combat planes the shipments represent 90% of January deliveries from the factory, or 97% of December deliveries. The Ferry service involved in this transaction is considerable.


Chief of Staff.

SECRET

Adm. Brown for
File

AI
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

File
WS

CONFIDENTIAL

December 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Admiral Leahy.

The President requests that the Joint Staff inform him as early as possible next week and in time to be used in his Friday talk, the total number of men of the armed forces overseas in all areas outside of the continental United States -- Army, Navy, Marines and Coast Guard. He does not care about having it broken down into areas or into particular services, but does wish a fairly accurate total.

He also wishes the Joint Staff, in consultation with the Maritime Commission, to inform him how many more landing craft we will be able to deliver in the Mediterranean and United Kingdom by April 1944 than had been planned two months ago -- in other words how much have recent orders about priorities for landing craft affected expected deliveries overseas in April?

W.B.S.
Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT OF A PROPOSED MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR - The President.

1. On Friday, 24 December 1943, it is estimated that there will be, ashore and afloat, a total of 3,784,800 members of the armed forces (officers and enlisted personnel) of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines and the Coast Guard serving in overseas areas or beyond the continental limits of the United States.

2. The recent priorities do not have any great effect on the number of landing craft in the Mediterranean-U.K. by April (actual increases are about 2 LST, 3 LCI(L) and 20 LCT). The real effect of these priorities will come later. They will augment the present program already large and now reaching its peak of production and will further ensure the success of the powerful worldwide amphibious operations planned and approved at SEXTANT (Cairo).

3. In order to meet requirements established at SEXTANT, a number of landing craft (26 LST and 26 LCT) will be provided in the Mediterranean by diversions from the Pacific. Some (10 LST) are being obtained from the Bay of Bengal.

4. The above figures relate to U.S. Naval resources only. The Maritime Commission is not building any landing craft, but is engaged in an extensive program of combat loaded transports and cargo ships.

Regraded Unclassified

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A1
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

28 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Subject: Landing Craft Production

In a separate envelope there has been enclosed for you a report of the ad hoc committee regarding a draft reply from the President to Mr. Justice Byrnes.

The three Chiefs of Staff present at the U.S. Army Headquarters Camp have modified the draft dispatch proposed by the ad hoc committee, and General Marshall, Admiral King and General Arnold are agreed on the following wording:

DRAFT OF TELEGRAM FROM
PRESIDENT TO JUSTICE BYRNES

Send
"The increase in critical types of landing craft proposed in your White 37 of 25 November 1943, coupled with unstated effect on other critical programs, does not repeat not become effective soon enough to justify change in present construction programs."

T. Royal
ROYAL

W.H.



SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

S E C R E T

28 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF:

The ad hoc committee appointed on November 28 consisting of General Somervell, Admiral Cooke and General Handy to consider Justice Byrnes' telegram White 37 of 25 November 1943 on landing craft production submit the following report:

The data contained in the telegram are reproduced in tabular form, Annex A. It will be noted that the increases proposed as indicated in the table show that very small increases in critical types can be provided in time to meet projected dates for OVERLORD

<u>OVERLORD</u>	<u>I n c r e a s e</u>	
	<u>LST</u>	<u>LCT</u>
May 1	2	10
June 1	7	31
July 1	22	66

Under the circumstances, it appears that the increase in critical types would be too small to justify any change in the present construction program. The telegram states that the increases would have an unstated effect on other programs such as those for naval construction, Army trucks, high octane gasoline and the Russian protocol.

In view of the small assistance indicated and the possible adverse effect on the other programs, we recommend that the attached draft of a telegram from the President to Justice Byrnes be proposed.

BREHON SOMERVELL
Lieut. General, USA

C. M. COOKE, JR.
Rear Admiral, USN

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General, USA

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

ANNEX "A"

INCREASED LANDING CRAFT PRODUCTION (U.S.)
PROPOSED IN BYRNES DESPATCH

	JAN.		FEB.		MARCH		APRIL		MAY		REMARKS
	Inc.	Total	Inc.	Total	Inc.	Total	Inc.	Total	Inc.	Total	
LST	0		2	447	5	477	15	517	28	570	Ship (308')
LCI(L)	0		3	508	10	547	20	597	38	665	Ship (153')
LCT 7						None					Ship (208')
LCT 5 & 6	0		10	724	21	785	35	860	50	950	108' long; moves independently
LCM 3	0		300	6079	300	7629	300	?	300	8469	Boat
LCVP	0		200	9646	200	10596	200	11546	200	12496	Boat
LCC	0		0		15	69	15	84	15	99	Boat
LVT						None					Amphibia
LCPL)											
LCSS)											Boat
			Increase at expense of LCVP								
AGC	0		0		0		1		2		Headquarters ships

NOTE: The number of boats and amphibians that can be usefully employed must be adjusted to production of APA's (combat loaders)

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

S E C R E T

DRAFT OF TELEGRAM FROM
PRESIDENT TO JUSTICE BYRNES

The increase in critical types of landing craft proposed in your White 37 of 25 November 1943 does not repeat not become effective soon enough to justify change in present construction programs.

WAR DEPARTMENT
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES

DATE _____

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Hopkins -
note the attached
think the President
will be interested -
Particularly in the
photos -

(HHA)

H. H. ARNOLD,
General, U. S. A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

3-7900, AF

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Decrease in German Fighter Production.

The damage to fighter factories at Regensburg and Wiener Neustadt has been reflected in German fighter production for the months of August and September, as shown in the following figures.

July	810
August	635
September	500

This production will further decrease as a result of the attacks on the Focke-Wulf factory at Marienburg which occurred on October 9th. Every building in that factory was badly damaged. (See attached photos).

A comparison of German and Allied fighter strength as of today is as follows:

Opposed to	(Army Air Forces	2451	
Germans	(Royal Air Force	5561	
			8012
Total	Germany		
			2350

H. H. Arnold
H. H. ARNOLD
General, U.S. Army
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Incl:
Photos



SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

I



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Regraded Unclassified

111



(SAV-100-64-33)(9-10-43)(25307-12-13500)(MARIENBURG)

Regraded Unclassified

IV



Regraded Unclassified

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FFI/AL-1

Serial: 001917

SECRET

9 SEP 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: HABBAKUKS.

Reference: (a) Report of Ad Hoc Committee - Enclosure to my
Letter Serial 001900 of 7 Sept. 1943, to you.
(b) Comments on Reference (a) sponsored by Mr. Churchill.
(c) Supplementary Report by Ad Hoc Committee dated
9 September.

Enclosures: Copies of References (b) and (c).

1. At Mr. Churchill's request, I went to the White House on Wednesday, September 8 at noon, and received from him reference (b) after some discussion of the points raised therein. Upon my return to the Navy Department about 12:20, I orally reconvened the Ad Hoc Committee to deal with reference (b), and submit herewith their supplementary report - reference (c).

E. J. KING

*see file
AL
HABBAKUKS*

A1

Subject: HABBAKUK, Report of Ad Hoc Committee.
(Not dated).

Forwarded to the President by the Cominch under dated
of 7 September 1943.

See File ^{A1}~~556~~/HABBAKUK

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MR. LUBIN *x*

SUBJECT: THE AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION SITUATION

Combat aircraft production in May was 4,214 planes. This is 20% below the 5,262 combat planes called for in the original 8-L schedule. It is 8% below the 4,605 planes called for in the revised new 8-L. The new "working 8-L" calls for 13% fewer planes in 1943 than was originally scheduled.

New schedule as percent of original:

	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>
Heavy Bomber (4)	93	93
Medium Bomber (2)	87	91
Light Bomber (2)	91	107
Light Bomber (1)	77	71
Fighter (2)	93	106
Fighter (1)	94	80
Navy Fighter	84	101
Navy Reconnaissance	61	76
Flying Boats	<u>84</u>	<u>94</u>
Total Combat	87	87

The total output of military planes (including trainers and transports) was 7,015.

BOMBERS

Heavy Bombers

Army bombers were up to schedule. Seven hundred five 4-engine heavy bombers were accepted. The schedule called for 711. Since January 1943 the output of 4-engine bombers has more than doubled.

SECRET

6/17/43

Medium Bombers

The acceptances of 2-engine medium bombers exceeded the revised 8-L schedule by 1%.

Light Bombers

The revised 8-L was exceeded by 8% for 2-engine light bombers and 13% for 1-engine light bombers.

Flying Boats

The only type of plane whose production fell down was in the case of 4-engine flying boats and 2-engine flying boats. In the former case, we failed to meet the revised 8-L schedule by 35%.

ARMY FIGHTERS

Acceptances of fighters were 22% below the revised 8-L schedule. Production was particularly short for the following models:

	<u>April</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>May Revised</u> <u>Schedule</u>	<u>May</u> <u>Actual</u>
Lockheed P-38, 2-engine	122	204	84
Bell P-39, 1-engine	511	558	312

The failure to maintain production of the 2-engine P-38 was due in part to a change-over to a new series. In the case of the P-39, the marked decline from April to May was partly due to a shift in the series and to the fact that a gun mount which was made by a sub-contractor did not come through. It should be pointed out, however, that taking the first five months of the year as a whole, the output of the P-39 is ahead of the original 8-L schedule (revised).

NAVY FIGHTERS

Contrary to the past experience, the acceptances of navy fighters were fairly good. Indeed, acceptances of navy fighters were within 6% of the 8-L schedule.

TRANSPORTS

Only 12 heavy 4-engine transports were accepted during the month. The schedule called for 16. Similarly, we fell down on the heavy 2-engine transport. In this instance, 25 were accepted of the total of 32 provided for in the 8-L schedule.

SECRET

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT

- 2 -

6/17/43

Medium Bombers

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Light Bombers

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SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

● SECRET ●

THE PRESIDENT

- 3 -

6/17/43

SUMMARY FOR FIRST FIVE MONTHS
1943

During the first five months of the year we failed to meet our acceptance schedule by 17%. During the period 17,000 combat planes were accepted. The schedule called for 20,555. In other words, we were a little more than a month behind schedule at the end of May. On top of this was a terrific increase in the schedules for the second half of the year.

To bring the schedules into closer relationship with reality, an 8-L "working schedule" was devised. This new schedule provides for a 3-month lag. In other words, the October level of production has been moved ahead to December. By the end of December we will be close to three months behind where we should have been under the original 8-L schedule.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Take up
with General
Marshall*

March 23rd, 1943.

SECRET

Memorandum for the President:

At Cabinet last Friday you asked for a reconciliation of the planes produced in the United States and the planes on hand. I am attaching a statement given me by Bob Lovett, covering the period from July 1, 1940 to February 28, 1943.

The total military planes produced in the United States were 81,349. If we subtract the 32,425 training planes, we have a production of 48,924 tactical planes. Of this production of tactical planes, the Army's share was 23,730. (The balance went to the Navy and to Lend-Lease). So the Army has 23,730 tactical planes to account for.

The Army has lost, from all causes, 5,175 tactical planes. The rest, 18,555, are on hand, — 6,068 overseas, 9,928 in Army units in this country, and 2,559 at modification centers for special equipment.

There is another breakdown of the 18,555 tactical planes on hand, showing which ones are modern combat planes, which are transport planes, which are special purpose planes and which are obsolescent planes.

RP Patterson

Robert P. Patterson,
Under Secretary of War.

rpp:lm
Enc.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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There is another breakdown of the 18,555 tactical planes on hand, showing which ones are modern combat planes, which are transport planes, which are special purpose planes and which are obsolescent planes.

RLP

Robert P. Patterson,
Under Secretary of War.

rpp:lm
Enc.

SECRET

SECRET

DEPLOYMENT OF AAF AIRPLANES

IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

	March 1/ 1943	June 30 1943	Sept 30 1943	Dec 31 1943	June 30 1944
Combat Planes (all types)	<u>Initial Equipment</u>				
On hand	644	1802	2650	4066	7355
Replacement (per month)	154	541	794	1214	2206
Reserve	59	122	427	1597	3574
TOTAL (IE and Reserve)	703	1924	3077	5663	10929

(50%)

SECRET

U. S. AIRPLANE PRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION
July 1, 1940 - February 28, 1943

1. Total U. S. Airplane production in above period,	81,349
Less total trainers produced in this period	<u>32,425</u>
Total U. S. <u>tactical</u> airplanes accepted	<u>48,924</u>
2. Total <u>tactical</u> airplanes were disposed of as follows:	
a) Delivered to foreign governments	16,737
Awaiting delivery to foreign governments 2/28/43	<u>196</u>
	16,933
b) Delivered to U. S. Navy	8,020
Awaiting delivery to U. S. Navy 2/28/43	<u>159</u>
	8,179
c) Delivered to other U. S. Agencies	82
d) Delivered to U. S. Army Air Forces	22,614
Awaiting delivery to U. S. Army Air Forces 2/28/43	<u>1,116</u>
	<u>23,730</u>
	<u>48,924</u>
3. The Army Air Forces share of above production is	23,730
It was distributed as follows:	
a) Sent to overseas units	6,068
b) In defense units Continental U. S., and Operational Training Units, repair depots, etc.	9,928
c) At manufacturers and modification centers for special equipment	<u>2,559</u>
Total tactical airplanes on hand February 28, 1943	18,555
<u>Plus</u> total losses of such types from all causes	<u>5,175</u>
	<u>23,730</u>
4. The Army Air Force figure is made up as follows:	
Total tactical planes produced in the U. S. and on hand 2/28/43	18,555
Of that figure, a) Modern combat types total	11,226
b) Tactical transport & troop carriers	1,266
c) Special purpose tactical (photo, observation, liaison, & utility planes)	4,656
d) Obsolescent types on hand	<u>2,607</u>
(Grand total reported to President by Chief of Air Staff, memorandum dated March 11, 1943, Exhibit 3.)	19,755
Deduct, planes produced <u>prior</u> to July 1, 1940, procured from private owners, and Spitfires received from England	<u>1,200</u>
Total Army Air Force U. S. produced planes remaining on hand 2/28/43.	18,555

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR AIR
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM for Secretary Knox.

Attached to this memorandum are four enclosures showing the losses from U. S. Naval aircraft incurred during the period of 1 December 1941 to 28 February 1943.

Enclosure (A) is a recapitulation of (B), (C) and (D). Enclosure (B) is a list of the losses of airplanes operating in U. S. Naval activities except for a total of 231 airplanes indicated therein which were transferred to the U. S. Army and never carried in U. S. Navy "on hand" totals. Aircraft assigned to foreign countries have not been included in any Navy totals shown in Enclosure (B).

Enclosure (C) is a list of airplanes which were transferred to foreign countries under Defense Aid commitments.

Enclosure (D) indicates to March 1, 1943, the distribution of U. S. Naval aircraft among the various theaters of operation.

A. L. Gates

SECRET

RECAPITULATION
DELIVERIES, LOSSES, DISTRIBUTION
U. S. NAVAL AIRCRAFT

SECRET

	On Hand 30 Nov. 1941	Total Deliveries 30 Nov. 1941 28 Feb. 1943	Lend Lease Del's.	Net Navy Del's.	Total Losses Including Lend Lease Diversions	On Hand 28 Feb. 1943	Atlantic & East Coast Squadrons	Pacific & West Coast Squadrons	Intermediate Train. & Misc. Activities U. S. A.	Operational Training	Delivery Pipe Line	TOTAL
VF	608	1880	228	1652	995	1393	275	573	132	199	214	1393
VSB	704	1241		1241	709	1236	235	452	142	204	203	1236
VB	100	911	39	872	238	773	177	290	70	108	128	773
VCS	471	1044	154	890	315	1200	440	285	376	99		1200
VSO	148	385	85	300	163	370	140	211	5	14		370
VPB ₂	411	1020	236	784	535	895	265	211	234	56	129	895
VPB ₄	5	67		67	2	70		39	19	1	11	70
VB ₄		91		91	1	90		70		8	12	90
VB ₂	19	259	3	256	15	263	121	54		22	66	263
VG	35	149	21	128	28	156	7	7	117	22	3	156
VJ	143	152	33	119	60	235	55	72	98	5	5	235
VJR	75	79	55	24	58	96	15	16	36	8	21	96
VR	19	175		175	10	184	4	49	95	2	34	184
TOTAL	2636	7453	854	6599	3130	6961	1734	2329	1324	748	826	6961

ENCLOSURE (A)

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

U. S. NAVY AIRCRAFT

TYPE	ON HAND 30 NOV. 1941	DELIVERIES 30 NOV. '41 TO 28 FEB. '43	TOTAL AVAILABLE	ON HAND 28 FEB. 1943	ANALYSIS OF LOSSES				
					(1) TOTAL LOSSES	(2) COMBAT	OPERA- TIONAL	TRAINING	(3) OBSOLESCENT, MISCELLANEOUS
VF	508	1,652	2,160	1,393	767	354	177	111	125
VSB	704	1,241	1,945	1,236	709	295	132	72	210
VTB	100	872	972	773	199	107	58	19	15
VOS	471	890	1,361	1,200	161	19	87	44	11
VSO	148	300	448	370	78	30	46	2	--
VPB(2)	411	784	1,195	895	300	111	97	16	76
VPB(4)	5	67	72	70	2	--	2	--	--
VB (4)	--	91	91	90	1	--	1	--	--
VB (2)	19	256	275	263	12	--	3	4	5
VG	35	128	163	156	7	--	2	--	5
	143	119	262	235	27	1	25	1	--
VJR	75	24	99	96	3	--	3	--	--
VR	19	175	194	184	10	3	3	2	2
TOTAL	2,638	6,599	9,237	6,961	2,276	920	636	271	449

(1) Does not include 24 VPB and 207 VSB airplanes transferred to the U. S. Army which were never carried in Navy "on hand" totals.

(2) Includes only losses due to enemy action.

(3) Includes planes which became obsolete, planes stricken for use in Technical Training and losses which could not be accurately categorized as combat, operational or training.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (B)

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

AIRPLANES DELIVERED
TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES FROM
U. S. NAVY PRODUCTION

Period: 30 November 1941 - 28 Feb. 1943

	United Kingdom	Australia	Dutch	China	Brazil	Bolivia	Chile	Cuba	Ecuador	Mexico	Uruguay	Venezuela	TOTAL	
VF	228												228	VF
VSB														VSB
VTB	39												39	VTB
VOS	100		24**			15	3		6	6			154	VOS
VSO	85												85	VSO
VPB (2)	213	17			6								236	VPB (2)
VPB (4)														VPB (4)
VB (2)	3												3	VB (2)
VB (4)														VB (4)
VG				1	20								21	VG
VJ					10			5		9#	9		33	VJ
VJR	38				14	1	2						55	VJR
VR														VR
TOTAL														TOTAL
By Country	706	17	24**	1	40	11	15	5	5	6	15	9	854	By Country

** As many of these 24 as were not lost,
exact quantity not known were subsequently
turned back to U. S. Navy in the field.

One (1) of these nine (9) may
still be enroute.

ENCLOSURE (C)

Regraded Unclassified

SECRETSECRET

DISTRIBUTION OF U. S. NAVY AIRCRAFT
1 March 1943

	ASSIGNED ATLANTIC				TOTAL ATLANTIC	ASSIGNED PACIFIC					TOTAL PACIFIC	Training Naval Air Activities Cent'l. U.S.A. IN DELIVERY	GRAND TOTAL
	U.S. Atlantic Coast	Carribean So. Amer. Bermuda	Argentina Greenland Iceland	North Africa		South Pacific	So. West Pacific	Central Pacific	North Pacific	U.S. West Coast			
VF	275				275	368		32		173	573	545	1393
VS	235				235	226		91		135	452	549	1236
VT	177				177	143		8		139	290	306	773
VS	296	144			440	110	6	43	42	84	285	475	1200
VSO	140				140	37	2	69		103	211	19	370
VPB ₂	89	134	18	24	265	54	14	53	23	67	211	419	895
VPB ₄						1		11		27	39	31	70
VB ₂	103		18		121					54	54	88	263
VB ₄						14		15		41	70	20	90
VG	6	1			7	2				5	7	142	156
VJ	54		1		55	20	5	37		10	72	108	235
VOR	14	1			15	2		13		1	16	65	96
VR	4				4	24	1	10		14	49	131	184
ZNP (L-T-A)	30				30					8	8	4	42
TOTALS	1423	280	37	24	1764	1001	28	382	65	861	2337	2902	7003

ENCLOSURE (D)

SECRET**SECRET**

Regraded Unclassified

*2x
noted
10*

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

US

February 1, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

To read and return for my
files.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Read by Mrs. Hopkins

WASHINGTON
WHITE HOUSE
PRODUCTION AND RESOURCES BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 15, 1943

SECRET

Dear Mr. President:

We were very glad to have your memorandum of January 8, confirming the memorandum on escort vessels which we had previously received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, under date of January 2, 1943.

Immediately on receipt of the letter from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we held a meeting of the Executive Committee of this Board, which was attended by Vice Admiral Horne, representing the United States Navy, Vice Admiral Dorling, representing the British Admiralty, and by Mr. C. E. Wilson, the Production Vice Chairman of the War Production Board. Specific lines of inquiry into the possibility of accelerating and expanding the construction of escort vessels in 1943 were agreed upon at this meeting, and have been instituted in the United States, United Kingdom and Canada. These inquiries will be pressed with all possible dispatch.

From the very outset, it appears clear that one feature of the problem is likely to be of particular importance. If we would assure the completion of the escort vessels now in contemplation, and realize every possible opportunity for acceleration and expansion of the presently planned program, we must do everything possible to reduce in number, simplify and standardize the types of escort vessels, merchant ships, auxiliary vessels and minor craft being built for the Navy, the Maritime Commission and the Army. In addition, it was agreed to examine in all three countries not only what could be done to accelerate and expand the presently planned production of escort vessels without interference with the merchant shipping program, but also to consider at what cost, in terms of merchant shipping,

SECRET



SECRET


- 2 -

SECRET


a further expansion could be achieved.

We hope to be able to present to you and the Combined Chiefs of Staff very shortly a memorandum showing the utmost acceleration and expansion which we consider to be practicable, and its effect upon other programs.


Sincerely,



Donald M. Nelson
American Member



Sir Robert Sinclair
British Deputy Member



E. P. Taylor
Canadian Deputy Member

The President,
The White House.

SECRET

SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY.

The attached was presented to the President for his consideration.

The President stated that before he took any action in either direction that he would like a "study" to be submitted to him.

Further, the President asked if the recommendations of the Commanders of the various Sea Frontiers had been obtained and, if so, what were their respective reactions.

Very respectfully,

John L. McCrea,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

Conrad's ltr. 2

12-22-42 re small craft

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

FF1/A4-1

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Serial:

001595

DEC 28 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR NAVAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT:

Enclosure: (A) Status of 173' and 110' PC craft
delivered since January 1, 1941.
(B) Status of PT Boats Numbers 81 to
149 inclusive and 112' PC Boats
Numbers 1466 to 1471 inclusive.

1. Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded in
reply to your memorandum request of December 26.
2. There are no 183' SC craft in service or
on order by the Navy. None of the 180' PC type has been
delivered.

E. J. King
E. J. KING.

SECRET

STATUS OF PATROL CRAFT

DEC 27 1942

Assignment	173 Foot PC					110 Foot PC				
	Delivered During Period 1/1/41 to 12/26/42					Delivered During Period 1/1/41 to 12/26/42				
	Present	Enroute	down	Out	Total	Present	Enroute	down	Out	Total
	Shake--	Fitting:				Shake--	Fitting:			
Assignment	Present	Enroute	down	Out	Total	Present	Enroute	down	Out	Total
<u>Atlantic Fleet</u>										
Greenland Patrol Group	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	-	6
Northwest African Sea Frontier	8	-	-	-	8	8	-	-	-	8
Advanced Bases	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	6
<u>Pacific Fleet</u>										
South Pacific Force	3	-	-	-	3	-	10	3	5	18
Southwest Pacific Force	-	-	2	-	2	-	6	5	1	12
<u>Sea Frontiers</u>										
Eastern	16	-	2	-	18	10	-	7	4	21
Gulf	-	-	-	-	-	26	-	7	2	35
Caribbean	30	-	1	2	33	14	-	-	2	16
Panama	8	-	-	-	8	10	-	1	1	12
Western	7	1	-	-	8	6	-	-	1	7
Northwest	8	-	-	1	9	5	1	-	-	6
Hawaiian	4	6	-	-	10	3	4	-	-	7
<u>Special Service</u>										
PC Training Center, Miami	4	1	-	-	5	5	-	-	-	5
Underwater Sound Laboratory, New London	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
<u>Lend-Leased</u>										
Norway	1*	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	1**	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Brazil	2***	-	-	-	2	1	-	4	-	5
	92	8	5	3	108	91	23	33	18	165

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

STATUS OF CERTAIN PATROL CRAFT
26 DECEMBER 1942

DEC 27 1942

MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS
(Numbers PT 81 to PT 149, inclusive)

<u>Number</u>	<u>Present Location</u>	<u>Present Employment</u>
81-84	Caribbean	Enroute New Orleans to Canal Zone. Estimated time of arrival 4 January. Ultimate destination NoWestSeaFron.
85-94	New Orleans	Assigned to Russia. PT's 86-91 depart New Orleans 27 December for New York. PT's 85, 92, 93 and 94 are not yet in service.
95-99, 101, 102	Newport, R.I.	Motor Torpedo Boat Training Center.
100	Hampton Roads, Va.	Operating for Army during December. Ultimate destination Training Center.
103-108	Canal Zone	PaSeaFron.
109-116, 119-124	SoPac	SoPacFor.
117, 118, 125, 126	Canal Zone	Depart for SoPac on U.S.S. PATUXENT about 30 December.
127-138	Canal Zone	Depart for SoWestPac on S.S. WHITE PLAINS and S.S. ESSO RICHMOND in early January.
139-141	Newport R.I.	Motor Torpedo Boat Training Center.
142-149	Enroute SoPac	On board S.S. GULF OF MARACAIBO and S.S. STANVAC CAPETOWN. Estimated time of arrival Noumea about 8 January.

112 FOOT PC
(Ex-Canadian Fairmales)

Assignment: Caribbean Sea Frontier

<u>Number</u>	<u>Present Location</u>	<u>Present Employment</u>
1466-1471	New York	Repairs. Enroute Miami for shakedown.

Regraded Unclassified

A1

SECRET

The special treatment (ballistic) steel is still tight but even that will be far less troublesome than it has been during the past year when enormous demands came in for alterations to ships in the fleet as well as for the building program.

Actually, the two big carriers will help to balance the materials situation because they will require only eight sets of main machinery (four shafts per ship) against a large weight of hull steel and armor.

My answer to the second question is therefore that the programs for other types appear to be adequate and, further, that a material increase in numbers of ships of other combatant types would throw us out of balance as to machinery deliveries.

E. L. Cochran

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.



SECRET

21 December 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN JOHN L. McCREA

Subject: 45,000-ton Aircraft Carriers.

Enclosure (herewith):

(A) SECRET correspondence on the subject.

1. The questions raised by the President have been weighed very carefully and I am giving herein my personal opinions, which have the support of the opinions of my own organization. I have not discussed the questions with authorities outside the Bureau of Ships since my conference with the President last month.

(a) I believe very sincerely that we should go ahead with the big carriers. The initial undertaking of two of the four recommended by the Department would accomplish the most important part of the program, namely, starting the only two ships which we could lay down during 1943 and getting the detail drafting and design work in hand. Should subsequent circumstances dictate need for additional ships of the type they can be ordered later with very small loss in time of delivery and small increase in cost.

My very earnest and honest answer to the first question therefore is in the affirmative.

Incidentally, I have just heard that the British Admiralty has in hand a new carrier design for ships considerably larger than the ILLUSTRIOUS Class, although not so large as our proposed 45,000-ton CV's.

(b) As to other types of ships which we could more profitably build using the steel which would go into the big carriers, the present building programs are, in my opinion, very well balanced as they stand. I personally have confidence in the 6000-ton, 5-inch cruisers of the ATLANTA Class. We have seven of them on order but the scheduled deliveries stretch out until the summer of 1945, largely because of the difficulty in meeting the delivery requirements for main machinery.

Actually today, and the situation will apparently continue, hull steel, particularly plates, is very much less critical than is manufacture of main and auxiliary machinery for ships, especially large reduction gears.

8 December 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

REAR ADMIRAL E. L. COCHRANE, U.S.N.
Chief of the Bureau of Ships

The President read the attached memorandum with interest. He asked specifically for a recommendation from you in regard to this matter:

"In Cochrane's opinion are we justified in building two of these large aircraft carriers?

What does he honestly think about the matter?

Are there any other types which we could more profitably build, using the steel that would necessarily go into the carriers?"

Very respectfully,

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval Aide to the President

Attachments

jlmccrea:jh

Memo for the President from Adm. Cochrane, dated 11-25-42; subject: 45,000 ton Aircraft Carriers; letter to the President from SecNav dated 10-31-42; subject: same; memo dated 10-28-42 from Chairman Navy General Board to SecNav; subject: same; photostated copy of graph; subject: Carrier Program as of 8-1-42.

A1

NOV 30 1942

Op-230-VHJ
(cc) 55/51-1

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Naval Aide to the President.
Subject: Submarine Tankers.

1. The suggested plan for a fuel carrying submarine is perfectly feasible, as is also the suggestion for conversion of an obsolescent submarine to such a purpose. However, we already have completed or underway the following submarines equipped for gasoline stowage, with capacities as indicated:

HARSHAL, NAUTILUS	- - - - -	16,360	gallons each
ARGONAUT	- - - - -	22,930	"
SS217 Class (24 SS)	- - - - -	9,500	"

2. In emergency, any fleet submarine could, by cleaning tanks and installing a few necessary blank flanges, transport gasoline in normal fuel tanks.

3. All our obsolescent submarines for which conversion plans are not already underway, are not suitable for conversion to gasoline carriers due to construction, size and age.

J.H. NEWTON
Acting

see file
51

SECRET

9. If the big carriers are started now, they will be available in 1945 should the need for them persist. They can be suspended if that need is terminated. These ships are, of course, designed to meet the lessons of the war as we have gleaned them so far. Further, they will accommodate the heavier planes which seem to be inevitable in the not distant future. For the early carriers of the ESSEX Class, the limit on individual plane weights is about 18,000 lbs. The 26,000-lb. limit first considered for airplanes for the big carriers is, I understand, already being approached by Bureau of Aeronautics' studies.

10. The big carriers are the most forward looking design we now have for any type. If we push ahead on the first two as suggested above, following with two more about six months later at the same yards, the completions of the first two will be speeded up with minimum interference with the rest of the program, and a distinct gain will accrue in the completion for the second pair over present prospects.

E. L. Cochrane

E. L. Cochrane
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.
Chief of Bureau

SECRET

the biggest, in dimensions at least, so far built in this country - and I doubt that we can finish them in less than twenty-four months from keel laying. The first ships then would finish in the summer of 1945 and the other two at about the end of that year.

4. This plan would permit pooling the two drafting rooms, which would assure rapid construction and would also permit all four ships to be laid down in the recently constructed shipbuilding docks, which would eliminate launching expense and hazard. These docks were designed for just such big ships.

5. The limitations of ways and materials to which the General Board referred in its earlier memorandum still confront us and will, if we go ahead with the big carriers, require shifting some of the 27,000-ton carriers and accepting moderate delays on three of them out of twenty-three - i.e.:

- CV15 Six months delay - from August 1944 to January 1945 - to be shifted to keep a building dock clear at Newport News for a big carrier.
- CV21 Four months delay - from January 1945 to May 1945 - to be shifted to clear ways for CV15.
- CV32 Eight months delay - from January 1945 to August 1945 - to be shifted from New York to Philadelphia or Norfolk to clear a building dock.

6. A third big carrier could be started at the Philadelphia Navy Yard in the summer of 1943 in a new building dock, but it would displace two heavy cruisers which could not be rescheduled for over a year. While this appeared desirable at first, further study indicates too great a cost in ships delayed and added expense of preparations, molds, templates, etc. for building at a third yard.

7. The plan to carry on the design work at two yards will require more effort in coordination and planning, but we are prepared to furnish that extra effort to speed up the ships. There will be a very much better balance in the work load at the two yards and more force available for the design work, which of course is the critical element in rapid building.

8. All of this has been planned without interfering with the present schedule for battleships of the IOWA Class (BB61-66), although two of them are not now scheduled for completion until late in 1946.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.



SECRET

November 25, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: 45,000-ton Aircraft Carriers.

Enclosure:

(A) Correspondence on the subject.

1. The original estimates for building the big aircraft carriers were made on the basis that all four of them would be allocated to Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company - the first ship being laid down in June 1943 and finishing in July 1945, and succeeding ships two months apart.

2. Several circumstances have developed since those estimates were made which dictate a change in this allocation of all four ships to Newport News:- namely

(a) Newport News ways schedule has been delayed by the landing craft program.

(b) The suspension of work on the big battle-ships - BB67-71 - has greatly reduced the work load in the Drafting Room at the New York Navy Yard.

(c) The Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company has requested, because of the limited clearances for launching their ships from their building ways, that they be released from any responsibility for damage incident to such launchings.

(d) Last but not least, the desirability of speeding up the big carrier program.

3. By reallocating two of these ships to the New York Navy Yard, we can speed up the construction by laying down two ships during the summer of 1943, one each at Newport News and New York, and one at each yard at the end of 1943. These are big ships -

0 11-1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

November 16, 1942

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: MR. LUBIN *RL*
SUBJECT: MERCHANT SHIPPING GAINS AND LOSSES
Week Ending November 8, 1942

(1) Merchant shipping losses during the week ending November 8 were the greatest since the middle of July. Total losses were 346,000 DWT tons. This loss has been exceeded only five times since last March. (See attached chart).

(2) New construction for the week was 189,000 DWT tons. This was 165,000 tons less than the week preceding, and, with one exception, the lowest output since the middle of August. (See chart).

(3) The net decrease in merchant tonnage available to the United Nations was 157,000 DWT tons. This is the greatest net loss since July 12 (seventeen weeks). (See chart).

(4) We lost six tankers of 64,000 DWT tons. No new tankers were commissioned during the week.

SECRET

GAINS AND LOSSES - WEEKLY

MERCHANT SHIPPING AVAILABLE TO UNITED NATIONS


(1,600 GROSS TONS AND OVER)

THOUSAND DEADWEIGHT TONS

MARCH 2 TO NOVEMBER 8, 1942

SECRET

THOUSAND DEADWEIGHT TONS



GRAPHIC PRESENTATION
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS BRANCH
NAVY DEPARTMENT

SOURCE: U.S. - WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION
U.K. - BRITISH MINISTRY OF WAR TRANSPORT

BASIS: DATE OF NOTIFICATION

Regraded Unclassified

A1-3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1942.

SI

This recommended program
by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of
Staff was approved by me
verbally and in writing and
is from now on the standard
of production set for the
calendar year 1943.

F. D. R.

WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In conformity with your memorandum of October 1, 1942 the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff submit the attached breakdown of types for the distribution of 100,000 tactical planes for the Calendar Year 1943.

With reference to the foregoing and in relation to the present general program of war materiel to be produced in 1943, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff have made an investigation of the production possibilities. They find the following:

a. The program that calls for 100,000 tactical and 31,000 training planes, in the desired types, is unobtainable in 1943, even if given first call on the entire resources of the nation. Furthermore, to attempt this program would almost certainly result in a reduction in output under the present (8-K) program.

b. We find that if aircraft should be accorded priority above all other production and the decision is made immediately, and the necessary measures for priority taken without delay, a total of 82,000 tactical and 25,000 training planes along the lines of the 8-K program is possible of attainment in 1943.

The foregoing view represents the opinion of the leading individuals in the Army, Navy and War Production Board who have closest familiarity with aircraft production and war materiel production in general. We refer to the Under Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, General Knudsen, General Somervell and General Echols (Air Materiel); for the Navy to the Assistant Secretary of the



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
Navy, Mr. Gates, Admiral Robinson, and Admiral Davison; and for the War Production Board to Mr. Wilson and Mr. Eberstadt. We understand that Mr. Nelson has already expressed similar views in writing to you.

There is general unanimity in the belief that if we set our program beyond our capacity, and give that program priorities accordingly, we will actually get fewer planes than we would produce if the objective were within practical striking distance. The 131,000 program involves the construction of approximately 13 major plants whose combined production in 1943 would probably not exceed 5,000 planes but whose priorities in machine tools and other items would force a reduction in output of existing plane plants, not to mention a most serious, and in our opinion, fatal reduction in the production of other war materiel. This last factor would not only disrupt the balance of Naval craft, water transportation, and Army expansion vital to the support for the proposed air power, but would force a drastic reduction in the finished and raw materials being furnished our Allies. We are informed that even with the present S-K program some reductions in non-aviation materiel will be necessary.

We find that at the moment serious delays in aircraft production are resulting from the present confusion as to objectives and priorities. Several weeks will be required properly to analyze conflicting requirements, but in the meantime we consider it imperative that certain action be taken, and therefore submit the following for your approval:

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff recommend that a program calling for 82,000 combat planes and 25,000 training planes be approved at this time as representing the maximum probable output and in the best interests of a balanced military and naval effort, and that you authorize the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff to instruct Mr. Nelson accordingly.

For the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff:


WILLIAM D. LEAHY,

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Incl.

- 2 - SECRET

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BREAKDOWN BY TYPES FOR 100,149 AIRPLANES AS DIRECTED
BY THE PRESIDENT IN HIS MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER 1, 1942

U. S. Army Cognizance

	<u>1943</u>
Long range, Heavy & Medium Bombers	22,777
Light & Dive Bombers	12,359
Fighters	29,015
Observation & Transports	<u>13,493</u>
TOTALS	77,644

U. S. Navy Cognizance

Patrol Boats	1,907
Scout, Dive & Torpedo Bombers	10,265
Fighters	8,140
Observation, Transport & Utility	<u>2,193</u>
TOTALS	<u>22,505</u>
TOTALS ARMY & NAVY	100,149

SECRET

A1-3

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Copy to file

OFFICE OF
DONALD M. NELSON
CHAIRMAN

November 5, 1942

SECRET

My dear Mr. President:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of October 29 setting our airplane goal at 82,000 combat planes and 25,000 non-combat planes for the calendar year 1943. We are setting our production schedules to meet this goal and promise you that every single bit of our experience and energy will be devoted to its accomplishment.

We are going to attempt to make 82,000 planes of the highest quality possible, because quality is more important in airplanes than quantity. It has been the experience on the fighting front that one plane of outstanding quality is equal in combat to four or five planes of inferior grade.

In order to accomplish this goal we have revamped our production organization. I have put Mr. C. E. Wilson in charge of the airplane program and have given him full power and authority to see that the objective is achieved.

Very sincerely yours,

Donald M. Nelson
Donald M. Nelson

The President

The White House



A1-3

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
November 3, 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

On October 30th, you submitted a memorandum asking if it would be possible to determine before November 7th whether or not steel could be made available to increase the merchant shipbuilding program as recommended by the War Shipping Administration.

The Joint U. S. Staff Planners are currently engaged in an intensive study for the purpose of adjusting the over-all military requirements to the production capabilities for 1943. They are to submit this report to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff not later than November 10th.

In making this study, there are innumerable computations to be made, and the Committee will be unable to draw logical conclusions until all of this spade work has been accomplished. They feel that they should have the over-all picture before they can draw an accurate conclusion as to whether the steel for the shipbuilding program can be made available. Unfortunately, the progress of their work will not permit them to put this picture together until sometime after November 7th.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, feel that it would be unwise to submit a recommendation with reference to this matter until the study referred to above has been completed. Their recommendations should reach you not later than November 10th or 11th.

For the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy

WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy



SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

65552

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
WASHINGTON.

October 31, 1942

SECRET

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(SC)CV/S1-1
(047900A)

My dear Mr. President:

Recently you made a contingent approval of the project for four large 45,000-ton airplane carriers. In your approval, you directed me to have the General Board certify in writing the answer to two queries that you put to them. I am attaching hereto their reply.

Their answer to your first query is unequivocal.

To the second query, they adhere to the original estimates for time necessary to construct these ships. However, I think this answer is dictated by a regard for their own reputation more than anything else. If they say they can be finished in a shorter time and they are not, they will hurt themselves in your estimation. If they say the time cannot be shortened and it is, they won't suffer any from that sort of a situation. In other words, we have here a typical naval psychology in action.

Yours sincerely,

Frank Knox

The President

The White House

Enclosure

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

64099

G.B.No. 420-7
(Serial No. 230)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
GENERAL BOARD
WASHINGTON

RAB

OCT 28 1942

From: Chairman General Board
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: 45,000-ton Airplane Carriers - Construction of.

References: (a) SecNav Memo SC 1014101 of 13 October 1942.
(b) General Board letter G.B.No. 420-7 (Serial No. 223) of 11 September 1942.

1. The General Board has reviewed the question of constructing four 45,000-ton airplane carriers, giving particular and careful consideration to reference (a) and to the memorandum from the President of the United States dated October 8, 1942. In this memorandum the President states:

"I am, therefore, willing to approve the immediate laying down of these four large carriers on two conditions:

1. That the General Board will certify that the program for the immediate construction of smaller carriers is adequate for the next two years.

2. That greater speed can be made in the construction of these 45,000-ton carriers than is indicated in the report of the General Board of September 11th."

2. In view of the discussion in reference (b) the General Board assumes that the "smaller carriers" referred to by the President relates to:

(a) carriers now being converted from light cruisers, and

(b) carriers now being constructed from merchant hulls or provided for by the conversion of existing merchant ships.


With respect to the first of these two categories, the number can not be increased except at the expense of cruiser tonnage. In view of the critical need for more cruisers, the Board does not believe that the allocation of any additional cruisers now building or projected for conversion to carriers is justified. With respect to the vessels of the second category, the Board is of the opinion that the number converted, in process or projected is adequate.

Regraded Unclassified

G.B.No. 420-7 (Serial No. 230)

The question of adequacy is a relative one, involving comparative strengths in numbers and in design features, plans for the conduct of the war, and the unpredictable results of hostilities over a long period. Having all of these matters in mind, the Board can only state that, in its judgment, the number of these smaller carriers projected is adequate.

3. The agencies of the Navy Department having to do with ship construction have been consulted and the General Board is of the opinion that greater speed can not be made in the construction of the 45,000-ton carriers than is indicated in its report of September 11th. In fact, it is possible that the dates given in the above-mentioned report are over-optimistic on account of present less favorable prospects as regards man power in addition to the other limitations discussed in reference (a).



Copy to V.C.N.O.

A1-3

held

October 30, 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

I am very glad that it appears likely that the steel will be available for the increased merchant shipping. I think this is the most important unfinished business we have from a production point of view and I realize that every day's delay in getting it started means that the ships will come out at a later date on the other end.

Would it not be possible for you to get this report to me not later than November 7th?

FDR

A1-3

October 29, 1942

SECRET

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have addressed today to Mr. Nelson. It outlines the understanding reached following our discussions last week.

I am anxious to reiterate my strong feeling that the 82,000 combat planes is not merely a goal to shoot at. I am convinced it can be realized and I am sure that the accomplishment of it may have far-reaching effects on the outcome of the war.

Very sincerely yours,

Enclosure.

The Honorable
The Secretary of War.

413
A1-3
SECRET

October 29, 1942.

My dear Mr. Nelson:-

This letter will confirm the understanding between you, General Marshall, Admiral King and myself relative to the 1943 production of aircraft.

The aircraft program will provide for the production of a minimum of 107,000 planes total, of which 82,000 shall be combat type. This program for aircraft, aircraft engines and their components will be given highest priority and whatever preference is needed to insure its accomplishment.

The Army, the Navy and other governmental agencies are to cooperate to the fullest in the furtherance of this program.

I want to reiterate that this directive calling for 82,000 combat planes and 25,000 non-combat planes for the calendar year 1943 does not mean production on a monthly basis at the end of 1943 at a rate equal to one-twelfth of the above planes, but that it does call for the production, or in other words actual delivery, of 82,000 combat planes and 25,000 non-combat planes between January 1, 1943 and December 31, 1943.

Finally, for the sake of the record, I want to make it clear that the above figure was the figure which you and the Army and Navy agreed could be produced within the calendar year 1943.

It is really essential that in one way or another this program be carried out in toto.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed)

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Donald M. Nelson,
Chairman, War Production Board,
Washington, D. C.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

October 28, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

On October 16th Admiral Land and Mr. Douglas submitted a recommendation to you proposing that 1,330,000 tons of steel be made available to the Maritime Commission, which they stated would result in an additional 2,856,000 tons of merchant shipping which could be constructed in existing Maritime yards. You referred their recommendation to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff for comment.

The Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff have studied this matter and find that there is a possibility of making the necessary amount of steel available for this purpose without interfering with the balance of the military program. However, it is probable that the surplus steel over and above that required by the military program and the currently approved shipbuilding program will not be available until some time in the third quarter of 1943.

A study is now being made with a view to reconciling the military requirements to the production capabilities in 1943 that have been indicated by the War Production Board.

The Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff, while recognizing the desirability of the increased merchant shipping which the Maritime Commission proposes, recommend that you defer decision on the matter until the study referred to above, with reference to military requirements and production capabilities, has been completed. It can then be determined with more accuracy as to what the effects of approving the Maritime Commission's recommendations will be. The study will be completed not later than November 15, 1942.

For the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.



SECRET

A1-3

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Capt MacLean
to file*

001170

OCT 8 1942

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

For: Admiral Leahy.

Subject: Disposition of Airplanes Produced under
Naval Cognizance - Calendar Year 1942.

1. The attached tables indicate the monthly acceptances of Naval airplanes produced in the calendar year 1942, the summary by models, and the summary by types. The monthly figures for October, November, and December, are predicted acceptances and both summary tables include the predicted acceptances for those months.

2. The matter of training plane requirements for all service for the coming year is at present being reviewed by the Joint Aircraft Committee. The result of this study will determine what, if any, facilities, small or large, now devoted to training plane production, can be converted for the production of combatant aircraft. It is not possible to make a statement in this matter until the Joint Aircraft Committee has completed its study. A further report in the matter will therefore be made.

E. J. King
E. J. KING

A1-3

SECRET

ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

October 8, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Letter from Mr. Donald Nelson to the President,
dated October 3, 1942.

1. Mr. Nelson's report shows that we can build an air force of the size required to secure air supremacy.
2. Air action as the dominant factor, properly supported and extended by the action of surface forces will win the war.
3. The Army Air Forces are prepared to operate the required equipment provided for in the Air War Plan '42, a copy of which you have.
4. Almost all of our combat air units can reach the point of employment under their own power. Shipping requirements for the remainder and accessory equipment described in the Air War Plan can be met.
5. To obtain decisive results, air power must be employed en masse - half measures will not do. Working with the RAF we can apply the mass necessary when the equipment is available.
6. To apply direct pressure against Japan, advances must be made by utilizing air strength supported by surface forces so that we can obtain bases from which air power can hit at the heart of Japan.
7. This advancing of bases must be relentless and must be limited only by the availability of forces not required to crush Germany.
8. I realize the drain of this plan on the Nation's productive capacity, but I have every confidence in it. Therefore, it is urgently recommended that you direct Mr. Nelson to give aircraft production an unassailable priority over the other programs outlined in his letter and that we adhere to the Air War Plan with steadfastness and confidence.



H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Incl: Memo for Gen. Arnold from
F.D.R., 10/6/42 /w/
Ltr to the Pres. from Mr.
Nelson, 10/3/42 /w/ Memo
to Mr. Nelson from Joint
Aircraft Planning Com., 9/28/42
subj: Aircraft Prod. in 1943 /w/
Exhibit A /w/ Tables 1 thru 11.



SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD

Will you speak to me
about this?

F.D.R.

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF
DONALD M. NELSON
CHAIRMAN

October 3, 1942

SECRET

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

In response to your letter of September 17 listing the number of airplanes which you regard as essential to be produced in 1943, I have had the matter studied thoroughly.

1. I believe your objectives can be achieved if airplanes are given a clear green light over all other war programs. There is for this purpose sufficient material and labor. Facilities which are now in existence, those already planned, plus a very limited number of new plants, as well as some conversion from other purposes, will be adequate.

2. If you decide on your objectives, there are some major considerations to bear in mind.

(a) Additional strain on the supply of aluminum, alloy steel, machine tools and other industrial equipment will develop. As you say in your letter "something of course must give way". In view of the limit of our production resources, the balance of our requirements will have to be adjusted, and, in some cases, postponed.

(b) Your objective can in any case only be carried out in 1943 if the decision to do so is taken at once. I suggest then that the necessary readjustment of the remainder of the program of requirements be dealt with by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by me immediately thereafter.

(c) The prospects of producing in 1943 the plane objectives are based on the assumption that the planes to be produced are to be those of the present, and now contemplated, models and design. Obviously, any major changes in type would bring new difficulties and delays. If, however, as you may well have in mind, any material changes should be made in the types now contemplated, then decisions on these matters should be made within a very short time after you have decided on your quantity objectives.



Attached is a more detailed report on the subject.

Respectfully yours,

SECRET

Donald M. Nelson

Attachment

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 28, 1942

PLANNING COMMITTEE

IN REPLY REFER TO:

TO: Donald M. Nelson

FROM: Joint Aircraft Planning Committee

SUBJECT: Aircraft Production in 1943

A. Our aircraft production plans have all been made in relation to the President's objective of 125,000 planes for 1943. Appraisals of this objective have all been on the basis of the existing spare and spare parts requirements, averaging 30% spares. Reassessment of these spare requirements is now under way by the Joint Aircraft Committee. This will probably result in a downward revision of most of the spare requirements, possibly to about 25%.

You have recently been requested to evaluate the possibility of attaining a new objective of 131,000 planes in 1943. Taking into account the changed composition of planes in this new proposal, and the probable reduction in the provision of spares, we find that the burden of achieving the new 131,000 plane program, in terms of machine tools, facilities, and raw material requirements, differs only inconsequentially from the previous 125,000 plane objective. The following analysis, therefore, has been made throughout in terms of fulfilling the President's existing objective of 125,000 planes with 30% spares.

I. Objectives for 1943

Airplane production in 1942 will probably total under 50,000 planes as contrasted with the President's objective of 60,000. The tactical plane production will fall one-third short. Production for the first quarter of 1943 is already pretty well set by current activities, at a level one-quarter short of the President's objective.

The major limiting factors for aircraft production in 1943 are in fabricating capacity for aircraft engines, propellers, and other components, and for aluminum products, and in allocations of machine tools, alloy steel, and copper. These limiting factors can be overcome by prompt and ruthless action, including severe cuts in other programs and the diversion to the aircraft program of raw materials, machine tools, existing structures, and manpower from other military products.

The most rapid possible completion of facilities now being built will affect aircraft production in 1942 little if at all. This would provide capacity to build about 107,000 planes in 1943. If new facilities are



added which can be completed by the middle of 1943 and necessary materials are allocated, production can be increased to 112,000 planes.

To get the maximum possible plane production, the expansion objectives should be somewhat higher than now appears feasible. It is therefore suggested that schedules, contracts, and allocations be based on producing 125,000 planes in 1943. At the same time, military plans should be based on the tactical employment of 112,000 planes.

These estimates presuppose that various types and models will remain as now contemplated. Further substantial changes in design or composition as a result of fighting experience may reduce quantities completed.

The magnitude of the suggested objective is indicated by the fact that it will require 40% of the Nation's military production. It will require the diversion to the aircraft program of 2/3 of the tools now scheduled for expanding plants for ordnance and transport and combat vehicles. It will require reaching a monthly rate of plane production of 6,600 for next January. By mid-1943, it must be the rate of 11,100. By December, it will have to be 13,500 planes monthly - 1,000 above any previous peak estimate.

II. What Must be Done to Achieve this Schedule.

A. All aircraft facilities now planned must be completed at the earliest possible date without interference. Approximately 85,000 tools are needed, or 35% of the output of the machine tool industry for the next year.

B. Additional fabricating capacity must be planned and completed by the middle of 1943. New plants will be required for propellers, engines, airframes, components. It may be possible to convert some existing plants (including some ordnance plants).

C. Orders should be issued to transfer critical tools not being utilized in the production of critical end products, to aircraft plants requiring such machine tools.

D. Alumina capacity increases will have to be expedited.

E. Aluminum fabricating facilities will have to be expedited and increased. Such facilities must be allocated tools and materials on the same basis as proposed for aircraft plants. These will be required for production of high-strength extrusions, high-strength sheet, aluminum wire, rod, and bar, and propeller forgings. Possible help can be secured by converting steel working facilities. Some plane designs will have to be modified to substitute tubes or rolled shapes for scarce products like extrusions.

F. Much closer scheduling of aluminum to aircraft plants, much tighter material and inventory control in such plants, and a sharp reduction in the flow-time in aircraft fabrication, all are needed.

G. Alloy steel needs can be met only by diverting steel from other proposed uses such as combat vehicles and ordnance. Even with the utilization of some open hearth alloy steel, it will still be necessary to expedite electric furnace capacity expansion now planned.

H. Aircraft copper requirements are approximately 5% of total requirements and should cause no great difficulties to give aircraft adequate allocations.

I. It is essential that bauxite imports be continued under convoy at the rate of 300,000 tons a month (for U.S. and Canadian production), until facilities are completed to use domestic low-grade bauxite.

III. Impact Upon Production of Other Munitions.

We do not have the raw materials nor the industrial capacity to reach the Presidential aircraft objective in 1943 and also fulfill all our other present objectives. The major over-all bottlenecks as now foreseeable are in alloy steel and copper.

A. Steel. Alloy steel requirements for the 4th quarter of 1942 will have to be cut down by 25% before they can be brought into line with supply. Sharp cuts are necessary regardless of how many aircraft are produced. The shortage continues at a gradually decreasing intensity, with requirements for the 4th quarter of 1943 in excess of supply by one-seventh. (Table 1.) Because aircraft takes such a small part (15%) of the total alloy steel requirements, the necessary percentage cuts in alloy steel for other services will not be much heavier for the 125,000 plane objective than under the present 107,000 plane schedule.

Equipment for the ground Army accounts for almost half of the alloy steel demand; naval ships take one-twelfth, and naval ordnance 5%. (Table 1.) Tank and combat vehicles make up over half of the Army demands. Ten individual items, including medium, assault, and light tanks, self-propelled mounts, 50 cal. ammunition, 75 m.m. shell bodies, 2-1/2 ton trucks, and 13-place personnel carriers, take two-thirds of all the Army requirements. (Table 2.) If all Army ground items were cut by half for the next quarter, that would eliminate 92% of the shortage. If, in addition, naval ordnance and ship requirements were cut by one-eighth, that would balance alloy steel supplies and requirements, including requirements for the 125,000 plane program.

Cuts as large as this would be only temporary. By the second quarter of 1943, a cut of 1/3 in production for the Army and no cut for the Navy would be all that was required; and by the 4th quarter, only a cut of 1/4th for the ground Army.

B. Copper. As indicated above, aircraft requirements represent only a small proportion of the total. The excess of aggregate copper requirements over the available supply is indicated in Table 3.

C. Machine tools. Completion of the President's aircraft program will depend upon large and immediate increases in the proportion of new machine tools which go into aircraft industry plants and aluminum fabrication. This would mean deferring completion of many incomplete plant expansions for Army-type equipment by 3 to 6 months (note Exhibit A.) If current production of ordnance and other Army-type equipment is cut as sharply as seems necessary in view of the alloy steel and copper bottlenecks, most of the reduced ground Army production can

be readily fabricated in plants already completed. Even some plants already completed can be converted to aircraft. (This has already taken place in some cases, where ordnance capacity is excessive.) Expanding and expediting the aluminum-fabricating program, however, may compete at some points with other raw material expansions.

D. Aluminum supply, though critical for aircraft, cannot be met by diversion from other uses. More than 90% of most aluminum products now go to aircraft. The over-all aluminum ingot supply will be adequate to meet the demand. (Tables 4 and 5.) The slight apparent deficit for the next two quarters can be overcome by reducing the flow-time, and by the reduction in the ground Army objectives necessitated by the alloy steel and copper situations.

As already indicated, there is a much tighter situation for several types of aluminum products, especially high-strength sheet, extrusions, wire, rod, and bar, and some forgings. (Tables 6 and 7.) Ground Army uses require almost half as much wire, rod, and bar as do aircraft; and the Navy 1/3 as much. (Tables 8 and 8-A.) Cuts in production for these services would ease the aluminum wire, rod, and bar situation materially. In other scarce aluminum products, such as extruded shapes (Table 9,) tubing (Table 10), and sheets (Table 11), the quantities used by the ground forces and the Navy are so small that even sharp cuts in their requirements will still leave marked deficits. Speeding up completion of plant expansions now under way, diverting processing equipment from steel, cutting down the flow-time, and redesigning planes away from scarce aluminum products will help to balance supply and demand in these cases.

IV. Recommendations.

The objective for 1943 should be 125,000 planes.

If this objective is to be achieved it will be essential that certain broad policies be followed in addition to the detailed suggestions made above.

A. There must be a reduction in other parts of the military program to keep total demands within range of feasibility. Otherwise unbalance prevents maximum production of completed units.

B. Effective manpower policies must be put into action so that essential mining operations (such as bauxite) will not be interrupted; that plants are kept operating at full capacity; that key production or management men are not drafted or recruited into the armed forces; that essential industrial workers are not left in non-essential industries.


C. There must be tight control of material and production scheduling, of inventories, and of production of all parts and instruments. This means more direct guidance by Government authorities of manufacturing establishments.

D. There is need for centralizing aircraft production, procurement, and directive responsibilities in a single existing agency. The diffusion of authority that exists today would be relieved by concentrating authority.


E. The airplane goal for 1943 cannot be produced unless a Directive from the Commander-in-Chief is given to take whatever material, tools, equipment and manpower are needed, and an order given to all Arms and Services, and other Government agencies involved, to act promptly in meeting such requests. Such action will have serious consequences on other elements of munitions production. Some projects will be delayed for many months. Unless superior authority is prepared to face this fact realistically and to stick to it, the endeavor should not be undertaken. Half measures will result not only in failure to meet the aircraft goal, but in a reduction in total war output through the confusion incident to alteration of programs and resultant loss of time.

It is the belief of the Committee that if the above proposals are adopted and carried through to the letter, there is a possibility of meeting the objective of 125,000 planes next year.

For the Joint Aircraft Planning Committee



Robert Nathan, Chairman, W.P.B. Planning Committee



Mordecai Ezekiel, Consultant, W.P.B. Planning Committee

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

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Gen. B. E. Meyers, U.S. Army Air Force

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CONSULTANTS ON TECHNICAL MATTERS:

Navy:

Capt. E. M. Pace, Jr., U.S.N.

Capt. H. B. Sallada, U.S.N.

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WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Harold A. Talbott, Director
Aircraft Production Division

From: George C. Brainard
Director, Tools Division

Subject: Air Corps Machine Tool Requirements

With reference to your request of September 4th, I am enclosing herewith the answers to the memorandum you gave me in your office.

The quantity of tools involved has increased materially over the figures in your memorandum. I was at Wright Field on Friday, at which time they made a determination for me of the requirement of 63,555 tools, including presses and hammers, which they wish to obtain in the balance of 1942. That left 34,282 for delivery in 1943. This would indicate that since July 1st, the Air Corps has ordered somewhere between twenty and twenty-five thousand tools through its prime contractors.

I believe very strongly that this number of tools will not be required to meet the programs laid down. We must strive for the greater utilization of machine tools now in plants and a much finer screening of requirements than has heretofore existed.

I shall be glad to discuss this with you at your convenience.

/s/ Geo. C. Brainard
George C. Brainard
Director, Tools Division

Enclosure

C
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WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Harold A. Talbott
Per Donald M. Nelson's request dated September 3, 1942

From: George C. Brainard

Subject: Air Corps Machine Tool Requirements

As of September 1st the Air Forces have on order a total of 97,837 machine tools including presses and hammers. Delivery of 63,555 tools is requested through the balance of this year. The remainder as soon as possible during 1943.

Providing necessary material is made available to machine tool builders and the green light is given to Air Corps requirements it is possible to meet these requirements out of the Service allocations.

The other Services would be affected substantially as follows:

1. The two most critical tools are thread grinders and balancing machines.

If orders for thread grinders for end product use were delivered as required there would be practically no machines available for the thread gauge expansion program, vital to both Air Forces and Ordnance.

No delivery of balancing machines for turbine balancing could be made to the Navy Bureau of Ships.

2. Other delays would be as follows:

a. Four months on some tools for Army Ordnance for tanks and mobile artillery principally for transmissions and final drives.

b. Two months on some tools for Army Ordnance for guns for above items.

c. Four months on delivery of some tools for fire control instruments, radio, radar, computers, etc., affecting both Army Ordnance and Navy Bureau of Ordnance.

d. Two months on some tools for Army Ordnance for guns of caliber of less than 75 millimeter.

e. Two months on some tools for Army small arms.

f. Slight delay on machine tools for ammunitions program principally 20 millimeter, 50 caliber and 30 caliber projectiles.

September 7, 1942

3. Auxiliary Equipment.

a. The anti-friction bearing program should meet the requirements of the military and naval program.

b. Gauge program other than thread gauges as mentioned above should meet the requirements of the military and naval program.

c. Cutting Tools. A reduction of 10% of all other service requirements will require diversion to the Air corps.

d. Cranes. To fulfill Aircraft requirements will require stopping construction of practically all other cranes for approximately three months and reallocating crane manufacturers' man hours to Air Corps requirements, since cranes for Air Corps requirements differ in specifications from those required by other services. An overall directive would be necessary to effect this change especially in connection with motor and electrical equipment.

e. On Monorails an overall directive on material including electrical materials would be necessary in order to meet the requirements of Air Forces. Other than in material there is practically no interference with monorails for other services.

f. Forging Hammers and Presses. There is insufficient equipment in process to take care of the proposed Air Forces program except by taking all that will be built, including Russian. Those building are generally not divertable. If forging hammers and press manufacturers were instructed to put all their efforts on the Air Forces equipment, the time-lag in building heavy presses and hammers would prevent the completion of the 1942 requirements in less than six months.

Possible method of ameliorating above conditions:

1. Insistence that the Services be compelled to remove machines already delivered from plants that are not making full utilization to those plants which are short. It is believed that considerable quantities of machines can be obtained by this action since there has been considerable over-ordering and advanced deliveries to contractors for their programs. This over-ordering may be due to changes in scheduled requirements as well as under-estimating machine production.

2. Insistence that immediate cancellation be made of any and all orders in excess of actual requirements. Such machines should be made available for allocation to any service needing them instead of holding up cancellation and diverting by the service to other of their own contractors since this action puts a premium on over-ordering.

/s/ Geo. C. Brainard
George C. Brainard
Director, Tools Division

Joint Aircraft
Planning Committee

Table 1
UNITED STATES ALLOY SUPPLY AND REQUIREMENTS TO MEET
PRODUCTION SCHEDULES
Second Half, 1942, and Year 1943
(000 Net Ingot Tons, Excluding Castings)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

September 25, 1942

	1942		1943			
	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter	1st Quarter	2nd Quarter	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter
Aircraft (B-K Ultimate Aircraft Prog.)	447	637	686	712	737	762
Air Force: (ex. facilities)						
Small Arms & Cannon	21	25	25	25	25	25
Bombs and Ammunition	153	111	111	111	111	111
Ground Equipment	63	63	63	63	63	63
All Other	3	2	3	2	2	2
Total	687	838	888	913	938	963
Army Ground: (ex. facilities)						
Tank & Combat Vehicles	971	1,072	1,116	1,160	1,160	1,160
Other Vehicles	174	201	220	222	222	222
Artillery Materiel	159	170	172	150	150	150
Artillery Ammunition	238	238	238	237	237	237
Small Arms Materiel	44	45	41	37	37	37
Small Arms Ammunition	93	107	107	107	107	107
All Other	40	35	37	36	34	35
Total	1,719	1,868	1,931	1,949	1,947	1,948
Navy: (ex. facilities)						
Ships	471	493	452	382	375	353
Ordnance	187	208	217	220	237	221
U.S. Marine Corps & Coast Guard	15	16	15	13	13	12
All Other	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total	674	718	685	616	626	587
Maritime (incl. ship repair)	45	43	43	36	36	36
Exports	282	326	326	326	326	326
Machinery, Equipment, Maintenance & Repair Consumer End Products	504	504	375	375	375	375
Total Requirements	3,911	4,297	4,248	4,215	4,248	4,235
Supply	2,946	3,281	3,438	3,555	3,753	3,753
Deficiency	965	1,016	810	660	495	482
Deficiency, % of Requirements	24.7	23.6	19.1	15.6	11.5	11.4

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Table 2. Alloy Steel Requirements and Schedules for
20 Major Items of Army Ground Equipment,
Last Quarter 1942 and Year 1943, by Quarters.

SECRET
September 29, 1942

		Number of Units Scheduled					Ingot Requirements, in Net Tons					
		1942	1943	1943	1943	1943	1942	1943	1943	1943	1943	Total
Unit		4thQuarter	1stQuarter	2ndQuarter	3rdQuarter	4thQuarter	4thQuarter	1stQuarter	2ndQuarter	3rdQuarter	4thQuarter	All Quarters
							(Thousand tons)	(Thousand tons)	(Thousand tons)	(Thousand tons)	(Thousand tons)	(Thousand tons)
Total, All Army Ground Items							1,868	1,931	1,949	1,947	1,948	9,643
Total for 20 Items							1,410	1,512	1,525	1,447	1,447	7,341
Tank, Medium M3 & M4 with armament	one	11,430	11,929	11,490	11,490	11,490	557	582	560	560	560	2,819
Tank, Modified Medium 3" Gun A.T.S.P.	one	2,050	2,400	2,400	2,400	2,400	97	114	114	114	114	553
Bomb 1000# S.A.P. as M59	thousand	186	186	186	186	186	99	99	99	99	99	495
Trucks, 2-1/2 ton	one	61,052	69,377	77,220	77,222	77,222	73	82	93	93	93	434
Cartridge, A.P. cal. .50	million	644	823	1,010	1,010	1,010	56	72	88	88	88	392
Shell, 75mm. A.P.C. M51	thousand	5,452	5,542	5,452	1,294	1,294	100	100	100	24	24	348
Tank, Light M3 w/o armament	one	3,720	3,120	3,120	3,120	3,120	65	65	65	65	65	325
Personnel Carrier M3-13 place	one	7,350	8,100	9,000	9,000	9,000	49	54	60	60	60	283
Tank, Modified Medium 105mm. How.S.P.	one	1,125	1,125	1,125	1,125	1,125	53	53	53	53	53	265
Tank, Assault w/o armament	one	0	185	615	1,200	1,200	0	13	45	87	97	232
Car Armored Medium	one	2,100	2,100	2,100	2,100	2,100	36	36	36	36	36	180
Truck, 1-1/2 ton	one	45,386	46,214	46,209	46,215	46,215	32	32	32	32	32	160
Shell, 57 m.m.APM 70	thousand	4,890	4,890	4,890	3,059	3,059	36	36	36	22	22	152
Modified 1/2 track, M3 for twin cal AA.MG	one	3,523	3,523	3,523	3,523	3,523	26	26	26	26	26	130
MG cal..50 Brg. Fix & Flex	thousand	169	184	184	177	177	24	27	27	25	25	128
Shell, 37mm.APC M51 & M59	million	18	17	4	0	0	49	46	11	0	0	106
Gun, 80mm.AA Mobile	one	2,174	2,493	2,506	998	998	25	28	28	11	11	103
Truck, 3/4 & 3/4 ton	one	7,322	24,406	30,676	31,690	31,690	8	16	20	20	20	84
Personnel Carrier M2, 8 Place	one	1,875	2,550	2,700	2,700	2,700	12	16	17	17	17	79
Gun, 40mm.AA M1	one	5,423	6,309	6,366	6,539	6,539	13	15	15	15	15	73

Regraded Unclassified

Joint Aircraft Planning
Committee

TABLE III

U. S. SUPPLY AND REQUIREMENTS OF COPPER
TO MEET PRODUCTION SCHEDULES
July 1, 1942 to December 31, 1943
(Short Tons)

September 28, 1942

REQUIREMENTS	1942		1943			
	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter	1st Quarter	2nd Quarter	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter
1. <u>Aircraft</u> (8-K Ultimate)	<u>19,534</u>	<u>25,252</u>	<u>30,083</u>	<u>32,672</u>	<u>33,454</u>	<u>34,102</u>
2. <u>Air Force</u> (Ex Facilities						
a. Small Arms and Cannon	220	278	308	308	309	309
b. Bombs and Ammunition	10,839	11,989	7,067	2,056	708	609
c. Ground Equipment	825	1,252	1,241	1,093	1,083	1,083
d. Chemical Warfare Equipment	493	245	245	245	245	244
e. Signal Equipment	2,097	1,808	1,043	2,081	1,258	1,258
TOTAL AIR FORCE	<u>14,474</u>	<u>15,572</u>	<u>9,904</u>	<u>5,783</u>	<u>3,603</u>	<u>3,503</u>
3. <u>Ground Forces</u> (Ex Facilities)						
a. Chemical Warfare	3,063	2,107	3,157	2,966	4,011	4,011
b. Engineer Corps	1,417	2,148	2,126	1,873	1,856	1,856
c. Artillery Ammunition	75,765	79,629	67,467	53,650	41,716	37,656
d. Artillery Materiel	12,515	15,145	15,216	14,789	9,429	9,429
e. Small Arms and Ammunition	166,635	188,826	202,091	211,831	213,131	213,131
f. Tank and Combat Vehicles	9,266	13,176	14,563	15,347	15,861	15,861
g. Automotive Equipment	12,462	7,590	8,378	8,988	9,043	9,043
h. Other Quartermaster Equipment	7,382	2,711	2,607	3,293	4,170	4,170
i. Signal Corps	10,375	5,566	5,007	4,630	4,595	4,595
j. All Other	529	610	615	610	654	654
TOTAL GROUND FORCE	<u>299,409</u>	<u>317,508</u>	<u>321,227</u>	<u>317,977</u>	<u>304,466</u>	<u>300,406</u>
Misc. & Expendable Ground	<u>14,401</u>	<u>15,351</u>	<u>15,243</u>	<u>15,220</u>	<u>15,338</u>	<u>23,842</u>
Misc. & Expendable Air	<u>1,565</u>	<u>2,371</u>	<u>3,231</u>	<u>2,848</u>	<u>2,822</u>	<u>2,821</u>
TOTAL ARMY	<u>329,849</u>	<u>350,802</u>	<u>349,605</u>	<u>341,838</u>	<u>326,229</u>	<u>330,572</u>

Regaded Unclassified

TABLE III - Continued

U. S. SUPPLY AND REQUIREMENTS OF COPPER
TO MEET PRODUCTION SCHEDULES
July 1, 1942 to December 31, 1943
(Short Tons)

	1942		1943			
	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter	1st Quarter	2nd Quarter	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter
(Requirements)						
4. Navy (Ex. Facilities)						
a. Ships	97,419	106,603	118,466	122,677	125,907	130,703
b. Ordnance	64,503	71,629	92,132	93,787	98,165	99,967
c. All Other	1,536	938	1,020	1,273	1,299	1,254
TOTAL NAVY	<u>163,458</u>	<u>179,170</u>	<u>211,618</u>	<u>217,737</u>	<u>225,371</u>	<u>231,924</u>
5. Maritime Commission (Including Ship Repairs)	<u>24,474</u>	<u>25,113</u>	<u>24,978</u>	<u>27,554</u>	<u>27,554</u>	<u>27,554</u>
6. Exports	<u>71,400</u>	<u>69,900</u>	<u>92,895</u>	<u>92,895</u>	<u>92,895</u>	<u>92,895</u>
7. Construction						
a. Direct Military	32,115	39,543	31,731	29,054	19,923	13,480
b. Plant Expansion	11,830	8,236	7,720	7,265	4,925	4,315
c. War Housing & Community Fac.	4,374	2,448	3,340	2,500	2,060	2,060
d. All Other Construction	3,629	2,615	2,480	2,130	1,420	1,070
TOTAL CONSTRUCTION	<u>51,948</u>	<u>52,832</u>	<u>45,271</u>	<u>40,949</u>	<u>28,328</u>	<u>20,925</u>
8. Industrial Equipment, Maintenance and Repair	<u>53,094</u>	<u>49,347</u>	<u>58,419</u>	<u>55,525</u>	<u>42,290</u>	<u>39,808</u>
9. Transportation & Public Util.	<u>103,815</u>	<u>50,066</u>	<u>149,222</u>	<u>51,812</u>	<u>50,019</u>	<u>48,224</u>
10. Consumers' End Prods. & Misc.	<u>9,231</u>	<u>9,100</u>	<u>12,781</u>	<u>12,779</u>	<u>12,779</u>	<u>12,779</u>
TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	826,803	811,582	874,872	873,761	838,919	838,783
SUPPLY	<u>659,400</u>	<u>676,900</u>	<u>694,900</u>	<u>701,900</u>	<u>696,900</u>	<u>698,300</u>
DEFICIT	167,403	134,682	179,972	171,861	142,019	140,483
Deficit as % of Requirements	20.2	16.6	20.6	19.7	16.9	16.7

Table 4.

CONFIDENTIAL

Joint Aircraft Planning Committee

September 25, 1942

UNITED STATES ALUMINUM SUPPLY AND REQUIREMENTS
TO MEET PRODUCTION SCHEDULES

(Unit 1000 Pounds)

	1942		1 9 4 3				Year
	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter	1st Quarter	2nd Quarter	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter	
<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>492,405</u>	<u>595,870</u>	<u>687,352</u>	<u>729,900</u>	<u>740,550</u>	<u>747,292</u>	<u>2,905,195</u>
<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>319,957</u>	<u>423,935</u>	<u>507,173</u>	<u>550,616</u>	<u>568,721</u>	<u>577,288</u>	<u>2,203,798</u>
<u>Army</u>	<u>70,254</u>	<u>71,479</u>	<u>77,057</u>	<u>76,888</u>	<u>75,959</u>	<u>75,759</u>	<u>305,663</u>
<u>Air Force</u>	<u>18,014</u>	<u>17,849</u>	<u>20,267</u>	<u>20,068</u>	<u>20,014</u>	<u>19,814</u>	<u>80,163</u>
Armament Equipment	14	19	24	24	25	25	98
Ammunition & Bombs	1,900	2,500	3,200	3,200	3,200	3,100	12,700
Signal Equipment	5,500	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	4,900	19,900
Chemical Warfare	7,600	5,800	5,850	5,850	5,850	5,850	23,400
Ground Force Equipment	800	1,200	1,200	1,000	945	945	4,090
Misc. Equipment & Supplies	2,200	3,330	4,993	4,994	4,994	4,994	19,975
<u>Ground Force</u>	<u>52,240</u>	<u>53,630</u>	<u>56,790</u>	<u>56,820</u>	<u>55,895</u>	<u>55,895</u>	<u>225,400</u>
<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>30,200</u>	<u>37,700</u>	<u>41,000</u>	<u>41,050</u>	<u>39,125</u>	<u>39,125</u>	<u>160,300</u>
Artillery Ammunition	9,900	11,200	12,100	12,200	12,200	12,200	48,700
Artillery Material	4,500	5,600	6,900	6,800	4,800	4,800	23,300
Tanks & Combat Vehicles	15,000	20,000	21,000	20,900	20,900	20,900	83,700
Small Arms & Ammunition	800	900	1,000	1,150	1,225	1,225	4,600
Chemical Warfare Service	4,800	3,700	3,900	3,900	4,900	4,900	17,600
Engineers	1,530	2,290	2,290	2,270	2,270	2,270	9,100
Medical Department	100	100	100	100	100	100	400
Signal Corps	6,000	3,000	2,800	2,800	2,800	2,800	11,200
Quartermaster Corps	7,900	5,150	5,150	5,150	5,200	5,200	20,700
Automotive	7,000	4,800	4,800	4,800	4,850	4,850	19,300
Other	900	350	350	350	350	350	1,400
Seacoast Defense	60	40	25	25	25	25	100
Misc. Equipment & Supplies	1,650	1,650	1,525	1,525	1,525	1,525	6,100
<u>Navy</u>	<u>28,408</u>	<u>26,777</u>	<u>30,551</u>	<u>30,063</u>	<u>23,486</u>	<u>21,861</u>	<u>105,961</u>
<u>Ships</u>	<u>18,011</u>	<u>16,640</u>	<u>16,297</u>	<u>15,827</u>	<u>13,830</u>	<u>12,309</u>	<u>58,263</u>
<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>9,823</u>	<u>9,518</u>	<u>13,665</u>	<u>13,665</u>	<u>9,120</u>	<u>9,120</u>	<u>45,571</u>
<u>Aeronautics)</u>							
<u>Marine Corps)</u>	574	619	589	571	536	432	2,128
<u>Coast Guard)</u>							
<u>Maritime Commission</u>	574	589	571	633	633	633	2,471
<u>Exports</u>	<u>30,222</u>	<u>30,100</u>	<u>29,010</u>	<u>28,710</u>	<u>28,811</u>	<u>28,811</u>	<u>115,342</u>
<u>Non-Military</u>	<u>42,990</u>	<u>42,990</u>	<u>42,990</u>	<u>42,990</u>	<u>42,990</u>	<u>42,990</u>	<u>171,960</u>
<u>Production (total)</u>	<u>381,100</u>	<u>458,300</u>	<u>543,600</u>	<u>667,000</u>	<u>697,200</u>	<u>702,300</u>	<u>2,610,300</u>
<u>Primary & Secondary</u>							
<u>Imports</u>	<u>56,200</u>	<u>77,400</u>	<u>91,700</u>	<u>112,000</u>	<u>128,200</u>	<u>132,600</u>	<u>464,300</u>
<u>Total New Supply</u>	<u>437,300</u>	<u>535,700</u>	<u>635,300</u>	<u>779,000</u>	<u>825,400</u>	<u>834,900</u>	<u>3,074,600</u>
<u>Deficit or Surplus</u>	(d) 55,105	(d) 60,170	(d) 52,052	(s) 49,100	(s) 84,850	(s) 87,608	(s) 169,405

Regraded Unclassified

Table 5.

JOINT AIRCRAFT PLANNING COMMITTEE

September 25, 1942

Total Aluminum Requirements
(Unit: 1,000,000 Pounds)

	1942	1943				
	4th Quarter	1st. Quarter	2nd. Quarter	3rd. Quarter	4th Quarter	Year
<u>Grand Total</u>	564	715	786	741	747	2,989
Aircraft <u>1/</u>	392	535	607	569	577	2,288
Total New Supply	536	635	779	825	835	3,075
Deficit or Surplus (d)	28	(d) 80	(d) 7	(s) 84	(s) 88	(s) 86

1/ Adjusted for proposed change in timing of 1943 production.

Regraded Unclassified

Table 6

Fabricated Aluminum, Requirements and Capacity
Total and Air Craft,
as of December, 1942
(Under the 8-J Ultimate Air Craft Program)
129,000 Planes with 30% spares.)

Item	Capacity	Total Requirements	Aircraft Requirements ^{1/}
	Million lbs.	Million lbs.	Million lbs.
Sheet - high strength	51.2	83.8	77.0
common	12.6	12.9	5.5
Extrusions - high strength	6.8	15.0	14.9
common	0.7	1.7	0.5
Wire, rod, and bar	37.7	53.8	21.5
Tubing - high strength	3.4	4.5	3.8
common	0.5	1.1	0.4
Rivets	3.1	3.8	3.7
Forgings - pistons	4.6	4.4	4.1
propeller blade,	2.8	4.9	4.9
other large hammer,	2.7	3.7	3.7
small hammer,	4.3	8.7 ^{2/}	8.6 ^{2/}
press forgings.	4.0	3.4	1.7
Castings - sand, heat treated	22.2	23.2	20.5
sand, non heat treated	8.9	8.5	2.7
permanent mold, treated	7.3	5.9	2.4
permanent mold, non treated	4.3	0.5	0.3
die	14.2	7.1	1.9

Total

^{1/} Based on average proportion going for aircraft in 1943.

^{2/} This is believed to represent an over-estimate by the Aluminum Committee, as there are no present reported shortages.

Source: Sept., 1942, Report of the Joint Aluminum Committee of WPB and ANMB, plus some adjustments.

Joint Aircraft Planning Committee
September 25, 1942

Table 7

Fabricated Aluminum Capacity and Requirements by Products,
Total and Air Craft,
To Be Delivered in 1943
(Under the 8-J Ultimate Air Craft Program,
129,000 Planes with 30% Spares.)

Source: Sept., 1942, Report of Joint Aluminum Comm., WPB & ANMB, plus some adjustments.

Items	Capacity (for 1943)	Total Requirements	Estimated Air Craft Requirements ^{1/}
	million lbs.	million lbs.	million lbs.
Sheet - h. s.	961	1,163	1,067
common	151	176	77
Extrusions - h. s.	136	238	236
common	17	20	5
Wire, rod & bar	617	806	364
Tubing - h. s.	62	62	52
common	7	15	5
Rivets	41	53	52
Forgings - pistons,	70	72	67
propeller blades,	87	91	91
other large hammer,	89	69	69
small hammer	58	125 ^{2/}	124 ^{2/}
press forgings			
Castings -			
sand, h. t.	348	331	292
sand, non h. t.	107	109	35
permanent mold, h.t.	87	82	33
non h. t.	51	7	4
die	171	106	29
Powder		67	0
Ingot		127	100
Miscellaneous		15	10
Total		3,197	2,701 ^{3/}

^{1/} Estimated from proportion of each product used for airplanes, on the average .7

^{2/} This is believed to represent an over-estimate of requirements, according to the Aluminum Committee, as there are no current shortages reported.

^{3/} Includes estimated amounts for ingot and miscellaneous.

Table 8

September 24, 1942

Joint Aircraft Planning
CommitteeCOMPETING USES FOR ALUMINUM

On most aluminum products aircraft takes almost the entire total. This is particularly true in high-strength extruded shapes where 99.2% go to aircraft, in large hammer forgings (largely propeller forgings) where 100% go to aircraft and small hammer forgings where 98.9% go to aircraft.

In other products there are some possibilities of substitutions. The distribution of the total use of products is as follows:

<u>High-strength sheet aluminum</u>	Percent
Aircraft	91.8
Army	
Signal Corps	2.7
Navy	
Bureau of Ordnance	0.1
Bureau of Ships	1.13
Remainder (Lease-lend, export, essential civilian, indirect military)	4.06
<u>High-strength tubing</u>	
Aircraft	84.3
Army	
Signal Corps	1.6
Ammunition	0.7
Artillery	0.2
Navy	
Bureau of Ships	1.96
Bureau of Ordnance	0.36
Miscellaneous	11.0
<u>Wire, rod, and bar</u>	
Aircraft	36.6
Army	
Ammunition	13.8
Artillery	2.0
Tank and combat	1.3
Engineer Corps	0.1
Signal Corps	1.4
Navy	
Bureau of Ordnance	7.8
Bureau of Ships	7.8
Miscellaneous	29.2
<u>Heat-treated sand castings</u>	
Aircraft	88.4
Army	
Tank and combat	5.8
Signal Corps	0.7
Quartermaster Corps	2.2

Navy	
Bureau of Ordnance	0.6
Bureau of Ships	1.4
Miscellaneous	0.8
<u>Permanent mold castings, heat-treated</u>	
Aircraft	40.1
Army	
Engineer Corps	0.8
Signal Corps	0.1
Quartermaster Corps	13.0
Navy	
Bureau of Ordnance	13.9
Bureau of Ships	3.3
Miscellaneous	28.7
<u>Die castings</u>	
Aircraft	27.0
Army	
Ammunitions	19.6
Artillery	0.6
Tank and combat	2.0
Chemical warfare	25.2
Engineer Corps	1.5
Signal Corps	0.7
Quartermaster Corps	2.0
Navy	
Bureau of Ordnance	7.3
Bureau of Ships	7.2
Miscellaneous	4.8
<u>Piston forgings</u>	
Aircraft	93.2
Army	
Tank and combat	6.5
<u>Small hammer forgings</u>	
Aircraft	98.9
Army	
Tank and combat	0.9
Miscellaneous	0.1
<u>Pressings</u>	
Aircraft	42.8
Army	
Ammunition	55.3
Miscellaneous	1.6
<u>Powder</u>	
Aircraft	0

The relative importance of the various types of aluminum is shown in the following tabulation:

Joint Aircraft
Planning Committee

Table 8 A. ALUMINUM WIRE BAR & ROD
SUPPLY AND REQUIREMENTS
(Unit 000 Lbs.)

SECRET

September 28, 1942

	1942		1943				1943 Year
	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter	1st Quarter	2nd Quarter	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter	
Total	95,131	120,140	143,001	154,505	156,957	156,649	611,112
Aircraft	73,018	98,638	120,202	132,037	134,537	134,241	521,017
Army	9,531	10,559	11,444	11,447	11,285	11,282	45,458
Air Force	841	714	799	792	787	783	3,161
Armament Equipment	10	14	17	17	18	18	70
Ammunition & Bombs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Signal Equipment	247	226	225	226	225	221	897
Chemical Warfare Equipment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ground Force Equipment	34	54	54	45	41	41	181
Misc. & Expend. Supplies	550	420	503	504	503	503	2,013
Ground Force	8,690	9,845	10,645	10,655	10,498	10,499	42,297
Ordnance	8,303	9,607	10,428	10,436	10,281	10,281	41,426
Artillery Ammunition	6,950	7,890	8,480	8,520	8,520	8,520	34,040
Artillery Materiel	369	470	580	561	404	404	1,949
Tanks & Combat Vehicles	916	1,170	1,282	1,267	1,267	1,267	5,083
Small Arms & Ammunition	68	77	86	88	90	90	354
Chemical Warfare Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Engineers	28	41	41	42	42	42	167
Medical Corps	1	2	1	1	1	1	4
Signal Corps	279	139	130	131	130	130	521
Quartermaster Corps	35	15	14	14	14	14	56
Automotive	-	-	-	-	0	-	-
Supplies	35	15	14	14	14	14	56
Seacoast Defense	14	10	6	6	6	6	24
Misc. & Expend. Supplies	30	31	25	25	24	25	99
Navy	3,821	3,611	4,238	3,904	4,018	4,009	16,169
Ships	2,049	1,750	2,284	1,954	1,954	1,954	8,146
Ordnance	1,718	1,803	1,891	1,391	2,010	2,010	7,802
Aeronautics)							
Marine Corps)	54	58	63	59	54	45	221
U.S. Coast Guard)							
Maritime Commission	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Exports	6,090	4,564	4,349	4,349	4,349	4,349	17,396
Non-Military	2,671	2,768	2,768	2,768	2,768	2,768	11,072
Capacity	90,156	113,091	124,693	145,693	169,693	177,290	617,369
Deficiency	(d) 4,975	(d) 7,049	(d) 18,308	(d) 8,812	(s) 12,736	(s) 20,641	(s) 6,257
Deficiency in % of Requirements	(d) 5.30	(d) 5.86	(d) 12.80	(d) 5.70	(s) 8.11	(s) 13.18	(s) 1.02

Regraded Unclassified

TABLE 9
U. S. ALUMINUM EXTRUDED SHAPES SUPPLY AND REQUIREMENTS TO MEET PRODUCTION SCHEDULES
(Unit 000 Lbs.)

	1942		1943				1943 Year
	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter	1st Quarter	2nd Quarter	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter	
Total	36,862	46,677	53,807	58,769	62,513	64,940	240,029
Aircraft	31,649	41,494	48,763	53,621	57,371	59,806	219,561
Army	<u>1,300</u>	<u>1,549</u>	<u>1,671</u>	<u>1,666</u>	<u>1,663</u>	<u>1,660</u>	<u>6,660</u>
Air Force	<u>761</u>	<u>907</u>	<u>1,119</u>	<u>1,117</u>	<u>1,116</u>	<u>1,113</u>	<u>4,465</u>
Armament Equipment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ammunition & Bombs	46	60	76	76	76	74	302
Signal Equipment	27	25	25	25	25	24	99
Chemical Warfare	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ground Force Equipment	8	12	12	10	9	9	40
Misc. & Expend. Supplies	680	810	1,006	1,006	1,006	1,006	4,024
Ground Force	<u>539</u>	<u>642</u>	<u>552</u>	<u>549</u>	<u>547</u>	<u>547</u>	<u>2,195</u>
Ordnance	<u>29</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>156</u>
Artillery Ammunition	10	11	12	12	12	12	48
Artillery Materiel	4	6	7	7	5	5	24
Tanks & Combat Vehicles	15	20	21	21	21	21	84
Small Arms & Ammunition	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chemical Warfare Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Engineers	271	405	405	402	402	402	1,611
Medical Department	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Signal Corps	78	39	36	36	36	36	144
Quartermaster Corps	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Motor Transport	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Seacoast Defense	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Misc. & Expend. Supplies	161	161	71	71	71	71	284
Navy	<u>2,711</u>	<u>2,138</u>	<u>2,341</u>	<u>2,449</u>	<u>2,446</u>	<u>2,441</u>	<u>9,678</u>
Ships	2,407	1,832	1,908	2,019	2,019	2,019	7,965
Ordnance	271	271	395	395	395	395	1,581
Aeronautics)							
Marine Corps)	33	35	38	35	32	27	132
Coast Guard)							
Maritime Commission	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Exports	827	1,121	657	658	658	658	2,631
Non-Military	375	375	375	375	375	375	1,500
Capacity	24,057	28,119	28,154	36,623	44,247	48,975	157,999
Deficiency	<u>d 12,805</u>	<u>d 18,558</u>	<u>d 25,653</u>	<u>d 22,146</u>	<u>d 18,266</u>	<u>d 15,965</u>	<u>d 82,030</u>
Deficiency, % of Reqmts.	<u>d 34.75</u>	<u>d 39.76</u>	<u>d 47.68</u>	<u>d 37.68</u>	<u>d 29.22</u>	<u>d 24.58</u>	<u>d 34.18</u>

U. S. ALUMINUM TUBING SUPPLY AND REQUIREMENTS TO MEET PRODUCTION SCHEDULES
(Unit 000 Lbs.)

	1942		1943				Total Year
	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter	1st Quarter	2nd Quarter	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter	
TOTAL	12,851	15,415	17,757	18,833	19,002	19,122	74,716
Aircraft	9,196	11,662	13,698	14,780	14,962	15,101	58,543
Army	1,946	2,083	2,416	2,405	2,392	2,376	9,589
Airforce	1,085	1,327	1,628	1,614	1,610	1,594	6,446
Armament Equipment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ammunition & Bombs	285	375	480	480	480	465	1,905
Signal Equipment	66	60	60	60	60	59	239
Chemical Warfare	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ground Force Equipment	54	82	82	68	64	64	278
Misc. & Expend. Supplies	680	810	1,006	1,006	1,006	1,006	4,024
Ground Force	861	756	788	791	782	782	3,143
Ordnance	<u>451</u>	<u>523</u>	<u>565</u>	<u>570</u>	<u>560</u>	<u>560</u>	<u>2,255</u>
Artillery Ammunition	368	415	446	452	452	452	1,802
Artillery Materiel	23	28	35	34	24	24	117
Tanks & Combat Vehicles	60	80	84	84	84	84	336
Small Arms & Ammunition	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chemical Warfare Service	5	4	4	4	5	5	18
Engineers	32	48	48	48	48	48	192
Medical Department	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Signal Corps	306	153	143	143	143	143	572
Quartermaster Corps	<u>62</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>96</u>
Motor Transport	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	62	24	24	24	24	24	96
Seacoast Defense	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Misc. & Expend. Supplies	4	4	4	2	2	2	10
Navy	<u>419</u>	<u>395</u>	<u>353</u>	<u>358</u>	<u>358</u>	<u>355</u>	<u>1,424</u>
Ships	312	288	245	251	251	251	998
Ordnance	81	81	81	81	82	82	326
Aeronautics	25	25	26	25	24	21	96
Marine Corps	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Coast Guard	1	1	1	1	1	1	4
Maritime Commission	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Exports	1,140	1,125	1,140	1,140	1,140	1,140	4,560
Non-Military	150	150	150	150	150	150	600
Capacity	10,767	11,682	12,994	16,245	18,164	21,045	68,448
Deficiency	<u>d 2,084</u>	<u>d 3,733</u>	<u>d 4,763</u>	<u>d 2,588</u>	<u>d 838</u>	<u>s 1,923</u>	<u>d 6,268</u>
Deficiency, % of Reqmts.	<u>d 16.22</u>	<u>d 24.22</u>	<u>d 26.82</u>	<u>d 13.74</u>	<u>d 4.41</u>	<u>s 10.06</u>	<u>d 8.39</u>

Regraded Unclassified

U. S. ALUMINUM SHEET SUPPLY AND REQUIREMENTS TO MEET PRODUCTION SCHEDULES

(Unit 000 Lbs.)

	1942		1943				Year
	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter	1st Quarter	2nd Quarter	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter	
Total	194,890	247,361	289,667	311,498	317,223	320,573	1,238,963
Aircraft	152,913	204,596	245,924	268,096	277,214	280,588	1,071,822
Army	12,372	12,850	13,917	13,803	13,609	13,595	54,926
Airforce	1,996	2,760	3,584	3,485	3,457	3,443	13,970
Armament Equipment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ammunition & Bombs	104	138	176	176	176	171	699
Signal Equipment	445	405	405	405	405	396	1,611
Chemical Warfare	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ground Force Equip.	397	597	597	498	470	470	2,035
Misc. & Expend. Supplies	1,050	1,620	2,406	2,406	2,406	2,406	9,625
Ground Force	10,376	10,090	10,333	10,318	10,152	10,152	40,956
Ordnance	5,717	7,530	7,952	7,936	7,770	7,770	31,429
Artillery Ammunition	297	336	363	366	366	366	1,461
Artillery Materiel	365	454	559	551	384	384	1,878
Tanks & Combat Vehicles	5,055	6,740	7,030	7,020	7,020	7,020	28,090
Small Arms & Ammunition	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chemical Warfare Service	5	4	4	4	5	5	18
Engineers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Medical Department	5	5	5	5	5	5	20
Signal Corps	3,852	1,926	1,798	1,798	1,798	1,798	7,192
Quartermaster Corps	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Motor Transport	91	62	62	62	62	62	248
Other	378	147	147	147	147	147	588
Seacoast Defense	7	4	3	3	3	3	12
Misc. & Expend. Supplies	412	412	362	362	362	362	1,448
Navy	11,552	11,093	11,366	11,139	7,940	7,930	38,375
Ships	7,697	7,776	5,754	5,522	5,522	5,522	22,320
Ordnance	3,775	3,243	5,533	5,533	2,344	2,344	15,754
Aeronautics, Marine Corps &							
Coast Guard	80	74	79	84	74	64	301
Maritime Commission	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Exports	12,803	13,572	13,210	13,210	13,210	13,210	52,840
Non-Military	5,250	5,250	5,250	5,250	5,250	5,250	21,000
Capacity	191,400	191,400	215,742	245,741	317,742	332,325	1,111,600
Deficiency	<u>d</u> 3,490	<u>d</u> 55,961	<u>d</u> 73,925	<u>d</u> 65,757	<u>a</u> 519	<u>a</u> 11,752	<u>d</u> 127,363
Deficiency, % of Reqmts.	<u>d</u> 1.79	<u>d</u> 22.62	<u>d</u> 25.52	<u>d</u> 21.11	<u>a</u> .02	<u>a</u> 3.67	<u>d</u> 10.28

Regraded Unclassified

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FFL/L34/A1-3

Serial 01135

CONFIDENTIAL

JUN 17 1942

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and
Chief of Naval Operations.
To : Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Mass Production of XCV's and Corvettes.


1. Pursuant to the oral approval of the President given on Monday June 15, 1942, I recommend that steps be taken at once, through the Maritime Commission, to contract for the building of

(a) 48 XCV's (AVG), 30 knot speed, of the "Kaiser" design, as approved by the Navy, subject to revision in numbers, up or down, according to future circumstances.

(b) 100 escort vessels of the corvette type, of Navy design and characteristics, modified as found essential for mass production.

2. It is understood that the ways, shipbuilding facilities and machinery building facilities under the control of the Maritime Commission will be used to construct these ships and further, that this program is not superimposed on the Maritime Commission merchant ship program but replaces an equivalent part of it.

Egk
E. F. KING.

Copies to:
OpNav
Chief of Prod. & Mat.
BuShips
AGOS (R)
President's Aide 

51287

L6-3

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1942

(SC)A1-3/CV
(O44400A/GRC)

S E C R E T
SECRET

My dear Mr. President:

Since you approved of my proposal to expedite in every possible way the completion of aircraft carriers now under construction, I have taken some rather energetic steps in this direction. Of course, the first condition laid down is that nothing in this line must be done to delay in any way the schedule of completion of the tank landing craft program but, with regards to all other types, the maximum of pressure is to be applied on behalf of the carriers.

The three principal yards building carriers are those at Fore River, Newport News, and New York Ship. I have had the manager of each of these yards in to the Department for conferences with myself, Mike Robinson and his staff, and Joe Powell, who took charge so successfully of expediting the program for battleships, has taken on this job. I think we will be able to forward the commissioning date by a considerable period of time as a result.

In light of the news today from the Southwest Pacific, this effort takes on an added emphasis.

Yours sincerely,

Frank Knox

The President

The White House

A1-3

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

51271

September 15, 1942

(SC)L11-1/QS1
(044300A)

SECRET
SECRET

My dear Mr. President:

I have received your memorandum replying to my letter recommending that the Maritime Commission reduce the number of cargo ships they are building and build as a substitute for them a very simple, easily constructed type of escort vessel.

Your comment on the tendency of the Bureau of Ships to constantly add to and increase the size of all types of ships constitutes one of the most acute problems I have had to deal with. As you know, far better than I do, this is not the only tendency of this character that must be overcome. There is also the tendency to try to improve constantly on accepted plans and thus delay completion of the ships in question. Even if the Joint Staff should act favorably on my proposal to substitute some corvette type of escort vessels for cargo ships, I know I am going to need your help to get out of the Navy a very simple design of escort ship the Maritime people can build.

On my last inspection tour down the Atlantic, Admiral Edwards and I looked over a very simple type of British corvette, about 1400 tons, speed of about 17 knots, which was in reality not much more than a steel hull, a very simple type of a reciprocating engine and the crudest and most primitive kind of quarters for the crew. It was armed with two 3" guns, some machine guns and depth charges. It carried a type of listening device which we are now producing in quantities. There is nothing in this inventory which is not available for the production of this very simple type of escort. The kind of shipyard labor that could produce a cargo ship could produce this escort vessel. It would obviously take less steel plate than would be required for the cargo ship it displaced. It would take a smaller engine than the one which it would displace in a cargo ship and the engine could be made in the same plant where the engine for the cargo ship would have been made. We have plenty of 3" guns and machine guns with which to arm her and, as I have said, we are producing the listening device required in quantities. The product when finished would be a rough, uncomfortable ship but it could go to sea in wintertime and have sufficient speed to be effective against submarines.

SECRET

SCJLH-1/QS1
(044300A)

S E C R E T

The President

- 2 -

September 15, 1942

It is not as good, obviously, as the more expensive better built and better armed escort vessels that we are building, but I believe it can be built in half the time and, by turning the job of building them over to the Maritime Commission, I believe we can get them in very much greater numbers than if they were built in shipyards controlled by the Navy.

There are two very cogent reasons for anxiety: one, the present success of the German subs in attacking North Atlantic convoys, successful because of the weakness of the escort; and two, the near approach of winter weather when many of the small craft now being used for escort purposes will not be able to keep to sea.

If the Joint Staff does approve this suggestion of mine, I know I will need your help in getting a sufficiently simple plan of a ship so as not to defeat the primary purpose of the whole thing, which is speedy production.

Yours sincerely,

Frank Knox

The President

The White House

A1-3

Navy Folder

September 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

I have not had a chance to answer yours of September first in regard to the problem of building more escort vessels. I think you are right and this should be done even at the cost of a few cargo ships.

However, there is and always has been a natural tendency in the Navy itself constantly to increase the size, cost and time of construction for ships of all kinds.

It is perhaps well said that in the case of destroyers, the additional requirements for ordnance, fire control, etc. makes the increase in their tonnage necessary. They have now gone up from the 1500 ton destroyer to the 2200 ton type. There is no question it takes more time, etc. to build a 2200 ton destroyer than a 1500 ton destroyer.

We have undertaken the building of corvettes on a large scale. The original corvette was a thousand tons. The size grew to 1200 tons and before you and I know it, the Navy will be demanding 2000 ton corvettes.

I think it is vital to keep the size down because we get more ships the lower the tonnage is kept.

- 2 -

This is, of course, not only an historic but a thoroughly understandable tendency in the Navy. I do wish the Navy would agree to a type which has proven successful, keep the tonnage down and multiply the actual numbers.

As I understand it, the Navy shipping board program has been worked out. If not, it should be in a conference between the Joint Board and the Maritime Commission.

F.D.R.

SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

September 1, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Since Bill Bullitt's return from London, we have had repeated conferences with members of the Navy staff on the escort vessel situation. While the sinkings by submarines have been sharply reduced in the waters surrounding Great Britain, and up and down our Atlantic Coast, in short wherever the area can be covered by land-based planes as well as surface vessels, it is nevertheless true that the sinkings continue at a dangerously high rate. Lately, attacks upon convoys, both in the North Atlantic and the Caribbean, have been frequent and successful to an alarming degree. When all the figures were in and all factors weighed in the month of July, there was no actual gain in cargo ship tonnage. The August figures already in also indicate a slight loss in that month. Summed up, we have not yet successfully met this menace and it threatens to grow still more serious inasmuch as the number of German submarines in operation steadily increases. This morning, as I dictate this memorandum, there are more submarines in the Atlantic than we have ever located before.

It is true that enemy attacks on merchant shipping are not winning the war for the enemy but they are likely to prevent us from winning the war within the predictable future. If we continue to lose merchant ships and cargoes at the present rate, we shall not be able to get enough men and materials to the fighting fronts to win the war. Under such circumstances, any hope of conducting successful offensives in Europe, Africa and the Far East is illusory. According to the memorandum submitted by Admiral Land to you on July 6, 1942, out of every ten tons which we consider essential to transport overseas, in this present quarter of 1942, four tons must be left behind. In the next year, a little more than two-thirds of the estimated requirements can be transported overseas. Accumulatively, if this condition is not corrected, it spells disaster.

Germany now has, it is estimated, approximately 120 U-boats operating in the Atlantic area. British information is to the effect that Germany has approximately 150 U-boats in training in the Baltic. Estimates of German submarine construction indicate that the Germans are producing at least twenty submarines per month and some estimates run as high as 28 per month. August was probably the most successful month we have had in the destruction of enemy submarines and, as nearly as we can calculate, not more than 15 or

SECRET

The President

- 2 -

September 1, 1942

16 subs were sunk. This means that the number of U-boats in actual operation is steadily increasing.

Experience has taught that reasonably safe transport overseas can only be carried on by means of escorted convoys. However, it is necessary if safety is to be procured that the escorts be adequate in numbers and in equipment. Our present convoys are too weakly escorted and this condition will grow progressively worse as time goes on unless the ratio of production of cargo ships and escorts is changed. The shortage of escort vessels at minimum estimate is as of September 1, 1942: United States, 792 short; Great Britain, 600 short.

At the present schedule of production in the United States, our shortage of convoy escorts will still be 512 on July 1, 1943. Continued and uninterrupted escorts of convoys on a vast scale is an integral part of new operations now planned, but we are confronted with a positive situation where such continued and uninterrupted escort is impossible. The acceleration of escort ship production, therefore, seems to me vital to avoid the risk of almost certain disaster at sea.

We are now producing an utterly insufficient number of escort vessels in proportion to the number of cargo ships we are building. It is worse than futile to continue to build cargo ships in numbers beyond that which we can adequately protect. Of what avail is it to try to build cargo ships faster than the enemy can sink them if we do not give the cargo ships a reasonable chance to survive? It seems to me the better part of wisdom, therefore, to substitute for the construction of a certain number of cargo vessels the construction of enough simple escort ships of the corvette type to provide adequate escort for our convoys. This would mean, reduced to simplest terms, that the Maritime Commission employ a certain number of its ways now devoted to cargo ship construction to the construction of a simple corvette type of escort ship, the plans for which the Navy would supply. The same steel plates, the equivalent of the same propulsion machinery and the same skilled labor can be employed to produce these corvettes as that now employed in producing cargo ships. In my judgment, it is far better to build 85 cargo ships and 15 corvettes on a hundred ways than it is to produce 100 cargo ships on a hundred ways with the certain knowledge that when the ships go to sea, due to lack of adequate escort, a high percentage of them will be sunk by the enemy.

I think this matter of sufficient importance ^{to suggest} that you summon at once a conference in your office of representatives of the Maritime Commission, the Navy, and the WPB for a restudy of the entire question of providing adequate escort for our convoys upon the security of which so much depends.

Yours sincerely,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The President

The White House

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ESCORT VESSEL REQUIREMENTS, U.S. FLEET

	<u>AVG</u>	<u>DD</u>	<u>DE & Corv</u>	<u>173¹PC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ATLANTIC:					
Troop convoys	5	53	-	-	58
Coastal convoys	-	52	128	128	308
Caribbean convoys	-	21	58	142	221
South Atlantic	12	24	44	-	80
	17	150	230	270	667
PACIFIC:					
Troop convoys	3	32	-	-	35
Coast-PH-Alaska	8	29	57	60	154
South & SW Pacific	12	14	78	30	134
	23	75	135	90	323
TOTAL	40	225	365	360	990

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U.S. CONVOY ESCORTS
AVAILABLE AND REQUIRED

	:1942 :	:	:	:	:	:	:1943 :	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Available	: July 1:	Aug. 1:	Sept. 1:	Oct. 1:	Nov. 1:	Dec. 1:	Jan. 1:	Feb. 1:	Mar. 1:	Apr. 1:	May 1:	June 1:	July 1:	:
AVG (a)	: 0 :	0 :	3 :	7 :	11 :	12 :	14 :	14 :	16 :	18 :	21 :	23 :	25 :	:
DD (b)	: 115 :	115 :	118 :	120 :	123 :	126 :	130 :	134 :	139 :	143 :	146 :	150 :	152 :	:
DE (c)	: 0 :	0 :	0 :	0 :	0 :	0 :	0 :	0 :	2 :	7 :	14 :	20 :	33 :	:
173' PC	: 35 :	48 :	59 :	72 :	95 :	107 :	122 :	139 :	147 :	158 :	172 :	210 :	236 :	:
Corvettes (d)	: 18 :	18 :	18 :	19 :	23 :	24 :	24 :	24 :	24 :	26 :	27 :	30 :	32 :	:
Total Available	: 168 :	181 :	198 :	218 :	252 :	269 :	290 :	311 :	328 :	352 :	380 :	433 :	478 :	:
Required Atlantic	: 667 :	667 :	667 :	667 :	667 :	667 :	667 :	667 :	667 :	667 :	667 :	667 :	667 :	:
Required Pacific	: 323 :	323 :	323 :	323 :	323 :	323 :	323 :	323 :	323 :	323 :	323 :	323 :	323 :	:
Total Required	: 990 :	990 :	990 :	990 :	990 :	990 :	990 :	990 :	990 :	990 :	990 :	990 :	990 :	:
Short	: 822 :	809 :	792 :	772 :	738 :	721 :	700 :	679 :	662 :	638 :	610 :	557 :	512 :	:
Percent Short	: 83.0 :	81.6 :	80.0 :	78.0 :	74.5 :	72.9 :	70.7 :	68.5 :	66.9 :	64.5 :	61.6 :	56.3 :	51.7 :	:

NOTES:

- Assumes first 2 AVG assigned training duties, and not available for escort.
- Assumes 2/3 DD on hand July 1 are used for escort duty, and that 1/3 of later additions or equivalents are to be so used.
- Assumes first 2 DE assigned training duties and not available for escort and first 35 DE will be assigned U.S.
- Assumes U.S. gets 10 twin screw and 15 single screw corvettes building in Canada.
- Above schedule is based on ready dates (i.e., ships are available following times after completion dates: AVG - 6 weeks, DD and DE - 8 weeks, corvettes - 8 weeks, 173' PC - 30 days after arrival tidewater).

Regraded Unclassified

A1-3

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

Date August 22, 1942

To: Captain J. L. McCrea, USN
Aide to the President.

Subject:

Admiral Leahy requests that
you give the enclosure to the President.
There is nothing urgent about it.



W. L. Freseman.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

SECRET

August 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Cargo Carrying Metal Dirigibles and Snow Machines.

1. In compliance with your memorandum to me of July 27th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the Metal Dirigibles and Snow Machines presented to you by Mr. Lubin in a paper dated July 23rd.
2. Difficulties in connection with the Snow Machine have been eliminated, and the development is proceeding rapidly. No further action is considered necessary.
3. The investigation of the proposed Metal Dirigible has elicited the following facts:-
 - (a) The proponents of the dirigible are apparently unwilling or unable to produce for study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff the necessary engineering data.
 - (b) The proponents appear unwilling to have the subject studied by any lighter-than-air experts available to the Army or Navy.
 - (c) The subject has also been brought to your attention by Mr. Nelson and Mr. Oscar Cox. Mr. Nelson has appointed a special committee to consider the dirigible, working on the assumption that the engineering features of the ship are practicable.
 - (d) The proposed dirigible was studied by the Navy in 1939, and was considered impracticable because insufficient engineering data was produced by its promoters.
4. I recommend no further action on the proposed dirigible be taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff until Mr. Nelson has completed his study of the subject and has requested the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should such opinion be considered necessary.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

SECRET

Subject: Cargo Carrying Metal Dirigibles and Snow
Machines.

5. Should further action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff be required at a later date, complete engineering data must be produced by the proponents before a considered opinion can be rendered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Very respectfully,

William D. Leahy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

Please ask the Joint Board
to consider this and let me have
a memorandum?

F. D. R.

*Ref'd to JNW
JCS 26th meeting
item 5*

[Signature]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

July 23, 1942

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: MR. LUBIN *LS*

There are two matters I should like to call to your attention. The first concerns the present controversy relative to transport by air.

Air Cargo Transport

Several months ago Leon Henderson brought to my attention the possibility of a relatively high-speed all-metal rigid dirigible which could meet our needs for long distance cargo transport.

The dirigible varies from those that have been produced in the past both in its shape and in propulsion plant. A model has been tested in an air-tunnel and from such information as I have been able to secure, has been thoroughly checked over and approved by some of the engineers of one of the big aircraft manufacturing companies.

I have had some engineers check very carefully into the possibilities of this type of airship, and their findings are as follows:

(1) The ship could carry 190 tons of cargo per month from San Francisco, California, to Sidney, Australia.

(2) To carry this amount of cargo per month would require 14 Douglas C-54's, which is the largest transport at present in production.

SECRET

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT

- 2 -

July 23, 1942

(3) To carry this amount of cargo would require 3 Douglas C-74's, which are not scheduled to be in production until 1944.

(4) To produce one all-metal rigid airship would require 300,000 man-hours as contrasted with 2,340,000 man-hours required to build 14 Douglas C-54's and 1,000,000 man-hours required to build 3 Douglas C-74's.

(5) The building of the rigid airship would require 70,000 pounds of aluminum. To get the same carrying capacity with Douglas C-54's would require 347,000 pounds of aluminum; and for the Douglas C-74's, 169,000 pounds of aluminum.

(6) Similar comparisons have been made between the proposed all-metal rigid airship and other types of cargo airplanes. In each instance, in terms of cargo capacity per month, there appears to be a tremendous saving both in man-hours required, engines needed, aluminum, rubber, and octane gas required.

As you know, there are two schools, both highly respectable, in the Army and Navy on this question of rigid airships. At the moment, the heavier-than-air group are in the ascendancy. However, I am personally convinced that the partial solution to our transport problem may be found in this new type all-metal, rigid airship. To build the first one would require something like \$2,000,000 and relatively little scarce material.

The Lend-Lease people have also looked into this matter and think sufficiently highly of it to be willing to undertake the expenditure of the necessary funds if they could secure your approval. The ships could be produced in large quantities and would require relatively little skilled labor, after the pilot airship had come off the line.

I should like very much to discuss with you the highlights and the engineering data in this new type of rigid airship. Both Oscar Cox of Lend-Lease and I have available all the information you might need to pass judgment on its merits.

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THE PRESIDENT

- 3 -

July 23, 1942

Snow Machine

The second matter I should like to bring to your attention is one which concerns Lord Mountbatten. He has been very much interested in the development of some form of locomotion which could be used on snow. Such a snow machine apparently is closely related to the possibility of establishing certain bases in Norway.

Lord Mountbatten has had a man over here for some months now working with our Army on the development of a machine which would do what he had in mind. He apparently discussed this matter with General Marshall when the General was over in London.

It appears that the whole project has gotten into snarls as a result of certain personal frictions and jealousies. The project is, in my opinion, sufficiently important to justify your turning the whole matter over to some skilled engineers who know something about the problems involved. Here, also, the Lend-Lease Administration has made a careful investigation and is willing to help push the thing along if they secure permission from you.

If you could conveniently see Oscar Cox and myself, I think we could tell you in a few minutes just what the issues are.

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A1-3

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

August 20, 1942.

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
MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

Subject: Metal Dirigibles for Cargo
Carrying.

Please refer to the attached correspondence which the President handed you with instructions "to find out about." The Joint New Weapons Committee has gone into this matter rather thoroughly, and attached is a summary of their preliminary report. I have talked personally with Mr. Lubin and have his slant on the matter.

The proposed dirigible does not represent a new type. It has been under consideration at various times by the Navy Department and others since 1939. The commercial proponents have been engaged in rather acrimonious discussion with Navy Department experts and others and in the later stages of the correspondence indulged in a good deal of mud-slinging. However, engineering details of the proposed airship sufficiently adequate to justify decision have never been presented.

Mr. Nelson's committee, working under Mr. Meigs, is giving expert study to the proposal and is covering the situation adequately. When they have passed on the engineering features they will, presumably, call on the Chiefs of Staff to express an opinion which will be, I assume, the same as that expressed in connection with Kaiser's proposals for a large fleet of heavier-than-air cargo ships, i.e., that the project is very desirable so long as it does not interfere with the production of combat-type aircraft and other critical items vital to the war effort.



W. B. SMITH,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.



Incls.
(See next page)

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Incls.

Copy of Memo.fm.Capt. McCrea to J.C.S., 8-13-42. **A**

Memo.fm.the President to Capt. McCrea, 8-10-42. **B**

CC of Memo.fm.Oscar Cox to the President, 8-6-42, w/incl. **C**

Ltr.fm.Mr.Nelson to the President, 8-7-42, w/incl. **D**

Memo.fm.Col.K.Maertens to Gen.Smith, 8-19-42, w/incl. **E**

SECRET

- 2 -

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 13, 1942.

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MEMORANDUM FOR
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The President has referred the attached correspondence to me with instructions "to find out about."

The memorandum which Mr. Nelson mentions as having been addressed to the President by Mr. Oscar Cox of Lend-Lease, was, at the President's direction, referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 8th, for consideration by the New Weapons Committee, under cover of my memorandum of that date.

With the return of the attached papers it is requested that I be supplied with any available information which could be given to the President at this time.

Very respectfully,

/s/
JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U. S. Navy
Naval Aide to the President.

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18244

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN McCREA:

TO FIND OUT ABOUT.

F.D.R.

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8-18-42

B

8-10-42

SECRET

OFFICE OF LEND LEASE ADMINISTRATION
FIVE FIFTEEN 22d STREET NW
WASHINGTON, D.C.

17468

August 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Oscar Cox
SUBJECT: Lighter-Than-Air Metal Airship

1. Before Mr. Stettinius left for London, he asked me to take up with you the building of a full-scale model of a lighter-than-air metal airship.
2. Mr. Lubin raised the question with you recently, and I understand that you referred it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My understanding is that it is now before the New Weapons Committee for consideration.
3. In many ways this new cargo ship is like the Sea Otter, and probably can be handled most effectively in the same way.
4. If agreeable to you, it might be wise to have the Lend Lease Administration work in close cooperation with the New Weapons Committee to build a full-scale model, if it is deemed wise to do so.
5. Attached is a proposed directive from you to Mr. Stettinius, if you wish to carry out this plan.

Attachment

/s/ Oscar Cox

C(1)

(8-6-42)

Ro 8/10/42

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

17469

TO: Mr. E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
Lend-Lease Administrator

FROM: The President

SUBJECT: Lighter-Than Air Metal Airship

1. The projected lighter-than-air ship which you have brought to my attention, if as successful as indicated by the preliminary survey report which I have seen, shows promise of giving the United Nations a great advantage over the Axis in long-range air transport--and at a fraction of the cost in terms of aluminum, rubber, engines, dollars and time for equivalent heavier-than-air transport planes. The possibility of supplying the interior of China and Russia by airship is worth special consideration at this time. I share your view that in these critical times such a vital possibility should be fully and vigorously explored.

2. Accordingly, the Lend-Lease Administration is authorized and directed, in full cooperation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the New Weapons Committee, to make available the necessary funds and to take all necessary steps to construct as quickly as possible a full size prototype of such a ship to test fully its potentialities. For this purpose the prototype ship should be able to undertake long overseas trips with full cargo--a small sized model would hardly give definitive results. In view of the nature and size of the project, I shall leave to your judgment the amount of money to be made available.

3. In carrying out the building of the full-scale model, you may, if you deem it wise, utilize CARGOES, INC., the corporation building a full-sized model of the Seamobile, and, in that way, get the cooperation and the advice of the War Production Board, the Navy and the War Shipping Administration--all of which have membership on the Board of Directors of CARGOES, INC.

C(2)

Re 8/10/42

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

18243

August 7, 1942

OFFICE OF
DONALD M. NELSON
CHAIRMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE
AUG 8 10 12 AM '42
RECEIVED

My dear Mr. President:

I understand that Mr. Oscar Cox of Lend-Lease has written a memorandum to you requesting that the Lend-Lease Administration be empowered to cooperate fully with the New Weapons Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in building a full-scale model of an all metal dirigible of new design. I further understand that Mr. Leon Henderson had previously discussed this matter with Mr. Lubin at some length.

Mr. Henderson has suggested that I write you on this important matter because of its implications in regard to materials, facilities, and manpower. In order that I may be in a position competently to advise you, I have directed Mr. Merrill Meigs, Chief of our Aircraft Branch, to set up a small committee to give prompt and expert study to this proposal, as per the attached copy of my memorandum to him of today's date.

If consistent with your views, I would greatly appreciate it if you could postpone a decision on this matter until the committee has completed its study.

Sincerely,



Donald M. Nelson

The President
The White House

Attachment
as noted

Copy
8-18-42
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18242

August 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Merrill Meigs
From: Donald M. Nelson

I attach herewith certain material on lighter-than-air transportation overseas, which has been submitted to me by Mr. Leon Henderson with recommendations for taking prompt action in order to give this idea a practical trial.

Mr. Henderson has already discussed this with Mr. Lubin and with Lend-Lease, who are willing to provide the financing, if appropriate clearance can be obtained from the President.

I would like to discuss this personally with the President but before doing so want to be as thoroughly informed as possible on the proposal. Therefore, I would like you to set up a small committee composed of yourself, as chairman, and having as its members Dr. J. C. Hunsaker, Chairman, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Col. R. E. Lord, Assistant Director, Board of Economic Warfare and Mr. Grover Loening. The function of this committee will be to consider the following aspects and make recommendations to me thereon:

(1) Assuming engineering practicability, would this type of ship make an important contribution to winning the war by increasing the payload carried overseas relative to the consumption of materials and manpower in doing so?

(2) Is there any impelling reason, in light of the answer to the first question, against constructing one ship, in order to test its feasibility from an engineering standpoint?

I would like for you to complete this study within ten days to two weeks and to present a written report to me. I am informing the President of the formation of this committee and requesting that he take no action on the matter until your studies have been completed.

wfs
8-15-42

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8-7-42
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Regraded Unclassified

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

August 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO: Brig. General W. B. Smith, Secretary,
Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Metal Dirigibles for Cargo Carrying

1. Pursuant to your directive of July 28, 1942, there is attached hereto report of the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment on the subject.

/s/ K. MAERTENS,
Secretary
J.N.W.

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COPY

August 19, 1942.

TO: Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff
FROM: Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment
SUBJECT: Metal Dirigibles for Cargo Carrying

REFERENCES: Letter of Mr. Lubin to the President
Letter of Mr. Cox to the President
Proposed directive from the President
to Mr. Stettinius
Letter of Mr. Nelson to the President
Letter of Mr. Nelson to Mr. Meigs

1. This subject was referred to the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment on the basis of the letter from Dr. Lubin to the President, which stated certain engineering performance data for the proposed new type of dirigible, and stated that these data had been checked by competent engineers.

2. The subject was considered by the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment at a meeting on August fourth, with Dr. J. C. Hunsaker present by invitation. Dr. Hunsaker is Chairman of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, and has had experience with design of dirigibles.

3. At this preliminary session the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment became convinced: (a) that the performance figures given are much at variance with the actual performance of such large dirigibles as have been built and tested in this country; (b) that the proposal contemplates departure from past practice by constructing airships with

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a metal skin; (c) that there is no apparent reason a priori or from the limited data before the committee concerning the new construction proposed, to expect radically improved carrying capacity for a given dead weight, and similar improved performance, by reason of this change in design.

4. The Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment therefore requested from Dr. Lubin the designs and engineering computations to which he referred, and asked that the material be promptly studied by Dr. Hunsaker, and by Captain Rosendahl who is recognized as an outstanding expert on dirigibles. The Secretary of the Committee was, however, informed by Dr. Lubin that the engineering computations were not in form for study by the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment, and Dr. Lubin suggested such study be made by direct conversations by representatives of the Committee with Mr. Gilboy and other individuals. Captain Rosendahl has since been transferred to sea duty. Accordingly, Commander Settle, Lt. Commander Bradley, and Mr. Burgess of the Bureau of Aeronautics, conferred on Wednesday, August 12th, with Mr. Gilboy, engineering consultant to Leon Henderson; Mr. Holden, special assistant to Leon Henderson; and Mr. Blackwell Smith, OPA attorney. The results of the conference are contained in the attached copy of the memorandum of Commander Settle to the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, marked enclosure (1). *(omitted)*

5. A Mr. Horne then visited the Secretary of the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment, left with him

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documents (2), (3), (4), and (5), ^{OMITTED} ~~enclosed~~, and stated that he would be willing to appear at the request of the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment before a committee set up by the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment provided it conformed to certain specifications regarding membership. These documents apparently refer to this same subject. They raise points far beyond the question of technical feasibility and economic justification of the proposal and assert or imply impropriety in the previous treatment of the subject by the Navy. It appears to have had a considerable history.

6. From the correspondence of Mr. Donald M. Nelson it appears that he has now set up a committee to study the subject, and has requested the President to postpone decision concerning the construction of a prototype until after this committee reports. This committee is concerned with economic aspects, on the basis of assumed engineering practicability. Mr. Horne states that he has been called before this committee.

7. The preliminary study and the data thus far before it are not sufficient for any positive opinion on the part of the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment. It appears this subject pertains to general cargo carrying rather than to military uses, and hence is not within the normal field of operation of the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment, unless included therein by your specific instructions. The subject appears to be receiving consideration

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elsewhere, leading perhaps to prompt action on a prototype. Other angles than the technical have been introduced. A thorough engineering evaluation would require some time for completion in such manner as to be fully dependable. The Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment therefore makes this preliminary report and requests further instructions.

For the Committee.

/s/ K. Maertens,
Secretary.

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to file

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THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

43290

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My dear Mr. President:

AUG 19 1942

In response to your memorandum of 12 August, the following information on the progress of the aircraft production program is furnished.

Schedules in effect on 31 December 1941 (War Production Board Report 8-H) called for the delivery of 22,537 airplanes in the period from 1 January, 1942, to 31 July, 1942. Actual acceptances totaled 23,127. Included in those schedules were 12,695 combatant aircraft as contrasted with actual production of 12,174. None of the foregoing figures include any "puddle-jumpers".

Schedules in effect on 31 December 1941 called for the production of 3,838 airplanes in the month of July. These schedules were revised upward to 4,502 as a target in anticipation of necessary tools and material being made available. Actual acceptances during July totalled 4,095.

The July deficit in bomber deliveries, amounting to 368 planes and specifically mentioned in your memorandum, may be attributed largely to the failure of the Douglas, Martin and Brewster companies to meet their production schedules. Brewster is under Navy production cognizance, but the results of the recent change in management of the company have not yet resulted in increased deliveries. Difficulty was experienced in correcting engineering defects of the new dive bomber; however, deliveries are now being made.

The monthly schedules of aircraft production are predicated on the premise that tools and materials will be made available in adequate quantity. At the present time aircraft production is falling below the target schedules, primarily due to shortage of materials and processed parts and difficulties experienced in bringing new models into production. It is considered that the manufacturers themselves, with the assistance of the technical branches of the Army Air Forces and the Bureau of Aeronautics, are exerting every possible effort to remedy the teething troubles of the new models.

Relief of indicated shortages in the immediate future is only possible by according aircraft priority over other elements of the war production program. It is believed that such action would really have a negligible effect on the other elements. The basis for this view is the fact that the bulk of material required for the aircraft program is but a small percentage of the total necessary for the war effort. The aircraft program now shares the preferred position in the priority scale with other competing items.

The Army and Navy Munitions Board has recently set up new priorities for the War and Navy Departments and Maritime Commission and the new priorities will undoubtedly be helpful in advancing the aircraft program but, as stated above, it is believed that further relief in this direction is needed.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Knox

The President
The White House

A1-3

SECRET

*Capt McCreary
for yr files*

- 2 -

I am informally bringing these figures to your attention so that you can assess their significance in terms of production facilities and material requirements.

I will appreciate your letting me know quickly as possible which arrangements will be required to realize this program.

August 17, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

... assignment but I believe the war will be won much earlier if we can do this. Something of course, must give way.

Dear Donald:

Very sincerely yours,

I have just received from General Arnold the appended statement of our aircraft requirements for 1943. Although they have not yet been confirmed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, I am of the opinion that these requirements are essential if we are to secure and maintain unquestioned air superiority over the Axis Powers in 1943. Slight adjustments in these figures may no doubt have to be made as time goes on, but such investigation as I have made convinces me that they represent what we must have during 1943.

AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS FOR 1943

The Honorable
Charles A. Nelson
Chairman, Commission Board.

All Types	139,190
Tactical	107,408
Heavy Bombers	12,202
Medium Bombers, 2-Eng.	12,065
Light Bombers, 2-Eng.	9,957
Dive Bombers, 1-Eng.	16,815
Fighters, 2-and 1-Eng.	43,382
Photographic, 2-Eng.	2,678
Transport, 4-and 2-Eng.	10,309
Other Types	31,782
Liaison, 1-Eng.	1,366
Trainers	22,132
Gliders	8,284

SECRET
SECRET

- 2 -

I am informally bringing these figures to your attention at this time so that you can assess their significance in terms of production facilities and material requirements.

I will appreciate your letting me know as quickly as possible which arrangements will be required to realize this program.

I know this is a tough assignment but I believe the war may well be won much earlier if we can do this. Something, of course, must give way.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Donald M. Nelson,
Chairman, War Production Board.

HLH/lmb

L6-3

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

SECRET	
By authority of the	
Ass't. Sec'y War (Air)	
AUG 14 1942	AK
Date	Initials

August 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to your memorandum of August 12, 1942, in regard to airplane production, I have had representatives of the War Department confer with representatives of the Navy Department and the Aircraft Production Division of the War Production Board.

Under the schedule of last December, as set up in Airframe Production Program, Aircraft Report 8-H, dated December 30, 1941, there were 12,695 combat airplanes scheduled to be delivered between January 1 and July 31, 1942. Army, Navy, and War Production Board records show that we failed to meet this target figure by about 3%. However, Report 8-H shows that a total of 22,537 airplanes were scheduled for delivery during this period, while 23,127 airplanes were actually produced. None of the foregoing figures include puddlejumper.

In regard to July production, the 4,501 airplanes scheduled in Report 8-J were the result of an upward revision of the 3,838 airplanes scheduled in Report 8-H in December. This upward revision was made in order to provide a target, which might be met, if the required tools and materials could be made available.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

The bomber deficit of 368 in July, which is based on the 8-J Report, is due primarily to the failure of the Douglas, Martin, and Brewster companies (on Army, British, and Navy type airplanes respectively) to make their scheduled deliveries. Delays in the delivery of the Douglas A-20 airplane have been caused by a new requirement for the installation of long range gas tanks in order to effectuate deliveries by air to Russia after sea deliveries became too hazardous. There has been a delay in the delivery of Martin A-30 light bombers, due to the necessity of changing the airplane, previously called the "Baltimore" by the British, to use American equipment and accessories in lieu of British equipment which was formerly installed in this airplane and was no longer available. Also, the Willow Run plant, operated by Ford, has not yet begun to deliver airplanes, nor has it been able to deliver the required parts in appreciable quantities to the Douglas assembly plant at Tulsa or the Consolidated assembly plant at Fort Worth.

One of the contributing factors that has brought about a reduction in airplane acceptances during the period January 1 to July 31, 1942, has been the confusion caused in the industry with its consequent delays in deliveries, brought about by the changing systems of priority ratings. Until February of this year priority ratings granted aircraft were wholly inadequate. After extensive discussions, an A-1-a rating was granted on February 16 to aircraft

SECRET

SECRET

to obviate the difficulties occasioned by the older split rating system which, in effect, applied two or three ratings to the same production line on the same article.

Then in May a new system of priorities was developed by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, which contemplated reverting to the split rating arrangement previously found unworkable in aircraft production. After many conferences, a revision of priorities was authorized which provided about the same system as prior to February. However, so many items were granted the top priority position as to make it quite ineffective in supplying materials required. This shifting of priority methods inevitably caused confusion among manufacturers with resultant loss in output.

When the aircraft Schedule 8-I (initial step in the President's Program) dated January 31, 1942, was prepared with the view of endeavoring to accelerate production more nearly to meet the President's Directive of January 3, 1942, target schedules were set up. These schedules were ten per cent higher than the estimates which the industry and the Allocation Subcommittee of the Joint Aircraft Committee believed could be met under the then existing conditions in regard to priorities and the availability of machine tools and materials. It was known that these schedules could not be realized unless the necessary tools and materials could be provided for the aircraft and aircraft accessory manufacturers, particularly the latter. Raw materials and tools have not been made available in adequate amounts.

SECRET - 3 -

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

With respect to machine tools, although a War Production Board order was issued on April 1, 1942, improving our priorities, it froze the old ratings for a period of thirty to sixty days, thereby postponing any relief for that period. The result has been to delay 1942 machine tool deliveries to the aircraft industry. The aircraft industry, therefore, cannot get the benefit until the latter part of this year.

The expected benefit now looks doubtful as steel for production of machine tools has recently been rerated, placing fifty per cent in a relatively lower priority classification. This rating for steel is so low that the Tools Branch, War Production Board, estimates a cut in monthly dollar output of tools from the present figure of \$111,000,000 to less than \$80,000,000 (or approximately a \$1,100,000,000 tool year.) The delay in obtaining deliveries of machine tools has retarded establishment of pilot lines and production tooling in aircraft plants. Unless tools are delivered as required by our schedules a further inability to accelerate production will result.

Critical shortages have developed rapidly in several basic materials such as the alloy steels, steel plate, aircraft bearing steels, cutting tool steels, and copper. These shortages are at present the major cause of production delays of the aircraft manufacturers, and attention has been repeatedly called to this situation over the past several months. It was specifically covered in my letter of March 20, in answer to a memorandum from the President to Mr. Hopkins dated March 13, 1942.

SECRET- 4 -

SECRET

Weekly reports from the Industrial Planning Section, Army Air Forces, show that out of 162 cases of shortages reported by manufacturers in July, 101 were steel and non-ferrous metals (steel 67.7; non-ferrous metals 30.3.) This, compared with January, when there were 16 cases of steel and non-ferrous metal shortages out of a total of 98 cases, shows the alarming increase in raw material shortage. The War Production Board is aware of this situation and on August 3 stated to the Aircraft Production Division, War Production Board, "The military demands for alloy steel are now in excess of the supply and, in spite of the prospective increase in alloy steel capacity, it seems likely that this disparity between demand and supply will increase rather than decrease."

Unless this critical situation in raw materials, particularly alloy steel and tools, is arrested, the target schedule (Report 8-K, which is less than the President's Program) cannot be met.

Summary

(a) Estimates made last December of January-June 1942 production of combat planes were 12,695. Actual production was less than this by about 3%.

(b) Estimates made last December of total plane production for the same period were 22,537. Actual production was 23,127 or about 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ % increase. No puddlejumper are included in these totals or in (a) above.

(c) July production was about 93% of Report 8-K target goal. This is within the target tolerance.

(d) July bomber deficit is accounted for largely by


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SECRET

special production changes in two plants. One was occasioned by installation of extra tanks to permit emergency delivery of aircraft to Russia; the other by necessity of installing American equipment in planes originally intended for British equipment no longer available.

(e) Major production difficulties have been and remain the following:

1. Priorities.
2. Machine tools.
3. Raw materials, particularly alloy steels.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Henry H. Stimson". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "H".

Secretary of War

SECRET

L6-3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

August 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR •

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
HON. DONALD M. NELSON

SUBJECT: AIRPLANE PRODUCTION

I am concerned by the figures on production of combat planes:

1. I am not definitely certain of the following figures but believe them to be right. Under the schedule of last December 12,695 combat planes were called for between January 1st and July 31, 1942. Actual production seems to have been only 12,293 -- or a deficit of 402 combat planes under last year's program.
2. The production in July appears to have been 4,095 planes of all types, against the total of 4,501 called for -- a deficit of 406 planes under the revised schedule. This July total does pass the 4,000 mark but I think it is a larger monthly deficit than any deficit in the past few months.
3. The bomber deficit in July seems to be the most serious -- 368.
4. The principal excess of production over scheduled figures seems to have been in the category of small communication planes -- "puddle jumpers" or "hedgehoppers." In other words, the least important planes seem to be going well and the most important planes very badly.

I think you should hold a clinic on this patient. Then you can let me know what disease he is suffering from and how he can be cured!

F. D. R.

(FILE COPY)

A1-3
SECRET

August 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The program of 570 combatant ships is hereby approved with the exception of the 4 New Design 45,000 ton aircraft carriers.

These four are not approved at the present time for two reasons:

1. They will not be completed until the following dates: two in the third quarter of 1945 -- three full years from now; one in the fourth quarter of 1945; and the fourth in the first quarter of 1946. To these completion dates it would seem reasonable to add six months each before these ships would be ready to take their places in combat.

2. While these ships would carry over 100 planes apiece, it is by no means determined that one ship of this size would be better tactically than two ships which would carry half the number of planes or three ships which would carry only one-third as many planes.

The 4 New Design 45,000 ton carriers would call for roughly 180,000 tons of steel.

I should, therefore, like to have a study made as to the advisability of building 16 11,000 ton carriers of the slower type, seeking to put into service 8 in 12 months and 8 more in the following 12 months -- in other words, 8 carriers by the Autumn of 1943; 8 more by the Autumn of 1944 and the possibility of still another 8 by the Autumn of 1945 -- at which time we would get the first 2 of these proposed 45,000 ton carriers.

It should be remembered that in the light of history, and on the doctrine of probability, this war may well be over before the lapse of three years.

F. D. R.

Copies to Admiral Leahy and Admiral King

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

August 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The program of 570 combatant ships which was recently approved by you consists of the following:

- 4 New design 45,000 ton Aircraft Carriers
- 10 ESSEX design Aircraft Carriers
- 17 BALTIMORE design Heavy Cruisers
- 16 Modified CLEVELAND design Light Cruisers
- 3 SAN JUAN design Light Cruisers
- 100 Modified design Destroyers, and
- 420 Destroyer Escort Vessels.

The attached table shows the estimated completion dates of the previous shipbuilding program in black and the corresponding dates for the additional program in red.

This new extension to the Naval Shipbuilding Program is a "tailing-on" program and will:

- (a) Utilize to the best advantage shipbuilding and manufacturing facilities now engaged in Naval Shipbuilding and those facilities becoming available as a result of the indefinite deferment of five (5) large Battleships and four (4) Large Cruisers.
- (b) Maintain for all practical purposes the rate of production of Naval vessels which will shortly be obtained under the current Naval program.
- (c) Maintain currently expected levels of labor forces and material requirements.
- (d) Require no increase in shipbuilding or manufacturing facilities now existing or about to come into production, but will keep these facilities employed to the maximum extent materials will permit.

Mr. Wayne Coy's memorandum of July 6, 1942, gave a complete picture of the Shipbuilding Program, both Naval and Maritime. This memorandum included the new extended Naval Shipbuilding Program referred to above and the steel plate requirements for the new program. The estimates of the requirements for the Naval Shipbuilding Program given in Mr. Wayne Coy's memorandum remain substantially the same.

The above comments are predicated on no material change in the maximum war effort as now established.

This memorandum has been reviewed and cleared by Admiral Land and Mr. Batt representing Mr. Nelson.

Regraded Unclassified

CONFIDENTIAL

COMPLETION BY QUARTERS

July 28, 1942 (745)

	1942		1943				1944				1945				1946	
	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2
1 Battleship - Alabama		1														
6 Iowa Class (45,000)				1	1				1	1		1		1		
2 Large Cruiser - Alaska Class								1	1							
8 Heavy Cruiser - Baltimore Class			1	1	1	1			2	1	1			6	6	2
17 Light Cruiser - Cleveland Class	2	3	1		3	2		3	3	2	2				2	1
16 Mod. Cleveland									5	2	3	5	1			
4 Light Cruiser - San Juan Class				1	1				1	1		1	1			
3 Aircraft Carrier - Ex.-OL Class		1	1	2	3		1	1				1	1			1
13 Essex Class		1	3	1	0	2	1	3		2						
10 New Design (45,000)										2				2	3	1
4													2	1	1	
36 Aircraft Carriers - Total		2	4	3	3	2	2	4		4	2		2	3	4	1
47 Destroyers - 1620-30 Class	14	20	11	2												
170 2050 Class	7	19	18	31	29	34	19	8	5	1				2		
4 Mod. 2050 Class								3	1							
100								3	14	17	21	21	14	7	3	
321 Destroyers - Total	21	39	29	33	29	34	19	14	20	18	21	21	14	9	3	
117 Escort Vessels - 24 knots	0	0	3	12	26	31	27	14	2	2	0					
158							14	34	47	46	17					
183 19 knots	0	4	19	42	46	36	25	7	3	1	0					
262				7	22		38	52	61	59	23					
720 Escort Vessels - Total		4	22	54	79	89	104	107	113	108	40					
204 Submarines	8	12	9	14	14	18	22	22	25	22	16	12	10	1		
TOTALS	31	61	66	107	131	146	147	151	171	161	85	40	35	20	11	3

NOTE:

Black - Old Program
Red - New Program

EXHIBIT "A"
Scheduling & Statistics Branch (745)
Bureau of Ships - Navy Department

Regraded Unclassified

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN McCREA

Can you before Tuesday next get me a very simple one page statement as to the tying in of all this data with the Navy's request for my approval of a program covering ten or twelve additional carriers, four new type 40,000 ton carriers, etc., etc?

Such a program ought to have the approval of Nelson and Land.

F. D. R.

*memo for the Pres -
The memo. you wished
is attached - Very resp John M. C.*

A1-3

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Capt. Nichols
to file*

SECRET

1 August 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your memorandum of July 27th requesting additional information on the four CV new design proposed ships.

1. The characteristics for the new type of aircraft carrier grew out of lengthy discussions before the General Board with a view to the development of a previously non-existent type of carrier, namely, one which could stand immense punishment and still survive. All thought would seem to point to the need of a carrier of this type in the eventual phases of finally driving through an attack toward enemy shores.

2. British carriers, e.g. (ILLUSTRIOUS), with a partly armored flight deck, have shown how much bomb attack a vessel of this general type can stand and still survive.

3. Growing out of this need the 45,000-ton design was developed. The attached small plans show the outstanding differences between this contemplated ship and the ESSEX (CV9). The outstanding feature of the large new ship is a flight deck 3-1/2" thick extending over the entire hangar. This feature itself more than anything else determines the large displacement. The hangar deck is 2" thick, and the third deck about 2" thick, so that the total amount of protection to the vitals of the ship is 7-1/2" in thickness. The armor, moreover, is considerably higher at the sides than on the ESSEX.

4. The ESSEX, on the other hand, has no armor on the flight deck and has a total protection to the vitals of 4" as compared with 7-1/2" on the large ship.

5. The large ship will carry 120 aircraft as compared with 81 on the ESSEX. The ESSEX, moreover, is practically at her limit of capacity with the size of planes now in use. This results both from the length of flight deck and its strength which will not carry heavier planes. The 45,000-ton ship, on the other hand, can operate very much larger planes than are now contemplated, though the number would be reduced below 120.

6. Speeds of both ships are about the same, approximately 33 knots.

7. The above gives a general comparison of the two ships. The 45,000-ton ship should be able to withstand infinitely more attack

Memorandum for: The President




from the air than the ESSEX and still survive, and this is the whole reason for existence.

8. To summarize: The 45,000-ton ship is absolutely up-to-date and looks to the future; the CV9 is a development of the type we have now been building for several years.

Egking

87

C.V. "E" 45000
 STD. DISPLACEMENT 45000 TONS
 L.W.L. = 900 FT.



MIDSHIP SECTION

LOOK AFT

SCALE 1" = 40 FT.

~~NOTE: THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY AND IS NOT TO BE USED FOR DESIGN PURPOSES. INCREASE IN DISPLACEMENT OF 100 TONS AND WEIGHT INCREASES 2 FT.~~

Regraded Unclassified

U.S. - 820 FT



PROFILE



SCALE 1" = 40 FT.

A-1-3
COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

1 August 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your memorandum of July 27 requesting additional information in connection with the new Navy Shipbuilding Program authorized in H.R. 7184.

1. The subject program which we desire to contract for immediately is a "tailing on" program and not in any way additional ship construction to be superimposed on the current program. See Exhibit A attached hereto predicting completions on the current program in black type and for the new program in red type.
2. The reasons for this are given below in detail but there is one paramount reason which should be stated at once. The entire material allocation of the country is being planned at the present time and it is necessary to include this building program in it and to order all material so that the shipbuilders and manufacturers can make orderly long-range plans. A partial release will not accomplish this purpose.
3. The plan contemplates keeping the existing shipyard ways and facilities, as well as manufacturing plants, operating at their current capacity. No additional shipyard facilities or manufacturing facilities are contemplated. I feel very strongly that facility expansions should be radically curtailed or stopped in order to best promote our defense effort.
4. In order to operate at capacity without serious interruption of production, it is necessary to place contracts sufficiently in advance to insure a continuous flow of materials and thus full utilization of labor and machine tools. It is necessary to place material orders several months in advance of keel laying. Many industrial plants supplying armament, equipment and machinery for ships run out of work well in advance of the shipyards and now require additional orders to prevent a curtailment or stoppage of work in their plants. The term "equipment and machinery" is meant to

Regaded Unclassified

SECRET

Memorandum for: The President

CONFIDENTIAL

include all items such as armor, guns, turrets, turbines, gears, shafting, stern posts, boilers, pumps, compressors, etc.

5. With special reference to your question as to deliveries on the 420 escort vessels, shown in red type which are additional to the 300 now under construction shown in black type, and 100 destroyers, shown in red type which are additional to the 221 destroyers now under construction, the general remarks as noted above apply equally as well to these vessels and deliveries are shown on Exhibit A. The same industrial facilities are used for the manufacture of equipment and machinery for the various types of vessels, so it is essential, in order to allow orderly planning to accomplish the program in the minimum time and to prevent confusion and delays, that the program as a whole be set up at one time.

6. This program is a vital part of an integrated war program and represents a decision arrived at during discussions extending over the past several months as to the number and types of Naval vessels necessary to best meet our defense effort. To substitute or superimpose another program such as the building of a number of fast transports could only end up in serious delays. The Army and Navy now have 87 transports in operation, now undergoing conversion or building and due for early completion, having an approximate capacity for carrying 140,384 officers and men on a single lift, and in addition have under construction by the Maritime Commission 56 transports with a speed of from 16-1/2 to 19 knots, capable of carrying approximately 285,000 troops. Exhibit B shows the predicted completion of the transports now under construction.

7. The Chief of Staff was present at the conference which dealt with these matters and concurred in the view that capacity to transport some 425,000 troops in one lift, when combined with the necessary parallel lift of impedimenta and munitions, would suffice, because the cargo-ship part of the troop-cargo ratio will be below that required for such a troop-lift (425,000).

8. Your approval is requested.

E. J. King

27

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

Memorandum for: The President

CONFIDENTIAL

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8. Your approval is requested.

E. J. King

87

CONFIDENTIAL

July 28, 1942
(745)

COMPLETION BY QUARTERS

	1942		1943				1944				1945				1946	
	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2
1 Battleship - Alabama		1														
6 Iowa Class (45,000)				1	1				1	1		1		1		
2 Large Cruiser - Alaska Class								1	1							
8 Heavy Cruiser - Baltimore Class			1	1	1	1			2	1	1					
17										2			6	6	2	1
24 Light Cruiser - Cleveland Class	2	3	1		3	2		3	3	2	2		1		2	
16 Mod. Cleveland									5	2	3	5	1			
4 Light Cruiser - San Juan Class				1	1				1	1		1	1			1
3																
9 Aircraft Carrier - Ex.-CL Class		1	1	2	3		1	1								
13 Essex Class		1	3	1	0	2	1	3		2						
10										2	2			2	3	1
4 New Design (45,000)													2	1	1	
36 Aircraft Carriers - Total		2	4	3	3	2	2	4		4	2		2	3	4	1
47 Destroyers - 1620-30 Class	14	20	11	2												
170 2050 Class	7	19	18	31	29	34	19	8	5	1				2		
4 Mod. 2050 Class								3	1							
100								3	14	17	21	21	14	7	3	
321 Destroyers - Total	21	39	29	33	29	34	19	14	20	18	21	21	14	9	3	
117 Escort Vessels - 24 Knots	0	0	3	12	26	31	27	14	2	2	0					
158							14	34	47	46	17					
183 19 Knots	0	4	19	42	46	36	25	7	3	1	0					
262					7	22	38	52	61	59	23					
720 Escort Vessels - Total		4	22	54	79	89	104	107	113	108	40					
204 Submarines	8	12	9	14	14	18	22	22	25	22	16	12	10	1		
TOTALS	31	61	66	107	131	146	147	151	171	161	85	40	35	20	11	3

NOTE: Black - Old Program
Red - New ProgramEXHIBIT "A"
Scheduling & Statistics Branch (745)
Bureau of Ships - Navy Department

Regraded Unclassified

A1-3

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

31 July 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Construction of Cargo Aircraft in Shipyards.

Utilization of shipyards for the construction of cargo aircraft is not immediately practicable. Some of the buildings would be suitable for such use but would require very extensive alterations. Practically the entire present equipment of tools would have to be removed and replaced by equipment suitable for the manufacture of aircraft, and a training program instituted to teach the workmen the special skills required. The problem would be very similar to that faced in bringing the automotive industry into aircraft production, and would be accompanied by a loss of output and a reduction of employment in the change-over period.

However, there is a more important consideration. The present aircraft program will utilize all of the critical materials in prospect for the aircraft industry, especially aircraft engines, and some reduction in other categories of aircraft will be absolutely necessary in an enlarged cargo aircraft program. A recent Report on Cargo Aircraft by the Cargo Plane Committee of the W.P.B., which recommended an increased cargo transport program, drew attention to the conversion of military types now in production to give immediate effect to such an increased program. The diversion to the manufacturers of these airplanes of any amount of critical material that might be taken from other war projects offers a more immediate acceleration to the cargo airplane program than the conversion of the ship-building industry to airplane construction. This is a matter that is being handled by the Chiefs of Staff.

In my opinion, an examination and analysis of the current Army-Navy cargo-transport plane program, as compared with the combatant plane program, may well reveal that the ratio of cargo-transport planes can be increased without undue reduction in combatant planes. The bottle-necks for such an increase are material, including machine tools and engines.

Another factor in the overall consideration of the use of "giant" cargo planes is the availability of suitable and adequate facilities for take-off and landing. For instance, construction is still in progress in Britain to enable an increased number of combat planes to be managed, as in connection with Bolero and/or air attack on European objectives.

E. J. King

23

Regraded Unclassified

A1-3

THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

August 1, 1942.

*copy to McCrea
to file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Admiral King has cleared the attached papers with the Under Secretary (the Secretary being absent from the Department this date).

Admiral King is anxious to get your approval.

Very respectfully,

John L. McCrea

JOHN L. McCREA

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

34623

(sc) A1-3 (1943-44)

CONFIDENTIAL

JUL 20 1942

Memorandum for the President

The Navy Department has submitted to the Bureau of the Budget a request for funds to cover the construction of combatant vessels which were authorized by H. R. 7184 which you approved on July 9.

The material situation is such that for certain of the ships and heavy components, primarily main propelling machinery, we cannot delay in getting orders placed without a break in the program. This is particularly acute in the case of aircraft carriers and light cruisers, but is true to a less degree for all other types, and it would be advisable to place awards for the entire program immediately. The program is as follows:

- 10 Aircraft Carriers similar to the ESSEX
- 4 Aircraft Carriers of a larger new design
- 16 Light Cruisers slightly modified CLEVELANDS
- 3 Light Cruisers slightly modified SAN JUANS
- 17 Heavy Cruisers similar to BALTIMORE
- 100 Destroyers modified 2100 ton type
- 420 Escort Vessels similar to present construction
 - about 1/3 to be steam with 24-knot speed, and
 - about 2/3 to be diesel with about 19-knot speed

Your approval is requested to proceed with the awards for the above vessels in advance of specific appropriation of funds by the Congress.

Frank Knox

Frank Knox

CONFIDENTIAL

Completion by Quarters

	1943		1944				1945				1946			
	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
10 CV Essex Class						2	2			2	3	1		
4 CV New Design									2	1	1			
16 CL Modified Cleveland					5	2	3	5	1					
3 CL San Juan Class								1	1			1		
17 CA Baltimore Class						2			6	6	2	1		
100 DD Modified DD 445				3	14	17	21	21	14	7	3			
420 DE Escort Vessel	7	22	52	86	108	105	40							

Regraded Unclassified

L6-3 (Progress Reports)

Brief of letter dated July 22, 1942, from Captain H. T. Smith, Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Quincy, Mass., to Rear Admiral C. A. Jones, Asst. Coordinator of Shipbuilding, BuShips, regarding the Herreshoff Manufacturing Company's Plant at Bristol, Rhode Island.

- 0 -

In connection with Mr. Haffenreffer's complaint, Captain Smith writes as follows:- Since June 20, 1942, the Herreshoff yard has had two contracts; (1) 10 British Motor Torpedo Boats, and (2) 10 Coastal Transports. Previously had a contract for 2 Motor-driven Minesweepers, the last of which was delivered on June 20.

British Motor Torpedo Boats (BPT's)

Unusually large number of delays on this contract for which Herreshoff not considered responsible—delayed plans, delayed decisions by British on design questions, British reluctance to accept substitute material when specified material not available, and the lateness or nonarrival of British-furnished equipment. The situation became so bad recently that Captain Smith recommended to BuShips that all work be stopped on BPT's at Herreshoff in order that upwards of 50 skilled workmen might be used on the APC's. Recommendation approved; personnel shifted; intend to continue on this basis until such time as British are sufficiently prepared.

Coastal Transports 1 to 10 inclusive (APC's).

This is the only USN contract Herreshoff now has. Absolutely no foundation for any complaint of delay due to unavailability of plans, lack of decision or reference of questions to the Bureau. Captain Smith has no record of a specific complaint by Mr. Haffenreffer that his work had been held up due to the referring of plans or questions to the Bureau. Eldredge & McInnis of Boston are the design agents and have done an excellent job. No complaint from Herreshoff as to the flow or quality of plans to the shipyard. A new phase has come up which may delay the boats and that is delivery of the engines. Captain Smith has taken up with BuShips, but outlook is not favorable.

Motor-driven Minesweepers 18 and 19 (YMS's)

It is thought Mr. Haffenreffer's complaint refers to these ships, which have been completed for some time. Nevins, of New York, original designer, very slow in producing plans. Herreshoff refused to finish up boats to its own plans, to be approved by Smith, without substantial bonus. As bulk of design work had already been accomplished and few plans remained to be drawn up, Bureau felt Herreshoff did not warrant high extra compensation asked for. This contract past history and irrelevant as to conditions at Herreshoff at present time.

Generally speaking, performance of Herreshoff yards so far has not been satisfactory to Supervisor of Shipbuilding. Compared to other yards, their equipment and facilities are by far the best, yet their production is relatively slow, accompanied by many excuses. Complain about such things as labor situations, inability to find skilled workers, high rates paid by competing yards, particularly the Maritime Commission, difficulty in obtaining satisfactory lumber, and even about gasoline and tire rationing. Fault believed to lie in poor management. Yard did better under General Superintendent named Newman, an old and well-qualified boatbuilder, but Newman's authority has been increasingly restricted. Captain Smith states confidentially that there is some feeling that the profit motive is uppermost, but that he does not feel sure enough of his ground yet to make an official case.

Show to President

ADDRESS ~~NAVY~~ DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF SHIPS. REFER TO
FILE NO.

L6-3

*file
Confidential*

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Navy Folder

13 July 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

I tried to expedite one hundred boats in these past sixty days, but ended up with ninety-nine; one or two of which are one or more days late on account of non arrival of material which I have desperately followed up. However, six more of these will be delivered by the end of the week. This number, plus the first 60-day schedule I gave you sometime ago, gives us a total of 207 boats.

The following list shows:

30 - 173-footers
31 - 110-footers
38 - 135-footers.

I trust I can get another one hundred out shortly.

Respectfully,

A. Loring Brasey
A. Loring Brasey,
Captain, U.S.N.R.

The President
The White House

60-DAY SCHEDULE
173' SUBMARINE CHASERS

No.	Contractor	Location	Delivery	Remarks
PC544	Defoe Shipbuilding Co.	Bay City, Mich.	6-6	Delivered
PC545	Defoe Shipbuilding Co.	Bay City, Mich.	6-27	Delivered
PC546	Defoe Shipbuilding Co.	Bay City, Mich.	6-22	Delivered
PC547	Defoe Shipbuilding Co.	Bay City, Mich.	7-11	Trials completed on way to New Orleans
PC548	Defoe Shipbuilding Co.	Bay City, Mich.	7-13	" "
PC549	Defoe Shipbuilding Co.	Bay City, Mich.	7-16	" "
PC464	George Lawley & Sons	Neponset, Mass.	5-15	Delivered
PC465	George Lawley & Sons	Neponset, Mass.	5-25	Delivered
PC466	George Lawley & Sons	Neponset, Mass.	6-3	Delivered
PC467	George Lawley & Sons	Neponset, Mass.	6-20	Delivered
PC468	George Lawley & Sons	Neponset, Mass.	7-11	Delivered
PC469	George Lawley & Sons	Neponset, Mass.	7-13	Delivered
PC487	Consolidated Shipbldg. Co.	Morris Heights, NY	6-2	Delivered
PC563	Consolidated Shipbldg. Co.	Morris Heights, NY	6-16	Delivered
PC564	Consolidated Shipbldg. Co.	Morris Heights, NY	6-30	Delivered
PC489	Sullivan DD & Repair Co.	Brooklyn, N. Y.	7-13	Delivered
PC565	Brown Shipbuilding Company	Houston, Texas	5-25	Delivered
PC566	Brown Shipbuilding Company	Houston, Texas	6-15	Delivered
PC567	Brown Shipbuilding Company	Houston, Texas	6-27	Delivered

NOTE: Delivered means boats have been tried by Naval Board and have been delivered to the Navy.

60-DAY SCHEDULE

110' SUBMARINE CHASERS

No.	Contractor	Location	Delivery	Remarks
*PC511	American Cruiser Company	Detroit, Mich.	6-19	Delivered
*PC512	American Cruiser Company	Detroit, Mich.	7-13	Delivered
*PC646	Robinson Marine Constr. Co.	Benton Harbor, Mich.	6-30	Delivered
PC744	Quincy Adams Yacht Yard	Quincy, Mass.	7-10	Delivered
PC638	Elizabeth City Shipyard	Elizabeth City NC	6-27	Delivered
PC639	Elizabeth City Shipyard	Elizabeth City, NC	6-23	Delivered
PC640	Elizabeth City Shipyard	Elizabeth City, NC	7-10	Delivered
PC641	Elizabeth City Shipyard	Elizabeth City, NC	7-11	Delivered
PC533	Luders Marine Constr. Co.	Stamford, Conn.	6-5	Delivered
PC534	Luders Marine Constr. Co.	Stamford, Conn.	7-10	Delivered
PC535	Luders Marine Constr. Co.	Stamford, Conn.	7-13	Trial by Board today.
*PC652	Julius Peterson	Nyack, N. Y.	6-16	Delivered
*PC653	Julius Peterson	Nyack, N. Y.	7-6	Delivered
*PC539	Peterson Boat Works	Sturgeon Bay, Wis.	5-28	Delivered
PC527	Mathis Yacht Building Co.	Camden, N. J.	5-28	Delivered
PC528	Mathis Yacht Building Co.	Camden, N. J.	6-13	Delivered
PC529	Mathis Yacht Building Co.	Camden, N. J.	6-26	Delivered
*Pancake Engines.				

No.	Contractor	Location	Delivery	Remarks
PC648:	Delaware Bay Shipbldg. Co.	Leesburg, N. J.	7-10	Delivery
PC520:	Vinyard Shipbuilding Company	Milford, Del.	5-25	Delivered
PC636:	Vinyard Shipbuilding Company	Milford, Del.	7-8	Delivered
PC654:	Westergard Rice Bros. Co.	Rockport, Texas	7-14	Trial by Board today.
PC655:	Westergard Rice Bros. Co.	Rockport, Texas	7-15	Trial by Board tomorrow
PC530:	Westergard Rice Bros. Co.	Rockport, Texas	5-2	Delivered
PC531:	Westergard Rice Bros. Co.	Rockport, Texas	5-31	Delivered
*PC663:	Fisher Boat Works	Detroit, Mich.	6-24	Delivered
PC650:	Westergard Boat Works	Biloxi, Miss.	7-10	Delivered
PC502:	Seabrook Yacht Corp.	Seabrook, Texas	6-3	Delivered
PC668:	Daytona Beach Boat Works	Daytona Beach, Fla.	6-29	Delivered
PC676:	W. A. Robinson	Ipswich, Mass.	7-15	Trial by Board today
*PC672:	W. E. Abrams	Halesite, L.I. NY	6-15	Delivered
*PC673:	W. E. Abrams	Halesite, L.I. NY	7-6	Delivered

60-DAY SCHEDULE

135' WOOD MOTOR MINE SWEEPERS as Submarine Chasers or Mine Sweepers

No.	Contractor	Location	Delivery	Remarks
YMS5	Henry B. Nevins, Inc.	New York, N. Y.	5-19	Delivered
YMS6	Henry B. Nevins, Inc.	New York, N. Y.	6-18	Delivered
YMS7	Henry B. Nevins, Inc.	New York, N. Y.	6-4	Delivered
YMS8	Henry B. Nevins, Inc.	New York, N. Y.	6-27	Delivered
YMS9	Henry B. Nevins, Inc.	New York, N. Y.	7-10	Delivered
YMS12	Rice Bros. Corp.	East Boothbay, Me.	7-1	Delivered
YMS19	Herreshoff Mfg. Co.	Bristol, R. I.	6-10	Delivered
YMS24	Greenport Basin & Constr. Co.	Greenport, L. I.	6-13	Delivered
YMS25	Greenport Basin & Constr. Co.	Greenport, L. I.	6-5	Delivered
YMS26	Greenport Basin & Constr. Co.	Greenport, L. I.	6-16	Delivered
YMS27	Greenport Basin & Constr. Co.	Greenport, L. I.	6-30	Delivered
YMS32	C. Hildebrand Drydock Co.	Kingston, N. Y.	5-14	Delivered
YMS33	C. Hildebrand Drydock Co.	Kingston, N. Y.	6-10	Delivered
YMS34	C. Hildebrand Drydock Co.	Kingston, N. Y.	6-27	Delivered
YMS44	Wheeler Shipbuilding Corp.	New York, N. Y.	5-27	Delivered
YMS45	Wheeler Shipbuilding Corp.	New York, N. Y.	6-5	Delivered
YMS46	Wheeler Shipbuilding Corp.	New York, N. Y.	6-20	Delivered
YMS47	Wheeler Shipbuilding Corp.	New York, N. Y.	7-2	Delivered
YMS48	Wheeler Shipbuilding Corp.	New York, N. Y.	7-9	Delivered
YMS62	Gibbs Gas Engine Company	Jacksonville, Fla.	6-23	Delivered
YMS63	Gibbs Gas Engine Company	Jacksonville, Fla.	6-	Delivered
YMS64	Gibbs Gas Engine Company	Jacksonville, Fla.	6-	Delivered

A1-3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Noted:
MAY 19 1942
H-Z G.

May 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

Please read and return for
my files.

F. D. R.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

MAY 14 1942

(SC) L4/PT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Referring to the memorandum from the Secretary of the Interior and your memorandum to me dated 4 May, 1942, in regard to some motor torpedo boats building in Canada, the following is submitted:

(a) The question of acquiring these craft as motor torpedo boats for our service was considered in January of this year by the Navy Department and decision against acquisition was made for the following considerations:

(1) Motor torpedo boat design has been standardized for our service and boats are now in production in adequate numbers.

(2) Acquisition of a dissimilar type, such as the Canadian Scott Paine boats, referred to in Mr. Ickes' correspondence would make interchangeability of boats in squadrons and interchangeability of parts difficult and not sound from an operational or maintenance standpoint.

(3) It is believed that the armament provided for the Scott Paine (Canadian) boats is not suitable for our service. As an example our boats are equipped with 21 inch torpedoes and the Scott Paines, with 18 inch and these latter are not capable of taking the larger torpedo.

(4) It is believed that the price mentioned in the basic correspondence (\$200,000 apiece) is considerably in excess of their value.

In view of this, the Navy Department does not recommend acquisition of the Scott Paine (Canadian boats) for our service.

Arthur L. Jeter
Acting

Regraded Unclassified

STATEMENT
of the
ACCEPTANCES OF AIRCRAFT
by Type and Models
for the
Calendar Year 1942

SUMMARY BY TYPE OF ACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES FOR 1942*

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>PACIFIC FLEET</u>	<u>ATLANTIC FLEET</u>	<u>TRAINING</u>	<u>NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.</u>	<u>SHORE STATIONS</u>	<u>DEFENSE AID</u>	<u>ARMY AIR FORCES</u>	<u>DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.</u>	<u>TESTS AND MISC.</u>	<u>TOTAL DELIVERIES</u>
Bombers, heavy, land**	39		14						2	55
Patrol Bombers, heavy, seaplane	46	3	12	14						75
Bombers, medium, land**	30	75	36						8	149
Patrol Bombers, medium, seaplane	227	232	129	16		201	12	7	8	832
Bombers, Dive and Torpedo	1034	311	226			156	187		18	1932
Fighters, Carrier	884	321	92			225			14	1536
Scout Observation	407	417	231			134			10	1199
COMBAT	2667	1359	740	30		716	199	7	60	5778
Transports, Multi-engine	52	4		53	35	9			9	162
Transports, Single engine	2	2			116	16			2	136
Utility	29	26		1	26	14			2	98
UTILITY AND TRANSPORTS	83	32		54	177	39			13	398
TRAINERS	162	125	3583			35			12	3917
TOTAL ALL TYPES	2912	1516	4323	84	177	790	199	7	85	10093

Note: Airplanes for Marine Corps are included in Pacific and Atlantic Fleet Distribution.

* Includes predicted acceptances of airplanes for months of October, November and December.

** Allocated to Navy from Army production.

CONFIDENTIAL

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SUMMARY BY MODELS OF ACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES FOR 1942*

MODEL	PACIFIC FLEET	ATLANTIC FLEET	TRAINING	NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.	SHORE STATIONS	DEFENSE AID	ARMY AIR FORCES	DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.	TESTS AND MISC.	TOTAL DELIVERIES
F4F-4, -4B	667	319	80			220				1286
F4F-7	20								1	21
F4U-1	170	2	3						9	184
F6F-1	27					3			3	33
FM-1			9			2			1	12
SB2A-3		5							1	6
SB2A-4			56			156				212
SB2C-1	23	48	3				4		3	86
SB2D-3, -4	665	74	54				183			976
SBN-1		7								7
BD-2	6	2								8
TBF-1	340	175	105						8	628
TBM-1			8						1	9
SO3C-1	91	51							8	150
SO3C-2	137	12				34			1	184
OS2U-3	41	193	231			100				565
OS2N-1	138	161							1	300
PB4Y-1	39		14						2	55
PB2Y-3	46	3	12	14						75
PBY-5A	119	115	16				12	2	4	268
PBY-5, -5B	108	30	105			201		5		449
PBN-1			8						1	9
PBM-3		87		16					3	106
PV-1	30	75	36						8	149
COMBAT	2667	1359	740	30	0	716	199	7	60	5778
R4D-1, -2, -3	47	1		50	12	0	0	0	3	113
R5O-3, -4, -5	5	3			12				5	25
JRF-5, -6B					11	9			1	21
JR2S-1, -2				3						3
J4F-2		3			3	14			1	21
J2F-5	29	23		1	23				1	77
GH-1					19				1	20
GB-2	2	2			33	16				53
HE-1					64				1	65
UTILITY	83	32	0	54	177	39	0	0	13	398

CONFIDENTIAL

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SUMMARY BY MODELS OF ACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES FOR 1942* (cont.)

<u>MODEL</u>	<u>PACIFIC FLEET</u>	<u>ATLANTIC FLEET</u>	<u>TRAINING</u>	<u>NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.</u>	<u>SHORE STATIONS</u>	<u>DEFENSE AID</u>	<u>ARMY AIR FORCES</u>	<u>DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.</u>	<u>TESTS AND MISC.</u>	<u>TOTAL DELIVERIES</u>
SNB-1			74						4	78
SNB-2			62						1	63
SNC-1			146			35			4	185
SNJ-3, -4	162	125	1119							1406
SNV-1			686							686
N2S-3, -4			1065						1	1066
N2T-1			43						1	44
NE-1			229						1	230
NP-1			125							125
NH-1			34							34
TRAINING	162	125	3583	0	0	35	0	0	12	3917
TOTAL ALL TYPES	2912	1516	4323	84	177	790	199	7	85	10093

Note: Airplanes for Marine Corps are included in Pacific and Atlantic Fleet distribution.

* Includes predicted acceptances of airplanes for months of October, November and December.

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CONFIDENTIALACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES IN JANUARY 1942

<u>MODEL</u>	<u>PACIFIC</u>	<u>ATLANTIC</u>	<u>TRAINING</u>	<u>NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.</u>	<u>SHORE STATIONS</u>	<u>DEFENSE AID</u>	<u>ARMY AIR FORCES</u>	<u>DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.</u>	<u>TESTS AND MISC.</u>	<u>TOTAL DELIVERIES</u>
F4F-4	25	39								64
F4F-7	1									1
F4F-4B						1				1
SED-3	1									1
TBF-1									1	1
OS2U-3	15	10	70							95
PBY-5A	3	49								52
COMBAT:	45	98	70			1			1	215
R4D-1, -3		1		1					2	4
J2F-5	19	13		1					1	34
UTILITY:	19	14		2					3	38
SNV-1			25							25
SNJ-3			51							51
NP-1			12							12
TRAINING:			88							88
TOTAL ALL TYPES:	64	112	158	2		1			4	341

CONFIDENTIALACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES IN FEBRUARY 1942

<u>MODEL</u>	<u>PACIFIC</u>	<u>ATLANTIC</u>	<u>TRAINING</u>	<u>NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.</u>	<u>SHORE STATIONS</u>	<u>DEFENSE AID</u>	<u>ARMY AIR FORCES</u>	<u>DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.</u>	<u>TESTS AND MISC.</u>	<u>TOTAL DELIVERIES</u>
F4F-4	65	12								77
SBM-1		4								4
TBF-1	1								4	5
OS2U-3	4	44	20			27				95
OS2N-1	2	3							1	6
PBY-5A	38	12								50
COMBAT:	110	75	20			27			5	237
R4D-1, -3	2				3					5
J2F-6	10	8			23					41
UTILITY:	12	8			26					46
SNJ-3			37							37
NP-1			12							12
TRAINING:			49							49
TOTAL ALL TYPES: 122	83	69			26	27			5	332

CONFIDENTIALACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES IN MARCH 1942

<u>MODEL</u>	<u>PACIFIC</u>	<u>ATLANTIC</u>	<u>TRAINING</u>	<u>NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.</u>	<u>SHORE STATIONS</u>	<u>DEFENSE AID</u>	<u>ARMY AIR FORCES</u>	<u>DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.</u>	<u>TESTS AND MISC.</u>	<u>TOTAL DELIVERIES</u>
F4F-4	30	26								56
F4F-7	1									1
SED-3	21	1								22
SEN-1		3								3
TBF-1		15							2	17
OS2U-3		61				3				64
OS2N-1	14	7								21
PBY-5A	37	13								50
COMBAT:	103	126				3			2	234
R4D-1	3			5	2					10
R4D-2					2					2
J2F-5		2								2
UTILITY:	3	2		5	4					14
SNJ-3			39							39
NE-1			5		1					6
NP-1			24							24
TRAINING:			68		1					69
TOTAL ALL TYPES:	106	128	68	5	5	3			2	317

March

Regraded Unclassified

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ACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES IN APRIL 1942

<u>MODEL</u>	<u>PACIFIC</u>	<u>ATLANTIC</u>	<u>TRAINING</u>	<u>NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.</u>	<u>SHORE STATIONS</u>	<u>DEFENSE AID</u>	<u>ARMY AIR FORCES</u>	<u>DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.</u>	<u>TESTS AND MISC.</u>	<u>TOTAL DELIVERIES</u>
F4F-4	54	38								92
SBD-3	54									54
TBF-1	25									25
SO3C-1		1							5	6
OS2U-3		39	10							49
OS2N-1	8	16								24
PBY-5	20	14	5							39
PBY-5A	11	11								22
PBM-3									1	1
COMBAT:	172	119	15						6	312
R4D-1	4			3						7
R4D-3				1					1	2
JR2S-1				1						1
UTILITY:	4			5					1	10
SNC-1			7						2	9
SNJ-3			42							42
NE-1			102							102
NP-1			30							30
TRAINING:			181						2	183
TOTAL ALL TYPES:	176	119	196	5					9	505

April

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ACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES IN MAY 1942

MODEL	PACIFIC	ATLANTIC	TRAINING	NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.	SHORE STATIONS	DEFENSE AID	ARMY AIR FORCES	DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.	TESTS AND MISC.	TOTAL DELIVERIES
F4F-4	65	40								105
F4F-7	2									2
SBD-3	60									60
BD-2	6	2								8
TBF-1	35	1								36
SO3C-1		2							2	4
OS2U-3		27	44							71
OS2N-1	19									19
PBY-5	20	16	15							51
PBM-3		1							1	2
COMBAT:	207	89	59						3	358
R4D-1	4			5						9
R4D-2					2					2
R5O-3		1								1
R5O-4					5					5
GB-2	2	2				2				6
UTILITY:	6	3		5	7	2				23
SNC-1			29			4				33
SNJ-3			45							45
SNJ-4			33							33
SNV-1			66							66
NE-1			122							122
NP-1			23							23
TRAINING:			318			4				322
TOTAL ALL TYPES:	213	92	377	5	7	6			3	703

May

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ACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES IN JUNE 1942

MODEL	PACIFIC	ATLANTIC	TRAINING	NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.	SHORE STATIONS	DEFENSE AID	ARMY AIR FORCES	DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.	TESTS AND MISC.	TOTAL DELIVERIES
F4F-4	90	29								119
F4F-7	3									3
F4F-4B						10				10
SBD-3	64									64
TBF-1	54	7								61
SO3C-1		4							1	5
OS2U-3			9			62				71
OS2N-1	25	6								31
PB2Y-3		1								1
PBY-5B			30			32				62
PBM-3		2								2
COMBAT:	236	49	39			104			1	429
R4D-1	8			2						10
R4D-3				2						2
R5O-5					3					3
JR2S-2				1						1
GH-1					2				1	3
GB-2					1					1
UTILITY:	8			5	6				1	20
SNC-1			30			12				42
SNV-1			37							37
SNJ-3			54							54
SNJ-4	10	22	65							97
N2S-4			97						1	98
NP-1			5							5
TRAINING:	10	22	288			12			1	333
TOTAL ALL TYPES:	254	71	327	5	6	116			3	782

June

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ACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES IN JULY 1942

MODEL	PACIFIC	ATLANTIC	TRAINING	NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.	SHORE STATIONS	DEFENSE AID	ARMY AIR FORCES	DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.	TESTS AND MISC.	TOTAL DELIVERIES
F4F-4	52	10								62
F4F-7	2									2
F4U-1									2	2
F4F-4B						36				36
SBD-3	54									54
SBD-3A							20			20
TBF-1	32	43								75
SO3C-1		5								5
OS2U-3	5	12	32			8				57
OS2N-1	20	30								50
PB2Y-3	1	2								3
PBY-5B			30			33				63
PBM-3				5						5
COMBAT:	166	102	62	5		77	20		2	434
R4D-1	5			3						8
JRF-5					2				1	3
J4F-2									1	1
GB-2					9	3				12
GH-1					10					10
UTILITY:	5			3	21	3			2	34
SNB-2			3						1	4
SNC-1			41			9				50
SNJ-4	20	23	132							175
SNV-1			135							135
N2S-3			53							53
N2S-4			97							97
N2T-1									1	1
NP-1			19							19
TRAINING:	20	23	480			9			2	534
TOTAL ALL TYPES:	191	125	542	8	21	89	20		6	1002

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ACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES IN AUGUST 1942

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MODEL	PACIFIC	ATLANTIC	TRAINING	NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.	SHORE STATIONS	DEFENSE AID	ARMY AIR FORCES	DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.	TESTS AND MISC.	TOTAL DELIVERIES
F4F-4	38	5								43
F4F-7	2									2
F4U-1		2							7	9
F4F-4B						90				90
SB2A-4			4							4
SBD-3	74									74
SBD-3A							30			30
TBF-1	12	32	19							63
SO3C-1	33	25								58
OS2U-3	9		46							55
OS2N-1	10	40								50
PBY-5A	12	11	4				6		1	34
PB4Y-1	2									2
PB2Y-3				3						3
PBY-5B						16				16
PBM-3		2		5					1	8
COMBAT:	192	117	73	8		106	36		9	541
R4D-1	4			4						8
R4D-3				4						4
JRF-5					3					3
J4F-2		3			1					4
GH-1					5					5
GB-2					1	2				3
UTILITY:	4	3		8	10	2				27
SNB-1			11						3	14
SNB-2			14							14
SNC-1			28			10			2	40
SNJ-4	30	10	130							170
SNV-1			82							82
N2S-3			72							72
N2S-4			96							96
N2T-1			4							4
TRAINING:	30	10	437			10			5	492
TOTAL ALL TYPES:	226	130	510	16	10	118	36		14	1060

August

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ACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES IN SEPTEMBER 1942

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MODEL	PACIFIC	ATLANTIC	TRAINING	NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.	SHORE STATIONS	DEFENSE AID	ARMY AIR FORCES	DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.	TESTS AND MISC.	TOTAL DELIVERIES
F4F-4	57	20								77
F4F-7	6									6
F4U-1	13									13
F4F-4B						43				43
F6F-1									1	1
FM-1									1	1
SB2A-4			6			30				36
SB2C									2	2
SBD-3	77									77
SBD-3A							30			30
TBF-1	35	16	21							72
XTBF-2									1	1
SO3C-1	57	14								71
OS2U-3	8									8
OS2N-1	14	26								40
PBY-5A	18	19	12				6	2	3	60
PB4Y-1	5									5
PB2Y-3	8									8
PBY-5B						6				6
PBM-3		12								12
PV-1		24							3	27
COMBAT:	298	131	39			79	36	2	11	596
R4D-3				2						2
JRF-5					3					3
J4F-2						4				4
GB-2					4	7				11
UTILITY:				2	7	11				20
SNB-1			18						1	19
SNB-2			15							15
SNC-1			11							11
SNJ-4	12	10	155							177
SNV-1			146							146
N2S-3			110							110
N2S-4			20							20
N2T-1			3							3
TRAINING:	12	10	478						1	501
TOTAL ALL TYPES:	310	141	517	2	7	90	36	2	12	1117

September

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ACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES IN OCTOBER 1942

MODEL	PACIFIC	ATLANTIC	TRAINING	NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.	SHORE STATIONS	DEFENSE AID	ARMY AIR FORCES	DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.	TESTS AND MISC.	TOTAL DELIVERIES
FM-1			2							2
F4F-4	51	11	30							92
F4F-4B						40				40
F4F-7	3									3
F6F-3									2	2
F4U-1	32		3							35
SB2A-4			8							8
SB2A (British)						35				35
SB2C-1	3	3	3						6	15
SBD-3	85	13								98
SBD-3A							32			32
TBM-1									1	1
TBF-1	36	21	25							82
SO3C-2	42	12							1	55
OS2N-1	26	14								40
PB4Y-1	17									17
PB2Y-3	11			3						14
PBY-5B						67				67
PBN-1									1	1
PBM-3		19								19
COMBAT	306	93	71	3	0	142	32	0	11	658
R4D-1	5			8	3					16
R4D-3				2						2
R5O-4	2	1			3					6
JRF-5					3	1				4
J4F-2						4				4
GB-2					7	2				9
GH-1					2					2
HE-1					5					5
UTILITY	7	1	0	10	23	7	0	0	0	48
SNE-1			15							15
SNE-2			10							10
SNJ-4	50		90							140
SNV-1			60							60
N2S-3			120							120
NH-1			4							4
N2T-1			8							8
TRAINING	50	0	307	0	0	0	0	0	0	357
TOTAL ALL TYPES:	363	94	378	13	23	149	32	0	11	1063

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October

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ACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES IN NOVEMBER 1942

MODEL	PACIFIC	ATLANTIC	TRAINING	NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.	SHORE STATIONS	DEFENSE AID	ARMY AIR FORCES	DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.	TESTS AND MISC.	TOTAL DELIVERIES
FM-1			3							3
F4F-7	1									1
F4F-4	80	34	25							139
F6F-3	9					1				10
F4U-1	50									50
SB2A-3									1	1
SB2A-4			15							15
SB2A (British)						38				38
SB2C-1		25								25
SB2C-1A							1			1
SBD-4	75	30	22							127
SBD-4A							33			33
TBM-1			2							2
TBF-1	50	20	20							90
SO3C-2	60									60
OS2N-1		19								19
PB4Y-1	11									11
PB2Y-3	16		2	3						21
PBY-5	26		10			30		4		70
PRN-1			3							3
PBM-3		19		6						25
PV-1	15	12	12						5	44
COMBAT	393	159	114	9	0	69	34	4	6	788
R4D-1	4			4						8
R4D-3				2						2
R5O-4	1								4	5
JRF-5						4				4
J4F-2						4				4
GB-2					5					5
HE-1					30					30
UTILITY	5	0	0	6	35	8	0	0	4	58
SNB-1			15							15
SNB-2			10							10
SNJ-4	20	20	120							160
SNV-1			65							65
N2S-3			200							200
NH-1			10							10
N2T-1			13							13
TRAINING	20	20	433	0	0	0	0	0	0	473
TOTAL ALL TYPES:	418	179	547	15	35	77	34	4	10	1319

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November

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ACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES IN DECEMBER 1942

MODEL	PACIFIC	ATLANTIC	TRAINING	NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.	SHORE STATIONS	DEFENSE AID	ARMY AIR FORCES	DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.	TESTS AND MISC.	TOTAL DELIVERIES
FM-1			4			2				6
F4F-4	60	55	25							140
F6F-3	18					2				20
F4U-1	75									75
SB2A-3		5								5
SB2A-4			23							23
SB2A (British)						53				53
SB2C-1	20	20								40
SB2C-1A							3			3
SBD-4	100	30	32							162
SBD-4A							38			38
TBM-1			6							6
TBF-1	60	20	20							100
SO3C-2	36					34				70
PB4Y-1	6		14							20
PB2Y-3	11		10	4						25
PBY-5	42		15			17		1		75
PBN-1			5							5
PBM-3		32								32
PV-1	15	39	24							78
COMBAT	443	201	178	4	0	108	41	1	0	976
R5C-1	1								1	2
R4D-1	8									8
R4D-3				2						2
R5O-4	2	1			1				1	5
JR2S-1				1						1
JRF-5						4				4
J4F-2						4				4
GB-2					6					6
HE-1					30					30
UTILITY	11	1	0	3	37	8	0	0	2	62
SNB-1			15							15
SNB-2			10							10
SNJ-4	20	40	128							186
SNV-1			70							70
N2S-3			200							200
NH-1			20							20
N2T-1			15							15
TRAINING	20	40	456	0	0	0	0	0	0	516
TOTAL ALL TYPES	474	242	634	7	37	116	41	1	2	1554

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December

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ACCEPTANCES OF AIRPLANES IN DECEMBER 1942

MODEL	PACIFIC	ATLANTIC	TRAINING	NAVAL AIR TRANS. SERV.	SHORE STATIONS	DEFENSE AID	ARMY AIR FORCES	DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORP.	TESTS AND MISC.	TOTAL DELIVERIES
FM-1			4			2				6
F4F-4	60	55	25							140
F6F-3	18					2				20
F4U-1	75									75
SB2A-3		5								5
SB2A-4			23							23
SB2A (British)						53				53
SB2C-1	20	20								40
SB2C-1A							3			3
SBD-4	100	30	32							162
SBD-4A							38			38
TBM-1			6							6
TBF-1	60	20	20							100
SO3C-2	36					34				70
PB4Y-1	6		14							20
PB2Y-3	11		10	4						25
PBY-5	42		15			17		1		75
PBN-1			5							5
PBM-3		32								32
PV-1	15	39	24							78
COMBAT	443	201	178	4	0	108	41	1	0	976
R5C-1	1								1	2
R4D-1	8									8
R4D-3				2						2
R5O-4	2	1			1				1	5
JR2S-1				1						1
JRF-5						4				4
J4F-2						4				4
GB-2					6					6
HE-1					30					30
UTILITY	11	1	0	3	37	8	0	0	2	62
SNB-1			15							15
SNB-2			10							10
SNJ-4	20	40	126							186
SNV-1			70							70
N2S-3			200							200
NH-1			20							20
N2T-1			15							15
TRAINING	20	40	456	0	0	0	0	0	0	516
TOTAL ALL TYPES	474	242	634	7	37	116	41	1	2	1554

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December

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