

Document L Berlin
Vol. I

PROBABILITY
of an
Outbreak of War
Documents L
Naval Attaché
BERLIN

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (R)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

Volume 1
Documents Numbers 1 to 33
(7 FEB. 1937 - 24 OCT. 1941)

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT

ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

C-10-m
 15-209-1P

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From 2 Date 7 February 1938 Serial No. 4-90 File No. 1F80(G)

Source of information Personal Observation, personal contacts and German press.

Subject GERMANY German Cabinet Changes Significance of

Inclosure: (Station reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subject)

~~Reference~~ (A) Page from Berlin newspaper "Volkischer Beobachter" of 2/6/38

NOTE.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is included in the space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

.. Significance of recent changes in German Cabinet

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

RT. MAY 21 1973

1. For several weeks there have been rumors regarding possible changes in the German Cabinet, primarily affecting the War Ministry, and having to do with the actions, conduct and personality of the Reich Kriegsminister und Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht, General Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg. About three years ago Marshal von Blomberg was married to a young woman about 26 years old. Marshal von Blomberg is about 59 years old. Der Fuhrer, Herr Hitler, and General Goring were witnesses at his wedding. Rumor has it that the young lady in question was Field Marshal von Blomberg's secretary, that he was directed by the Fuhrer to marry her, just as it was ordered by the Fuhrer that General Goring marry his first wife. It was further rumored that Field Marshal von Blomberg had advised the Fuhrer that his intended bride was the daughter of an Army officer of good rank, whereas in truth, (according to gossip and rumor), she is the daughter of a farmer from Hanover. The Naval Attache gives the above information purely as rumor and rumor, with the real truth somewhere between, but which probably provides the spark for the present upheaval.

2. The occasion of Field Marshal von Blomberg's marriage, whatever the reason for it or the truth of the rumors occasioned by it, was used both by the Army and the Nazi Party to bring to a head the jealousies, animosities or conflicts previously reported to exist between the two - the Army and the Party.

3. It is also reliably reported that the Army used the occasion and circumstances of Field Marshal von Blomberg's marriage to make representations to Mr. Hitler for Field Marshal von Blomberg's removal as War Minister and as Commander in Chief of the Defense Forces, ostensibly because he had violated the code of the Old Army in his marriage, but primarily because he did not represent the true ambitions and aspirations of the New Army; that he was becoming too old and soft and could not or would not maintain the Army's idea of aloofness and independence of Party politics. The Army's spokesman was reported to be General Fritsch, the Commander in Chief of the Army, whose resignation was today accepted by the Fuhrer on the grounds of "ill health". It is also rumored that General von Fritsch is under protective arrest. This cannot be verified. It is a fact, however, that Field Marshal von Blomberg is, at present, out of the country - in Capri on his honeymoon.

4. The conflict between the Army and the Party is due to the desire of the Army to remain out of politics and their desire not to be too Nazi politically controlled, but to remain the 'balance wheel' of the present regime.

The Party, at least the radical members of the Nazi Party, used this occasion also for a show-down.

5. The today's (Saturday, 5 February 1958) German press gives the results of the Fuhrer's decisions which are made public. These decisions are far-reaching and have possible serious further reactions. They affect not only the Army but the Air Force as well as the Foreign Service. It remains to be seen

Approved with the following conditions: <u>C-D-E</u> (1) <u>Director</u> B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16 (2) <u>Major</u> <u>Ar</u> <u>Chief</u> <u>Budget</u> <u>C.M.O.</u> <u>Comd</u> <u>War</u> <u>Collage</u> <u>M.I.R.</u> <u>Plan.</u> <u>Out.</u> <u>T.S.B.</u> <u>C.A.R.</u> <u>Eng.</u> <u>S.A.A.</u> <u>M.A.S.</u> <u>Avn.</u> <u>U.S.</u> <u>M.C.</u> <u>H.Q.</u>															
Tech. Div.	C. in C.	C. in S.	Com. Dist. Com.	Com. Rec. Pers.	C. in C. Asst.	C. in S. Asst.	Com. Air	Assigned to	Operations				Base	Com. Base	Return to Base No.
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From Z Date 7 February, 1938 Serial No. P-90 File No. EF30 (G)
 Source of information Personal Observation, personal contacts and German Press.
 Subject G E R M A N Y German Cabinet Changes Significance of.
 (Station reported on) (Index title or per index sheet) (Subsidiary)

Reference

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whether the present changes portend a more aggressive and radical foreign policy. It is the present consensus of opinion that temporarily at least, the Party has gained an important victory in that they have carried their point and the Army possibly loses some of its independence and is now more than ever under Party control, which they have previously successfully resisted. Also, the Army's influence which has acted as a balance wheel against precipitous and hasty actions on the part of over-enthusiastic politicians, has been greatly decreased, if not destroyed. The danger and possibilities of the present situation lie in whether the Army quietly accepts the present decisions or will make further "protests" or representations to the Fuhrer. Inasmuch as the Fuhrer has personally taken charge of all the Armed Forces, further "protests" on the part of the Army, especially in a dictator-ruled country, are very apt to be looked on as personal disloyalty to the Fuhrer and punished accordingly. Should such an eventuality occur, another "blood purge", similar to that of 1934, is not beyond the realms of possibility. The situation is much more serious than the German Government controlled press indicates. Of necessity, a great show is made of "National Unity" under the Nazi Party, and this is the primary reason assigned for the present multitudinous changes. However, the present situation goes far beyond this and is loaded with dynamite.

6. Among the decisions of the Fuhrer announced in today's press (5 Feb.) are:

a) Convening of the Reichstag on 20 February 1938 for an explanation of the present decisions.

b) Acceptance of the "resignation" of Field Marshal von Blomberg as War Minister and Commander in Chief of the Defense Forces on account of "ill health". (He is now on his honeymoon on the Island of Capri).

c) The acceptance of the "resignation" of General Fritsch, Commander in Chief of the Army, who is reported (rumor) to be under protective arrest. He was presumably the spokesman for the Army's demands. The reason assigned for his resignation was "ill health".

d) General Göring has been promoted to General Field Marshal but given no additional duties. It will, however, be noted that he now is the highest ranking officer of the three branches of the Armed Forces. It was rumored that he was a candidate for Field Marshal von Blomberg's position but was strenuously opposed by the Army because of his close Party affiliation and his lack of proper military and technical qualifications.

e) General of Artillery von Brauchitsch, at present in command of Group 4, has been promoted to General Oberst and named as Commander in Chief of the Army, as relief of General von Fritsch, now retired.

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Director	B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16				Memorandum	Jr. Sec.	Budget	C.N.O.	Gen'l Staff	War College	N.I.B. Plan.	Gen. Dir.	T.B.	C.A.R.	Eng.	S.A.	M.A.S.	Asst.	U.S. M.C.	H.Q.
Tech. Dir.	C. in C.	Com. Bat. For.	Com. Sea. For.	C. in C. Asst.	Com. S.S.R.	Com. Asst.	Attended at				Operations				State	Com. Sec.	Return to Bureau No.			
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From Z Date 7 February, 1938 Serial No. R-90 File No. EF30 (G)
Source of information Personal observation, personal contacts with German press
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f) General of Artillery Keitel has been named as Chief des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief of the Supreme Staff of the Defense Forces). He was formerly Chief of the Defense Bureau. This officer presumably displaces Field Marshal von Blomberg, but under a different title and lower rank. Field Marshal von Blomberg's office has been assumed personally by the Fuhrer, Herr Hitler, and no longer exists under the new reorganization. It is here assumed by many that, General Göring having been promoted to Field Marshal, will ultimately succeed Field Marshal von Blomberg.

g) The Navy was entirely disconnected with the present changes.

h) Herr von Neurath, the former Foreign Minister, was kicked up-stairs to be President of the newly formed Secret Cabinet Council.

i) Herr von Ribbentrop has been recalled as Ambassador to England to become Foreign Minister, vice von Neurath, relieved. Von Ribbentrop is known as a rabid Party man, while von Neurath is not.

j) The German Ambassadors to Tokio, Rome and Vienna have been recalled for further disposition.

k) The following changes and promotions in the Army are announced as a result of the present shake-up:

- 1) General of Infantry List, commanding General of the IV Army Corps, to command of Group II (a promotion).
- 2) General of Artillery Becker, present leader of the Proving Grounds of the Army (inventor of "Big Bertha" of world-war fame), to be Chief of the Proving Office of the Army.
- 3) General von Richenau, at present Commanding General of the VII Army Corps, to command of Group IV.
- 4) Lieutenant-General von Gossler, Commander of the 19th Division, to be Inspector of Cavalry.
- 5) Lieutenant-General von Wietersheim, Commander of the 29th Division, to the Commanding General of the XIV Army Corps.
- 6) Lieutenant General Scroth, Commander of the 1st Division, to Commanding General of the XII Army Corps.
- 7) Lieutenant-General von Schwedler, Chief of the Army Personnel Office, to be Commanding General of the IV Army Corps.

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Yach. Div.	C. to C. U. S.	Com. Sec. Fin.	Com. Sec. Fin.	C. to C. U. S.	Com. S. S. A.	Com. S. S. A.	Attended at	Specimen	Com. Sec. W. P.	Com. M. P.	Specimen	Specimen	Specimen	Specimen	Specimen	Specimen	Specimen	Specimen

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(Classify new copies each January first) (Submit original copy from O. N. I. Index)
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 Subject G E R M A N Y German Cabinet Changes Significance of
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- 8) Lieutenant-General Ritter von Schobert, Commander of the 33rd Division, to be Commanding General of the VII Army Corps.
- 9) Lieutenant-General Busch, Commander of the 23rd Division, to be Commanding General of the VIII Army Corps.
- 10) Lieutenant-General von Stulpnagel, Commander of the 30th Division, to be Chief Quartermaster II in the General Staff of the Army.
- 11) Major-General Guderian, Commander of the 2nd Panzer (Armored) Division, to be Commanding General of the Panzer troops.
- 12) Major-General von Lewinski, Chief Quartermaster I in the General Staff, to Command of the 18th Division.
- 13) Major-General Schwantes to be Commander of the 19th Division.
- 14) Major-General Veiel, Commander of the 2nd Schützen Brigade, to be Commander of the 2nd Armored Division.
- 15) Major-General Bremer, Artillery Commander 3, to be Commander of the 34th Division.
- 16) Major-General Graf von Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt, Commander of Infantry Regiment 8, to be Commander of the 23rd Division.
- 17) Major-General Lemelsen, Commander of the War College in Dresden, to be Commander of the 29th Division.
- 18) Major-General Ritter von Speck, Artillery Commander 17, to be Commander of 53rd Division.
- 19) Major-General von Kortzfleisch to Command of the 1st Division.
- 20) Major-General von Briesen, Commander of Infantry Regiment 69, to be Commander of the 30th Division.
- 21) Major-General Brand, Commander of the Artillery School, to be Inspector of the War Schools.
- 22) Major-General von Arnim, Commander of Infantry Regiment 68, to be Commander of the Reersdienststelle 4.
- 23) Colonel Behlendorff, Division Chief of the Supreme Command of the Army, to be Artillery Commander 31.

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- 5) General of Cavalry von Pörgrell, now Inspector of Cavalry, with the right to wear present uniform.
- 6) General of Infantry Liese, with the right to wear present uniform.
- 7) Lieutenant-General von Niebelschütz, now Inspector of War Schools, with the right to wear present uniform.

m) Numerous changes in organization of the Air Ministry and in personnel of the Air Force, which ~~are~~ being reported separately.

n) At the same time it is announced that Herr Funk will take over his duties as Economics Minister on Tuesday, 8 February. It will be remembered that Dr. Schacht, recently resigned this office which, ad interim, has been administered by General Göring, who is Head of the Four Year Plan among his numerous other duties. It is felt that the Economics Ministry will be subordinate to General Göring and his Four Year Plan. General Göring also announces the re-organization of the Economics Ministry as follows:

MAIN DIVISION I (Industrial Division for German Raw and Semi-Manufactured materials), consisting of:

- Division 1 (General Questions and Plans)
- Division 2 (Industrial Group of Experts)
- Division 3 (Chemical)
- Division 4 (Mineral Oil Industry)

THIS MAIN DIVISION is headed by Major-General of the Air Force, LOEB.

MAIN DIVISION II (Mining, Iron and Power), consisting of:

- Division I - Mining.
- Division 2 - Iron.
- Division 3 - Power supply.

THIS MAIN DIVISION is headed by Major-General von HANSEN.

MAIN DIVISION III (Industrial Arrangement, Commerce, Skilled Labor), consisting of:

- Division 1 - Industrial Organization.
- Division 2 - Trade Police.

THIS MAIN DIVISION is headed by Herr SCHMEER.

MAIN DIVISION IV - Money and Credit.

THIS MAIN DIVISION is headed by Herr LANGE.

MAIN DIVISION V -- (Commerce, Foreign Exchange, Exports), consisting of:

- Division 1 - Provincial Advisory Council.
- Division 2 - Foreign Exchange Control.
- Division 3 - Exports.

THIS MAIN DIVISION is headed by Herr von JAWITZ.

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Director	A-B-C-D-E	Monograph	Index	Subject	C.N.O.	Gen'l Staff	War College	M.I.B.	Nav.	Inf.	T.A.R.	C.A.R.	Exp.	S.S.A.	M.A.R.	Adv.	U.S. M.C.	H.O.
Tech. Dir.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Sec. For.	Com. Sec. For.	C. in C. Adv.	Com. S.S.A.	Com. Adv.	Attached at	Com. Dir.	W.P.	Com. M. T.	State	Com. Sec.	Return to	Exam. No.				

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
ATTACHE'S REPORT *C-10-m, 15209-R*

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and also externally, in foreign policy, now that the Army has lost its position as the 'balance wheel' to radical Nazi Party politicians who may be tempted to try any external adventure, however wise or unwise.

10. Attached hereto are the photographs of the important personalities assuming new duties as the result of the decrees of the Fuhrer of 4 February 1938 in the Army, Air Force and Economics Ministry.

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Tech. Dir.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Int. Fin.	Com. Int. Fin.	C. in C. Asst.	Com. S. S. A.	Com. Asst.	Attached at	Operations	Com. Dir.	W. P.	Com. J. A. T.	State	Com- munic.	Return to Route No.				

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From 2 Date 19 February 1938 Serial No. R-105 File No. EF30/EF-7

Source of information Foreign Press and Personal Observations

Subject GERMANY/AUSTRIA Austrian-German Relations

Reference

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (R)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By IKT, NAHS MAK MAY 21 1973

A-B-C-D-E														
Director	B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16	Monograph	Journal	Budget	C.N.O.	Gen'l Staff	War College	M.I.B.	Nav.	Std.	T.A.S.	C.A.S.	Rep.	S.S.A.
Trk. Div.	C. to C. Lt. &	Com. Staff. Per.	Com. Staff. Per.	C. to C. Adm.	Com. Staff. Per.	Com. Staff. Per.	Com. Staff. Per.	Com. Staff. Per.	Com. Staff. Per.	Com. Staff. Per.	Com. Staff. Per.	Com. Staff. Per.	Com. Staff. Per.	Com. Staff. Per.
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From Z Date 19 February 1938 Serial No. R-105 File No. EF30/EF7
Source of information Foreign Press and Personal Observation
Subject GERMANY/AUSTRIA German-Austrian Relations
Reference German-Austrian Relations

Summary (The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)
German/Austrian Relations.
7 1938

1. The recent shake-up in the high commands of the German Army and in the Foreign Service, which was announced on 4 February, was followed by the un-announced and secret conference between the German Chancellor Herr Hitler and the Austrian Chancellor Herr Schussnigg on 12 February at Berchtesgaden, Herr Hitler's retreat on the German-Austrian border. No previous announcement of this conference had been made and it was not until the conference was completed and Herr Schussnigg was back in Austria that the public was aware that such a conference was contemplated or had taken place. A very broad and general communiqué was later issued by both Governments, to the effect that questions of mutual interest to both countries had been discussed and that the conference was intended to implement the Austro/German Agreement of 1936, which had not worked to the satisfaction of either Government, particularly to Germany.

2. It was reported that the conference was held at Herr Hitler's initiative. Herr Hitler was attended by the new German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, Field Marshal Göring, recently promoted to this rank, Herr von Papen, the German Ambassador to Vienna, recently recalled. It is also reported that certain high officers of the German Army were also present, but this is not confirmed. Herr Schussnigg was attended by Dr. Hugo Schmidt, the Austrian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

3. It is generally supposed that the Austrian Chancellor was put under considerable pressure and possibly threats during the conference at Berchtesgaden to accept the German demands.

4. Prior to any official or tangible announcements as to the real engagements entered into, it was reported that Herr Hitler had demanded among other things that German Nazi organizations in Austria be accorded the same rights and privileges as other groups and political parties; that an amnesty for political prisoners, which would of course include all German Nazis arrested and imprisoned in Austria at the time of and subsequent to the "Putsch" in 1934, terminating in the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss, be granted; and that certain Austrian Nazis with known German Nazi sympathies be included in a new Austrian Cabinet. It was particularly stressed that Germany desired the appointment of an Austrian Nazi to the Cabinet as Minister of the Interior, which office controls the Austrian police.

5. It was also reported, though not confirmed, that a time limit was placed on the acceptance by Austria of Herr Hitler's demands, and that during the interim there was considerable German troop and air concentration on the German/Austrian border. The alleged concentration of German armed forces on the border has been explained as a routine maneuver.

6. It was not until 16 February that the first tangible results of the Hitler-Schussnigg conference became evident. On that day the formation and

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From Z Date 19 February, 1938 Serial No. R-105 File No. EF50/EF7
(Companion copy series) (Subject proper number from O. N. I. Index)
Source of information Foreign Press and Personal Observation
Subject GERMANY/AUSTRIA German-Austrian Relations.
(Station reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subject)

Reference

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and composition of a new Austrian Cabinet was announced in the German Press, as was the amnesty for political prisoners.

7. The composition of the new Cabinet is particularly noteworthy in that Dr. Seyss-Inquart, who is generally regarded in Germany as a Nazi, was appointed Minister of the Interior with control of the Austrian police. This appointment has been hailed with great joy in Germany and has been particularly emphasized in the German press.

8. Among the others in the newly formed Austrian Cabinet, who may be considered to have Nazi leanings, are:

Guido Schmidt - Foreign Minister
Professor Adamovich - Minister of Justice
Colonel Glaize-Horstenau - Minister with Portfolio
Colonel Heschy-Doliva - Secretary of Industry
Adolph Watzek - Secretary of Labor.

9. It is generally believed that the first two measures so far announced, the formation of a new Cabinet containing officials approved by Herr Hitler and the release of political prisoners, are only the forerunners of other measures yet to be taken.

10. It is worthy of note that the newly appointed Minister of the Interior, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, lost no time in rushing to Berlin to confer with the German authorities. He arrived in Berlin on 17 February and was received by Herr Hitler in conference, also by General Goring and the Chief of Police Himmler.

11. So far, there has appeared no mention of the obligations undertaken by Germany in return for the concessions made by Austria, nor is there any tangible evidence that any such obligations were undertaken by Germany. To date it seems that the "Agreement" entered into at Berchtesgaden is rather one-sided. It is true that reports have it that Germany has agreed to respect the "Sovereignty" of Austria, but this hardly makes sense with the measures so far announced which appear not only to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria but also pave the way for further "peaceful infiltration" by Germany into Austria which can possibly finally result in a union of the two "German peoples", or control of Austria by Germany. The common language, origin, ideals, and associations of the two countries are constantly expressed in the German press. Austria is frequently spoken of as a "German State". The exact implication of such an expression is not known but is capable of several interpretations.

12. For the moment, the developments in Austria appear as another victory for the totalitarian States and their methods. It yet remains to be seen whether the majority of the Austrian people are satisfied with the developments,

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internal policies of the Party, for example, the doing away with Chaplains in the Army and the Party attitude to the Churches; the doing away with the old military salute and the substitution therefor of the National-Socialist salute; the introduction of Commissars in the Army in the form of political instructors; the desire that officers be recruited only from the youth who had gone through the National-Socialist Cadet Corps; the opposition to the introduction of politics in the Army; the opposition to the expenditure of so much money and material for Party buildings and public works to the detriment of the Military, Naval and Air Forces; and finally, there was said to be strenuous opposition to any attempts to transform the Army into a National Socialist Army with the attendant dangers of losing its age-old traditions and independence.

17. A more aggressive foreign policy has certainly appeared as predicted and while it is not known whether the Army was consulted before the present developments in German/Austrian relations, or whether they approved or disapproved, and if any of the conjectures above are true, it appears reasonable to believe that the Army shakeup of 4 February cannot be entirely disassociated from the events of today. The writer was not long ago informed by an intelligent German that the German High Command recently opposed the proposal to send approximately 80,000 regular German troops to Spain, which was favored in influential Nazi circles. This opposition on the part of the Army, coupled with other oppositions to the Nazi Foreign Policy, was the real cause of the shake-up of 4 February. Still further retirements in the Army, in addition to those reported and announced, are expected to take place shortly.

18. The German Navy has so far remained completely unaffected by the recent changes. It is understood that at the beginning of the present regime in Germany, the Commander in Chief, in conference with officers of the Navy, made it distinctly understood that the Navy would go along hand and glove with the National Socialist Party and that those officers who would not do so could ask for immediate retirement which would be granted without question. Thus the navy, in contrast to the Army, has become entirely National Socialist and as such could not not be expected to be involved in such political changes as took place on 4 February.

19. In connection with the recent announcements regarding German/Austrian relations, further developments and announcements are expected. So far the concessions have all been made by the Austrians, viz, the formation of a pro-Nazi Austrian Cabinet and the Amnesty for political prisoners. Further concessions are to be expected.

20. The German Reichstag has been called to meet at 1 p.m. Sunday, 20 February, at which meeting Herr Hitler is expected to make important pronouncements. All Germans have been ordered to assemble at their radios in their homes or at the public loudspeakers erected throughout the land to hear Mr. Hitler.

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From 2 Date 18 March 1938 Serial No. R-171 File No. EF/P9
Source of information PERSONAL Observation and Press
Subject EUROPE Political Situation
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

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Recent Events in Central Europe

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

MAY 21 1973

By RT, NARS Date

1. Events in Central Europe have developed rapidly in the past week and the trend and results of these events give reason to predict future events. The world has been confronted with one "fait accompli" after another, after the manner of the Dictator-ruled countries. There has never been much doubt as to Germany's real and final intentions in regard to Austria. Opinion differed as to the time and methods to be employed by Germany. As usual, a propitious moment was chosen for the "coup".
2. Events in Germany and Austria in the past six weeks are all inter-related. First there was the Army and Diplomatic shakeup in Germany on 4 February, followed on 12 February by the unexpected and sudden conference between Herr Hitler and Herr Schuschnig at Berchtesgaden, at which final absorption of Austria by Germany was, in fact, assured. Then followed the special session of the German Reichstag at which session Herr Hitler made important pronouncements fortelling future events. On 9 March Herr Schuschnig suddenly and unexpectedly announced the plebiscite for Austria to take place four days later on Sunday 13 March. This move of Herr Schuschnig apparently took the German Government by surprise and provided the spark for what happened a few days later. Herr Schuschnig's announcement of the plebiscite was greeted in the German press with all the criticism, derision and vituperation with which the Nazi press, at times, is very proficient.
3. Without doubt, the sudden announcement of the Austrian plebiscite hastened events and was the deciding factor for immediate and drastic action by Germany. Otherwise it is believed that the quiet infiltration and absorption of Austria by Germany would have simply continued at a more rapid pace than formerly and would have required some months to accomplish by the "peaceful" means contemplated in Germany. It goes without saying that while Germany primarily intended a peaceful penetration and absorption of Austria covering months, they had plans ready for instant military occupation of Austria in case of necessity.
4. This military occupation of Austria actually took place on Friday-Saturday, 11-12 March, two days after the announcement of the Austrian plebiscite.
5. As is now known, Austria has been completely taken over by the National Socialist Government and is being completely and thoroughly organized along National Socialist lines. Austria is now a province or state of Greater Germany, just as are Hannover, Westphalia, East Prussia, etc., without an iota of sovereignty.
6. The reorganization of Austria along National Socialist lines, the formation and indoctrination of the hundreds of Nazi organizations, will require time and be attended with difficulties, but the final result is not to be doubted. Undoubtedly some reaction will set in after the first days of jubilation are over and the iron fist of Nazism makes itself felt. It will not be easy for thousands of Austrians, unsympathetic to the doctrines of National Socialism, however

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From 2 Date 18 March, 1938 Serial No. E-171 File No. EF/P9

Source of information Personal Observation and Press

Subject E. H. R. O. P. E. Political Situation

Reference

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silent they are now perforce, completely to change their method of living and be subject to the many restrictions, regulations and sacrifices to be imposed upon them.

7. The German Reichstag has been convoked to meet at 8:00 p.m. today, Friday, 18 March. Herr Hitler will address the Reichstag and his speech will be broadcast to the German people. Important pronouncements are expected.

8. It is, of course, difficult to predict the next moves of the totalitarian states, as it is their practice to act suddenly and announce later. However, past events and the known aspirations of the Nazi Government point in three directions, as follows:

a) Czechoslovakia, where there is a considerable German minority, the Sudeten Deutsche, who are daily, particularly since the Austrian annexation, becoming more vociferous and bold in their opposition to the Czechoslovakian Government. Several incidents have already occurred on the German/Czechoslovakian border, resulting in riots and disorder between the Czech authorities and the Sudeten Deutsche. There seems little doubt that the Sudeten Deutsche under their leader Herr Henlein are controlled and motivated by the Nazi Party in Germany. One may look for increased agitation in Czechoslovakia by the German minority. In view of the constant threats in speeches made by Herr Hitler, Field Marshal Göring and other prominent Nazis, that Germany will protect their own minorities beyond its borders, it is to be expected that sooner or later with prepared agitation and propaganda Germany will find or provoke the incident considered necessary for drastic action against Czechoslovakia following the lines of their recent annexation of Austria. The territorial ambitions of Nazi Germany in Central and Eastern Europe have been the subject of much writing by authorities on international affairs, in fact it is difficult to read Herr Hitler's book "Mein Kampf" without immediately seeing that territorial expansion in Europe itself takes precedence over expansion at a distance, as for example, the return of Germany's far distant colonies. With Czechoslovakia annexed to Germany, Germany's ambitions in regard to Ukraine would be made immeasurably easier of accomplishment.

b) The second direction in which Nazi aspirations point is to Hungary. One hears little of this except that it is always stated that Hungary is much more friendly and susceptible to National Socialism than was Austria and that when Germany was ready and the time propitious, the absorption of Hungary could easily and swiftly be accomplished.

c) The third direction of future German aspirations points to Poland - Polish Corridor - Lithuania. Incidents are daily occurring on the Polish/Lithuanian border. The Polish Foreign Minister Beck recently hurried back to Warsaw from a four day visit to Rome where he had been in conference with

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From Z Date 16 March 19 38 Serial No. E-171 File No. EF/P9
(Commence new series each January first) (Obtain previous number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Personal Observation and Press

Subject E. R. U. O. P. E. Political Situation
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Signors Mussolini and Ciano on account of the tense situation (as announced in the German press) between Poland and Lithuania. Field Marshal Göring has just returned from a "hunting trip" to Poland. There have been numerous exchanges of visits between statesmen of Germany and Poland in recent months. The recent visit of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to Poland is generally believed to have been a failure. The Poland - Polish Corridor - Lithuanian situation and its possibilities were not discussed in Berlin two weeks ago, but now it is heard on every side. Some are positive in their declarations as to future events. These declarations take the general line that Poland, with the assistance of Germany, will take Lithuania or that part of it containing the seaport of Memel. In return for German assistance, Germany will get back the Polish Corridor and Danzig.

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(Commence new series with January file) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)
Source of information *Conversation, Press & Observation*
Subject *GERMANY* Erection of Fortifications
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet)
Reference

REMARKS.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Reported building of fortifications along the
German/French border, paralleling the French Maginot Line.

1. A recent decree promulgated by the Commissioner of the German Four Year Plan (General Göring), conscripts all German labor. This order compels all citizens of the Reich to work on any task assigned them. In this manner, labor may be "given leave" (taken) from present employment and put to work on specified work. The exact nature of "specified work" is not known, however, it may be reasonably assumed that it is closely related to the brewing Czechoslovakian situation.
2. In conversations with German sources, it has been stated that Germany has been undertaking the erection of fortifications along the Western German/French border, paralleling the French Maginot line, with an initial view of completing same in the normal time of a year or so. The continued tense German/Czechoslovak situation which, temporarily at least, seems to have halted the Nazis "Drang nach Osten" (Drive to the East) as a result of Germany's uncertainty as to France's course of action in the event Czechoslovakia is invaded (with the likelihood of involving England), has spurred the Nazis on to completion of their counterline fortifications with all possible speed. It is understood that Dr. Todt, President of the V.D.I. (Association of German Engineers) and who is charged with supervision of Reichsautobahnen construction, was recently approached by General Göring to hurry the completion of the fortifications, and that Dr. Todt pointed out that it was a physical impossibility to complete the project within the year with the labor available to him, but that if he were given a free hand with labor, the undertaking could be pushed to completion. Hence the issuance of the labor conscripting decree through which, it was stated, the fortifications will be completed within three to four months.
3. In Berlin a tremendous building program has been underway for the past few months - erection of numerous new state buildings, construction of new streets, new underground communications (subways), etc. Since the promulgation of the above decree, it has been observed that there has been an appreciable diminution in the labor employed on these projects, which would appear to indicate that labor is being diverted to works of a far more important nature - of military import.
4. The numerous daily German press articles dealing with the Czechoslovakian situation clearly emphasize Germany's intention not to allow the Sudeten problem to escape solution advantageous to Germany, and that she is biding time until the propitious moment arrives.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date *MAY 21 1973*

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From Z Date 22 July 1938 Serial No. R-440 File No. EF50/P91
Source of information Reliable observation
Subject GERMANY Military and Naval Activities
Reference (a) Z Report R-504 of 1 July, 1938, = 20583-7

Index—The review, editing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Attention should be given to geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.

Increased military and naval activities, presumably related to the Czechoslovakian question.

1. I have gathered from reliable sources in conversations and otherwise:
 - a) The work on the counter-Maginot line along the French border is being pushed to the utmost. Ten thousand masons and concrete workers have been sent recently to this work, together with Autobahn laborers and others from all parts of Germany. A large number of Pioneer (Engineer) divisions have been detailed there.
 - b) At Kiel. Day and night shifts were observed on the aircraft carrier, at present about half completed.
Day and night shifts observed on one large cruiser in the floating dock, name not known.
One 10,000 ton cruiser, not named - probably "I" - on ways, ready for launching.
 - c) Navy, general. Destroyers are going into commission more frequently than in the past.
Rumors of a large reserve of submarine machinery and periscopes on hand, for which the necessary hulls could be built in a very short time.
 - d) Reserve divisions being called to active duty 15 August, after harvest is over, presumably for Fall maneuvers.
2. It has been breathed that in event of war with England, Germany will establish a submarine and seaplane base at the northwest corner of Spain (Coruna or Vigo) to operate against British commerce.
3. With her back secured by the counter-Maginot line, Germany will feel safer about a push to the East, in the belief that France and England will not consider Czechoslovakia worth the lives, time and money required to break through the line of fortifications.
4. It is not believed that Germany, Government or people, want war. The building up of the armed forces is primarily for a show of German strength at diplomatic conferences, either to force the Czechs to grant very favorable terms to the Sudeten Germans or to hold the British and French back if and when the Germans take forcible measures in Czechoslovakia.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

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From 2 Date 12 December, 19 56 Serial No. E-704 File No. 8750/P16-1

Source of Information CONFIDENTIAL Conversation (Indicate source and date of interview) (Indicate present number from O. N. I. Index)

Subject GERMANY Complement of German Ships
(Machine reported on) (Indicate title as per Index sheet)

Reference

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Full war-time complement maintained by German ships at all times.

DEC 28 1956

1. The Naval Attache recently learned from a reliable source that ships of the German Navy carry a full war-time complement at all times. The crew of a 1600 ton destroyer is 270 men.
2. The Engineer's Force is sufficient to provide a watch in three under all conditions, including full power. One section is on watch, one sleeping, one at the anti-aircraft guns or in magazines.

DECLASSIFIED

NA 11662, Sec. 3(E) and 4(D) or (H)

OSD's letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, MAY 21 1973

NAID Date

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From 2 Date 10 March 1939 Serial No. R-183 File No. EF30/A14
(Continuation cover series each January first) (Submit proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Reliable

Subject GERMANY "Push" to the Northeast
(Submit subject matter) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Substitute)

Reference

Summary of the contents, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. (Submit summary of contents, personnel, or political action, and the gist of the report.)

German "push" reported to be directed toward the Northeast instead of toward the Southeast and Ukraine.

1. In conversation with a reliable source, I learned that the German "push", when it came, would be directed toward the Northeast instead of toward the Southeast and Ukraine. My informant stated that he had obtained this information from one who was present when the expansion was discussed with Mr. Hitler. The General Staff had considered the Ukraine drive, but Herr Hitler stated that history showed that whenever Germans moved to southern and more favorable lands and climates, the race deteriorated. Consequently, he advocated pushing up to the Northeast, to the vicinity of Moscow. Poland's loss of the Corridor is to be appeased by delivery of or assisting her in taking a hunk out of the Ukraine with a Black Sea port.

2. There is no time schedule for this push. It is just one of the steps which have been laid out for any advance in the outline for a bigger and better Germany.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

in RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

MAR 27 1939

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From Z Date 17 March, 1959 Serial No. R-187 File No. NY 80-114
(Continued on next page)
(See January 1961)

Source of information Observations, Press

Subject GERMANY Acquisition of Czechoslovakia
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet)

Reference: a) Mi-Berlin Report No. 18,506, dated 18 March, 1959.⁵

NOTE—The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is furnished in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

The German Acquisition of Czechoslovakia and Probable Future Expansion of the German Empire.

1. As a matter of historical interest in connection with the Czechoslovakian "kidnap" and dismemberment, reference a) is quoted in full hereunder. It is believed that this report is an excellent, concise resumé of recent conditions in Czechoslovakia up to the time of the submission of the report, Monday, 15 March 1939. Ensuing events during the next few days moved at such a rapid pace - so smoothly and without casualty - that one can only believe that the acting was done by a very carefully selected cast and that the curtain was not lifted until each actor had very thoroughly rehearsed and mastered his rôle.

*GERMANY - Comment on Current Events - No. 9. Subject: The Present Disorders in Czechoslovakia.

"It is at present too early to give an accurate interpretation of the consequences which may arise out of the present disorders in Czechoslovakia. The situation, however, is viewed in Berlin with considerable anxiety. There appears to be no question of doubt that the separatist movement of the Slovaks has been abetted through German propaganda and that German unofficial agencies are responsible in a large degree for the present outbreak of the Slovaks in the separatist movement. The headquarters of this movement is placed on good authority as Vienna.

"In order to form any conclusion in regard to the eventual outcome of these disorders, one must briefly recall the events since the Munich Agreement. By the terms of the Munich Agreement, the frontiers of Czechoslovakia and the neutrality of the new state as finally constituted, were to be guaranteed by France, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, as soon as a satisfactory settlement with Germany and Poland had been reached. Further, by the terms of the Vienna Agreement, the frontiers of Czechoslovakia and Hungary were to come under the same general settlement, with Italy and Germany as arbiters. The settlement upon which this condition rested included not only a definition of the frontiers but the political, military, and economic relations between Germany and the Czechoslovak state. Among some of the more important questions which would be incorporated in this agreement were: autonomy for Slovakia and for Ruthenia, the reduction of the Czechoslovakian Army, an indemnification to Germany for her occupation of the Sudetensdeutsch territory, the economic and political relations with Czechoslovakia with Germany, and the abrogation of the Czechoslovakian treaties with France and Russia. A dispatch from the American Legation in Prague, signed by Mr. Carr, dated March 2, 1939, sets forth the conditions which it was expected that Germany would demand of Czechoslovakia before the guarantee of her frontiers would be given. These are quoted from the Prague dispatch as follows:

1. The granting to Germany of one-third of the Czechoslovak gold reserve.

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From Z Date 17 March, 1939 Serial No. R-187 File No. EF50/Al4
(Communicate new copies each January first) (Subject proper number from O. N. I. Index)
Source of information Observations, Press
Subject GERMANY Acquisition of Czechoslovakia
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)
Reference: a) MA-Berlin Report No. 16,506, dated 15 March, 1939.

NOTE:—(The review, indexing and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

2. The reduction of the Czechoslovak Army to 30,000 or 40,000 men.
3. Acceptance by Czechoslovakia of Czechoslovak paper currency which the Germans exchanged for Reichsmarks upon the incorporation of the Sudeten area into Germany, the acceptance to constitute payment for arms and other war material to be supplied by Skoda.
4. Extraterritoriality for all Germans in Czechoslovakia together with German courts with jurisdiction over German nationals.
5. Cancellation of the French and Soviet pacts.
6. Liquidation of the Little Entente.
7. Withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the League of Nations.
8. Complete neutrality of Czechoslovakia.
9. Entry of Czechoslovakia into the anti-Comintern group.

"On Friday last the Czechoslovakian government announced its intention to reduce the Czech Army to 100,000 men and also announced that neither Ruthenia nor Slovakia would be allowed a separate army.

"The status, then, of Czechoslovakia at the moment is still one of flux. No agreement has been reached with Germany, the question of the autonomy of Slovakia and Ruthenia has not been settled, nor is it believed that the announced reduction of the Czechoslovak Army to 100,000 is satisfactory to Germany. Within the past week the Slovakian claims for complete autonomy have taken a sudden and more violent form which in Pressburg and other Slovakian cities have reached a point of open revolt. The Czech government has taken prompt measures to suppress these disorders. It has been learned in Berlin that Pressburg has been completely surrounded by the Czech Army and cut off from all communication with the rest of the country. The same measures have been taken in two other Slovak cities. This action on the part of Prague is significant in that it definitely shows that the government does not fear a general uprising of the Slovak people, but is directing its efforts entirely to the suppression of the Slovak parties in the centers of trouble where it is believed they have been acting under the instigation of German agents. The Slovak Party has sent a request to Germany for aid. So far the German government has not replied, but a strong note from Berlin to Prague may be expected within the next twentyfour hours.

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From Z Date 17 March, 1939 Serial No. R-187 File No. EF50/A14
(Commence new series each January first) (Classify proper number from O. N. I. Index)
Source of information Observations, Press
Subject GERMANY Acquisition of Czechoslovakia
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Sub-title)
Reference: a) NA-Berlin Report No. 16,506, dated 15 March, 1939.

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"In the present crisis there always remains the possibility of German armed intervention in Czechoslovakia and the military implications which might arise from the present situation have given rise to much speculation in military circles in Berlin. Since it is generally conceded that the present crisis has been precipitated by Germany, one must immediately seek the object which Germany desires to gain. It may be that the present disorders are expected to lead to a Nazi uprising in Prague and to a semi-independent Ukrainian and Ruthenian state created on Nazi principles and wholly in the hands of Berlin; or it may mean the first step in the long-expected move of Germany to the East. The German papers for the last four days have been creating the same sort of build-up over this crisis as was created before the Sudeten-Deutsch crisis in September. There has been a good deal written on the Carpatho-Ukraine question. If this is the first step towards a German move to the East, the whole affair takes on a decidedly military aspect. A glance at the map would show the advantage from a military point of view which Germany would acquire through either a military occupation of the Czechoslovakian state or the creation of independent military forces in Ruthenia and Slovakia which were dependent for their existence upon Germany and which could be relied upon to act with Germany in the event of war with Poland. If either a German occupation of Czechoslovakia or the creation of the Ruthenian and Slovakian independent states were to occur, the German Army acting from Austria, through Ruthenia and Slovakia, would be in the same position in regard to Poland as the German Army was after the Anschluss with Austria in regard to Czechoslovakia.

"For the last month or two military opinion in Berlin has been crystallising to the effect that Poland is the next enemy of Germany and that the questions of the Corridor, Danzig, and Memel will be allowed to remain quiescent until such time as Germany is ready for a move to the East, which will almost of necessity bring her into conflict with Poland and with Russia.

"It has not been believed, however, that such a move would be commenced until the political situation on the West had been entirely settled and until German support of Mussolini was no longer of immediate necessity. It has therefore been the opinion that the Eastern move and the creation of the Carpatho-Ukraine state would be delayed until Italy had obtained a settlement of its difficulties in the Mediterranean. In this light, the present Czechoslovak troubles seem to be premature if they are to be connected with Germany's Eastern ambitions.

"It is possible also that if Slovakia and Ruthenia succeed in separating themselves from the Czech state, they may be incorporated into Hungary. This could only be possible from the German point of view if the same Nazi movement were to occur simultaneously in Hungary and a new Nazi Hungary be brought within the orbit of the Axis. Since the present feeling in Hungary is distinctly anti-Nazi, this view cannot be given too much credence but should not altogether be neglected. Another opinion advanced in military circles is that as soon as Germany begins an armed intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Poles will

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From Z Date 17 March 1959 Serial No. R-187 File No. KF50/A14

Source of information Observations, Press

Subject GERMANY	Acquisition of Czechoslovakia
(Nation reported on)	(Index title as per Index sheet)

Reference: a) MA-Berlin Report No. 16,508, dated 15 March, 1959.

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immediately occupy Ruthenia. If this occurred, a war between Poland and Germany could scarcely be avoided.

"Since Friday the German papers have been steadily building up the Czechoslovakian crisis. The press articles for the first two days were confined to the oppression of the Slovaks and the Slovakian demands to gain their rights. Beginning, however, with Sunday's press, announcements began to be made of German blood being spilt in the Slovakian territory, and to-day's papers carry the announcements of German Frakorps fighting side by side with the Slovaks in Pressburg, and of attacks upon Germans within the Czech state. A significant statement was made yesterday at the Staatsoper during the Memorial Day celebration, by Admiral Raeder, who, in his speech, said that whenever or wherever German blood was spilt, Germany would act swiftly and with force.

"From all these possibilities, the gravity of the present situation can be easily understood. It appears that at the moment Germany is more than likely to intervene with force in the present Czechoslovak crisis. If such armed intervention does occur, it will be made with the maximum German effort and in such force as to prevent a counter-military move in Ruthenia either by Poland or Hungary. It is believed that this move is regarded by Germany as premature and that it had not been anticipated for several months to come, but that some factor, either the German Nazi Party in Slovakia or some other agency, has precipitated a crisis which forces Germany to act at once. It is not believed that an international crisis of any great magnitude to the Western Powers will be brought about by the present situation."

2. On 13 March, the Military Attache had fairly definite information that 40 out of 55/60 normal divisions of the German Army were concentrated around the Czech borders. The garrison troops at Stettin apparently remained near the northeastern border against Poland since it is not believed that Poland's attitude was quite so cooperative as it was last September. German troops started crossing the Czech border at 6:00 p.m., Monday afternoon. At 9:00 a.m. the next morning (14 March), they were in Prag. All important cities of Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by German troops by noon of Tuesday, 14 March. In the meantime, Slovakia declared its independence and Hungarian troops, with certainly the acquiescence and possibly at the suggestion of Germany, entered Carpatho-Ukraine. No resistance was offered to the occupation except possibly some minor local disturbances in the Carpatho-Ukraine. Der Führer, himself, entered Prag shortly after the troops, which indicates that he had not expected any great amount of complications.

5. It is felt that England and France were known to be indifferent to this maneuver, which doubtless made for greater ease and lack of nervousness in its execution. The Italian attitude seems to have been of very great reserve, with no public comment for several days. The Italian Naval Attache suddenly and

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5. The Naval Attache hesitates to make comments or predictions on matters which he feels fall properly within the province of the Embassy and the Military Attache, but offers his firm conviction that Germany will continue her "push to the east", probably with an accelerated tempo now that Czechoslovakia has been seized with so little ado. Hungary and Roumania are both pretty much honey-combed with pro-Nazi organisations, and while there would probably be some resistance to a German invasion, I do not think that it would be whole-hearted or of long duration. Poland, on the other hand, will be inclined to offer all the resistance that she can muster. Lithuania has a considerable sprinkling of German agitators but I believe that Latvia and Esthonia are not Nazi nests. With the Siegfried Line at their backs in the West, the Baltic (a German lake) on their left flank, and Italy controlling the Mediterranean to guard their right flank, it is a matter of but a short time before Germany would over-run Poland and possibly a good section of Russia as well. I believe that in time the German Empire will be bounded, roughly, on the north by the Baltic - up to Leningrad; on the east by a line roughly Leningrad-Moscow-Mouth of the Don River; on the south by the Black Sea, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, Italy and Switzerland; and with the present boundaries on the west. Many variables enter into the picture which may prevent its fulfillment. One of the major of these is the swallowing of indigestible masses of non-Germanic and contrary-minded peoples. A further possibility is an economic crack-up due to absorption of industrial nations before getting around to the agricultural and mineral lands. A third factor which would badly upset the itinerary is the very remote possibility of Rome changing its polarity to a Rome-Paris-London Axis. While the official and service feeling between Germans and Italians has always been extremely cordial as big brothers of the Axis, my impression is that Italians have no love for Germans, and the Germans have riveted in their minds that Italy sold out in 1914. Further, der Führer completely pushed Il Duce off the front page some time ago and has not let him return.

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From Z Date 17 March, 1939 Serial No. B-197 File No. EF50/A14
(Continuation new series each January first) (Submit proper number from O. N. I. index)
Source of information Observations, Press
Subject GERMANY Acquisition of Czechoslovakia
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Sub-title)
Reference: a) MA-Berlin Report No. 16,506, dated 15 March 1939.

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6. ✓ The German method, as borne out by their conquest of Austria, Sudet-
land, and now Czechoslovakia, is the dispatching of Nazi "missionaries" or
professional agitators into the coveted territory well in advance, who finally
proceed to get themselves talked about in the German papers as an "oppressed
minority" of German blood which must be protected. There are such groups in
Hungary and Roumania at present, and, when the right time comes, if not already,
they will doubtless be found also in Poland, Ukraine, Latvia and Esthonia. It
is known that each member of the Nazi Party pays 75 pfennige (80 cents) monthly
dues to the "Verband für die Deutsche in Ausland" (Society for Germans Abroad)
which is, in effect, a society for the propagation of the faith. Since there
are roughly four million party members, this represents a very tidy sum for
propaganda and agitation. It is not believed that Belgium, Holland or the Scan-
dinavian countries fall within the limits outlined for the Greater Germany, as
they are probably of more use to Germany as neutrals than they would be as semi-
rebellious subject states.

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From Z Date 17 July, 1959 Serial No. R-459 File No. EF30

Source of information Reliable (Continues new series each January first) (Index proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Subject GERMANY Navy General Notes
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference _____

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**Conversion of Fishing Trawlers to Naval Use and Notes
on other German Merchant Ships.**

1. Information was received in this office to the effect that several trawlers in Hamburg were being taken over by the Navy, that they were being renovated, guns installed, and that there were naval ratings on board. Accordingly, the writer visited Hamburg over the past week-end and made a tour of the harbor on one of the pleasure steamers. At the two shipyards - Stülcken Werft and Deutsche Werft (Reihersteig branch) - which are adjacent to each other, six trawlers were observed undergoing overhaul and being painted war color. A naval sailor was seen on one of them. There was no evidence of guns being installed as far as the writer could determine. The names of these ships were: "Steiermark," "Berlin," "Mecklenberg," "Franken," "Frans Dankworth," and "Jochum" (?). Their general characteristics are as follows:

"Steiermark":

Built - 1938.
Tonnage - 446
Length - 50.66 meters (166.25 feet).
Horsepower - 750.

"Berlin":

Built - 1937.
Tonnage - 472.
Length - 50.85 meters (166.79 feet).
Horsepower - 800.

"Mecklenberg":

Built - 1938.
Tonnage - 472.
Length - 50.85 meters (166.79 feet).
Horsepower - 800.

"Franken":

Built - 1937.
Tonnage - 435.
Length - 49.55 meters (162.52 feet).
Horsepower - 750.

"Frans Dankworth":

Built - 1936.
Tonnage - 464.
Length - 49.81 meters (163.58 feet).
Horsepower - 750.

All of these ships have reciprocating engines with exhaust gas turbines. No ship by the name of "Jochum" is listed in the Germanischer Lloyd so it is likely that the name was not correctly observed.

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From Z Date 17 July 1959 Serial No. R-459 File No. EF50
 Source of information Reliable
 Subject GERMANY Navy General Notes
 (Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Substitute)

Reference

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2. While in Hamburg, another source was contacted who confirmed the information that these ships were being taken over by the Navy. It was further stated that they would be used as minesweepers. It was also added that this was the beginning of the conversion of all merchant ships to the naval service which had been previously designated for that purpose. //

5. It was also heard in Hamburg that a Hamburg-American Line freighter had had its regular sailing cancelled and that it was being loaded with unknown freight.

4. At Stettin, the freighter "Hindenburg" was tied up to a wharf between the Stettiner Oderwerke and Gotslow. It was flying the naval ensign although no naval ratings could be seen on board. It had an unusual amount of life rafts piled on deck and was loading freight, but the nature thereof could not be ascertained. Just below this ship, three other freighters were tied up - the "Lewante", "Anhalt" and "Antares". These ships were flying the normal flags and were not loading or unloading. The "Hindenburg" was built in 1921, displaces 7880 tons, and is equipped with reciprocating engines developing 5700 horsepower which give a speed of 11½ knots. Its length is 468.68 feet; breadth is 58.25 feet.

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From 2 Date 10 August, 1939 Serial No. R-500 File No. EF50/98
Source of information German shipping literature
Subject GERMANY Merchant Ships
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet)

Reference

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Increased German purchases of merchant ships from foreign firms.

1. It has been noted in German shipping literature that while German private shipping companies purchased only three merchant ships (tankers and freighters) from foreign firms during the months of January and February of this year, the number of ships bought from foreign firms during March and April 1939 was twenty-three (23). Figures for the later months are not yet available. This recent spurt in the purchase of merchant vessels was discussed with another attaché who stated that his government was aware of this situation and regarded it as an attempt by Germany to acquire a "war reserve" of shipping. The list of ships purchased in the months of March and April is given hereunder. It will be observed that most of the ships are rather old.

(Ship)	(Kind)	(BRT)	(Built)	(Purchased from)	(New Name)
MANTILLA	Steam Tanker	5671	1916	Norway	NORDMEER
MENDOCINO	Steam Tanker	6921	1917	Norway	KARIBISCHES MEER
PRINSDAL	Motor	3000	1939	Norway	ARENSBURG
ROSE	Motor	3039	1938	Norway	ALSTERTOR
VRATOR	Motor	3053	1938	Norway	ANGELBURG
(Building)	Motor	3200	1939	Sweden	
M. C. HOLM	Steamer	2814	1924	Denmark	IMTRAUT HORN
ILVES	Steamer	1599	1930	Finland	GLUCKKAMP
MOUNT HELMOS	Steamer	6481	1923	Greece	BERKERSHEIM
MOUNT ESSO	Steamer	5252	1919	Greece	ROBERT BORNROFEN
VASSOS	Steamer	4733	1912	Greece	PAULINE FRIEDERICE
DIENSTSTAFNAGE	Steamer	4525	1922	Scotland	MAGDALENE VINNEN
ESSEX ENVOY	Steamer	5210	1922	England	HERMOD
LALPHAM	Steamer	4818	1915	England	HARM FRITZEN
MEOPHAM	Steamer	4330	1916	England	ANTJE FRITZEN
PEAKHAM	Steamer	4465	1912	England	JURGEN FRITZEN
STARBRIDGE	Steamer-Tanker	5963	1917	England	EUROFELD
FRIESLAND	Steamer	1029	1904	Lithuania	FRIESLAND
HOLLAND	Steamer	991	..	Lithuania	HOLLAND
GOTLAND	Steamer	990	1913	Lithuania	GOTLAND
HEROY	Steamer	3523	1921	Norway	IRIS
SIR KARL KNUDSEN	Motor Tanker	7747	1928	Norway	CHARLOTTE SCHLIE-MANN.
ACME	Steamer	2964	1919	Panama	TILSIT

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THE NAVAL ATTACHE
BERLIN W.B. Pariser Platz 2

Telephone: 12-7131 (Extension 121)
Telegraph: Alameda 9 1939

A2-7/L-552

AMERICAN EMBASSY

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29 AUGUST 1959



From: The Naval Attache, Berlin.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence Division)
SUBJECT: Restriction of Foreign Military Attachés to Limits of Berlin.
Reference: a) German Navy Ministry letter, M.Att. 5162 of 26 August 1959
b) NA-Berlin dispatch (cable) to Opnav, 0027, of 27 August 1959.

1. The translation of reference a) is quoted herewith:

"In view of the international situation the Naval Attachés are requested not to make trips or rides of their own outside of Greater Berlin as well as trips by their assistants or other officers of their armed forces without previous inquiry at the Naval Attaché Group. All prior authorizations to visit firms outside of Greater Berlin are hereby withdrawn.

By direction
(signed) Mirow
Captain and Chief of the Naval Attaché Group."

2. Similar letters were sent out by the War and Air Ministries. The War Ministry letter stated merely "BERLIN" instead of "GROSS BERLIN". The Air Ministry letter (which was not sent to this office nor to that of the U.S. Military Attaché), used the expression "forbidden to make trips".
3. This restriction was reported to our Chargé d' Affaires and to the Navy Department.
4. A canvass of other Attachés in Berlin disclosed that all had reported the matter to their home departments and to their embassies. Several suggested that like restrictions be placed on the German Attachés in their home capitals. One case of protest by an Air Attaché to the Air Ministry on account of the wording used drew the response that the notification was hastily drawn and that "requested not to make trips" was intended.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

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From 2 Date 30 August, 1959 Serial No. R-556 File No. EF30/QS
 Source of information AmConsul Hamburg Report #126 of 6/26/59.
 Subject GERMANY Conversion of Merchant Ships into Hospital Ships.
 (Station reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subject)

Reference

NOTE:—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is appended to this report. Mention leading paragraphs, personnel, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

American Consul Hamburg's Report regarding the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Hospital Ships.

1. The following excerpt is taken from consular source noted above:

"the steamships Berlin, Stuttgart and General Osorio are reliably reported to have been converted into hospital ships and to have sailed for the Baltic on August 25."

2. The "Berlin" is the 15,286 B.R.T. North German Lloyd ship that recently had a boiler explosion. It is listed as being able to make 16.0 knots. The "Stuttgart" is a 15,387 B.R.T. "K.D.F." (Strength through Joy) ship. Its speed is also listed as 16.0 knots. The "General Osorio" is a 11,590 B.R.T. motorship of the Hamburg-Südamerika Dampfschiff.-Ges. Its speed is given as 15.0 knots.

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From Z Date 17 October, 19 59 Serial No. H-646 File No. EF30/A16-5

Source of information Amconsul, Hamburg (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(F)

Subject GERMANY U-Boat Practices in Right of Visit and Search
(Nation reported on) (Index title as now index shown) (Page title)

Reference

NOTE.—The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Forwarding Monograph Report M-646 of 17 October 1959 -
re Current German U-Boat Practices in the Exercise of the Right
of Visit and Search.

Inclosure: A) - Above-mentioned report.

1. Inclosure a) is forwarded herewith.

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NA-BERLIN

M-646

17 October 1939

(GERMANY)

907

907 - 800

Operations

Submarines

G-E-R-M-A-N-Y - Current German U-Boat Practices in the
Exercise of the Right of Visit and Search.

1. According to a report from the American Consul General, Hamburg (15 October 1939), the following information concerning the application by U-Boat commanders of the German Prize Law emanates from what is believed to be a responsible source within the active submarine fleet:

a) It is true that a special order personally issued by Hitler to U-boat commanders at the outbreak of war enjoined the latter to comply most strictly with the present Prize Law, especially with those portions providing for the warning and rescue of crews of torpedoed vessels. The reason given for this strict injunction is that it is better to forego the capture of many thousands of tons of shipping than to involve the Reich in diplomatic difficulties with neutral countries.

b) The S.S. ATHENIA is believed by at least several German U-boat commanders to have been sunk on the unfortunate order of some over-zealous German commander who had been ordered to sea prior to the outbreak of war and who, therefore, had not seen the new Prize Law or Hitler's special order.

c) It was further stated that U-boat commanders are finding it extremely difficult to comply with the provisions of the Prize Law for warning vessels before destruction and for bringing crews to safety. The vulnerability of a submarine's hull to fire from the smallest calibre guns and the alleged British practice of arming and disguising merchant vessels often places the commander in the unhappy position of choosing between the safety of his vessel and crew and the observation of the restrictive provisions of the Prize Law. (See particularly Article 57 (1)). It was stated that U-boat commanders often welcomed violations of their orders to heave to and cease use of the wireless apparatus inasmuch as such violations can be construed as aid to the enemy which can be countered by force, and makes vessels liable to immediate destruction. (See articles 73 (1) 1, and 39 (3) 1).

d) As a result of these legal restrictions the effectiveness of submarine activity has been seriously curtailed. It is the opinion of responsible U-boat commanders that the near future will see either a considerable relaxation of the Law or the inauguration of unlimited submarine warfare.

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From Z Date 25 May, 1939 Serial No. 2-739 File No. 22862/116

Source of Information Conversation (Indicate name and rank of source) (Indicate date of report)

Subject G. E. R. M. A. N. Y. War, Preparation for and Conduct of (Indicate title as per index sheet) (Indicate date)

Reference

Notes: (The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personnel, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Preparation for, and conduct of, war.

1. Through conversation with German soldiers, both directly and indirectly through their relatives, the writer has learned that the German troops on the west front are being fitted out with light summer or tropical uniforms. The impression prevails amongst them that they are bound for Spain. How they are to get there is purely conjecture to them.

2. Previously the writer was informed that German submarine crews have been sent to Italy. This information was not as well authenticated as that given in (1). However the two facts may fit in together and it may all be part of a German plan to carry the war into the Mediterranean and cut the important Allied lines of communication through the Mediterranean and to the Atlantic. It must be done with the secret, or open, assistance of Italy and Spain.

3. The advantages of such a plan are obvious. If German-Spanish forces could gain control of the Straits of Gibraltar, they could throttle the Allied trade to and from the Mediterranean. If the Germans could establish a submarine base at Coruna, it would be of great assistance in cutting the important Allied lines of communication to North and South America and Africa. It is believed that this was one of the benefits the Germans hoped to gain when they assisted the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War.

4. The difficulty of transferring sufficient German troops to Spain is apparent and the attendant dangers are great, but also the advantages to the German cause are obvious. At first glance such plans appear to be fantastic but under certain conditions can be realizable. At any rate, Germany has little to lose by such a course and much to gain, provided of course that she can gain the necessary cooperation from Italy and Spain.

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From Z Date 14 Dec., 1939 Serial No. R-782 File No. EF22/A2-14
(Comments new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Personal Observations

Subject D E N M A R K Visit to Copenhagen Observations during
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference: a) Z Report R-700 of 13 November 1939

REMARKS—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Observations on visit to Copenhagen.

1. The writer visited Copenhagen 8-12 December, 1939, traveling by the usual route - train between Berlin and Warnemünde, ferry between there and Gjedser, and Danish train between Gjedser and Copenhagen.

2. At Warnemünde, I observed a small German submarine standing in and upon returning by ferry to this port I saw a small submarine standing out. Also, on the return to Berlin, I obtained a view previously blocked by trains on the siding and saw four destroyers and torpedo boats tied to the dock. I presume therefore that Warnemünde is used as destroyer and submarine base. The observations substantiate the belief that the small German submarines are finding employment in the Baltic.

3. Many freight cars were observed on the sidings and most of these were loaded with coal. These cars were awaiting ferry transfer to Gjedser and thence many were destined for Sweden and Norway. I was told that four ferries (two Danish and two German) were running day and night between Warnemünde and Gjedser, each making as a rule six round trips a day. Since each passage consumes about two hours, it indicates that the ferries must move with little delay at each end. I was also informed that the Sassnitz-Trelleborg ferries (also two German and two Swedish) are operating under a similar rush schedule, but due to the longer run cannot make the same fast turn-around. At Gjedser also many freight cars were awaiting ferry shipment but many were observed to be empty. It would indicate that Germany is piling up "devisen" in the Scandinavian countries; perhaps to pay for the iron ore so largely drawn from Sweden.

4. Patrol vessels were again sighted to north-westward and also to eastward - the latter apparently patrolling the German minefield - Gjedser - Wustrow (peninsula west of Rügen).

5. In Copenhagen I interviewed Captain Pontoppidan, the director of the Danish naval intelligence service. He stated that to date they had picked up over 300 German mines which had washed up on the eastern and southern shores of Denmark. A few of these mines exploded on impact with the beach. He said that the mine cables were too weak; also they were too lightly anchored with blocks of concrete. Apparently the mines "hopped" and in instances the concrete blocks struck together and broke up. Moreover they shifted position and brought destruction to five German patrol boats guarding their minefields. About 20 British and German mines have

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ATTACHE'S REPORT

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From Z Date 14 Dec., 1939 Serial No. R-302 File No. 10980-A-34

Source of information PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS

Subject DENMARK Visit to Copenhagen Observations during

Reference

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come from at least 3 submarines. Captain Pontoppidan gave a more conservative estimate of 20 German submarines lost.

9. Many rumors were floating around that the Germans were building pontoons and barges in great number at the North Sea shipyards, especially around Hamburg. Numerous persons sought information relative thereto. The impression seemed to be that the pontoons and barges were intended for a German attack on Holland; perhaps an attack on some outlying Dutch island, such as Texel, which would enable the establishment of a German air base within striking distance of England.

10. Copenhagen is said to be the spy center of Europe today. Many agents of all countries may be contacted. I was reliably informed that Germany maintains 26 press attachés alone in Copenhagen. In my opinion, the U.S. should have a naval intelligence officer permanently stationed in that city.

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EO 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NAME Date MAY 21 1973

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From Z Date 20 December 1939 Serial No. R-797 File No. EF30/A16-1
 Source of information Reliable conversation (Common wire series) (Select proper number from O. N. I. index)
 Subject GERMANY Military Mission to train Russian Army
 (Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Sub-title)

Reference

NOTE.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

German army officers and non-commissioned officers sent to Russia to assist Russians in organizing, equipping, and training their military forces.

1. From various sources it has been learned that German army officers and non-commissioned officers have recently been sent to Soviet Russia. Their whereabouts in that country is unknown to their relatives and the latter assume that they have been sent to assist the Russians in organizing, equipping, and training their military forces.

JAN 22 1941

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OSD letter, May 2, 1972

By RT, NARS DATE MAY 21 1973

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From Z Date 2 Jan. 1940 Serial No. R-3 File No. EF30/A16-3
Source of information American Consul Hamburg
Subject G. E. R. M. A. N. Y. Conduct of War Miscellaneous Notes
Reference (Index title as per index sheet) (Subject proper number from O. N. I. Index)

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Miscellaneous notes from the American Consul at Hamburg regarding general activities in the conduct of the war.

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 2, 1972

MAY 21 1973

1. Quoted hereunder as matters of interest are two reports of 24 November and 1 December 1939, respectively, rendered by the American Consul Hamburg to the Chargé d'Affaires of this Embassy:

"I have the honor to refer to the last sentence of the paragraph headed 'Poland' on page 2 of my strictly confidential communication No. 146 of October 20, 1939, and to elucidate Mr. Chase's necessarily veiled telephonic conversation of this morning with you.

"Yesterday we learned that the 20th Division (based on Hamburg) had suddenly received orders during that afternoon to prepare to depart with all equipment the following (this) morning for the West Front. So far as we can ascertain their destination was to be reached by this evening. Information available, although not conclusive, leads us to believe that this abrupt move is not one for the relief of troops in position, but rather one of reinforcement - perhaps in preparation for a surprise attack on the Netherlands/Belgian frontier. The fact that the order to prepare for immediate departure was given within a few hours of yesterday morning's general staff meeting with the Führer in Berlin would seem to make this belief less fantastic. We were further informed that the discontent in Germany is increasing so rapidly that 'something' has to be done and, therefore, that a surprise attack on the Belgian/Netherlands frontier within a few days would not be out of the question.

"Another fact that lends support to the theory that the attack upon the Netherlands/Belgian frontier was not abandoned, but only postponed, at the end of the week of the München 'Attentat', is that during the last ten days men from this area have been suddenly (less than 24 hours notice) drafted into the army, apparently for the sole reason that they possess a good knowledge of the Netherlands language. One such case, known to us, is that of a man in his forties, father of three children, holding an important position in a factory making an essential product, and for whom, it is understood, an exemption from service had been previously obtained. This man was given only a few hours before he was sent off to the West Front.

"Requisitioning of Autos. It is stated reliably that the requisitioning of automobiles has commenced again on a large scale in this area.

"Parachute Mine Laying. Yesterday (Thursday) afternoon the

A-B-C-D-E														
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Tech. Div.	C. in C.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	C. in C.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.
Div.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.

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From Z Date 2 Jan., 1940 Serial No. R-3 File No. EE30/A16-3
(Commence new series each January first) (Select primary number from O. N. I. index)

Source of information American Consul Hamburg

Subject G E R M A N Y Conduct of War Miscellaneous Notes
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subdividing)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

English radio announced that there was evidence that many mines had been recently laid along the English east coast by parachuting them from airplanes. This announcement recalled the, what at that time had seemed just another extravagant story, told by a well-known Hamburg German in a conversation which he had had some 30 hours earlier with one of our officers. In this conversation of the preceding day the German was commenting on the large number of ships which had been sunk by mines off the southeast coast of England during the immediately foregoing days and stated that he had been informed that German airplanes had been parachuting mines into this area in order to sever the channels of communication. This statement having been proved to have been not as extravagant as was originally believed to be the case, it may be worth while to repeat another one made by the same man, one which, when doubt was expressed by the auditor, was repeated with confident vigor. This man maintained that he knew to be a fact that the German general staff plans to invade, perhaps not until the spring, perhaps before then, England with a land army from bases in the low countries. It may be added that variations of this plan imputed to the general staff have been current here for several weeks, but that it has been heretofore impossible to trace them down to what might be considered an at least half-way reliable prophet.

"München 'Attentat'. The above-mentioned well-known Hamburger also expressed his opinion about the explosion in the Nazi sanctuary at München. He stated that he knew enough about the inner party feud, especially as it has manifested itself on the part of the 'better' Nazis against the Von Ribbentrop wing since the 'sell-out' to Russia, to feel certain that the 'Attentat' was a well planned attempt to 'get' the Führer and that wing of the party which in recent months has been riding high by this other wing."

"I have the honor to refer to the second paragraph of page 1 of my strictly confidential communication No. 151 of November 24, 1939, and to submit the following additional information. Parenthetically it should be stated that the first line of the second paragraph of that communication should have read: 'Yesterday we learned that the remnants of the 20th Division.....'.

"From trustworthy sources we have just learned that the concentration of troops and material on the Belgian 'etherlands frontier is dense and deep and that the remaining elements of the

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Trk. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Sec. For.	Com. Sec. For.	C. in C. Adm.	Com. S. S. R.	Com. Adm.																

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 Source of information American Consul Hamburg
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20th Division, which left Hamburg a week ago, were, as already stated, very probably reinforcements rather than relief.

"Among the troops concentrated in the Belgian/Netherlands frontier area the feeling of boredom and dissatisfaction has grown so rapidly that, added to the disinclination (acquired during the Polish campaign) to engage in further combat, army circles are said to believe that an early German offensive will be necessary if the dissatisfaction is not to take a more serious turn.

"Our informants, who have just returned from the above-mentioned area, state that the civilian population in the cities and villages are undergoing privations, chiefly with regard to food, that make Hamburg, upon return here, seem like a paradise. The population is said to have tolerated thus far these privations because they have readily accepted the explanation that it is all the fault of England. Transportation difficulties are said to be enormous in northwest Germany, with factories in the Ruhr experiencing great delay in obtaining supplies and the necessary empty freight cars to haul away their finished products. Reliable estimates indicate that the movement of loaded and empty freight cars has so slowed down that it is the equivalent of a 25 percent reduction in the quantity of cars available for use. In this connection it should be added that trustworthy sources of information state that normal, and even larger than normal, quantities of coal can now be brought up to the mine heads in Polish Silesia, but that there is a serious shortage of cars to move them.

"Drafting of Interpreters. With respect to the second paragraph of page 2 of my above-mentioned communication reliable informants state that during the past two weeks some 350 to 400 men with a good knowledge of the Netherlands and French languages have been drafted into the army. These men are generally from 40 to 55 years of age.

"München Attentat. Among the soldiers on the Netherlands/Belgian frontier roughly 60 percent, so it is estimated, believe that Strasser organized the explosion at München, while roughly 40 percent are, to say the very least, extremely skeptical of this official explanation of the affair.

"Nazi Penetration into Armed Forces. Among the troops in northwest Germany, so it is reliably stated, the results of efforts to plant party spies have been often ineffectual. As soon as one

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	S-1	S-2	S-3	S-4	S-5																
Tech. Dir.	C. in C.	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	C. in C.	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff	Ch. of Staff
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is discovered the officers manage to get rid of him: some of them have even been given military prison sentences.

"Gasoline and Oil. Of unknown accuracy is the statement of a member of the anti-aircraft force to the effect that there is an adequate supply of gasoline for the immediate needs of the mechanized forces, but that the situation is not nearly as favorable with respect to lubricating oils.

"German-Russian Conquest of India. On the afternoon of the 24th of November Reichsstatthalter Kaufmann gave a 'pep' talk in the Atlantic Hotel to a large gathering of Hamburg's leading businessmen, who had assembled by 'command' invitation from him. The meeting was reported in the local press, but the contents of the speech were not made public. One of the men present recounted to one of our officers that, in an effort to rally the waning enthusiasm of the local business community, the Reichsstatthalter described to his audience how a Russian army with German officers was being prepared to undertake an invasion of British India."

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Tech. Div.	C. in C.	Com. Sec. Fin.	Com. Sec. Fin.	C. in C. Adm.	Com. S. S. S.	Com. Adm.	Attended at				Operations				State	Com. Sec.	Return to Bureau File				
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Source of information AmConsul, Munich.
Subject GERMANY Conduct of the War
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the very heavy cost in casualties which will attend a determined drive in the West must, I believe, reflect information in possession of the High Command. This assurance is to me interesting for it is not supported by anything I have heard from the rank and file in Bavaria. Even though the Bavarian now realizes that the hope he once had for peace after the brief Polish campaign had been finished was illusory, he shows no keenness to put his shoulder to the wheel and get over with what he regards as a bad business. He evidences no discernible fear or hatred of England, and little desire to contribute to acquiring greater glories for the Reich. Rather, he seems to occupy himself with nursing his dislikes of the Nazis.

"Out of material which has come (at first hand) to me and members of my staff in recent weeks and which indicates the attitude of the Bavarians toward the Government and the war, I select the following as representative:

"a) An intelligent private soldier of good education says that in his barracks, which houses perhaps 500 men, from 70 to 75 per cent of his comrades are opposed to the Government, about 20 per cent are indifferent, and about 5 per cent are '200 per cent Nazi'. These last, he says, are cordially hated. By all the others they are regarded as self-seekers and spies. This particular soldier does not want to see Germany win the war, for the reason that he believes a German victory will mean the end of the Christian idea in Europe.

"b) A member of an anti-aircraft unit says that the standing joke among his fellows is: 'Have you heard the news? 20 British planes flew over our position. We shot down 40.' An interesting sidelight on what credence is given to the High Command's communiques!

"c) An officer (age about 50 years) of a regiment stationed nearby, looks forward with longing to the day when the signal will be given for the overthrow of the present Government. 'The Bavarian regiments will know what to do', he says, speaking quietly and with assurance, as one who states an accepted fact.

"d) Two soldiers awaiting the arrival of a streetcar during the nightly blackout, fall into conversation. It develops that one of them returned recently from Poland. He says that the German troops are not popular there, although things are somewhat better now, and that he was glad to leave. The other is on leave from the West Wall, but must return in a few days. In reply to the question 'How are things out there?', he gives his impressions at some length. They are not impressions which the German authorities would be pleased to hear. Having given them he asks, after a short pause: 'What are we fighting for anyway?' At that moment a streetcar arrived. This conversation was carried on in normal tones at a car stop at which perhaps 25 or 30 people were gathered. Most of them must have heard it.

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Y. S. Div.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.	C. in C.
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	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	Adm. Sec.	
	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	
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	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	
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Source of information AmConsul, Munich.

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Subject GERMANY

Conduct of the War

(Nation reported on)

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"In spite of what one hears almost daily from Bavarians along the line of the foregoing brief sketches, it is possible that in Germany as a whole a change in attitude toward the war has in fact taken place. The authorities, civil and military, most certainly have facilities for gathering information throughout the country and for evaluating it. Yet one wonders whether the reports they receive are always accurate.

"Turning now to the Bavarian intellectuals from whom some degree of leadership may be expected in the event of an internal political crisis, after exploring probabilities and possibilities and searching their souls they have arrived at the conclusion that the interests of the German State of the future will be best served if the war goes into a not too protracted stalemate. They do not believe that Germany has the resources to win a war against the British and French empires, even allowing for a certain amount of assistance from the Soviet Union. On the other hand they do not want to see the Reich suffer a military defeat, for they are unable to convince themselves that the new order in Europe which Allied propagandists so frequently assert will follow upon an allied victory, will provide for Germany the position of full equality and the assurance of equal opportunity to which it is entitled and which, in their opinion, it must have if enduring peace is to come to Europe. And they are profoundly afraid of the spread of communism if Germany should lose the war. They claim to have evidence that communist propagandists are working like the proverbial beaver throughout the country, and that the German workman is not reluctant to listen to them. They wish the war to end before the ultimate aim of the Soviet Union is achieved or has a materially better chance of success than it has at present. This aim, as they and many others understand it, is the destruction and subsequent disintegration of Western Europe, followed by revolution aided and directed by Moscow and the military and civil forces which it commands. They want the war to end while Germany is healthy enough internally to resist successfully Soviet designs, and strong enough militarily to secure from the Allies the terms of a just peace. These conditions can be fulfilled, they believe, only after a deadlock between the opposing armed forces convinces the Allies that a decision by force of arms can be obtained, if at all, only over a very long period and at a prohibitive cost to them. Figuring that a popular rising which in an exhausted Germany might get beyond the control of the 'moderates' would be repugnant to Britain and France, they feel that British and French fear of such a rising if the armed struggle should become deadlocked, would cause the two governments to become unwilling to negotiate a settlement which Germany could accept. Opportunity for successful negotiations would be increased, they are convinced, if at the right moment Herr Hitler should be removed and should be succeeded by a strong man who would not be unacceptable to the Allies. At the moment they can think of no one other than Field Marshal Goering who could carry through the removal and afterward hold the country together. They are somewhat alarmed by rumors (quite unconfirmed) that Herr Himmler aspires to be the strong man and the successor of Hitler if the latter should be dropped, and that in this connection he has been putting out feelers in London and Paris. I am not disposed to believe that the rumor of overtures in the two capitals is founded on fact, for I doubt that

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Tech. Div.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.
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Div.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.	C. I. C.

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From Z Date 19 January, 1940 Serial No. R-57 File No. EF50/A16-
(Continuation new series each January first) (Select proper serial from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information AmConsul, Munich

Subject GERMANY Conduct of the War
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

REMARK.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

despite the known ambition of Herr Hitler he has the illusion that he would be acceptable to Britain or France.*

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ATTACHE'S REPORT

PFR 19 JAN 1940

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From 2 Date 19 January, 1940 Serial No. R-57 File No. 16-2

Source of information AMCONSUL Munich

Subject GERMANY Conduct of the War
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet)

Reference NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

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Probability that Germany will wage totalitarian warfare in Spring; German officer's view that attitude of people now makes possible waging intensive warfare on all fronts not borne out by observations in Bavaria; Bavarian intellectuals hope for early peace to avert entrenchment of communist influence, and their belief that best interests of State require Hitler's removal.

EVALUATION

Observations gathered by the American Consulate, Munich, from various sources, which give support to the general belief that the German offensive must be undertaken in the near future in the form of intensive warfare on all fronts, otherwise the morale both at the fronts and at home will undergo a severe strain.

SUMMARIZATION

Germany is believed to intend to wage totalitarian warfare in the Spring, staking everything on a tremendous campaign. The statement by an informed German officer that there has taken place in the last two months a change in the attitude of the people toward the war which now makes it possible for intensive warfare to be waged on all fronts, whereas the country last autumn would not have tolerated the necessary sacrifice of life, is not borne out by what one hears and observes in Bavaria. No appreciable change is discernible in the attitude toward the war or the Government of the rank and file. Bavarian intellectuals hope that the war will go into a stalemate while the Reich is still strong enough to resist communist influence on the one hand, and to exact a just peace from the Allies on the other. They believe that the best interests of the State require the removal of Herr Hitler at the proper moment and his replacement by a man strong enough to hold the country together thereafter. In this connection their thoughts run at present to Field Marshal Goering.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

by RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

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A-E-C-D-E										Index	File	Serial	Date	Status	Comments	Return to	Index No.
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From Z Date 21 February, 1940 Serial No. R-102 File No. EF30/ALG-3
(Commence new series each January first) (Substitue proper number from O. N. I. Index)
Source of information German Navy Ministry
Subject GERMANY Submarine Warfare Conduct of
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Substitute)
Reference: a) Alusna-Berlin dispatch 0020-1600 (February 1940).

Remark:—The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Indicate leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.

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first, ships of other nations might thereupon sail under the American flag and it might possibly cause other neutral nations to take offense. He remarked further that he thought the original matter of the discussion following the "Burgerdijk" case at the Press Conference, had been a misunderstanding, on which point he was informed that I also took it to be a misunderstanding because one of the Embassy Secretaries had compared the information which the Embassy transmitted, with the stenographic record of Baron von Stumm's press conference at the Foreign Office, and that the two accounts were in agreement. It was after leaving Admiral Raeder that occasion was had to stop for a moment to chat with his Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Attache Group, who reviewed the conversation to assist me in having it straight and, in effect, repeated the foregoing, which I fully understood. The Chief of Staff remarked that it would be quite to their liking if other neutrals followed the U.S. precedent and proclaimed the same forbidden sons.

5. On leaving Captain Mirow he told me that when sending his written reply of 17 February (Inclosure A), he had to abide by the promulgated rules of submarine warfare, and that a statement as important as the one which had just been made to me could naturally only come from the responsible Commander of the Navy.

4. Admiral Raeder impressed me as being absolutely honest and sincere in his statements that Germany is trying to avoid all possible friction with the United States, and that he had actually issued these instructions.

5. Admiral Raeder did not specifically mention the "Iroquois" case when he spoke of having his name publicized, but he gave me a knowing smile and said that as a military man he preferred not to be publicly mentioned. The Naval Attache believes that any public dissemination of this information would react very unfavorably toward his present cordial personal and official relations with the German Navy.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

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
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ATTACHE'S REPORT

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From Z Date 21 February, 1940 Serial No. R-102
Source of information German Navy Ministry
Subject GERMANY Submarine Warfare
Reference: a) Alusna-Berlin dispatch 0029-1600 (February 1940)



Statement by Admiral Raeder that American ships will not be molested by German U-Boats (torpedoed or stopped for visit and search), and desire of Germany to avoid all possible sources of friction with the United States.

EVALUATION

Official statement of German Navy Ministry relative to the conduct of submarine warfare, as derived in personal interview with Grand Admiral Raeder on 20 February 1940.

SUMMARIZATION


Official German statement that U-boats have been instructed that when making contact with American ships, not only not to torpedo them, but to leave them alone entirely, not even to perform the customary visit and search to which Germany is entitled. Desire of Admiral Raeder that no publicity whatever be attached to this matter for obvious reasons.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 2 1 1973



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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial R-622 Monograph Index Guide No. 100
(Start new series each year, i. e. 1-40, 5-40) (To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See U. S. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From The Naval Attache at Berlin Date 8 November, 1940
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference: a) Alusna-Berlin dispatch 081445 (November 1940)
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source American Newspaper Correspondent Evaluation Unverified
(As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with - identify when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject GERMANY Political Forces
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

NOTE: (Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated, include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

B R I E F

Rumors that German Armed Forces in favor of declaring war on the U.S. immediately, to forestall further aid to Great Britain, which plan is opposed by Ribbentrop; Hitler's reaction not known.

1. There is a fairly current rumor at present in Berlin to the effect that high officers in the German Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) have recommended an immediate declaration of war on the United States in order to stop all help to Great Britain, assuming that as soon as the U.S. gets into the war, the production of military equipment would be diverted to our own purposes. It is rumored that Ribbentrop opposes this plan. Nothing is known or rumored as to what Mr. Hitler thinks about it.

REMARKS

E.O. 1.652, sec. 3(c) and 5(d) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

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Serial R-657 Monograph Index Guide No. 105/105-100
(Start new series each year, i. e. 1-95, 2-00)
(To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From Naval Attaché at Berlin Date 6 December, 1940
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference _____
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source Personal Observation Evaluation Reliable
(As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with _____ identify _____)
(As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject A F R I C A Colonies; Policy toward such areas
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

NOTE:—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated, include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

- Inclosures: A) Schedule of lectures on colonial problems given by the Verein Deutscher Ingenieure at Stuttgart 2-3 December 1940.
B) Two newspaper articles on the colonies.

B R I E F

Lectures sponsored by the Verein Deutscher Ingenieure on technical problems in the tropics. Verein Deutscher Ingenieure, one of the world's famous engineering societies, is now controlled by the National Socialist Party and is no longer a pure engineering technical institution. The German colonies are assumed to be all of Africa except the Union of South Africa. German engineers from Africa report that Allis Chalmers, Caterpillar Tractor, and Ford are their main stumbling blocks to economic control of the continent. Engineers and doctors to work for conquest of Africa.

-O-

1. General. Having been invited to attend the meetings of the Verein Deutscher Ingenieure on colonial and engineering problems in the tropics, I was fortunate enough to be a participant in hearing the future German plans for Africa. I believe I was the only foreigner present, and the meeting was dominated and permeated by the National Socialist Party. Reichs Commissar Todt was in charge of the meeting and General Ritter von Epp made the political speech. Army, Navy and high ranking Party members were among the honored guests. The German Navy had a Rear Admiral, two Line Captains and two Engineering Commanders present. There were about 700 engineering members present, plus about 50 leaders of the Hitler Youth movement, who I was informed were to be the leaders in the new colonies. The newspapers had considerable propaganda regarding the African colonies, of which Inclosures B) are a sample. A considerable number of books were available on the various African languages and dialects.

2. Political. General Ritter von Epp, in his speech, stressed the fact that Germany was the dominant nation in the

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world and the best, and was therefore best qualified to take and hold Africa. He said: "Africa belongs to us. If we cannot get it in a negotiable manner, we will take it." From his speech I deduced that he meant Germany would control all of Africa except the Union of South Africa, which would become a sovereign state under the economic domination of Germany. General Epp continued: "Now is the time to get engineers and doctors ready to take over that which belongs to us, and then we will show the world how a colony should be run." He further stressed the importance of members of the Party obtaining sufficient training for African duty, and went into details from his personal experience regarding the problems in Africa confronting the white man. He insinuated that it might be necessary to draft the best available people for African service.

3. It is interesting that in a number of the speeches it was pointed out that the railroads in Africa have been built by private concerns and each railroad has a different gauge. There are now 10 different gauges in Africa. It was stated that from now on only one gauge would be used - the German gauge - and that particular stress would be made to have the new railroads run on the German size and that the new lines of communication would be Berlin-Rome-Africa. This obviously was to avoid having to make and protect a sea route.

4. Engineering. Considerable concern was evinced among the various speakers as to the labor problem in Africa. It was stated that in the old German colonies there were only 4 people per square kilometer, that a German worker could produce 8 times as much as a native laborer, and that this must be taken into consideration in planning the exploitation of the land.

5. The following additional points were brought out:

- 1) The greater percentage of labor will have to be supplied from Europe.
- 2) Machine tools must be built simple and efficient enough to suit the labor problem.
- 3) Ships should be built to use cheap transportation, possibly using the native wood of Africa as fuel.
- 4) As German industry is built to handle certain types of wood, these trees should be planted in the African forests, and industry should now adapt itself to use the other woods available. There are only 20 to 30 types of wood in Germany and there are 600 types in Africa.
- 5) Farming in the colonies must be accomplished by machines simple enough for native workers. It is the problem of German industry to supply these items.
- 6) Motors, cables, engines must be built especially for tropical duty. It is not possible to take European electrical equipment and expect it to do the work required in the tropics.
- 7) Coal in Africa is good but transportation is very expensive, so that boilers must be produced to use the waste products of farms, such as sugar cane, rice, coffee shells, cotton waste, wood shavings, etc.
- 8) It was recommended that windmills be built for farm use and small factory use. To take care of the various

wind intensities, batteries of 2000 ampere hour capacity will be supplied so that a constant electrical output can be obtained.

9) Heavy trucks, catapillar tractors and towing cars must be standardized for efficient use of spare parts and overhauls.

The problems of clean air, water, gas, and oil were discussed.

6. Economic. After one speaker had extolled the virtues of German automobiles as being the best made, a heated discussion followed in which the engineers from Africa stated that the old American Ford automobile was the only practical private car for tropical duty, and that the present German automobiles were of no use in the colonies; that German automobile industry would have to produce a car equal or better than the Ford. Another speaker said: "Our main opponents in Africa are not the English, French or Belgians, but the U.S. At the present time Allis Chalmers and Catapillar Tractor control the economic market. It is necessary for Germany to economically defeat the U.S. in Africa." In various other lectures Allis Chalmers and Catapillar were quoted by African engineers as dominating the market, particularly from the spare part angle and cost.

7. Medical. The medical profession will be organized to take care of the problems in the colonies. Doctors, hospitals and nurses are to be organized and sent to Africa at the same time as industrial plants are set up. Considerable comment was made of the success the U.S. had in building the Panama Canal, particularly of the coordination of the medical and industrial forces.

naudel

1100

From The Naval Attache at Berlin Date 18 December 1940
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Subject EUROPE General Situation (Context of the War) Estimate of
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

Notes.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

B R I E F

Naval Attache Berlin's estimate of the general European situation, based on two and one-half years absorption of information, ideas and impressions gained from a wide variety of sources. (NY 105855)

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

MAY 21 1973

1. With the arrival of the winter season in NORTHERN EUROPE and the consequent slackening of military operations on all but the ALBANIAN and AFRICAN fronts, there comes the natural time for reviewing the events of the war to date and estimating the situation for the future. This report - an Estimate of the General European Situation - is based on the Naval Attache Berlin's two and one-half years absorption of information, ideas and impressions gained from observations, conversations with American, German and foreign officials, news correspondents, various high-class German civilians, reading of military and economic reports and of American and German press and magazines, and of listening to various European and American radio broadcasts. In the short scope of this estimate, the sketches of the countries other than GERMANY are perhaps too brief and may be at variance with the information obtained from our representatives in those countries. Even in such cases it is doubted if the broad general picture is greatly incorrect.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE GENERAL EUROPEAN SITUATION AT YEAR'S END, 1940

POLAND was quickly disposed of by an overwhelming force of arms. It suffered another partition and its people were dispossessed to make room for the repatriated GERMAN BALTS from the ex-BALTIC REPUBLICS. Many POLISH prisoners are working as laborers on GERMAN estates. All semblance as a geographic entity has been studiously erased by their conquerors. There is one enormous task in store for those who will have to unscramble the POLISH property tangle after the war, what with a war having been waged over it, POLES dispossessed, and BALTS and NAZIS moved into the western half and the RUSSIANS into the eastern.

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The BALTIC REPUBLICS have disappeared from the map as the result of an "overwhelming desire" on the part of the people to join the great UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. The pressure put on these people in order to attain this end is so obvious that no comment is necessary, and so disgusting that words inadequately describe it.

FINLAND fought RUSSIA bravely and well a year ago but in the end, due to sheer force of numbers and absolute lack of FINNISH personnel and material replacements, had to cede certain valuable territory to RUSSIA.

SWEDEN says that she gave FINLAND her practical maximum of assistance. Both these countries live in perpetual fear of RUSSIA and GERMANY, but the fear of RUSSIA is much greater than that of GERMANY. Under GERMAN domination they have some semblance of national sovereignty; under RUSSIAN domination they feel they would be serfs. The question arises - "Why did not SWEDEN and FINLAND join the AXIS when the doors were open a few weeks ago, when the juveniles RUMANIA, HUNGARY and SLOVAKIA were allowed to become members?" The answer is two-fold. First, they are under GERMAN economic and, to some extent, political domination already. Second, RUSSIA has always had a hope of eventually retaking all of FINLAND and possibly part of SWEDEN, and GERMANY has allowed this hope to incubate. Should SWEDEN and FINLAND be taken into the AXIS, RUSSIA would know definitely that her hopes were groundless and that the clash with GERMANY advanced to the near future, and probably would, therefore, cut off the limited supplies she is furnishing GERMANY now and might conceivably line up on the side of the ALLIES.

NORWAY, DENMARK, THE NETHERLANDS and BELGIUM are under complete military occupation by GERMANY. Their present resistance is limited to unfriendly and mildly obstructionist attitude. Their stock of materials and foods, like that of every other country under GERMAN occupation or control is being systematically and completely plundered. The longer the war lasts, the more certainly everyone in EUROPE will starve, BUT GERMANY WILL STARVE LAST OF ALL.

The conditions in occupied and unoccupied FRANCE are not much different from those of THE NETHERLANDS and BELGIUM. The FRENCH were stripped of the Armistice and while they were still dazed from the knockout blow administered them. They have regained consciousness and are, to some extent, feeling shame for their past conduct. ENGLAND'S heroic resistance and absorption of the terrific blows of the Air and Commerce War has gone far to reawaken the FRENCH people and to build up a moral resistance to GERMAN domination and plundering. Weygand, from within, and de Gaulle, from without, are the exponents of this growing resistance. Laval, and his successor Flandin, are definitely in GERMAN control. Petain is the present balance, to be dropped as soon as the outcome of the war shows a definite trend in either direction.

PORTUGAL is traditionally friendly to GREAT BRITAIN, will undoubtedly remain so, but is too weak militarily to be of great moment.

SPAIN is on the verge, or maybe even past the verge, of starvation. Three years of Civil War in which the minority won only through GERMAN and ITALIAN help, have ravaged the land of its economy and have left a great smoldering of potential revolution. The SPANISH FALANGISTS feel a great deal of gratitude to the GERMANS and ITALIANS for their help, although they thoroughly despise the latter and think the former are pretty coarse brutes in the possession of a wonderful military machine. SPAIN is full of GERMAN "tourists" and there have been many rumors of SPAIN, with open or concealed GERMAN aid, taking GIBRALTAR. "GIBRALTAR for the SPANIARDS" is a slogan made in GERMANY, the SPANIARDS themselves were entirely indifferent to BRITISH possession of GIBRALTAR until the GERMAN propaganda started pumping the bellows, and it is believed they are still more or less indifferent. ITALY wants GIBRALTAR, and that is why GERMANY, determined not to let ITALY have it, will see that SPAIN gets it, IF, and that IF is getting bigger every day. ENGLAND is ever dislodged from the Rock.

SPAIN will remain neutral, friendly to GERMANY in gratitude for past help, but for her to be actively belligerent or pro-AXIS non-belligerent, is out of the question. In the first place, while Franco and Sener may be more or less completely under the AXIS thumb, they have nothing material to give. Secondly, Franco doesn't dare arm his people. If he did the Civil War would break out afresh. Thirdly, what little foodstuffs is coming into SPAIN is getting through by the grace of BRITAIN. Any foolishness on the part of the SPANISH leaders would result in the economic noose being drawn tight.

SWITZERLAND is in a precarious economic position. Her income is largely derived from tourists and the manufacture of precision instruments. The tourist trade has dropped to zero. SWITZERLAND does not produce any of the necessary raw materials for her fine mechanical manufacture. Imports of these necessary raw materials have fallen off tremendously, as have also the possibility of exports. SWITZERLAND'S agriculture is insufficient to nourish the population or to provide fodder for their dair cattle.

There was a probability last May of a military invasion of SWITZERLAND in order to get through to FRANCE, had the GERMAN drive through the LOW COUNTRIES failed. That probability is now passed, but SWITZERLAND lives under the economic domination of the AXIS, which means BERLIN. Also the SWISS state positively that they will blow up the railway tunnels in case of invasion and that may have a deterrent effect on the AXIS Powers, since about 40 per cent of GERMAN/ITALIAN railway traffic rolls through these tunnels.

HUNGARY and SLOVAKIA are completely puppets of BERLIN. Their recent elevation to membership status in the AXIS does not alter that situation. It is not believed that their peoples are completely happy about their position, but there is very little they can do about it.

ROMANIA, the one-time "fat boy of Europe", who grew fat after World War I only on account of Queen Marie's personality, has been cut down to boy's size again by SOVIET RUSSIA, HUNGARY and BULGARIA. Her oil fields and her agricultural fertility caused GERMANY to instigate an imitation-NAZI IRON GUARD and to send two divisions of troops into ROMANIA to "train her Army", to say nothing of S.S., GESTAPO, and "TOURISTS" who have been there in large numbers for considerable time to insure ROMANIAN compliance to GERMAN wishes, especially as regards oil deliveries. There are 12 to 16 divisions of GERMAN troops reported in the CARPATHIAN area - SLOVAKIA, HUNGARY and ROMANIA - just in case they might be needed in that region.

BULGARIA has a pro-AXIS Cabinet and a population racially sympathetic to RUSSIA. She was almost in the AXIS column and then unexpectedly declined to join. GREEK resistance, magnified by the consequent stiffening of the TURKISH spine, caused BULGARIA to reflect. It is stated that in Molotov's recent visit to BERLIN, he quietly told Hitler that RUSSIA would guarantee BULGARIA against BRITISH aggression, which put the brakes on the GERMAN ambition of "protecting" BULGARIA the same as ROMANIA.

YUGOSLAVIA is pathetically neutral. She knows that all her neighbors are standing by with carving knives in hand. GERMANY wants an outlet to warm salt water, ITALY wants the rest of the DALMATIAN COAST, HUNGARY, ROMANIA and BULGARIA want the rest of YUGOSLAVIA. In the case of an AXIS victory, YUGOSLAVIA will disappear. She is too weak militarily to enter the war aggressively on the ALLIED side, but in case of invasion will probably follow the GREEK example of stiff resistance. Her present relations with RUSSIA are excellent, which may have a sobering influence to prevent a premature AXIS grab.

TURKEY is quite friendly to BRITAIN, but lives under the double threat of RUSSIA and the AXIS, both of whom covet the DARDANELLES. A month or so ago there was the grave fear that RUSSIA would block out TURKEY while GERMAN troops pushed down from ROMANIA through BULGARIA, TURKEY, SYRIA and PALESTINE into EGYPT. For this, RUSSIA was to be paid off with PERSIA. That possibility seems more remote now after Molotov's fruitless (for the AXIS) visit to

BERLIN and the unexpectedly stiff resistance by the GREEKS to the ITALIAN invasion. Unless RUSSIA actively threatens or invades TURKEY, their resistance, backed up by BRITISH help, to GERMAN invasion, will cause the GERMANS loss of time, men and material, at the very least. The TURKISH terrain has only one railroad and one main road along the route which will have to be used. In the winter season the country is pretty much flooded by heavy rains. A few strategic bridges blown out would bog down the GERMAN advance in this season.

RUSSIA, the enigma, with the greatest natural resources of all kinds in EUROPE, the giant with flabby muscles (as proved by the FINNISH campaign), needs only intelligence and the galvanic spark of life to make it the strongest power of all. It is not in the cards for any RUSSIAN regime, either Czarist or Soviet, to educate the masses and rule through intelligence - they might find themselves thrown out of the driver's seat if they did. It is therefore to be expected that the present regime will continue to rule through ignorance, superstition, fear and Communistic propaganda.

SOVIET RUSSIA also has ambition to rule the world, and has had it since the Bolsheviks came to power. Their method cannot be direct frontal attack by force of arms - FINLAND proved how weak RUSSIA is in this category - and further, it might not be safe for the present regime to put arms and intelligence into the hands and brains of too many people. RUSSIA'S method of attack is by insidious infiltration of communistic ideas, coupled with infinite patience in letting these seeds of internal discord germinate. They sprout and grow much faster and stronger when the host land is in the difficulties of depression or the misery of a long war or its aftermath.

Measured with this yardstick, RUSSIA's present foreign policy becomes clear. Before the outbreak of the present war, GERMANY was a growing, but unproved, military power, too strong for RUSSIA to take on, and yet probably very vulnerable to the combined power of GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE and POLAND. Besides, why should RUSSIA weaken herself when the others were daily growing more willing to lock horns with GERMANY? Hence, the August 1939 RUSSO/GERMAN commercial treaty. For her first dividend, RUSSIA received the eastern half of POLAND.

The quick POLISH campaign demonstrated the strength of the GERMAN military machine, and the expected flow of RUSSIAN raw materials was reduced. Of course, the terrible winter, the need of RUSSIAN transportation for their own use in the FINNISH campaign, and the difficulties of trans-loading from RUSSIAN broad gauge to GERMAN standard gauge freight cars was stressed, and had some bearing. With the "blitz" campaign in the WEST this Spring and Summer, it looked as if GERMANY were moving entirely too fast and the delivery valve was turned down some more. RUSSIA delivered promises and excuses. The unexpected heroic resistance by BRITAIN to anything and everything that GERMANY had to use offensively, the BRITISH and GREEK successes in the MEDITERRANEAN area, finally brought the GERMAN triumph of having Molotov personally visit BERLIN. It is not believed that Molotov's visit, heralded as it was, was very fruitful for GERMANY or the AXIS. Probably some more promises and possibly a slight opening of the delivery valve to enable GERMANY to continue the war. It is also reported that Molotov complained about GERMANY delivering to RUSSIA only 30 per cent of what she had agreed, and threatened to cut down RUSSIAN deliveries. Once EUROPE has been bled white, RUSSIA wins without extending herself. She undoubtedly knows of the GERMAN troops continually passing through FINLAND to and from NORTHERN NORWAY, of the great strength of GERMAN troops in EAST PRUSSIA, POLAND and the CARPATHIANS (about 80 divisions), of the perpetual GERMAN "Drang nach Osten", particularly the UKRAINE and the vital TRANS-Caucasian oil fields, and fully realizes just exactly what is in store for her in the case of a GERMAN victory.

In spite of loud ITALIAN complaints, GREECE was meticulously neutral. The GERMAN Military Attache at ATHENS assured himself of this fact as late as August 1940 and so reported to his Government. Partially through pique

at the GERMANS for not having fore-informed him of their "protection" of RUMANIA, partially to the growing discontent in ITALY, partially to show the world that he, too, was a great military genius, Mussolini invaded GREECE 28 October, expecting, if one can believe local ITALIAN officials, that GREECE would make only a token resistance, if even that much, and then come to heel like DENMARK, HUNGARY or RUMANIA did to GERMANY. Of all the peoples so far engaged in this war - be they the aggressors, the raped, the war declarers, - the FINNS and the GREEKS unexpectedly had the intense instantaneous flame of patriotism, long sharp knives, and the complete determination to use them to the bitter end. "Better to die noble than to live meanly", and yet we see this exemplified in its highest form only by two of the poorest and weakest countries ^{involved} in this war.

Now, after almost two months of the GREEK campaign, there is not a combatant ITALIAN soldier in GREECE, and there are daily fewer in SOUTHERN ALBANIA. The BRITISH position in all of the MEDITERRANEAN, but especially in the eastern part, has been immeasurably strengthened with the acquisition of GREEK bases and the GREEK impetus to conquer the ITALIANS. Since early November I have maintained that GREEK opposition to the ITALIAN aggression was the turning point of this war. How long the GREEKS can go on pushing the ITALIANS out of the BALKANS hinges on only one question, which is: Are the GERMANS coming to ITALIAN assistance?

Had the GREEKS supinely lain down at the first sign of ITALIAN aggression, it is doubted if the attitude of YUGOSLAVIA or TURKEY would be as stiff as it is today. Now, if only for prestige reasons, so as not to be classed by the whole world as being less than the GREEKS, these two countries will resist AXIS military aggression as determinedly as the GREEKS. Through superiority of numbers, equipment and General Staff, the GERMAN Army can pierce through this resistance and arrive in EGYPT, but the cost has suddenly become tremendously greater and EGYPT may not be worth it.

ITALY contemplates a big offensive next Spring to retake ALBANIA and to take GREECE. By that time they might find themselves transporting troops through enemy infested waters and attempting to land them in the face of violent opposition.

ITALY has suffered itself to be led by a strutter who has been beating himself on the breast for the past twenty years and announcing to all the world that ITALY is a Great Power. He had no occasion to enter the war in June - ITALY was prospering more than it had in his entire regime - except to be in at the kill and to get some choice cuts of the carcasses. (There is a GERMAN comparison of Caesar's "I came, I saw, I conquered", with Mussolini's "He came when he saw that he would conquer"). There is no GERMAN trust or respect for the ITALIANS. The tie that still binds them into the AXIS is a personal admiration and friendship by Hitler for Mussolini. Their original reason of being kindred "have-nots" totalitarian powers leaning on each other for mutual support in an unsympathetic world, has been outgrown - by the GERMANS, at least.

ITALY is not and never can be, in spite of Mussolini's bellowings, a first-rate power. It is not economically self-sufficient, it does not own the exclusive rights to any one thing for which the world must come to it. Its people have too long lived a sunny, care-free - albeit a touch squalid - existence to be suddenly metamorphose into a dominant military race of co-world conquerors. Latins of whatever nationality are individuals and are capable of just so much regimentation, and no more.

Their entry into the war was not particularly popular in ITALY, was accepted more or less because victory and spoils were just about to be had. They have not yet had the victory, the spoils are daily growing farther away, and the rationing of food, especially in spaghetti and coffee, has caused considerable grumbling. Coupled with their reverses in ALBANIA and EGYPT, it might be enough for the ITALIANS 1) to withdraw from the war, 2) to overthrow Mussolini, 3) to force GERMANY to make the decision to "protect" ITALY

and conduct the MEDITERRANEAN campaign alone, using such ITALIAN men and material as may be useful, or to abandon ITALY and the MEDITERRANEAN problem entirely.

GERMANY - Party, armed forces or the average man in the street - has no use for a weakling. If they could, right now, induce a beaten, but inherently and traditionally strong and courageous FRANCE to join them, they would cast ITALY off in a twinkling.

ITALY'S only chance of surviving is the present insufficiency of BRITISH and GREEK land, sea and air forces and equipment in the MEDITERRANEAN area. If the BRITISH and GREEKS have enough to keep the ITALIANS on the run for a while longer, ITALY must collapse. If the ALLIED power is just insufficient to keep them on the run, or if the GERMANS erect a barrier behind which the ITALIANS can retire and reorganize, they will have delayed the day of their collapse.

Having disposed of the minor contenders, the satellites and bystanders, we come to the two main contestants, GERMANY and ENGLAND.

Since time immemorial the GERMAN has been military minded. Prior to 1871 it was mainly the PRUSSIAN who was perennially occupied in fighting his neighbors - the POLES, the RUSSIANS, the SWEDES, the DANES, the FRENCH and the AUSTRIANS - right around the circle. Those wars were of more or less local effect in time and place. With the formation of the GERMAN EMPIRE, under PRUSSIAN leadership, in 1871, the scope of GERMAN activity broadened out to include the world. The basic military ideas remained firm, and world domination became the national ambition. However little an individual GERMAN might be bothered by rank, GERMANS in the mass and as a people are eternally conscious of it. They have no concept of equality. This is probably derived from their subconscious, as well as conscious, militarism, in which all government employees as well as military forces are given some sort of rank or rating. The GERMAN is either the junior, in which case he clicks his heels, salutes and says "Sir" to everybody in sight, or he is the senior and demands that everyone do it to him. That is the case of the individual - it is equally true of the nation. That is also the underlying reason why GERMANY is innately incapable of having a democratic form of government.

The NATIONAL SOCIALIST Party was formed in the post-war years when the REPUBLIC was floundering in its infancy and came into power by fraud and strong-arm methods in the bitter depression years. By flattering the GERMAN love for things military, they soon had the Armed Forces with them, or at least not openly hostile to them. Through fear, mutual espionage and concentration camp methods, they rooted out all opposition and brought even the indifferent GERMANS into a state of nervous fear of their lives.

At this time the other nations were tremendously occupied with internal affairs - depression and unemployment being the principal worries. Through this gap in international vigilance, GERMANY slipped in an Air Force, a larger Army, revival of Conscript Service, and even concluded a Naval Treaty with ENGLAND.

The GERMAN military mind had not ceased to function in the years when they were down. Every technical improvement in military equipment throughout the world was studiously followed and probably even participated in by the numerous GERMAN officers and engineers who roamed the world in the 1920s and early 30s. AMERICAN mass production was studied in detail, to the end that Henry Ford became the third God of War. Clausewitz, for his thesis of the Nation at War - Schlieffen, for The Plan - and Henry Ford, for Mass Production, are the three.

GERMAN industry had been regimented, GERMAN scientists, engineers and inventors were called in, and the whole nation was turned in the preparation of the largest Armed Force with the best and most modern equipment of all time.

Even now, with the war in its second winter doldrums, an army of from seven to nine million trained men available and no active land fighting having taken place since June, the GERMANS are still calling men to the colors for training. Whatever their ultimate maximum of fighting men may be, be it twelve million or fourteen million, they will all be thoroughly trained soldiers if and when they are called to active combatant duty. There will be no raw recruits and no clumsy, senescent Home Guard coming in as replacements in the front lines, no matter how long the war lasts. Their armament industry is in full swing, grinding out new and replacement material.

The economy supporting all of this is one of paper and plunder. The national economy, as well as everything else in the nation, was regimented to follow the will of the Party. Imports unnecessary for war uses were discontinued long ago and every available scrap of Foreign Exchange was used to purchase strategic materials which could not be obtained by barter or bullying. Hard money of intrinsic value has disappeared. With the acquisition of NORWAY, DENMARK, HOLLAND, BELGIUM and occupied FRANCE, those countries have been systematically plundered of every article of value, either directly for the war machine or the nourishment of the GERMAN nation, or indirectly for barter or foreign exchange purposes. Raw materials from SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA, RUMANIA and YUGOSLAVIA come in via the barter-under-pressure system.

GERMANY was an emptying shell, now it has been temporarily replenished, but all of EUROPE will be an empty shell and, the longer the war lasts, the emptier. AND IF GERMANY WINS THIS WAR THE WHOLE WORLD WILL BE AN EMPTY SHELL FOR THE GREATER GLORY OF THE NAZI PARTY.

One cannot live in this country for long without having the utmost revulsion for the utter ruthlessness, despotism and lust for power to serve no good end.

Likewise, a military man cannot read the actual exploits of the GERMAN Armed Forces or get occasional glimpses of them without being impressed by their organization, size, equipment and General Staff work. I am not a NAZI-ophile or a GERMAN Wehrmacht enthusiast. Like a baseball umpire, I try to call 'em as I see 'em, and this GERMAN military machine is the mightiest which has appeared on earth to date.

It will take a terrific military effort by a larger, equally well, if not better, equipped force to defeat this military machine in the field. THEY MUST NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.

Other than their defeat in the field, there remains 1) a compromise, 2) revolt from within, and 3) economic blockade.

There is some peace talk going on from time to time, starting in with Hitler's DANZIG speech shortly after the conclusion of the POLISH campaign. The GERMANS would, naturally, like to see peace concluded, but on their terms, which roughly include holding the territory conquered, restoration of colonies, having absolute dominion over EUROPE and AFRICA, and probably having the whole world, less GERMANY, disarm so as to make their next step easier. Such a compromise would be equal to a complete BRITISH defeat. For the present, at least, the GERMANS will agree to very little less. The disgorging of stolen territory, beginning with the SAAR, or even with CZECHOSLOVAKIA, the disbanding of the NAZI PARTY, the de-militarization of GERMANY, which are conditions acceptable to BRITAIN, are obtainable only over several million GERMAN dead bodies.

It is doubted if a medium position can be found acceptable to both sides. Any compromise peace, leaving GERMANY armed and the NAZIS in control, will be only a breathing spell to let them eat a few square meals, import some more necessary war material, and then continue the war for world domination.

Revolt from within is only a dream of the wishful thinkers. The BRITISH Intelligence Service apparently turned in a lot of misinformation along this

line, as is evidenced by the silly propaganda leaflet campaign in the early stages of the war. The GERMAN Propaganda machine has the answer to any BRITISH propaganda to encourage internal revolt in GERMANY. Based on fact or not, it still registers with the GERMAN people that they were promised a lot of things by President Wilson's Fourteen Points, and by subsequent ALLIED propaganda which decidedly did not come to pass as they had pictured it. The individual GERMAN, be he a red-hot NAZI, indifferent to the Party, or just one jump ahead of the GESTAPO, realizes that this war is not for cheese, chalk or marbles, and believes that it is, instead, a fight to the death of either the BRITISH EMPIRE or the GERMAN REICH. All of them over 20 years of age have lived through the post-war hunger years, and all of them over 25 have lived through the war years as well. There are many who would like to see the war end today without destroying ENGLAND, but when the alternative thought flashes through their minds - that if they don't defeat ENGLAND, ENGLAND will defeat them - their attitude changes and they must all stick together, see this war through, and then after the war is over, they will do something about the NAZI PARTY.

Heinrich Himmler's GESTAPO is diabolically efficient at nipping any subversive tendencies in the bud by prompt, ruthless and drastic action. Not until the bulk of GERMAN citizenry is ready to risk dispossession, torture and death of self, loved ones and friends, will the internal revolution come about. The GERMAN in military uniform, with a standard weapon in his hand, and in the company of many more equipped like him, is a brave, resolute and capable fighter. The sacred flame of freedom, which would make him fight, in uniform or not, with a pitch fork, a billiard cue, or a pistol taken by force from the corner policeman, not only does not burn in his breast, but his mind cannot clearly grasp the fact that such a flame can exist, unless, of course, Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry were to tell him it did. Then he would believe it without thinking.

As long as 1) GERMANY is starving less than her neighbors, or her people are so informed by the Propaganda machine and believe it, 2) Himmler's Secret Police remain effective, 3) the GERMAN Armed Forces are not decisively defeated in the field, 4) the R.A.F. does not visit death and destruction over GERMANY in proportion to what the LUFTWAFFE has done over ENGLAND, there will be no internal revolt in GERMANY.

There remains then only the fourth alternative - ECONOMIC BLOCKADE

This weapon was effective in World War I, although the GERMAN U-boats and commerce raiders put somewhat of a double edge on it. At that time, all of SCANDINAVIA, THE NETHERLANDS and SWITZERLAND were neutral, and due to BRITISH rationing by blockade, had only a little surplus to spare for the CENTRAL POWERS. BELGIUM, FRANCE, ITALY, RUMANIA and RUSSIA were hostile. GERMAN submarines, approximately the same number in commission as now, had the long route between KIEL and the NORTH SEA bases and their patrol stations in the CHANNEL and the ATLANTIC. No one had an Air Force of great military moment at that time. GERMANY did not have a rationing system until late in the war when she had nothing left to ration. In spite of all of that, GERMANY put up a terrific fight for over four years.

In the present situation, GERMANY has the complete market of SCANDINAVIA, such produce as can be grown under war conditions, and such reserves as could be plundered out of the LOW COUNTRIES, FRANCE and POLAND, plus what their bully and barter system can get out of YUGOSLAVIA, HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA and RUMANIA, plus the amount their bargaining can get out of that other astute horse-trader, Stalin.

The day that GERMANY started this war, she went on rations. The General Staff work had been done long before; the ration cards had been printed and were distributed astonishingly quickly; and the system went into effect without much ado. The ration allowed was ample to sustain life plus a little more. Occasionally during the year, such as last Xmas, a few extras were allowed, accompanied by great fanfare of radio and press. The original ration

has since been reduced somewhat, especially in fats and meats, and there is a strong rumor that the new cards to be issued in mid-January 1941, will bring a serious reduction - half the present amount - in fats and meats. Tea and coffee have been non-existent since rationing started (except for a monthly rationing of an eighth of a pound during the past two months), eggs are a rare treat, and the weekly ration of butter is just a smear, at present an eighth of a pound. There are surprisingly few attempts to beat the ration system or of bootlegging. For one thing, GERMAN people docilely accept orders from the authorities; for another, the penalties meted out in the few cases which have been discovered, have been swift and heavy.

Big Party members are, of course, not hampered by rationing, although they go through the motions for the effect.

Basically, then, GERMANY is better off in this war by having more countries to draw on and exploit, and for putting a rationing system into effect from the start.

For raw materials, other than food, she has SWEDISH iron, FRENCH and BELGIAN coal in addition to her own, aluminum ores from YUGOSLAVIA, wood pulp to replace cotton from her own country, FINLAND and SWEDEN, rubber from plunder and the artificial Buna, fuel oil from RUMANIA and RUSSIA in addition to the synthetic gasoline distilled from coal. Her copper supplies depend on booty and what little is mined in the CARPATHIANS, or what can be wangled out of RUSSIA. It is not believed that the FINNISH nickel mines have started to produce much as yet.

In spite of these foodstuffs and raw materials reportedly available, one has a feeling that may be the reserve store houses aren't so full, and maybe these people are operating on a shoestring, after all.

With regard to the other edge of the two-edged sword - the counter-blockade on ENGLAND, GERMANY is better off at present than she was in the last war. With approximately the same number of submarines in commission, she can have more on patrol simultaneously since the distance between the CHANNEL PORTS and the operating areas is considerably less than between KIEL and the operating area. It is also rumored that when a submarine returns to base, a relief crew comes aboard, makes such repairs as necessary, refuels and provisions and returns to the operating areas while the last crew takes a thorough rest.

The submarines have an added advantage in having long-range reconnaissance planes available to spot convoys for them, whereupon the submarines attack by divisions, or, as the GERMAN press describes it, like a wolf pack.

The Air Force, also, has been wreaking considerable havoc on BRITISH commerce. Surface raiders have not been as numerous or as dramatic as in the last war, yet they take their toll, too.

GREAT BRITAIN had an enormous merchant marine at the start of the war, has built ships, bought ships, chartered ships, and has taken over the greater part of the NORWEGIAN, DANISH, DUTCH, BELGIAN and GREEK merchant fleets. Yet the BRITISH have suffered a painful net loss in tonnage sunk and in trip time lost by ships having to wait for convoys and by having to make repairs after damage which did not sink the ship. That BRITAIN can be starved out by the present submarine and air campaign is a very grim possibility. If BRITAIN were in grave danger of being counter-blockaded in 1917, she is in much greater danger now.

And now for ENGLAND, the symbol of the BRITISH EMPIRE, whom the GERMAN reports and propaganda describe as a heap of rubble and ashes, whose press photos coming in via LISBON or the UNITED STATES tend to confirm the GERMAN statements, and yet, whose speakers are heard over the radio quite cheery and

and yet bull-dog determined. Her "head is bloody, but unbowed". Some say that the ENGLISH people are "punch-drunk", that they are mechanically going through the motions of living, that if they could get away to some quiet spot and think things out calmly, they would see the futility of their resistance and accept the "generous" GERMAN offer of sharing the world. The average sensible GERMAN, official or otherwise, however, when gotten alone, has only intense admiration for the BRITISH and says, "My God! How these people can take it! If that were to happen to us, we should have caved in long ago."

Curiously, a year ago these same people disclaimed any racial relationship with the BRITISH. Now they are practically blood brothers, but unfortunately for both, fighting each other. It actually sends a chill through their beings when they read or hear the BRITISH calmly remark that their offensive won't get underway until 1942. It's fantastic, it's incredible, it's impossible, yet the GERMANS know it's true. They try to talk themselves out of it and to think themselves out of it, but the old refrain still runs through their minds that the BRITISH will just begin to fight in 1942.

That the BRITISH were caught unprepared when war started is woefully true, that their conduct of the NORWEGIAN campaign left much to be desired is also true, that they had not learned as late as June is evidenced by the unnecessary loss of H.M.S. GLORIOUS. At last, after several shifts in the High Command of all branches of the Service, they are beginning to display the old qualities which made and preserved their EMPIRE through centuries. Their present campaign in EGYPT and the help they are giving the GREEKS may soon put ITALY out of the war and release a portion of the MEDITERRANEAN FLEET for vital service in Home Waters.

They are far from being out of the wilderness - they have many trying days and nights ahead. This winter will be particularly bad, with the insufficient shelter against the elements, damaged transportation and communication facilities, and the practical certainty of epidemics of all forms of communicable diseases, ranging from common colds to typhus.

Their small, but very potent, air defense has forced the GERMAN Air Force to confine itself to only night attacks on ENGLAND, after its heavy losses in the day attacks of August and September. They still have a long way to go before they have driven GERMAN bomber squadrons from over their shipping lanes and GERMAN long-range reconnaissance planes out of the EASTERN ATLANTIC, and before they can bomb the occupied territory at will, day or night. By that time, they may have won the war through hunger. If not, they will have to bomb and bomb until the ALLIED infantrymen can set his feet firmly on continental soil, and defeat the GERMAN Army in the field.

ENGLAND has proved that she can absorb all the punishment that the GERMAN Air Force is capable of administering, and still carry on cheerfully. As in 1917, she must quickly beat down the Submarine and Air menace to her commerce. More warships per convoy, and above all, air scouting ahead of the convoy are required.

It is conceivable that GERMANY, if not able to beat down ENGLAND by Air and Commerce War, will keep nominal pressure there, but direct her main military effort toward the conquest of the UKRAINE and TRANS-CAUCASIA. With this area in her possession, delivering food and fuel to GERMANY, she would be in an infinitely stronger position to propose a peace and the sharing of world dominion.

The conquest would not take long, but the organization time necessary and the two or three years necessary for crops to grow, be harvested and distributed, might be sufficient for ENGLAND to put more effective power into her offensive, especially so if RUSSIAN resistance and sniping were to be serious.

The situation for ENGLAND is decidedly grim, but not hopeless. It is well that she has a heart of oak and a chin of armor plate. She has sore need of them to stop the "blitz" the while she is building up her war machine. She will have to build rapidly and enormously in every department toward the end that she can be mistress in the Air War, the Naval War, the Economic War and, if need be, the War on Land. It is not believed that the BRITISH EMPIRE, globe girdling as it is, possesses in itself men, money, materials, undisturbed industry and time in sufficient quantity to do more than hold the GERMAN Juggernaut at bay. She must obtain from outside her boundaries more help than she is now getting in order to succeed in the final victorious thrust.

THE NAVAL ATTACHE
BERLIN W.B. Pariser Platz 2

Telephone: 12-7131 (Extension 121)
Telegraph: Alusna Berlin

AMERICAN EMBASSY

BERLIN

4 February 1941

Dear Captain Kirk,

This morning's radio bulletin brought the good news that you have been appointed Director of Naval Intelligence. Please accept my hearty congratulations and my expression of pleasure in working with you again. I regret it will be for only a short time, as the late news I have is that Captain Pickhardt will be here in the latter part of March. However, after almost three years on the job here I've got to get to sea in preparation for the next Selection Board. You are probably familiar with my cabled and written request for sea duty. I should have returned home a year ago, but stayed on in what I thought were the best interests of the Navy and the United States. Had the Selection Board done right by me I might have been induced to stay over here until the whole thing blows up, but I simply can't now.

After your London experience, the amount of reliable information coming in from Berlin must seem rather puny, but it is all that is obtainable.

Since this Government is so fond of the word "retaliation", you might put these same screws on Vice Admiral Witthoeft:

Restrict his U.S. Navy contacts to you, Captain Bode, Captain Moore and Admiral Stark's Aide. Have the FBI shadow all his movements.

Give him no information other than that which appears in a very carefully censored press.

Restrict his activities to a radius of 75 miles around Washington, except with a special pass, to obtain which he has to state the nature of his business and the hours of departure and arrival; and make him go by train. He might see something if he went by car or plane.

I wonder how he would enjoy being cut to 50 gallons of gasoline (60% pure, 40% trash), 16 pounds of meat, 7 pounds of butter, 16 eggs and a sniff of coffee and tea per month?

One of the things that has given me a great deal of concern ever since the ATHENIA case in September 1939, is gauging the right instant to apply the torch to codes and files. I have written and sent word home about this, but the best answer is to keep my ear to the ground. I don't expect any gentlemanly chivalry out of this crew of gangsters, and if the Gestapo does beat me to the Embassy door some morning, I want to be able to laugh in their faces. I realize that there might be a case of

Still think he is the best judge of the time for burning - unless we declare war & burn down in in advance.

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (H)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, DATE MAY 21 1973

breaking the code, so just send me "Remember Dewey" and I'll be ready right now to fire. "Chicago 1971" or "Till the boys come home" would go right over their heads.

With best wishes to you, your family and the ONI staff from Alusan-Berlin and our families, I am,

Very respectfully,

Captain Alan G. Kirk, U.S. Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence,
Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

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OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
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Serial 123

Monograph Index Guide No. 102/102-100

From Naval Attaché

at Berlin

Date 15 February 1941

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Source Conversation

Evaluation Reliable

Subject G E R M A N Y

Political Forces; Policy

Foreign Intelligence

NOTE: (There exists careful summary of report, containing information necessary to be kept in contact with, source, priority, status, etc.)

B R I E F

Chinese military attaché, after visit to Belgian, French coastal ports, reports no visible signs of impending invasion of England observed. Many troops present but no preparations in evidence for large scale invasion attempt. German disappointment that English colonies had not revolted. Axis pressure on China to conclude peace with Japan unfruitful. Japanese reserves all used up; believes there will be no Japanese in China in another three years. Doubt that Germany can successfully invade England.

Swedish military attaché, in conversation with German Party member, was told that following conquest of England, Africa could be taken followed by German exploitation of South America. War now not only against England but also against U.S. which is only strong force left against the new order. Belief that landing in England will be attempted by Germans after six weeks intensive submarine and air warfare.

R.O. 11682, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) of (R)

-O-

OSD letter, May 2, 1974

MAY 21 1973

1. The following opinions were expressed to me by two foreign military observers in Berlin at the present time.

2. Chinese Military Attaché:

"I have just completed a trip to the Belgian and French coastal ports. I could not see any visible signs of impending invasion of England from the ports visited. There are many troops in Belgium and in northern France, but there do not appear to be any preparations or equipment available for a large scale invasion attempt. I had a long talk with General Falkenhausen, an old friend of mine. He told me that it was a great blow to the German General Staff that the English colonies had not revolted at the outbreak of the war. The German General Staff had practically unanimously agreed that this would occur and even if it did not occur, the colonies would not assist England to any great extent. I believe that this did not occur because India saw what happened when the Japanese invaded China, and that India prefers English domination to Japanese domination. The same thing applies to

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Egypt. The Egyptians hate the Italians, and as soon as Italy entered the war they also favored English domination to Italian domination. The General told me that this was one of the greatest setbacks that the Germans had had since the war started.

"We do not intend to make any peace with Japan until all Japanese are out of China. The Axis has put pressure on us to conclude a peace, but we have taken our stand and told them that it is out of the question. The Japanese have used up all their reserves. I guarantee that there will be no Japanese in China 3 years from today.

"I do not think it is possible for Germany to invade England successfully."

3. Swedish Military Attaché:

"A high German Party member told me that after England has been conquered they intend to take Africa and then exploit South America. The U.S. will then have to join the Axis party. The war from now on is not against England, which is merely a stepping stone to world domination, but against the U.S., which is the only strong force left in the world against the new order.

"I believe a landing will be attempted in England after 6 weeks of intensive submarine and air warfare - not before.

"I am convinced that if pressed this government is so ruthless that if they consider it necessary they will wage a bacillus war."

much greater range than those in European air forces. The fighter protection for our bombers could only then become effective when we succeeded in producing fighters which with respect to speed were equal to all the demands of modern air combat and, in addition, possessed a range far greater than the situation on the European continent demanded from the designers. Japan has solved this problem in an outstanding manner. The war with China, in which since the summer of 1937 I took part in 15 large battles as commander of a brigade and later as a division commander, has demonstrated that our air force is equal to its assignments. One thing, however, we lacked: dive-bombers. However it remained open to our officers in the most important attacks to dive with their machines on the assigned objectives, fortifications and armored bunkers, and with sacrifice of their lives to accomplish their mission. - And this they did! This spirit of individual readiness to give all was further evidenced at the battles at Nantscho where our planes landed on the enemy fields, having driven the defenders into the cellars by preceding bombing attacks, and personally set fire to hangars and buildings before taking off again."

As Inspector-General of the Japanese Army Air Force, Lieutenant General Tomozuki Yamashita, who was born Nov. 18, 1883, has performed outstanding service as the organizer of Japan's modern air force. He is known as one of the most capable officers of the Army and is numbered among the most sincere friends and admirers of Germany.

On the Channel General Yamashita and his party were permitted to visit a bomber group which had partaken in decisive engagements in the Western campaign. They were received by the Wing Commander, Group Commander, Squadron Commanders and officers of the group as well as the commander of the AA battery located near the field. Representatives of the Air Fleet and also of the Air District were likewise present. The Group Commander gave a full account of the organization of a bomber group, after which the Japanese officers were permitted to go into detailed questions of organization. Lunch was served in the officers' mess and inspection was made of the quarters and operating layout. The loading of a Heinkel bomber with a bomb of the heaviest caliber was demonstrated whereupon a tour was made through the field shops of the group. In questioning after the inspection as to impressions and comparisons with the Japanese Air Force, General Yamashita stated that, except for the difference of integration with the Army and Navy, the Japanese air organization is very similar to the German. He added that he was very well informed both as to the German organization and as to the striking power of the German Air Force.

General Yamashita is making his third visit to Germany in the past 20 years. The first visit was shortly after the World War. From 1927-1930 he was Military Attaché in Vienna. He entered the Japanese Army originally as an

infantryman, but as a first lieutenant joined the Air Service and by 1916 he had completed the 3-year course in the War Academy and served then, till the end of the World War, as a member of the General Staff. As a Captain he went to Switzerland for studies until 1921, during which time he made his first visits to Germany. He then served 5 years in the War Ministry, on the completion of which he came to Vienna. On return to Japan he spent 2 years as Colonel in an infantry regiment. During a tour 1932-1936 in the War Ministry he had his first opportunity to take decisive part in the expansion, organization, and fitting of the Japanese Air Force. As a Major General in 1936-1937 he commanded a brigade in Korea and in the summer of 1937 as commander of a mixed brigade he took part in the attacks on Peking. Promoted to Lieut. General and Commander of a reinforced brigade, which distinguished itself in the battles at Hankow, he became Chief of the General Staff of the Army Group, North China. Later he was a division commander in Manchukuo and in China. In 1940 he was appointed to his present capacity of Inspector General of the Army Air Force.

2. It is apparent from the text of the editorial services and the press releases that not only has an imposing air delegation been sent from Japan but also that the German Air Force is extending to the members of the delegation opportunities for first-hand studies of organization, operations, equipment, and industry such as have not hitherto been extended to foreign visitors, except possibly the Italians before and shortly after Italy's entry into the war.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial	194	Monograph Index Guide No.		608
(Start new series each year, i.e., 1-100, 2-100)		To correspond with AT 100-1, give series 100, 10, N, L Index from Make separate report for each index title		
From	The Naval Attache	at	Berlin	Date 26 March 1941
(Ship, fleet, unit, station, office, station, or person)				
Reference	(Reference, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)			
Source	Conversation with Argentine banker	Evaluation	Reliable	
(Is official, personal, hearsay, rumor, confidential, press, correspondence with, identity, etc.)		(Is reliable, doubtful, untrustworthy, etc.)		
Subject	GERMANY Army; Operations			
(Name, reported on)		(Main title as per index group)		(Make separate report for each title)
NOTE: This entry careful summary of report, including subject-matter covered, dated, include discussion facts, sources, claims, dates, etc.				

Large numbers of troops being transferred from Belgian Coast to Eastern Germany. No special indications in Belgium that invasion of England contemplated in the near future. Barge and small landing boat building program behind schedule and will not reach any great proportion until end of April.

4-2-44

1. An Argentine banker who made a recent trip to Brussels, reports that considerable numbers of troops are being transferred from the Belgian Coast to the eastern part of Germany and as yet no troops have been sent to replace them.
2. He stated further that there were no special indications in Belgium of a contemplated landing in England in the near future, and that the building program of barges and small special landing boats is behind schedule and will not reach any great proportion until the end of April.

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APAA-1

Serial **211** Monograph Index Guide No. **103**
From **Naval Attaché** at **Berlin** (Date **5 April** 1941)
Reference
Source **Conversation** Evaluation **Reliable, well informed**
Subject **GERMANY** **Political Forces; International Relations**

Foreign political developments and immediate program as affecting Japan, Sweden, Finland, Russia, England.

- 9 -

(a) Japan The situation on conclusion of Matsuoka's visit is apparently none too satisfactory, from the German point of view. It appears that no particularly impressive results were attained, especially as regards a possible U.S.-Japanese involvement to divert our attention and assistance. (There are some indications in Berlin of a desire to "plant" this impression among the attachés.)

(b) Sweden The appreciable increased pressure applied on Sweden recently to yield further to German demands, if not actually to take a final position relative to the Axis and the "new order", which was responsible for the partial mobilization measures recently taken by Sweden, has suddenly disappeared. The reasons for this abrupt reversal of position and the renewed cordiality in dealings shown by Germany were not known to my informant. (Question:- Has Sweden yielded on some important issue?)

(c) Finland A request made by Finland to join up with the 3-power pact last fall was flatly rejected by Germany. Finland is still desirous of such a development, but as far as is known, Germany has not yet consented. The only reason for such attitude on the part of Germany would be a continuing desire not to give direct offense to Russia on a question so pertinent to Russia's recent and present policy with regard to Northern and Baltic states.

(d) Russia My informant is inclined to side with the growing faction which believes that preparations for military undertakings by Germany on a large scale against Russia are indicative of more than just a safeguarding of the eastern boundary against

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[illegible][illegible]

any eventuality. He cites the extensive movements of German troops in the east as if for an actual campaign, the establishment of extensive communication and supply terminals in the east which would serve such a campaign, and the rumor that all females and children are to be evacuated from the General Gouvernement by April 15th. He maintains that probable reasons for action against Russia are (1) a feeling that a decisive victory against England cannot be obtained this year, (2) that action against Russia holds promise of success in view of relative locations and strength of the forces on both sides, and (3) that acute need exists for the supplies which could thus be obtained from Russia. In respect to the last point, the objective would be a quick thrust into Russia before the new crops would be affected by the operations. The operations against England in the meantime can be continued from the air and at sea on present or even greater scale, without offering appreciable interference with such a campaign. He admits, on the other hand, that such a move is replete with risk, that it does not appear logical in many respects, that the whole present confusion regarding probable intentions may be just another "diversion maneuver" just as last year's rumors relative to impending action in the Balkans, that the attitude relative to Finland does not fit into the picture, and that the combined pressure by Germany and Japan during the visit of Matsuoaka may have been largely an attempt to force Russia to join up in some more active way with the Triple Powers, perhaps, even in a military agreement.

(e) England As indicated above, on the hypothesis that military operations against Russia are impending, the plan of action against England would be one of increasing sea and air warfare, but that no attempt at a decision would be made before July-August of this year. In the meantime some new weapons are to be brought into use, such as improved airplane models, more devastating bombs, and extensive laying of a new non-sweepable type of mine.

2. In my personal analysis of the foregoing, the following is submitted:

(a) England is Germany's principal enemy.

(b) Action leading to a decision over England cannot be too long delayed by Germany without risk of serious complications produced by U.S. assistance on a tremendously expanding scale.

(c) Action against Russia, therefore, would be logically postponed if there appear to the Germans to be any prospects of early success against England. In the absence of such prospects, or if Germany is resigned to some eventual stalemate, action against Russia now might be indicated.

(d) The threat of offensive against Russia, on the scale of the present preparations, is the finest defense possible against any adventurous notions which Russia might entertain. It, at the same time, is an excellent diversion move, since it does not reveal intentions and can serve the dual purpose of defense and aggression.

(e) I believe the German desire and intentions to seek a decision over England are still predominant over all other issues. The Russian issue, then, would resolve itself, not into military operations in Russia at this time, but rather into pressure of all sorts to force her to join, or assist on greater scale, in the alignment against England.

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OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT

anna-1

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial 312 Monograph Index Guide No. 1100-300
(Start new series each year, i. e. 1-40, 5-40)
(To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From Naval Attaché at Berlin Date 26 May, 1941
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference _____ (Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source Official Evaluation Official
(As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with—identify when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject GERMANY General Summary: Relations with the U.S.
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

Notes.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated, include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

Brief

Recent German Government decree restricts travel of U.S. Naval Attaché and assistants to Greater Berlin. Special permission for travel outside Greater Berlin not being granted at present.

-O-

1. This office previously reported the German Government's travel restrictions placed upon Attachés and officers of the U.S. Armed Forces, which confined travel to Greater Berlin, the decree taking effect 26 August 1939. For travel outside of Greater Berlin it was necessary to request special permission in each instance. On 16 November 1939, these travel restrictions were modified, permitting U.S. Attachés and officers freedom of travel up to the areas of Wittenberg, Templin and Angermünde. Travel to other localities in the German Reich required special permission which, up to a few days ago, had always been granted to the Attachés of this office. However, a recent request by the Assistant Naval Attaché for Air for permission to travel from Berlin to Vienna has been refused by the local authorities with the added information that henceforth all travel of the Attachés of this office must be confined to Greater Berlin and that special permission for travel outside Berlin is not to be granted.

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Nav.	Chf.	T. & D.	C. & E.	Eng.	S. & S.	M. & S.	Arm.	U. S. M. C.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Bat. For.	Com. Sec. For.	C. in C. A. F.	Com. Spec.	Com. Avion.	F. & T. U.
Attaché at	Op-11	Op-12	Op-13	Op-14	Op-15	Op-16	Op-17	Op-18	Op-19	Op-20	Op-21	Op-22	Op-23	Op-24	Op-25
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Arch.															

Return to _____

wait for the U-boat to fire first." This statement unveils Roosevelt's shooting order. And the demand of the paper that shooting begin automatically as soon as a German U-boat shows itself anywhere in the route to Iceland, emanating from a commentator, reveals the systematic war provocation of the President which has been instilled among the journalists and political hounds backing the President.

Naturally, the London radio goes much farther and joyfully quotes from the New York Times that the well known American paper has come out with the demand that every American ship meeting a German U-boat in the waters to Iceland, shall immediately fire the first shot. The scream following the first shot, is intended to alter the face of American public opinion in the U.S.A. This is an irresponsible betrayal of policy which the present President of the U.S.A. is using to chase after the war."

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial 553 Monograph Index Guide No. 106
From The Naval Attache at Berlin Date 30 September 1941
Reference Semi-Official
Source German Press Evaluation German Views
Subject GERMANY Political Forces; Prosecution of War; General International Situation

Brief

German newspaper article treating the sinking of the United States ship ROBIN MOOR; sinking justified by reason of ship carrying contraband, as confirmed by ship's papers; international law complied with by the U-boat.

1. In the "Frankfurter Zeitung" of 30 September 1941 appears an article entitled "Five Piratical Incidents", which is intended as an answer to President Roosevelt's recent speech regarding the sinking of U.S. ships. The article's treatment of the ROBIN MOOR incident is considered of sufficient interest to warrant translation, appearing hereunder.

"The first 'incident' is that of the Robin Moor, and was used in June for a violent anti-German campaign in the American papers. The facts in the case are simple. On 21 May, at 0430, a German U-boat sighted a steamer in the South Atlantic. The U-boat could distinguish no flag, nor an illuminated national emblem. According to Prize Law, the ship was ordered to stop and to send the captain with the ship's papers aboard the U-boat. Instead of the captain, the first officer appeared without any papers alongside. He explained that his ship was enroute to South Africa with a cargo of motors, parts, auto parts, and general goods. The officer was informed that, according to his own admission, the cargo was absolute contraband for a power at war with Germany and would have to be sunk. He contented himself with requesting 30 minutes time to abandon ship, which was granted. At the order of the U-boat captain, the captain of the Robin Moor came alongside with the ship's papers and the contraband character of the cargo was confirmed. After the ship was sunk the lifeboats were supplied with food by the German U-boat.

"There can be no question as to compliance by the German U-boat with international law. Motors and motor parts (it appears that these were chiefly airplanes engines) are absolute contraband according to the British contraband list, and therefore also according to the German one.

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Nav.	Ord.	T. & D.	C. & R.	Eng.	S. & A.	M. & S.	Arm.	U. S. M. C.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Rel. Fac.	Com. Sec. Fac.	C. in C. A. F.	Com. Spec.	Com. Attn.	F. A. T. U.
Attached at	Op. 10-11	Op. 12	Op. 13	Op. 14	Op. 15	Op. 16	Op. 17	Op. 18	Op. 19	Op. 20	Op. 21	Op. 22	Op. 23	Op. 24	Op. 25
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(Article 23, paragraphs 4 and 9 of the German Prize Regulations). Enemy destination of unconditional contraband is considered proved according to Article 23, if documents confirm that it is to be unloaded in an enemy port, and, according to paragraph 2, if the ship is cleared for enemy ports only. Ships carrying contraband are also subject to Article 23, paragraph 1, which provides for visit and search. Ships visited and searched under Article 72, paragraph 2, even when neutral, may be destroyed when their service to the enemy is definitely expected ("Wenn ihre Einschiebung mit Sicherheit zu erwarten ist"), and when the safety of the war vessel or the success of its operations might be affected by bringing into port for adjudication. Suppositions of this nature were present in this case. Service to the enemy was to be expected, because more than half the cargo was contraband (Article 23, paragraph 2). It is not possible for a lone U-boat operating in the South Atlantic, far from German bases, to bring a ship into port without exposing herself to considerable danger and jeopardising the success of her operations. Destruction is only permitted when passengers, crew and papers of the vessel are previously placed in a safe place. Ship's boats may be considered as a safe place under certain circumstances, namely when (Article 74, paragraph 1) sea and weather conditions are favorable, and when land or other ships are near. Such cases are provided for in the London rules concerning submarine warfare as well. It is proved that these conditions existed by the fact that the boats were sighted after a time by other steamers and that the entire crew and all other persons on board were rescued by them without exception."

~~REDACTED~~ 84 1941 na-del

Monograph Index Guide No. (Special File)

Monograph Index Guide No. 12
(To correspond with 41 DQC given above, see U. S. J. Index Guide
Make separate report for each month)

B e r l i n

Date 1 December 1941

Radio, Press, Rumors,
c., chiefly unverified.

Excluded etc., chiefly unverified.

Current Conversations, Week of 25 Nov./1 Dec. 1941.

Notes: (1) Here are an excellent summary of report, containing substantial supporting data. I include important facts, numbers, dates, etc.

B r i e f

Matters and subjects brought up at daily conference of the naval and military attaches, week of 25 November - 1 December 1941.

●●●●●

1. The following matters and subjects were brought up at the daily conference of the naval and military attaches during the week of 25 November - 1 December 1941.

a) G.S.I came in very clearly at 6 p.m. the night of 24 November, but was again subject to interference. At 7 p.m. there was no interference. He said that it had been decided by the Regular Army generals over the protest of those adherent to the Party, that no forces would be detached from the Russian front to reinforce the German Army in Libya. He said that forces of Rommel were perfectly able to take care of themselves, but for the fact that their motor transport was in a deplorable state. This was due to the fact that they had a lot of old junk French trucks which had been bought for them in Algiers, Tunisia and Morocco. The buyers were Hauptmann Bieberfeld and Lieutenant Roetge, who had gotten their army appointments by Party favor, and had a deal with a Jewish garage man named Goerlitzer at No. 7 Rue Sabati in Algiers. The gentleman was said to buy up the worst sort of unusable junk and sell it to the German Army at high prices, out of the profit from which he gave a slice to the buyers, namely, Bieberfeld and Roetge.

The "Chief" also said that there were 255 trucks stuck between Maroa Sousa and Derna as a result of their being defective. Bieberfeld and Roetge were exchanging their money for dollars in Tangier with a man named Abu Sur. The "Chief" ended with a blast at the useless and cowardly Italians and at General Prittwitz of the Gestapo, who had some connection with the supply system. The Prittwitz connection was not quite clear on account of fading.

b) Rumors are current concerning the death of Moelders, who is said to have protested that his sisters who are nuns, have been dispossessed.

c) From the tone of the radio news on both sides, it was felt that the British were not having too much success in Libya.

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d) Indications were noted that there might be a chance of Germany advancing towards the Caucasus through Turkey. Indications of increasing Turko/Bulgarian tension had been noted due to Bulgarian naval vessels having searched Turkish ships in the Black Sea. This had caused the Turks to prohibit entrance of their vessels into Bulgarian ports.

e) German people are said to be discontented but in noway suffering from low morale.

f) G.S.I was not heard the night of 25 November, although several attempts were made at 2100 and later. Second hand, it was learned that he had delivered a broadside at Frau Scholtz-Klink during one of the recent talks which our listeners were unable to receive.

g) Rumored that in at least one camp of Russian prisoners, the prisoners were receiving a bread ration 100 grams less than that received by German civilians. At this camp it was said that considerable cannibalism had occurred in the locked freight cars in which the prisoners had arrived.

h) A traveller reported that on the way from Turkey, he had been obliged to change cars no less than four times at points where bridges were destroyed or unusable.

i) Rumored that the German meat ration is to be cut from 400 grams weekly to 300 grams next month. Tobacco ration cards for men and women have come into effect.

j) It is practically impossible to purchase any Christmas articles in Berlin. 125 grams of candles are said to be allotted to each German family with children; none to others without children.

k) Newspapers carry the announcement of the death of a third important German airman within the last few days, General of the Fliers Wildberg.

l) Rumored that Moelders had been grounded some weeks before accident, and there are rumors that all is not on the up and up.

m) Observers report arrival of Ciano at the Adlon Hotel in Berlin - greeted with total silence, contrary to statement in newspapers.

n) An article in the Swedish (Stockholm) paper Svenska Dagbladet reports several people arrested in Tokio, including 6 Germans, on espionage charges. Among those arrested is the director of a German newspaper and a press photographer. Also stated that German influence in Japan has lessened considerably of late; further, that a raid was made by Jap police in Tokio on the German State Bureau where documents were found uncovering the fact that Japanese military and industrial information had been given to Berlin. Protest thereover is said to have been made by the German Ambassador to the Jap Government.

o) G.S.I transmission the night of 26 November complained of the inadequacy of training of the Luftwaffe. He was difficult to receive.

p) Special precautions were taken at the subway stations adjoining hotels occupied by visiting Statesmen and Diplomats, presumably to prevent the placing of bombs.

r) Rumors concerning the death of Udet, Moelders and Wilberg become more persistent. Now said that Udet received public reprimand from Fuehrer in presence of Goering, and shot himself. Moelders death said to have occurred before that of Udet. Wilberg said to have died 20 November, and this was known in Breslau. Luftwaffe morale said to be adversely affected by burial of Udet, a suicide, beside v. Richtofen. Udet said to have been drinking especially heavily and to have accepted favors from manufacturers unable to meet their commitments.

s) German papers carry first report of attempt of small British force to land on French coast.

t) Germany's troubles with irredentist Serbians confirmed. B.B.C. carried report of U.S. Secret Service having obtained evidence that total destruction of Belgrad is planned by Germany. It is said that two more German divisions are being sent to Serbia.

u) Rumored that very bad feeling exists between Rumania and Hungary.

v) Attention brought to the fact that reference to colonies has not been made in German papers for sometime, indicating that German expansion is headed exclusively eastwards, possibly to Vladivostok and joining with Japan. ✓

w) Visiting diplomats of the anti-komintern pact countries were shown through the A.A. tower in the Berlin Tiergarten.

x) General morale in Germany said to be improved by apparent failure of British to attain their Libyan objectives. This said to be reflected in Italian relations.

y) A British radio station operating on 260 meters, while sending Spanish news, was interfered with by a peculiar dissonant, five note interference. The same station with English news, suffered a different type of interference which local listeners have learned to associate with that interposed by Germany in case of "G.S.1".

z) "G.S.1" was not heard on 27 and 28 November. However, further confirmation of his popularity among soldiers at the front was obtained, Kiev being the spot.

aa) Special regulations for Jews, among other discriminatory measures, now require that special permission be secured in order to send a package to a Jew outside the German Reich proper; permission is not being granted at this time.

bb) Reports of additional men being mobilized were received. Estimated at two million.

cc) Horses and geese are being requisitioned by the Wehrmacht.

dd) Rumored that Americans are not allowed in Kiel, the left bank of the Rhine, or in Tyrol.

ee) Bottles are not available for drugs and the like. Purchasers of ink must bring their own bottles.

ff) Even non-essential decorative material is being brought fast. Stated that orders for souvenirs used in Winterhilfswerk campaign of 1948 are already being placed.

gg) Germans said to be annoyed at Swedish foreign minister for taking an attitude which did not approve 100% the New Order in Europe.

hh) Swedes said not to be allowed to visit Russian prison camps because the visiting privilege is not granted to the Bulgarians with respect to German prison camps in Russia.

ii) The recently created Croat admiral who is Croatian Military Attache to Berlin, designed his own uniform.

jj) Continuous and insistent reports keep coming in to the effect that Dietrich's death was suicide.