

BOX 171. 1. A-16 WASHINGTON CONFERENCE -- 1943: May, 1943.

COPY

SETTLEMENT IN NORTHERN AFRICA; RE REFUGEES

The President's suggestion to look up Italian plans for settlement might bring immediate practical results.

Inquiry to be made as to titles of land, soil and possibilities of compounding water for power irrigation.

If titles are found to be in the Italian Government, matters will be simplified. It will also be satisfactory, if the Italians took over the land from the inhabitants.

I am wondering if the doors of all countries cannot be opened to a few of the refugees. Each one taking a few, would soon take care of many.

The Present position of the United States and Britain and the United Nations victories would make the opening up of that possibility greater now than at any other time. They might be persuaded in order to show their adherence to the four freedoms.

(SIGNED) BERNARD M. BARUCH

draft conf

T-1 W.S.

*Not Sent
LHR*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
AND THE PRIME MINISTER

*Turning up May 23
LHR W.S.C*

The complete destruction of the Nazi Afrika Korps and their Italian allies in North Africa completed one phase of the military decisions made at Casablanca. Progress on other operations, determined at that time, is proceeding satisfactorily.

Aggressive warfare, however, requires a constant implementation of strategy, based upon military events. Further operations, in addition to those determined upon at Casablanca, must be set afoot. Therefore the President and the Prime Minister decided to meet again with their Chiefs of Staff.

They have agreed on further steps to be taken in the overall planning of a global war. The operations which have been approved include every theatre of war all over the world.

There has been a complete meeting of minds on:

- (a) The war in the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia.
- (b) The war in China and Southern Asia.

- (c) The situation in the Middle East.
- (d) The war in the Mediterranean.
- (e) The war at sea in the North and South Atlantic.
- (f) The war in Western Europe.
- ~~(g) The war in Eastern Europe - the Russian-German front.~~

Action in all these theatres is inter-related in regard to shipping, air power and the command of the seas by our navies.

The war at this time stands far better than when the President, the Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff met at Casablanca.

Our unrelenting anti-U-boat campaign is prospering, with the result that there are far more merchant ships available than had been anticipated. The triumphs of the Russian Army have inflicted shattering blows upon the German forces. Heroic China still stands firm. The weight and intensity of the Allied air offensive grows continually.

The vast production of munitions assures to the United Nations the weapons with which to destroy the enemy.

However the Combined Chiefs of Staff remain convinced that all plans must be based on a complete military

victory without counting on any possibility of the enemy's internal collapse.

The President and the Prime Minister also examined with the Chiefs of Staff the forms of temporary civil and military organizations to be set up when the Nazi, Fascist or Japanese occupied territories are freed.

The fullest possible contacts have been maintained with Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, to whom the final reports have been submitted.

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Admiral Brown to file
File 1913
May 25, 1943.
STATEMENT TO BE MADE TO THE CHINESE

Following is a suggested statement to be made to the Chinese authorities with regard to decisions reached at the Trident Conferences.

"It has been decided to pursue the operations in the ANAKIM theater which were discussed at the Calcutta Conference with certain modifications. The following are the proposals which will be made to the Generalissimo: -

First, the concentration of available resources as supreme priority within the Assam-Burma area on the building up and increasing of the Air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons monthly by early Fall, and the development of Air facilities in ASSAM with a view to:

- a. Intensifying Air operations against the Japanese in BURMA;
- b. Maintaining increased American Air forces in CHINA; and
- c. Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.

Secondly, vigorous and aggressive land and Air operations will be begun at the end of 1943 monsoon from ASSAM into BURMA via LEDO and IMPHAL in step with an advance by Chinese forces from YUNNAN, with the object of containing and engaging as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the Air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the BURMA road.

Thirdly, amphibious operations against the Burmese coast with the purpose of interrupting Japanese communications between the coast and their northern front.

Fourthly, the interruption of Japanese sea communications into BURMA.

For the above purposes all possible measures will be taken to secure the Naval Command of the Bay of Bengal by an adequate

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STATEMENT TO BE MADE TO THE CHINESE (Cont'd)

force. No limits, except those imposed by time and circumstances, will be placed on the above operations, which have for their object the relief of the siege of China."

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409-5
(C.C.S. 242/3)

24 May 1943

(1) CP3 73
(2) CCS 242
(3) CCS 242/1
(4) CCS 242/2

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

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C.C.3. 242/3

24 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Enclosure is a final report on the results of the
Trident Conference.

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TRIDENT

Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Final
Agreed Summary of Conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of
Staff.

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 242) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.

I. OVERALL OBJECTIVE

In conjunction with RUSSIA and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS Powers.

II. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

1. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS in EUROPE.

2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

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3. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers and, if possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the full resources of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of JAPAN.

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

1. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE and the BRITISH ISLES.

2. Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

4. Intensify the air offensive against the AXIS Powers in EUROPE.

5. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the AXIS citadel.

6. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable ^{aid the war effort of} to keep RUSSIA ~~actively in the war.~~

7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable ^{aid the war effort of} in order to keep CHINA ~~actively in the war~~ as an effective ally and as a base for operations against JAPAN.

8. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of TURKEY in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI 1.)

9. To prepare the French ^{force in} Army in NORTH AFRICA to fulfill an active role in the war against the AXIS Powers. (See also Section VI 2.)

IV. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR 1943-44 IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The following operations in execution of the overall strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interests should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. THE U-BOAT WAR

a. Operation to Seize the AZORES ISLANDS.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the AZORES is essential to the efficient conduct of the anti-U-boat war for the reasons set out in the Annex. The preparation of the plan for the capture of the AZORES ISLANDS is a responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the UNITED KINGDOM and that in the first place the islands of FAYAL and TERCEIRA should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor regarding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at present the earliest date for the arrival of the force in the AZORES will be about the end of August. It is agreed that the land, air, and sea facilities of the AZORES will be available to all UNITED NATIONS forces. *Political decision of British. If an earlier movement is to be made, further study should be by the two governments.*

b. Other Anti-U-Boat Measures.

All possible measures for strengthening the air forces engaged in the Bay ^{of Biscay} Offensive and for increasing the number of VLR aircraft engaged in convoy protection have been examined and such steps as are practicable are being taken. *Regraded Unclassified*

c. Flexibility of Forces.

The necessity for flexibility in the utilization of both air and sea forces has been agreed, and steps to improve matters in this respect are being constantly studied and implemented.

2. DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

a. Combined Bomber Offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U. S. - British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

b. Cross-Channel Operations.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That forces and equipment shall be established in the UNITED KINGDOM with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the UNITED KINGDOM by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available.

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).

 2 Infantry Divisions - Follow-up.

 2 Air borne Divisions.

Total 9 Divisions in the Assault.

Build-up: 20 Divisions available for movement into lodgement area

Total 29 Divisions

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The expansion of logistical facilities in the UNITED KINGDOM will be undertaken immediately, and the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the initial assault and build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the UNITED STATES of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

Morgan operation - Norway

c. Operations in the MEDITERRANEAN to Eliminate ITALY from the War.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That the Allied Commander in Chief, North African Theater, will be instructed to mount such ^{practical} operations in exploitation of HUSKY ^{within his means} as are ~~best~~ calculated to eliminate ITALY from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. ^{Which is the alternative} ~~Each~~ specific operation ^{to be adopted} will be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in NORTH AFRICA may use for his operations all those forces available in the MEDITERRANEAN Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the UNITED KINGDOM, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will not be considered available. It is estimated that the equivalent strength of 19 British and Allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the MEDITERRANEAN Area subsequent to HUSKY. These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the UNITED KINGDOM and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to TURKEY. It is further estimated that there will be available after HUSKY a total of 3,648 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives.

Regraded Unclassified

d. Bombing of Ploesti.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U. S. Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields from bases in NORTH AFRICA. Further, they have agreed that the Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, will be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These steps have been taken.

3. OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN.

We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required.

e. Operations in the BURMA-CHINA Theater.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:

(1) The concentration of available resources, as first priority within the ASSAM-BURMA Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air route to CHINA to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early Fall, and the development of air facilities in ASSAM with a view to:

(a) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in BURMA;

(b) Maintaining increased American air forces in CHINA; and

(c) Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to CHINA.

(2) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations at the end of the 1943 monsoon from ASSAM into BURMA via LEDO and IMPHAL, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from YUNNAN, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to CHINA, and as an essential step towards the opening of the BURMA road.

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(3) The capture of AKYAB and of RAMREE ISLAND by amphibious operations, with possible exploitation.

(4) The interruption of Japanese sea communications into BURMA.

(5) The continuance of administrative preparations in India for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of ANAKIM.

b. Operations in the PACIFIC.

Various courses of action have been examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the operations they have agreed to undertake have the following objects:

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA.
- (2) Ejection of the Japanese from the ALEUTIANS.
- (3) Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS.
- (4) Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and Japanese held NEW GUINEA.
- (5) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

V. AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 1943-44.

We have examined our resources with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the above operations and our conclusions are as follows:

Ground Forces.

1. All the ground forces required can be made available.

Naval Forces.

2. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture AKYAB and RAMREE, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated some diversion of U. S. naval forces may be required. Subject to this, all the naval forces required can be made available.

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Air Forces.

3. Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.

4. For cross-Channel operations there will be sufficient air forces in the U. K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of which needs further investigation. In the absence of any detailed plan for cross-Channel operations, it has not been possible to estimate the requirements in gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent study, which we are initiating.

5. For operations in BURMA there are only small deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater.

6. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in ASSAM, the air transport and defense requirements of the air route into CHINA, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met.

Assault Shipping and Landing Craft.

7. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have allowed for, and provided that the U. S. and British planned productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can be made available. We have agreed upon the necessary allocations.

Supply of Critical Items.

8. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. With the exception of steel for landing craft construction, deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend that the possibilities of providing the necessary items, and particularly steel, should be further examined.

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Shipping.

9. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate, personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected operations for 1943/1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect will not be unmanageable.

Oil.

10. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters, but the whole question of stocks and of tankers must receive urgent examination in the light of the decisions taken at the Trident Conference.

VI. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS.

1. Equipment for TURKEY.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the ANFA Conference that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to the Munitions Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for TURKEY. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of such equipment as may be agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least practicable delay.

2. Rearming of the French in NORTH AFRICA.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in NORTH AFRICA should be

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proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U. S. forces. The use of captured German equipment for this purpose will be explored.

VII. OTHER CONFERENCES.

1. Decisions of the CASABLANCA conference in conflict with the provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August in order to examine the decisions reached at this conference in the light of the situation existing at the time.

A N N E X

ADVANTAGES TO BE GAINED BY THE USE OF THE AZORES

1. Experience has shown that so long as we can keep even a single aircraft with a convoy during the greater part of each day, the operation of U-boats is greatly hampered. In order to obtain maximum air protection at the present time it is necessary for U. S.-U. K. convoys to follow a northerly route which not only suffers from the disadvantages of bad weather and ice, but which inevitably becomes known to the enemy. If we take a southerly route at the present time, we lose shore-based air protection over a large part of the passage. There is the further peril of U-boat concentrations against the U. S.-Mediterranean convoys. We regard the immediate occupation of the AZORES as imperative to conserve lives and shipping and, above all, to shorten the War.

2. The facilities which we particularly require are as follows:

- a. Facilities in the AZORES on TERCIERA for operating V.L.R. aircraft;
- b. Unrestricted fueling facilities for naval escorts at either SAN MIGUEL or FAYAL.

3. The benefits which would accrue from these facilities may be summarized as follows:

- a. They would give us a much extended air cover for all convoys plying between:
 - (1) U.S.A. or WEST INDIES and the MEDITERRANEAN;
 - (2) WEST INDIES and the U. K.;
 - (3) SOUTH AMERICA and the U. K.;
 - (4) U. K. and the MEDITERRANEAN;
 - (5) U. K. and WEST AFRICA, and the Cape and Eastwards.

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b. The increased areas under air cover would give us much greater scope for evasive routing, e.g., when U-boats were concentrated in northern waters, North ATLANTIC convoys could be routed via the AZORES instead of always having to follow the ICELAND (C) route. (See diagram)

c. Without the AZORES we shall always be moving on the outside of the circle while the enemy operates inside it. Air forces there would be centrally placed to cover all varieties of the U-boat campaign against the North ATLANTIC and MEDITERRANEAN theaters.

d. We should be able to increase our carrying capacity owing to the possibility of using more direct routes across the middle of the ATLANTIC.

e. We could increase our harassing action against U-boats not only when on passage to and from the BISCAY bases, but also while resting, refueling and recharging their batteries in mid-ocean where hitherto they have been practically immune from interference by aircraft. New detection and attacking devices, which are expected to come into service this spring, would enhance the effect of such action.


f. Unrestricted fueling facilities in the Islands would enable us to make better use of our inadequate numbers of surface escorts.

g. Blockade running between GERMANY and JAPAN would be rendered so hazardous as not to be worth the risk.

h. German warships and raiders would have greater difficulty in evading detection after breaking out into the ATLANTIC.

i. The Islands would provide more direct all-weather air supply routes from U.S.A. to EUROPE, AFRICA, and the FAR EAST.

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File
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRIME MINISTER

I have started to get a
brief report on Libya and
Tripoli and we will have it
by Sunday.

F. D. R.

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404-1
(C.C.S. 242)

21 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

DRAFT OF AGREED DECISIONS

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COPY NO. 10

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C.C.S. 242

21 May 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

DRAFT OF AGREED DECISIONS

Memorandum to the President and the Prime Minister
Submitted by
The Combined Chiefs of Staff

The attached paper sets out the agreed decisions that have been reached so far by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the present conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These decisions still need to be related to the resources available and particularly to the availability of shipping and landing craft. This is being done and a final report will be submitted to you on Monday, 24 May 1943.

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E N C L O S U R E

DRAFT OF AGREED DECISIONS

I N D E X

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1. Azores Islands.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have already submitted to the President and the Prime Minister the following recommendations:

a. That the acquisition of the Azores Islands should be accomplished as soon as possible and, in any event, early enough for them to be utilized by the United Nations during the winter of 1943-1944. *(Five reasons)*

~~b. That an effort should first be made to secure the use of these islands by diplomatic means without making military commitments to the Portuguese Government.~~

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed:

a. That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation and use of the Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings and the effect of the plan on other military commitments now in view.

b. That as soon as these plans have been approved preparations should be made to implement them. ~~in case diplomatic efforts should fail.~~

2. The Combined Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U.S.-British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and April 1, 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

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3. Defeat of Axis Powers in Europe.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:-

a. That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944:

Assault: 5 Infantry Divisions (Simultaneously loaded
in landing craft)
2 Infantry Divisions - Follow-up
2 Airborne Divisions

Total 9 Divisions in the Assault

Build-up: 20 Divisions available for movement into
lodgment area

Total 29 Divisions

b. That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Each specific operation will be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will not be considered available.

c. The above resolution shall be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a meeting in July or early in August, the date to be decided later, in order that the situation may be examined in the light of the result of HUSKY and the situation in Russia.

4. Burma-China Theater.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:-

a. The concentration of available resources as first priority within the Assam-Burma Theater on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early Fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to -

(1) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;

(2) Maintaining increased American air forces in China;

(3) Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.

b. Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

c. The capture of Akysab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations *and possible occupation of Myanmar as a result thereof*

d. The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

5. Operations in the Pacific - 1943-44.

The courses of action examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the conclusions reached by them are as follows:-

a. Far Eastern Theater.

(1) Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China.

Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan and to keeping China in the war.

(2) Air operations in and from China.

Close coordination with other elements of plan are essential.

b. Pacific Theater.

(1) Operations in the Solomons and Bismarck Archipelago.

Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining pressure on Japan, and the defense of Australia.

(2) Operations in New Guinea.

The capture of New Guinea will facilitate the opening of a line of communications to the Celebes Sea and contribute to the defense of Australia.

(3) Operations in eastern Netherlands East Indies.

Due to limitation of forces, operations other than air warfare should be restricted to the seizure of those islands necessary to the capture of New Guinea.

(4) Operations in the Marshall Islands.

Shortens line of communications to Southwest Pacific and Celebes Sea.

(5) Operations in the Caroline Islands.

Necessary to gain control of central Pacific, thereby facilitating establishment of line of communications to Celebes Sea. Will enable United Nations forces ^{to} directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.

(6) Intensification of Operations against Enemy Lines of Communication.

All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific.

7. Protection of our convoys
Conclusions:

a. Offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-1944 should have the following objectives:

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.
- (2) Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China.

- (3) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
- (4) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
- (5) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese-held New Guinea.

(6) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

b. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and amphibious craft.

6. Re-arming of the French in North Africa.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the re-arming and re-equipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and United States forces in the various theaters.

7. Bombing of Ploesti.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the United States Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Roumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa or Syria. Further, that the Commander in Chief of the North African Theater should be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

May 18, 1943.


Gen. Watson
White House,
Wash. D.C.

My Dear General:

Herewith, are two reports on Magnesium concerning which the President and the Prime Minister asked me about yesterday at luncheon.

I am enclosing one other duplicate, in case the President wishes to give it to the Prime Minister.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "M. Baruch", written in a cursive style.

BERNARD M. BARUCH

MEMORANDUM ON MAGNESIUM:

Unless there are demands for lend-lease and for our Armed Forces, which were not ordered up to the afternoon of May 17, 1943., supply has overtaken demand.

All bins have been filled. Two months advanced shipment have been made to China and Russia.

A stock pile is now accumulating here at the rate of 7,500,000 lbs. per month.

All listed demands up to Dec. 31, 1943., will be met by production and a stock pile of 50,000,000 will be accumulated by Dec. 31, 1943.

There need be no anxiety ove this metal unless much larger demands are contemplated than have been placed. If- -there are any such future requirements, it should be immediately presented to the Magnesium unit of the W.P.B..

JM Zaruch

POSSIBLE TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

With W.S.C.
May 1943

It is assumed that the purpose of the talks will be to coordinate British and American policy with respect to current questions and to lay the basis for coordinating policy with respect to future problems.

I. Current Questions

- RA (1. General De Gaulle and General Giraud
(2. North Africa
(3. Soviet Union
LWH ((a) Soviet-Polish relations
(b) Soviet relations with other eastern
and southeastern countries
(c) Protection of convoys
LRH 4. Finland
CWC (5. Attitude toward other Axis satellites
(6. Attitude toward Governments in Exile
(7. Yugoslavia
WPG 8. Spain
JCHB 9. Eritrea and Ethiopia, Djibouti
JWJ 10. Bombing of Rome
TCA 11. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
RBR 12. Refugees
JDH 13. Bases

II. Continuing or future problems

- JDH (1. Coordination of policy with respect to the
administration of reoccupied territories, in-
cluding machinery for coordinated advance
TCA (planning
LP (2. Implementation of Article VII of Lend-Lease
Agreement
AAB (3. Postwar civil aviation
LWH 4. Integration of the Soviet Government into
conversations, as they develop, concerning
future problems.
CWC (5. Integration of the Governments in Exile into
CEB (such conversations.
ED (such conversations.
TCA (6. Development of method for general discussion
JDH (of future problems, including postwar problems