

MR 000.71 PROPAGANDA

1942 & 1943

MR 000.71 PROPAGANDA
Serial
1942 & 1943

DECLASSIFIED

Not Room
Bot 46

Bot 46

19 P.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DEB 12-29-71

205 Reg 17emo
29-71

Date: 8/23/71

Signature: RHP

From: Algiers
To: War

Nr: WB779/20632

29th December, 1943

NAP 565 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and Sherwood OWI and USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff and London Coordinators signed Eisenhower cite PHINC.

Summary FMB directive for week beginning December 27th. Leading with Roosevelt Christmas Message and salient points to stress: all media.

Italy Military: From Mediterranean to Adriatic German resistance stubborn and will be so reported. We continue stress Allied unity through many nations present Italian front. Part played Italian troops however will be stressed only if AFHQ announces successful action by them.

Rail communications remain prime objective our sabotage campaign.

We urge correspondents copy carefully edited in order exclude from propaganda output any comparisons between operations Italy and Russian front: recent example was comparison Ortona Stalingrad which most undesirable.

Political: We continue report political developments freely objectively, refraining participation or reporting personal differences.

Rumors reported liberated Italy that Allies "Promises" distribution of food unfulfilled. Reports also reveal apathy local population that we counter both by campaign local Italian press and local radio. We present frank picture tremendous problem bringing food to liberated populations. We show problem increasing as further territories liberated and our

CM-IN-17895 (29 Dec 43)

COPY No.

17

000.71 THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers

To: War

No. W 879/20632 29 December, 1943

page 2 dm

communication lines lengthened. We point out while United Nations do all possible provide immediate relief upon arrival Allied Troops liberated peoples must do their part rationing equally existing stocks, refraining from hoarding, taking measures possible increase production food despite difficulties. We prod local apathy by reporting instances useful communal activities liberated Italy, similar activities current Britain America, using when available achievements Americans Italian descent.

Germany: We address wives parents German Austrian soldiers featuring conditions life, morale, food tobacco rations, recreation in Allied PW camps. Objective is obtain families encourage soldiers to desert. This done entirely by inference, no direct appeals to desertion or encouragement of desertion (see our cable December 23)

Austria: PW interrogations show Austrian Troops Italy unaware Moscow statement. We revive this by leaflet, radio also urging Austrian population inform soldiers of Moscow declaration when safely possible.

France: New Years line similar Christmas: Recognition hope deferred, bleak hungry months ahead, continued family separation but full recognition faith courage of French resistance. We reaffirm importance this resistance our common cause. We continue stress available material on French troops Italian front.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S (Capt. Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD

Gen Strong
Gen Hilldring
Gen Arnold
Adm King
LOG

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED

CM-IN-17895 (29 Dec 43) 1703Z 4h

17

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

From: Algiers
To: WAR

No: W-8494/18906, 24th December 43

NAF 562 for AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeat to Sherwood OWI ND USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff nd London Coordinators signed Eisenhower cite FHPWO.

Prisoner interrogation recently suggests psychological inducement for desertion provided by leaves. On return to front potential deserters try to act quickest so that family reassured when soldier reported missing. Several soldiers have revealed that they deserted following encouragement by family.

We consider it important possibility further influence soldiers families in Germany so that they will recommend desertion to soldier on leave.

Following suggested: Series broadcasts to German women playing up life nd conditions in Allied prison camps stressing advantages such as safety, comfort, health, food, pastimes, morale. Recommend continue avoid direct appeals to troops for desertion or to families suggesting they tell soldier to desert. Preferable that idea of desertion should come of itself from knowledge of advantages of prisoners life. Excellent material for this contained prisoners intercepted letters AG PWB D section report December 13th on German deserter coordinate: Chief of Staff.

Nosig.

ACTION: CCS (Capt. Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD, Gen Strong, Gen Arnold, Adm King, LOG

CM-IN-15680 (25 Dec 43) 1159Z jb

COPY No. 19

~~SECRET~~
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers
To: War

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

No. W-8158/17077, NAF 559 21st December 1943

NAF 559 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and Sherwood OWI and USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff and London coordinators signed Eisenhower cito FHPWO

With Italian front news we stress superior Allied air support. We continue point our difficulties this campaign avoiding commitments on allied objectives. To show unity Allied effort we stress presence American British Canadian French New Zealand Indian Troops in line, with Italian Troops beside them, still not referring to Italians as Allies. This used to France Italy and enemy stressing weight of many nations united against Germans. We repeat December 13th directive points on German destruction livestock and food in path retreat also sabotage campaign on railroad communications.

Advisory Councils recommendations for return part Southern Italy to Italian administration reported as news we now using responsible Allied neutral comment as available giving fair picture free expression public opinion in Britain USA by using favourable or adverse comment. Further items same subject if upcoming be similarly treated first news then followed impartial comment from Allied neutral sources.

France: Using the line recent Anglo American statements on future of France disclose no new attitude but in line previous statements allied leaders. We play fully French Troops on Italian front using colour background personal deeds valour if hard military news lacking. We continue stress resistance news but carefully scrutinize items avoiding those capable provoking reprisals. We continue use material showing Vichy does not represent France

CM-IN-13348 (21 Dec 43)

COPY No. 13

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-8158/17077, 21st December 1943 Page 2

but without labouring the point which may be taken
for granted. We continue full coverage operation
measures by Comité National.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

ACTION: CCS (Capt. Royal USN).

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King

CM-IN-13348 (21 Dec 43) 1901Z jb

COPY No. 13

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-7571-13729, 14 December 1943

NAF 544 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff
for Sherwood OWI and USFOR for British Chiefs of
Staff and London Coordinators signed Eisenhower cite
PHINC.

*Propaganda
Psychological
warfare*

Our line to Italy for week beginning 13th De-
cember calls for conservative frontline reporting.
We play up to interested countries official news of
forces other than British American. Italians even
in action not referred to as Allies. We revive sa-
botage campaign specially attentive railway communica-
tions particularly south of Pisa Rimini line. We out-
point important central Italian rail centers and by
use of resistance news from other occupied countries
stress vulnerability German transportation. We give
fullest publicity to fact retreating Germans system-
atically destroying all food including all animals
cattle and draft. We urge all Italians in path of re-
treat hide carefully such food supplies, livestock. We
point out by so doing they ensure feeding their own
families; hasten Allied advance by making more transport
available for war materials; hasten liberation of Italy.
This hide your food campaign specially adapted for leaf-
lets; great caution should be used in radio to avoid en-
couraging hoarding in liberated areas.

We continue report fully statements Anti Fascist
Groups also reporting eventual moves Badoglio Govern-
ment of technicians tending show increasing Italian act-
ivity in common war effort. We report frankly divergencies
between personalities or parties but without dealing with
petty personal differences.

For France we report intersession activities of
commission of assembly consultative such as study of

GM-IN-8984 (14 Dec 43)

COPY No. 13

000.71

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

From:

To:

Fr:

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page #2

War

W-7571-13729

14th December, 1943

Statut Du Maquis. We report operation measures against collaborationists and we unmask political campaigns directly or indirectly ex Vichy recalling Vichy registered no protest against pillage of France, execution and deportation patriots but contrariwise sanctioned these and credited concentration camps in France. We stress Allied neutral comment showing Vichy nowise represents France.

For Satellites we stress Hull's warning to Bulgaria, Hungary Roumania pointing out their responsibilities and share in consequences of terrible defeat which United Nations so surely bringing to Nazi Germany. We recall Teheran invitation to Democratic Nations to join our cause.

No Sig.

DECLASSIFIED

JCB memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION:

OPD

General Strong (OWI)

Admiral King

Admiral Horne

General Arnold

CM-IN-8984 (14 Dec 43) 2049Z med

COPY No. 13

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

He

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W 7367/12567 11th December 1943

Reference joint directive last week cable 6437 December 4th, our cable December 6th and cable from PWE December 9th number 6514. NAF 543 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeat to Sherwood OWI and USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff and London coordinators signed Eisenhower cite FHINC.

We feel on food campaign to Italy major emphasis should be on frank discussion existing food shortage and difficulties. While agreeing necessity give where possible constructive advice we suggest that emphasis cannot properly lie on attempts convince Italians that "It is up to them to do something". Our information from Italy reveals general discontent springing from alleged unfulfilled promises by Allies. Therefore anything which could be construed as implying Italians themselves to blame, or any general recommendations unsupported by practical suggestions would in our opinion have adverse and embittering effect. Spring sowing will depend on supplies seed and fertilizers and extent to which plow beasts can be preserved from Germans.

We therefore recommend

- (A) Frank exposition factors complicating food production and distribution,
- (B) Emphasis on German requisitioning,
- (C) Allied transport difficulties due magnitude war effort and German destruction Italian communications.

CM-IN-7505 (12 Dec 43)

[REDACTED]

COPY No.

19

000.71 THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

From: Algiers
To: **INCOMING MESSAGE** Page 2

No. W7367/12567 11th December 1943

(D) Reports hardships suffered Greece and Yugoslavia,

(E) Strong recommendation the Italians employ ingenuity to frustrate German deprecation and conserve and distribute food supplies in accordance with regional peculiarities.

We unadvise general recommendation to hoard since this occurring already for mercenary and economic reasons.

Upsumming: reference USFOR cable December 4 number 6437, section 2 Italy recommend cautions handling point A. Difficult implement appeal conversion black market into national solidarity market (point B) but recommend appeal local efforts preserve and distribute food. Points CDE stand.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Adm Horne
LOG

CM-IN-7505 (12 Dec 43) 0813Z jb

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

COPY No. 19

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

hm

P R I O R I T Y

Franklin D. Roosevelt's Message

~~DEF. ASSIGNED~~

*JCS Reg. Memo
29-7*

Date- 8/23/7

Signature- RHP

From: Algiers
To: WAR

Nr.: 10397W6996

6th December 1943

OK
NAF 539 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff to Sherwood
OWI and USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff and London coor-
dinators repeat to USAFIME signed Eisenhower cite PHINC.

Line to Italy for week beginning December 6th contin-
ues reference to Badoglio government as temporary trustee
for Italian people. We recommend continued use comment by
Naples antifascist leaders as available. We report fully
activities of advisory council for Italy and UP play Allied
press comment. We note in married directive under Italy
recommendation for major campaign designed to induce Ital-
ians to help alleviate present food difficulties. We feel
suggested means for implementing such campaign too vague
and may well appear impractical to listeners on the spot.
We are trying to obtain specific practical suggestions from
Bari which will take into account regional peculiarities.
Pending receipt of these we suggest the food campaign be
held up.

For France we recommend mentioning our concern for
French prisoners in Germany.

For Yugoslavia we report news Tito government fact-
ually avoiding speculation relations between the King and
Tito government. We refer to the Partisan forces as the
Yugoslav Army of National Liberation.

Nosig

ACTION: CC/S (CAPT. ROYAL, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD GEN. STRONG GEN. ARNOLD GEN. HILLDRING
ADM. HORNE

COPY No.

CM-IN-4828 (7 Dec 43) T 07082 THE MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000.71

19

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

JDJD C 48
291834A
HJN

WDCC
29 Nov
2244Z

PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

From: Algiers
To : War

No : W-6467, 29 November 1943

NAP 532 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeat to Sherwood OWI and USFOR British Chiefs of Staff in London coordination signed Eisenhower cite PHINC .

Considering the importance of Austria as a target for Allied propaganda following Moscow Conference we would welcome fuller directive recommendations than we have hitherto received in the last 2 weeks joint directives. We feel these directives are applicable to other satellites and do not sufficiently distinguish between them and special position occupied by Austria. To point out consequences to Austria of long War does not of itself constitute strong inducement to take active measures to break loose from German yoke. Can you send us official indications long term Allied Policy towards Austria couched in terms appealing to Austrian listener and reader of leaflets, and stimulating him to action.

In commenting on Allied aerial offensive against Germany we are taking care not to suggest that we consider this offensive as a substitute for invasion.

For Italy we continue previous weeks line. On military side recommend we do not make too much of Montgomerys message to troops nor relax caution standing directive to stick close to communiques and unimply march on Rome will now be easy .

New Subject: We would welcome further guidance on Bulgaria. We feel time has come for us to receive directives on Southeastern Europe EURAUQENY wire.

No Sig

NOTE: This message has been relayed to Cairo by WDCC
ACTION: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD, Gen Strong, Gen Arnold, Adm King, LOG

CM-IN-18186

(30 NOV 43) 0238Z flw

COPY No. 19

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000.71

JDJD C 62
22/1655A
lmm

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

WDCC
22 Nov
1854Z

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers
To: War

No. 4337/W 5836, 22 November 1943

NAF 527 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff to Sherwood
~~OWI and~~ USFOR British Chiefs of Staff and London Coordinators signed Eisenhower cite PHINC

Line recommended for Italy reaffirms previous week's directive with following additional. Use material showing Badoglio Government only temporary and composed technical experts. Do not state or imply government is representative democratic. Report comment Naples Anti-Fascist political leaders recalling simultaneously their pledge, not embarrass government in prosecution war.

For France recommend reporting Work Committee and Assembly stressing particularly aspects indicating French unity. Show Activity Committee Consultative Assembly marks important stage rebirth French political life, but listener should be reminded Assembly provisional body. Report Work Commission depuration showing it animated desire out carry spirit justice task purging French political scene of unhealthy elements punishing those guilty crimes against France and patriots. If reported resignation Petain becomes official, suggest most effective indication to world Allied attitude towards Vichy Regime would be play news briefly, inconspicuously without comment thus attaching minimum importance such maneuver.

Relayed to SEXTANT.

No Sig.

ACTION: CCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)
INFORMATION: OPD, GEN STRONG, GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING, ADM HORNE, LOG

CM-IN-13725 (22 Nov 43) 2150Z mcs

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

COPY No.

000.71

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

JDJD B38
15/1854
MC

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WDCC
15 Nov.
2147Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

CORRECTED COPY

P R I O R I T Y

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DEPT. OF DEFENSE

JCS Reg. Memo
29-71

Date- 8/23/71

Signature: RHP

From: Algiers
To: War

Nr: W5312/1326

15th November, 1943

AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and Sherwood OWI USFOR
for British Chiefs of Staff and London coordinators and
to TROOPERS from AFHQ signed Eisenhower cite PHINC W5312/
1326 15th Nov nil.

Captured German prisoners directly involved Casazzo
Outrage raises important point for Allied propaganda. NAF
522. News their capture has been stopped at request of
War Office. In view ever present possibility leakage news
of capture we urge that Allied propaganda for such eventu-
ality be immediately coordinated. We suggest that if news
leakage occurs or if ban on news is lifted we should state
(1) That Casazzo incident is being fully investigated (2)
That results investigation will be forwarded London War
Crime Commission. At same time we believe decision as
to time phase of ultimate trial and what trial procedure
will be followed in this and similar cases is matter of
requiring immediate attention responsible quarters Wash-
ington and London.

No Sig.

NOTE: Corrected copy of CM-IN-9474 (16 Nov 43) CCS

ACTION: CCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD ADM KING
GEN STRONG GEN HILLDRING
GEN ARNOLD

CM-IN-9612 (16 Nov 43) 0512Z vo

COPY No.

18

000.71

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

JDJD B 44
15/1855A
l.m

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

WDCG
15 Nov
2255Z

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

JCS Reg. Memo
29-71

P R I O R I T Y

Date- 8/23/71

Signature- RHP

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W 5313/1327, NAF 521, 15 November 1943

OK
To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and Sherwood OWI
and to USPOR for British Chiefs of Staff and London Co-
ordinator signed Eisenhower cite FHINC. NAF 521.

PWB Directive week beginning November 15th follows.
Line for Italy as amended by London Coordinators cable OK
3683. On military side continue stick to communiques
avoiding speculation.

On Lebanese Crisis, we reporting events briefly
factually basing our reports only on official statements.
We avoid inflammatory press comment but quote historic
background material. In view conflict between British
and French statements we need special guidance soonest.

For France we reaffirm special guidance cabled
November 10th on reorganization French National Committee.
Reference Married Directive November 12th we recommend
avoiding statement that conflict of personalities generals
is over. For your information, Giraud unappeased and we
should not play him up too strongly as CINC French Army.

No Sig.

ACTION: CC/S (Capt. Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Admiral King
General Hilldring
Log

CM-IN-9455 (16 Nov 43) 0056Z med

COPY No. 18

000.71

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA LIMA	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE RRRRRR DEFERRED
DATE 10 NOV 1942	INFORMATION	COM 15	PRIORITY
TOR CODEROOM 1914/10			ROUTINE RRRRRR DEFERRED
DECODED BY BRACKEN			
PARAPHRASED BY COFFMAN			

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

ROONEY**101435 NCR 5863**

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

ACTION

	F-00
	F-01
	F-015
	F-0015
	F-05
	F-07
	F-1
	F-11
	F-2
	F-3
	F-30
	F-31
	F-32
	F-33
	F-34
	F-35
	F-37
	IG-00
	VCND

GERMAN PROPAGANDA FILMS BORROWED THRU EMBASSY FROM PERUVIAN CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES LIMA HAVE BEEN SENT TO US ARMY MOTION PICTURE SERVICE TO MAKE COPIES FOR USE AS POSSIBLE COUNTER PROPAGANDA. FILMS FLOWN BY AIR MISSION TO TALARA ON 3RD FOR FURTHER TRANSFER BY BOMBER TO QUARRY HEIGHTS CANAL ZONE. SEE EMBASSY STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL DESPATCH 5290 OF 5 NOVEMBER TO STA DEPARTMENT.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(C) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By *4* NARS Date *JAN 3 1973*

16.....ACTION

10/11.....13.....20G.....COMINCH.....20-OP.....NAVAIDE....

17.....00R.....FILE

101435

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-58818

000.71

JDJD A35
08/1625A
MC

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WDCC
8 Nov.
1854Z

INCOMING MESSAGE
PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

From: Algiers
To: War

Nr: W-4631 /8135 8th November, 1943

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and Sherwood OWI
and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff and London
Coordinators-NAF 510-signed Eisenhower cite FHINC.

Political line to Italy continues as for last week when clarification situation Italian Government occurs will issue special guidance our NAF 501 amended per London Coordinating Committee OZ 3546. We reaffirm last weeks line on food for Italy: (C of one of last week)

Our opinion is that for present sabotage campaign to Italy should confine itself to general appeals to Italians to hamper German war effort and more particularly sabotage German lines communications. We do not consider advisable to specify localized objectives or put forward specific types sabotage. We fear such appeals would lead to violent German reprisals having deterrent effect Italian sabotage activities and morale. Our opinion may change as military situation develops and we will keep you informed.

Main lines for propaganda to France same as last week. Recommend particular care avoid giving French impression they will be supplied with food immediately after Allied landings. We will give full coverage consultative assembly representing the articulate voice of France and expressing vigor French political thought. Disappointment at omission France from London advisory council persists locally and we recommend emphasizing universal application its findings in spirit of Moscow conference.

No Sig
FOOTNOTE: NAF 501 is CM-IN-1404 (3 Nov 43) CC/S
ACTION: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)
INFORMATION: OPD, Gen Strong, Gen Arnold, Adm King, LOG
CM-IN-4925 (8 Nov 43) 2035Z jb

COPY No.

000.7 THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

JDJD A37
03/1405A
md

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

WDCG
03 Nov
1456Z

U R G E N T

From: AFHQ in North Africa
To: War

NO. W 4168/5843, NAF 502, 03 November 1943

NAF 502 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and Sherwood
OWI Troopers pass to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff and
London Coordinators PWE Cairo PWB Tunis 72 Avenue Jules
Ferry Filpot Sicily for PWB Palermo from Freedom signed
Eisenhower cite FHPWO W4168/5843 3rd Nov 1500B.

Paragraph 1 background message W-4135/5664 sentence
7 please correct: The news will be announced through
ordinary channels and no political censorship is being ex-
ercised.

No Sig

ACTION: CCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
GEN HILLDRING

CM-IN-1633 (3 Nov 43) 1625Z vc

000.71

COPY No. 18

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

JDJD A 9
021955A
efg

INCOMING MESSAGE

WDCC
3 Nov
0355Z

PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: WAR

No. W-4135/5664, 2 November 1943
(NAP 501)

NAF 501 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and Sherwood OWI, to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff and London coordinators, to PWE Cairo to Tunis PWB 72 Avenue Jules Perky and to Palermo AJB signed Eisenhower cite PHPWO.

Special background information and directive on the Italian situation:

1. (Background): When Badoglio met Sforza and Groce at Naples at the end of October in an endeavour to broaden the basis of the present Italian Government, he met with an uncompromising refusal by Sforza to join any government so long as King Victor Emanuel remained on the throne. Badoglio returned to Brindisi November 1st, and reported to the King that he could not form a government and tendered his resignation. The King, unwilling to recognize that he and not Badoglio, was the obstacle, is going to Naples on November 3rd. It is expected that Sforza will be seeing the King shortly and will inform him of his decision. Since Badoglio and Sforza have both recently referred to each other in the highest terms, it is assumed that they will be prepared to work together and it is surmised that an agreement has been reached between them. The plans are thought to be that Badoglio would resign and that the King would then abdicate in favour of the 6 year old Prince of Naples, that Badoglio would be named Regent with Sforza as Prime Minister if the King agrees and the regency is set up. The news will be announced through ordinary channels and no military censorship is being exercised. While the above solution appears the most likely, it should be emphasized that neither the abdication of the King nor his acceptance of Badoglio resignation are yet

CM-IN-1404 (3 Nov 43)

COPY No.

18

000.71

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2

From: Algiers
To: WAR
No. W-4135/5664, NAF 501, 2 November 1943

certain.

2. (Directive):

1. The political events of major importance which are taking place in Italy should be reported fully and objectively.

2. These events will be a source of encouragement to all those peoples who are now labouring under German and Fascist rule comparable with that which formerly obtained in the whole of Italy.

3. Hence we must avoid all defensive explanation.

4. We can and should point out that these changes are fulfilment of the Allied promise to the Italian people and to all other nations that they themselves will choose their leaders and determine the form of their future government free from all foreign pressure or internal dictatorship EG tripartite statement and Moscow Conference.

5. We must avoid all comment on or criticism of the personalities involved and must not speculate on future developments in the Italian situation. We should avoid discussing the policies which various leading figures have stood for in the past and confine ourselves to reporting such statements as they may make.

6. We should bring out that we are not concerned with the actual individuals who form the Italian Government but are only interested that it should be founded on a democratic basis, that it should be anti Fascist and that it should loyally reserve the armistice terms, and that it should use its total resources in the war effort of the United Nations.

ACTION: CCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD, GEN STRONG, GEN HILLDRING
GEN ARNOLD, ADM KING, LOG

No Sig.

CM-IN-1404 (3 Nov 43) ~~SECRET~~

COPY No. 18

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

JDJD C42
01/1730A
IBH

INCOMING MESSAGE

WDCC
1 Nov
2024 Z

P R I O R I T Y

WJY
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
~~DECLASSIFIED~~
JCS Reg Memo
29-71
Date- 8/23/71
Signature- RHP

From: Algiers
To : War

No. W 4002/5078 - 1 November 1943

NAF 500 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and
Sherwood OWI and to USFOR for British Chiefs of
Staff and London Coordinators signed Eisenhower cite
FHPWO.

1. Married directive October 30th recommends we encourage Italians to produce food for themselves and asks for expert advice from Italy on best methods for conducting this campaign. This recommendation parallels cables from London 5792 and 5810 both October 27th suggesting we propose to Italian Government that it broadcast over radio Bari instructions to sow maximum grain and legume acreages also instructions concerning other crops. These two cables advocate such broadcast best done by Italian Government and not by BBC or OWI.

2. We have consulted with military government section here which concurs such campaign should be undertaken by Italian Government only over radio Bari and any other local means at its disposal. We are therefore puzzled by recommendations in married directive and suggest that this be reversed immediately.

3. Our line for Italy forthcoming week otherwise agrees with married directive. We propose that reference without undue prominence be made November 4th to Italian Armistice 1918. On military side we

CM-IN-445 (1 Nov 43)

~~SECRET~~

COPY No. 18

000.71

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To : War
No. W 4002/5078 - 1 November 1943

Page 2

particularly recommend sober factual reporting without speculation on progress campaign.

4. For France there are persistent indications from sources recently within France that the French are getting tired of counsels of prudence and forbearance concerning Western invasion. We therefore recommend avoiding giving such counsel in direct form at same time reporting factually items bearing on future allied operations in West. Recommend continuing campaign explaining Lend Lease to French stressing economic solution of war debts problem.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong (OWI)
Gen Arnold
Adm King

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED

CM-IN-445 (1 Nov 43) 2252Z bjm

COPY No. 18

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OPD 000.7 Sec (25 Oct 43)
Operations Division, WDGS
Policy Section, WDOFD MNH

October 27, 1943

CG USAF CBI AMMISCA CHUNGKING CHINA Number 3709

CG USAF CBI AMMDEL NEW DELHI INDIA Number 3913

From Marshall to Stilwell information Ferris

Comments and recommendations in AMMDEL AG 2453, October 25 convey a possible misconception of the purpose to be served by Anglo-American propaganda committees referred to in AGWAR 3734 to AMMDEL and 3638 to AMMISCA.

These committees were conceived as a means to improve coordination of Anglo-American propaganda policy, particularly in European Theater of Operations, where effective and immediate decisions may be required by emergency developments in the situation. Three committees of equal US-British membership therefore were established at strategic locations in order that emergency situations could be coped with without resorting to the routine of usual propaganda authorities.

It was not CCS intention that these emergency propaganda committees should undertake independent American propaganda operations within your theater. In fact, there will be no occasion for these committees convening except where existing US-UK propaganda policy does not adequately cover a particular development that may arise requiring an emergency and immediate solution. As was indicated in previous message on this subject, China and Indo-China fall within the purview of Washington Committee. The New Delhi Committee has no jurisdiction outside southeast Asia theater. The establishment of the New Delhi emergency committee is not to be construed as authorizing pooling American and British propaganda personnel under southeast Asia command.

CM-OUT-12785 and 12786 (28 Oct 43)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1973

By *Q* JAN 3 1973
NARS Date

~~SECRET~~

12
COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Book message to AMMISCA and AMMDEL Oct 27 1943 Page Two

American officer of appropriate rank designated by you, familiar with American propaganda aims in southeast Asia theater, in conjunction with State Department and OWI representatives, should afford adequate American representation for dealing with emergency propaganda policy.

ORIGINATOR: GENERAL HANDY

INFORMATION: C OF S
JCS (Captain Royal USN)
GENERAL STRONG

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By *[Signature]*, NARS Date JAN 3 1973

CM-OUT-12785
CM-OUT-12786 (28 Oct 43) 2300Z law

~~SECRET~~

COPY No. 12

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

JDJD Nr C62
25/1910A
sav

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WDCC
25 Oct
2313Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

DECLASSIFIED

From: Algiers
To: War

JOS memo, 1-4-74 MAY 3 1974
By RHP, NLR, Date

Nr: W 3400 25 October, 1943

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and for Sherwood
OWI to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff and London
Coordinators signed Eisenhower cite FHINC. This is
NAF 489.

i.e. propaganda
Our line to Italy for coming week agrees married
directive. We further recommend that in using statements
or passages from statements by Badoglio and other
members of Government we avoid those which only up-
build House of Savoy and have no bearing on democratic
future Italy or prosecution war against Germany and Fas-
cism.

Reference PWE cable 5708 October 23rd we recommend
giving all concrete facts on national treasures that
have been destroyed by Germans reporting at same time
all hard facts on national treasures saved from des-
truction by Italians and Allies.

For France reports agrees that there is lively hope
in France of victorious conclusion Allied Operations
Western Europe by end of year. In view of danger of
profound and unfavorable psychological reaction among
French should these hopes not be fulfilled our primary
task for this and succeeding weeks must be temper French
expectations and counsel prudence and preparation so
that French will continue draw on their moral strength
and self discipline to endure coming winter. Such
statements as those by Marshal Smuts in which he speaks
of final decision being forced next year should be played
up soberly and convincingly. Would appreciate London
reaction on importance this French campaign.

No Sig

18

CM-IN-15405 (26 Oct 43)

COPY No.

000.71 THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2

Number W3400

25 October 1943

5708 is not identified in WDCMC.

ACTION: CCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
LOG


DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-15405 (26 Oct 43) 0107Z mos

18


COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Operations Division, WDGS
Policy Sec. WDOFD, OPD
000.24 (22 Oct 43) JHC

October 22, 1943

CG, USFOR LONDON ENGLAND	Number <u>4754</u>
CG, FREEDOM, ALGIERS	Number 689
CINC SWPA, BRISBANE	Number 9502
CG, SPA, NECAL NOUMEA	Number Rane 8807
COMGENCECENTPAC	Number 7431

Book message for Devers, Eisenhower, MacArthur, Harmon and Richardson from Marshall.

Reference WD message dated 20 October 1943 regarding Anglo-American propaganda policy. Request you pass above reference to Navy Commanders concerned.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: OIC WDCMC
G-2 (OSS)
CGAAP
JCS (Capt Royal USN)
Admiral King
CAD
BPR

CM-OUT-9890 (22 Oct 43) 2207Z ejv

CM-OUT-9891

CM-OUT-9892

CM-OUT-9893

CM-OUT-9894

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By OSD Letter, May 3, 1972
By *[Signature]*, NARS Date JAN 3 1973

43

COPY No.

~~SECRET~~
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000.71

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

h

Operations Division, WDGS
Policy Section, WDOPD
OPD 00.24 (18 Oct 43)

October 20, 1943

CG, USAF CBI (FORWARD ECHELON) AMMISCA CHUNGKING CHINA	Number 3638
CG, USAF CBI (REAR ECHELON) AMMDEL NEW DELHI INDIA	Number 3734
CG, US FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS USFOR LONDON ENGLAND	Number R-4655
CG, NATO FREEDOM ALGIERS	Number 508
CG, USAF IN MIDDLE EAST AMSME CAIRO EGYPT	Number 7479
CINC SWPA BRISBANE AUSTRALIA	Number 9410
CG, USAF IN SOUTH PACIFIC NECAL NOUMEA NEW CALEDONIA	RANE 8755
CG USAF IN CENTRAL PACIFIC COMGENCECENTPAC	Number 7393

For Stilwells action and information to Ferris Devers
Eisenhower Royce MacArthur Harmon and Richardson from
Marshall.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that existing
machinery for coordination of Anglo-American propaganda
policy neither functions with sufficient speed nor avoids
contradiction when operating under conditions of emergency.
CCS also consider present procedure, used to obtain agreed
decisions on propaganda policy from appropriate authorities
of the US-UK Governments, is too protracted to guarantee the
unified action required by developments in cases of emergency.

CM-OUT-8860 through 8867 (21 Oct 43)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 303 and 50D) or 02

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By *[Signature]* NARS Date JAN 3 1973
COPY No. 45

~~SECRET~~

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000.71

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

BOOK MESSAGE

October 20, 1943

PAGE 2

In order to remedy this situation, the President and Prime Minister have authorized the CCS to establish 3 Anglo-American Committees of equal membership in each of the following theaters for the purpose of emergency coordination of Anglo-American propaganda policy: 1, Pacific Theater including China and Indo-China in Washington; 2, European Theater in London; and 3, Southeast Asia Theater in New Delhi.

These committees are empowered, in emergency, to make AD HOC decisions when necessary or desirable, and to issue special directives on propaganda policies for appropriate agencies of the theater commanders and US-UK governments. Committee decisions and directives will be binding for all propaganda operations directed to theaters concerned until revised by normal process of consultation between US-UK Governments. CCS are charged with the responsibility of establishing all 3 committees at the places designated. Priority will be given for the immediate creation of the committee to be responsible for propaganda in connection with impending operations in the Mediterranean.

Committee membership in each case will consist of one representative each of US Chiefs of Staff, British Chiefs of Staff, State Department, British Foreign Office, Office of War Information and British Political Warfare Executive. Committees are authorized to call in further assistance when necessary.

In conformity with above, US Chiefs of Staff have designated Major General G. V. Strong for Washington Committee and Admiral H. R. Stark for London Committee.

US Chiefs of Staff desire that you designate appropriate US military representative to serve on New Delhi Committee and notify the War Department of your selection.

ORIGINATOR: OPD
INFORMATION: G-2 (OSS)
CG AAF
JCS (Capt Royal USN)
COMINCH
CAD
BPR
LOG

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (2)
CDD Letter, May 3, 1983
By *g* JAN 3 1973
NARS Date

COPY No. 46

~~SECRET~~
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
and CM-OUT-8860 through 8867 (21 Oct 43)

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

BOOK MESSAGE

October 20, 1943

PAGE 3

CM-OUT-8860 (21 Oct 43) 0005Z flw
CM-OUT-8861
CM-OUT-8862
CM-OUT-8863
CM-OUT-8864
CM-OUT-8865
CM-OUT-8866
CM-OUT-8867

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (2)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By *g*, NARS Date JAN 3 1973

COPY No. 46

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

~~SECRET~~

JDJD C-48

Filed 1858A/18
MC

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CCWD
18 Oct 43
2130Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
~~DECLASSIFIED~~ JCS Reg. Memo
29-71

From: Algiers
To: War

Date- 8/23/71

Signature- RHP
Signature-

Nr: W 2813 NAF 473 18 October 1943

04 This is NAF 473 To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHINC.

We feel that certain Italian problems were not given their proper emphasis in the Married and London directives for propaganda to Italy. We accept the Married directive for friendly broadcasts but it neglects to bring out the task of propaganda to Italians and to a lesser extent to German Troops in Italy.

We feel our primary task this week for Italy is to bring home to all Italians the realization that it is the duty of each one of them to join the fight against Germany in every possible way. It would be seriously prejudicial to Italian assistance if out of consideration for our Allies we did not fully exploit the positive aspects for the Italians of Italy's Declaration of War. By maintaining a vigorous resistance to the German forces the Italian nation through its armed forces and its civilian population may hasten the redemption of Italy.

Assume injunction against references to Allies supplying food to Italians does not apply to hard facts of past or current supply which consider most useful incentive propaganda in Italian broadcasts to Italy.

No Sig.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD, GENERAL STRONG, GENERAL ARNOLD,
GENERAL HILLDRING, ADMIRAL KING, EOG

CM-IN-10938 (18 Oct 43) 2331Z med

18

~~SECRET~~

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000.71

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

JDJD B 53
11/2157A
mej

INCOMING MESSAGE SCWD
12 Oct 43
0015Z

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W 2269, 11 October 1943

TO AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and for the personal attention General Walter B Smith to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite PHINC MAP 462.

Directive for propaganda is submitted as follows:

Pending further guidance last weeks directive in Italy still stands. We recommend however, intensifying appeals to the Italian people to help escaping Prisoners of War. BBC broadcasts on this subject reported as being of great value by escaped Prisoners of War and we therefore, recommend a particular effort to extend and intensify these broadcasts.

No Sig.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
SGS
Gen Bedell Smith
Adm King

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-6845 (12 Oct 43) 0217Z vc

COPY-No. 14

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000.71

JDJD A 34
4/1818A
lmn

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CCWD
4 Oct
2251Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers
To: War

No. 3169/W 1686, 4 October 1943

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, to USFOR for
British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite PHINC NAF
437

Only important changes from last weeks directive
are the following.

1. Propaganda to Italy.

Political

(A) During the 2nd period before the re-
turn of the King and Badoglio to Rome,
we should avoid identifying ourselves
onesidedly with the King and Badoglio
as against the centre and left wing
parties.

(B) We should stress however that
Badoglio's Government remains the le-
gitimate and constitutional Government
of Italy and quote all appeals made by
it emphasizing in particular promises
to broaden the Government.

(C) We should report the attitude taken
up by the political parties in Italy
using as comment only.

(1) Calls for unity in the struggle
against the Germans

(2) The Anglo-American Governments
pledge that Italy shall be free to
choose its own Government after the
war.

CM-IN-2512 (5 Oct 43)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

25

000.71

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To: War

No. 3169/ W 1686, 4 October 1943

page 2

(3) Left Wingers and labour leaders in the United States and Great Britain should be allowed to have a voice in the situation.

Messages of sympathy and encouragement which should not be anti-Badoglio but which need not be specifically pro-Badoglio ought to be given. We recommend that such messages be obtained.

(D) Dealing with National Fascist Government we speak consistently about collaboration with the Germans and less about the members themselves. A solemn Anglo-American warning should be issued to collaborators with the Germans. We consider this to be preferable to a warning by the Italian Government at the present time.

(E) Our line to the Italian people should stress the positive rather than the negative aspects of resistance. We concentrate on what the Italians should do to help. We revive the appeal for help to escaping prisoners. We emphasize the value of passive resistance as well as sabotage.

(F) We refer to the official Italian Government Station as "Radio Bari" and no longer as "Radio Italiana".

(G) A special directive will be issued on the Mediterranean Allied Commission.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Dat#

CM-IN-2512 (5 Oct 43)

MAY 3 1974

COPY No.

25

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: ~~Adg~~
To: War

No. 3169/ W 1686, 4 October 1943

page 3

2. Balkans

(H) Pending Cairo advice not yet received in answer our cable advise on Balkan situation. Can you please stir up Cairo in order to enable us to harmonize our line with theirs?

No Sig.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. STRONG
GEN. ARNOLD
ADM. KING
LOG

CM-IN-2512 (5 Oct 43) 0211Z cng

DECLASSIFIED

JOS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

COPY No 25

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

JDJD B106
271843A
EMK

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WDCC
27 Sept 43
2244Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

From: Algiers
To: WAR

No: W-119/217, 27th September 43

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHINC.

Previous directive NAF stands: following further points are added. This is NAF 423.

(1) Propaganda to Italy.

(A) Military.

Do not overplay stories German demolitions Naples area. No signs yet Kesselring plans Naples evacuation. *captured 9/28*

Do not commit us to capture Foggia. Commit Germans to hold it since loss by them of this vital airbase makes transalpine bombing certain.

Continue avoid suggestion Yugoslav Liberation Army fighting on Italian territory. Continue to ascribe this fighting to local Yugoslav Italian inhabitants.

Carry no news Italian participation in Corsican campaign unless provided from French sources.

(B) Naval.

Give prominently all items on Italian Naval craft in action against Germans. Leaflet and pamphlet writers can now prepare material on Italian Navy surrender based on assumption that in the immediate future crews of many ships other than battleships will serve under Cunningham's orders.

(C) Political

(1) Owing to initial difficulties organization

CM-IN-19577 (28 Sept 43)

Map Room
COPY No. 15

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000,71

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To: WAR

Page 2

No: W-119/217, 27th September 43

of communications Brindisi-Algiers we urgently request that OWI New York BBC London should not quote radio Italiana direct. They should only requote radio Italiana from United Nations radio which continues to devote 1045 Algiers programme to official texts.

Remember never to refer to Radio Italiana as Radio Bari. Please see that press is advised accordingly.

(2) Deliberately build up Badoglio Government as rallying point Italian resistance, Success Left Parties accept Badoglio leadership. *STRESS?*

(3) In our view Italian civilian resistance continues surprisingly strong. Again stress generously how this contributes to Allied successes. Do not permit sabotage, passive resistance campaigns to flag in 3rd week. This is the danger period of Italian morale which requires all encouragement.

(4) Do not underestimate potential effect Graziani's speech which may appeal to younger officers with Fascist inclinations. Counter by stress on (A) fighting cooperation Italian Army Navy Airforce with Anglo-Americans.

(B) Unconstitutional nature National Fascist Government and domination of it by inroads.

(C) Evidence national unity.

(2) Propaganda to German Troops.

Previous directive holds. Recentest interrogations indicate belief many German Troops that chance of victory will be given by new secret weapon next spring. Suggest this belief best countered by derisory passing references to this whisper propaganda campaign.

(3) Propaganda to France.
Corsica.

For your information the French Authorities are extremely optimistic. Follow their communiques closely. Give no details on strength of French Forces or equipment of Patriots. Avoid any speculation on capture of Corsica as pointing to invasion of France.

Nosig.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD, Gen. Strong, Gen. Arnold, Adm. King, Log
CM-IN-19577 (28 Sept 43) 0513Z med

COPY No.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

15

JDJD B 186
20/1709B
1mn

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CCWD
20 Sept
2257Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers
To: War

No. 7333/W546, 20 September 1943

Directive following for propaganda to Italians and German Troops in Italy by radio and leaflet is submitted. This is NAF 412 to AGWAR for Combined Chief of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower.

Propaganda to Italians

Political

1. During period when decisions are being taken in highest quarters on future policy towards Italian Government, special care must be taken to avoid all discussion of King, government or individual members of government.

2. We must refer to them always as the Italian government.

3. For your information BARI on 713 KW is now serviced by PWB technical staff and transmitting daily as "Radio Italiana" The Official Station is the "Italian Government". For security reasons, it must not be referred to as radio BARI.

4. Official Italian appeals and instructions such as 2nd Badoglio appeal which you have already received should be quoted repeatedly stressing always that they are official statements by the Italian Government.

CM-IN-15263 (21 Sep 43)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974
24

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000.71

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To: War

No. 7333/W546, 20 September 1943

page 2

5. In our view though organized military resistance has collapsed on the mainland, civilian resistance is increasing and going unexpectedly well. Give full recognition to this resistance as directly assisting our campaign by blocking German communications and holding down troops.

6. Assume in propaganda majority Italians support us and only professional Fascists support Germans. We interpret in this sense your amendment to our last weeks directive. In our view this is sober fact.

7. Continue sabotage and passive resistance campaign more strongly than last week. Provided that we give advice not instructions, our Italian advisors are convinced such appeals highly effective by radio and leaflet.

8. Continue derision Mussolini but do not spotlight.

9. We agree relevant points OWI PWE Joint Directive 17th September.

Military.

1. Continue tone strongest confidence stressing rapid liberation Southern Area. Drop suggestion all Italy can be rapidly liberated. Modify tone resistance appeals to Northern workers accordingly follow closely the line of appeals issued by left wing Italian Parties.

2. Do not permit report about improvement

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

CM-IN-15263 (21 Sep 43)

MAY 3 1974

24

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

-3-

From: Algiers

To: WA

INCOMING MESSAGE

Nr.: 7333/W546

20th September 1943

Salerno Front to express itself prematurely in talk of victory. 1st victory on this front will be achievement 1st objective Naples.

3. Stress importance Southern Italy Airfields particularly round Foggia which provide bases Transalpine bombing.

4. We require constant speedy guidance on treatment Balkans Greek Islands. Could this be arranged.

5. Please prevent embarrassing incidents such as premature and inaccurate attribution to Allied Headquarters of statements on Corsican Campaign such as BBC 19th. French opinion very sensitive on this point. No news whatever should be given about Corsica until official communique. For your information the German forces in Corsica are strong and better equipped than the French or Italian and we cannot expect an early victory although possibility German evacuation not excluded.

Propaganda to German Troops:

Following propaganda lines suggested by newest frontline PWB interrogations 43 prisoners Salerno front. Prisoners mostly for your information only from Panzer Grenadier regiment wiped out Russia and reconstituted from robust recruits stiffened by east front veterans.

1. You should assume shock Italian collapse exceeded expectations and agree view expressed by prisoners that affect on ignorant German home public even greater than on Germans in Italy who knew Italian unreliability.

Exploit this shock by stressing rising popular resistance Italy and Balkans threatening German communications..

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-15263 (21 Sep 43)

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY No.

24

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

From: **ALB**
To: **WAB** **INCOMING MESSAGE**

Nr.: 7333/W546

20th September 1943

Also exploit keen resulting anxiety stimulated according to prisoners by new regulations governing gasoline issues.

Generally continue exploit sensitivity increasing allied manpower material superiority especially aircraft artillery and importance of Naval bombardment.

2. Newest German propaganda line has strikingly influenced prisoners interrogated few of whom even hoped avoidance defeat. This line runs as follows:

Allout German defense cannot perhaps achieve victory but by exacting heaviest Anglo American losses can break unconditional surrender determination and enable Hitler obtain suitable conditional surrender.

Suggest to counter this line you sharpen attacks German leadership especially Hitler Goering. Prisoners all receptive such attack and showed anxiety whether distinction would be made subordinate individual and responsible leadership.

Stress only German early peace hope speedy destruction war prolonging Hitlerite leadership and individual refusal work and die for this leadership. Stress delaying actions only prolong useless soldiers bloodshed and aerial destruction Germany. Most prisoners interrogated regarded Air Offensive as natural and Goerings fault.

3. Continue and intensify PW radio items with PW names messages news camp life. Prisoners interrogated provided outstanding evidence effectiveness and attractiveness such radio programs. Several prisoners had received first news missing relative from allied radio. Prisoners spontaneously asked for announcement their names on allied radio. Several referred specifically with

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

CM-IN-15263

(21 Sep 43)

MAY 3 1974

24
COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

-5-

From: AL
To: WAN **INCOMING MESSAGE**

Nr.: 7333/W546

20th September 1943

approbation to "prisoner news programs" but uncertain still precisely which programs meant. Complementary leaflet campaign urgently necessary.

No Sig .

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
LOG

CM-IN-15263 (21 Sep 43) 0528Z vc

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

COPY No.

24

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff

September 15, 1943

CG, FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 7793

FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF USFOR
LONDON

Number R-3139

We concur in the directive to PWE and OWI proposed in your NAF 401, *at chd*
with the exception of Paragraph 2, where we think the line (for Eisenhower
FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 231, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff) should be to
praise Italians who cooperate but not to refer to them in general terms as
friends.

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD

General Strong
General Arnold
Admiral King
LOG

CM-OUT-7150
CM-OUT-7151

(15 Sept 43) 2146Z mjo

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

COPY No.

16

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000.71

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

JDJD C 13
131946B
EW

INCOMING MESSAGE
13 Sept 1943
2352Z

Priority

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W 9915, 13 September 1943

Directive for PWE OWI radio to Italy follows. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower FHINC. This is NAF 401.

(1) Background Not for propaganda use.

First phase exploitation dramatic combination Armistice and Naples landings now over 2nd phase begins Main objective now is to sustain Italian civilian resistance both active resistance of tiny saboteur minority and passive resistance vast majority.

We advise propaganda to Italy should be based on tacit assumption of long and arduous campaign between evenly balanced forces. This campaign may well last into 1944. Even on short view we cannot reckon on early fall of Naples. Here German forces roughly equal our own in strength. Nor can we reckon on Montgomerys advance being rapid enough to affect Naples battle. Nor can we expect in immediate future any but local exploitation capture of Taranto.

Propaganda problem therefore is how to prevent sudden slump volatile Italian moral as Italians come to realize what lies ahead. In our view it will be disastrous suddenly to disclose this grim prospect. On the other hand it is impossible to maintain propaganda at high pitch of confidence early victory recommend in our 1st directive. The following directive attempts

CM-IN-10571 (14 Sep 43)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

COPY No. 38

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000.71

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W 9915, 13 September 1943

to indicate a middle way. It should be borne in mind by French and English desks

(2) Directive.

(A) Take Roosevelt/ Churchill message as key not. Address Italian people as friends and as an occupied people but do not call them Allies.

(B) Continue in all propaganda to Italy confident optimistic picture military situation linking appeals resistance with stress Allied strength and news of campaign in Italy.

Admit Germans control Rome and Northern Italy but do not stress German strength. Comment constantly upon German strategic embarrassment stressing Russian victories ferment in Balkans inside German news and European resistance

(C) Continue appeals for sabotage German communication lines. Aim of this campaign is not of course to give instructions to actual saboteurs but to create sabotage atmosphere and in particular to insure Italian civilians regard saboteurs as heroes and assist them. This special SOE request. Give there for only such detailed sabotage instructions necessary to create atmosphere. Take care never to call such sabotage appeals instructions but only advice. On this point we are correcting our own broadcasts. Quote in news wherever useful German admissions Italian sabotage resistance.

(D) Give increasing attention to passive resistance campaign such as majority Italian civilians, actually carry out. To antidote bombing effects stress our bombing directed against German communications and suggest Italians help our bombing by themselves slowing up these communications. Continue labor leader messages to Italian workers especially

CM IN-10571 (14 Sep 43)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

COPY No. 38

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 3

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W 9915, 13 September 1943

transport workers.

(E) Continue ban all appeals to Armed Forces. Requote frequently any official Italian appeals we may be able to obtain.

(F) Continue to avoid all discussion Italian government and King. For your information we are seeking to arrange radio Palermo and if possible at later stage radio Bari become Italian government stations. If they do so should be quoted when giving instructions but we should take care to avoid identifying Italian government propaganda line with our own.

(G) Treat with derision so called National Fascist Government. Dont spotlight Mussolini.

(H) Continue to harp on courageous action Italian Fleet. We shall seek to provide material.

(I) Continue to regard morale German troops in Italy as important propaganda objective. Here our previous directive for week beginning August 30th still holds unchanged by Armistice announcement.

(J) Remember Italian audience only interested by events in Italy and such outside events as directly affect Italian situation. Concentrate therefore in news bulletins on Italian and Russian campaigns Balkan news European resistance and German weakness. Briefest references far east sufficient. Show explicitly how all news from outside Italy links with Italian situation. Avoid at all costs impression of remoteness from Italian situations.

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD, GEN STRONG, GEN ARNOLD, GEN HILLDRING,
ADM KING WHITE HOUSE, LOG

No Sig

CM-IN-10571 (14 Sep 43) 0334Z vc

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

COPY No. 38

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

JDJD C 29
7/1831B
lmm

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

URGENT

From: Algiers
To: War

No. 1514/W9343, 7 September 1943

Answering your FAN 212 in case AVALANCHE we advise as follows: (this is NAF 357 for CCS and BR CS signed Eisenhower)

1. In view of unusual uncertainty situation, we suggest ~~no new directive at all~~ should be issued prior to AVALANCHE. BIGOT AVALANCHE.

2. OWI, PWE and Cairo should be instructed monitor US continuously from D minus 2, and in event new developments should be instructed to follow our radio line precisely in all propaganda media. We shall be able to send first directive for your approval and coordination on D day.

3. A plan for propaganda is now nearing completion covering the several new contingencies now possible. For security reasons and because of number of contingencies still open, we feel it wiser to await further developments before submitting plan.

4. Meanwhile we advise that PWE should gradually ease its anti-Badoglio line and come into line with Washington and Algiers.

No Sig.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Admiral King
Log

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-5260 (7 Sep 43) 1306Z ems

COPY No.

14

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000.71

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

JDDJ CS1
Filed 07/1943
JP

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCW
7 Sep 1943
2234

SECRET SECURITY

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

CORRECTED COPY

From: Algiers
To : War

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

No. W 9394 7 September 1943

Propaganda plan for AVALANCHE and related operations (For combined Chiefs of Staff and British Chiefs of Staff from McClure signed Eisenhower) (Cite FEINC). References below are to paragraphs of Jan 212 and supplement our NAF 357. Bigot Avalanche. This is NAF 362.

3A. Directive covers only the next few days. This is formative. Italian Morale which will crystallize either into active national resistance or disunity and apathy. Main task of propaganda during this period is to ensure that the former occurs.

(1) Background (Not for use in propaganda).

A. Political. The terms of the military armistice granted Italy by the Allied Commander in Chief have been approved by the governments of the UK, US, and USSR acting in the interests of the United Nations, and have been accepted unconditionally by the Italian Government.

The armistice is a strictly military instrument, signed by soldiers. No political financial or economic terms are included. These will be imposed later.

The granting of an armistice does not necessarily imply recognition of any Italian Government; far less, acceptance as an ally or even as a collaborator. It means only the cessation of hostilities between the armed Forces of Italy and those of the United Nations.

On the other hand, the Representatives of the

CE-IN-6046 (8 Sep 43)

COPY No.

15

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974
Page 2

From: Algiers
To : War
No. W 9384 7 September 1943

United Nations have indicated that they will assist and support any Italian armed Forces or Italian individuals who oppose the Germans or obstruct their war effort.

B. Military. Initial operations in Italy will be against greatly superior German Forces. The surrender of the Italian Government if successfully exploited can materially reduce the hazards of the operation by preventing effective German concentrations against our Forces.

In particular propaganda can stimulate Italian resistance to the Germans. But the Italian fear of Germans cannot be overestimated. To compensate it we must convince Italians:

(A) That their resistance is now backed by great Allied Forces.

(B) That only a short violent effort is necessary for victory.

(2) Objective of psychological warfare during first few days.

(A) To embarrass German strategy by the combined shock of our landings and the Italian surrender. In particular to create the impression that many landings are possible and that Italian resistance is widespread.

(B) To maximize the resistance of the Italian armed Forces and to demoralize the German armed Forces.

(C) To obtain maximum Italian civilian resistance and in particular to paralyze German rail and road communications.

(3) General directive for all propaganda beamed to Europe.

CM-IN-6046 (8 Sep 43)

COPY No. 15

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To : War
No. W 9394 7 September 1943

Page 3

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

(A) Political.

(1) Once we have authenticated the Italian surrender in the eyes of the Italian people, drop all discussion of it and concentrate attention on military events and Italian resistance. In propaganda to Italy slur over unconditional surrender. Refrain even in French from emphasis on it during the first 3 or 4 days when our primary aim is to encourage Italian resistance to the Germans.

(2) Avoid all discussion of the character motive and future of the Italian Government and of the King. Concentrate attention on the Italian people, civilians and soldiers, assuming for propaganda purposes that they are seizing the opportunity to assist in the liberation of Italy.

(3) Avoid till further notice all discussion of the armistice terms.

(4) Limit references to the Vatican to quotations from official statements, or from the Vatican radio.

(5) Ban all Italian enigre appeals.

(6) Say nothing which would suggest to the Italian Government or military leaders that we are fomenting popular movements against them, in particular working class movements. Stress unity of Italian resistance.

(B) Military.

(1) Stress the size and power of Allied Forces, giving during the first few days the very fullest to all news of landing but stress Allied sea and air power.

(2) Do not discuss the moving strength of the German Armies in Italy since this will depress

CM-IN-6046 (8 Sep 43) [REDACTED]

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

15

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers

To : War

No. W 9394 7 September 1943

DECLASSIFIED

Page 4

Italian morale.

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

(3) Emphasize Italian Military and civilian resistance, giving the Italians where necessary, the benefit of the doubt.

(C) Appeals for Italian resistance. Observe the following special directive carefully:

(1) Wherever possible appeals for resistance, both military and civilian should be made by the Italian Government and its authorized spokesmen; and then rebroadcast by our radio stations. As far as possible we should avoid issuing instructions to resistance on our own authority. Italian radio stations should be monitored for such appeals which should then be repeated frequently in our broadcasts and leaflets.

(2) If owing to breakdown of communications such appeals are not forthcoming, we propose to send you a detailed directive.

(3) Under no circumstances should we make any direct appeals to the Italian Army.

(4) In quoting Italian appeals for resistance, link them as closely as possible with news of our landings and of Anglo American strength.

(5) Where possible quote non-political statements by Allied labour leaders welcoming resistance by Italian industrial workers, especially transport workers. But take greatest care to stop anything which stimulates disunity between Italian Army and Italian workers.

(6) Discourage religious appeals for resistance from British or American sources.

3B. Due to unusual uncertainty of situation

CM-IN-6046 (8 Sep 43)

COPY No.

15

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To : War
No. W 9394 7 September 1943

Page 5

OWI, PWE and Cairo should monitor us continuously until situation clarifies. They should follow our radio line precisely in all propaganda media until a radio directive agreed between London and Washington is issued by CCS to OWI, PWE and PWB. On military affairs we will provide necessary guidance from AFHQ by special cables addressed to CCS for PWE, OWI and Cairo.

3C.

1. Specially desire be advised on non-political statements by Allied labour leaders welcoming resistance by Italian industrial workers.

2. Request special care in broadcasts to Italy to indicate clearly what we should regard as key statements by Allied statesmen.

3D. For this operation special broadcast 1830 hours D minus 1 by radio Algiers and United Nations hook-up. Uncertain situation will probably cause communique at unexpected hours thereafter. Monitoring should be assured.

3E. None.

NOTE: Corrected copy of CM-IN-5725 (8 Sep 43) CC/S

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GFM ARNOLD
ADM KING

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-6046 (8 Sep 43) 1439Z vc

COPY No.

15

[REDACTED]

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

JDJD C 81
07/1912B
mej

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

OPERATIONAL
PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

From: Algiers
To: War

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

No. W 9394, 7 September 1943

Propaganda plan for AVALANCHE and related operations (for Combined Chiefs of Staff and British Chiefs of Staff from McClure signed Eisenhower cite FHINC). References below are to Paragraphs of FAN 212 and supplement our NAF 357. BIGOT AVALANCHE. This is NAF 362.

Paragraph 3 A. Directive covers only the next few days. This is formative period Italian Morale which will crystalize either into active national resistance or disunity and apathy. Main task of propaganda during this period is to ensure that the former occurs.

Paragraph (1). Background (not for use in propaganda).

Subparagraph A. Political. The terms of the military armistice granted Italy by the Allied Commander in Chief have been approved by the Governments of the UK, US, and USSR acting in the interests of the United Nations, and have been accepted unconditionally by the Italian Government.

The armistice is a strictly military instrument, signed by soldiers. No political financial or economic terms are included. These will be imposed later.

The granting of an armistice does not necessarily imply recognition of any Italian Government; far less, acceptance as an ally or even as a collaborator. It means

CM-IN-5725 (8 Sept 43)

COPY No.

15

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: Algiers
To: War

Page #2

No. W 9394, 7 September 1943

only the cessation of hostilities between the Armed Forces of Italy and those of the United Nations.

On the other hand, the representatives of the United Nations have indicated that they will assist and support any Italian Armed Forces or Italian individuals who oppose the Germans or obstruct their war effort.

Subparagraph B. Military. ~~Initial operations in Italy will be against greatly superior German forces.~~ *out*
The surrender of the Italian Government if successfully exploited can materially ~~reduce the hazards~~ *improve the prospects* of the operation by preventing effective German concentrations against our forces.

In particular propaganda can stimulate Italian resistance to the Germans. But the Italian fear of Germans cannot be overestimated. To compensate it we must convince Italians

(A) That their resistance is now backed by great Allied Forces,

(B) That only a short violent effort is necessary for victory.

Paragraph (2). Objective of psychological warfare during first few days.

Subparagraph A. To embarrass German strategy by the combined shock of our landings and the Italian surrender. In particular to create the impression that many landings are possible and that Italian resistance is widespread.

Subparagraph (B). To maximize the resistance of the Italian Armed Forces and to demoralize the German Armed Forces.

CM-IN-5725 (8 Sept 43)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

COPY No. 15

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: Algiers
To: War

DECLASSIFIED

Page #3

No. W 9394, 7 September 1943

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

Subparagraph (C) To obtain maximum Italian civilian resistance and in particular to paralyze German rail and road communications.

Paragraph (3). General directive for all propaganda beamed to Europe.

Subparagraph (A). Political

(1) Once we have authenticated the Italian surrender in the eyes of the Italian people, drop all discussion of it and concentrate attention on military events and Italian resistance. In propaganda to Italy slur over unconditional surrender. Refrain even in French from emphasis on it during the first 3 or 4 days when our primary aim is to encourage Italian resistance to the Germans.

(2) Avoid all discussion of the character motive and future of the Italian Government and of the King. Concentrate attention on the Italian people, civilians and soldiers, assuming for propaganda purposes that they are seizing the opportunity to assist in the liberation of Italy.

(3) Avoid till further notice all discussion of the armistice terms.

(4) Limit references to the Vatican to quotations from official statements, or from the Vatican radio.

(5) Ban all Italian emigre appeals.

(6) Say nothing which would suggest to the Italian Government or military leaders that we are fomenting popular movements against them, in particular working class movements. Stress unity of Italian resistance.

Subparagraph (B). Military.

(1) Stress the *

No Sig.

* Balance of message undecipherable being serviced.

WDCC.
FOOTNOTE: FAN 212 is CM-OUT-1996 (4 Sept 43) CC/S
NAF 357 is CM-IN-5260 (7 Sept 43) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen. Strong, Gen Arnold, CofS, Adm. King,
OPD

CM-IN-5725 (8 Sept 43) 0125Z

COPY No. 15

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

COLONEL HAMMOND.

These papers, I think, belong to the President and were handed by him to the Prime Minister. I return them with thanks as we have our own copy.

TR

6. 9. 43.

Miss Tully:

These were sent to me. It appears that they should be in the President's files. The subject is not dead and will probably be further considered.

W. L. Guseman

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

3 September 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER:

Subject: Propaganda Committee.

Enclosure: C.C.S. 310/2.

Enclosed is a proposal which has been agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and is submitted for your approval.

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

J. G. Dill
J. G. DILL,
Field Marshal,
Head of the British Joint Staff
Mission in Washington.

William D. Leahy
WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Franklin D. Roosevelt's Library
DECLASSIFIED

JCS Reg Memo 33-71

Date- 8/23/71

Signature- RHP

COPY NO. 51

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

645-3
(C.O.S. 310/2)

3 September 1943

645
(1) CCS 310
(2) CCS 310/1

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS Rg Memo 33-71

Date- 8/28/71

Signature- RHP
Signature-

C.C.S. 310/2

3 September 1943

COPY NO. 51

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

~~Propaganda Committee~~
~~DECLASSIFIED~~

JCS Rg Memo
33-71

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

Date- *8/23/71*

PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE

Signature- *RHP*

Memorandum to the President and the Prime Minister
from the Combined Chiefs of Staff

We have been examining the possibility of establishing Anglo-American machinery for the coordination of propaganda in an emergency, and wish to make the following proposal and recommendations.

THE PROPOSAL

To establish coordinating authorities with power of decision for Anglo-American policy in propaganda.

BASIS OF PROPOSAL

Recent experience in the European theater demonstrated that existing Anglo-American machinery for the coordination of and dissemination of instructions for propaganda operations in an emergency neither functions with sufficient speed nor avoids contradiction when operating under conditions of emergency.

The present procedure in obtaining agreed decision on propaganda policy from the responsible authorities of the two Governments is too protracted for the immediate unified action required by emergency developments.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend for your approval:

- a. That Anglo-American Committees of equal membership be set up forthwith for the emergency coordination of Anglo-American propaganda policy in each of three theaters:

- [REDACTED]
- (1) In Washington for the Pacific Theater,
 - (2) In London for the European Theater,
 - (3) In New Delhi for the South East Asian Theater.

b. That these Committees be empowered, in relation to the theaters concerned, to make ad hoc decisions when emergency developments occur which make such decisions necessary or desirable and under such conditions to issue special directives on propaganda policies for the appropriate agencies of the two Governments and of the Theater Commanders.

c. That these decisions and directives be binding for all propaganda operations directed to the theater concerned until revised by the normal process of consultation between the two Governments.

d. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff be charged with responsibility for securing the establishment of these three Committees in these three places, and that priority should be given for the immediate creation of the Committee which would be responsible for propaganda in connection with impending operations in the Mediterranean.

e. These Committees to consist of:

- One representative of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- One representative of British Chiefs of Staff.
- One representative of U.S. State Department.
- One representative of British Foreign Office.
- One representative of U.S. Office of War Information.
- One representative of British Political Warfare Executive.

These committees to have power to call in further assistance as and when necessary.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff

September 4, 1943

CG
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 6906

USFOR, LONDON, FOR
BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

Number R-2667

1. Whenever a plan for an operation is approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, you will without delay submit a propaganda plan pertaining thereto. This plan will become effective upon approval by The Combined Chiefs of Staff. For Eisenhower, Freedom Algiers, FAN 212, from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. Such plans will be in consonance with basic propaganda plans in effect in the areas involved or will indicate any changes desired therein.

3. The plans will indicate: A The propaganda aims and themes to be effective before and during the operation. B The plan for effecting changes in approved themes to meet changes in the situation. C The assistance desired from agencies under the control of, or cooperating with, The Combined Chiefs of Staff. D The system for releasing information of the initiation of major phases of the operation. E Such other features as you may desire to include.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CG/S

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
LOG

CM-OUT-1996
CM-OUT-1997

(4 Sept 43)

1658Z

v1b

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

JCS Reg. Memo
29-71

Date 8/23/71

Signature: RHP

Map Room

COPY No. 15

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000.71

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

September 1, 1943

CG FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 6620

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON

Number R-2535

In reply to HAF 343 the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree to your suggestions with the following amendments: Question 2A: An appeal for a general strike might react to our disadvantage by paralyzing all ability on the part of Italy to help us. Therefore in the 3rd sentence delete the words "A general strike" and substitute the words "Sabotage of all forms of communication". Change last sentence under question 2A to read "Appeals should be made impressing on population necessity for maintaining law and order".

For Eisenhower FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 208, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Under question 2B: Change the 2nd sentence to read "On D day of avalanche an appeal to the Army to refuse to fight against the liberating Armies, but to retain a high standard, should be issued".

Propaganda agencies in Washington and London are being requested to conform to your suggestions as amended above. With regard to question 4 your suggestion is under consideration and you will be advised further.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen. Strong
Gen. Arnold
Adm. King
LOG

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

ON-OUT-442
ON-OUT-443

(1 Sep 43)

2044Z

ad

COPY No.

Map Room
15

JDJD Nr A69
1947B/29
enf

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers
To : War - W 8634
USFOR London - 7792
29th August 1943

Answers to the 4 questions contained in FAN 204 follow. This is NAF 343 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite PHINC. This is a BIGOT message.

Question 1:

A. BAYTOWN

(1) The significance of the 1st landing on the mainland of Europe should be the leading theme of all comment.

(2) It should not be suggested that the aim of the operation is the opening up of the Straits of Messina.

B. AVALANCHE

(1) Until the Commander in Chief gives the word, the greatest caution should be exercised in news treatment and comment on the scope of the operations.

(2) There should be no suggestion during this period of the scale of the operation.

(3) Further operations should not be excluded.

Question 2:

A. Attitude to civilians. During BAYTOWN the line should remain unchanged. From the start of AVALANCHE appeals to sabotage the German communications should

CM-IN-22614 (30 Aug 43)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

COPY No.

19

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000.71

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY
CONTROL

From: Algiers
To : War - W 8634
USFOR London - 7792

Page 2.

29th August 1943

be greatly intensified. An appeal for a general strike should be made by radio and leaflet on AVALANCHE D day. A draft for such an appeal, combined with an appeal to the Armed Forces, will be submitted for consideration. Throughout BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE our attitudes to the Italian people should grow steadily "softer", I.E., more appreciative of the genuineness of the Italian peoples struggle for Liberty and Peace, and of the difficulty in which they find themselves. Special attention should be paid to the working population of Northern Italy and to transport workers generally. American and British pledges to permit the Italians to rebuild a Free Democracy after the war should be repeated. Appeals for general insurrection or revolution should be avoided until further notice.

B. Attitude to soldiers. During BAYTOWN appeals to surrender should be limited to Tactical leaflets. There should be no incitement to mutiny. On D day of AVALANCHE an appeal to the Army to refuse to fight against the liberating Armies should be issued, combined with the appeal for a general strike. This appeal should be followed, at a time to be determined by the Commander in Chief, by appeals for positive action against the Germans.

Question 3.

During BAYTOWN line towards the Italian Government should be Anti-German and on no account Anti-Badoglio. Do not refer to the responsibility of the Badoglio Regime for permitting Italy to remain Germany's Ally. No mention of the House of Savoy. No reference, except by quotation of official Allied statements, to negotiations for making Rome an open city. This treatment will continue during AVALANCHE

DECLASSIFIED

JOS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-22614 (30 Aug 43)

COPY No. 19

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY
SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: Algiers
To : War - W 8634
USFOR London - 7792

Page 3.

29th August 1943

until and unless a special directive is issued.

Question 4:

The operations BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE may precipitate military and political events of such major importance that the first instructions should be received by the operators in London, New York and Algiers within 18 hours maximum. The existing machinery for coordination and dissemination of such instructions neither functions with sufficient speed nor avoids contradictions. It is therefore suggested for the period of these operations and as a test for future operations that the responsibility for the co-ordination and dissemination be with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This suggestion, of course, leaves with London, Washington and the Commander in Chief the right to initiate in their own spheres proposals for changes in propaganda policy. For routine matters, the present procedure can be maintained.

No Sig

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
LOG

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-22614 (30 Aug 43) 0345Z mcs

COPY No.

19

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000.71

RC 36
Filed 26/1950Z
EA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CCWD
August 26, 1942
2138Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Ankara

To: Milid

No. 242, August 26, 1942

Investigation requested reference your 164 failed to disclose Yugoslavia's information service intentionally aiding Axis propaganda. Their report goes through Military Attaches and both are independent of the Embassy. My belief they are primarily interested in promoting internal Yugoslavia's affairs and conflicts from Serbian Angle. Ambassador has been informed and is of same opinion.

Jadwin

FOOTNOTE: 164 is CM-OUT-4652 (8/15/42) G-2

ACTION: G-2 *8/6*

INFO COPIES: OPD

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
NARS Date *JAN 3* 1973

CM-IN-10217 (8/27/42) 1130Z

M. I. B. JOURNAL NO. 53 AUG 27 1942
27

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000, 71

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

August 26, 1943

CG

FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 6110

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

USFOR LONDON

Number R 2303

In order that (BIGOT for Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 204, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff) proper guidance may be given U S and British Propaganda Agencies The Combined Chiefs of Staff desire your suggestions concerning propaganda lines to be employed on the following points with reference to Baytown and Avalanche:

1. The scope and purpose to be ascribed to the operations.
2. The action and attitude desired of Italian civilians and soldiers.
3. Our attitude toward existing Italian authorities.
4. A system whereby changes in propaganda lines may be effected promptly.

No Sig

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

*JCS Reg Memo
29-71*

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD

Gen Strong

Gen Arnold

Adm King

LOG

Date: 8/23/71

Signature: RHP

CM-OUT-10997

(26 Aug 43)

2338Z

Fth

CM-OUT 10998

COPY No. 15

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000-71

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA SANTIAGO	FOR ACTION	OPHAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE 27 JULY 42			ROUTINE DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM 1931	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY MC GILL			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY WIDMAN			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

GARTH**271534 NCR 977**

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

TEXT

ACTION

F-00
F-01
F-015
F-0015
F-05
F-07
F-1
F-11
F-2
F-3
F-30
F-31
F-32
F-33
F-34
F-35
F-37
IG-00
VCNO

NEW AND DANGEROUS NAZI PROPAGANDA AS FOLLOWS:

"GERMAN SUBMARINE WARFARE HAS PRODUCED ACUTE SHORTAGE OF
GASOLINE IN ENGLAND AND AUSTRALIA THEREBY PREVENTING SECOND
FRONT OR ANY SUSTAINED LARGE SCALE AIR RAIDS. THIS
ASSURES AN EARLY GERMAN VICTORY."

RELIABILITY B.**DISTRIBUTION:****ACTION.....16.****10/11.....COMINCH.....17.....OPDO.....****FILE: 200P.....NAVAID.****271534 NCR 977**

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By: *JA*, NARS Date **JAN 3 1973**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 16-58118

WTOB 26
220905Z
BMS

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Priority

From: Brisbane
To: War

Number: C 3371 22nd June 1943

This Headquarters has been completely engrossed in the planning and conduct of operations against the enemy in our immediate front and has not made any study of possible propaganda programs (reference your 4920 19th). Moreover there is not available here the detailed information that would be essential for the planning of an effective and appropriate propaganda campaign in Europe South America and the Far East. (To Chief of Staff War Department sgd MacArthur C 3371) for these reasons although I appreciate the suggestion it is recommended that the agency in the United States that is charged initially with this activity handle the matter utilizing in its conduct of any propaganda campaign the material contained in Official Documents of this Headquarters in the form of communiques and such part of the Daily Operations Reports as the War Department in its judgement deems appropriate to make available to it. If during the course of active operations some feature should develop which in my opinion could be used to advantage I will make appropriate recommendations.

attached

4920 is CM-OUT-8203 (19 June 43) JCS
Action: JCS

No Sig

Information: OPD
Gen. Arnold
Adm. King
Gen. Strong
LOG

CLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 2, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date

NOV 14 1973

CM-IN-13659 (22 June 43) 1257Z ce

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

11

000.71

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Joint Chiefs of Staff

June 19, 1943

CINC SWPA
BRISBANE AUSTRALIA

Number 4920

In order that American propaganda agencies may best further the interests of your theater concerning forthcoming operations (for MacArthur from The Joint Chiefs of Staff) suggest you submit recommendations as to the nature of propaganda desired prior to the initiation of Cartwheel and during and after each phase. You should indicate the line you recommend propaganda take in Europe, South America and the Far East.

ORIGINATOR: JCS

INFORMATION: OPD
ADM KING
GEN ARNOLD
GEN STRONG
LOG

CM-OUT-8203 (19 Jun 43) 2052Z vc

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

map Room

COPY No. 11

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

000.71

JAPANESE-ORGANIZED BROADCASTS

4 U.S. PLANES DOWNED AT WAKE ISLAND

Taking note of the American attack on Wake Island, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued the following communique at 2:00 p.m., (Tokyo time) December 25, as broadcast in Japanese (Dec. 25, 2:40 a.m. EWT) to the Western Coast of North America:

Headquarters Communique--"Our Imperial Forces stationed at Otorijima intercepted enemy forces which came from the Midway Island direction on the night of December 23 and met in battle several enemy B-17 planes.

4 Planes Downed--"Four of these were downed while damages were inflicted upon six and these were repulsed. As for our losses, one was killed and four were wounded. Small fires were started at four places and besides the above no other damages were caused."

Counteroffensive--Tokyo, relayed by Harbin, (Dec. 25, 6:00 a.m. EWT) tells home and Empire audiences in Japanese that "in an attempt to recover from her succeeding defeats, the American Navy planned a counteroffensive measure in the Solomon Island area, an important strategical point in the Southern Hemisphere, beginning this summer and each time their attempts were frustrated. In spite of the fact that heavy damages were inflicted upon the enemy, she is persistently holding on to her plan.

Leave Midway Base--"As it has been indicated in the Imperial communique, during the night of December 23, an enemy air force formation consisting of about a dozen planes of the Flying Fortress Boeing-17 type left their base at Midway and attacked our Otori Island (Wake Island) by flying more than 1,100 nautical miles. Our force on the island was fully prepared for the raid, because such an attempt was expected, so that the enemy was met by our iron-tight anti-air raid facilities, and fierce attacks on the enemy commenced.

Four Boeing Planes--"Thus the huge bodies of four Boeing-17s were immediately enveloped in fierce fire and these planes were downed, leaving red flames behind them, and six other planes also fled after being set afire. In contrast to the damage suffered by the enemy, our losses have been small as follows: 4 small fires started, one killed in action and 4 were severely injured.

Defenses of Island--"Thus the enemy attack was frustrated. The fact that our force did not falter, but inflicted heavy damage although they were subjected to bombardments by enemy heavy bombers, indicates the iron-tight defense and high fighting spirit of our garrison unit on Otori Island.

Counterattack Attempts--"Recently the enemy has been attempting to carry out counterattacks from various directions, however our Navy will meet them with stern attacks no matter from which direction the enemy may attack us and they will be quickly crushed."

HEAVY DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY RAIDERS

Tokyo (DOMEI, Dec. 25, 2:00 a.m. EWT) tells the world in English: "Commenting on the American raid against Otori Island (Wake), quarters close to the Imperial Navy declared that the heavy damages sustained by the raiders should demonstrate again the painful and disastrous consequences of attempting to give battle to Japan anywhere.

Damaged Planes--"They said the attacking forces which roared bravely from Midway lost nearly half their planes while the rest limped away badly mangled, and it is doubtful that all the badly damaged planes were able to fly 1,100 miles back to their base.

Flying Fortresses--"They pointed out that the raid was carried out by the U.S. much-vaulted 'Flying Fortress' which Americans fondly believe to be invincible and declared that the terrific mauling received at the hands of the Imperial Navy should make the Americans reconsider the boastful claims of U.S. militarists of the planes' fighting.

Blind Bombing--"The same quarters disclosed that the attacking forces when they encountered the Japanese fled in a disorderly manner after unloading their bombs blindly. They said that the U.S. should bear in mind that Japan is ready to meet any and all counterattacks against Japanese-occupied areas in the southern regions, in the Pacific and in the North. In fact, the Imperial Navy is (hoping) for a chance to meet the U.S. as it will give the Japanese a chance to annihilate the U.S. Navy."

WHITE HOUSE ECONOMIZES ON CHRISTMAS

Manila (Dec. 24, 4:30 a.m. EWT) tells the Philippines in English that to save electricity, the usual Christmas trees on the grounds of the U.S. White House won't be lighted this year and adds that a further reason for this may be "fear of possible night air raids".

Britain Forestalls U.S.--Berlin quotes British quarters in Ankara as declaring to a neutral diplomat that the Anglo-de Gaulle occupation of French Somaliland was a move to forestall American occupation of that country.

Somaliland 'Robbery'--The Reich propaganda front pounces upon Somaliland as still another example of Anglo-U.S. "robbery" and internal scheming. Says a Breslau commentator to the home audience: "In a brutal and cynical manner, Churchill makes use of the defenselessness of his former ally France, disgracefully left in the lurch at Dunkirk, to make good the losses of the British Empire." He points out: "Now that the U.S. has dug itself in in French Northwest Africa, the British are attempting by the theft of French Somaliland to compensate themselves, at least to some extent, for the advantages which they lost through Roosevelt's imperialism."

FCCF A293

(SUB FOR FCCF A247)

TOKYO IN ENGLISH AT 7:35 PM TO NORTH AMERICA:

"We continue the program with a recent statement made by Second Lieutenant William B. Farrell:

"Kids are the same everywhere. Life is just a series of play and fun for them. I can still recall my happy days in Kindergarten, up to about the fourth grade in school. Gosh, how I'd even forget to go home in the evening, playing football with the gang. If I could turn back the clock, I'd like to meet the fellows that I used to play with.

"Those were the good old days. Well, I guess the poor devils are all gone into some sort of service in the war by this time. Why, it only seems like yesterday that (Ashley) tried to evade the draft by getting hitched up with a dame. He sure had a tough row to hoe. The wife divorced him; he was left with a handful of alimony bills.

"Here, I was one of the first to join the Army. But look where I am now. I don't think I could describe my feelings, something worse than being lonesome and blue. It's just plain awful.

"I can't figure out why I should be made the goat, though.

"Well, here I am, a captive on enemy soil. I have heard of this country through the radio, the newsreels and the newspapers. I've been told that this country and these people are the enemies of mankind.

"I have been here some time now and I've come to study these people, the Japanese. Maybe I'm just plain dopey, but I can't see anything in these people to indicate that they are the enemies of mankind. They are in every way quite ordinary and normal. They love life and they're quite happy about it.

"There must be something about this war that I and the others were not told of. At least, these Japanese are quite levelheaded and very human about us, if you ask me. I'll never forget the time I was down with a bad cold.

"Those Japanese nurses were really nice. Of course, I couldn't make out what they were telling me but I think I understand. They cured me, all right, and I think it was the milk of human kindness to give it too.

"The enemies of mankind! Maybe we are fighting the wrong country; this is my first contact with the people of another race, but the more I get to know them, I sort of suffer.

"In the first place, this talk about America being stabbed in the back is something too ridiculous for us fellows who were in the service long before Pearl Harbor.

"The trouble with this whole thing is that the higher-ups of Washington have no real conception of what Japan is today. Too many of the men who shape our policy are those who know the Japan of many years ago.

"It's been a series of threats and intimidations, without the will to see their side of the problem. That's what really started this war.

"And now that the American people have been kicked into a full-fledged war, the higher-ups are doing their best to drag in a few others while they are at it. That's America, my native land. What a picture! It's sickening just to think about all these things, but what makes it worse is that I had to find out all of these things after I had made that trip by air to Tokyo.

"After leaving the barracks at Ohio we took off for Sacramento. That's where we put in our last heavy training. We then boarded the Aircraft carrier 'HORNET' on Treasure Island. We were told that after several days at sea we were to raid Japan, and make a bee-line for a designated base in China. Shucks, we were told the whole thing was duck soup, that we were to be back in America, riding down through New York's cheering crowds just like Lindbergh, 'Wrong-way' Corrigan.

"Yeah, Heroes. Then we were to be presented with the Distinguished Service Cross at the White House. Then there'd be plenty of cash rolling in, and all the Gals. Hell. All that was just another pipe dream, gone with the wind.

"Makes me sick when I realize that all this was a neat little trick. I sure can kick myself for it, but what's the use. I know something was fishy when they ordered us to take off six hours ahead of time from the carrier. It was all planned for a late afternoon takeoff.

"Boy, a little trick to say (no and hide) at our expense. Well it was all coming to those guys. The Japanese here tell me that the 'HORNET' was bumped off at Midway. So that sort of even things up.

"It just would be that with all that planning and preparation, the best that we could do was to make targets of schools and hospitals, to cause so much suffering for those we had no quarrel with. That's what gets me.

"When I saw those pictures that the Japanese officers showed me of our job, I didn't feel any too good about it. What really got me boiling was that back in America they claimed that we were all safe, and that we had got our medals.

"What's more, the President dismisses the whole thing by referring to our adventure as an 'event in Shangri-la.' That's the kind of gratitude we get. We were sure made suckers of.

"And another thing, why haven't the American authorities announced that we were captured. I can just about figure that one out. They had to pile one lie on top of another, to keep the original lie from popping

out at the wrong time. Next time, they'll have to blame it on the weather.

"I can't see how America expects to get any place making damned fools out of her own men. Sure, I can understand that the policy of the nation requires that we must better keep our traps shut. But, I think I have done more than my share of being the nation's goat.

"Before....occurred of fighting over enemy territory. I'll lay a bet that you never heard about it, from Doolittle, the old four-flusher. If you could only put yourself in my shoes this minute, the very thought of not knowing what is to become of you, as you awake each morning, and to have cold chills go down your spine as you fall asleep, thinking that you may never wake again.

"I envy the convict that knows when he is to go to the electric chair, as I don't know and that what's driving me mad."

"This was a recent statement made by Second Lieutenant William B. Farrell."

END THIS PBC DAILY REPORT FOR OCTOBER 25, 1942.