

PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY'S FILE
Subject File
Office of War Information: Survey
Of Intelligence: Dec. 1942
Box 156

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

WASHINGTON

December 7, 1942

Dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of INTELLIGENCE
REPORT 52 which was prepared for the Director of the
Office of War Information.

Sincerely yours,

R. Keith Kane
R. Keith Kane
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.



PSF
OWI

12-4-42

INTELLIGENCE REPORT 52

TO THE DIRECTOR, OWI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains information relating to the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, as amended, U. S. Code 50, Sections 31 and 32. Its transmission or communication in any manner to any unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

OFFICE OF
WAR INFORMATION
BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE

COPY No. 1

CONTENTS

	Page
EDITORIAL ATTITUDES	1
Confidence	1
Churchill	2
Rubber Revolt.	3
POPULAR REACTIONS	4
Turning Point.	4
Strategy	7
Information.	8
DEVELOPING SITUATIONS	9
Resentment about Rationing	9
Treatment of Italian Aliens.	12

The period covered by this report is the week of November 26 through December 2, except where otherwise specifically stated

EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

CONFIDENCE

Editors have begun to think of the North African offensive in somewhat more sober terms. They treat it now, not as a picnic, but as a campaign. While most of them remain confident that the allies will take Tunisia, they have become aware that a real fight is on our hands. Hanson Baldwin pointed out, for example, that "The hardest fighting is still to come... It seems probable now that Tunisia is not going to fall easily."

Comment continued on the arrangement with Admiral Darlan -- most of it in the form of justification. The more liberal commentators, however, remained sharply critical; their uneasiness was increased by Secretary Hull's announcement of an understanding with Admiral Robert respecting Martinique.

Even among the majority condoning these expedients there was a good deal of anxiety that General De Gaulle and his Fighting French might fail to appreciate the logic on which they were based. A fairly typical expression of this point of view appeared in The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot: "It is still clear that the French, and probably the British, are deeply disturbed by the whole uncertainty of how Darlan appeared in the driver's seat on the bandwagon and how long he is going to stay there."

The reported destruction of the French fleet at Toulon and the passing of French West Africa into United Nations control naturally gave a new lift to editorial thinking. Most observers credited these gains in part to Admiral Darlan's influence. Some argued, however, that Dakar would have joined our

side anyway because of its military helplessness and that Frenchmen needed no injunction from an ex-Vichyite to keep the fleet out of Nazi hands. The action at Toulon was generally interpreted, indeed, as a sign of French resurgence. Most comment on the subject paid tribute to the French sailors and asserted that their sacrifice recovered France's honor.

Only a minority among news analysts treated the stories about the scuttling of the fleet with skepticism. A majority took it more or less for granted that all the major French warships were destroyed or damaged beyond usefulness to Hitler. They found particular satisfaction in the fact that, with the final occupation of Toulon, France became a completely occupied country and could no longer be considered in any sense a collaborator of Germany.

The caution evidenced in current comments about North Africa was almost wholly lacking in appraisals of the new Russian offensive. News interpreters, both in the press and on the air, accepted Soviet communiques with little qualification and speculated happily about a Nazi rout on the eastern front. Great stress was placed on Russian claims about German casualties.

The warmest praise was expressed for the power and punch of the Red army. Although a substantial number of comments suggested that the Anglo-American success in North Africa had made the Russian offensive possible, most of them gave credit generously to Russian generalship and stamina.

CHURCHILL

Commentators applauded the quiet confidence of Prime Minister Churchill's latest broadcast. And they heartily endorsed the portion of his speech directed toward the Italian people. The Washington Post was alone in

cautioning against attempts to take Italy out of the war by supplanting Mussolini and dealing with lesser Fascists. "One Darlan may have been necessary," this newspaper warned. "But one Darlan is enough."

There was minor annoyance in some comments over Mr. Churchill's refusal to consider post-war problems now. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch observed that "While the Prime Minister is not only a war leader par excellence, but the only conceivable war leader for Britain, it is yet to be seen how he will loom at the peace table." Most discussions, however, stressed instead Mr. Churchill's assurance of continued British cooperation with the United States, if the war in Asia should continue after hostilities have ceased in Europe.

RUBBER REVOLT

Only a few newspapers have given outright support to the Middle Western campaign against nationwide mileage rationing. The Chicago Tribune has consistently attempted to portray the measure as an unwarranted infringement on midwestern liberties, imposed exclusively to appease the irritation of easterners who cannot get adequate supplies of gasoline. The Denver Post declared: "Nobody has shown, to the satisfaction of the American public, that bureaucratic restrictions on privately owned automobiles and trucks will contribute anything to the war effort."

But a number of other commentators attacked the rationing program obliquely. They argued that it is inefficiently administered, that its application is too stringent and that special problems are not adequately taken into account. This sort of criticism was by no means confined to the Middle West.

The New York Sun, in a fairly representative editorial, declared: "Protests against starting nationwide gasoline rationing on December 1 were probably not so much directed at the reasoning of the Baruch committee, as they were dictated by the fear that Washington bureaucrats do not realize how complex this job is and how easily its inefficient handling will fall upon urban and rural populations alike." The press, as a whole, while piously prepared to support the principle of nationwide mileage rationing, does not seem very enthusiastic about endorsing the practice.

POPULAR REACTIONS

TURNING POINT

To millions of Americans the launching of our offensive in North Africa seemed to constitute a definite turning point in the war. The news, followed almost at once by the announcement of a great naval victory in the Pacific, gave a dramatic lift to public opinion. A surge of optimism was reflected in general appraisals of the war's progress.

Three quarters of the American public now appear to be convinced that we are headed up the highroad toward victory. A comparison of the answers given to identical questions asked by the Bureau of Intelligence shortly before and shortly after the opening of the North African campaign shows how greatly confidence has increased.

JUDGING FROM THE WAY THINGS HAVE BEEN GOING IN THE
LAST FEW WEEKS, WOULD YOU SAY THAT RIGHT NOW WE
ARE WINNING THE WAR OR LOSING THE WAR?

	<u>October</u>	<u>Late November</u>
Winning the war	44%	74%
About even	31	18
Losing the war	15	3
Don't know	10	5

This sudden growth of optimism, however justified by events, may make the country ill-prepared to withstand the shock of reverses which perhaps still lie ahead. There is evidence, too, that the high degree of confidence may be tinged, to some extent, with complacency:

WOULD YOU SAY THAT WE'RE WORKING HARD ENOUGH NOW
TO BE PRETTY SURE TO WIN THE WAR, OR DO YOU FEEL
WE WILL HAVE TO WORK A LOT HARDER IF WE'RE GOING
TO WIN?

	<u>October</u>	<u>Late November</u>
Working hard enough now	22%	30%
Have to work harder	75	65
Don't know	3	5

There has also been a significant jump in popular certainty that the United Nations will win the war hands down -- decisively. Following the good news from Africa, the Bureau asked a national sample a multiple-choice question which it had not posed since the latter part of July:

WHICH ONE OF THESE FOUR STATEMENTS COMES CLOSEST
TO THE WAY YOU THINK THE WAR WILL END?

	<u>July</u>	<u>Late November</u>
There is no question that the United States and her allies will win the war and be able to write the peace terms.	58%	73%

OUTCOME OF THE WAR (table cont'd.)

	<u>July</u>	<u>Late November</u>
We'll win the war all right, but the losers will be strong enough so we will have to make some con- cessions too	28	19
We won't be defeated, but neither will the Axis -- the war will end in a draw	6	3
I'm afraid the Axis powers have a pretty good chance to win the war	3	0
Don't know	5	5

The disappearance of a belief that the Axis might win seems to confirm an inference previously drawn by the Bureau -- that those who held this view were not defeatists, but were, rather, people with so strong a sense of urgency and anxiety about the war that they were extremely pessimistic.

The real defeatists are the people who thought, and still think, that the war is going to end in a stalemate. People who hold this opinion tend also to think that our allies can't be trusted, that we should keep our forces at home to protect our own shores and that we should not enter into any post-war international association. They are defeatists in the sense that they are without hope for the future and are probably highly susceptible to negotiated peace propaganda.

other consequence of the North African and southwest Pacific successes has been a resurgence of hope that the war may be over fairly soon. Nearly three quarters of the public now think that peace will come within a two-year period:

ABOUT HOW MUCH LONGER DO YOU THINK THE WAR
WILL LAST?

	<u>August</u>	<u>Early November</u>	<u>Late November</u>
Less than a year	17%	33%	37%
13 mos.-2 yrs.	27	30	35
25 mos.-3 yrs.	17	15	13
37 mos.-5 yrs.	17	8	6
Over 5 yrs.	6	2	2
Don't know	16	12	7

The growth of optimism registered by these opinions is not necessarily unhealthy by any means. Victories, as well as defeats, may provide a spur to popular determination. A hope that the war can be won quickly may promote increased effort. It seems clear, however, that Government information needs to stress our recent successes as constituting the creation of an opportunity, rather than the achievement of a goal. The hopes recently aroused can be realized only through intensified effort.

STRATEGY

The North African campaign has also had a collateral effect on popular thinking about how the war should be waged. From time to time, the Bureau has asked national samples a question designed to discover whether they thought American strength should be concentrated against the German, or the Japanese, end of the Axis.

Early in November, when our foothold in the Solomons was seriously threatened and when the Germans seemed satisfactorily contained by the Russians around Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, the public was inclined to believe that we ought to mobilize our strength mainly against Japan. In the latter part of the month, however, after the Japanese had been successfully stopped in the southwest Pacific, and the Germans were on the run in North Africa, the balance of opinion was completely reversed:

WHICH ONE OF THESE DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES
OUGHT TO DO NOW IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY AND JAPAN?

	<u>Early November</u>	<u>Late November</u>
Fight Japan with most of our forces and send just enough help to Europe to keep Hitler from making more gains.	32%	21%

12-4-42

CONCENTRATION OF STRENGTH (table cont'd)

	<u>Early November</u>	<u>Late November</u>
Fight Germany with most of our forces and send just enough help to the Pacific to keep the Japs from mak- ing more gains	23	30
Attack Germany and Japan with equal force	32	35
Pull our forces close to home and use them to protect our own shores	6	5
Don't know		9

INFORMATION

Americans seem to feel that no news is bad news. At any rate, they are better satisfied with their Government's information policy when it is able to report successes. The rush of glad tidings from the southwest Pacific and North Africa has been accompanied by a marked drop in popular criticism regarding the Government's reporting of events at the fighting fronts.

Dissatisfaction with the adequacy of military and naval news was at its highest point of the year in the early part of November. By the latter half of the month, approval had jumped to the highest point recorded by the Bureau since the war began:

DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT IS GIVING THE PUBLIC
AS MUCH INFORMATION AS IT SHOULD ABOUT THE FIGHT-
ING IN THIS WAR?

	<u>Early November</u>	<u>Late November</u>
Yes	62%	75%
No	31	19
Don't know	7	6

DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

RESENTMENT ABOUT RATIONING

Within the last few weeks many of the regular correspondents of the Bureau of Intelligence have written in to report rising dissatisfaction in their communities about rationing. The impressive thing about these letters is not only their unanimity but their spontaneity. They have not been written in response to any specific inquiry. Of their own accord a large number of competent observers in all parts of the country have felt impelled to report on the same subject. Those writing include businessmen, bankers, editors, librarians, ministers -- all people of some standing in their communities.

The following report, from a New England businessman, is typical: "Dissatisfaction with the rationing situation is growing with alarming rapidity ... Reaction takes three forms...hoarding, ... irritation, and lack of belief in the necessity, which becomes an excuse for violation of regulations." An ace Chicago newspaperman writes: "The people are really grumbling for the first time." He adds that if it weren't for North Africa, complaints would be even more numerous and vehement.

Correspondents agree on the need for an intensified program to persuade people of the necessity, fairness and value of rationing. They report that the public is again beginning to question the need for rationing. Many people simply don't believe that there are real shortages of coffee, fuel oil, gas and rubber.

Despite the immediate favorable reaction to the Baruch report, the rubber and gas situation seems to be a particular sore spot. People grumble that the enormous supply of old tires can't be used, that the reported shortage is less bad than painted, that development of synthetic rubber is delayed by politics and selfish economic rivalries. One correspondent complains on his own account that with the present gas allowance, it would take ten years to wear out a set of tires and that within three years the U. S. is bound to have an ample supply of synthetic rubber. Such objections may be pure rationalizations. Nevertheless, correspondents feel that factual information about the need for rationing would reduce complaints of this character.

Centers of oil supply protest that local gas rationing is worse than senseless. In certain communities in Pennsylvania, for example, people are asking whether they will have to run their gasoline into the ground, since more is produced as a by-product of lubricating oil manufacture than they are allowed to use or are able to ship.

A California labor editor writes that the threat of gas rationing has sent hundreds of airplane plant workers back to their homes in Texas and the Middle West. They left despite the counter-arguments of friends who remained that "men on the battlefields don't get home to lunch."

The administration of rationing programs continues to arouse numerous complaints. Confusing orders and contradictory statements not only heighten resistance to rationing, but impair public confidence in the efficiency and good faith of the Federal Government. There is great in-

dignation over the time and waste involved in such procedures as tire inspection, which is sometimes denounced as "an insult to the citizen's intelligence."

Correspondents point out with heat that premature notice of rationing, as in the case of coffee, constitutes an open invitation to hoard. People in the lower income groups complain that such announcements "give the big shots a chance to stock up." Some of the people who can't shop early in the day also grumble that supplies are exhausted by the time they can get to the stores.

Several correspondents point out that information about rationing is likely to be overlooked when it is intermixed with other newspaper material. They suggest that space should be regularly set aside for official announcements and news about rationing, and that such material should perhaps be set off from other news stories by being boxed.

A number of correspondents feel that people's acceptance of rationing depends to a very large extent on the intangible factor of spirit. They say that the particular complaints people raise are perhaps less important than the indication that the public is not yet genuinely ready for sacrifices. Too little emphasis has been put on the connection between hardship and heroism, between compliance with regulations and victory.

Equally important, people have not been made to feel that rationing is a matter for cooperation as well as compulsion. Rationing is now seen as something imposed from above. Emphasis needs to be put on the fact that it provides the machinery by which the people can pursue ends of their

own choosing, with equality of sacrifice assured.

At the present time, according to the correspondents, bootlegging is rampant in connection with all rationed commodities, and it is being engaged in by "the best people." Rationing has not been endowed with prestige. As one correspondent says, it is imperative that the public be made to feel that observance of rules is "generous and smart" -- that rationing constitutes an important means by which the American people can participate in winning this people's war.

Recent grumbling may be, in some measure, a reaction to good news. Victories may have diminished the popular sense of urgency about the war and of the importance of civilian sacrifice. The attitude underscores the need for informational efforts to make people aware that North Africa is, in fact, nothing more than "the end of the beginning."

TREATMENT OF ITALIAN ALIENS

In early November only four Americans in ten appeared to be aware that Italian aliens had been removed from the "enemy alien" category. A national sample was asked:

IS IT YOUR IMPRESSION THAT GERMAN AND ITALIAN ALIENS
ARE BEING TREATED THE SAME, OR DO YOU THINK ONE GROUP
IS BEING TREATED BETTER THAN THE OTHER?

Germans and Italians treated alike	36%
One being favored	40
Not ascertainable	24

(Asked of those who answered: "One being favored")
WHICH GROUP IS BEING TREATED BETTER?

Italians being favored 39%
Germans being favored 1

Some respondents may have failed to reply that the Italians were being favored because the question did not specify treatment by the Government. They may have been thinking in terms of social or economic discrimination.

Better-educated people were far better informed about the status of Italian aliens than the less well educated. Sixty-two per cent of the college graduates in the sample knew that Italians were being given preferential treatment; only 24 per cent of those who had not completed grammar school knew it.

Only 25 per cent of the people in the sample felt that Italians should be treated better than other alien groups. The difference in viewpoint on this question between those who knew of the Government's recent decision to accord the Italians preferential treatment and those who did not was striking. Forty per cent of the former group, but only 15 per cent of the latter, believed that Italians should be treated less strictly than other enemy aliens.

Educational factors are at least partly responsible for this sharp contrast. The better educated respondents were far more prone than the less well educated to endorse the Government's policy of treating Italians leniently -- either because they recognized its manifold political advantages or were more sympathetically disposed to the Italians.

In addition, however, it appears that knowledge of the policy inclines people to accept it. Informational efforts designed to acquaint people

with the Government's decision to give the Italian aliens preferred treatment may simultaneously foster increased approval of the move.

— * * * —

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
WASHINGTON

file

December 14, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of INTELLIGENCE
REPORT 53. Permit me to call your attention
particularly to the item starting on page four
and the item starting on page ten.

Sincerely yours,

R. Keith Kane

R. Keith Kane
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.



PSF
OWI

12-11-42 970

INTELLIGENCE REPORT **53**

CONFIDENTIAL

This document contains information relating to the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, as amended, U. S. Code 50, Sections 31 and 32. Its transmission or communication in any manner to any unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

OFFICE OF
WAR INFORMATION
BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE

COPY No. 1

CONTENTS

	Page
EDITORIAL ATTITUDES	1
Anniversary	1
Censorship	3
Cabinet	4
Social Security	4
POPULAR REACTIONS	5
Manpower	5
Barriers to the Employment of Women	9
Understanding of the Anti-Inflation Program	10
News Accuracy	14
DEVELOPING SITUATIONS	15
Presentation of the Fuel Oil Crisis	15

✓

The period covered by this report is the week of December 3 through December 9, except where otherwise specifically stated

EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

ANNIVERSARY

Newspapers celebrated the anniversary of Pearl Harbor with a profusion of glad tidings. A casual reader of headlines could scarcely have surmised that the first year of war ended in anything less than complete success for the United States.

The story of Pearl Harbor was recounted, to be sure, with grim accents and tragic photographs, but the predominant note was the Navy's declaration that the handicap "soon will be erased forever." Tough German resistance was acknowledged in Tunisia; but there was a prevailing implication that it would speedily be overcome. The headlines from Russia told exclusively of Red army gains. A cheering appraisal of the South Pacific situation by Admiral Nimitz was highlighted on all front pages. Minor successes in the Solomons and on New Guinea were dramatized. Allied air raids over Germany and Italy were represented as crushing blows to the Axis. All in all, the front pages turned December 7 into a day of jubilation.

Editorial pages were scarcely less encouraging. They reviewed the first year of war -- and concluded that it had turned out well. The United Nations were held to be on the march -- wresting the offensive from an enemy which a year ago had everywhere been on the attack. And in almost all comments, there were reminders that our strength was growing while the enemy's diminished. OWI's dash of cold water on the progress of production did little to becloud the general satisfaction.

In a good many appraisals, Italy was virtually counted out of the war. The overwhelming view was that she is now extremely weak, militarily, economically and especially from the standpoint of civilian morale. According to the Topeka Capital, "The continued bombing of Italy's industrial cities will further demoralize the civilian population ... No amount of talk will allay the fears of the war weary Italians." The Atlanta Constitution appraised Mussolini's speech as follows: "Poor old Benny the Bum! That attempted apologia he made Wednesday, 81 minutes of pitiful puerility spewed over the radio into the ears of such Italians as had patience to listen, revealed the old black shirt as just about at the end of his tether."

Germany, it was recognized, retained much greater strength. But, while most comments devoted conventional phrases to pointing out that a tough job still lies ahead, their general tone suggested that pressure from the east, south and west could not fail to crush the Nazis. In many estimates, the situation was regarded as far more hopeful than that of 1918. Only in the past day or two have the difficulties of the North African campaign been genuinely appreciated.

As for Japan — it would be just a matter of time, once the Germans had been knocked out. Japanese shipping losses were added up and compared happily with our own. Successful defense of the Solomons was hailed as an assumption of the offensive. The industrial deficiencies of Japan were recited anew. Although Ambassador Gr w's book and speeches have been widely quoted, his message has by no means been made a central theme by editors.

There were, of course, numerous exceptions to this prevailing disposition

to catalog allied advantages. Nevertheless, the net impression given by the news and editorial comment on Pearl Harbor Day was one of rather high and easy optimism, obscuring the enormous difficulties which must still lie ahead.

CENSORSHIP

Editorial commentators, having vociferously demanded a full account of our Pearl Harbor disaster accorded it a very mixed reaction when it was at last released. A good many discussions of the Navy's report took the occasion to criticize again the withholding of the information for so long a time. The Boston Post observed, for example, "... Every American will feel that it could have been taken with fortitude and courage and engendered an iron resolve to fight on to victory."

The Scripps-Howard papers considered it "unfortunate that the old wound is reopened at this time... Now, instead of having the story well behind us, the Government must lacerate the public with it again. The result is painful. And it is destructive of American confidence." Other commentators turned their attention mainly to Japan's failure to follow up her initial advantage, moralizing that this disclosed a fatal rigidity in the Japanese military mind.

Press and radio have now joined in attacking the Government's information policy on another score. There has been a recent rash of protests about the censorship of criticism on the political phases of the North African campaign. A number of critics complained during the week that censorship has kept the British from a knowledge of the prevailing American distaste for "Darlanism." Several commentators argued that any ban on the reporting

of differences of opinion between Britain and America might prove disastrous to future collaboration.

CABINET

In general, the press applauded the streamlining of governmental organization to cope with the manpower, food and production problems. Commentators have, for some time, clamored for unified control in these areas.

Herbert Hoover's speech on the subject was widely praised.

There was, at best, however, no more than tepid applause for the President's selection of Paul McNutt for the manpower portfolio. The Baltimore Sun remarked that "The test of the new program will come, of course, in its operation. It has yet to be shown, for one thing, that Mr. McNutt himself is the proper man for the new post." Respecting Mr. Wickard, there was some fear that he had not been granted enough power to carry out the job.

Critics felt, however, that these moves were very much in the right direction. A number of them are currently suggesting that the next step ought to be the creation of a simplified war cabinet, or supreme war council, consisting of the top administrators (commonly called "czars") who are in charge of major problems.

SOCIAL SECURITY

American newspapers displayed a high degree of sympathetic interest in the Beveridge report proposing a post-war social security program for Britain. The New York Post called it "the best statement of war aims we've had." The Hartford Courant commented that "The preparation and the submission

of the plan are evidence of the seriousness with which the democratic peoples are facing the fact that a military victory in the war will be valueless unless it paves the way to the establishment of a social order, national and international, that will not only recompense individuals for their present suffering but also help to prevent the repetition of world-wide revolution..."

A majority of the discussions of the subject suggested that something akin to the Beveridge plan will be necessary here if the United States is to avoid a post-war depression. The commentators, of course, avoided specific commitments. But their endorsement of social security in principle seemed lively and genuine.

POPULAR REACTIONS

MANPOWER

In the early part of November, shortly before sweeping control of manpower problems was placed in the hands of Paul McNutt, the American public expressed a lively awareness of the need for such action. But people were much more conscious of the farm labor shortage than of the scarcity of workers in the field of industrial production:

FROM WHAT YOU'VE HEARD, DO YOU THINK WAR
PLANTS IN THIS COUNTRY CAN GET ALL THE
WORKERS THEY NEED NOW?

Yes	57%
No	33
Don't know	10

HOW ABOUT FARMERS IN THIS COUNTRY? DO YOU
THINK FARMERS CAN GET ALL THE WORKERS THEY
NEED NOW?

Yes	9%
No	86
Don't know	5

Awareness of the manpower problem was indicated also by a widespread belief that enlargement of the labor force should take precedence even over expansion of the Army and Navy:

GRANTING THAT BOTH OF THESE THINGS ARE IMPORTANT, WHICH ONE IS MOST IMPORTANT FOR US TO DO RIGHT NOW -- INCREASE THE SIZE OF OUR ARMED FORCES, OR INCREASE THE NUMBER OF WORKERS IN WAR JOBS?

Increase size of armed forces	22%
Increase number of workers	40
Both equally important	25
Don't know	13

A decided majority of the public in November expressed readiness for governmental control over the allocation of manpower:

RIGHT NOW, DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE SOME OF THE PEOPLE OUT OF JOBS NOT CONNECTED WITH THE WAR EFFORT AND PUT THEM TO WORK IN WAR INDUSTRIES?

Yes	61%
No	16
Depends	14
Don't know	9

WOULD YOU FAVOR A PLAN UNDER WHICH WAR WORKERS WOULD HAVE TO GET PERMISSION FROM THE GOVERNMENT IF THEY WANT TO LEAVE THEIR PRESENT JOBS TO TAKE A JOB SOMEWHERE ELSE?

Yes	65%
No	25
Don't know	10

Again the sense of urgency about the scarcity of farm labor was even more apparent:

NEXT SPRING OR SUMMER, DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO TAKE SOME OF THE PEOPLE NOT ALREADY CONNECTED WITH THE WAR EFFORT AND PUT THEM TO WORK ON FARMS?

Yes	83%
No	7
Don't know	10

Despite this general awareness of manpower difficulties, there are widespread objections to enlarging the labor force by the recruitment of aliens.

SHOULD ALL WORKERS IN WAR INDUSTRIES HAVE TO BE CITIZENS OF THIS COUNTRY, OR DO YOU THINK IT IS ALL RIGHT TO HIRE SOME PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS?

Citizens only	66%
Some not citizens	31
Don't know	3

Respecting Negroes, there was a general recognition that discrimination is being exercised against their employment in war industries:

IN GENERAL, DO YOU FEEL THAT RIGHT NOW NEGROES HAVE AN EQUAL CHANCE TO GET GOOD WAR JOBS, OR DO YOU THINK WHITE PEOPLE USUALLY HAVE THE BEST CHANCE?

Negroes have equal chance	22%
Whites have best chance	70
Negroes have best chance	1
Don't know	7

The white people in the sample were asked the additional question, "Do you think that's the way it ought to be?" Among those who acknowledged discrimination against Negroes, 41 per cent said that they favored this practice. And among the small number of

whites believing that Negroes have equal opportunities, 23 per cent declared that they considered this equality undesirable.

In large part, prejudices against the employment of women in war industry appear to have broken down. Recognition of the manpower shortage has impelled most of the public to feel that married women without children now ought to take war jobs. They are much less prone, however, to acknowledge a need for the employment of married women with children:

AS THINGS ARE NOW, DO YOU THINK THERE IS ANY
NEED FOR MARRIED WOMEN WITHOUT CHILDREN TO
WORK IN WAR INDUSTRIES?

Yes	71%
No	21
Don't know	8

(Asked of those who said "Yes") HOW
ABOUT MARRIED WOMEN WITH CHILDREN?
RIGHT NOW, DO YOU THINK THERE IS ANY
NEED FOR THEM TO WORK IN WAR INDUSTRIES?

Yes	14%
No	53
Don't know	4

Apparently the public is no longer greatly in need of education as to the existence of the manpower problem. But informational measures seem necessary to stress its urgency and to break down longstanding prejudices against easing the labor scarcity through the employment of aliens and Negroes.

The expressed popular readiness to accept rather stringent federal restrictions on normal freedom in seeking jobs augurs well for the application of Mr. McNutt's new powers. The readiness can be counted upon to continue, however, only if the need for restrictions is made abundantly clear and if

workers are persuaded that they will be applied with absolute fairness. Even more than in relation to other economic controls, the public seems certain to apply to the regulation of manpower the tests of necessity and equity.

BARRIERS TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN

Despite widespread recognition on the part of the general public that women are now needed in war industries, among women themselves there is still considerable reluctance to seek employment. In part, this reluctance stems from a failure to realize how urgently their services are now needed in the war effort. In some part, it stems, too, from social attitudes which make idleness a mark of prestige for women.

A private survey, conducted among New Jersey women living in the vicinity of an airplane plant seeking to recruit additional workers, disclosed that few women realized the seriousness of the current labor shortage. Most of the women took the position that they were willing to go to work "when they were needed" — without appearing to realize that the time had already come.

Many women hesitate to look for work because they do not know what jobs are available and what working conditions are like. They are easily discouraged by complicated employment procedures and are reluctant to compete for jobs.

In some places, lack of facilities for day care of children continues to make it difficult for mothers to seek employment. Moreover, there was some tendency to feel that the day nurseries were charitable or social

service institutions which involve some social stigma. When day care facilities for children are established, it is essential that everything possible be done to give them the same prestige now enjoyed by public schools.

Social pressures work against, rather than for, the employment of women at the present time. Among many, there persists a feeling that there is a certain loss of prestige entailed in going back to work soon after marriage. An information campaign is needed to acquaint women with job opportunities and to make them associate employment with patriotism. The public as a whole must be made to regard the participation of women as an essential part of the war effort.

UNDERSTANDING OF THE ANTI-INFLATION PROGRAM

The American public expresses overwhelming approval of each of the individual phases of the President's seven-point anti-inflation program. But it is extremely fuzzy in its understanding of how these phases are related to one another. It fails to recognize that all parts are essential to the program as a whole — that each of them is an integral part of inflation control.

The gaps in popular understanding are significant because they appear to be responsible, in large part, for such opposition as still exists to individual economic measures. Recognition of the need for regulation is a prerequisite to public acceptance. Interviewing conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence with a large nationwide sample in October has shown

that approval and understanding go hand in hand: those most prone to support a particular anti-inflation measure are those most aware of its relation to the cost of living.

Some sort of wartime limitation on wages and salaries was considered desirable by 85 per cent of the people interviewed, although only 21 per cent favored universal freezing at present levels. Only half of the total sample, however, was aware that a ceiling on the amount people might earn for the duration would have an effect on the general level of prices in this country. Recognition of this economic relationship between wages and prices appears to have been a strong factor in determining support of the general limitation on earnings.

57 per cent of the people who favored a limitation on wages and salaries, as compared with

43 per cent of those who opposed such a limitation ... were aware that a measure of this sort would have an effect on prices in general.

A ceiling on farm prices was desired by 78 per cent of the national sample. Again, however, nearly half of the people questioned failed to recognize that the limitation of farm prices would affect the prices of other articles. In this instance, knowledge of the economic relationship was an even more striking factor.

65 per cent of the people who wanted to limit farm prices, as compared with

37 per cent of those who opposed a farm price ceiling... recognized that the regulation of farm prices would affect the level of other prices.

A ceiling on business profits for the duration was desired by 85 per cent

of the public. Half understood that prices would be affected by such a measure.

57 per cent of those who approved a limit on business profits, as compared with

31 per cent of those who disapproved such a limit ... recognized that control of business profits would influence the general price structure.

The rationing of all materials in which shortages might develop was desired by 72 per cent of the public. But no more than three in ten recognized that governmental action in this field had an effect on prices. The reason most commonly given for the support of rationing was that it would insure equitable distribution of scarce goods.

33 per cent of those who approved rationing, as compared with

26 per cent of those opposed ... were aware that the measure would have an influence in keeping prices in line.

Restrictions on installment buying were favored by 59 per cent of those interviewed. Half of the sample recognized that such restrictions would affect prices; but most of these people had in mind only the interest and service charges involved in installment sales. Few regarded installment buying as inflationary. Yet understanding of the relationship between installment buying and price levels was much higher among those who desired governmental control in this sphere.

67 per cent of those who thought the Government should make it harder for people to buy on the installment plan, as compared with

30 per cent of those who did not think the Government should take such action ... were aware that buying on the installment plan affects prices in general.

Such direct forms of economic control were much more widely favored than increased application of indirect forms, such as taxation. Only 44 per cent of the public expressed a belief that taxes should be higher than they were this year. No more than a quarter of the sample appreciated the fact that taxation serves to siphon off excess purchasing power and, thus, to exercise an influence on the cost of living. Once more, understanding of this economic fact was closely related to approval of increased taxation.

41 per cent of the people who thought next year's taxes should be higher, as compared with

14 per cent of those who were opposed to increased taxation ... recognized that a rise in taxation would affect the general prices.

No comparable questions were asked in regard to the seventh point of the President's anti-inflation program -- the purchase of war bonds and stamps. It is apparent from the interviewing, nevertheless, that among people who desired the application of a compulsory plan of bond purchases, there was little recognition of its anti-inflationary influence.

The approval expressed by the public for each of these economic controls was an expression of approval in principle. Actual application of the restrictions is certain to encounter a less cordial reception. For when people feel the pinch of Government regulation, they can accept it cheerfully only if they are genuinely aware of its need and purpose. The

country appears to be in sore need of an adult education program in the field of elementary economics. Information in this field can do much to promote popular recognition of the real benefits to be derived from restrictions and, through this, popular acceptance of inconveniences which may be entailed in their application.

NEWS ACCURACY

Despite an apparent improvement in the public's feeling that war news is not colored, there has been a decline in the past six months in the feeling that the government is making a real effort to produce accurate news. This conclusion stems from a study conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, University of Denver. In this test, variant phrasings of questions about the accuracy of news were posed to parallel cross-sections during the month of October. These phrases had also been used at different times earlier in the year.

One question was: "Do you think the war news the government does release is accurate, or that it makes the situation look better than it really is, or makes it look worse than it really is?" The answers showed a slight, but favorable trend.

	<u>February</u>	<u>October</u>
Accurate	39%	43%
Better	36	32
Worse	12	8
Don't Know	13	17

In another form, the question read: "Do you think the government is TRYING to present the war news accurately, or is TRYING to make it look better, or look worse than it really is?" The findings showed an increase in the number

thinking that the government is deliberately coloring the news.

	<u>April</u>	<u>October</u>
Accurate	62%	53%
Better	21	29%
Worse	4	6%
Don't Know	13	12%

Despite these contrary trends, people are still more prone to think that the government is trying to do an honest job of reporting, than to think that the government is succeeding in making the news accurate.

DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

PRESENTATION OF THE FUEL OIL CRISIS

Previously reported Bureau of Intelligence studies have revealed a dangerous amount of public resistance to fuel oil rationing. A recent review of speeches, press releases and news stories on the fuel oil situation, made by the Bureau, suggests that informational weaknesses may be partly responsible for this reaction. Many of the weaknesses which were observed resulted -- often all too obviously -- from the division of administrative authority. Despite the notably effective handling of many aspects of the fuel crisis, the very phases of the job in which it was most essential to enlist public confidence and understanding have been marred by lack of coordination. This has enormously added to the difficulty of the informational task.

That task was difficult enough to begin with. Americans had to be educated to the fact that the fuel problem was one of transportation, not of production. They had to be acquainted with the basic logistics of the fuel crisis

-- made to realize, for example, that in 1941 the heavily populated and industrialized East Coast consumed about 40 per cent of total national production, and that more than 95 per cent of this tremendous demand was supplied by tankers.

No systematic and sustained efforts have been made to familiarize the public with such facts as these. The absence of effective official presentations of the arithmetic of the situation has left a vacuum in which many conflicting interpretations have arisen.

As early as April 6, Petroleum Coordinator Ickes ordered a 25 per cent curtailment in the normal deliveries of petroleum products to the East. In a speech in Boston on May 27, he made it clear that "rationing...on a rather severe basis, is likely to be necessary throughout the East for an indefinite period. He stressed the discouraging aspects of the situation: declining inventories, the inability of the OPC to accumulate fuel oil against the demands of winter.

Enough statements of this sort might have given the public a realistic understanding of the crisis. But other officials gave out straws of hope for the future. Their utterances were given disproportionate emphasis in the media. People yielded to the hope that some quick solution to the fuel shortage would be found. The pipeline to the East, for example, first loomed on the horizon as a panacea. Now it appears that it will do little more than meet mounting military demands and compensate for the deterioration and transfer of railroad tank cars.

Inconsistencies in presentation of the facts have led not only to unjustified

optimism, but to a great deal of confusion. On August 12, Mr. Ickes declared that the fuel oil situation had shown improvement in the previous two weeks. On August 19, OPA described the situation as "worse rather than better"; and on August 25, Leon Henderson warned that "there has not been a period in the last six weeks when the gravity of the problem has not deepened." Quite possibly Mr. Ickes' statement was made in the light of increases in tank car movements, while OPA's emphasis was on the approach of heavy winter demand. If so, a consistent presentation could have been readily worked out. But none was.

In August, OPA and OFC also slugged it out in public over the issue of rationing. On August 7, Paul O'Leary of OPA declared: "Fuel oil on the eastern seaboard is a very likely subject for rationing in the not distant future." On the 13th, Mr. Ickes retorted: "OFC is not working on any fuel oil rationing system."

On the 16th, OWI stepped into the breach to explain that OPA and OFC "had clarified their position with respect to the fuel oil situation." But a reference in the OWI story to the fact that Mr. Ickes still hoped to avoid rationing must have puzzled those who remembered his Boston speech.

Judging from press reports only, OFC itself was not always careful to present a coherent picture. Certain newspapers reported early in July an "OFC estimate" that oil stocks in New England were larger than at the same time in 1941. Later, OFC declared that they were down 50 per cent. Late in August an "OFC official" was quoted in some papers to the effect that "maybe there was a bit of a scare in that (later estimate)."

In September, with the actual inauguration of rationing imminent, officials acceded to demands for an estimate of the curtailment which would be necessary. A dizzying number of figures was tossed around, climaxed by OPA's ingenious resolution -- a $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent reduction from normal, equivalent to a 25 per cent reduction from last winter's consumption.

Unhappily, no one put much emphasis on the fact that there were unknown and unpredictable factors which might make it necessary to revise whatever decision was reached. This omission had unfortunate consequences this last month. The North African campaign compelled Mr. Ickes and, later, a group of officials concerned with rationing to issue statements indicating that they had not anticipated North African needs. In a December 3 statement explicit reference was made to "the unanticipated heavy demand for oil shipments to support the United States military forces." In this connection, it is interesting to note that the President's Order of December 2 confirms the power of the Army and Navy Departments to withhold information from the Petroleum Administrator at their discretion.

If, however, that Order succeeds in bringing about a greater centralization of authority, it will pave the way for a much more coherent and effective presentation of the fuel oil problem. But it will now be an uphill fight to develop popular acceptance for fuel oil rationing. If compulsory conversion becomes necessary, it will require a particularly skillful informational campaign.

In many ways the history of fuel oil confusion parallels the history of rubber confusion. A statement as authoritative, clear and comprehensive as the Baruch Report may now be necessary to make Americans understand the ABC's of the fuel oil situation.

- - * * * - -

PSF
0101

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

AMERICA AND THE POST-WAR WORLD

12.16.42

CONFIDENTIAL

This document contains information relating to the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, as amended, U. S. Code 50, Sections 31 and 32. Its transmission or communication in any manner to any unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

**OFFICE OF
WAR INFORMATION
BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE**

COPY No. 1

C O N T E N T S

The Report in Brief

The Promise of the Future	1
Obstacles	2
Isolationism	4
The Role of the United States	6
Vagueness	9
Attitudes Toward Other Nations	11
Views on Economic Issues	13
Other Related Issues	14
Clusters of Opinions	15
Conclusions	17

THE REPORT IN BRIEF

Americans hope for a world in which they and their children may live free from the threat of war. But they have scarcely begun to think realistically about how this goal may be achieved.

When asked how a better world might be brought into being, 40 per cent of a national sample could offer no suggestions. Only 25 per cent made suggestions of a political or economic nature. People's views about the post-war world are seldom crystallized or held with real conviction.

There is a general realization that isolationism no longer spells security. Fewer than 20 per cent of the American people appear to be firmly opposed to the principle of international collaboration. The isolationists are predominantly people with relatively low income and education and relatively limited contacts.

The views of the people who favor some degree of U. S. participation in world affairs fall into three broad classes. One group of people believes in full political cooperation with other nations. A second group urges simply that the United States "be friendly" with other nations. A third group wants the United States to dominate the post-war world.

People's fears appear to be the greatest obstacle to the belief that peace can be maintained through international cooperation. Isolationism is frequently related to mistrust of England and Russia and to anxieties about the economic consequences of close ties with other nations. A tendency to exaggerate the importance of America's contribution to the United Nations' war effort also appears to be associated with isolationism.

The belief that America should join a comprehensive organization of nations is also typically part of a cluster of opinions. Those who hold this view tend to have confidence in America's allies, to be hopeful about the economic future, and to take a fairly realistic approach to war issues. The people most aware of the difficult problems involved in winning both the war and the peace are most willing to endorse the idea of international collaboration.

"The better world for which you fight --
and for which some of you give your lives --
will not come merely because we shall have
won the war. It will not come merely be-
cause we wish very hard that it would come.
It will be made possible only by bold vision,
intelligent planning and hard work."

[12-16-42
041

-- Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 6, 1942

AMERICA AND THE POST-WAR WORLD

An enduring peace is America's most widely accepted war aim. Americans fight for a world in which they and their children can live their lives free from the recurrent threat of war.

But people's wishes have not yet been translated into clear and concrete goals. Little thought has been given to plans for achieving the better world of which Americans dream. Until such plans are developed, and effectively presented to the people, there can be no assurance that they will support an enlightened policy for the post-war world.

THE PROMISE OF THE FUTURE

Many factors favor the establishment of a stable international order at the end of the present world war. The fighting itself has knitted together some of the most powerful and populous nations of the world. Partnership in the struggle against Fascism has broken down much of the suspicion and ill will which stood in the way of close collaboration between the United States, the British Empire, Russia and China before the war.

The United Nations have entered into a number of military, political and economic agreements of far-reaching significance. At the end of the war an embryonic pattern for world collaboration may already be in existence.

In many respects the war has been a great schoolmaster. It has made people more aware of economic interdependence. It has fostered a realization of the extent to which communication developments have shrunk the size of the world.

Another encouraging factor is the support the principle of international collaboration is receiving in the press. With a few conspicuous exceptions, newspapers want the United States to take part in international affairs in the post-war world.

Most editors feel that we made a mistake, for which we are now paying dearly, in not accepting our international responsibilities after the last war. The assertion that this time we must win the peace as well as the war has become a cliché. In addition to endorsing the principle of post-war collaboration, newspapers have overwhelmingly supported such general statements of America's war goals as the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms.

OBSTACLES

While the war is knitting some nations together, it is also leaving a terrible heritage of bitterness and hatred. Even among the United Nations real and important conflicts are almost certain to arise.

Men's fears may keep them from attempting to achieve their hopes. Distrust and suspicion of other nations may once again cause Americans to shy away from international collaboration. Or action may be blocked by economic fears -- by the belief that international cooperation will be costly to the United States, or precipitate a depression, or lower the American standard of living.

Similarly, we may fear that our diplomats are certain to be outsmarted by the suave representatives of other countries. Many other stereotypes of this sort stand in the way of cooperative post-war planning. For example, there is the notion that the attempt to achieve a better world is visionary and impractical. There is the belief that internationalism is incompatible with Americanism. There is the illusion that policies which have served America in the past will necessarily be appropriate and advantageous under the changed conditions of today.

Many of these notions are being sedulously fostered by a small but powerful minority of America's newspapers. Certain papers are engaged in an all-out campaign to sabotage the idea of post-war collaboration. Their basic strategy is to appeal to people's fears about the future. They argue that America is certain to lose in any attempt to cooperate with other nations. They foster mistrust of America's allies. Finally, together with some newspapers of good will, they insist that attention to post-war problems interferes with the prosecution of the war.

Even in the editorial columns of newspapers supporting the principle of collaboration, there has been little discussion of specific plans for post-war international organization or of the difficult social and economic

problems which will require solution after the war. Editorials have discussed America's war goals in extremely nebulous terms. Few prescriptions have been advanced for achieving those goals. The press has particularly shied away from the fact that greater participation in international affairs may require important domestic adjustments.

There is little danger that such factors as these will cause us to forget our hopes, and keep us from making some attempt to achieve a more secure world. But they might readily make the attempt abortive. After this war, as after the last one, there may be an immense tiredness, an overpowering desire to "return to normalcy," to get the boys back home. This desire, reinforced by ignorance which clouds our vision and by fears which make every course seem dangerous, may keep us from exerting ourselves sufficiently to attain our post-war goals. They may make us reluctant to accept the responsibilities and the sacrifices which are the inevitable price of the advantages of participation in a world society.

The readiness of the American people for international reformation, it is clear, may determine the success or failure of the attempt to build a better world order after this war. To estimate the extent of their readiness the Bureau of Intelligence has conducted a number of investigations in recent months. This report is based upon these studies, the most intensive of which was made in August.

ISOLATIONISM

The war has taught most Americans -- the hard way -- that some form of international collaboration is necessary to preserve peace. In July almost half of the people in a national sample had come to the conclusion that we

made a mistake last time in not joining the League of Nations. Only 28 per cent were convinced that we had not made a mistake, and most of these objected, not to the principle of joining an organization of nations, but to some feature of this particular association.

Relatively few Americans now advocate complete isolation of the United States from world affairs when the present war is over. Only two people in ten, of a national sample interviewed in August, disapproved of the idea of this country joining an organization of nations after the war:

IN GENERAL, DO YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF THE
IDEA OF THE UNITED STATES JOINING AN ORGANIZATION
OF NATIONS AFTER THE WAR?

Approve	63%
Disapprove	19
Don't know	18

In early December Gallup asked a very similar question. Trial tabulations of the first small group of replies to be received indicate that six Americans in ten believe that the United Nations should move toward setting up a world organization before the end of the war. An additional two in ten would favor an attempt to set up a world organization after the war:

SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT TAKE STEPS NOW, BEFORE THE
END OF THE WAR, TO SET UP WITH OUR ALLIES A WORLD
ORGANIZATION TO MAINTAIN THE FUTURE PEACE OF THE
WORLD?

Yes	64%
No, after the war	19
No, never	5
No opinion	12

A number of other studies confirm the fact that fewer than 20 per cent of

the American people now cling to an isolationist position. They are predominantly people with relatively limited contacts. There are proportionally more isolationists in the country than in the city.

People with relatively low income and education are more likely to be isolationists than those more favorably situated. And the individuals who are uninformed about international affairs, as a result of infrequent social contacts and limited educational background, are far more prone to favor isolationism than the well-informed.

The people in the August sample who endorsed American participation in an organization of nations were asked whether other countries besides the United States and her allies should be admitted to membership. The overwhelming majority -- 85 per cent of those to whom the question was put -- felt that they should.

Those who replied in the affirmative were then asked whether the Axis nations should be admitted to the international organization. Seventy per cent of those questioned replied that they should.

These people comprised only 37 per cent of the total sample. It is encouraging, however, that almost two-thirds of the American people apparently favor United States membership of an organization of nations; that a majority would not limit participation to the United States and her allies; and that even during wartime more than a third feel that the organization should be so comprehensive as to include America's enemies.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

Few people take the position that this country should let the rest of the

world "stew in its own juice" after this war. But there are wide differences of opinion about the part the United States should play in international affairs. In addition to isolationism, three viewpoints were found to be widely held:

1. One group of people believes in full political cooperation with the rest of the world. They want the United States to participate in some sort of organization of nations. As one person put it:

"I suppose my idea would be an enlargement or refinement of the League of Nations. Let all countries get together as the United States; thirteen states originally got together and formed one Government. It would have to have the hearty cooperation of the conquerors and the conquered."

Most of the advocates of an association of nations want the United States to take the initiative in its organization and operation. One man declared:

"The United States should take the leading part. She has the best minds, the ability and no prejudice regarding these things. I feel this war was unnecessary if the United States had taken an active part in the last peace terms and then had assumed the responsibility which was thrust at her but which she refused to accept."

The people who urge full-fledged political collaboration are predominantly urban dwellers. They stand considerably above average in income and education

2. Another group of people advocates simply that the United States "be friendly" with other nations. These people tend to speak of nations as though they were individual human beings. Often, too, they speak of the relationship of nations in a religious frame of reference.

Their genuine good will toward other peoples and countries may lead them to support concrete plans for securing a stable international order, when

such plans are proposed. But they have not yet begun to think realistically about how to achieve the better world for which they hope. They are unaware of the complicated economic and political problems which will confront the world after the war. They are well-intentioned but vague:

"We ought to be more friendly with others. Like the Bible says, 'We are all brothers.' I think we ought to practice the Golden Rule. It was hate, and greed and sin that caused this war."

The people who talk along these lines have lower than average incomes and educations.

3. A third group of people vociferously demands that America dominate the post-war world. They are internationalists, but in a strictly America-first sort of way. They might favor an organization of nations, but only if they felt certain that the United States would dominate it. They talk, sometimes rather belligerently, along such lines as these:

"I think it's up to us to take a very active part and that we police the rest of the world. That's what we should have done ten years ago; then we wouldn't have had this war on our hands now. I think that's the only way we can have any peace, for us to put the rest of the world where they belong and then police them for at least a hundred and fifty years."

The people who take this position possess slightly higher than average income and education. More of them are men than women. There is evidence that many of the people in this group were once isolationists. The change in their attitude is less drastic than it might at first appear. In most instances the key to their viewpoint on international affairs appears to be the desire for security. They have been forced by the war to the real-

ization that security cannot be obtained through withdrawal from the world. Now they pin their hopes on an America so strong that it can control all potential dangers.

VAGUENESS

It is clear that most Americans have only nebulous, and in some cases even misguided, notions of the way to achieve a stable international order.

If anything, the preceding discussion understates the vagueness of people's thinking about the post-war world. In lumping together all the people who take a somewhat similar viewpoint, the confusion and contradictions which characterize the thinking of many individuals have been obliterated.

The discussion fails also to suggest the tentativeness of Americans' views about the post-war world. A number of interviewers commented that most people appeared troubled and uncertain when they tried to state their ideas about the nature of the peace.

The transition from isolationism to a wider outlook is evidently a precarious one. Most Americans see that isolationism did not prevent the present war and that some new formula is necessary if peace is to be maintained. But so far no specific proposal has been advanced which has captured their imagination.

Until some proposal wins popular acceptance, there is a very grave danger that, during the let-down after the war, many Americans now generally sympathetic to international collaboration, may return to isolationism.

At present, they are looking forward to a world of democracy and friendliness. They hope that, after the war, greater emphasis will be placed on religion. They ardently long for an enduring peace. But, when asked how the kind of post-war world they want can be brought into being, four in ten could offer no suggestions. Seventeen per cent thought only in terms of winning the war. Twelve per cent felt that the United States could best contribute to the maintenance of peace through educational and religious guidance. Only one person in four volunteered suggestions about political and economic measures.

There is convincing evidence, however, that Americans will respond to concrete proposals which embody their hopes about the post-war world. The idea that the basic freedoms should be extended to all people throughout the world is enormously popular. As early as February, a national sample overwhelmingly endorsed the idea of American collaboration with other nations to guarantee the Four Freedoms throughout the world:

WHEN THE WAR IS OVER, DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES
SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT TAKE A FULL AND ACTIVE PART ALONG
WITH OTHER NATIONS IN:

	<u>Should</u>	<u>Should not</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
Guaranteeing freedom of speech all over the world	82%	11%	7%
Guaranteeing freedom of re- ligion all over the world	87	9	4
Guaranteeing that all nations get a fair share of raw materials	83	9	8
Helping to secure better work- ing and living conditions for people all over the world	87	9	4

(Cont'd) WHEN THE WAR IS OVER, DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT TAKE A FULL AND ACTIVE PART ALONG WITH OTHER NATIONS IN:

	<u>Should</u>	<u>Should not</u>	Don't know
Maintaining a world police force to guarantee against future wars	86%	8%	6%

ATTITUDES TOWARD OTHER NATIONS

People's views on America's post-war policy are inevitably influenced by their attitudes toward other nations. Their views about England and Russia are of crucial importance. If they lack confidence in these nations, they are hardly likely to favor a cooperative approach to the problem of the post-war world.

Many Americans still display a great deal of suspicion of their major allies. About three-fourths of the American people believe that England can be counted upon to cooperate with us after the war. Some people expect her to follow a more democratic and liberal policy toward her empire and to be friendly to the United States in the post-war world.

But a full fourth of the people interviewed in August expressed fears that England might cause trouble in the post-war world. The misgivings most commonly expressed were that she would assume more than her due credit for winning the war; demand too important a role in international affairs; or stand pat on imperialism. A bitter minority charged that England was simply fighting for the preservation of her empire.

Almost a fourth of the people in the August sample also anticipated trouble with Russia in the post-war world. About half of these people commented

that they "never had liked Russia" or mentioned some specific action that had offended them, such as the attack on Finland. A number specified that they were distrustful of Russia because of her form of government. It may be significant, however, that only four per cent of the sample expressed the fear that Russia would try to spread communism throughout the world after the war. And 35 per cent -- a far larger number than were apprehensive -- expected Russia's post-war behavior to be satisfactory and cooperative.

Furthermore, confidence in Russia's post-war intentions is growing. On four occasions national samples have been asked: "After the war is over, do you think Russia can be depended upon to cooperate with us?" Affirmative replies increased from 38 per cent in February to 51 per cent in November. The deep admiration people feel about Russia's valiant resistance to Nazi aggression is having its effect. In November, in the third month of the Russian stand at Stalingrad, but before the launching of the North African offensive, Americans believed that in relation to her means Russia was doing more than any of the United Nations, including the United States, toward winning the war.

In November, a national sample was asked if the United States would continue to cooperate with its allies after the war, and if we should do so. Eight in ten felt that we would and should cooperate with Russia; nine in ten that we would and should cooperate with England.

However, suspicion and hostility toward England and Russia have by no means been eliminated. They might easily mount to dangerous heights if the fortunes of war change or if conflicts of interest arise. Many Americans still talk about Russia, England, and other nations in stereotyped, unrealistic terms.

The understanding and knowledge of foreign nations, which are prerequisites to real sympathy with them, are notably lacking. Many interviewers commented on people's ignorance both of foreign countries and of America's international policies. This lack of information was not only apparent with respect to such a far-off country as Russia; few people were concerned or informed about South America, or this country's relationships with its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.

Significantly, persons who were ignorant about international affairs were far more prone to be isolationists than those who were relatively well informed.

VIEWS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

People's views about economic relationships in the post-war world were also investigated by the Bureau of Intelligence. It was found that fear of unrestricted foreign competition still dominates the thinking of a rather high percentage of Americans. The stereotypes of the '20s are still widespread: our industry must be protected from foreign underselling; cheap foreign labor must not be permitted to undermine our high standard of living.

Twelve per cent of the people in the August sample believed in free trade. Fifty-four per cent were willing to sanction trade protected by tariffs. But eight per cent advocated that America not trade with other countries at all, and a far larger number were skeptical about the benefits of international commerce. As many believed that "we should buy at home and preserve the American standard of living" as felt that "trade benefits everyone."

People's fear of foreign competition is also reflected in their views about the immigration policy America should pursue after the war. Only 14 per

cent favor a policy of unrestricted immigration. Thirty-seven per cent would use a quota system and reserve the right to exclude some groups altogether. Thirty-five per cent would not let in any foreigners.

Half of the people who want to place severe or complete restrictions on immigration in the post-war world gave no reason to justify their position. The argument most frequently advanced by the others was that immigrants compete with American workers. Other large groups maintained that immigrants "cause trouble" or that they are "undesirable people." Some of these replies reflected the immediate war situation and the fears of spies and sabotage.

Americans also have deep anxieties about the domestic economic future. Most people have little confidence that the goal of freedom from want will be attained. Six people in ten of a national cross section interviewed in October expected the war to be followed by a depression. A full third believed that business would be worse and unemployment more prevalent in the five years right after the war than it was in the years immediately preceding it.

OTHER RELATED ISSUES

People's views on the policy the United States should pursue in the post-war world were also found to be related to their appraisal of the nation's war effort. Persons who are prone to exaggerate the importance of America's contribution to the United Nations' war effort are less likely to favor international collaboration after the war than those who have a better appreciation of the contribution of our allies. Similarly, persons who are

smug and complacent about the progress of the war are less likely to favor collaboration than those who are apprehensive and concerned.

People who have a sense of community with the peoples of other countries, who believe in the basic equality of all human beings, are more prone to favor international cooperation than those who do not. Internationalism is often associated with the belief that the rights and privileges of the common man should be protected and extended.

In keeping with this position, the internationalists are more prone than the isolationists to feel that the United States should be generous in its treatment of other nations after the war. However, the public as a whole appears to have a deep sense of America's responsibilities in mitigating the chaos of the post-war world. In reply to a question asked last March, eight people in ten said that the United States should feed and clothe people in other countries, if necessary, after the war.

People's views on America's policy in the post-war world are not invariably related to the nature of their opinions on associated issues. In some instances their viewpoint appears to be related rather to the definiteness of their convictions. People who have definite opinions one way or the other on a number of social and political issues are more prone to favor U. S. participation in international affairs than those who express no opinion.

CLUSTERS OF OPINIONS

While not invariably related to the character of an individual's beliefs, the view that the United States should join a comprehensive organization of

nations is typically part of a cluster of opinions. Those who hold this view tend to think also that England and Russia can be depended upon to cooperate with us after the war; that the present amount of governmental regulation of business is necessary and should be continued after the war; that business conditions will be better in the post-war years than they were before the war; that the United States should wage the war offensively; and that a negotiated peace with Hitler should not be considered. They also tend to feel that we have not yet made enough sacrifices; and they are prone to be active participants themselves in the war effort -- to buy war bonds, to conserve needed materials, and to engage in some volunteer defense work. In general, they take a fairly realistic approach to war issues.

In some instances, these ideas may be expressed as lip service to ideals now commonly accepted. In any case, real interest and faith in an effective post-war society of nations demand more than generalized hopes for the future. They are closely related to solid understanding of the problems involved in the prosecution of the war and the winning of the peace. The people most aware of the nation's economic and military difficulties, and most cognizant of the problems involved in post-war reconstruction, are the people most ready to understand and accept the real significance of international collaboration.

The isolationists, like the internationalists, typically hold a cluster of associated opinions. In addition to disapproving of American participation in an organization of nations, they tend to believe that we were right not to join the League of Nations; that there is no need for further rationing and sacrifices; and that there should be no limit on wages and salaries.

They are less prone than the rest of the population to engage in civilian defense work, and they are far more prone to favor a negotiated peace.

CONCLUSIONS

The fundamental strategy of informational efforts connected with the post-war world is inescapably determined by the need of appealing to people's hopes and overcoming their fears.

The positive task involved is to show the American people that the world of peace and security for which they hope is actually attainable through international cooperation. Their vague wishes for a better world must be translated into concrete goals. And definite plans must be presented for achieving those goals, so that they will not seem impracticable and unrealistic.

Simultaneously, the fears which might make people hesitate to accept the responsibilities of international collaboration must be attacked. Mistrust of other nations must be broken down. It is particularly important that residual suspicion of Russia and England be dissipated, so that the United States can cooperate closely with them in peace as well as in war. The fear that close economic relationships with other nations will be disadvantageous to the United States must be dispelled with facts and figures.

Ignorance is almost as formidable a foe of cooperation as fear. Indeed, the two are closely interrelated. More often than not, distrust of other nations is a product of lack of knowledge, rather than of dislike. A final essential task of informational policy must be to raise Americans' general level of knowledge of other nations and of international affairs.

In part, the problem is one of supplying information, so that foreign peoples will not seem remote and strange, and so that the public will have the facts to appraise suggested policies. In addition, through forums and other means, Americans must be given opportunities to discuss and debate these policies — to think through for themselves the problems involved in building a more secure world.

- - - * * * - - -

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
WASHINGTON

December 19, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing INTELLIGENCE Report 54 and Special INTELLIGENCE Report, "America and the Post-War World." Your attention is called particularly to the item on page four of report number 54. The same subject is referred to in the item on page 16 but a fuller discussion of the post war world material can be found in the Special Intelligence Report enclosed.

Sincerely yours,

R. Keith Kane
R. Keith Kane
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the U.S.
The White House
Washington, D. C.



12-18-42

INTELLIGENCE REPORT **54**

CONFIDENTIAL

This document contains information relating to the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, as amended, U. S. Code 50, Sections 31 and 32. Its transmission or communication in any manner to any unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

OFFICE OF
WAR INFORMATION

BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE

COPY No. 1

C O N T E N T S

	Page
EDITORIAL ATTITUDES	1
Battlefronts	1
Labor	3
United Nations	4
POPULAR REACTIONS	5
The Work Week and Overtime Pay	5
Labor Representation on the WPB	8
DEVELOPING SITUATIONS	12
Soldiers and Civilians	12
America and the Post-War World	16

A summary of investigation and analysis conducted for certain OWI officials, issued for OWI and the interest of other members of the Government.

The period covered by this report is the week of December 10 through December 16, except where otherwise specifically stated.

EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

BATTLEFRONTS

Editorial optimism adjusted itself this week to the modified tempo of allied progress. The news from Tunisia, Russia and the Pacific led commentators to more sober appraisals of the war as a long, tough struggle against determined, resourceful adversaries.

The increased length of allied supply lines and the necessity of constructing advance air bases were the chief reasons offered to account for the reduced speed of the allied offensive in North Africa. Rommel's flight from El Agheila offset earlier uneasiness. Most of those analyzing the situation regarded it as the prelude to a decisive air duel between the contending forces. The prevailing judgment was that the United Nations, because of their superior resources, would be able in time to bring up overwhelming aerial power.

Much of the comment on North Africa continued to deal with Admiral Darlan. Editors seemed to feel some obligation to justify the "military expediency" involved in the arrangement with the Vichy leader. They insisted vehemently that it will prove only temporary in character and pointed redundantly to the benefits which have accrued from it.

Interest in Darlan has been superseded, however, by anxiety over Spain's General Franco. The Generalissimo's speech to the Spanish Falange December 8 was widely interpreted as indicating that Spain intends to stay out of the war. The Atlanta Constitution remarked cheerfully, "It is not

likely that Franco of Spain will abandon the neutral position his country has so far held in the war, despite his outright approval of the fascist system of Government given in his speech of a few days ago."

But some observers were more apprehensive. According to the Christian Science Monitor, "Those who think they see in General Francisco Franco's latest public pronouncements assurances that Spain is not going to permit the Nazis to strike from Gibraltar at the flank of British-American forces in North Africa are fooling themselves... The fact is that Spain is on the brink of war and General Franco is bargaining with both sides. However, the chances of his coming to terms with Britain and America seem slight."

Editors were disturbed, too, by Franco's assertion that the choice of the world lies between fascism and communism. "The fallacy of his speech," said the Pittsburgh Post Gazette, "lies in the fact that there are not two, but at least three, possible courses for post-war Europe."

Comparatively little comment appeared during the week on developments in Russia. Stiffened German resistance and counterattacks have dissipated the more extravagant hopes for a decisive victory on the eastern front.

There was no more than subdued applause for General MacArthur's gains in New Guinea. The stubbornness of Japanese resistance and the long delay in our capture of Buna and Gona added to the awareness that triumph is not quite around the corner. The Richmond Times Dispatch expressed the prevailing view when it asked: "If it has taken from early August until mid-December for us to get and to maintain footholds on remote and lightly defended Pacific islands... how long will it take us to recover the

Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and Wake and to subdue Japan proper?"

The development of the week which proved most heartening to the news interpreters was the announcement that General Zeitzler had replaced General Halder as chief of the German general staff. The dominant judgment was that this shift indicates the Nazification of the German army and the eclipse of the regular military commanders. Some suggested that it signified a change in German military strategy from the offensive to the defensive. The Scripps-Howard newspapers went so far as to state that "Hitler's substitution of a Gestapo 'yes man' as head of the German army in place of the Junker General Halder may be the beginning of the end." Like others, however, this editorial went on to say, "But it is safer to assume instead that the change presages even more vigorous enemy warfare."

LABOR

The press was very nearly unanimous in condemning President Roosevelt's intercession in the Montgomery Ward situation. Mark Sullivan's comment on this score was fairly typical: "Montgomery Ward cannot be considered a war industry. If the President can successfully make this demand on Montgomery Ward, he can make it on any citizen or group."

Similarly, editorial sympathy was very much on the side of the railroad managements and against the demands of the railroad brotherhoods for a pay raise. Most commentators argued that the railroads had suffered severely until the war brought them unexpected prosperity and that now they should have an opportunity to build up needed reserves. The demands of the brotherhoods were taken as an occasion for attacking the "featherbed

rules² which the unions have allegedly maintained in the face of the war effort. Commentators fairly friendly to labor argued that the demand for higher wages would serve only to alienate the public more than ever from workers in general.

The principal argument leveled against the granting of pay increases to the railroad employees was that it would have an inflationary effect. Some newspapers employed this same reasoning to support approval of the lowering of railroad rates.

In comments on labor problems in general, editors continued to inveigh against the iniquities of the 40-hour week. There has been no diminution of the pressure for amendment of the Wage and Hour Law to have overtime pay begin only after a work week of 48 hours.

UNITED NATIONS

The speech recently delivered by Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands elicited a good deal of editorial comment on post-war problems. Most of the comment praised the speech highly and accepted it as a workable scheme for the post-war world. The Louisville Courier Journal, for example, called it "a heartening example of the anxious willingness of the world's greatest democracies to make the Atlantic Charter a living reality."

A minority, however, dissented — generally on the ground that pre-war imperial arrangements could never be restored. Attacks on this speech and on Prime Minister Churchill's assertion that the British empire would be preserved have been so sharp as to make some commentators fear serious

dissension between America and her allies. The New York Times warned that "any attempt to dictate terms to our allies instead of to our enemies is sure to be self-defeating." Nevertheless, the discussion of post-war problems has, for the first time, been couched in concrete terms and in regard to fairly specific proposals.

POPULAR REACTIONS

THE WORK WEEK AND OVERTIME PAY

Newspaper agitation for amendment of the Wage and Hour Law is reflected in a widespread popular belief that the weekly hours of labor should be lengthened for workers in war industries. Eighty-three per cent of the public feel that the work week should be 48 hours or more; 47 per cent think that overtime pay should start only after a 48-hour minimum.

In the latter part of November, the Bureau of Intelligence asked a national sample three questions concerning the working hours of war plant employees:

ABOUT HOW MANY HOURS A WEEK, ON THE AVERAGE,
DO YOU THINK WORKERS IN WAR INDUSTRIES ARE
ACTUALLY WORKING NOW?

HOW MANY HOURS A WEEK, INCLUDING ALL OVERTIME,
DO YOU THINK WORKERS IN WAR INDUSTRIES SHOULD
PUT IN?

AND HOW MANY HOURS A WEEK DO YOU THINK WORKERS
IN WAR INDUSTRIES SHOULD PUT IN BEFORE THEY
GET EXTRA PAY FOR OVERTIME?

	Are working	Should Be working	Should work before Overtime Pay
Under 48 hours.....	29%	5%	28%
48 hours	28)	34)	37)
49 to 59 hours	14 } 51	24 } 83	6 } 47
60 hours or more	9)	25)	4)
No overtime pay			14
Not ascertainable	20	12	11

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the concept "war industry" is too elastic for use in the construction of statistics respecting the actual work week. The B.L.S. reports, however, that in September the average work week in all manufacturing industries was 42.4 hours; in the durable goods industries, the average work week was 44.6 .

As the foregoing table indicates, only a minority of the public was under the misapprehension that the Wage and Hour Law restricts war workers to a 40-hour week; more than half of the people interviewed believed that the men in war industries were working 48 hours a week or more. Farmers were more prone than other people to hold the view that the employees of war plants are limited to 40 hours.

Very few persons in any occupational group thought that the average work week should be less than 48 hours. A third of the manual workers themselves felt that the optimum work week is 48 hours; and nearly half of them said that the work week should be more than 48 hours. Farmers, accustomed to working extremely long hours themselves, were considerably more prone than any other occupational group to declare that war plant employees ought to put in 60 hours or more each week.

When estimates of the actual work week are compared with estimates of what the work week ought to be, it appears that 30 per cent of the public believed that workers were putting in as many hours as they should and 40 per cent felt that workers were putting in fewer hours than they should; only six per cent expressed the view that the actual work week is longer than it ought to be, while 24 per cent were without opinions on this score.

About a quarter of the whole sample supported the provision of the Wage and Hour Law that overtime pay should begin after 40 hours. Slightly more than half of the sample desired a longer work week before the commencement of overtime pay, the bulk of these people centering on 48 hours as the proper dividing point. In addition, 14 per cent said that no overtime should be paid at all.

Retention of the 40-hour provision of the Wage and Hour Law was most popular, naturally, among manual workers, least popular among farmers. Even among manual workers, however, a full third felt that overtime pay should begin at 48 hours. Farmers were more prone than other groups to say that there should be no overtime at all or that it should begin only after a work week of 60 hours or more.

Apparently a sense of urgency about the war has impelled the general public to think in terms of a minimum work week of 48 hours. And considerable resistance has developed to the principle of overtime pay before this minimum has been met. The impact upon wage scales of a sudden change in the Wage and Hour Law is perhaps inadequately appreciated.

People are not fully aware, moreover, of the fact that in most essential war

industries the hours of labor are limited only by the availability of raw materials, machinery and plant facilities; in many phases of production, workers are already putting in more than 48 hours a week. The public needs to be informed that workers themselves are not primarily responsible for the length of the work week and that revision of the Wage and Hour Law would mean a cut in their earnings without necessarily increasing the weekly hours of labor.

LABOR REPRESENTATION ON THE WPB

Interviewing conducted with a small national sample in late November indicates that half of the American people feel that organized labor should be represented on the War Production Board;

AS YOU PROBABLY KNOW, THE WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
IS A GOVERNMENT AGENCY IN CHARGE OF ALL WAR PRO-
DUCTION IN THIS COUNTRY. DO YOU THINK THERE
SHOULD BE REPRESENTATIVES OF UNION LABOR ON
THIS BOARD?

Yes	52%
No	30
Don't know	18

Three-fourths of those who wanted labor to be represented felt that it should have as much to say as management. These people comprised 38 per cent of the entire sample.

An effort was made to discover why people felt as they did about this issue. Their responses were carefully analyzed in the light of information they gave about themselves and the viewpoints they expressed on related matters. A smaller sample was questioned intensively.

It was found that some people felt as they did out of a general sense of fair play. They believed that all groups deserve representation on so important a Government agency as WPS. But most people's viewpoints appeared to be even more strongly influenced by three other factors: (1) their general attitude toward labor; (2) their occupation; and (3) union membership.

Many people evidently make little effort to weigh the merits of the specific issue of labor representation on the WPS. Their opinion is based, rather, on their general attitude toward organized labor. The sample was asked a question which in the past has been found to be a useful index to pro- or anti-labor feeling: "Do you think the Government's attitude toward labor unions is too strict, about right, or not strict enough?"

Of those who stated that the Government's attitude toward labor unions is:	This percentage favored labor representation on WPS
Too strict	76%
About right	60
Not strict enough	45

Occupation also plays an important part in determining people's attitudes toward giving labor a voice on the WPS. Forty-four per cent of the executives in the sample, and 38 per cent of the farmers, were opposed to granting labor representation on the WPS. In contrast, only 21 per cent of the industrial workers felt that labor should not be represented on the Board.

Only ten per cent of the union members in the sample felt that labor should not be represented on the Board. Thirty-four per cent of the non-union members were of this opinion.

To get additional insight into the more extreme viewpoints, intensive interviews were conducted with 30 men in the managerial group and 24 labor leaders. Only three of the 30 executives felt that labor should have an equal voice with management on the War Production Board. Seven felt that labor's voice should be heard, but only in an advisory capacity. Twenty felt that labor should not be given any representation whatever.

Most of the businessmen took the position that the management of production was their own prerogative and expressed anxiety about labor's growing power. A number maintained that labor leaders have no managerial ability and do not cooperate well with management. The following remarks, by a San Francisco businessman, are fairly typical:

"Production is the job for management. Some labor leaders are intensely patriotic, but they don't know production problems, and could contribute little. Recent moves to add labor men to the WPB have been merely in the nature of token representation to satisfy labor's demands. I doubt the wisdom or need of even that. There have already been enough concessions to labor."

The labor leaders overwhelmingly took the position that labor deserved equal representation with business on the WPB. Many of those interviewed were bitter because labor has been denied adequate representation for so long. And they at least gave the impression that they would not be satisfied now by mere "token" representation, carrying no real responsibility or power.

They feel that workers, as a result of their practical experience, can contribute to the solution of production problems and deserve a place in the policy-making structure of WPB. The following statement by a militant New York labor leader is typical:

"Labor wants more participation in helping to plan the work. Labor wants to participate in the advance of government at this time. It wants to accept responsibility and not just be tolerated by business. Labor believes our participation in planning and policy making will increase production. Labor feels that it can often see how to coordinate the different processes in manufacturing better than an engineer can, because they are themselves doing the work..."

"We do not believe in casting the managers aside. We believe that it will take the teamwork of all to win the war."

Education and knowledge of the War Production Board appear to exert little influence on people's viewpoints on labor representation. People were given the names of Henderson, Nelson and Jeffers and asked to identify the head of WPB. Only 47 per cent could do so correctly, and some of them may have guessed the right answer. The opinions of the people who did not know that Nelson is the head of WPB were compared with the opinions of those who did. While, as might be expected, the "don't know" answers regarding representation were higher among the former group, the ratio of "yes" to "no" answers was about the same among both groups. Among the relatively well educated people in the sample and the less well educated, too, the ratio of approval to disapproval of the idea of labor representation was about the same.

Unlike some labor leaders and executives, the general public, while tending to favor labor representation on WPB, does not feel strongly about the

question; the issue is not at present a live one. But if it should ever come to a head, these findings suggest that the division of opinion might be just about what it is revealed here. For it does not appear to matter greatly whether people are informed or uninformed about this question. Their opinion is likely to be determined by their general attitude toward labor, their occupational status, and their affiliation or non-affiliation with a union.

DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS

Army encampments have created serious problems for communities in which they have been established. They have brought about sudden increases in population, together with a disruption of normal community life. Cleavages have developed between the regular residents and the men in uniform.

As a means of studying the impact of Army camps upon nearby communities, the Bureau of Intelligence, in cooperation with the Special Service Branch of the Army, has recently conducted exploratory surveys in three medium to large-sized Army camps near towns of 10,000 to 25,000 population. Camp community problems were known to exist, though they were not considered exceptionally critical, in the localities selected. These were:

Fayetteville, N. C.	-	Fort Bragg
Hattiesburg, Miss.	-	Camp Shelby
Columbus	)	
Edinburg		
Franklin		
Indianapolis)		Ind. - Camp Atterbury

Fayetteville, with a long Army camp tradition, used to regard "regular Army men" as riffraff. This attitude persisted when selectees came to Fort Bragg in large numbers in 1940.

Hattiesburg, having profited by the proximity of Camp Shelby in the last war, campaigned to have it reopened in 1940, before America was actually at war.

The Indiana towns had no experience with or desire for an Army camp. Camp Atterbury was a real war camp, opened in the summer of 1942.

In each camp, over \$20,000,000 was spent on construction within a few months. The sudden influx of construction workers, wage differentials and union activities precipitated hostility and suspicion. After the camps were completed, new employment opportunities opened. Unemployment vanished, domestic help became scarce and badly paid jobs went begging.

The stores and restaurants of the towns were overwhelmed. Newcomers, opening businesses "for the duration", appeared and caused disgruntlement among local businessmen by their unorthodox business practices. Civilians accused the merchants of hiking prices; soldiers complained of a two-price system which fleeced men in uniform.

Housing and transportation facilities were badly overtaxed in all of the communities. Rents skyrocketed, and established tenants were displaced, in some instances, by newcomers. Inadequate bus and railway facilities brought soldiers and townspeople into close and uncomfortable contact. Conflicts over jurisdiction arose between town and military police.

The stereotyped notion of the soldier as profligate and loose in morals has been responsible for much of the hostility on the part of civilians. In the smaller communities, soldiers and vice are considered synonymous. Prostitution has burgeoned while attempts to control venereal disease have contributed to the schism between enlisted men and townsfolk; prophylactic stations have been especially productive of ill feeling, since they constitute a violation of traditional reticence and are a glaring public symbol of the worst that the soldier means to small town civilians.

All of the communities studied, with the exception of Indianapolis, blamed the soldiers for an alarming increase in drinking and drunkenness. Dives and juke joints, slot machines and shooting galleries flourished in the camp communities. The soldiers thronged to them, while the townspeople complained that their former places of amusement were crowded and noisy and that decent folk had to stay at home.

All three of the camps surveyed had considerable numbers of Negro troops. Their presence added racial tensions to the other difficulties. Normal friction between white and Negro men in uniform was aggravated by the local practices of segregation and discrimination. To the Negroes, the nearby towns offered almost nothing in the way of recreation or relaxation.

In none of the communities studied were the citizens ready psychologically or practically to cope with the problem of entertaining enlisted men. Locally sponsored hospitality has been confined to a few sporadic gestures, giving way to a shrugging off of all responsibility.

Organized efforts to bridge the gap between soldiers and civilians -- particularly those undertaken by the USO -- have not thus far met with much success in the communities investigated. Before its actual appearance on the local scene, the USO has regularly been the object of successful drives for funds. Later, however, it has gained, in most places, only undisguised animosity due to its operating methods and to its employment of well paid, but sometimes tactless, personnel recruited from out of town, who have failed to enlist community-wide support or to mould their activities to meet either the character of the community or the needs of the men.

Difficulties cannot fail to arise when large bodies of men in uniform are suddenly placed upon the doorsteps of communities unfamiliar with them and unprepared to meet their needs. But these difficulties can be ameliorated by the encouragement of sympathetic relations between town and camp.

Soldiers interviewed in all of the camps made it clear that they desired contact and companionship with the civilians in the communities near which they were located. Off duty, they often want to get away from fellow-soldiers, to meet civilians and to have some semblance of normal social intercourse. The problem of community-camp relations revolves around the establishment of this sort of friendly association between civilians and soldiers within the limits of the town's abilities.

Information can play an effective part in promoting this sort of friendliness by giving civilians a sense of their responsibility toward the Army men. The problem can best be approached through local efforts and institutions. Initiative must come from the community itself. It must be carried on by members of the community. Effort must be directed toward

making civilians recognize that the enlisted men, though strangers, are themselves members of families and communities akin to those with which the war has brought them into involuntary contact.

AMERICA AND THE POST - WAR WORLD

Americans hope for a world in which they and their children may live free from the threat of war. But they have scarcely begun to think realistically about how this goal may be achieved.

When asked how a better world might be brought into being, 40 per cent of a national sample could offer no suggestions. Only 25 per cent made suggestions of a political or economic nature. People's views about the post-war world are seldom crystallized or held with real conviction.

There is a general realization that isolationism no longer spells security. Fewer than 20 per cent of the American people appear to be firmly opposed to the principle of international collaboration. The isolationists are predominantly people with relatively low income and education and relatively limited contacts.

The views of the people who favor some degree of U. S. participation in world affairs fall into three broad classes. One group of people believes in full political cooperation with other nations. A second group vaguely, but potentially, sympathetic to collaboration, urges simply that the United States "be friendly" with other nations. A third group, including a number recently isolationist, wants the United States to dominate the post-war world.

People's fears appear to be the greatest obstacle to the belief that peace can be maintained through international cooperation. Isolationism is frequently related to mistrust of England and Russia and to anxieties about the economic consequences of close ties with other nations. A tendency to exaggerate the importance of America's contribution to the United Nations' war effort also appears to be associated with isolationism.

The belief that America should join a comprehensive organization of nations is also typically part of a cluster of opinions. Those who hold this view tend to have confidence in America's allies, to be hopeful about the economic future, and to take a fairly realistic approach to war issues. The people most aware of the difficult problems involved in winning both the war and the peace are most willing to endorse the idea of international collaboration.

(These findings summarize a Special Intelligence Report, America and the Post-War World, issued December 16, and available to authorized individuals on request.)

- - * * * - -

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

WASHINGTON

December 28, 1942


Dear Miss Tully:

I am sending to you herewith Intelligence Report No. 55 for your attention particularly to the items beginning on pages 6, 9, and 13.

You will also find enclosed copy of the "Report From the Nation" which is a summary of some of the more important studies which this Bureau has made during the past year. You will find it, I think, a rather useful round-up of American opinion since Pearl Harbor.

Finally, you will see enclosed the first issue of the Fortnightly Bulletin which the Bureau is beginning to issue. It is intended as a catalogue of completed and about to be completed investigations. It is further intended to make more available the findings of the Bureau and you may feel free to call upon us for reports referred to therein.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures - 3



PSF
OWI

12-25-42

INTELLIGENCE REPORT 55

CONFIDENTIAL

This document contains information relating to the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, as amended, U. S. Code 50, Sections 31 and 32. Its transmission or communication in any manner to any unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

OFFICE OF
WAR INFORMATION
BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE

COPY No. 1

C O N T E N T S

	Page
EDITORIAL ATTITUDES	1
Home Problems	1
War Front Prospects	3
POPULAR REACTIONS	5
Appreciation	5
Sentiment Toward Negroes	6
DEVELOPING SITUATIONS	9
Stereotypes About "Washington"	9
The NAM Views the Future	13
Newspaper Strike	17
Confusion	19

A summary of investigation and analysis
conducted for certain OWI officials,
issued for OWI and the interest of other
members of the Government.

The period covered by this report is the
week of December 17 through December 22,
except where otherwise specifically stated.

EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

HOME PROBLEMS

Two days in which the eastern states were theoretically deprived of gasoline — the life-blood of modern locomotion — provided the outstanding editorial excitement of the week. Treatment of the "crisis" was, on the whole, fairly philosophical. Once the commentators understood that the lack of gasoline was occasioned by North African needs and that it would be of short duration, they accepted the attendant inconveniences with reasonable good cheer.

The situation was grasped, of course, as an occasion for belaboring the Administration. Most papers attributed the shortage to bureaucratic mismanagement. The New York Herald-Tribune, among others, indulged in a general homily:

"This misdirection of gasoline rationing merely brings home to countless Americans what many have been fearing for months — or longer. When an Administration... fumbles one vital problem after another, from rubber to gasoline, from food rationing to manpower... a day of reckoning is inevitable."

The gasless week-end provided an apex for editorial irritation over rationing. But despite this irritation, commentators viewed Leon Henderson's resignation from OPA soberly and rather sadly. The prevailing judgment was that Mr. Henderson had executed his job with inadequate diplomacy, but with extraordinary forcefulness and courage. The St. Louis Post

Dispatch summed up the general feeling fairly accurately: "The OPA chief trod on many tender toes while in office. His course would have been much easier had he stayed off those toes. But that has never been the Henderson technique... There remain many kinks to be ironed out, but Henderson deserves great credit for installing the country's first rationing system on a sound basis."

Nearly all of the comments on Mr. Henderson's decision to leave OPA spoke of the enormous difficulty of the task he had undertaken. The Christian Science Monitor referred to it as "the most complex, touchy and thankless in Washington," pointing out that, because he headed the agency "through which war laid its most intimately irksome restraints on every segment of American life, Mr. Henderson got the blame."

It was commonly assumed that the hostility of the farm bloc in Congress was primarily responsible for the Price Administrator's retirement. This pressure group victory caused considerable uneasiness to a number of commentators. They expressed fear that further concessions might be made to this or other special interests and that there might be a general let-down in OPA's guardianship against inflation. Such divergent publications as the Wall Street Journal and PM expressed genuinely keen regret over Mr. Henderson's passing.

Most observers, however, expect that Senator Brown, whose appointment to the OPA post is taken for granted, will be able to deal with recalcitrant congressmen more successfully. They are extremely vague in describing other benefits for which they hope under a changed administration. The

reform most frequently recommended is some simplified rationing procedure. The handling of fuel oil was often cited as an outstanding instance of complexity in OPA management.

The prevailing feeling seems to be that rationing and price control should be administered in the future just as forthrightly and firmly as in the past -- but that somehow they should be made more palatable for those whom they inconvenience. The press wants toughness and tact, coercion and co-operation, an iron hand in a velvet glove. The editorial demand, apparently, is for strict compulsion on a wholly voluntary basis.

One additional topic of domestic debate concerned manpower. The President's recent press conference statement on the size of the Army did not still the newspaper controversy over the question. A number of editorial critics took issue with Mr. Roosevelt, arguing that, since manpower is limited, it might be advisable to use more of it to produce equipment of war for our troops and for such of our allies as have millions of men already facing the enemy.

WAR FRONT PROSPECTS

Radio broadcasts and news pages were again full of good news this week. With the rout of Rommel at El Agheila and the development of allied air superiority over Tunisia, commentators breathed more easily about the North African campaign. They were fairly cautious, however, in their assessment of these gains.

The predominant tone of the comment on the Rommel retreat was one of

speculation. The Nazi general still commands so much respect among American military analysts that some wondered if he was not drawing General Montgomery into a trap. Others pointed out that, by joining forces with the German army in Tunisia, he could present a formidable front to the United Nations invaders.

Similar restraint was exhibited in appraising the gains of General MacArthur's forces at Buna and the offensive launched by General Wavell in Burma. Victory in New Guinea has been so long in coming that its importance is now somewhat discounted. The Richmond Times Dispatch warned that "If anybody thinks the fall of Buna and Gona means that the United Nations are now ready to begin a large scale offensive toward Japan ... he had better revise his opinions."

The British advance into Burma was cheered, though somewhat skeptically -- perhaps because of the absence of Japanese opposition. Barnet Nover said that it "appears to be a good deal more than what the military people call a reconnaissance in force, but a good deal less than an all-out invasion..." Stress was placed on the importance of the Burmese campaign as a means of reopening the United Nations supply line to China.

The warmest enthusiasm was stirred at the turn of the week by the inauguration of a third Soviet offensive on the eastern front. Hope was renewed that German forces at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus might be genuinely trapped, after all. Most commentators have been careful thus far to avoid description of the Russian gains as decisive. There is no doubt, however, that they approach the year's end with great expectations.

POPULAR REACTIONS

APPRECIATION

Whatever their distaste for communism, Americans are developing a hearty respect for the fighting qualities of the Russian people. Recent interviewing indicates that public esteem for the Red army has risen appreciably since the Russians turned the Nazis back at Stalingrad and began their counter-offensive on the long eastern front.

Comparison of the answers given to a question asked in August and again in the early part of December shows an increased readiness to acknowledge that the fighting ability of the Red army is equal to that of our own forces. A third of the public now puts the Russians on a par with ourselves:

FROM WHAT YOU KNOW OR HAVE HEARD, WOULD YOU SAY
THE ALL-AROUND FIGHTING ABILITY OF THE AMERICAN
ARMED FORCES IS BETTER, ABOUT THE SAME OR POORER
THAN RUSSIA'S?

	<u>August</u>	<u>December</u>
Better	65%	51%
About the same	22	33
Poorer	5	7
Don't know	8	9

That this shift of opinion was occasioned by no diminution of respect for the American fighting forces was made plain by the answers to another question comparing America's armed services with Germany's. The trend was in the opposite direction:

WOULD YOU SAY THE ALL-AROUND FIGHTING ABILITY
OF THE AMERICAN ARMED FORCES IS BETTER, ABOUT
THE SAME OR POORER THAN GERMANY'S?

	<u>August</u>	<u>December</u>
Better	57%	65%
About the same	19	19
Poorer	15	8
Don't know	9	8

This respect for Russia as a fighting ally has been manifested in several other expressions of public opinion reported by the Bureau. It has been accompanied by an increased confidence that the Russians can be counted on to cooperate with us when the war is over.

Respect is a prerequisite to friendship. It may well be that continued emphasis on the accomplishments of the Russians and their contributions to the United Nations cause will dispel American prejudices and be conducive to better relations with Russia in the future.

SENTIMENT TOWARD NEGROES

A majority of the American public seems unaware of the very considerable measure of discontent which prevails among Negroes in the United States today. Nevertheless, there is greater recognition among white people than there was a few months ago that their colored fellow-citizens are dissatisfied.

Identical questions, posed by the Bureau of Intelligence in July to a sample composed entirely of white persons and in November to a national sample which included Negroes, showed the following divisions of opinion:

DO YOU THINK MOST NEGROES ARE PRETTY WELL SATIS-
FIED WITH THINGS IN THIS COUNTRY, OR DO YOU THINK
MOST OF THEM ARE DISSATISFIED?

	<u>White Respondents</u> <u>July</u>	<u>November</u>	<u>Negro Respondents</u> <u>November</u>
Satisfied	62%	55%	56%
Dissatisfied	24	34	40
Don't know	14	11	4

Even among Negroes, a majority said that people of their race were, on the whole, satisfied with conditions in the United States; it should be noted, however, that Negroes are reluctant to express grievances to white inter-viewers.

In the southern states, two-thirds of the white people believed Negroes to be satisfied with conditions in this country. Among northerners, however, only half expressed such an opinion.

Recognition of Negro dissatisfaction was rather closely associated with education. Thirty-nine per cent of the whites who had completed high school, as compared with 29 per cent of those who had not, said that Negroes were dissatisfied. Even more strikingly, 71 per cent of the better educated Negroes, as compared with 30 per cent of the less educated, said that most members of their race were dissatisfied.

Despite the growth of awareness among white people that Negroes are dis-contented, there was no increased acknowledgment on the part of the whites that Negroes were being treated unfairly. Negroes themselves, on the other hand, while not admitting disgruntlement, complained in overwhelming num-bers that they were denied equality of opportunity:

DO YOU THINK NEGROES ARE GETTING ALL THE OPPORTUNITIES THEY DESERVE IN THIS COUNTRY OR DO YOU THINK THAT, IN GENERAL, THEY ARE NOT BEING TREATED FAIRLY?

	<u>White</u> <u>July</u>	<u>Respondents</u> <u>November</u>	<u>Negro Respondents</u> <u>November</u>
Getting all the opportunities they deserve	59%	63%	32%
Not being treated fairly	31	31	60
Don't know	10	6	8

Again, southerners were much more prone than northerners to feel that the Negroes were getting fair treatment. Four in every five southern whites held this opinion. In the North, however, only about half of the white people said that Negroes were getting all the opportunities they deserved.

In the face of this majority assertion that Negroes have all fair opportunities, there is a general recognition that they do not have as good a chance as white people to get jobs in war industries. In October, the Bureau posed the question of Negro opportunities to another national sample in concrete terms:

IN GENERAL, DO YOU FEEL THAT RIGHT NOW NEGROES HAVE AN EQUAL CHANCE TO GET GOOD WAR JOBS, OR DO YOU THINK WHITE PEOPLE HAVE THE BEST CHANCE?

Negroes have equal chance	22%
Whites have best chance	70
Negroes have best chance	1
Don't know	7

The white people in the sample were asked the additional question, "Do you think that's the way it ought to be?" Among those who acknowledged discrimination against Negroes, 41 per cent said that they favored this practice.

And among the small number of whites believing that Negroes had equal opportunities, 23 per cent declared that they considered this equality undesirable.

Many Americans, apparently, deny that Negroes are treated unjustly and at the same time admit that they do not enjoy equality of opportunity. They are not so much unaware of Negro grievances as unwilling to acknowledge their justification. They feel simply that Negroes do not deserve economic equality with whites.

In the face of such an attitude, the growing white awareness of Negro dissatisfaction may lead to increased racial friction. It is an attitude which creates a formidable barrier to the full utilization of manpower in the war effort.

DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

STEREOTYPES ABOUT "WASHINGTON"

Regular correspondents of the Bureau of Intelligence paint a black picture of public sentiment toward the Federal Government. Recent letters increasingly depict a popular attitude of scorn and suspicion toward those responsible for conducting the war effort on the home front.

The correspondents are, of course, not representative of the general public. They are drawn disproportionately from the upper income brackets. Many of them are businessmen or editors temperamentally unsympathetic to

the Administration. Indeed, there is concrete evidence that they have grossly overstated the extent of popular dissatisfaction.

In the early part of December, the Bureau of Intelligence posed to a national sample the following question:

DO YOU FEEL THAT, AS A WHOLE, THE GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON ARE DOING ALL THEY
COULD DO RIGHT NOW TO HELP WIN THE WAR?

Yes	52%
No	37
Don't know	11

This division of opinion was strikingly confirmed by a comparable question asked of a small sample from December 8 - 10 by the Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research:

DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN
WASHINGTON HAVE DONE A GOOD JOB OR A POOR
JOB DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR?

Good job	51%
Qualified answers	6
Poor job	26
Don't know	17

The people who said, in response to this latter question, that the Government agencies had done a "poor job" were asked:

DO YOU FEEL THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS IMPROVED
THE WORK OF THESE AGENCIES OR ARE THEY
ABOUT THE SAME AS THEY WERE A FEW MONTHS AGO?

Improved	63%
Same	29
Don't know	8

Despite this majority expression of confidence, there appears to be a very substantial minority -- perhaps a third -- of the American people which has serious doubts about the Government's conduct of the war. Reports from the Bureau's correspondents can probably be said to give, with a fair degree of accuracy, the complaints most commonly expressed by these disgruntled people.

Certain stereotypes prevail. Apparently there is a widespread feeling, fostered by editorial criticism in the daily press, that Washington has a mistaken attitude toward the public, that it doesn't trust the American people, treats them as children, considers them apathetic and tries to enforce regulatory measures by compulsion, rather than by cooperation.

Criticism is directed much less frequently to the President than to his subordinates. In spite of the President's popularity, his personal advisors are more distrusted than his political enemies -- at least by those dissatisfied with Administration conduct of the war. There is a widely held notion, according to the correspondents, that all Government agencies are on a spending spree and that a thorough house-cleaning is desirable. Many people visualize Washington, in the words of one correspondent, "as an overstuffed and overstaffed package of personal animosities, conflicting jurisdictions and presidentially pardoned inefficiencies prodigally tied together with red tape."

A majority of the Bureau's correspondents, when questioned on the point, report public readiness to accept increasing Government controls as a war-time necessity. Most of them add, however, that, in some cases, this

acceptance is coupled with fear that the increased restrictions and limitations will not be eliminated at the end of the war, but will lead to some form of dictatorship, socialism or fascism. The terms are used almost indiscriminately to indicate any species of totalitarianism inimical to the American tradition of individual initiative.

This alarm over increasing controls is associated, to some extent, with uneasiness over increased centralization of Government. The states rights cry is loudest in New England and the South. Such fears are commonly associated with other sentiments of antipathy toward the New Deal.

"Regimentation" appears to be a powerful, though vague, symbol, regularly invoked by any element eager to arouse feelings against current procedures and policies. The range of its applications is suggested by the announcement of a group of farmers in Stearns County, Minnesota — organized under the title "Farmers Council for Action" — that one of their aims is "to stop REGIMENTATION, if someone in AUTHORITY should dare and try it."

"Regimentation" seems to be a convenient rallying point for resistance to wartime discomforts and inconveniences. It is a formidable bugbear conjured up, not so much by circumstances as by an emotional climate. The bluster of stereotypes evoked by the term "regimentation" undermines the confidence of people in their Government and obstructs the healthy cooperation of the public in the war effort on the home front. It can scarcely be overcome by facts alone. The facts must be mobilized in force to project a positive picture of the Government as the people's agent, serving them and making their will effective.

THE NAM VIEWS THE FUTURE

The recent NAM convention in New York provided a sounding board for ideas which may come into head-on collision with the Administration's position on America's war aims and the post-war world. The ideas reflect the thinking of an extremely influential group and are already receiving widespread attention. The large measure of agreement among eight major speeches delivered by businessmen at the convention suggests that America's industrial leaders subscribe to them with rather startling unanimity.

Men in the managerial group are evidently wedded, more firmly than ever, to an unmodified version of the free enterprise system. But they recognize that this system is on trial. They are well aware of the need for presenting it in a favorable light to the American public. And they are aware of the need for meeting certain basic responsibilities. But Henry J. Kaiser was virtually alone in offering any positive or imaginative suggestions for the future.

The industrialists see that, to prove its salt, capitalism must provide full employment — in Mr. Kaiser's words, "a nationwide, yes, a worldwide opportunity for all who want to work." Secondly, it must prove its worth by turning out a large and expanding volume of goods.

The speeches make it abundantly clear that "business" considers itself a rival of "Government" for the control of America's social and economic future. Businessmen foresee a struggle for control between the managers and the "reformists" now in office. They feel that they are in a position to win the struggle. Conceding that the American public was dissatisfied

with the pre-war performance of industry, they insist that it is now equally dissatisfied with the New Deal. C. M. Chester remarked: "The silver lining of the war control situation seems to be that the economic planners will not play a return engagement after the war. The public has seen their wares and don't like them." (sic)

Essentially business seeks to regain control by promising full employment and prosperity in an economy unregimented and unregulated by Government. Industry, the NAM speakers argued, is the only instrumentality which can provide assurance against freedom from want, because industry is productive and Government is not, and because industry alone has the necessary experience, know-how and initiative. W. P. Witherow declared:

"If Government undertakes a share-the-wealth plan on an international scale, it may benefit those in foreign lands, but only by the impoverishment of the American people. For Government has no source of capital except by taxing the incomes of its citizens... That is why I believe Government cannot do the post-war job, even if it tries."

Industry, the speakers insisted, should be given a free hand to do the job. The Government should not attempt to share control. W. P. Witherow declared: "You never saw a winning football team with two quarterbacks on the same team on the field at once." Wilfred Sykes made a more elaborate statement of this same point:

"It is necessary for the proper functioning of a business that in any situation, one decision must be made. The policy arising from such a decision must be carried out by management, and the responsibility must rest with management. The whole private enterprise system rests upon decisiveness, and the assumption of responsibility by single individuals in accordance with their

share in the activities of the business... To use more homely words, I might quote General Campbell, the Chief of Ordnance, who said, 'You can't do a job with someone breathing down your neck.'"

The speeches suggest that, even in 1942, many of America's industrial leaders conceive of the future in narrowly materialistic, nationalistic and commercial terms. It was in connection with war aims and post-war plans that the conflict between the philosophy of business and that of the Government was most sharply in evidence. A number of the speakers made contemptuous references to what they regarded as abstract, unrealistic and misguided statements of America's war aims. Witherow's "no-milk-for-Hottentots" statement has already received a great deal of attention:

"I am not making guns or tanks to win a 'people's revolution.' I am making armament to help our boys save America... I don't want any 'modified' free enterprise of Bill of Rightless Democracy.

"Immediately after the war, government aid to war-torn countries is a foregone conclusion. But not the rehabilitation of their economy or the reforming of their lives. I am not fighting for a quart of milk for every Hottentot, or for a T.V.A. on the Danube, or for governmental hand-outs of free Utopia. Our boys are fighting and manufacturers are making war materials to preserve liberty — our liberty..."

Although unusually biting in phraseology, these remarks did not differ in substance from those made by a number of the industrialists. Henry J. Kaiser, too, talked of the importance of industry's adopting a plan "which would put courage, hope and strength in place of all the fanciful theories which forecast free food, free medicine, free housing, and all other similar donations on the part of the paternalistic state."

These views of America's business leaders have already received considerable

attention, and are certain to receive a great deal more. Except for attacks on Witherow's speech from such liberal newspapers as the St. Louis Post Dispatch and the Chicago Sun, most of the comment has been favorable. Kaiser's speech was unanimously praised by the papers which discussed it. The convention and the recent elections have unleashed a fresh wave of virulent criticism of the Administration in business and trade magazines.

The NAM has a well-filled war chest for publicizing the sort of ideas expressed at its convention. Its revenue is in excess of \$1,000,000 a year. Its resources and prestige insure it access to every important opinion-forming medium. A skillful campaign will probably be undertaken by the Association to persuade the public of the desirability of business control of the nation's economic life.

The Government can scarcely afford to be less systematic in the presentation of plans for building a more secure and prosperous world. Recent Bureau of Intelligence reports reveal widespread anxiety about the economic future. They show that people's thinking about the post-war world is vague and confused.

The Government cannot depend on an occasional speech of the President or Vice President to dissipate these fears and clarify people's ideas about how to win the peace. Public acceptance of any program which the Government may agree upon can be insured only through a determined, persistent, planned campaign.

NEWSPAPER STRIKE

The typical reaction among New Yorkers, deprived of their morning newspapers for three days last week, was one of indignation. There was little knowledge of the issues involved in the strike responsible for the interruption of normal deliveries. Most people blamed the strikers on the ground that they were obstructing an essential public service.

The situation presented an unusual opportunity to examine the role of newspapers in the daily lives of the public, with special reference to war information. Accordingly, during the second day of the strike, the Bureau of Intelligence interviewed 30 individuals selected at random. All of them were native New Yorkers, roughly in the middle income level and regular readers of the metropolitan press. The interviews were intensive in nature, conducted through informal, detailed conversations.

Of those interviewed, 19 indicated that they missed their papers "very much"; four missed them "considerably"; three, "just a little"; three, "not at all"; one thought that "maybe we would be better off without them."

Most of the 19 who admitted missing the papers "very much" expressed anger. Typical comments:

"It's outrageous."
"A terrible situation."
"It's a criminal offense."
"Who's to blame? Labor should be shot."

The others expressed frustration at having their daily routine upset. One remarked plaintively, "I look forward to the paper every morning." A

commuter said, "It's part of my day, I just twiddled my thumbs coming in this morning."

Most missed was news from the fighting fronts, although general war news and international political developments were specifically mentioned by nearly half of those interviewed. The non-news sections were cited, but with much less frequency.

Despite the articulate dissatisfaction with the absence of newspapers, most of the respondents felt that they had somehow kept in touch with the progress of the war. When questioned specifically about operations in Africa and in the South Pacific, only six said that they had been unable to keep up with developments in these sectors.

Adjustment to an almost newspaperless city took several forms. Most of the respondents turned to the radio. This was particularly true of the regular radio listeners who simply increased their listening time. Three of the respondents were non-listeners and they expressed considerable difficulty in obtaining radio news, since broadcasting schedules were not available.

In addition to the radio, many sought information from out-of-town papers and from PM and the Brooklyn Eagle, deliveries of which were uninterrupted. In the business districts, PM was sold out by 4 o'clock on the first day of the strike. Interestingly enough, there was a rush also to Time and Newsweek. This may mean that people turned to the news magazines, as one respondent put it, "just for something to read." The desire for very recent news obviously was not satisfied by this substitution. Many New Yorkers

made special trips to the newspaper offices to purchase copies of their favorite daily.

Almost all the people interviewed thought that the strike would be over very soon, because it seemed "impossible" that they should be without their papers for any length of time. The spectacle of 3,000 union men depriving 7,000,000 people of newspapers struck New Yorkers in general as "outrageous."

CONFUSION

The two-day suspension of gasoline sales did little to encourage public acceptance of the mileage rationing program as a device for rubber conservation. On the contrary, it augmented the still prevalent popular belief that gasoline rationing is occasioned solely by transportation difficulties which created a shortage of gasoline in the East.

Reports from OWI field representatives in eight eastern seaboard, mid-western and southwestern cities indicate that popular confusion about the mileage rationing program has been considerably aggravated. The explanation that suspension of gas sales along the eastern seaboard was due to military needs in connection with the North African campaign related gasoline shortages more closely than ever to transportation problems. In the areas where gasoline is plentiful, resistance to mileage rationing was stimulated by the week-end crisis. Continued careful explanation of the relationship between gasoline and rubber seems essential.

- - * * * - -

Bureau of Intelligence
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

M-2319

Bulletin of Intelligence Projects

Number: 1

Date: Fortnight - December 23, 1942

Studies completed December 9 -23

Subject	Description
1. America and the Post-War World (Special Intelligence Report, issued December 16 (Confidential)).	A survey of public opinion respecting America's allies and post-war problems.
2. Community Tensions in Three Army Camp Impact Areas (Confidential).	An analysis of the problems created by soldier-civilian relations in towns near which Army camps have been located. Surveys in three areas were conducted in collaboration with the Special Services Branch of the Army. (A digest of the findings of these surveys is included in Intelligence Report # 54.)
3. Report on the Far East From Gripsholm Passengers (Confidential).	Appraisals of the effectiveness of allied information in reaching far eastern peoples.
4. Labor Representation in the WFB (Confidential).	A survey of public opinion regarding membership in WFB for representatives of organized labor. (Reported in Intelligence Report # 54)
5. The 40-Hour Week and Overtime Pay (Confidential).	Popular estimates respecting the actual and optimum work week in war industries and the relation of overtime pay to hours of labor. (Reported in Intelligence Report # 54)
6. Public Sentiment Toward Negroes (Confidential).	Public opinion about dissatisfaction among Negroes and about equality of opportunity between Negroes and Whites. (Reported in Intelligence Report #55)
7. The NAM Views the Future (Restricted).	An analysis of statements about post-war problems made by industrial leaders at the recent NAM convention. (Reported in Intelligence Report # 55)

8. Policies and Attitudes of Management and Labor

Policies of the AFL, CIO and United Mine Workers as disclosed by daily proceedings of their annual convention; policies and attitudes of the personnel managers of large plants as disclosed by discussion at the annual convention of the American Management Association.

Studies Nearing Completion

1. A new report on American attitudes about the United Nations.
2. A study designed to bring up to date previous information on public obstacles to the acceptance of the mileage rationing program.
3. A study on public understanding of the Government's anti-inflation program.
4. A study of public awareness of the manpower problem and attitudes toward specific phases of it.
5. An investigation of the degree to which the public feels surfeited with war-related radio programs.
6. An analysis of the efficacy of the radio allocation program, based on the monitoring of Philadelphia radio stations.
7. A study of the motivations which have proved most effective in the sale of war bonds and stamps.
8. A report on the shipbuilding industry, dealing with labor attitudes and the causes of absenteeism.
9. A survey of newspaper and magazine treatment of the Indian problem.

Continuing Services

1. Intelligence Report (weekly - Confidential)
2. Weekly Media Report (Restricted)
3. United Nations Intelligence Digest (weekly - Confidential)
4. United States Official Statements (weekly - For Administrative Use)
5. Summary and Analysis of Feature Motion Pictures (weekly - Restricted)
6. Newsreels and OWI Campaigns and Programs (Monthly - Restricted)

Requests for these reports should be made in writing to Miss W. L. Shamon, Room 5427, Social Security Building, or by telephone to extension 71248 (National War Agencies). Where extra copies are not available, the master file copies may be referred to within the central offices, Bureau of Intelligence, Room 5427.

PSF
owl
770

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


REPORT FROM THE NATION

DECEMBER 7, 1942



OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE

COPY NO. 13 FOR _____



CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	1
CIVILIAN PROBLEMS AND RESPONSIBILITIES	4
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND POLICIES	10
PRODUCTION PROBLEMS	19
THE ENEMY	26
UNITED NATIONS	31
THE POST WAR WORLD	36
MILITARY AFFAIRS	46
WAR INFORMATION	52
APPRAISAL OF THE WAR'S PROGRESS	57
REPORT FROM THE NATION	63

★

The American compact is altogether with individuals.

- Walt Whitman

★

INTRODUCTION

THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

The people of the United States are 130,000,000 individual personalities. They are farmers, storekeepers, bankers, miners, locomotive engineers, lawyers, druggists, doctors, teachers, stenographers, housewives, manufacturers, fishermen, salesmen...

And they are Roman Catholics and Jews and a variety of Protestants.

They are easterners, westerners, southerners, middle westerners.

Some of them were born here, some came from other lands. They talk more languages than you can count. They have white skins, black skins, red skins and yellow skins.

Their differences are innumerable — and sometimes violent. They tug and push for themselves, individually, and for the groups with which their special

interests are identified. They think, to some extent, in terms of personal welfare and group advantage.

But for all that, *they are a people.*

They are a people because they are tied to one another as a family is tied — because underneath all the differences they have certain common hopes and common loyalties — because they think of themselves, not only as farmers or factory workers, not only as Texans or Californians, not only as aliens, Negroes, property owners, Republicans or Democrats, but as Americans.

They are a people in the same sense that the British and the Russians and the Chinese are peoples — not just because they happen to live inside a set of boundary lines staked out on the map as the U.S.A. — but because they have a common inheritance of ideas.

They are a lot of publics. But they are also a public.

During the past year, the Bureau of Intelligence has interviewed samples of this public — samples carefully selected to give proportional representation to all the constituent publics. It has talked with more than 75,000 individuals. And it has studied the points of view presented to the American people by their news

media, by the men and women who have attained leadership among them and by the spokesmen and publications representing their group and sectional interests.

Public opinion is forever changing. It is a product of leadership, circumstances and specific events. Its responses to these factors in the past afford an index to its development in the future. They constitute a measurement of growth.

The Bureau presents here a selection of significant opinions expressed by the American public since Pearl Harbor. These are highlights. The story they tell is by no means complete. Yet, taken together, they reveal a pattern of public thought.

This is the way Americans sized up some of their major problems during their first year at war...

★

We are now in this war. We are all in it -- all the way. Every single man, woman and child is a partner in the most tremendous undertaking of our American history.

- Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 9, 1941

★

CIVILIAN PROBLEMS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Americans talk of total war, of a people's war. The terms have become clichés in their newspapers, magazines and radio broadcasts. But the war is a remote one. It has ruffled, but it has not ruptured, their normal ways of living. The sweat, strain, anger, fear, pain, exhaustion, selflessness of the battlefields have been but dimly reflected at home. The war is drama. It is not yet blood.

Yet Americans know, in some measure, that the war is theirs. They understand that the role of the civilian today is not a passive one, that it involves vigorous affirmative support of the national cause.

Most Americans, by midsummer, had a sense that they were sharing in this cause:

DO YOU FEEL THAT ANYTHING YOU YOURSELF ARE NOW DOING IS HELPING THE UNITED STATES TOTAL WAR EFFORT? (August)

Yes	83%
No	15
Don't know	2

This sense of participation came largely from the performance of their regular jobs. They were by no means fully mobilized in voluntary civilian activities:

ARE YOU DOING ANY CIVILIAN DEFENSE WORK, SUCH AS AIR RAID WARNING, FIRST AID, RED CROSS WORK, AND THE LIKE? (August)

Yes	29%
No	69
Don't know	2

Less than a quarter of a small sample interviewed by the Bureau of Intelligence in late September were rated as regular and active participants in volunteer war work. Much of the work mentioned by the remainder required little time or effort and was being done on an individual, rather than a group, basis.

Active participants in civilian defense work were disproportionately drawn from the ranks of those who most strongly supported the war and were well situated socially and economically.

There was an untapped reservoir of Americans willing to do voluntary war work:

IS THERE ANY SORT OF VOLUNTEER WAR ACTIVITY
YOU WOULD LIKE TO DO, BUT HAVEN'T BEEN GIVEN
A CHANCE TO DO? (August)

Yes	21%
No	74
Don't know	5

Some people complained that the organized volunteer war efforts were inefficient, hampered by politics and social discrimination. But a majority felt that they were being managed satisfactorily. This satisfaction increased between spring and autumn.

HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE WAY CIVILIAN
DEFENSE IS BEING RUN IN YOUR COMMUNITY?
DO YOU THINK IT IS BEING RUN VERY WELL,
ONLY FAIRLY WELL, OR POORLY?

	February	October
Very well	42%	54%
Fairly well	20	24
Poorly	8	8
Don't know	30	14

A large body of the public has felt that the American people, as a whole, did not view the war with sufficient seriousness -- reflecting, perhaps, a strong sense of urgency in themselves:

IN GENERAL, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE PEOPLE IN
THIS COUNTRY ARE TAKING THE WAR SERIOUSLY
ENOUGH?

	March	August
Yes	31%	41%
No	64	54
Don't know	5	5

The people who feel that they are contributing to the war effort and who are taking part in volunteer civilian activities are prone to hold certain opinions which indicate an identification with the national cause -- an acceptance of the war as *their* war. These people tend to have strong convictions and feelings about the war; they are prone to feel a sense of community with the peoples of other lands -- to feel that this is, in fact, a war of all the peoples of the earth; they tend to believe that greater effort is needed for victory and that the war should be waged offensively. Finally, they have a clearer sense than others of what they are fighting for, of what they hope victory will bring.

The strongest bar to participation in the war effort appears to be complacency. People uncritically content with the progress of production, overoptimistic about the fighting and overconfident respecting American strength are the people least engaged in voluntary war work. The attitude most commonly associated with identification and participation is a firm determination to fight the war until absolute victory is achieved.

A feeling of discrimination has kept many of America's Negroes from close identification with the war effort. When Negroes in Harlem were interviewed by the Bureau during April, more than half of them expressed a belief that they were not accorded equal opportunities with white people to take part in war production:

IN GENERAL, DO YOU FEEL THAT RIGHT NOW,
NEGROES HAVE JUST AS GOOD A CHANCE AS
WHITE PEOPLE TO GET DEFENSE JOBS, OR NOT?

Just as good a chance	28%
Not as good a chance	62
Don't know	10

Although, as a group, Negroes are patriotic citizens and devoted to democratic ideals, resentment has led a substantial minority among them to feel that the war is exclusively the concern of whites and that their own efforts must be devoted to securing opportunity and equality for their own people. The Double-V campaign, sponsored by certain Negro leaders and publications, has had a strong appeal, as evidenced by the responses of Negroes interviewed in Memphis during May.

RIGHT NOW, DO YOU THINK IT IS MORE IMPORTANT
TO CONCENTRATE ON BEATING GERMANY AND JAPAN
OR TO MAKE DEMOCRACY WORK BETTER HERE AT
HOME?

Beat Germany and Japan	39%
Make democracy work	35
Don't know	26

Most of the nation's white people, however, were unaware of this resentment among the colored population:

DO YOU THINK MOST NEGROES ARE PRETTY WELL
SATISFIED WITH THINGS IN THIS COUNTRY, OR
DO YOU THINK MOST OF THEM ARE DISSATISFIED?

	June	November
Satisfied	62%	54%
Dissatisfied	24	35
Don't know	14	11

Almost one-half of a cross section of white people expressed the belief that Negroes have as good a chance as whites to get jobs in war plants. This view was about equally prevalent in all parts of the country; but the relatively well educated were not so likely to express it as the less well educated.

There were sharp differences in opinions about Negroes between whites living in the South and whites living in the Northeast and West. Northerners and westerners were more prone than southerners to acknowledge that Negroes are as patriotic as whites, that they make equally good soldiers and that they are entitled to wage equality with whites for equal work. Southerners were more prone than northerners and westerners to believe that Negroes are generally satisfied with existing conditions and that they are getting all the opportunities they deserve.

Action begets belief, just as belief begets action. Through the joining of hands in common effort, Americans have accomplished much of genuine value in the prosecution of the war; and, at the same time, they have strengthened their awareness of a common purpose, their unity as a people. But they are, as yet, neither fully integrated nor fully mobilized for civilian participation in the national cause.

★

We shall give up conveniences and modify the routine of our lives if our country asks us to do so. We will do it cheerfully, remembering that the common enemy seeks to destroy every home and every freedom in every part of our land.

- Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 23, 1942

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND POLICIES

Long before the Government undertook comprehensive measures to combat inflation, the American public expressed a desire for stringent economic controls to regulate the cost of living and to secure equitable distribution of scarce articles.

When the President's seven-point economic program was at last put into effect, there was majority endorsement of each of its items. But their interrelation was not fully understood. People were confused, moreover, about the application of these controls. Criticism was directed mainly at the way in which the anti-inflation program was put into practice, rather than at its principles.

The public applies two standards to economic restric-

tions -- necessity and equity. It demands assurance that sacrifices are genuinely requisite to the war effort and that their burdens are fairly distributed.

Press and radio commentators have argued vehemently that the American people have been far ahead of their Government in willingness to face the economic restrictions required for total war -- that the public has waited only for leadership from its Government. Some support for this contention is to be found in the readiness for sacrifice which people expressed when interviewed by the Bureau of Intelligence in August:

DO YOU THINK THE PEOPLE IN THIS COMMUNITY
HAVE BEEN ASKED TO MAKE TOO MANY SACRIFICES
OR NOT ENOUGH?

Too many	2%
About the right amount	22
Not enough	70
Don't know	6

A quarter of the population felt that they personally had been exempted from some hardships that the war had brought to their neighbors:

SO FAR IN THE WAR, DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU
PERSONALLY HAVE HAD TO MAKE *MORE* SACRIFICES
OR *LESS* SACRIFICES THAN OTHER PEOPLE IN
THIS COMMUNITY?

More	9%
About the same	65
Less	23
Don't know	3

Almost the entire public voiced a willingness to make additional sacrifices:

AS THE WAR GOES ON, WILL YOU BE WILLING TO MAKE MORE SACRIFICES, EVEN THOUGH OTHER PEOPLE ARE NOT MAKING AS MANY AS YOU ARE?

Yes	94%
No	4
Don't know	2

As long ago as January, the public was overwhelmingly in favor of governmental price control. By August, when the anti-inflation program was already in operation, the endorsement of price control rose to an even higher level:

HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT HAVING THE GOVERNMENT REGULATE PRICES DURING THE WAR -- IN GENERAL, ARE YOU FOR IT OR AGAINST IT?

	January	August
For	84%	91%
Against	6	6
Don't know	5	3
Depends	5	

In the early part of October, however, a substantial minority of the people expressed doubt respecting the Government's ability to keep the cost of living within reasonable bounds:

DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT WILL ACTUALLY BE ABLE TO CONTROL PRICES?

Yes	65%
No	19
Don't know	16

Approval of price control was highest in large cities, somewhat lower in small towns and lowest among farmers. While urban people interpreted price control in terms of living costs, farmers were more concerned about the level of agricultural prices.

Confidence had been higher in June when the four major occupational groups showed the following division of opinion respecting approval of price control and confidence in its effectiveness.

	Approval	Confidence
White collar workers	93%	77%
Business owners	85	74
Manual laborers	93	86
Farmers	89	72

Most Americans expressed agreement that wages and salaries should be limited in some way for the duration of the war. But they differed widely as to the kind of limitation that ought to be imposed:

DO YOU THINK THERE SHOULD BE ANY LIMIT ON HOW HIGH WAGES AND SALARIES SHOULD GO DURING THE WAR? (October)

Yes	85%
No	9
Don't know	6

(If "Yes") DO YOU THINK ALL WAGES AND SALARIES SHOULD BE KEPT WHERE THEY ARE NOW, OR DO YOU THINK SOME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO GO HIGHER? (October)

Kept where they are	21%
Some go higher	57
Don't know	7

People were much more prone to express willingness to have their own incomes fixed at existing levels than they were to favor rigid freezing of all wages and salaries:

WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO HAVE YOUR OWN INCOME FIXED WHERE IT IS NOW AS LONG AS THE WAR LASTS, OR DO YOU THINK IT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO GO A LITTLE HIGHER? (October)

Income fixed	42%
Allowed to go higher	41
Depends	13
Don't know	4

Persons whose income came from wages and salaries --whether they were white collar, manual or farm workers--were most inclined toward a form of stabilization which would allow some wages to go higher. Most of those in favor of freezing all wages and salaries at present levels were business and farm owners; but, even in these groups, less than a third favored such a drastic curb.

There was also general recognition of a need to limit income other than wages and salaries:

DO YOU THINK THERE SHOULD BE ANY LIMIT ON HOW HIGH BUSINESS PROFITS SHOULD GO DURING THE WAR? (October)

Yes	85%
No	6
Don't know	9

HOW ABOUT THE PRICES FARMERS CAN GET FOR THEIR PRODUCTS? DO YOU THINK THERE SHOULD

BE ANY LIMIT ON HOW HIGH THEY SHOULD GO DURING THE WAR? (October)

Yes	78%
No	14
Don't know	8

Such direct forms of limitation were more popular than the tightening of indirect forms:

DO YOU THINK PEOPLE'S TAXES NEXT YEAR SHOULD BE HIGHER THAN THEY WERE THIS YEAR? (October)

Yes, higher	44%
No	44
Don't know	12

This view prevailed in October despite the fact that most people in a different sample interviewed later in the month said they had not experienced the pinch of taxation with any severity:

HAS IT BEEN A REAL HARDSHIP FOR YOU TO PAY THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF TAXES YOU'VE HAD TO PAY OVER THE PAST YEAR, OR NOT?

Yes	22%
No	73
Don't know	3
Didn't pay	2

Ever since last March, the public has been markedly in favor of rationing goods likely to become scarce:

DO YOU THINK WE OUGHT TO START RIGHT NOW TO RATION ALL MATERIALS IN WHICH SHORTAGES MAY DEVELOP, OR DO YOU THINK WE OUGHT TO WAIT UNTIL THERE REALLY IS A SHORTAGE?

	March	October
Ration right now	73%	72%
Wait for shortage	21	21
Don't know	6	7

Either because they had faith in the effectiveness of rationing or because they lacked full awareness of the war's potential effects upon civilian economy, people did not anticipate grave shortages of essential consumer goods:

DO YOU THINK WE WILL EVER HAVE SHORTAGES IN THIS COUNTRY AS BAD AS THEY HAVE IN OTHER COUNTRIES? (October)

Yes	10%
No	71
Don't know	9
Depends	10

The possibility of shortages has by no means blinded the public to the importance of sending the sinews of war to our allies:

SHOULD WE CONTINUE TO SEND SUPPLIES TO OUR ALLIES, EVEN IF IT MEANS WE WILL HAVE SOME SHORTAGES HERE AT HOME? (October)

Send supplies	88%
Not send supplies	7
Don't know	5

Considerable doubt appears to have developed in the public mind respecting the efficacy and equity of rationing:

IF WE RATION A LOT MORE THINGS, DO YOU THINK THERE'LL BE MUCH CHISELING -- THAT IS, PEOPLE GETTING MORE THAN THEIR SHARE OF THESE THINGS? (October)

Yes, chiseling	49%
No	43
Don't know	8

AT THE PRESENT TIME DO YOU THINK A LOT OF PEOPLE ARE GETTING MORE THAN THEIR SHARE OF THE THINGS THAT ARE RATIONED?

Yes	38%
No	52
Don't know	10

Other aspects of the anti-inflation program met with general endorsement:

DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE MAKING IT HARDER FOR PEOPLE TO BUY ON THE INSTALLMENT PLAN? (October)

Yes	59%
No	29
Don't know	12

IN THE LAST MONTH, HAVE YOU OR YOUR FAMILY BOUGHT ANY BONDS OR STAMPS? (October)

Yes	73%
No	27

Opinion was confused respecting the desirability of making bond purchases compulsory. Half of those interviewed thought the Government should require everyone to buy war bonds and stamps each month. But only 19 per cent said that they themselves would be willing to have the Government tell them how many bonds or stamps they had to buy each month.

In connection with war restrictions, "compulsory" tends to lose its dictionary meaning and to denote a program which is considered unnecessary or unfair. People do not seem to care much whether compliance with a program is voluntary or mandatory. Their main

concern is that it be necessary and that it be so administered as to insure equality of sacrifice.

★

The superiority of the United Nations in munitions and ships must be overwhelming -- so overwhelming that the Axis nations can never hope to catch up with it. In order to attain this overwhelming superiority the United States must build planes and tanks and guns and ships to the utmost limit of our national capacity. We have the ability and capacity to produce arms not only for our own forces, but also for the armies, navies, and air forces fighting on our side.

- Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 6, 1942

PRODUCTION PROBLEMS

The concept of America as the arsenal of democracy has captured the imagination of the American people. They have been so imbued with the idea that production will win the war that they have tended, perhaps, to overemphasize its importance. Their satisfaction with the progress of the production program has fluctuated in accordance with optimistic or pessimistic news from the battle fronts.

In the early spring, the public was convinced that production was moving ahead speedily and efficiently. But, with the bad news of summer months and the de-

velopment of serious raw material shortages, people turned a more critical eye on production progress:

IN GENERAL, DO YOU THINK THAT PRODUCTION OF WAR MATERIALS IN THIS COUNTRY IS GOING ALONG VERY WELL, ONLY FAIRLY WELL OR POORLY?

	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.
Very well	67%	50%	40%	53%	45%
Only fairly well	23	40	50	41	42
Poorly	2	4	4	3	4
Don't know	8	6	6	3	9

Criticism of production was distinctly a mark of the more educated groups. In September,

55 per cent of the college graduates, as compared with

30 per cent of those who had never completed grammar school... said production was going "only fairly well" or "poorly."

Those who were dissatisfied with the production program tended to place the blame for its shortcomings on labor troubles, rather than on raw material shortages or managerial inefficiency. In particular, there developed an extremely widespread belief that labor leaders were impeding the war effort. Newspapers fostered this view by giving dramatic emphasis to strikes, to union malpractices and to the demands made by labor leaders:

DO YOU FEEL THAT AS A WHOLE THE LEADERS OF LABOR UNIONS ARE DOING ALL THEY COULD DO RIGHT NOW TO HELP WIN THE WAR?

	March	June	July	August
Yes	25%	36%	28%	31%
No	54	40	48	53
Don't know	21	24	24	16

The public was much less inclined to blame the rank and file of labor or the people in charge of factories for production deficiencies:

DO YOU FEEL THAT AS A WHOLE THE PEOPLE IN CHARGE OF FACTORIES -- THE EXECUTIVES -- ARE DOING ALL THEY COULD DO RIGHT NOW TO HELP WIN THE WAR? HOW ABOUT THE WORKERS IN THE FACTORIES?

	March		June	
	Executives	Workers	Executives	Workers
Yes	59%	57%	67%	73%
No	26	32	17	17
Don't know	15	11	16	10

	July		August	
	Executives	Workers	Executives	Workers
Yes	61%	63%	66%	64%
No	22	25	26	30
Don't know	17	12	8	6

There was a widely prevalent conviction that strikes, at least in war industries, should be absolutely banned for the duration of the war.

AS THINGS ARE NOW, DO YOU THINK WORKERS IN WAR INDUSTRIES SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO STRIKE? (June)

Should	8%
Should not	88
Don't know	4

A third of the public felt, however, that if labor gains were surrendered for the duration of the war they would never be recovered:

IF WORKERS GIVE UP SOME OF THEIR GAINS NOW --
LIKE SHORTER HOURS AND BETTER WAGES -- DO
YOU THINK THEY WILL GET THEM BACK AFTER THE
WAR? (June)

Yes.	47%
No	33
Don't know	20

It is a significant commentary on the willingness of workers to sacrifice for the sake of the war effort that they favored a ban on strikes in war industries in almost exactly the same proportions as the public at large. Yet they were considerably more apprehensive than the general public that their pre-war labor standards would never be regained; 44 per cent of the war workers in the sample said that they did not think that workers would get their gains back after the war.

Public hostility toward war workers appears to have increased markedly in the summer and early fall, especially among farmers and even, in addition, among groups such as teachers and white collar employees who were not until recently unsympathetic to labor. The incomes of these people have not kept pace, generally speaking, with the rising cost of living and they have perhaps been envious of the apparent prosperity of war workers.

Special studies of war workers themselves indicate that they have a keen recognition of the importance of their role in the war

effort. But a considerable number of them, especially in plants which have had a record of bad labor relations, have been distrustful of management. Fear of lay-offs and of a post-war depression have sometimes kept them from full devotion to their jobs. Subject often to deplorable living conditions in overcrowded war production centers and aware of the public hostility toward them, war workers have tended, in some measure, to think of themselves as a special class apart from the American people as a whole. The cleavage constitutes a serious impairment of national unity.

Concern over the attitude of labor gave way in the public mind by the beginning of autumn to concern over the scarcity of labor:

FROM WHAT YOU'VE HEARD, DO YOU THINK WAR
PLANTS IN THIS COUNTRY CAN GET ALL THE
WORKERS THEY NEED NOW? (October)

Yes	57%
No	33
Don't know	10

HOW ABOUT FARMERS IN THIS COUNTRY? DO YOU
THINK FARMERS CAN GET ALL THE WORKERS THEY
NEED NOW? (October)

Yes	9%
No	86
Don't know	5

Recognition of this problem impelled a large segment of the public to believe that the recruitment of industrial workers was even more important than enlargement of the Army:

GRANTING THAT BOTH OF THESE THINGS ARE IMPORTANT, WHICH ONE IS *MOST* IMPORTANT FOR US TO DO *RIGHT NOW* -- INCREASE THE SIZE OF OUR ARMED FORCES, OR INCREASE THE NUMBER OF WORKERS IN WAR JOBS? (October)

Increase size of armed forces	22%
Increase number of workers	40
Both equally important	25
Don't know	13

Despite this awareness that the manpower problem is an urgent one, Americans retained strong objections to the employment of aliens in war industries:

SHOULD ALL WORKERS IN WAR INDUSTRIES HAVE TO BE CITIZENS OF THIS COUNTRY, OR DO YOU THINK IT IS ALL RIGHT TO HIRE SOME PEOPLE WHO ARE *NOT* CITIZENS? (October)

Citizens only	66%
Some not citizens	31
Don't know	3

A majority of the public, however, favored restrictions upon the normal freedom of workers in seeking employment.

WOULD YOU FAVOR A PLAN UNDER WHICH WAR WORKERS WOULD HAVE TO GET PERMISSION FROM THE GOVERNMENT IF THEY WANT TO LEAVE THEIR PRESENT JOBS TO TAKE A JOB SOMEWHERE ELSE? (October)

Yes	65%
No	25
Don't know	10

Nevertheless, pride in America as the arsenal of democracy was reflected in a prevailing belief that

this country was contributing a major share of the United Nations war equipment:

FROM WHAT YOU'VE HEARD WOULD YOU SAY THE UNITED STATES IS PRODUCING LESS THAN HALF OR MORE THAN HALF OF THE WAR MATERIAL USED BY THE ALLIES? (August)

Less than half	12%
About half	18
More than half	51
Don't know	19

(If "More than half") WOULD YOU SAY THE UNITED STATES IS PRODUCING PRACTICALLY ALL OF IT?

Yes	18%
No	29
Don't know	4

The view held by 51 per cent of the public that the United States is contributing more than half of the war material used by the allies is closely associated with unrealistic appraisals of our armed forces and with other evidences of complacency. The general outlook characterized by this cluster of opinions is negatively correlated with attitudes favorable to post-war collaboration.

Americans have limitless faith in the power of their industrial machine. Many of them recognize, however, that here and there its gears fail to mesh smoothly. The people most keenly aware of production shortcomings and of labor and manpower problems are also the people who assess military and post-war problems most realistically.

★

The militarists in Berlin and Tokyo started this war. But the massed, angered forces of common humanity will finish it.

- Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 6, 1942

★

THE ENEMY

No clear policy has been enunciated by the Government in regard to the common people of the countries with which we are at war. Some officials, including the President, have represented them as hoodwinked victims of their dictatorial Governments. Others have suggested that the people themselves share responsibility for the aggression and cruelty in which they have participated.

Editorial commentators have varied similarly in their indictment of the enemy. Cartoons tend to represent Germans, Italians and Japanese in stereotypes -- as brutish, treacherous and warlike. But comment frequently suggests that these people are out of sympathy with their militaristic overlords. Revolt is considered a real possibility in Germany and Italy. In the minds of most Americans, there appears to be a distinction between enemy Governments and the people

of enemy countries. When interviewed in July, three-quarters of the public said that the German Government, rather than the German people, was our chief enemy. Only three-fifths singled out the Japanese Government in the same way.

IN THE WAR WITH GERMANY, DO YOU FEEL THAT OUR CHIEF ENEMY IS THE GERMAN PEOPLE AS A WHOLE OR THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT?

IN THE WAR WITH JAPAN, DO YOU FEEL THAT OUR CHIEF ENEMY IS THE JAPANESE PEOPLE AS A WHOLE OR THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT?

	Germany	Japan
Government	74%	61%
People or both	23	36
No opinion	3	3

Nevertheless, the public was inclined to think of Germans and Japanese in conventionalized terms. The sample was asked to select from more than a score of adjectives attributing a variety of virtues and vices to the enemy peoples. The words most frequently chosen to describe the Germans were "warlike," "hard working" and "cruel;" for the Japanese, the words most commonly selected were "treacherous," "sly" and "cruel."

The distinction between enemy Governments and peoples was reflected in a widespread view that Germans are not firmly united behind their Fuehrer:

DO YOU THINK MOST OF THE RANK AND FILE SOLDIERS IN THE GERMAN ARMY ARE LOYAL TO HITLER? (July)

DO YOU BELIEVE MOST OF THE GERMAN GENERALS
ARE LOYAL TO HITLER? (July)

DO YOU THINK MOST PEOPLE IN GERMANY ARE
BEHIND HITLER IN THIS WAR? (July)

	Soldiers	Generals	People
Yes	61%	59%	53%
No	30	30	39
No opinion	9	11	8

THE WAY THINGS LOOK NOW, DO YOU THINK THERE
IS A GOOD CHANCE OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE
REVOLTING AGAINST HITLER IN THE NEXT
YEAR? (October)

Yes	37%
No	42
Depends	7
Don't know	14

Among the majority believing that the Ger-
man people are behind Hitler, the most com-
mon explanation offered in support of the
belief was that they are forced to be, are
afraid to be otherwise. Indeed, no more
than half of this group gave reasons which
indicated a belief that the support was soli-
dly based upon self-interest and convic-
tion.

Those convinced of German unity were drawn
disproportionately from the upper income
groups, the better educated (except in the
lower income class), older people, profes-
sional men, business executives and those
who regard Germany, rather than Japan, as
our prime enemy.

The bulk of the American public recognized that the

Axis is engaged in a war for the conquest of the world
and that its treatment of Americans, should we be de-
feated, would be extremely harsh:

HERE ARE SOME STATEMENTS TELLING WHICH PARTS
OF THE WORLD GERMANY AND JAPAN MIGHT TRY TO
RULE IF THEY WIN THE WAR. WHICH ONE COMES
CLOSEST TO YOUR OWN OPINION? (July)

(a)	Just their own countries and the surrounding territories	3%
(b)	The Germans will rule Europe and Africa and the Japan- ese will rule Asia, leav- ing North and South America to us	23
(c)	They will divide the whole world between them, includ- ing the United States	66
	Qualified answers	4
	Don't know	4

The prevailing view among Americans by September was
that rather severe punishment should be meted out to
the Germans after a United Nations victory is achieved:

DO YOU THINK THE TREATMENT OF THE GERMAN
PEOPLE IN THE PEACE TREATY AFTER THE LAST
WAR WAS TOO HARSH OR NOT HARSH ENOUGH?

Too harsh	21%
Just about right	7
Not harsh enough	56
Don't know	16

IF WE WIN THIS WAR, DO YOU THINK THE PEACE SHOULD BE HARDER ON THE GERMAN PEOPLE THAN THE ONE AFTER THE LAST WAR, OR NOT AS HARD?

Harder	65%
About the same	6
Not as hard	17
Don't know	12

But detailed questioning in July indicated that most of the public, while desiring ruthless punishment of Nazi leaders, were content to police the German people as a whole, keep them from rearming and deal with them fairly leniently. No more than two per cent of all those questioned demanded reparations of the defeated foe.

The strength, resourcefulness and ambition of the Axis do not appear to be fully appreciated by the American public. On the other hand, the war has not warped most Americans to hatred, brutality or vengefulness toward the enemy. They seem still prepared to deal with the German and Japanese peoples in a generous spirit as fellow-victims of Fascist aggression.

★

The United Nations constitute an association of independent peoples of equal dignity and importance. The United Nations are dedicated to a common cause. We share equally and with equal zeal the anguish and awful sacrifices of war. In the partnership of our common enterprise, we must share in a unified plan in which all of us must play our several parts, each of us being equally indispensable and dependent one on the other.

- Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 23, 1942

★

THE UNITED NATIONS

Americans have become aware that the war is a cooperative enterprise. They realized early in the year that the United States must have the help of its allies in order to achieve victory—a conviction which appears to have remained fairly constant.

DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES ALONE COULD BEAT JAPAN AND GERMANY, OR THAT WE WILL NEED THE SUPPORT OF OUR ALLIES IF WE ARE GOING TO WIN?

	May	July	November
Will need allies	78%	83%	79%
Can win alone	17	14	16
Don't know	5	3	5

The opinion that the United States could defeat the Axis unaided may have been expressed by some because of a desire to appear patriotic. It suggests overconfidence and was, in fact, associated with other highly optimistic opinions, such as that the war would be over within six months and that there is no doubt whatever of victory. The people holding these beliefs were drawn disproportionately from the lower educational and economic levels.

A minority of the American public had serious doubts about the reliability of our allies -- particularly the Russians:

DO YOU THINK ENGLAND (RUSSIA, CHINA) MIGHT
MAKE A SEPARATE PEACE WITH GERMANY WITHOUT
TALKING IT OVER WITH HER ALLIES? (May)

	England	Russia	China
Yes	10%	26%	7%
No	77	51	80
Don't know	13	23	13

Nevertheless, Americans entertained a high opinion of the quality of Russia's war effort. They have felt consistently, when asked to compare the wholeheartedness of the contributions made by each of the United Nations, that the Russians ranked well above our other allies. Indeed, after the Red army's heroic resistance at Stalingrad, but before the American offensive in Africa, Americans rated the Russian war effort above even our own:

CONSIDERING WHAT EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES
COULD DO, WHICH ONE DO YOU THINK IS TRYING
HARDEST TO WIN THE WAR -- ENGLAND, RUSSIA,
CHINA, OR THE UNITED STATES?

	May	July	November
England	8%	7%	5%
Russia	22	34	44
China	9	13	10
United States	40	33	28
Don't know	21	13	13

The dissatisfaction with England's war effort reflected in these comparative estimates was further attested by answers to another question asked at frequent intervals by the Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research: "Do you think the British are doing all they possibly can to win the war?" Opinion on this score fluctuated markedly in accordance with the fortunes of war. After the fall of Singapore, only 49 per cent of the public answered this question affirmatively. But in November, after the British Eighth Army had successfully routed Rommel in North Africa, confidence was expressed by 74 per cent.

The uncertainty respecting Russia as an ally was reflected in doubts as to that country's willingness to cooperate with the United States in the solution of post-war problems. American confidence on this score, however, has increased with the progress of the war. It has been consistently high in regard to Britain and China:

AFTER THE WAR IS OVER, DO YOU THINK RUSSIA
(ENGLAND, CHINA) CAN BE DEPENDED UPON TO
COOPERATE WITH US?

(Percentages answering "Yes")

	Russia	England	China
February	38%	76%	80%
May	45	77	83
July	43	68	85
August	51	72	86

In the latter part of November, the Bureau questioned a national sample regarding cooperation with Russia and Britain in somewhat different terms:

- (a) DO YOU THINK RUSSIA CAN BE DEPENDED UPON TO COOPERATE WITH US AFTER THE WAR?
- (b) DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR?
- (c) DO YOU THINK WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR?

	(a) Russia will	(b) We will	(c) We should
Yes	51%	78%	80%
No	24	7	8
Don't know	25	15	12

- (a) DO YOU THINK ENGLAND CAN BE DEPENDED UPON TO COOPERATE WITH US AFTER THE WAR?
- (b) DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH ENGLAND AFTER THE WAR?

(c) DO YOU THINK WE *SHOULD* CONTINUE TO
COOPERATE WITH ENGLAND AFTER THE WAR?

	(a) England will	(b) We will	(c) We should
Yes	76%	91%	89%
No	13	3	5
Don't know	11	6	6

The American public appears to appreciate the British and Russians, and to a lesser degree the Chinese, as important allies. Cooperation with them is regarded as essential for the prosecution of the war and desirable for the solution of post-war problems. But, in the minds of most Americans, the United Nations remains a concept, rather than a solid and enduring coalition.

★

We are fighting today for security, for progress and for peace, not only for ourselves, but for all men, not only for one generation but for all generations. We are fighting to cleanse the world of ancient evils, ancient ills.

- Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 6, 1942

★

THE POST WAR WORLD

Most Americans believe they have a clear awareness of why they are engaged in the present world war. But the definitions of national purpose which people offered showed little consistency and considerable fuzziness. They constituted, perhaps, only a warm and patriotic loyalty to familiar American symbols.

DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT THIS WAR IS ALL ABOUT -- THAT IS, WHAT WE ARE FIGHTING FOR? (July)

Yes	66%
No	30
No opinion	4

Men professed an understanding of the war more frequently than women. Superior educational and economic background were both closely related to this sense of awareness.

When people who answered this question affirmatively were asked to define America's war aims, more than half expressed them in positive terms -- generally of a vague and more or less idealistic nature, such as freedom, liberty, democracy or American ideals. Other definitions reflected a somewhat defensive view of the war -- that we are fighting to get rid of Nazism and Fascism or that we are battling for survival. A few said that our purpose is to preserve or enhance our economic and political power.

Even at the outset of America's participation in the war, only a minority of the public felt that victory should bring this country any territorial aggrandizement:

IF THE ALLIES WIN THE WAR, DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE SATISFIED TO GET BACK JUST THE TERRITORY WE HAD BEFORE (INCLUDING THE PHILIPPINES), OR DO YOU THINK WE OUGHT TO GET SOME MORE TERRITORY? (February)

Same	74%
More	21
Don't know	5

People who desired additional territory for the United States were rarely specific as to its location. They seemed to be thinking mainly in terms of military or naval bases. Islands in the Pacific were mentioned by a considerable number. Some suggested that this country should annex Canada. A few thought we ought to take over Japanese and German possessions, including even these enemy countries themselves.

The majority, however, concentrated their hopes for the future on intangibles. They responded overwhelmingly to the ideals expressed in the Four Freedoms:

WHEN THE WAR IS OVER, DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES SHOULD, OR SHOULD NOT, TAKE A FULL AND ACTIVE PART ALONG WITH OTHER NATIONS IN: (February)

	Should	Should not	Don't know
Maintaining a world police force to guarantee against future wars	86	8	6
Guaranteeing freedom of speech all over the world	82	11	7
Guaranteeing freedom of religion all over the world	87	9	4
Guaranteeing that all nations get a fair share of raw materials	83	9	8
Helping to secure better working and living conditions for people all over the world	87	9	4

More than two-thirds, 69 per cent, of the public were in favor of all of these activities.

Eighty-one per cent favored at least four of them.

Eighty-eight per cent favored at least three of them.

A blanket rejection of all five was expressed by only three per cent of all those interviewed.

The people who endorsed American collaboration to prevent future wars and to guarantee the Four Freedoms were drawn predominantly from among those who were confident of allied victory and who anticipated post-war cooperation from both Britain and Russia.

There was a direct relation between these beliefs and education. Men and women were nearly equal in their approval. Only a slight increase in acceptance of these ideas appeared with rising economic status. There were no important geographical differences throughout the country.

The growth in America of a faith in international collaboration has been abundantly registered in the nation's daily newspapers. A great majority of them have, for some time, argued that the hope for future peace must be founded upon collective security when the present war is ended. They have stressed consistently that America must "win the peace as well as the war." They have defined "winning the peace" as the establishment of a stable international order extending the basic freedoms to all peoples throughout the world.

Nearly half of the American public had come to the conclusion by midsummer that the United States erred after the last war by its failure to participate in efforts to establish collective security:

DO YOU THINK WE SHOULD HAVE JOINED THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS AFTER THE LAST WAR?

	July	August
Yes	46%	47%
No	23	28
Don't know	31	25

Although some people expressed opposition to the League of Nations as a matter of principle, more did so on the ground that the League had operated unsatisfactorily.

The educated, more than the uneducated, and the prosperous, more than the poor, thought that the United States should have joined the League after the last war.

An even larger percentage, nearly two-thirds of the whole public, agreed at that time that America ought to take part in some sort of international association when the present war is ended:

IN GENERAL, DO YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF
THE IDEA OF THE UNITED STATES JOINING AN
ORGANIZATION OF NATIONS AFTER THE WAR? (August)

Approve	63%
Disapprove	19
Don't know	18

Most of the people who answered this question affirmatively felt that the post-war association should be of a broad character:

(Asked of those who approved) DO YOU
THINK OTHER COUNTRIES BESIDES THE UNITED

STATES AND HER ALLIES SHOULD BELONG TO
THIS ORGANIZATION OF NATIONS? (August)

Yes	54%
No	7
Don't know	2

(If "Yes") SHOULD THE AXIS BELONG?

Yes	37%
No	14
Don't know	3

While education and economic status exercised little influence on the general notion that the United States should join an international organization after the war, they were significantly related to the belief that other nations should be included, and particularly to the idea that the Axis should be admitted. People who had completed high school or had gone to college were more prone than those with inferior education to reason that the post-war organization should be comprehensive.

There was a pronounced feeling among Americans, however, that the United States would be the dominant nation in international affairs after the war.

IF THE ALLIES WIN THE WAR, WHICH COUNTRY
DO YOU THINK WILL HAVE MOST TO SAY IN
WRITING THE PEACE TREATY?

	May	July
Russia	4	3
England	12	13
United States	61	68
Don't know	23	16

In May, the most common reason advanced in support of this belief was that America was doing the most to win the war. A number also reasoned that the United States would have the most to say in writing the peace treaty because we would have the greatest power and prestige. A few based their contention on the argument that this country stands for fair ideals and has a higher intellectual and educational level than the people of other lands.

Most people, indeed, look ahead to the war's end with a strong sense of America's responsibilities to the rest of the world. Rather striking generosity was manifested in answers to a question posed to a national sample during March by the Denver University National Opinion Research Center:

IF AFTER THE WAR PEOPLE IN SOME OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD ARE STARVING, DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HELP TO FEED THE PEOPLE IN THESE COUNTRIES?

Yes	80%
No	7
Depends	11
Don't know	2

But Americans face the economic future for themselves, as well as for the rest of the world, with a good deal of apprehension.

THE WAY THINGS LOOK NOW, DO YOU THINK THIS WAR WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A DEPRESSION? (October)

Yes	59%
No	29
Don't know	12

(If "Yes") DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE ABLE TO PREVENT SUCH A DEPRESSION?

Yes	26%
No	24
Don't know	9

This fear was reflected in answers given to two other questions asked by the Bureau in August:

IF WE WIN THE WAR, DO YOU THINK BUSINESS CONDITIONS IN THE FIVE YEARS RIGHT AFTER WILL BE *BETTER* OR *WORSE* THAN THEY WERE IN THE FIVE YEARS BEFORE THE WAR STARTED?

Better	48%
About the same	10
Worse	33
Don't know	9

HOW ABOUT UNEMPLOYMENT? DO YOU THINK WE WILL HAVE *MORE* UNEMPLOYMENT OR *LESS* IN THE FIVE YEARS AFTER THE WAR THAN WE HAD IN THE FIVE YEARS BEFORE THE WAR STARTED?

More	33%
About the same	11
Less	46
Don't know	10

The public in August also foresaw significant changes in our economic system in the post-war period:

RIGHT AFTER THE WAR, DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE *MORE* CONTROL OR *LESS* CONTROL OVER OUR WAY OF DOING BUSINESS THAN IT HAS NOW?

More	55%
Same	12
Less	17
Don't know	16

(If "More") DO YOU THINK THIS WILL BE TRUE
ONLY RIGHT AFTER THE WAR, OR DO YOU THINK
IT WILL CONTINUE FOR A LONG TIME?

Only right after	12%
Continue long time	38
Don't know	5

The view that the United States should join a comprehensive organization of nations after the war is part of a cluster of opinions. Those who hold this view tend to think also that Russia and England can be depended upon to cooperate with us after the war, that the Government exercises about the right measure of control over private enterprise and will exercise about the same amount in the post-war period, that business conditions will be better after the war than they were before it started, that people have not yet been asked to make enough sacrifices and that the United States should wage the war offensively. These sentiments reflect a hopeful, yet fairly realistic, approach to war issues.

But real interest and faith in a definite post-war society of nations demand more than generalized confidence in the future; they are related closely to solid understanding of the problems involved in the prosecution of the war. The people most aware of the nation's economic and military difficulties are the people most ready to understand and accept the real significance of international collaboration.

Most Americans have not yet formulated concrete goals for the future. They look ahead at once with misgivings and with hopes. Their misgivings leave them still

reluctant to accept the implications and responsibilities of full participation in a world society. But there appears to be nascent among them today a sense of their community with other peoples. This sense has not yet matured. It appears ready, however, to respond to leadership which will appeal to hopes, rather than to fears.

★

We cannot wage this war in a defensive spirit. As our power and our resources are fully mobilized, we shall carry the attack against the enemy -- we shall hit him and hit him again wherever and whenever we can reach him.

- Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 6, 1942

★

MILITARY AFFAIRS

Government spokesmen and American news media have, for the most part, represented the war as indivisible. They have hammered home its global aspects, emphasized the complexity and magnitude of the task to be accomplished.

Often, however, the press has magnified minor American successes, has fostered the notion that American men and machines have turned the tide. And a minority of the press, bitterly opposed to the Government's foreign policy, has urged a narrow view of the conflict, centering attention upon the Pacific area, discouraging widespread offensive action.

Many people tend to view the war, not in planetary terms, but as a series of episodes in which "the boys

from home" participate in action. Their appraisal of events is governed largely by the news from those sectors in which U. S. troops are involved.

Long before the launching of an American campaign in North Africa, the public overwhelmingly agreed with the President that the war must be waged offensively:

AS THINGS ARE NOW, DO YOU THINK WE ARE
DOING THE RIGHT THING IN SENDING OUR MEN
OVERSEAS TO FIGHT? (September)

Yes	87%
No	8
Don't know	5

In its appraisal of where our offensive effort should be concentrated, American opinion has shifted with changing events. In general, the people have tended to demand the strongest action against that member of the Axis which was most in the news:

WHICH ONE OF THESE DO YOU THINK THE UNITED
STATES OUGHT TO DO NOW IN THE WAR AGAINST
GERMANY AND JAPAN?

	Early Late				
	May	July	Sept.	Nov.	Nov.
Fight Japan with most of our forces and send just enough help to Europe to keep Hitler from making more gains	33%	21%	24%	32%	21%
Fight Germany with most of our forces and send just enough to the Pacific to keep the Japs from making more gains	22	40	32	23	30

(continued on following page)

(WHICH ONE OF THESE DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES OUGHT TO DO NOW IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY AND JAPAN?) (cont'd.)

	May	July	Sept.	Early Nov.	Late Nov.
Attack Germany and Japan with equal force	27%	23%	31%	32%	35%
Pull our forces close to home and use them to protect our own shores	7	8	7	6	5
Don't know	11	8	6	7	9

The American public expressed an extremely high measure of confidence in the fighting ability, equipment and leadership of its armed forces. When asked in September to compare them with those of other countries, most Americans rated them superior in nearly all respects:

WHICH OF THESE COUNTRIES WOULD YOU SAY HAS...

	U.S.	England	Russia	Japan	Germany
The Strongest Army	31%	1%	14%	2%	42%
The Strongest Air Force	51	20	1	2	13
The Strongest Navy	52	27	1	6	3
The Smartest Generals	58	2	5	1	19
Best Fighting Spirit	65	6	12	5	5
Best Equipment For Its Army	66	2	1	1	20

The high confidence in American armed forces seemed to be based more upon patriotism than realism. The less educated groups were much more prone than the well educated to rate U.S. strength above that of the enemy in every respect. For example,

72 per cent of the college graduates interviewed, as compared with

24 per cent of those who had not completed grammar school -- thought that Germany had the strongest army.

This comparative rating of military capacities gives added emphasis to other indications that Americans considered the Germans a more dangerous and formidable foe than the Japanese.

On the whole, the public appeared to be well satisfied with the way in which the Army treated its troops. It was generally believed that they received adequate training and that there was no serious discontent among the enlisted men.

DO YOU THINK THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS ARE GETTING ENOUGH TRAINING BEFORE THEY GO INTO BATTLE? (September)

Yes	67%
No	18
Don't know	15

68 per cent of those with friends or relatives in the armed forces, as compared with

58 per cent of those with no such connections with the military -- felt that American soldiers were getting enough training before going into battle.

HAVE YOU HEARD OF ANY CASES OF DISCONTENT
AMONG SOLDIERS IN THE ARMY CAMPS HERE IN
THE UNITED STATES? (September)

Yes	20%
No	80

(a) (If "Yes") DO YOU THINK THIS
DISCONTENT IS SERIOUS ENOUGH
TO HURT THE FIGHTING SPIRIT OF
OUR ARMY AS A WHOLE, OR DO YOU
THINK IT DOESN'T AMOUNT TO MUCH?

Serious enough to hurt	3%
Doesn't amount to much	15
Don't know	2

Despite this general confidence in the outlook of men
already enrolled in the Army, a good deal of discon-
tent and confusion developed over the operation of
the Selective Service system:

IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE, DO YOU FEEL THAT
ANY PARTICULAR GROUPS OF MEN HAVE BEEN DRAFTED
BEFORE THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN? (October)

Yes	36%
No	55
Don't know	9

DO YOU THINK MOST PEOPLE HAVE A CLEAR IDEA
OF WHEN THE VARIOUS GROUPS WILL BE DRAFTED,
OR DO YOU THINK THAT MOST PEOPLE ARE PRETTY
CONFUSED ABOUT THIS? (October)

Clear idea	30%
Confused	60
Don't know	10

Although there has been a high degree of
satisfaction with the principles of Selec-
tive Service, popular irritation developed

in late summer over the inconsistencies of
local draft boards and over contradictory
statements by federal, state and local Se-
lective Service officials. There were fre-
quent complaints that uncertainty about
their draft status made it difficult for
married men and for the 18 and 19-year old
group to obtain training or employment in
war industries.

Eagerness to carry the fighting to the enemy and pride
in the nation's armed services characterize a people
essentially united for vigorous prosecution of the
war. It does not appear, however, that Americans yet
appreciate in full the difficulties of the military
job ahead of them.

(12-7-42)



This Government will put its trust in the stamina of the American people, and will give the facts to the public as soon as two conditions have been fulfilled: First, that the information has been definitely and officially confirmed; and, second, that the release of the information at the time it is received will not prove valuable to the enemy directly or indirectly.

- Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 9, 1941



WAR INFORMATION

The Japanese bombs at Pearl Harbor were echoed by roars from the American press. Editors complained that the story of American losses at the Hawaiian base was not fully revealed by the Government. Rumors filtered through the country that our entire Pacific fleet had been destroyed.

As the war progressed, editorial criticism of the Government's information policy increased in volume and acerbity. Newspaper and radio commentators declared,

not only that the Government was withholding information beyond the requirements of national security, but also that it was "spoon feeding" the American public, shielding it from a knowledge of our losses and magnifying the importance of minor successes.

A substantial minority of the American public agreed with the critics that the Government has given the people inadequate information about military and naval events. But this feeling has apparently been determined in large part by the nature of the news from the fighting fronts. In early November, when the Solomons were seriously menaced and North Africa seemed securely in the hands of the Axis, discontent ran high. By the latter part of the month, a flood of good news from these sectors had made satisfaction soar.

DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT IS GIVING THE PUBLIC AS MUCH INFORMATION AS IT SHOULD ABOUT THE FIGHTING IN THIS WAR?

	Feb.	Mar.	July	Aug.	Early Nov.	Late Nov.
Yes	67%	69%	70%	71%	62%	75%
No	24	22	23	19	31	19
Don't know	9	9	7	10	7	6

Criticism respecting the adequacy of the Government's war news was markedly higher among people of better education than among those who had inferior schooling. Sectionally, people in the South were least inclined to be critical on this score; and

this was true even when educational differences were taken into account.

A portion of the public has assailed the quality, as well as the quantity, of Government news:

DO YOU THINK THE WAR NEWS THE GOVERNMENT DOES RELEASE IS ACCURATE, OR THAT IT MAKES THE SITUATION LOOK BETTER THAN IT REALLY IS, OR THAT IT MAKES IT LOOK WORSE THAN IT REALLY IS?

	August	Late November
Accurate	53%	54%
Better	26	33
Worse	4	4
Don't know	17	9

The answers to another question, asked earlier in the year, suggest, however, that people were by no means unaware of the need for military security:

IN GENERAL, DO YOU THINK THE CENSORSHIP OF NEWS IS TOO STRICT, NOT STRICT ENOUGH OR ABOUT RIGHT? (May)

Too strict	8%
Not strict enough	20
About right	60
Don't know	12

While all available data indicate that no more than a tiny minority of the public listens with any regularity to broadcasts from enemy sources, a majority of the people interviewed in May felt that they should be left free to do so if they chose:

DO YOU THINK PEOPLE OVER HERE OUGHT TO BE ALLOWED TO LISTEN TO SHORT-WAVE BROADCASTS DIRECT FROM GERMANY AND JAPAN?

Yes	57%
No	31
Don't know	12

Most of them were well aware, however, that the circulation of news from enemy broadcasts might prove a dangerous influence and felt that control of this circulation should be in governmental hands:

WHICH OF THESE COMES CLOSEST TO THE WAY YOU FEEL THE PRESS AND RADIO SHOULD HANDLE WAR NEWS PUT OUT BY THE GERMAN AND JAPANESE GOVERNMENTS?

- (a) They should not publish or broadcast it at all 20%
- (b) They should publish or broadcast, it only if they label it enemy propaganda 46
- (c) They should be allowed to publish or broadcast it any way they want to 21
- Don't know 13

(If a or b) WHO SHOULD SEE THAT THIS IS CARRIED OUT — THE NEWSPAPERS AND BROADCASTERS THEMSELVES, OR THE GOVERNMENT?

Newspapers and Broadcasters	10
Government	52
Don't know	4

The desire to have Axis news labeled as enemy propaganda was highest among those with most education and diminished as the amount of formal schooling decreased. On the other hand, the less-educated people were those

most strongly in favor of forbidding the broadcasting or publishing of Axis news at all, while the better-educated were less disposed to take so drastic a step.

While the public, for the most part, has faith in the news of the war which it receives through its Government, inadequacies in the release of information appear damaging to this faith. There is a ready understanding of the need for military security, but Americans insist that their Government deal with them as frankly and fully as possible.

★

There never has been -- there never can be -- successful compromise between good and evil. Only total victory can reward the champions of tolerance and decency and freedom and faith.

- Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 6, 1942

APPRAISAL OF THE WAR'S PROGRESS

The American public, considered as a whole, stands for unlimited prosecution of the war until total victory is achieved. A significant minority of this public, however, falls in varying degrees to support the common cause and to share in the national determination to overcome Fascism.

A small portion of the public has expressed a willingness to negotiate peace with the enemy -- leaving him in possession of his conquests.

IF THE UNITED STATES AND HER ALLIES HAD A CHANCE TO MAKE WORLD PEACE ON THE BASIS OF BOTH SIDES NOT GOING FURTHER, BUT LEAVING THINGS AS THEY ARE NOW, WOULD YOU FAVOR OR OPPOSE SUCH A PEACE? (August)

Favor	12%
Oppose	82
Don't know	6

A larger number of people, as many as 30 per cent of the whole population, expressed in the early spring a willingness to negotiate peace with German army leaders, if they were to take over the reins of Government from Adolf Hitler. One-half of the people taking this view professed a belief that the acceptance of such a peace would constitute a defeat for Hitler -- indicating either a total failure to grasp the realities of the situation or a concealed preference for an Axis triumph. A quarter of the group openly acknowledged that this sort of peace would amount to a Hitler victory.

The people who expressed this willingness to negotiate with the enemy were drawn disproportionately from among the underprivileged, uneducated and youthful portions of the public. They are people peculiarly susceptible to the discharge of their resentments in Fascist patterns, and responsive to demagogic appeals. They constitute the core of defeatism and isolationism in the United States today.

Most Americans, even in the dark days of mid-summer, were confident -- perhaps somewhat overconfident -- of victory over the Axis.

WHICH ONE OF THESE FOUR STATEMENTS COMES CLOSEST TO THE WAY YOU FEEL THE WAR WITH GERMANY AND JAPAN IS GOING? (August)

We've practically beaten them already 4%

(WHICH ONE OF THESE FOUR STATEMENTS COMES CLOSEST TO THE WAY YOU FEEL THE WAR WITH GERMANY AND JAPAN IS GOING?) (August) (cont'd)

It may take some time to beat them, but the way we're working now, we can't possibly lose	63%
Unless we work a lot harder, we won't beat them at all	28
It looks as if it's too late -- it would take a miracle to overcome the losses we've already had	1
Don't know	4

This confidence was reflected also in estimates regarding the outcome of the war. Not unnaturally, the anticipation of complete victory has mounted since the launching of the American offensive in North Africa and the naval victory over Japan around the Solomon Islands.

WHICH ONE OF THESE FOUR STATEMENTS COMES CLOSEST TO THE WAY YOU THINK THE WAR WILL END?

	Feb.	Apr.	July	Late Nov.
(a) There is no question but that the United States and her allies will win the war and be able to write the peace terms.	54%	60%	58%	73%
(b) We'll win the war all right, but the losers will be strong enough so we will have to make some concessions too.	30	28	28	19

(WHICH ONE OF THESE FOUR STATEMENTS COMES CLOSEST TO THE WAY YOU THINK THE WAR WILL END?) (cont'd)

	Feb.	Apr.	July	Late Nov.
(c) We won't be defeated, but neither will the Axis -- the war will end in a draw.	7%	3%	6%	3%
(d) I'm afraid the Axis powers have a pretty good chance to win the war.	4	2	3	0
Don't know	5	7	5	5

Defeatism appeared to be associated more with the view that the war would result in a stalemate than with the view that the Axis powers have a pretty good chance to win. The latter opinion was held, at least in part, by people with so strong a sense of urgency about the war that they were extremely pessimistic. But the belief that the war would be inconclusive was correlated closely with opposition to offensive action, distrust of our allies and unwillingness to engage in post-war international collaboration.

Perhaps the most sensitive barometer of public confidence lies in changing estimates as to the duration of the war. People have altered their opinions significantly in reaction to the shifting fortunes on the battlefronts. They have revealed marked fluctuations between optimism and pessimism -- a lack of stability which may have dangerous implications for a nation embarked upon a long and difficult struggle.

ABOUT HOW MUCH LONGER DO YOU THINK THE WAR WILL LAST?

	January	March	May
Less than a year	12%	8%	24%
13 mos.-2 yrs.	33	22	29
25 mos.-3 yrs.	22	20	15
37 mos.-5 yrs.	23	21	12
Over 5 yrs.	5	8	3
Don't know	5	21	17

	August	Early November	Late November
Less than a year	17%	33%	37%
13 mos.-2 yrs.	27	30	35
25 mos.-3 yrs.	17	15	13
37 mos.-5 yrs.	17	8	6
Over 5 yrs.	6	2	2
Don't know	16	12	7

The effect of events upon opinion was even more dramatically illustrated by reactions to the receipt of good news almost simultaneously from North Africa, the South Pacific and the Russian front:

JUDGING FROM THE WAY THINGS HAVE BEEN GOING IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS, WOULD YOU SAY THAT RIGHT NOW WE ARE WINNING THE WAR OR LOSING THE WAR?

	October	Late November
Winning the war	44%	74%
About even	31	18
Losing the war	15	3
Don't know	10	5

To millions of Americans, the North African campaign seemed the "turning point" of the war. Their optimism is now so high that they seem ill-prepared for reverses

which may still lie ahead. So sudden a shift of opinion reflects, perhaps, a dangerous instability. It can easily lead to a relaxation of effort, urgency and willingness to sacrifice on the home front.

Americans, considered as a people, believe, with the President, that the war must be waged until "total victory" is achieved. But, in the absence of any clear concept of victory or any concrete definition of war aims, they may mistake mere military success for their real goal. A negotiated peace, if it can be disguised as a defeat for the enemy, may become an alluring mirage. Only clear, strong leadership can forge the popular determination requisite to "total victory."

REPORT FROM THE NATION

In addition to its own field staff, the Bureau of Intelligence regularly employs the interviewing facilities of the Denver University National Opinion Research Center. Much of the material presented and interpreted in this report comes from this source.

Valuable data have been gathered also by the Program Surveys Division of the Department of Agriculture, and by the permanent field representatives of the Office of War Information.

Certain non-governmental research agencies have generously made their own findings in the field of public opinion available to the Bureau. Significant supplementary material has been contributed by the Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research, by the American Institute of Public Opinion and by the firm of Elmo Roper.