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OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

WASHINGTON

November 6, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of an INTELLIGENCE
REPORT on "Personal Identification With the War"
which was prepared for the Director of the Office of
War Information.

Sincerely yours,

R. Keith Kane

R. Keith Kane
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.



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OWI

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION WITH THE WAR

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OFFICE OF
WAR INFORMATION

BUREAU OF
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COPY No. 1

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The Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information uses a variety of procedures and techniques to obtain its data on the attitudes of people and on what is brought to their attention. These procedures and techniques have been found reliable after extensive experimentation over a period of years.

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THE REPORT IN BRIEF

Identification

The nation's full strength can be mobilized only if its citizens regard the war as their war. The extent to which they accept the war as their own may be measured by the degree of support they give to the war effort and the degree of concern they feel about the fighting.

Two-thirds of the people interviewed in a recent field study were judged to be vigorous supporters. Most of the rest gave the war some degree of support. Only three per cent were opposed to the national cause.

More than half of those interviewed were rated as being deeply concerned about the war. Only eight per cent appeared to be entirely unconcerned.

People who earn less than \$1800 a year and have less than a high school education are somewhat less likely to feel closely identified with the war effort than those who are more favorably situated. People whose contacts with others are relatively frequent were found to be more deeply identified than the comparatively isolated.

Among the mental attitudes which usually accompany a sense of identification four are conspicuous. Those who support the war and manifest anxiety about it tend to have definite convictions about the nature, course and objectives of the struggle. Frequently, they have concrete expectations about the post-war world, and feel confident that these can be achieved.

They are more likely than the relatively lukewarm supporters of the war to identify strongly with America's allies or to think in broad international terms. Finally, in many cases they have been stirred to real anger by the actions or attributes of the enemy.

Participation

As compared with the number of people who whole-heartedly support the war, relatively few feel that they are contributing importantly to winning it. War work is far more potent than anything else in arousing a feeling of participation.

People do not appear to be greatly interested in whether their participation in wartime programs is governed by voluntary or compulsory procedures. They ask two questions which cut across the voluntary versus compulsory controversy: Is any given program necessary? Is it so administered as to insure equality of sacrifice?

"Many individuals have made great sacrifices, but as a nation we are not yet more than ankle deep in the war." -- Office of War Information, August 7.

PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION WITH THE WAR

Total war calls for the total enlistment of the American people -- enlistment of their hearts and minds, as well as of their energies and skills.

The degree to which Americans recognize and accept the war as their war is an index of their united strength.

This sort of self-identification with the war clearly involves more than assent to America's part in it. It involves real conviction as to the value of the goals for which we are fighting. This conviction characteristically expresses itself in zealous personal efforts to promote victory and in profound concern about the fighting.

The intuitive judgments of even the best informed individuals do not furnish a reliable appraisal of the extent to which Americans give this kind of support to the war effort. In response to requests from officials of OWI and other agencies, the Bureau of Intelligence conducted a field investigation in September to secure objective evidence on this score.

A small but carefully selected cross section of the entire population was interviewed. On the basis of extended conversations, these people were given ratings as to their support of the war effort and the degree of

concern they felt about the war. These two attitudes were regarded as the most trustworthy indications of identification with the national cause.

SUPPORT

The extent to which people support the war varies widely. At one extreme are the all-out supporters. These people are firmly persuaded of the justice of our cause and believe that the enemy must be defeated at all costs. Their support is emotionalized; it stems from the heart as well as from the head. The attitude of this group is typified by the outburst of a worker in a war industry, who has since enlisted in the armed forces:

"My God, nobody seems to realize this is war and that we all got to do our part... Of 60 Marines sent out from this base only eight are still alive. And yet people around here go on doing things the same old way...

"What are we giving up? Nothing! And yet many people complain about the war and what it's costing them... The only 'sacrifice' worthy of discussion is the sacrifice of life, and few people at home will be called upon to make that sacrifice."

At the other extreme is a small group of individuals who are hostile to this war and doubt the wisdom of our being in it. Some of the people in this group are conscientious objectors. But there are also a number of unregenerate, anti-administration America-Firsters. The bitterness with which they speak is illustrated by the fulmination of a retail merchant, who cites The Chicago Tribune as a source of much of his information:

"The Government is moving to totalitarianism. The war is just a disguise... They are doing everything they can to make things go wrong so they can go into totalitarianism... I feel it is my duty as a good old American citizen of an old line of American citizens to speak the truth and tell everybody I can about them."

Even allowing for the fact that some respondents may have concealed or toned down such viewpoints as this, it appears certain that no more than a very small percentage of the population is strongly opposed to America's participation in the war. The bulk of the public is behind the war effort with more or less intensity, ranging between the two extremes.

CONCERN

People were also rated on the degree of concern they manifested about the war. As might be expected, most of those who were rated high on support of the war effort were also rated high on concern.

There were occasional exceptions. Some people who fully support the war have such complete confidence in the way the Government is running it that they display little anxiety. Typically they feel that Uncle Sam and they themselves are doing all they can and that there is no use worrying.

Among those who support the war there are also some who are too preoccupied with their personal problems to give it much thought. Typical is a young Michigan farmer. He is an all-out supporter of the war and is considering enlisting in the Navy. But at the moment he is too harassed with the job of running his farm in the face of shortages of labor and equipment to keep up with war developments.

There are also some people who do not fully support the war but who are so situated that they do feel deep anxiety about it. Some mothers whose sons may be called, some men whose businesses are affected by the war, belong in this group.

Except in such situations, there was a high correspondence between the rating on support and the rating on concern.

The ratings on these two basic attitudes are shown in the chart opposite. On the basis of them, the entire sample was arbitrarily divided into two groups of equal size -- the "more identified" and the "less identified." The two groups were then compared from a number of points of view.

ATTITUDES ASSOCIATED WITH IDENTIFICATION

It was found that people who feel identified with the war may usually be distinguished from those who do not by the following attitudes:

1. Definite convictions about the war
2. Hatred of the enemy, his leaders, or his ideology
3. International sympathies
4. Positive war purposes

No one of these attitudes furnishes an infallible clue to personal identification with the war. But each one is reasonably reliable. For example, seven respondents in ten of those who are "more identified" with the war manifest deep sympathy with America's allies and with people throughout the world. Only three in ten of those who are "less identified" express such sympathy.


1. Definite Convictions about the War

Those who are "more identified" tend to have definite convictions about the progress of the war and the effectiveness with which it is being waged. Within broad limits, it does not much matter what these convictions are. Some of the "more identified" people are optimistic, some pessimistic about


COMPONENTS OF IDENTIFICATION



Support



Concern



the way the war is going. Some are confident that America will attain its war aims; some are skeptical. Some approve the way the Government is running the war; some are critical. But, usually, the people whose hearts are in the war effort have clear-cut convictions one way or the other. In contrast, the "less identified" people frequently have no opinion, at any rate none that they feel prepared to defend strongly.

Apathy was judged to be the most usual cause of failure to express definite opinions. A few individuals may have been afraid of confiding in an interviewer or may have lacked the verbal ability to express themselves. But most of those who were non-committal simply lacked the information or the interest to assess war issues. These are the people who are most prone to remain outside the war effort.

As one might expect in view of this finding, the people closely identified usually find the war a natural and exciting topic of conversation. In contrast, those "less identified" ordinarily do not talk much about the war. The chief reason for this difference, it may be assumed, is that those who feel strongly about the war seek opportunities to express and debate their viewpoints. Conversely, discussion promotes a sense of identification with the war, probably by facilitating the formulation of opinion.

2. Hatred of the Enemy, his Leaders, or his Ideology

A second attitude characteristic of identification with the war effort is a deep feeling of anger at the enemy. This does not ordinarily take the form of a hard, steady hatred of the German or Japanese people; more often

it stems from outraged recoil at specific actions of the enemy, such as atrocities or the attack on Pearl Harbor. In some cases it takes the form of hatred of enemy leaders or of indignant rejection of the ideology of the "New Order." Six in ten of those who are "more identified" with the war effort have a strong feeling against the enemy; only four in ten of those who are "less identified" are similarly wrought up.

When people are specifically asked what they dislike about Germany and Japan, however, all but a very few express some degree of hostility. Important differences are emerging in the way in which Americans feel about their two major enemies. The Japanese people and leaders are lumped together as objects of hatred. In the case of Germany, on the other hand, anger is frequently directed against Nazi leaders, against the totalitarian form of government, and against Nazi doctrine. All the evil things about the German system tend to be personified in Hitler.

3. International Sympathies

There appears to be a definite relationship between identification with the war effort and breadth of view. As pointed out above, those who support the war are far more prone than those who do not to feel closely linked with the United Nations and with people throughout the world. Conversely, they are far less likely to think primarily in terms of the selfish interests of their own class or group, or to be preoccupied with the impact of events upon their families or themselves.

Among all the people interviewed, three in ten seemed to be thinking internationally — generally in vague, humanitarian terms. Only one in ten

expressed close, specific identification with our allies.

Three persons in ten were primarily concerned with what is to the immediate self-interest of the United States. This attitude was shared about equally by the "more" and "less" identified.

The remaining 30 per cent were chiefly concerned with the way the war affected their class or group, their families or their own personal fortunes. It is clear that the United Nations' concept has not yet become the organizing focus of Americans' thinking about the war.

4. Positive War Purposes

Close relationship exists between identification with the war and people's expectations about the post-war world. Understandably, those who foresee a better society emerging from victory are more prone to support the war than those who have no clearly defined hopes for the future.

At present the people who think that peace can best be secured in the future by American military domination of other nations appear to have more confidence in their plan, and therefore to be more firmly identified with the war effort than those who are thinking in terms of idealistic but still vague hopes for international cooperation.

It is the latter-group, however, which is most closely in accord with America's war aims as expressed in the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. Their identification with the struggle may be expected to strengthen as the idea of a post-war world based upon cooperation receives clearer formulation and as practicable plans are advanced for bringing it into being.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS

People who earn less than \$1,800 a year, have less than a high school education, and little opportunity for group life, are somewhat less likely to feel closely identified with the war effort than the more favorably situated. Some members of submerged minority groups may regard the war as an enterprise of the dominant element in the population and fail to see how its outcome affects them.

Those who have relatively frequent opportunities for taking part in group life are more closely identified with the war than those who are comparatively isolated. Men have a somewhat higher degree of identification than women; persons in larger communities a higher degree of identification than those in small towns and rural areas.


PARTICIPATION

Opportunities to participate in the war effort have obvious value for those people deeply concerned about the progress of the war and eager to find some outlet for their mobilized energies. A companion study conducted last summer by the Bureau of Intelligence revealed a close relationship between identification with the war and participation in home-front war activities. The people who recognized and accepted the global nature of the war and displayed an offensive spirit were most prone to buy war bonds, to undertake civilian defense work, and to cooperate with various conservation programs. This relationship unquestionably existed not only because belief begets action, but also because action begets belief.

Evidently, however, there is now a lack of satisfying opportunities for participation. The number of people who feel that they are contributing importantly to the war effort is far fewer than the number who wholeheartedly support the war. The chart below groups respondents in accordance with the contribution they feel they are making to the war effort.



SENSE OF PARTICIPATION



The war has brought marked changes into the lives of three-fourths of the population and, as might be expected, it is these people who are most prone to have some sense of participation in the struggle. In most cases, however, the changes have been insufficient to give people the feeling that they are making an important contribution.

A shift into war work, or some similar significant alteration in one's

life, is very likely to inspire this feeling. Bond buying is evidently no longer able to do so -- probably because it seems like a minimal contribution now that Americans are fighting and dying. In general, work appears to be far more potent than any other activity in arousing the feeling of participation. Thus the continuing conversion of the nation's economy to war production should automatically bring more people into the orbit of the war effort.

A small minority of respondents -- including some who now feel that they are contributing to the war effort as well as some who feel that they are not -- assert that they would welcome more opportunities for participation. These people, typically, are not self-starters. They want the government to tell them what to do.

Respondents were asked for suggestions as to what the Government might do to draw people more fully into the war effort. About three people in ten reacted, sometimes indignantly, with statements to the effect that people's hearts are already in the war or that the Government is already doing all it can. An equally large group had no suggestions.

The suggestions most frequently advanced were that there should be more programs requiring people to share alike and that steps should be taken to bring the war closer home to people; some people advanced the idea that "a few bombings might help." Perhaps eight per cent of the sample echoed the thought which has appeared in many newspapers that the Government "should set its own house in order." Another group mentioned that the Government should give the people more information -- including the bad news as well as the good.

COMPULSORY VS. VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION

An effort was made to discover whether people preferred to participate in the war effort through voluntary or compulsory procedures. But it was found that people think very little in these terms. Their approval of any given program is based primarily on two other considerations:

1. The feeling that it is necessary.
2. The feeling that it is so administered as to insure equality of sacrifice.

If a program passes these tests, it is not likely to be regarded as compulsory, even if compliance with its provisions is, in fact, mandatory. In connection with war programs, "compulsory" tends to lose its dictionary meaning and to denote a program which is considered unnecessary or unfair. A program is looked upon as compulsory only when people question the need for it, or when some individuals actually or apparently benefit from it more than others.

When, on the other hand, programs are regarded as necessary and well administered, their compulsory aspect may actually be welcomed as a means of insuring equality of sacrifice. Many people feel, too, that only compulsory methods insure a full and effective use of the nation's resources.

As previous studies have revealed, people are more prone to accept compulsion in connection with programs already in operation than in connection with proposed programs. But so far as both existing and proposed programs are concerned, a large majority believes that participation should be on a compulsory, rather than a voluntary, basis. Only two per cent of those interviewed rejected compulsion on ideological grounds.

Favorable experience with present compulsory programs disposes people to accept compulsion in connection with proposed programs. For example, those whose experience with sugar rationing has been relatively satisfactory are more inclined than those with reservations about it to favor the compulsory rationing of electricity.

Any investigation in advance of the inauguration of a particular program is likely to understate people's readiness to accept compulsory provisions. But people's response to any given program is fundamentally determined by their views on how necessary it is and how fairly it is administered.

It is those who are most responsive to voluntary appeals who are most strongly in favor of the use of compulsory procedures. The people who respond to voluntary appeals are, by and large, individuals who appreciate the urgency of the war and are not disposed to question the usefulness of any reasonable proposal for winning it. The views of this group were well expressed by a foreign-born but thoroughly Americanized worker:

"The Government should do everything, everything, to make anything go quicker and evenier for everybody. You lose too much time asking people, 'Please,' and 'If you don't mind.'"

"In peacetime, that's democracy. In wartime, its murder -- of the boys fighting, I mean. If the Government thinks it's necessary, order it done. The time for asking has passed."

CONCLUSIONS

Identification with the war effort is closely linked with a number of factors which may be significantly affected by Government informational policy.

1. There is a very close relationship, for example, between identification

and definite convictions about the war. The optimistic and pessimistic are both more identified with the war than the apathetic and the confused. Those who approve the Government's conduct of the war and those who criticize it are both more prone to feel that it is their war than those who have little interest in the way things are run.

Such facts as these underscore the importance of giving the people as much information as possible about the nature and progress of the war. They demonstrate again the desirability of releasing all news, bad as well as good, which security considerations do not make it imperative to withhold.

Because people need not only access to the facts but opportunities to formulate opinions about them, forums, town meetings and adult education have a high value in wartime. If, through discussion, people could develop a clearer understanding of just one subject, the kind of post-war world they want, and the way of achieving it, their sense of personal involvement would be greatly enhanced.

2. The findings also point to the value of sharpening emotional reactions to the combatants and the issues of the war. Men are aroused by sympathy for their allies and by anger at the hateful beliefs and practices of their enemies.

Continued efforts should be made to encourage regard for Russia, England, China and the other United Nations. Identification with the war effort may also be fostered by reminding Americans of such things as the treachery of Pearl Harbor and the brutality of Lidice.

3. People require more opportunities than they have been given thus far to become participants in the war effort. Such opportunities are important not simply because victory requires the strength and abilities of the entire population; they are also important because of the beneficial effect of participation upon those already aroused and those still apathetic.

People without outlets for their energies may remain outside the war effort and even develop strong feelings of frustration. There is a real danger that, instead of channelizing their energy into the common effort against the enemy, they may become embittered at the Government or at some element within the population.

4. The Government need not hesitate to employ compulsory methods whenever they are indicated. Speaking generally, the American people do not raise the question of voluntary versus compulsory participation. They ask: Is a given program necessary? Is it equitably administered?

A continuing task of Government informational policy must be to demonstrate the necessity and the equity of all programs in which citizens are asked to take part.

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WASHINGTON

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Sincerely yours,

R. Keith Kane

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EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

ELECTION

Editors turned aside from the war this week to discuss the congressional and gubernatorial elections. In volume of comment, these contests took precedence over all other topics. Much of the interest, however, seemed more formal than fervent.

With the exception of a few vehemently isolationist newspapers, both Republican and Democratic commentators refrained from discussing basic issues. For the most part, they confined their arguments to the merits of specific candidates, conventional criticism of the Administration and the need for a two-party system in a democracy. Great stress was placed on the importance of voting at a time when democratic liberties are in danger.

BATTLE FRONTS

Press and radio found cheer in the news of allied gains against Rommel in North Africa. All of those who interpreted the progress of the battle agreed that the British had won the first round. But they were exceedingly cautious in forecasting the final decision.

The offensive was represented as long-planned and well-equipped; a number of commentators stressed the point that the allies now possess numerical superiority on the ground and dominance of the air over North Africa. Evidently, however, their respect for Rommel is so great as to make them guarded in the expression of optimism. The Chicago Daily News, in a fairly typical comment, ventured the statement that "The African see-saw has been going a long time, but this may be the last act. There is every indication

that the United Nations are striking in sufficient force to make it so."

Behind such cautious observations, long-range hopes and speculations were occasionally expressed, generally in conditional clauses. If the African offensive should succeed, a number of commentators suggested, a second front against the Axis might be opened through an invasion of Italy.

The fighting in Russia was comparatively neglected by the news analysts. They rejoiced in the continued resistance of Stalingrad, but noted that the Red army has been unable to expel the invaders from the city and that Nazi gains continued steadily toward the Grozny oil fields.

Chief editorial concern centered, naturally, around the fighting in the Solomons. Uneasiness over developments in the South Pacific gave way at the turn of the week to sudden jubilation at news of the withdrawal of the Japanese fleet. The Philadelphia Record called this "the most significant American naval victory since Midway." But most comment warned that the Japanese would return and that the fate of the Solomons still hangs in the balance.

In one respect, all commentators felt better satisfied about the Pacific situation. They accepted the prompt announcement of our loss of an aircraft carrier as indicative of a change in Navy news policy and applauded Elmer Davis as primarily responsible for the improvement. The New York Post called it "the Navy's best stroke of propaganda to date. It means the Navy realizes at last that we don't need coddling." Like the Post, a good many newspapers felt that "the Navy should have named the carrier, too."

In assessing the development of events around the Solomons, a great many

commentators came to the conclusion that American difficulties there resulted from an absence of unified command. They agreed with the Omaha World Herald that, against the skillful Japanese, "America has pitted an Army and Navy ... often divided by jealousy, always divided in command."

A number of observers went beyond this general indictment, charging specifically that disunity in the South Pacific stemmed from political considerations responsible for denying overall authority to General MacArthur. The Atlanta Constitution, for example, said that "There has been little to excuse the machinations that have kept the greatest military leader of the United States from a role in the war which would give him scope to exercise his talent."

The newspapers most bitterly opposed to the Administration are once more taking up MacArthur's cause, twisting his denial of political aspirations into proof that he was politically persecuted. "The circumstances," declared the Chicago Tribune, "all suggest that political considerations had hamstrung our ablest military leader because his popularity and the faith he commanded among the American people were resented... If the strings have been loosened so that MacArthur's airmen can help to save the beleaguered garrison on Guadalcanal, it is at the price of a quitclaim on his future, which would have been in the hands of his fellow citizens in any event, and not in his own." The Hearst papers, along with others, are booming MacArthur for supreme military command of the entire American war effort.

SQUEEZE

It is no overstatement to say that American newspapers were displeased with

the executive action placing a \$25,000 limitation on individual salaries. The more temperate commentators agreed with the New York Times that "The new ruling represents a clear example of administrative action to circumvent the will of Congress." Generally, it was pointed out that the measure has little, if any, validity in controlling inflation or raising revenue. The less restrained critics fulminated about Communism and Sovietization of the United States.



DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

HOSTILITY TOWARD LABOR

Hostility toward industrial workers is growing throughout the nation, even among groups which have not until recently been unsympathetic to labor. Reports from OWI field offices to the Bureau of Intelligence indicate that anti-labor sentiment is rising, not only among farmers, business and professional people, but also among teachers, office employees, retail salespeople and other white collar workers.

Generally speaking, the wages of people in these groups have not kept pace with the rising cost of living. Naturally, they are envious of the apparent prosperity of war workers. When they read about workers demanding further wage increases, and justifying these demands by pointing out that prices have gone up, they see red. They are inclined to blame workers for the price rises already experienced. They are especially antagonistic toward the wage demands of workers who are already earning \$1 or \$1.25 an hour.

All strikes, or threats to strike, are now bitterly resented. Strikes in war plants are considered almost treasonable. But people are not in a

mood to make distinctions between what is and what is not an essential war industry. Strikes in any field provoke resentment against the strikers. In a labor dispute in Arizona, a number of big grocery concerns threatened to close rather than meet union demands. In effect, they threatened to strike. Nevertheless, public indignation was directed, not at them, but at the unions.

Irritation about strikes is by no means confined to the areas where they occur. In Oklahoma, Texas and Florida, where strikes are notably infrequent, people believe that strikes are common everywhere else. The facts about the low incidence of strikes are not generally known.

In the present climate of opinion the public may be particularly receptive to the charges of Pegler and other labor baiters about union "shake downs," racketeering and high initiation and membership fees. Many people feel that unions and labor leaders are getting rich out of the war effort.

A production-conscious public is also irked because it feels that labor is not exerting itself to the utmost. It reacts angrily to reports that workers are guilty of slow-downs, are unwilling to put in overtime, and are frequently absent from their jobs. It is largely unaware that slow-downs sometimes result from raw material shortages and managerial inefficiency.

Some of the antagonism felt toward labor spills over against the Administration. People who are in a mood to believe accusations made against unions and labor leaders wonder why the Administration permits such conditions to continue. There is widespread skepticism about the firmness

the Administration will display in cracking down on further wage increases. In some quarters the President is regarded as a captive of organized labor.

Workers are well aware of the feeling against them. Following a series of articles in a Seattle newspaper about alleged labor abuses at the shipyards, many workmen from the yards stopped wearing their badges and helmets on the street.

But workers do not feel conciliatory: they are inclined to return the hostility directed against them with interest. They believe that they are being deliberately gouged by landlords and storekeepers. As one individual put it: "Whenever the working man gets a five per cent increase in pay, they'll polish up all the old ways and invent a hundred new ways of getting it back."

Workers believe that they are entitled "for once" to earn good money. In most cases they are working long hours under intense pressure. In many war centers they are living under almost intolerable conditions. Under the circumstances, their own tempers are often short.

Whatever the public may think, workers and the labor press do not feel that they can relax and depend upon the Administration to defend their interests. Although they have great personal affection for the President, they do not feel that the Government agencies with which they now have most to do — the WPB, the Army, the Navy and the Manpower Commission — are on their side. They believe they are entitled to greater representation in these bodies. Because they have surrendered many of their basic rights, including the right to strike, they feel that it is necessary to be vigilant and aggressive.

Workers face a growing number of restrictions. They can no longer seek higher wages; indeed, there is mounting agitation for reducing wages through the abolition of the 40-hour week. Their right to seek better jobs or to move from place to place may be severely restricted, as it already has been in one or two industries.

With their opportunities for economic advancement curtailed, the satisfaction of workers will depend far more than it has in the past on working, living and community conditions. If, on top of the sacrifices they are making in connection with their jobs, they feel discontented with housing, transportation, health and recreational facilities, their spirit, productivity and willingness to accept continued controls are bound to be impaired. If, in addition, they believe themselves despised in their communities, they will feel like pariahs, rather than vital participants in a common enterprise.

The cleavage between workers and the general public seriously endangers the entire home-front war effort. The most vigorous efforts are indicated to remedy the group consciousness and antagonism which are developing.

The public needs to be informed — in positive, not defensive terms — about the patriotism of labor and the contribution it is making to the war effort. It is necessary, also, to give people a sympathetic understanding of the problems workers face and of the conditions under which they are living. Erroneous notions are prevalent about the extent to which the real standard of living of workers has improved.

A great deal can also be accomplished through local efforts to integrate workers more fully into the everyday life of their communities. There is a

particular need to erase the line of demarcation in war centers between newly-arrived war workers and the established residents. Sympathy between war workers and the general public is essential to national unity.

IGNORANCE OF PRICE CONTROL

A study conducted in the early part of August for OPA officials by Crossley, Incorporated, on behalf of the Bureau of Intelligence revealed extremely widespread ignorance of the nature and application of the Government's price control program. Interviewing in Indianapolis, Indiana, a city of 400,000 in which the cost of living has been rising somewhat faster than the average for American cities of comparable size, showed that nine out of ten people there believed that the Government should control prices. Only eight out of ten people, however, were aware that Government regulation of prices was in effect.

Ignorance that a price control program was in operation was greater among women than among men and considerably more prevalent among the lower income groups than among the well-to-do or those of average economic status. One out of three persons on the lowest rungs of the economic ladder did not know that there was any Government regulation of prices. And these are the people, obviously, to whom price control is of the greatest importance.

All of the people interviewed were asked, "What is a ceiling price?" They were shown four definitions of a ceiling price, among which a correct definition was included. Only 58 per cent of the whole sample selected the correct definition.

The 58 per cent who knew (or guessed) the correct definition of a price ceiling were then shown three statements, one of them true, respecting the way in which it operates. An additional eight per cent betrayed their ignorance on this test. Thus, only half the people interviewed in Indianapolis revealed any real knowledge of the nature of a ceiling price. Scarcely more than one-third of the lowest income groups possessed such knowledge. Women, who do most of the shopping for the ordinary family, were found to know less about ceiling prices than men.


Additional questioning revealed that many of the people who possessed this rudimentary knowledge about ceiling prices were not aware that these prices may vary in different stores. Only 27 per cent of the whole sample knew what a ceiling price is and how it applies to the different stores in which they trade. The lowest income groups almost wholly lacked this knowledge. Only 13 per cent of them were able to answer all of these questions correctly. Among women of all economic levels, only 23 per cent, as compared with 31 per cent of the men, passed all these tests.

All of the people who knew what a ceiling price was (58 per cent of the whole sample) were also asked if they thought that ceiling prices had been set on most of the things, all of the things or only a few of the things that can be bought today. Only 28 per cent understood that price control was applicable to most consumer goods.

These questions embrace the elementary facts about price control. No more than 14 per cent of the whole sample interviewed were able to answer all of them correctly. The following chart presents a cumulative index to

knowledge and ignorance about the price control program.

CUMULATIVE INDEX TO KNOWLEDGE AND IGNORANCE ABOUT PRICE CONTROL



It seems especially significant that information on this subject was rarest among the people who need it most — women and low-income families. Apparently, a great majority of the public is not buying intelligently — or even knowingly — within the price control program.

People do not learn the facts about price control as they ultimately learn the facts about rationing or most other Government programs — through experience and participation. Price control, unlike most other programs, has no educative effect in the process of its operations. And the bulk of the public apparently has not yet learned much about it from the press and radio.

A separate study, conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence in August on a nationwide basis, showed that fewer than one-third of the people then

expressed full satisfaction with the manner in which the price control program had operated to keep prices in line; half the public expressed either partial or outright dissatisfaction with the way the program had worked. Apparently, therefore, whether or not people have a clear understanding of this program, they pass judgment on it anyway. And this judgment is likely to affect their satisfaction with the Government's efforts respecting economic problems in general. It may even affect their confidence in the future ability of the Government to take adequate measures for the control of living costs.

CONFIDENCE IN PRICE CONTROL

More recent interviewing conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence indicates that the confidence of the American people in the Government's ability to keep the cost of living under control has waned rather markedly. At the end of June, six weeks after the President's seven-point anti-inflation program went into operation, about three-fourths of the public expressed a belief that it would serve effectively to curb prices in the future. In the early part of October, however, only two-thirds expressed such faith.

The Bureau posed the following question to representative cross sections of four occupational groups -- white collar workers, small business proprietors, labor and farmers: "Do you think the Government will actually be able to control prices?" The table on the following page shows the percentages in each group answering this question affirmatively in April, June and October.

	<u>April</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>October</u>
White collar workers	73%	78%	66%
Small business proprietors	71%	75%	64%
Labor	78%	86%	66%
Farmer	70%	73%	59%

Farmers have been consistently lower in confidence about the operation of price control than any of the other major occupational groups. Labor was, in the early stages of the program, the most optimistic, but its faith has now diminished so that it is about on the same level as that of white collar workers and small business proprietors.

This decrease in confidence respecting the Government's ability to control prices does not, in any sense, of course, measure the actual effectiveness with which price control is operating. It stems, perhaps, from the existing widespread ignorance of the program's operation. People unaware of its scope may have been misled into thinking that it was operating ineffectively because they observed that prices were rising on articles, such as food products, which were not until recently covered by OPA regulations.

Public confidence in the Government's ability on this score may not be essential to effective application of the price control program. The program does not require the cooperation of the average citizen. But lack of confidence on this score may lead to general public distrust of the Government's vigor and efficiency.

PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION WITH THE WAR

The nation's full strength can be mobilized only if its citizens regard the

war as their war. The extent to which they accept the war as their own may be measured by the degree of support they give to the war effort and the degree of concern they feel about the fighting.

Two-thirds of the people interviewed in a recent field study were judged to be vigorous supporters. Most of the rest gave the war some degree of support. Only three per cent were opposed to the national cause.

More than half of those interviewed were rated as being deeply concerned about the war. Only eight per cent appeared to be entirely unconcerned.

People who earn less than \$1800 a year and have less than a high school education are less likely to feel closely identified with the war effort than those who are more favorably situated. People whose contacts with others are relatively frequent were found to be more deeply identified than the comparatively isolated.

Among the mental attitudes which usually accompany a sense of identification, four are conspicuous. Those who support the war and manifest anxiety about it tend to have definite convictions about the nature, course and objectives of the struggle. Frequently, they have concrete expectations about the post-war world, and feel confident that these can be achieved.

They are more likely than the relatively lukewarm supporters of the war to identify strongly with America's allies or to think in broad international terms. Finally, in many cases they have been stirred to real anger by the actions or attributes of the enemy.

As compared with the number of people who whole-heartedly support the war,

relatively few feel that they are contributing importantly to winning it. War work is far more potent than anything else in arousing a feeling of participation.

People do not appear to be greatly interested in whether their participation in wartime programs is governed by voluntary or compulsory procedures. They ask two questions which cut across the voluntary versus compulsory controversy: Is any given program necessary? Is it so administered as to insure equality of sacrifice?

(These findings summarize a Special Report, "Personal Identification with the War," issued by the Bureau of Intelligence, October 28, and available to authorized individuals on request to the Bureau.)



ENEMY PROPAGANDA

THE JAPS AND NAVY DAY

Japanese propagandists made America's Navy Day the occasion for an all-out short-wave attack on the U.S. Navy.

Tokyo claims an overwhelming Japanese victory in the Solomon Islands battle. It uses these claims, Ghormley's removal, and U. S. admissions of sinkings to prove the weakness of the American fleet.

Japan utilizes this alleged weakness to attack America's military and political leadership. "Repeated failures" and growing popular dissatisfaction are cited as the reasons for Ghormley's removal. It is maintained that the United States admitted its losses in the Solomons battle only as the result of "popular pressure," and that important losses still remain undisclosed. President Roosevelt is charged with being responsible for the situation

and the only obstacle to peace with Japan. In its "Lights from the East" program, Tokyo says, "Thousands now are already injured or dead. Then comes a showdown with Roosevelt and an era of peace with Japan. Roosevelt's America has failed."

In keeping with this appeal to defeatists and isolationists, Japan borrows a trick from the Nazis and attempts to prove her impregnability. Not only is an offensive against Japan impossible, according to Tokyo, but Hawaii and the East Coast have been jeopardized by recent "American reverses" and communications with Australia and South America are already cut.

At the same time that Japan is attempting to persuade the United States and the rest of the world of her strength, however, monitoring of her domestic broadcasts reveals that she is warning her own people against over-confidence. Although recent battles are interpreted as victories, losses are admitted and the people are warned of coming U. S. attacks.

BERLIN AND ROME

Japan's European allies also waxed derisive and ironical over America's Navy Day. Perhaps because of a lack of suitable German victories to stress, the Nazis put a great deal of emphasis upon recent Japanese "successes" in their domestic broadcasts.

Probably because of the deep concern the German people feel about the Russian campaign, the Nazis devote far more attention to it in domestic propaganda than in broadcasts to North America. Increasing emphasis is put on the Caucasus offensive and decreasing attention given to Stalingrad.

Britain's offensive in Egypt is treated in a reserved manner by both Berlin and Rome. Although the official attitude is one of "calm confidence," admissions of British strength and advances have been made to both foreign and domestic audiences.

Such ambitious objectives are attributed to the offensive, however, that even if it makes considerable headway, it can still be treated by the Axis as a failure. According to Berlin, one of the purposes of the campaign is to pave the way for attacks on Italy. Significantly, Rome omits references to this objective in its domestic broadcasts.

WILLKIE'S SPEECH

U-6-42 The Axis, following its usual procedure with any important statement, exploited the Willkie speech in both domestic and short-wave broadcasts. Both Germany and Italy found it highly useful in their present efforts to persuade their people that America's production program is failing and that the United Nations are split by quarrels.

Axis propagandists also wrung ammunition from the speech for their unrelenting efforts to create discord among the United Nations. Willkie's pronouncements were made official by characterizing him as "Roosevelt's right-hand man." The Nazis then proceeded to tell England that the speech was the President's way of warning her that she may get less land-lease supplies in the future. According to Goebbels, the speech also revealed that the U. S. is attempting to supercede British authority in India. Lord Haw-Haw tried to show that, by demanding a second front, Willkie was snubbing Alexander's Egyptian offensive.

In broadcasts to the Near and Middle East, Rome quoted Willkie as saying that U. S. silence on the Indian problem had "alienated the Indians." The Nazis beamed judicious selections of the speech to South America. In slightly distorted form some of Willkie's statements were also fed back to America, to foment dissatisfaction with the Administration.

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OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION


WASHINGTON

November 13, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of INTELLIGENCE REPORT
49 which was prepared for the Director of the Office
of War Information.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the U. S.
The White House
Washington, D. C.



PSF
OWI

11-13-42

INTELLIGENCE REPORT 49

CONFIDENTIAL

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OFFICE OF
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BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE

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Such recommendations and suggestions as may appear in this report have not been cleared in advance with the Director of the Office of War Information and do not necessarily reflect his views or those of the Office of War Information. Recommendations and suggestions, if they do appear, are only submitted by individuals in the Bureau of Intelligence who have assembled the data and they are offered for the consideration of appropriate authorities.

The Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information uses a variety of procedures and techniques to obtain its data on the attitudes of people and on what is brought to their attention. These procedures and techniques have been found reliable after extensive experimentation over a period of years.

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The period covered by this report is the week of November 5 through November 11, except where otherwise specifically stated.



EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

CELEBRATION

Press and radio are counting their eggs, if not their chickens. Even the most restrained comments on the American landings in Africa convey a sense of triumph. All of the news interpreters agree that the tide of war has definitely turned.

Some trumpets had begun to flourish even at the beginning of the week over the British victory in Egypt, but in many, if not most, comments there was an underlying note of fear that Rommel would once more get away. The Boston Post, on November 6, for example, remarked that "There was hesitance on the part of the public yesterday to believe that the miracle had come to pass."

With Sunday's news, however, the miracle was almost unquestioningly believed to be consummated. Commentators, of course, warned their readers that the conquest of Africa could constitute no more than a beginning of the great United Nations offensive. They pointed out that a long road must be traveled before the sources of Axis power can be crushed. But they left no doubt that the offensive is at last fully under way and that the allies have their armored battalions on the highroad toward final victory.

It is commonly taken for granted that the conquest of North Africa will be a prelude to allied invasion of Europe somewhere along its Mediterranean coast. In general, this is accepted as a satisfactory, if not a superior, substitute for the long desired second front on Europe's Atlantic coastline.

Analysts emphasized the great advantages to be gained by control of the Mediterranean — shortening of supply lines, easing the strain on allied shipping, bases from which to blast the Italians by air, exposure of Hitler's soft southern flank. While there was general acknowledgment that this might please Russia less than an invasion from the West, there was also a prevailing belief that Hitler could counter the allied blow in Africa only by withdrawing troops and planes from his eastern front.

The commentators were lavish in their praise for the planning and execution of the attack. Many of them pointed out that it had required painstaking coordination of military, naval, aviation and diplomatic endeavors. Compliments were showered on American leadership and, above all, on the President himself. A number of commentators emphasized the United Nations character of the invasion by giving credit generously to the British for their share in it.

Secretary Hull's justification of the State Department's policy in regard to the Vichy Government was accepted by most commentators, though rather dubiously by a few. The prevailing feeling was one of delight that relations with Vichy have, at last, been severed; commentators seemed content to forget the old policy debate. They were particularly pleased by the adroitness and eloquence of the President's appeal to the French people and are hopeful of French cooperation.

General MacArthur's successful campaign against the Japanese in New Guinea was overshadowed by the events in Africa but served to bolster the general jubilation. There was rejoicing also over the repulse of the Japanese

on Guadalcanal. Nevertheless, there were numerous reminders, similar to that in the Des Moines Register that "though things look slightly less anxious in the Southwest Pacific just now, the Japs must not be considered to have given up the effort to drive us out of the Solomons." All in all, press and radio have written it down as a magnificent week for our side.

ELECTIONS

[11-13-1942]

Most editorial writers interpreted the election results as a rebuke to the Administration. The Detroit News called them "a protest against stumbling and fumbling." The Scripps-Howard papers said, "The people at the polls were protesting inefficient, ankle-deep conduct of the war." The Christian Science Monitor more temperately saw a reflection of "manifest public impatience with some of the muddling in the conduct of the war" and noted that "rebukes seemed directed as much toward Congress as the President."*

The great conservative majority of the press, unsympathetic to the whole domestic program of the New Deal, naturally rejoiced over the Republican gains and justified their rejoicing by calling it a return to the two-party system. They were, nevertheless, somewhat uneasy about the consequences of their victory. They insisted rather self-consciously that

* The Gallup Poll, at the very end of October, asked: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Roosevelt is handling his job as President today?" The following results, as yet unpublished, are reported with Dr. Gallup's permission:

Approve	70%
Disapprove	19
Don't know	11

Dr. Goebbels could get no comfort from this shift in congressional power and that it presaged only a more vigorous and efficient prosecution of the war.

That they are somewhat worried lest it mean something else is attested by an editorial in the New York Herald Tribune, which warned against any sudden overthrow of the Administration's social program. It cautioned against social and economic reforms while we are at war, declaring that "If the Republicans would fulfill their pledge to concentrate, as the loyal opposition, in speeding up the winning of the war, they will keep this admonition in mind." The Providence Journal said: "As long as the war lasts, the minority members would be well advised to fight Roosevelt less and Hitler more."

ARMISTICE DAY, 1942

The prevailing emphasis in Armistice Day editorials was on the need for winning the peace, as well as the war, by the establishment of an international community. A number of commentators placed stress on the importance of keeping America armed and prepared for future conflict in the post-war world. But, for the most part, they placed their reliance for the future on international collaboration and were hopeful that, through it, some happier organization and integration of the world could be achieved.

In contrast, that portion of the press which has been consistently "isolationist" saw little hope ahead. The Washington Times-Herald and New York Daily News, for example, expressed the conviction that "War is

as natural to human life as is peace" and that "This is not going to be the last big war." They have nothing to suggest for the preservation of peace save reliance on the weapons of war.



POPULAR REACTIONS

SHACKLING

Despite considerable press and radio excitement over the issue, the American public seemed little stirred about the controversy which raged for a time over the chaining of British and German prisoners. Interviewing conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence with a small sample on November 9 indicated that half the people in this country were unaware that the Germans had put British prisoners in irons. Three-quarters of the public did not know that the British had retaliated by shackling German prisoners in Canada.

The Bureau asked the following question: "From what you have read or heard, has Germany put any war prisoners in chains — that is, shackled them during the war?"

48%	said "Yes"
24%	said "No"
28%	didn't know

In response to the same question about England:

24%	said "Yes"
45%	said "No"
31%	didn't know

Those who knew about the shackling of prisoners were much more prone to

condone it on England's part than on Germany's. The Bureau asked, in regard to each, "Do you think she was justified?" The 48 per cent who knew that the Germans had put British prisoners in irons were split up as follows:

Justified	3%
Unjustified	43%
Don't know	2%

The 24 per cent who had knowledge of the British reprisal divided:

Justified	13%
Unjustified	8%
Don't know	3%

INCOME REGULATION

Most Americans are in agreement that wages and salaries should be limited in some way for the duration of the war. But there is considerable disagreement among them as to the kind of limitation that ought to be enforced.


Early in October, on the eve of the sweeping controls instituted under Economic Director Byrnes, the Bureau of Intelligence asked a national sample: "Do you think there should be any limit on how high wages and salaries should go during the war?" An overwhelming majority of the population — 85 per cent — answered "Yes."

But only a minority was thinking in terms of rigid wage freezing at present levels. The Bureau asked all those who favored wage limitation, "Do you think all wages and salaries should be kept where they are now, or do you think some should be allowed to go higher?"

22% wanted wages and salaries kept where they are now
 56% would allow some wages and salaries to go higher
 7% did not know at which level wages and salaries should be kept


As might be expected, persons whose income came from wages and salaries — whether they were white collar, manual or farm workers — were most inclined toward a form of stabilization which would allow some wages to go higher. As the following chart indicates, most of those in favor of freezing salaries at present levels were business and farm owners; but even in these categories, less than a third favored such drastic curbs.

KINDS OF WAGE LIMITATION FAVORED



People in all occupational groups were considerably more willing to have their own earnings frozen at current levels than to advocate a general freezing of wages and salaries. The Bureau asked: "Would you be willing to have your own income fixed where it is now as long as the war lasts, or do you think it should be allowed to go a little higher?" The first alternative was chosen by 41 per cent of the sample — nearly twice the number of persons who favored general wage freezing. An additional 15 per cent said, "It depends"; the factor which made most of them uncertain was a fear of increased living costs.

WILLINGNESS TO HAVE OWN INCOME FIXED



Attitudes toward income limitation might be expected to be related to economic level. But more important than this is the comparison of present income with previous income. The more money people were making in comparison with previous incomes, the more willing they were to accept their present incomes for the duration of the war:

46% of those who had more money coming in than before the war,

42% of those who had the same income as formerly, and

34% of those who were making less money -- were willing to have their incomes fixed at present levels for as long as the war lasts.

There is evidence, also, that people recognize the need to limit income other than wages or salaries. Eighty-five per cent favored profit regulations; 79 per cent believed that farm prices should be limited. Such direct forms of limitation were more popular than the tightening of indirect forms, as indicated by the fact that 44 per cent of the total population favored higher taxes for next year and 49 per cent believed that there should be compulsory bond buying.

These findings point to the need for qualifying the oversimplified generalizations which have appeared in some published polling results to the effect that the country is overwhelmingly in favor of wage fixing. The term "wage fixing" plainly has a wide range of meaning. Most of those who approve it do not think of it in terms of wage-freezing at current levels.

"DRAG"

A substantial minority of the American public believes that Army and Navy commissions are frequently awarded on the basis of "pull" rather than merit. As reported in Intelligence Report #44, as many as 23 per cent of a sample interviewed in September thought that a man needs inside influence to become an officer in the Army.

October reports of OWI field representatives indicate that this belief is still widespread. It is tending to diminish as a result of corrective measures taken by the War and Navy Departments, but many people still say that a man's chances of getting a commission depend on which side of the tracks he lives on.

The people who voice these complaints tend to look down on men who receive commissions upon enlistment. They distinguish sharply between the officers who have been awarded what they call "cellophane commissions" and those who have earned their bars through the Officer Candidate Schools.

Some people also grumble that the average citizen is handicapped in getting a commission by lack of information. They claim that it is impossible for a man to find out how to apply for a commission unless he has personal contact with some interested Army or Navy official. There is also some belief that too many commissions are being granted.

Such notions impair confidence in the armed forces. Continued informational efforts are indicated to familiarize the public both with the procedures for seeking commissions and with the standards applied in awarding them.

WOMEN IN UNIFORM

Reports from OWI field offices indicate that the human interest treatment given the WAACS and the WAVES has seriously back-fired. The emphasis on pulchritude and panties has given people an idea that these women's auxiliary corps aren't doing anything very important. Many people have gotten the impression that they are playthings for the Junior League set. The belief is widespread that it is the wealthy society girls, able to buy the nice uniforms, who get in and dominate both organizations.

Except in a few places where woman suffrage is not completely accepted, it is generally agreed that there are many situations in the Army and the Navy where capable women could replace able-bodied men, thus releasing them for active duty. But it is not recognized that the WAACS and the WAVES are being trained to "take over" in this way. They are associated, rather, with frills. Many service men, according to the field reporters, resent their presence in the armed forces.

Informational efforts seem needed to acquaint people with the fact that both organizations select their personnel democratically on the basis of competence and character and to promote awareness of the essential nature of their functions. Emphasis on the frilly side of their activities might well be discouraged.

RATING ON EFFORT

From time to time the Bureau of Intelligence has asked a question designed to obtain popular appraisals as to the relative war efforts of each of the United Nations: "Considering what each of these countries could do,

which one do you think is trying hardest to win the war?" The results obviously are on a comparative basis and afford little indication of absolute estimates respecting the contributions of our allies. They reveal, however, a significant trend toward recognition of the supreme effort being made by the Soviet Union.

As the following table shows, Americans, during the early spring, were patriotically inclined to give top ranking to their own country. Later, as the Russians took the full brunt of the Nazi assault on the eastern front, appreciation of the Red army's heroic resistance exceeded even that given to our own forces in the Pacific. By the first week in November when the question was most recently posed, the Russian war effort clearly rated first place in the minds of the American public.

"CONSIDERING WHAT EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES COULD DO, WHICH ONE
DO YOU THINK IS TRYING HARDEST TO WIN THE WAR?"

	<u>May</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>November</u>
England	8%	7%	6%
Russia	22	34	44
China	9	13	9
U.S.A.	40	33	28
Don't know	21	13	13

Such estimates are, of course, largely conditioned by events. No doubt, appreciation of the British and American efforts will be heightened by the North African campaign. These opinions suggest, however, that Americans have a growing awareness of the all-out nature of Russia's contribution to the United Nations cause. The awareness may have implications for future Soviet-American relations.



ENEMY PROPAGANDA

AMERICAN OFFENSIVE

Enemy radios reacted to America's invasion of North Africa with self-righteous indignation. They protested that the Axis never dreamt of occupying France's African colonies and charged America with "international immorality." On the night of November 9, Radio Berlin employed a battery of its ace commentators to persuade the American people that the African offensive faced insurmountable difficulties and to prove that it represented a breakdown of American moral principles. Tokyo sadly informed the world that all neutral countries now face the danger of invasion.

Enemy radios represented Secretary Hull's explanation of his Vichy policy as a "significant admission ... that the principal activity of American consular and diplomatic position in France was that of espionage and the gathering of information, as well as anti-German propaganda ..."

Before Hitler marched into occupied France, Axis propagandists asserted that the French were united and ready to defend themselves against "aggression." The effectiveness of French resistance in Africa was emphasized, frequently with material from French sources.

French radios, under Nazi domination, presented America's African stroke as a betrayal on the part of an ungrateful former friend. They insisted that the French would defend themselves and emphasized the bravery of the colonies' initial resistance. Radio Paris announced Doriot's demands for a declaration of war against the United Nations.

ROMMEL'S RETREAT

Different versions of the British Eighth Army's decisive victory over Rommel were beamed to the various audiences of Axis radios.

In propaganda to the United Nations and neutral countries, Radio Berlin attempted to exploit Rommel's high reputation as a military strategist. The Marshal was pictured as being in complete mastery of the situation, withdrawing to prepared positions while inflicting heavy losses on the British. Reminders of his previous comebacks and British warnings against over-optimism formed the basis for arguments that the outcome of the campaign was still in doubt. The Germans, it was insisted, would ultimately be victorious.

Axis satellite radios were used, as in the past, to bolster confidence in Axis strength, without endangering the reputation of official German military information. They gave occupied Europe a highly optimistic interpretation of the events in North Africa. Radio Rome, however, described the situation in cautious terms.

Germany told its own people very little about the North African campaign. Vague reports were released of violent fighting, heavy British losses, and a "strategic withdrawal" by Marshal Rommel. Finally, on November 9, the Germans were told guardedly of British successes in a talk by a military commentator. But emphasis was placed on Rommel's ability as a commander and the improvement in his supply situation as a result of the westward movement of his armies.

The Italian people were given a much more accurate account of the North African military situation. The significance of the American invasion and

the continued advance of the British Eighth Army was not minimised. Italy finally conceded in its domestic broadcasts that the ultimate aim of the United Nations' offensive was to secure bases for attacks on Southern Europe. The turn of affairs was described as admittedly grave for Italy. The people were exhorted to remain calm and to "fight again and resist, as in the past."

UNITED STATES ELECTIONS

Axis propagandists agreed that the election results revealed widespread dissatisfaction in the United States. This dissatisfaction was variously attributed to the "bungling" of the war effort by the Administration, an uninterrupted series of "military defeats," resentment over "violation of peace pledges" and "Roosevelt's insatiable demands for personal power." Each country stressed the particular types of dissatisfaction which suited its own propaganda objectives.

There were a few references to the victories of isolationists. But Axis transmitters definitely discouraged the expectation of any change in America's attitude toward the war as a result of the elections.

Axis propagandists disagreed as to the effectiveness of the opposition from the new Congress. Berlin predicted that the President's power will be unaffected, repeating its argument that he is going totalitarian. Vichy and, to a lesser extent, Tokyo contended that New Deal legislation will be imperiled.

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OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION


WASHINGTON

November 18, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of an INTELLIGENCE
REPORT on "Voluntary Participation in the War Effort"
which was prepared for the Director of the Office of
War Information.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.



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11-18-42

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR EFFORT

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OFFICE OF
WAR INFORMATION

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THE REPORT IN BRIEF

Civilian mobilization is one of the imperatives of total war. It is valuable not simply because of what it accomplishes, but equally because it tends to strengthen participants' support of the national cause.

Participation

Less than a fourth of a small sample of people interviewed by the Bureau of Intelligence in late September were rated as regular and active participants in volunteer war work. Much of the work mentioned by the remainder requires little time or effort and is being done on an individual, rather than a group, basis.

Participation in the protective aspects of OCD's program is relatively satisfactory. In contrast, few have thus far been enlisted in the recently organized Service Corps, which is concerned with such things as nutrition, consumer education, recreation, child care and salvage.

Active participants in civilian defense work are disproportionately drawn from the ranks of those who strongly support the war and are well situated socially and economically. But by no means all of these people have been recruited into the program. As many as a fourth of those interviewed were interested in participating actively and well able to do so, and yet were doing little or nothing.

Acceptance

There is relatively little disapproval of the civilian defense operation. The prevailing attitude, however, is one of passive acceptance rather than of strong and informed approval. Most people have no more than a sketchy knowledge of the civilian defense program. Comparatively few realize that it embraces service, as well as protective, activities.

Only a small minority criticized the program. "Upper crust" control and political meddling were among the most frequent causes of complaint. Programs also aroused criticism when they either were, or appeared to be, unsuitable to the needs of a particular community. Occasional criticisms were also voiced about the administration of civilian defense work.

"Civilian Defense to the average person has a connotation of defense against military attack on the civilian population. Actually, what the people should be made to realize is that it is Civilian Mobilization for aggressive action.

"It is a civilian attack on the problems of malnutrition...community health, family security, recreation... The most important part of Civilian Defense -- the Service Corps -- is actually not a defensive organization. It is attacking... problems on the home front."

-- Hayse Tucker
OCD Director, Alabama

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR EFFORT

Civilian mobilization is one of the imperatives of total war. Total war means all-out war. It means attacks on civilians as well as on soldiers. It means psychological and economic, as well as military, offensives. A nation cannot hope for victory in such a struggle unless all its people brace themselves against the attacks of the enemy and direct their energies toward the attainment of victory.

Civilian mobilization is valuable, furthermore, not simply because of what it accomplishes but, equally, because of its effect on those who take part in it. A number of studies conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence have shown that participation is highly valuable in strengthening people's identification with the national cause. While it is true that those who vigorously support the war seek opportunities to participate, it is equally

true that participation tends to arouse, sustain and heighten enthusiasm. Informational efforts designed to increase either identification or participation will serve also to increase the other.

The American people have already been asked to become participants in the war effort in numerous ways. Their Government has requested them to buy bonds, to conserve many materials, to collect scrap. It has been necessary to develop a huge organization against the eventuality of air attack. In cities, towns and rural areas innumerable war-born problems have arisen which demand prompt and effective community action.

To discover the ways in which the civilian population has recognized and responded to these challenges, the Bureau of Intelligence conducted an exploratory study in late September. Interviews were conducted with a small national sample selected as carefully as possible to be representative. A number of active workers in OCD, USO and Red Cross programs were among those who were questioned. The data obtained were supplemented by interviewer reports on respondents and on conditions in the areas studied. In addition, OWI field offices in 27 states submitted material on the participation of civilians in volunteer war activities.

Since the study was exploratory in character, its findings must be accepted cautiously. Apart from the smallness of the sample and the lack of field reports from some states, the problem of participation is a difficult one with which to deal. The word itself has not exact and universal meaning. It was found, for example, that many respondents did not look upon their contributions to war and relief organizations as a form of participation. Another recent Bureau of Intelligence study revealed that bond buying also

fails in many cases to give people a sense of contributing importantly to the war effort.

The variations in conditions among the states, and in different communities within a single state, also make it difficult to generalize about participation with complete accuracy. Despite these difficulties, it is believed that the main findings of the study are valid and significant.

The emphasis of the study was on voluntary participation in the war effort, particularly through organized and systematic activities. No attention was paid to participation through one's job. The value of work in fostering identification with the war effort has been amply demonstrated in previous Bureau of Intelligence investigations. The aim of this study was to secure information on other forms of participation.

EXTENT OF PARTICIPATION

"In spite of the enthusiasm and devotion of a limited group within the community, the majority of people aren't doing anything," says a Philadelphia Air Raid Warden. And from the other side of the continent, in suburban San Francisco, an interviewer describes the situation in similar fashion: "I am impressed with the small number of people who are doing anything."

The people interviewed were rated on the extent of their participation in the war effort through other means than their work. The amount of time an individual gave to volunteer activities, the degree of responsibility he assumed, and the regularity with which he participated were all considered. More than half of the people in the sample were rated as participating.

little or not at all. An additional fourth of the group participated only moderately or sporadically. These ratings may be modified by the effects of the OCD "block plan" since September.

Most of the war work mentioned requires little time or effort. And much of it is being done on an individual, rather than a group, basis. The commonest ways of participating in the war effort are through contributing money, buying bonds and saving scrap.

OWI field representatives report that participation in the protective aspects of OCD's work -- blackout preparations, decontamination, rescue, evacuation, demolition, repair, first aid, auxiliary firemen and police -- is relatively satisfactory. Participation is light, in contrast, in OCD service programs, which are concerned with such things as nutrition, consumer education, recreation, child care and salvage. Judged by the degree of interest shown in both protective and non-protective activities, participation was regarded as good in only six of the 27 states from which reports were received.

The failure of many people to engage in volunteer work is not peculiar to wartime. In peacetime, too, some Americans tend to join a number of organizations and to participate actively in community life, while others do not engage in any group activity. But in the kind of war in which America is involved it is urgently necessary to utilize the energies of the entire population.

In the fever-pitch excitement which attended the outbreak of war that goal seemed easy to attain. Right after Pearl Harbor volunteers filled the headquarters of civilian mobilization agencies. There were not jobs enough for everyone who wanted to do something.

While it was not to be expected that recruiting would continue at the same pace — if only because there was a group of diminishing size to draw upon as more and more people became enrolled — it is clear that a dangerous diminution of interest has occurred. It is not confined to those who have never been enlisted for war work. Many of the early volunteers have dropped out of activities.

In some places civilian defense leaders report difficulty in finding enough workers for projected programs. As one person describes the situation: "The glamour has worn off for many who got into civilian defense work at first because of the excitement and because they thought it was the thing to do."

FACTORS INFLUENCING PARTICIPATION

To ascertain the factors which accompany or account for active participation in war work, respondents were analyzed from a number of points of view. Some of the most important factors are shown in the chart on the following page.

Support of the war, as might be expected, was one of the most important determinants of participation. As the chart shows, those who are rated as high in their participation in civilian mobilization are disproportionately drawn from the enthusiastic supporters of the war effort.

Deep intellectual interest in the progress of the war was also found to be closely related to participation. On the other hand, a tendency to fret and worry about the war did not seem to affect participation significantly.

The expectation of bombing or invasion appears to exert some influence.

Another recent Bureau of Intelligence survey indicates that there has been a pronounced decline in the expectation of air raids in recent months. Only a

SOME FACTORS RELATED TO PARTICIPATION

SUPPORT OF THE WAR



INTEREST IN THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR



EXPECTATION OF BOMBING OR INVASION




CAR OWNERSHIP



PROPERTY OWNERSHIP



EDUCATION



DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION

High
 Moderate
 Little or none
 Not ascertainable

minority of Americans now expect raids on either the Atlantic or the Pacific coast. This may make it more difficult for the OCD to recruit additional workers for its protective activities from now on.

In extreme cases the belief that America is secure against air attack is likely to make people skeptical about the value of all protective activities.

A Philadelphia housewife angrily declared:

"I think this: all these air raids is all a farce, because I don't think they'll ever have the strength to come over here and to do any real damage. I mean damage on a large scale. There might be a token bombing of New York, but it would be a suicide squad that would do it. And I don't think they could come in sufficient force to do any real damage."

Another woman respondent, in San Mateo, California, exhibited a point of view far more likely to encourage participation:

"Yes, they will try to bomb us, especially if they begin to lose, get desperate, and want to save face. We are pitifully lacking in coast defenses; they might invade. If they could, they would."

EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC STATUS

Economic status, as measured by property ownership, social position, as measured by membership in organizations, and education all strongly affect participation in war work. The active participants are disproportionately drawn from the upper socio-economic level.

The chart shows the close relationship between property ownership and participation. Home owners are more likely to be active than those who do not own their homes; car owners are more active than non-owners. As is perhaps natural, property owners are particularly prone to display a serious interest in protective activities.

The chart also shows the close relationship between education and participation. Those with a high school education are more likely to be active in war work than those who have not gone beyond grammar school; college graduates show a still greater sense of responsibility.

While education and economic status each exercises some influence on participation, independently of each other, there is a great deal of over-lapping; the highest participation comes from those who are well educated and well situated economically.

These same people are also most active in already existing organizations. It was found that 90 per cent of the most active participants in voluntary war work are members of at least one organized group.

Not only are the less active and affluent people often neglected in efforts to recruit workers for civilian defense, but in one way or another they be given to understand that they are not wanted. An interviewer reported from Oklahoma:

"Business men are the leaders in most civilian efforts. It is doubtful if the lower half of the population feel as free to participate as they should. Even in the Red Cross it is the women in the upper income groups who participate most."

Leadership and control of civilian defense work is particularly likely to fall into the hands of people who are favorably situated socially and economically. The situation in Knoxville, Iowa, is typical:

"The leadership of the civilian mobilization activities is the same as the leadership in all other civic enterprises. The Chamber of Commerce, the Legion, the business men, the Women's Club... In a town like Knoxville leadership in community activities always goes hand in hand with socio-economic position. It is one of the signs one has succeeded. He can take time off from the grind of making ends meet to give to civic enterprise."

OTHER FACTORS

As one might expect, length of residence in a given community also affects participation. Established residents are far more likely to participate than newcomers. This fact has dangerous implications at the present time because of unprecedented internal migration. A community whose population has swollen rapidly may experience extreme difficulty in organizing adequate civilian defense programs. In a sense, manpower mobilization is impeding civilian mobilization.

Proportionately, people of foreign and native origin are about equally represented among the participants in civilian war work. There is a pronounced difference in extent of participation, however, between whites and Negroes.

In part Negroes rank low in participation because they are less closely identified than whites with the war effort; their enthusiasm has been dampened by continued discrimination. But it was found that participation is low even among those Negroes who support the war effort and manifest an interest in volunteer work. In the opinion of a number of reporters, these individuals are inactive primarily because little or no effort has been made to recruit them into civilian defense programs.

THE "UNTAPPED POTENTIAL"

It has been emphasized that the participants in civilian defense activities are disproportionately drawn from the ranks of those who strongly support the war and are relatively well situated socially and economically.

But by no means all the people in this group have been recruited into

volunteer work. It was found that there is a large "untapped potential" of civilian defense workers. As many as a fourth of the people in the entire sample were interested in participating actively in war work and were well able to participate, but were nonetheless doing little or nothing.

These people did not differ from active participants in educational or economic status or in the extent of their support of the war effort. They did differ significantly from active participants, however, in two important respects. They were far less likely to be members of other groups and organizations. And they had relatively little contact with the people in their communities who were active in civilian defense work. The active people in a community, the "joiners," are evidently the first people to become interested in civilian defense work. And they tend to confine their recruitment efforts to their own particular circle.

THE APPEAL OF THE ACTIVITY

Participation in volunteer war work is influenced not only by the type of personal factors which have been discussed, but also by the attractiveness of the activities themselves and the effectiveness with which they are publicized. People can be mobilized with comparative ease for work which is demonstrably useful and valuable.

The state of Washington has been exceptionally successful in developing a program which has captured the imagination of its residents. Its program is extremely broad, including a wide variety of service, as well as the basic protective, activities. Among other things, the state's Defense

Council has:

Participated in the organization of 135 local War Price and Rationing Boards.

Helped organize and finance a state Salvage Committee and 133 local committees.

Arranged a dozen "retailers' clinics" at key points to help OPA explain and interpret price regulations.

Coordinated the efforts of Federal, State and local agencies to solve the farm labor supply problem; sponsored "Farm Labor Week," during which more than 15,000 city people registered for spare-time harvest work.

Sponsored the Victory Garden program.

Assisted communities in arranging "Town Meetings for War."

Directed the creation of mutual-aid medical areas, to insure maximum mobility of emergency medical services in the event of disaster.

Directed and financed an exhaustive survey of idle machine tools and helped to get them where they were needed (in co-operation with the Manufacturers' Association of the state).

The same imagination has been displayed in publicizing Washington's program. The Defense Council has solicited the help of the state's writers, illustrators, actors, radio experts and advertising men. Newspapers have donated space to special State Defense Council displays. A special weekly bulletin is issued. The facilities of the state's 26 radio stations have been combined into a "Victory Network," which presents a regular weekly program and special programs from time to time. Billboards, window displays, and speakers are also used to inform people of civilian defense activities.

The special campaigns Washington has launched from time to time have been

unusually successful. Last summer a special effort was made to get homes prepared for blackouts and the danger of incendiary bombs. A check made in early September in 15 of the state's 39 counties indicated that 85 per cent of the homes had taken all of the precautions which were recommended and were displaying "We Are Prepared" cards.

EXTENT OF APPROVAL

Throughout the country there is relatively little disapproval of the present civilian defense program. And public satisfaction with its operation has increased markedly since the beginning of the year.

The prevailing attitude, however, is one of passive acceptance rather than of strong and informed approval. Many people have simply not been reached by the program. They accept it, feel satisfied that it is being well run, but know very little about it.

Relatively few people think of the program in broad terms, as embracing all the war-related activities of the civilian population. Most people are unfamiliar with OCD's service responsibilities in such fields as health, education and recreation. They tend to think of it as being exclusively concerned with protective activities.

The overwhelming majority of those interviewed felt that a civilian mobilization program is necessary. But few people felt that it was essential in order to marshal the entire strength of the civilian population in support of the nation's armed forces. Most people favored the program because they recognized the necessity of making preparations against the danger of air

attack. Some people felt that the program's value lies chiefly in its effect on people's "morale." A few regarded civilian mobilization as a frill with little relationship to the winning of the war.

CRITICISMS

Only a small minority of those interviewed were critical of the present civilian defense program. But many of the critics are well informed, and reports from interviewers suggest that their complaints are often well-founded. Leaving criticisms of particular programs out of consideration, "upper crust" control of civilian war work is one of the most frequent causes of complaint. From numerous places comes the cry that the "wealthy class" or the "country club crowd" has a firm monopoly on the civilian defense program. But this complaint is diminishing as more and more communities recognize the importance of attracting people from all walks of life into civilian defense work.

The meddling of politicians, wherever it is in evidence, is also resented. People feel strongly that politics has no place in a wartime program, such as civilian defense. Whenever the leadership of OCD is so flagrantly top-heavy with partisanship that it is identified as a Republican or Democratic organization, public support is difficult to obtain.

In some places people are cool to the civilian mobilization program because it appears to have little relation to any real problem or danger. Many people in the middle west, for example, refuse to believe in the possibility of air raids. Evidently, little effort has been made to acquaint them with the fact that many midwestern points are more accessible to air

attack than coastal cities. Nor has enough been done in some communities to supplement the protective aspects of OCD's work with other types of activity, the value and need of which would be immediately apparent.

A number of respondents, many of whom are or were active participants in OCD, grumble about the administration of the program. Here and there complaints are made about slow delivery of equipment and poor coordination between Federal and State agencies. There are frequent charges of lack of direction and able leadership. Many workers complain that they have not been given enough to do and that no effort has been made to sustain their interest. It is significant that spirit is best where volunteers are given opportunities to be active. In New York State, for example, it is reported that the best spirit exists among auxiliary firemen, because they are usually permitted to participate in the regular activities of the fire departments.

Many critics feel that the administrative weaknesses of OCD are inevitable in view of the organization's almost complete dependence on volunteer workers. They argue that there simply aren't enough volunteers available with the time and ability to direct so vast an operation as civilian mobilization. There is a widespread belief that more paid workers are needed, especially at the county level.

The OCD program in some states has been handicapped by lack of funds. The Wisconsin legislature not only failed to make an appropriation for the program, but neglected to adopt legislation which would have permitted the state's subdivisions to do so. In Missouri also, civilian mobilization has

been retarded by the lack of enabling legislation. Even the distribution of equipment furnished by the national office of the OCD, such as gas masks, helmets and stretchers, has been delayed for several months.

CONCLUSIONS

To the extent that the criticisms of the civilian mobilization program are justified, they, of course, demand administrative correction. But there are many ways in which informational efforts can contribute to the success of the steps which are taken to broaden, democratize and strengthen the civilian mobilization program. Information can play a significant part in developing understanding of the program and in enlisting wider participation in it.

1. Participation in civilian defense work is closely related to support of the war and intellectual interest in it. Participation may be expected to increase automatically as Americans gain a clearer understanding of war issues, objectives and developments. In an important sense, every effort to improve people's understanding of the war may be expected to generate increased interest in what civilians can do to help win it.
2. There is a pressing need to broaden people's conception of the civilian mobilization program. At present most people are simply unaware of many of the problems which can be -- and in many places are being -- dealt with through the cooperative efforts of civilians. Once they develop this awareness, they may be expected to assume more responsibility and to demand a broad and well-rounded program.
3. The importance of wide participation in volunteer war work also

requires stress. Information on the breadth of the OCD program can also be utilized to bring out the need for large numbers of volunteer workers. Particular efforts should be made to enlist the participation of the groups who are now under-represented in OCD programs -- the economically and educationally underprivileged, the people who are not members of existing organizations, and newcomers to the community.

4. Information also has an important and continuous task in explaining the what, why, when and where of civilian mobilization. The value of the program as a whole and of each specific activity needs to be carefully explained. People need to be informed on such matter-of-fact subjects as what to do, where to take things, when and where various assemblies will be held. Information of this sort is needed not only at the beginning of an undertaking to enlist public interest, but continuingly to sustain it.

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
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of INTELLIGENCE
REPORT 50 which was prepared for the Director of the
Office of War Information.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.



PSF
OWI
11-20-42

INTELLIGENCE REPORT 50

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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The period covered by this report is the week of November 12 through November 18, except where otherwise specifically stated.

EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

VICTORIES

News of the great sea battle around the Solomons added to the rejoicing over North Africa. The commentators strove for restraint. They echoed Secretary Knox's warning that the American naval success was not decisive and that the Japanese would reform their battered fleet and try again. They pointed out that the enemy is still strong and resolute.

To all of them, however, it seemed a great victory -- the more satisfying because it was won in characteristically American fashion. Most editorial interpretations stressed the daring of Admiral Halsey's strategy. They treated it as a magnificent vindication of the Navy and its commanders. They were pleased, too, that the fleet's big battlewagons at last had their day.

Some analysts foresaw complete American dominance of the southwest Pacific as a result of the engagement. They are now hopeful that our positions in the Solomons can be consolidated, that General MacArthur will succeed in driving the Japanese from New Guinea and that his bombers will destroy the enemy base at Rabaul.

Despite these hopes, press and radio still express misgivings about the over-all conduct of the Pacific campaign. The critical statement delivered in Congress by Representative Maas stirred their uneasiness and strengthened

their insistence on the need for a unified command. The outcome of the week-end naval battle satisfied them that the Army and Navy chiefs in the southwest Pacific are cooperating — but not that they are united.

There was general approval of the Navy's refusal to release information about the battle while it was in progress. Distrust of the Navy as a source of information was reflected, however, in a few comments on the communique announcing the victory and detailing the losses on both sides. Not all the commentators are convinced that the Navy has yet told the whole story.

DIPLOMACY

The diplomatic phases of the North African campaign have evoked almost as much enthusiasm as the military achievements. The swift subsidence of French resistance was ascribed to shrewd political planning. There was particular gratification, besides, over Josef Stalin's letter to an Associated Press correspondent acknowledging that the allied undertaking would be of help to the Red army.

At the turn of the week, however, press and radio commentators revealed perplexity and, in some cases, dismay over political maneuvers in North Africa. For the most part, General Giraud was accepted as an appropriate leader of the Free French. But the position of Admiral Darlan was widely questioned.

Leading newspapers counseled patience concerning political decisions which might be made by General Eisenhower and pointed out that collaboration

with Darlan might save lives and time. Most of them, however, urged that General de Gaulle be taken into the confidence of allied leaders and that his record of devotion to freedom should not be disregarded in favor of mere expediency. "From 1940 on," the Chicago Sun pointed out, "General DeGaulle has been organizing resistance to Hitler... It is tremendously important that French enemies of Hitler march together... It is essential that the Fighting French National Committee... have the power to delegate its authority."

The distaste which American commentators had for association with Admiral Darlan was evidenced most clearly by the relief which they expressed over the President's press conference assurance that the Army's political arrangements in Africa were purely temporary. The New York Times observed that it "ought to put an end to doubt about the course our Government is pursuing."

Success in North Africa has given rise to some rather high hopes about the diplomatic future. "If Lady Luck stays with us," said Raymond Clapper, "we might have Italy reeling in chaos and virtually out of the war by Christmas." Ernest Lindley noted that "The entire Balkan Peninsula and Hungary, as well as France and Italy, are ripe for the political campaign to which the Anglo-American forces can give real substance by their presence on the southern shore of the Mediterranean."

THE HOME FRONT

In spite of the excitement over military affairs, a good deal of editorial

attention continued to be devoted to the domestic problem of manpower. The chief focus of comment was the report of the War Manpower Commission's Labor Policy Committee. The criticism of the report most frequently cited was that it made no mention of the 40-hour week as a barrier to maximum utilization of available manpower. "The report is hardly complete," said the Hartford Courant, "in that it fails to discuss the effect of the short working week on the manpower situation."

Few critics of the Wage and Hour law took the trouble to point out, as did the St. Louis Post-Dispatch that "There is no restriction in the law on the number of hours that may be worked." Most of them treated it exclusively as a ceiling upon hours, rather than as a floor under wages.

Editors seemed inclined to shy away from considering the question of compulsion in regard to manpower allocation. Like the Birmingham Age Herald, they felt that "We don't want to resort in wartime to any greater compulsion than is necessary," but, in general, they avoided commitment as to the need for compulsory methods.

As usual, there was an overwhelming insistence that the manpower shortage is serious and that the Administration must do something. The deepest concern was expressed over the scarcity of farm labor. The feeling is now widespread that we may encounter serious difficulties in agricultural production. The Butte Standard, for example, remarked that "No matter how patriotic the farmers are... they know better than anyone else how futile it is to plant crops and then not have sufficient help to harvest them. The present outlook is for curtailment in the face of greater war needs."

A few newspapers have already taken up Senator Harry Byrd's charges that Government agencies are grossly overstaffed. They point to Washington sarcastically as a fertile source of surplus manpower.

DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

GOVERNMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE

A panel of 20 newspaper editors -- regular correspondents of the Bureau of Intelligence -- reports vehement dissatisfaction with the Government's information policy. In letters received during the first week in November, they charged that there is unwarranted delay, censorship and coloring in the treatment of military news; that needless confusion persists in statements about the home front; that the Administration, particularly the President, treats the press with hostility.

Elmer Davis was largely exempted from this criticism. The prevailing opinion was that he has done as good a job as possible under existing conditions, but has been handicapped by lack of authority in determining what news should be released.

The editors were almost unanimous in condemning Government handling of military news. They believe that the public is resentful when a belated release gives people the impression that they have been deliberately deceived about military developments -- either by misinformation or misleading in-

terpretations. The Doolittle episode, the editors report, has seriously impaired confidence in the Government's war communiques. Some of them believe that people are listening to enemy broadcasts and giving them credence in unprecedented numbers.

According to the editors, there is a widespread conviction that censorship is rigid beyond any requirements of security; many people, in and out of the newspaper business, feel that news is being used to manipulate American opinion, not simply to deceive the enemy. They charge, for example, that news of reverses is withheld until there are offsetting successes. One editor wrote bitterly:

"Not one single person I interviewed believes the few governmental explanations about keeping such information for months from an enemy that was right there at the time and seems to have the faculty of learning things and announcing them weeks before they are told by our own Government."

Interviewing conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence gives some support to the contention of the editors that a growing number of people are dissatisfied with the amount of war news released. In July and again in November, a national sample was asked this question: "Do you think the Government is giving the public as much information as it should about the fighting in this war?" Replies divided as follows:

	<u>July</u>	<u>November</u>
Yes	70	62
No	23	31
Don't know	7	7

Criticism of the Government's handling of home front war news was also

severe. One editor observed, "The public will always give the Government the benefit of the doubt in military questions, but not in affairs at home." All the correspondents complained that the statements of Government officials about such issues as the manpower situation and the draft status of married men are still hopelessly confusing and contradictory. General Hershey was perhaps the most frequently criticized individual. A number of editors made the point that confusing statements make people distrust not only informational releases but also the competence of their Government.

In addition to these complaints which the editors believe to be shared by the public, the press has a number of grievances of its own. Many newspaper men feel that the Administration is deeply antagonistic toward the press; some think that a deliberate attempt is being made to discredit newspapers in the eyes of the public. The hostility of the Administration is manifest, these critics say, in its dealings with newspapermen as individuals as well as in its attitude toward the press as an institution. Many reporters seem to feel that they are being treated as irresponsible school boys. The President's reference to "typewriter strategists" occasioned especial ire.

Some newspapermen feel that the Administration is partial to other media. For example, a Cleveland editor protested that magazines and radio are sometimes permitted to "jump the gun" in his section of the country with choice items of news. He feels that newspapers are cooperating more closely than other media with the Office of Censorship, and are being penalized in consequence. But the editors themselves appear to recognize that such

difficulties as these could be readily dealt with once the corroding antagonism between the Administration and the press was cleared up.

It seems significant that the Government's suits against the Chicago Tribune and the Associated Press were cited as evidence of hostility by none of these correspondents.

The editors appear to be genuinely eager for better relations with the Administration. One offered what he believed to be a simple formula:

"If it were officially recognized that newspapers, perforce, are an integral part of the war effort; if newspapermen were treated as members of an honored and valued profession; if the impression were created that their efforts are appreciated, understood and desired -- I think there quickly would be a great change for the better in all respects."

The editors also made a number of suggestions for bolstering public confidence in the Government's handling of military news. Although they feel that the Army and Navy can be franker and faster than they are at present in releasing news, they are well aware that there is frequently a need for delay and secrecy. But they do not feel that this need has been convincingly explained to the public. They suggest that the press, radio and motion pictures all be employed to show people specifically how a delay in releasing some one piece of information aided our armed forces. One editor wrote:

"If OWI could take the Wasp case, for instance, show clearly that the enemy did not know of this loss for weeks, and publicize the story freely, it might go a long way toward mollifying public opinion."

Along the same lines, it was suggested that whenever important news is released belatedly, it should be accompanied by an authoritative statement

telling why it was delayed. Neither press nor public, according to the editors, wants information which might jeopardize the security of our armed forces, but they do want to feel that the Government is taking them into its confidence as fully as possible.

FUEL OIL RATIONING

Recent interviews with a small sample of people in the areas marked for fuel rationing suggest that immense difficulty may be experienced in securing acceptance of the program. Three-fourths of those interviewed had heard or read something about the tight fuel situation and knew that fuel oil rationing was imminent. But the opinions and attitudes of many of the people in the sample indicate that they are ill-prepared for the discomforts which fuel rationing will probably entail.

One-third of the group thought that fuel rationing was unnecessary. Another third did not know whether it was necessary or not. The opponents of rationing argue somewhat like the people who balked at gasoline rationing. Ignoring the transportation shortage, they take the position that there is no reason for people to suffer from cold when there is no shortage of fuel. There was only slight awareness of the present difficulty of getting fuel where it is needed. People in the midwest were particularly resistant to rationing.

Many people have not even faced the fact that they are going to find it difficult to get as much fuel as they used last winter. Only a few of those who use coal or gas were aware that shortages of these fuels may be experienced. And only half of the oil users recognized that they would have trouble in getting their usual supplies.

Over half of the people in this small sample were thinking in terms of using just as much fuel as last winter, rather than in terms of cutting down. Even among those who use fuel oil, a substantial minority have not faced the necessity of economizing.

The one-third cut in fuel oil allowance was opposed by a majority of those interviewed. The individuals who feel that they have already done everything possible to heatproof their homes and to economize on the use of fuel were particularly prone to feel that such a cut would mean a real hardship.

The suggestion that the one-third saving be achieved by keeping home temperature at a maximum of 65° clashes with the notion that a temperature of 70° or thereabouts is essential for good health. Less than a third of those interviewed felt that they could keep the heat to 65° or less without jeopardizing their health. There was no great fear that the fuel situation will actually lead to a wave of illness. But this lack of apprehension was due to a refusal to admit that there is a shortage rather than to confidence in people's ability to withstand colder temperatures.

People with young children, aged persons or invalids in their homes were most inclined to fear that fuel shortages would endanger health. They were evidently unfamiliar with the special dispensations to which they may be entitled.

The Government's efforts to get people to heatproof their houses have met with a markedly different response among homeowners and renters. Generally speaking, owner-occupied houses were in much better condition than rented ones to begin with and many owners have taken steps to improve the heating

efficiency of their own homes. In contrast, few rented houses have been improved, although they offer the greatest possibilities for fuel conservation. The fact that responsibility for improving these houses is divided appears to be at the root of the difficulty.

Intensified informational efforts appear to be needed, if the fuel situation is not to be a source of tension and widespread complaint once cold weather sets in. It is essential to give people a better understanding of the reasons for rationing. They are not likely to accept discomfort with good grace so long as they are skeptical about the need for it.

People also need to be given more facts about the nature of the program. The special provisions for those with children, old people or invalids in their homes need to be widely publicized. The fear that the 65° maximum endangers health needs to be vigorously combatted. Information must take account of the special situation and objections of all groups affected by rationing.

In connection with efforts to induce people to improve the heating efficiency of their houses, different approaches appear indicated for homeowners and non-owners. Perhaps the starting point is to find a formula under which renters and landlords can cooperate to make necessary improvements.

PRESSURE

An organized campaign has developed in Midwestern states to bring about a three-month postponement of the nationwide mileage rationing program scheduled to go into effect December 1. This campaign has resulted in a large volume

of mail directed to the Rubber Administrator, protesting against nationwide gasoline rationing at this time. A formal proposal to postpone the rationing program has been introduced in the House of Representatives.

The effort to mobilize public opinion in support of postponement had its inception and was prosecuted most vigorously in the city of Indianapolis. Handbills and petitions were distributed in that community under the sponsorship of a "Midwest Rubber Conservation Committee," composed of "the executive officers of a number of the state associations representing various industries." The appeal for postponement was given practically no publicity through Indianapolis newspapers and radio stations; it was disseminated by hand and by mail.

In Detroit, on the other hand, while literature in support of the plan was distributed to workers at automobile plants, the publicity was disseminated largely through newspapers and radio broadcasts.

In both cities the principal argument advanced was that a 35-mile speed limit would suffice for the conservation of tires.

In order to test the effectiveness of this campaign, the Bureau of Intelligence conducted interviews with people in Indianapolis and Detroit and compared them with interviews undertaken simultaneously in the cities of St. Louis and Cleveland, which had not yet been subjected to the propaganda efforts. In each of the four cities the Bureau asked:

HAVE YOU HEARD OR READ ANYTHING ABOUT A PLAN TO PUT OFF
GASOLINE RATIONING AROUND HERE UNTIL THREE MONTHS FROM
NOW?

The results show a striking contrast between the two pairs of cities.

	<u>Indianapolis</u>	<u>Detroit</u>	<u>St. Louis</u>	<u>Cleveland</u>
Yes	45%	56%	19%	10%
No	55	44	81	90

That those who had knowledge of this proposal to postpone gasoline rationing were significantly affected in their attitudes toward the gasoline and tire problems is shown clearly in the answers given to two other questions asked in the four communities. For purposes of comparison, there is shown below the distribution of opinion in each of the four cities and in a national sample interviewed at the same time.

DO YOU THINK THAT GASOLINE RATIONING THROUGHOUT THE NATION IS NECESSARY?

	<u>Indianapolis</u>	<u>Detroit</u>	<u>St. Louis</u>	<u>Cleveland</u>	<u>National</u>
Yes	31%	38%	56%	69%	55%
No	62	58	35	24	36
Don't know	7	4	9	7	9

DO YOU THINK GASOLINE RATIONING IS THE BEST WAY TO SAVE TIRES?

	<u>Indianapolis</u>	<u>Detroit</u>	<u>St. Louis</u>	<u>Cleveland</u>	<u>National</u>
Yes	51%	63%	80%	89%	79%
No	41	31	13	5	15
Don't know	8	6	7	6	6

Not asked nationally, the following question was designed to test the acceptance of the basic argument used in both Indianapolis and Detroit.

DO YOU THINK THE 35-MILE SPEED LIMIT WILL DO ENOUGH TO SAVE TIRES WITHOUT RATIONING GASOLINE AROUND HERE?

	<u>Indianapolis</u>	<u>Detroit</u>	<u>St. Louis</u>	<u>Cleveland</u>
Yes	72%	70%	42%	46%
No	16	25	37	40
Don't know	12	5	21	14

Those people in Indianapolis and Detroit who considered nationwide gasoline rationing unnecessary were much more prone than those who shared this view in St. Louis and Cleveland to advance the additional arguments used in the campaign that plenty of gasoline is available and that tires are already being conserved by voluntary limitation of mileage.

The Detroit and Indianapolis campaigns differed in one respect; and this difference was reflected in people's other reasons for opposing gas rationing. In Detroit, a great many of those opposed to gasoline rationing explained their opposition on the grounds that it would cause serious inconvenience to war workers. This argument was rare in Indianapolis, where one of the most common objections to rationing was that it would put small dealers out of business.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR EFFORT

Civilian mobilization is one of the imperatives of total war. It is valuable not simply because of the war work achieved through voluntary cooperation, but equally because it strengthens among those who participate the sense that the war is their war.

Less than a fourth of a small sample of people interviewed by the Bureau of Intelligence in late September were rated as regular and active participants in volunteer war work. Much of the work mentioned by the remainder

requires little time or effort and is being done on an individual, rather than a group, basis.

Participation in the protective aspects of OCD's program is relatively satisfactory. In contrast, few have thus far been enlisted in the recently organized Service Corps, which is concerned with such things as nutrition, consumer education, recreation, child care and salvage.

Active participants in civilian defense work are disproportionately drawn from the ranks of those who strongly support the war and are well situated socially and economically. But by no means all of these people have been recruited into the program. As many as a fourth of those interviewed were interested in participating actively and well able to do so, and yet were doing little or nothing.

There is relatively little disapproval of the civilian defense operation. The prevailing attitude, however, is one of passive acceptance rather than of strong and informed approval. Most people have no more than a sketchy knowledge of the civilian defense program. Comparatively few realize that it embraces service, as well as protective, activities.

Only a small minority criticized the program. "Upper crust" control and political meddling were among the most frequent causes of complaint. Programs also aroused criticism when they either were, or appeared to be, unsuitable to the needs of a particular community. Occasional criticisms were also voiced about the administration of civilian defense work.

(These findings summarize a Special Report of the Bureau of Intelligence, Voluntary Participation in the War Effort, issued November 18 and available to authorized individuals upon request to the Bureau.)

ENEMY PROPAGANDA

SHORT-WAVE COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Reactions to America's North African offensive continued to dominate German and Italian propaganda this past week. Both domestic and short-wave broadcasts from Berlin and Rome skillfully diverted attention to the importance of Axis counter-measures. It was claimed that United Nations' shipping losses in connection with the occupation were enormous. The strength of the Axis was repeatedly stressed.

The occupation of France and Corsica was treated as one of a developing series of energetic counter-measures to nullify the American offensive. The American offensive "forced" Hitler to occupy all of France, and the French fully approved the move, according to Axis radios. The occupation made the "South Wall" as impregnable as the "East and West Walls," closing "the last gap in the Fortress of Europe."

Axis submarines and planes wreaked such havoc among United Nations' war and merchant ships that the occupation of Africa was turned into a "Pyrrhic victory," according to Berlin and Rome. The concentration of ships, they claimed, afforded them a "happy hunting ground." The way in which this propaganda line was used to produce anxiety in the United Nations is well illustrated by a comment of the renegade, Robert Best: "As soon as the American public learns about the extent of the losses of the landing fleet, a wave of horror is sure to sweep the country."

The Germans claimed that Tunis and Sicily control the "Mediterranean narrows," while the Axis-dominated islands serve as "giant, unsinkable

aircraft carriers." From vantage points in their possession the Nazis argued that they can control Mediterranean shipping and bomb American bases in Africa. They boasted that Axis troops in Tunisia would "spoil Eisenhower's sightseeing trip."

Despite these confident claims, a significant shift was apparent in Radio Berlin's treatment of the United States. Since the claim that America is weak is scarcely compatible with the admitted facts about the African offensive, America is now being presented, not as a handicapped weakling, but rather as a hypocritical, scheming aggressor. The inevitable "documentary proof" of America's predatory intentions toward France was produced by the Nazis and broadcast over Axis and French radios. The "proof" consisted of papers left in the U. S. Embassy in Vichy, showing that America had no intention of ever returning France's colonies to her.

Both Germany and Italy engaged in a little muscle flexing for the benefit of their own populations and the world at large. The increased emphasis on German strength came at a time when the Nazis found it best to devote less attention to actual military operations. The gap was filled with exorbitant claims about the excellence of German morale and German leadership -- notably Hitler's. To Americans, the Nazis portrayed a Germany with plenty of food, high per capita income and a rich cultural life.

The Italians, who had to deal with the fear of invasion and, possibly, with a shaken internal morale, adopted a somewhat different approach. They explicitly denied that morale was low. Nevertheless, they found it necessary to exhort the people to calm and fortitude, warning them against the

evil effects of wagging tongues, defeatism and rumors. Italian unity and ability to withstand adversity were both stressed.

The Italians also adopted the propaganda methods used by the Nazis when a second front in the West seemed imminent. They asserted that Italy would deal harshly with invaders. And they warned their own people, a la Goebbels, that they would be destroyed if they were defeated, losing "even their eyes to cry with."

UNITED NATIONS DISUNITY

In the reactions to the understanding between General Eisenhower and Darlan, the Axis found material connected with the African offensive that could be used in efforts to foment United Nations disunity. Goebbels and Co. claimed that "serious divergences...are known to exist between the United States and England concerning the U. S. understanding with Darlan.

Earlier the Axis tried to link Giraud with Roosevelt and de Gaulle with Churchill, predicting "certain rivalry between the two major traitors." Both English and Americans were pictured as being dissatisfied with de Gaulle and "thinking of a substitute for him."

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November 30, 1942

My dear Mr. Kane:

It was thoughtful of you to forward
with your letter of November twenty-eighth a
copy of that Report. I appreciate your courtesy
in making it available to me.

Very sincerely yours,

Grace G. Tully
Private Secretary

R. Keith Kane, Esq.,
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence,
Office of War Information,
Washington, D. C.

pl

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
WASHINGTON

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
November 28, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of INTELLIGENCE REPORT
51 which was prepared for the Director of the Office of
War Information.

Permit me to call to your special attention the
item on page 13 entitled "The Press and Federal Employees."
I think it will interest you.

Sincerely yours,


R. Keith Kane
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.



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INTELLIGENCE REPORT 51

TO THE DIRECTOR, OWI

CONFIDENTIAL

This document contains information relating to the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, as amended, U. S. Code 50, Sections 31 and 32. Its transmission or communication in any manner to any unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

OFFICE OF
WAR INFORMATION

BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE

COPY No. 1

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The period covered by this report is the week of November 19 through November 24, except where otherwise specifically stated.

EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

THANKSGIVING

The good cheer continued. A study of major headlines in 20 metropolitan newspapers for the week indicated that 78 per cent of them blazoned good news from one or another of the fighting fronts. Editorial comment was scarcely less buoyant.

Commentators took time off from sober interpretation of the war to salute the Navy. They tossed their hats in the air for the Boise. They paid tribute to Admiral Callaghan and eulogized Admiral Halsey. Even on sober second thought, most commentators agreed with the Houston Chronicle that the naval battle around the Solomon Islands "is likely to rank among the decisive naval victories of the world..."

There were almost equal plaudits for General MacArthur and his allied troops pushing the Japanese back on New Guinea. The Patterson and McCormick newspapers once more boomed the General as the great American hero. They argued that, given adequate troops and equipment, he could roll the Japanese right back to Fujiyama.

Comment on the North African campaign assumed a somewhat less roseate hue as editors, columnists and radio broadcasters speculated on the enemy's next moves. The Birmingham Age Herald was among those pointing out that "If Rommel could rally the remainder of his army... the allies would again be facing a much more formidable job than that which has been tentatively visualized as possible in the last week."

Some counterstroke by Hitler is generally anticipated. William Philip Simms, in the Scripps-Howard newspapers, outlined the possibilities most commonly considered: "He might try to cross Spain to get to Gibraltar and Morocco. He might try to reach the oil fields of the middle East through, or by going around, Turkey. He might even try an invasion of England... Or, he might consolidate his present hold on the continent, go on the defensive, and at the same time launch a peace move."

Guessers pointed most frequently to Spain. They found cheer in General Franco's reiteration of his neutrality. But the return of Serrano Suner to a cabinet post aroused some apprehension. Raymond Gram Swing suggested, on the air, that the Spaniards might be getting ready to stab General Eisenhower's North African expeditionary force in the back.

Interpretations of the battle for Tunisia were in agreement as to its strategic importance. According to the Denver Post, "When it is won by the allies, they will be in a position to strike and strike hard at the most vulnerable link in the Axis chain -- Italy." Most prognostications were extremely hopeful. The Cleveland Plain Dealer, for example, said that the Axis, "outnumbered and underequipped... cannot overcome through reinforcements and new supplies the advantage held by the United Nations in North Africa."

FRANCE

As soon as the President issued his statement defining General Eisenhower's arrangement with Admiral Darlan, a flood of comment appeared, revealing profound relief and agreeing heartily with Mr. Roosevelt. "Darlan ordered

Frenchmen to capitulate, and they did so," the St. Louis Post-Dispatch pointed out. "The fact that Eisenhower accepted this help certainly did not mean that he was setting up a Vichy regime, American model, in North Africa, or that he was attempting to dictate the future of France. That, as the President said, will be determined by Frenchmen."

For the remnants of the Vichy regime, Laval in particular, commentators expressed only the utmost contempt. In cartoons, Laval was commonly portrayed in the form of a mustached rat or a diminutive fuehrer. It is generally assumed that the French people are overwhelmingly eager to share in a United Nations victory.

GERMANY

A good many commentators expressed the view that Germany is weakening on the political and economic, as well as on the military, fronts. Nazi efforts to keep the news of North Africa from the German people, or to twist its real significance, were viewed as indicative of low morale within the Reich. Occupation of southern France was expected to raise transportation difficulties. Numerous comments suggested that Italy's vulnerability to air attack would have shattering effects on the outlook of Italians. The food shortage throughout Europe might be aggravated by the loss of Algeria and Morocco. Rumors of a rift between Hitler and his generals were occasionally seized upon as further evidence of Nazi internal difficulties.

A few newspapers warned vehemently against placing any credence in such rumors. The Christian Science Monitor regarded them as prefabricated in Germany and declared that "The object of such moves is to catch the free

world in the snare of a 'cheap peace.' No one knows better than the German militarists that there is no such thing. The rest of us should know it, too, by now." And the Philadelphia Record cautioned that "The overthrow of Hitler will not alone be victory. Nor will a deal with the Junkers be peace." In general, it seems unlikely at this time that American press and radio will rise easily to any "negotiated victory" bait.

POPULAR REACTIONS

CONFIDENCE

The rout of Rommel's forces in North Africa by the British Eighth Army gave a striking boost to the confidence of Americans in England's war effort. Just prior to news of the decisive British victory, and again shortly following it, the Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research posed the following question to comparable national samples:

DO YOU THINK THAT THE BRITISH ARE DOING ALL
THEY POSSIBLY CAN TO WIN THE WAR?

	<u>October 27</u>	<u>November 10</u>
Yes	64%	74%
No	23	18
Don't know	13	8

Opinion on this topic has fluctuated sharply with the changing fortunes of war. Last February, immediately after the fall of Singapore, no more than 49 per cent of the American public were willing to credit the British with making an all-out war effort.

Public confidence in the American war effort was similarly heightened by the news of General Eisenhower's successful invasion of French North Africa:

DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES IS DOING ALL
IT POSSIBLY CAN TO WIN THE WAR?

	<u>October 27</u>	<u>November 10</u>
Yes	67%	75%
No	28	22
Don't know	5	3

Although these questions have been asked with great frequency throughout the year, this is the first time that the approval expressed for the British war effort equalled that expressed for the United States.

PRESCRIPTION FOR A RADIO SERIES

As pointed out in last week's Intelligence Report, three people in ten of a national cross section interviewed in November felt that they were being given too little news about the fighting fronts. Either because recent releases have failed to satisfy many individuals or because attacks on Army and Navy information policy have shaken public confidence, dissatisfaction has mounted sharply since last summer. It is now at the highest point since people were first questioned about the adequacy of military news in February.

Persons interviewed in November were also asked: "Suppose a Government official were going to make regular radio talks to the people -- what would you like to have him talk about?" Their replies, tabulated below in general categories, point to the areas about which people want authoritative information. Percentages add up to more than a hundred

because multiple answers were permitted.

Military progress of the war	40%
Domestic issues	20
What our leaders are doing	12
Civilian participation in the war	8
Post-war world	8
Production, shipping, equipment	7
Nothing	7
Miscellaneous	9
Not ascertainable	7

Responses sometimes showed quite specifically what questions people want to hear discussed, and even what kind of approach they would be likely to approve. For example, the individuals who wanted more information about "the progress of the war" were hungry not only for news of how U.S. troops are faring in different parts of the world, but also for analyses of the probable length of the war and the prospects for victory. They were insistent that the treatment be frank. They wanted the complete war picture -- in the words of one respondent, "Full discussion of all facts -- good, bad or indifferent." But many of them explicitly recognized the need for withholding any information which might be of value to the enemy.

The people who wanted to hear domestic issues discussed were in general a hard-boiled lot. Many of them were clearly critical of the Administration, and wanted explanations of policies of which they disapproved. Typical was an individual who thought the official should use his radio time to account for the Government's "favoritism" toward unions. Others wanted to hear talks on problems which vexed them -- the rising cost of living, the difficulty of finding farm help. There was some irritated demand for talks explaining the need for various rationing programs.

Most of the people who wanted more information about what the nation's leaders are doing also manifested a critical tendency. They felt that they should be acquainted with the duties of important officials, and recognized that they were not. Many of them expressed an interest in Congressional procedure and a desire for information about the measures considered by Congress. A wide audience evidently exists for a series of down-to-earth talks on the functioning and problems of a democratic government in wartime.

The people who asked that civilian participation be discussed wanted clear-cut instructions on what they could do to help win the war. There was a widespread desire for facts about nutrition and for practical advice on conserving money and materials. Some people requested that the talks suggest ways in which women, school children and other groups might participate in the war effort.

The people who wanted the Government spokesman to talk about the post-war world were particularly concerned about the nature of the peace and the future role of the United States in world affairs. Those who wanted authoritative information about production were interested not only in the broad question of how well production is going, but in the way in which our fighting equipment compares with that of other nations. Considerable curiosity was manifested about the shipbuilding program and the success being experienced in getting supplies to the fighting fronts.

Seven per cent of the people interviewed were opposed or indifferent to the proposed series of radio talks. Some of them said that they were well satisfied with the information they are being given at present; others were simply

uninterested. A recalcitrant few took the position that the official couldn't tell the truth and that there would be no point in listening to him.

The better educated respondents were somewhat less prone than those who had not completed high school to request that the military progress of the war be discussed in the radio talks. In contrast, they exhibited considerably more interest than the less well educated people in issues connected with the peace and the post-war world. They tended to be somewhat more critical than the less well educated and were notably more concerned about the nation's financial situation. Few differences were evident on a regional basis, save that people in the South were least inclined to demand explanations from the Administration about its conduct of the war.

LEND-LEASE REPAYMENT

Nine Americans in ten believe that we should continue to send supplies to our allies -- even if it means that we will have some shortages here at home. But only four in ten believe that we should give our allies these supplies. America is not yet ready for Sir Walter Venning's recent proposal that bookkeeping be forgotten in connection with Lend-Lease.

There is, however, a pronounced trend in the direction of greater generosity toward our allies. This is evident from responses to a question which has now been asked of a national cross section four times this year:

DO YOU THINK WE SHOULD GIVE OUR ALLIES THE SUPPLIES
WE ARE SENDING THEM, OR DO YOU THINK WE SHOULD GET
REPAID FOR THEM IN SOME WAY AFTER THE WAR?

	<u>February</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Give to allies	19%	35%	37%	39%
Get repaid	75	58	55	54
Don't know	6	7	8	7

In November, the group of people who felt that the U.S. should exact some type of repayment from its allies was asked: "In what way should they repay us?" Many respondents showed little awareness of the economic difficulties repayment would involve. About half of the group (26 per cent of the entire sample) replied, "In money." Seventeen per cent felt that we should be paid back in goods. Others felt that our allies should make trade concessions to us after the war or turn over colonies or land to the United States.

The belief that Lend-Lease balances can be cancelled through payment in money and goods may be a source of serious trouble in the post-war world. Quite apart from their military contributions in the common struggle against the Axis, America's allies have made at least partial repayment in the form of technical aid, patents and industrial processes. Dramatization of the reciprocal nature of Lend-Lease may make Americans less insistent upon a cash settlement of accounts, and educate them to the importance of international cooperation in the post-war economic order.

DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

FARM DIFFICULTIES

In addition to the widely publicized rural labor shortage, farmers now face other serious difficulties which threaten food production. Reports received by the Bureau of Intelligence from OWI field representatives and correspondence panels indicate that the nation's food producers are now

handicapped by transportation problems and by a scarcity of farm machinery.

The scarcity of farm machinery, coupled with the labor shortage, may result in an unfortunate shift in agricultural production. One Middle Western correspondent observed: "The kind of farm production requiring most labor is the kind the country most needs, such as dairying and meat production. When help gets scarce, a farmer who is engaged in this kind of production may be forced to turn to the only kind of production he can manage almost alone with machinery. He grows more cereal crops. In other words, he shifts from the kind of production we need to the kind we don't."

The tire shortage and difficulties in buying and repairing trucks trouble farmers in getting their produce to market. Dairymen in some areas find it impossible to meet the requirements of city health departments that their milk trucks be insulated. Farmers and ranchers in southern plain states fear that they will be unable to conduct their business under gasoline rationing because they already use passenger cars to do much of their hauling. A report from South Dakota estimates that 30 to 40 per cent of the trucks moving farm produce and supplies will be off the road within a year, unless additional tires are made available. Truck registration has badly snarled existing truck pooling arrangements among farmers and has occasioned widespread resentment.

Because they are afraid that they will not have men and machinery to operate their farms, farmers in many parts of the country are reducing their production. In the New York milk shed area, it is reported, 32 auctioneers say they sold 40,821 head of cattle up to the middle of October this year,

as compared with 25,125 for the same period in 1941. Agricultural war boards in Wisconsin, a leading dairy state, report a new high in farm auctions -- 3,000 sales listed so far this year. Wool sheepmen in several mountain states are reducing their flocks as much as 40 per cent because of the lack of sheep herders. Parts of many crops, such as fruit, cotton, sugar beet and garden truck were not harvested for ~~lack~~ of labor.

Remembering the costly investment they made during the last war and the serious farm collapse after it, a growing number of farmers are reluctant to expand their operations in order to increase production; they hesitate to purchase seed, feed, livestock and other necessary items to produce crops which they fear will not reach market.

The field men and correspondents report the following solutions suggested by local farm leaders:

- (1) Defer farm labor from the Army on the same basis as other skilled or professional deferments.
- (2) Allocate or ration labor to meet the needs of agriculture.
- (3) "Freeze" farm laborers to their jobs.
- (4) Make wider use of Japanese labor from relocation areas and import more Mexican labor.
- (5) Mobilize local citizenry to meet seasonal demands.

Aware of their responsibilities, many farmers urge an educational program to acquaint city people with the importance of the farmer in the war program and with the problems he faces. Informational measures seem needed also to persuade farmers that the Government is genuinely aware of their

difficulties and is acting effectively to solve them. Their hired hands need assurance that the work they do in the fields constitutes a patriotic service to the nation. And the farmers themselves need to be reminded that their production of essential crops is a vital part of the war effort.

SELECTIVE SERVICE

Interviewing conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion indicates that over-all satisfaction with the fairness of Selective Service has been subject to only slight fluctuation during the last six months. In April and October three-quarters of the people interviewed thought that the draft was being handled fairly in their communities.

The people who expressed dissatisfaction with the operation of Selective Service were asked: "In what way is the draft not being handled fairly?" Significant differences are apparent between the criticisms voiced in April and in October. On both occasions the most common complaint was that favoritism is shown by local boards -- that money and politics talk -- but this accusation declined in relative importance between April and October. And fewer complaints were made in October about draft boards taking too many skilled workers or men who are physically unfit.

In contrast, there was a sharp rise in criticisms over inconsistencies among local draft boards. People also protested more in October than in April that draft boards "take married men while there are still single men around." Similarly, there were many complaints about draft boards taking older men, while young men are still left in civilian life -- a complaint which no one raised in the spring.

Complaints about the number of farm boys being drafted also rose between April and October, undoubtedly in reflection of the tight farm labor situation. It is encouraging to note that the policies about which increased dissatisfaction was felt have already been modified, or are now in process of being changed.

Save that farmers were slightly more critical than the rest of the nation, there were no significant differences in satisfaction with Selective Service by occupation, economic status, region, age, religion or nationality background. Nor was there any difference in attitude between people who have members of their families in the armed forces and those who do not.

People who disapprove of the way President Roosevelt is handling his job were distinctly more critical of Selective Service than those who approve of his leadership. Their dissatisfaction may stem in large part from a generalized distrust of the Administration. Previous studies have shown that the anti-Roosevelt minority tends to be more critical than the President's supporters of most phases of the war effort.

THE PRESS AND FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

Senator Byrd's charge that the Federal Government is the "chief offender" in the waste and hoarding of manpower is receiving a good press. Most newspapers did not have to be persuaded as to the merit of the Senator's viewpoint. Criticism of the "overstaffing" of Government agencies has been common in editorial discussion of the manpower crisis in recent weeks. One or two columnists wouldn't let a piece on the African offensive go by without at least a passing reference to boondoggling in Washington.

Thus Senator Byrd's statement provided an occasion for a return to familiar ground. Of approximately 40 newspapers checked by the Bureau of Intelligence, 19, plus a pair of columnists, joined the excursion this past week. Only Samuel Grafton dissented. He pointed to the work done by OWI employees in connection with the African offensive as an example of loyal devotion to duty.

The widespread endorsement of the Byrd charges contrasts sharply with the limited attention paid to Elmer Davis's speech of November 17 at the New York Herald Tribune Forum. In this address Mr. Davis stressed the devotion, hard-work and small pay of most Government employees. Few newspapers gave these remarks more than the most perfunctory news coverage, and none of the papers checked by the Bureau commented on them editorially.

The treatment of the President's order tightening deferments for Federal employees also suggests that the press puts a low evaluation on their services. All of the ten newspapers commenting on the order approved it. A typical reaction was that of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, which said that the order "corrects the most glaring injustice in Selective Service management. Despite the labor shortage, the Government has steadfastly refused to adopt a Spartan code for itself."

CONFUSION ABOUT WAR AIMS

Recent statements of highest United Nations' officials have created the impression that the war aims of the United States, England and Russia have not yet been satisfactorily reconciled. There appear to be important differences of opinion with respect to the treatment of colonies on the one hand and the aggressor nations on the other.

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Whatever their intent may have been, and however they may lag behind actual British practice, Prime Minister Churchill's remarks of November 10 on colonial policy gave many people the impression that England is fighting to preserve the status quo. Churchill declared: "We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King's first minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." The tone and apparent significance of this statement contrast sharply with the Atlantic Charter and with President Roosevelt's address, a few days after Churchill's, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Philippines Commonwealth Government. In this speech the President reasserted the principle that "the acceptance of sovereignty (by the United States) was but an obligation to serve the people of the Philippines until the day when they themselves might be independent and take their own place among the nations of the world."

Senator Pepper severely criticized the Churchill statement in a speech at Boston to a CIO convention and in a later interview. Although paying tribute to Churchill as "the leader of a great nation," he deplored the fact that "considerations of Empire had not been eliminated from the objectives of the war." In his interview he declared: "I am sure that Mr. Churchill... did not intend to forget humanity in a moment when our fortunes were a little better, and become a spokesman for Empire."

The Indian leader Rajagopalachariar interpreted Churchill's remarks as an indication that Britain did not intend to give India her independence. In an interview with New York Times correspondent Herbert Matthews, he said: "You Americans are thinking only of war, but England wants to retain her Empire. Will America fight for India after this war if during the war you

allow yourselves to be dictated to by Mr. Churchill. The American Government can tell the British they must solve the Indian problem..."

Stalin reopened the question of the post-war treatment of the Axis powers with his statement of November 6, in which he reviewed the war and Soviet international policy. After denouncing the absurdity of Hitler's declared intention of destroying Russia and all her organized military forces, he made it plain that Russia was fighting to annihilate Hitler's Government and Hitler's Army, not to destroy and disarm.

"It is not our aim to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia... It is not our aim to destroy all military force in Germany, for every literate person will understand that this is not only impossible in regard to Germany, as it is in regard to Russia, but it is also inadvisable from the point of view of the future..."

There is a possible contradiction between these words and Point Eight of the Atlantic Charter, which states that "the disarmament of (aggressor) nations is essential." Stalin's position also appears to be at variance with recent statements of other United Nations leaders, which have tended to call for more and more severe treatment of Germany and Japan. Illustrative of the trend was the speech by Foreign Minister Eden at Glasgow on October 30, in which he declared: "Hitler is not an accident. He is a symptom. Let no one forget that in the kind and generous moments after the war... The problem of Germany will remain because Hitlerism has inculcated this terrible doctrine into the young people of Germany." Eden implied that Germany would have to be supervised for a long period after the war.

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