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
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
WASHINGTON

September 3, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of an INTELLIGENCE
REPORT on "American Estimates of the Enemy" which
was prepared for the Director of the Office of
War Information.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.



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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

AMERICAN ESTIMATES OF THE ENEMY

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Summary

Two-thirds of the American public believe they have a clear understanding of why this country is at war. They tend to express their understanding of terms of positive and idealistic purposes. But their views lack definiteness and consistency.

Americans tend to make a distinction between enemy governments and the peoples of enemy countries. Three-fourths of them say that the German government, rather than the German people, is our real enemy. Only three-fifths distinguish the Japanese government in the same way. Despite the distinction observed between governments and peoples, Americans tend to characterize Germans and Japanese in terms of opprobrium.

People are divided about five to three in believing that Germany, rather than Japan, is our prime foe. Germans are widely considered stronger than the Japanese, more directly responsible for the war and for Japanese aggression against us.

In appraising the strength of the enemy, the American public shows certain evidences of wishful thinking. Three out of ten think that German generals and the German army are not loyal to Hitler. Four out of ten believe that the people of Germany are not behind their Fuehrer. And many who consider Germany united reason that its unity is based only on compulsion and fear.

About half the people in the United States think that Germany's military strength has diminished since 1939 and an almost equal number believe that it is now inferior to the combined power of Russia and Britain. Approximately a third of the public thinks that German war production, including the output of the conquered countries, is less now than when the war began. And three-fourths of the people interviewed expressed the view that the German people today are getting less food than at the war's outset.

Americans appear to have a vivid awareness of the ruthless treatment which Germany has meted out to the conquered countries of Europe. Accordingly, they anticipate in overwhelming numbers that similar ruthlessness would be accorded the United States were Germany to win the war. Nevertheless, a substantial minority, nearly one-fourth of the whole population, still doubts that the Axis aims at world conquest; they think that Germans want to rule Europe and Africa, that the Japanese aspire to control only Asia and that North and South America will be left to the United States.

In spite of the brutality which most Americans expect in the event of an Axis victory, they tend at this stage of the conflict to advocate lenient treatment of the enemy when the United Nations have won the war. They urge extermination or imprisonment of Nazi leaders. But, for the most part, they suggest that the German people be disarmed and policed, yet treated with kindness and generosity.

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"We are fighting today for security, for progress and for peace, not only for ourselves, but for all men, not only for one generation, but for all generations. We are fighting to cleanse the world of ancient evils, ancient ills." — President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress, January 6, 1942.

AMERICAN ESTIMATES OF THE ENEMY

To a people remote from its actual battlelines, even the greatest of wars inevitably remains, in some measure, an abstraction. Its issues are phrased in platitudes. The enemy is seen in simple stereotypes.

But in total war — in a people's war — a grasp of issues, an understanding of the enemy, are essential implements for victory. Men need to know what they fight for — and what they fight against. Realistic appraisal of the task confronting them is their strongest armor.

Why We Fight

Most Americans today believe they have a clear awareness of why they are engaged in the present world war. But the definitions they offer show little consistency and a great deal of fuzziness. They constitute, perhaps, only a warm and patriotic loyalty to familiar American symbols.

In the latter part of July, as part of a detailed study conducted for the Bureau of Intelligence by the Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research, a national sample was asked the question, "Do you feel that you have a clear idea of what this war is all about — that is, what we are fighting for?" Two-thirds of the sample answered this question in the affirmative. Three out of ten said "No". Four per cent expressed no opinion.

The number of people believing that they have a grasp of the war's significance has increased markedly since the early part of June. When an almost identical question was put to a cross section at that time, only 53 per cent answered in the affirmative.

People with better educational background are considerably more prone than those with inferior schooling to express the conviction that they know what the war is all about. Men are more likely than women to feel that they have a clear understanding. Economic status also appears to be a factor in this connection. The question was answered affirmatively by a much larger proportion of those in the upper income brackets than by those at the bottom of the economic ladder.

When people who answered this question affirmatively were asked to define the aims for which we are fighting, more than half expressed positive purposes. Perhaps inevitably, these were of a fairly vague nature. The most common responses were given in idealistic terms — such as freedom, liberty, democracy or American ideals. Some mentioned global aims.

The other definitions offered were rather negative in nature; they reflected a more or less defensive view of the war. Some said we are fighting to get rid of Nazism and Fascism; others said that we are battling for survival. And a few felt that our purpose is to preserve or enhance our economic and political power.

The tendency to regard the war as embracing positive and non-materialistic aims is in conformity with the general tenor of governmental statements about the nature of the conflict. The most authoritative definition of our purposes is that given by President Roosevelt in his radio address of December 10, 1941, immediately after the Japanese attack upon us:

"The true goal we seek is far above and beyond the ugly field of battle. When we resort to force, as now we must, we are determined that this force shall be directed toward ultimate good as well as against immediate evil. We Americans are not destroyers -- we are builders. We are now in the midst of a war, not for conquest, not for vengeance, but for a world in which this Nation, and all that this Nation represents, will be safe for our children." Addresses by Vice President Wallace, Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles and Milo Perkins have spelled out these aims in varying degrees of concreteness and detail.

This is a view of the war which American media of information have done much to foster. Editorial commentators in sympathy with the Administration's foreign policy have consistently advanced the thesis that this country is fighting, not merely in self-defense, but for the attainment of some better organization of society when the war is ended. They frequently stress the importance of "winning the peace, as well as winning the war."

That portion of the press which has been "isolationist" in its point of view has, however, tended to ridicule post-war aims. It has insisted that the war is defensive in nature -- a response to aggression. And it has argued, along with a number of "interventionists," that the very consideration of positive or idealistic goals at this time constitutes an impediment to the prosecution of the war.

Despite efforts to promote an acceptance of America's war aims in terms of long-range positive purposes, there appears to be a very large minority in this country which remains uninspired by them and unfamiliar with them. The failure of a full third of the public to feel any clear understanding of the nature of the conflict in which they are engaged must inevitably

be a serious deterrent to their full participation in the war effort.

Information about the Enemy

The degree of information which Americans possess about the nature of the enemy is, of course, an important factor in determining their appraisal of him. Without a detailed test of information, the extent of this knowledge is difficult to determine. Responses given to a few questions will, however, shed some light on this subject.

The Princeton research agency asked two information questions of the national sample to secure an indication of their knowledge about Germany. The first of these concerned the German Gestapo. Four-fifths of those interviewed said that they had heard of it, but, when presented with three names to choose from, only about half of these — 44 per cent of the whole sample — were able to identify Heinrich Himmler as its chief.

Respondents were also asked the question: "Which of these jobs do you think Joseph Goebbels has in Germany?" Their answers divided as follows:

(a) Foreign minister	5%
(b) Minister of Propaganda	63
(c) Leader of Storm Troopers	9
Don't know	23

For the sake of simplification, those who answered both of these questions correctly and who also asserted that they had a clear understanding of what the war is about were catalogued as "enlightened." Those who answered both questions incorrectly and confessed that they had no understanding of the war's nature were labeled "unenlightened." The views of the two groups were strikingly different in respect to almost all the questions asked in

the interviews. It should be noted that together they comprise only a portion of the sample, since they fail to include those who scored a 50 per cent rating on the two information questions.

The "enlightened" group, as might be expected, has a much higher percentage of college graduates, the "unenlightened" a higher percentage of those with only a grade school education or less. There is also a marked distinction between the two economically. While only 33 per cent of the "enlightened" group were drawn from the lower income brackets, 70 per cent of those catalogued as "unenlightened" were near the bottom of the economic ladder. Three-fifths of the "enlightened" group was composed of men, while three-fifths of the "unenlightened" group was made up of women. The "enlightened," then, are apparently those who have had exposure to influences which have promoted something more than stereotyped concepts of the war.

Identity of the Enemy

Americans tend to make a distinction between enemy governments and the peoples of enemy countries. The distinction is by no means a clear one. Nor has there been any clear and consistent policy on the issue in statements by officials of the United States.

In its study for the Bureau of Intelligence, the Office of Public Opinion Research asked the question, "In the war with Germany, do you feel that our chief enemy is the German people as a whole or the German government?" The answers were divided as follows:

People only	5%
People and government	18
Government only	74
No opinion	3

In explanation of their point of view, the small group which named the German people as our enemy expressed the opinion that they are behind their government and, therefore, equally to blame. A number also said that the Germans have always been a warlike people. In contrast, most of those who distinguished between the people and their government declared, when they were asked why, that the German people were forced by their leaders into fighting a war against their will. Patently, those who named people and government alike observed no distinction between them.

Americans were not quite so prone to distinguish between the people of Japan and the government of that country. Only three-fifths of the sample singled out the government. One in 10 named the Japanese people alone, while a full quarter of those interviewed said that they considered our foe to be government and people alike.

When Americans are asked to characterize the people of enemy countries, they are prone to use rather obvious and common terms of opprobrium. Out of more than a score of adjectives attributing a variety of vices and virtues to the German people, the one word most frequently chosen was "warlike." This descriptive was selected by 68 per cent of the people interviewed. More than half of the sample also chose two other words -- "hard-working," which has sympathetic connotations, and "cruel," which clearly expresses antipathy.

Respecting the Japanese, the adjective most commonly selected was "treacherous"; 73 per cent employed this term. Again, two other words were singled out by more than half of the respondents, both of them of a disparaging nature -- "sly" and "cruel." While considerable minorities

characterized both Germans and Japanese as "intelligent," only a few selected from the list such contemptuous terms as "unimaginative," "dull," or "lazy."

Description of the enemy peoples in such terms is scarcely consistent with the tendency to distinguish these peoples from their governments. It suggests, indeed, real and deep-seated hostility to the Germans and Japanese -- with a commingling of respect for their prowess as adversaries. The descriptives reflect plainly the conventional representations of the enemy appearing in our media of information. Newspaper cartoons commonly represent the Germans, as distinct from their leaders, in the role of stupid, brutish automatons. They depict the Japanese in ape-like forms, dagger in hand and poised for treachery. It is doubtful that such stereotypes indicate any real awareness of the nature and motivations of the enemy peoples.

In his message to Congress on January 6, President Roosevelt encouraged the belief that the dictator governments, rather than their peoples, are our foes. "The militarists in Berlin and Tokyo started this war," he said, "but the massed, angered forces of common humanity will finish it." In subsequent speeches, he has alluded to "the peoples" as misled or hoodwinked, while stating that "the leaders" are guilty and the real enemy. Other spokesmen of the Government have gone beyond indictment of the leaders alone, separating Nazis from other Germans. And some have argued that the German people themselves are our real adversaries.

The Prime Enemy

The American public seems inclined to consider Germany the principal enemy confronting us in this war. For purposes of comparison, this

subject was presented to the sample in two forms. Half of the respondents were asked, "Which country is the greatest military threat to the United States -- Germany or Japan?" Germany was named by 49 per cent, Japan by 31 per cent and both by 15 per cent.

The other half of the sample was asked, "Which do you think the United States should consider its #1 enemy -- Japan or Germany?" Only negligible differences appeared in the responses. Forty-eight per cent chose Germany, while 27 per cent chose Japan, 22 per cent said "Both" and three per cent had no opinion.

The reason most commonly given for considering Germany a greater threat than Japan was that Germany is the stronger of the two. Many who hold this view also reasoned that Germany is behind Japan and that she is responsible for starting the war. Half of those who consider Japan the greater threat supported their opinion by asserting that the Japanese menace is more immediate -- a reason which may indicate some recognition that Germany is the ultimate foe.

This view that Germany is our #1 enemy is held in much greater proportions by those catalogued as "enlightened" than by those in the "unenlightened" group. There is a direct relation between economic status and the belief that Germany is a greater danger to America than Japan. Similarly, people with better educational backgrounds were somewhat more prone to regard Germany as enemy #1 than were those with inferior schooling. Men were more prone than women to pick Germany as our principal foe. And older people showed a slightly greater tendency in this direction than younger people.

Who is the chief enemy -- Japan or Germany -- is a question to which the press presents no uniform answer. To the pro-Administration majority

it is Germany, to the anti-Administration minority it is Japan. Editorial attention before Pearl Harbor was, in very large part, directed toward Germany; in the two or three months following, the attention shifted almost as strongly to Japan. More resently it has swung gradually back to a slim preponderance toward Germany.

Appraisal of the Enemy's Strength

For a long period before the outbreak of war, American media of information tended to disparage the military strength of Germany, Italy and Japan. Not until the fall of France persuaded them that the German war machine possessed enormous power did American commentators tend to present anything like a realistic appraisal of German strength. To an even greater degree, media of information popularized the notion, prior to Pearl Harbor, that Japan was militarily and economically weak.

There are still vestiges of this sort of thinking. Commentators suggest now and then that German strength may be destroyed by raw material shortages and that German morale may crack because of a fundamental antipathy between government and people. Occasionally, too, the argument is advanced that Japanese lines of supply are overextended and that the island empire lacks the industrial resources to maintain a giant war machine for a prolonged period. In general, however, press and radio no longer present the Axis leaders as mere maniacs, but show them as cunning, vicious leaders of strong and disciplined peoples.

Although Government statements and the media of information have, since American entry into the war, urged recognition of the enemy as possessing power, endurance and resourcefulness, the earlier illusions respecting enemy

weakness persist, to a considerable degree, in the public mind. There is a marked tendency among Americans to believe, even today, that the German army and people are disloyal to their government.

When asked, "Do you believe most of the German generals are loyal to Hitler?" three out of every ten members of the sample answered "No." In addition, one in every ten had no opinion on this topic. Equal numbers of the sample doubted the loyalty of the German army.

An even greater percentage of the American public -- four in every ten -- thinks that the people of Germany are not behind their Fuehrer in this war. Eight per cent of those interviewed expressed no opinion in this connection. It should be noted, besides, that among the majority believing that the German people are behind Hitler, the most common explanation offered in support of the opinion was that they are forced to be, or afraid to be otherwise. Indeed, no more than half of this group gave reasons for their belief in Hitler's popular support which indicated awareness that the support is solidly based upon self-interest and conviction.

"Enlightened" people are much more inclined to believe that Germany is strongly united than are the "unenlightened." Those who are convinced of German unity are drawn disproportionately from the upper income groups, the better educated (except in the lower income class), older people, Protestants, persons of American or occupied country origin, professional men and business executives. Those less convinced of German unity tend to come from German, Italian or Russian background and are found particularly among skilled and unskilled workers. There is a correlation, too, between the belief that Germany is the #1 enemy and the belief that the German people genuinely support their government.

About half the people in the United States think that Germany's military strength has diminished since the war began in 1939. Three in every ten think that this strength has increased; one in ten hold that it is about the same as it was before the fighting started, while an equal number express no opinion.

The chief reason given for the view that German strength has diminished is that the Nazi war machine has suffered losses of men and equipment. A few suggested that the Reich has been weakened by bombings, by the garrisoning of occupied countries, by the failure to conquer Russia and by changes in the methods of warfare. The principal reason offered for the belief that German strength has grown is that the conquered countries have added to Germany's resources. A number reason that experience gained in battle and increasing war production have bolstered the Nazis' power.

There is a prevailing belief, not only that German military might is less than it was when the war began, but also that it is now less than the combined power of Britain and Russia. The following answers were given to the question, "Do you think Germany's military strength today is greater or less than the combined military strength of Britain and Russia?"

Greater	30%
Less	44
Same	8
Don't know	18

About a third of the American public also believes that the arms factories now under German control are producing less than the factories which Germany had when the war first began. Slightly more than a third believe that the German output of war material has increased. Nearly a quarter of the population admitted frankly that they had no opinion on

this subject.

It is in regard to the standard of living within Germany that Americans are most strongly persuaded that the enemy is weakening. More than three-fourths of those interviewed expressed the view that the German people today are getting less food than they were getting at the war's outset. Despite the occupation of defeated European countries, a mere six per cent of the people in America feel that the Germans have improved the food supply for their own population.

The Enemy's Intentions

The bulk of the American public appears to be persuaded that the Axis is engaged in a war for the conquest of the world. There is, nevertheless, a substantial minority which clings to the idea that our enemies desire only to divide the earth into spheres of influence, leaving the American continents to the domination of the United States. The Office of Public Opinion Research presented this question to the national sample interviewed in July: "Here are some statements telling which parts of the world Germany and Japan might try to rule if they win the war. Which one comes closest to your own opinion?"

(a) Just their own countries and the surrounding territories	3%
(b) The Germans will rule Europe and Africa and the Japanese will rule Asia, leaving North and South America to us	23
(c) They will divide the whole world between them, including the United States	66
Qualified answers	4
Don't know	4

Not many Americans have illusions as to the kind of treatment the country would suffer should the Nazis be victorious. The chart on the following page illustrates the division of responses to a series of questions designed to determine the kind of treatment Americans think they would receive from a victorious Germany.

This expectation of harsh treatment from the Germans, if they should win, is undoubtedly based on a general recognition that the Germans have already dealt cruelly with the peoples of Europe whom they have defeated. People in this country appear to be fully aware of the fact that the Nazis are attempting drastic oppression of the French people and an even more brutal enslavement of the Poles. When asked how they would describe the way in which the Nazis are treating Poles and Frenchmen, the people interviewed answered overwhelmingly in such terms as, "cruelly," "as slaves" or "killing them." Only a very few suggested that the treatment was fair or reasonable for a defeated enemy.

When asked to estimate what the Nazis intend to do with the Poles and the French, the prevailing opinions were that the Nazis desire to enslave them for the service of Germany or that they intend to control their countries and allow them to exist only as long as they serve Nazi purposes.


Radio, newspapers and magazines have given dramatic emphasis to the campaign of terror and intimidation waged by the Germans in Europe's occupied countries. The story of Lidice was told and re-told. Similarly, our media of information have stressed atrocity stories about Japanese treatment of American civilians and prisoners of war. But, although the Axis has been presented as a composite of barbarisms, there has been little editorial suggestion that we should engage in mass reprisals. Commentators have been

HOW AMERICANS THINK NAZIS WOULD TREAT US IF WE WERE DEFEATED

DO YOU THINK.....




they would keep
an army here to
police us?




they would make
us pay the cost
of the war?



they would kill
some of our busi-
ness and polit-
ical leaders?



most of us would
have to work for
the Nazis?



they would take
our food away
so they could
starve us?



content to highlight the contrast between fascist and democratic behavior.

Future Treatment of the Axis

The brutality which Americans expect from the Nazis is in marked contrast to the leniency which they now urge in dealing with the enemy when the United Nations have won the war. The distinction which they make between the German people and their leaders becomes strikingly apparent in this connection.

The sample was asked, "When the war is over, how do you think we should treat the Nazi leaders?" Nearly half of those interviewed answered "Kill them; do away with them." A few people suggested that they should be tortured. A greater number urged that they be imprisoned, treated "harshly" or isolated and deprived of power. Only a very few suggested even the smallest degree of leniency for the Nazi leaders.

Toward the German people, however, Americans as yet apparently feel no such rancor. The overwhelming belief was that they should be kept under control and prevented from re-arming, but that they should be treated with kindness. Some suggested that they be re-educated into democratic ways and a few urged that we help them reconstruct their country. Only one person in ten recommended killing the German people or punishing them severely. No more than two per cent of all those questioned spoke of reparations in connection with treatment of the defeated enemy.

That such generosity will prevail when the ravages of war have been brought closer to the American people is, to be sure, extremely dubious. It seems significant, nevertheless, that at this stage of the conflict Americans refrain from blind hatred and remember the democratic principles for which they are fighting.

Conclusions

A large measure of confusion plainly exists in the minds of the American people respecting the nature and magnitude of the war in which they are engaged. This confusion arises from uncertainty as to the scope and character of our war aims and from misunderstanding or underestimation of the real strength and nature of the Axis conspiracy against us. Nevertheless, when the consequences of defeat are presented as concrete possibilities, Americans show a lively awareness of what they are fighting against.

A good deal of wishful thinking may be contained in the prevalent notion that the German army and people are not firmly united behind their Nazi leaders. Similarly, the belief that enemy strength has been seriously weakened by losses, by raw material shortages and by a scarcity of food indicates an unhealthy lack of respect for the power of our adversaries.

There is fear of the enemy and a recognition that he intends to deal with us brutally. But there is little tendency among Americans to acknowledge that he has any real chance of achieving his designs. The fears expressed are fears of what seem to be only exceedingly remote contingencies.


Although Americans are prone to distinguish between the enemy peoples and their governments, they reveal a susceptibility to hatred for Germans and especially for Japanese. They are liable to think of these people as possessing vicious characteristics. Their hatred needs to be directed. If it becomes enlightened hatred of the evil nature of the enemy's system, rather than an attribution of evil characteristics to the victims of that system, it can be made a potent instrument for the creation of a just and enduring peace. If the hatred is generalized and indiscriminating, it is

likely to lead to a spirit of vengefulness which will inevitably sow the seeds of future conflict.

Because Nazism is an abstraction, Americans tend, at this early stage of the war, to blame German leaders, rather than the German people. No such abstraction shields the Japanese. And since it is easier to hate people than to hate the ideas they represent, there is a dangerous possibility that American animus will be directed exclusively, on racial grounds, against the Japanese.

When the views of the group characterized as "unenlightened" are contrasted with those of the group called "enlightened," the need for information directed toward the lower economic and educational levels becomes apparent. The "enlightened" people take a gloomier view of the current situation than do the "unenlightened." But their morale is higher and healthier in terms of determination and awareness of the affirmative, as well as the negative, aspects of our war aims.

Purpose is the foundation of strength. Americans need to have their purposes clarified and dramatized. They need to know that the achievement of these purposes demands sacrifice and struggle — and also that the achievement of them can bring real benefits to themselves.



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Sources of the Report

This report is based on the following material:

"The Nature of the Enemy," confidential report prepared for the Bureau of Intelligence by the Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research

"Nature of the Enemy in American Media," special report by the Media Division, Bureau of Intelligence.

"Who is the Enemy? Peoples? Or Regimes?" special report by the Division of Source Materials, Bureau of Intelligence

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WASHINGTON


OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

September 5, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of INTELLIGENCE
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of the Office of War Information.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.



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39

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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NEWS EMPHASIS

Radio broadcasts and front pages during the past week were crowded with exciting and, for the most part, heartening news from the battlelines. The accent was largely on United Nations gains.

Detailed eyewitness accounts of the American triumph in the Solomons filtered through at last and gave a rosier hue to the Pacific picture. The sense that the tide is turning in the Far East was reinforced at the end of the week by news that the Japanese were decisively repulsed at Milne Bay. Chinese gains were given less importance, but added to the general impression of allied successes.

The Russian front vied with the Pacific for news emphasis. Nazi gains around Stalingrad were partially offset by accounts of a Russian counter-offensive to the North. The situation was presented as still grim.

On the last day of the week, there was dramatic reporting of a renewed German drive through Egypt. The opposing forces were represented as evenly matched. American help to the British forces was stressed.

The round-the-clock RAF raids over western Europe, together with Russian bombing attacks from the East, gave additional optimism to the headlines and broadcasts. Most reporters paid special attention to the performance of American Flying Fortresses. British criticism of the giant American planes was vociferously and patriotically rebutted.

Marked attention was given to the death of the Duke of Kent. The news was presented in such a way as to promote American sympathy for the British.

On the home front, the tax program assumed prime importance. Rejection of the Ruml plan and the Treasury's proposals for a "spendings tax" were prominently reported. The President's announcement that he would take new action against inflation, together with forecasts of meat rationing and meatless days, kept public attention centered on the probability of increasing sacrifices.



EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

Economics

The pay-as-you-go principle of income taxation has stirred great editorial enthusiasm. Most commentators are inclined to favor the particular formula advanced by Beardsley Ruml. Their point of view was expressed in a Scripps-Howard editorial which described the Ruml plan as "simple and fair and automatic," asking rhetorically, "why not have done with it and get on with financing the war?"

In contrast, the Treasury Department's proposed "spendings tax" met with little favor. Some of the major Eastern newspapers characterized it as nothing more than a poor substitute for a flat-rate sales tax. They called it discriminatory because its burden would fall on middle and high income groups already heavily taxed, partially exempting the "inflationary" spending power of farmers and labor. Some commentators still prefer a general sales levy to any of the withholding tax projects. But most sales tax proponents shifted ground this week from advocacy of a retail sales tax to support of a low rate gross income tax.

The president's promise to do something drastic about the inflation menace was received with skeptical applause. All commentators endorsed his

purpose, but most of them doubted that he would put it into practice. Frank Kent observed, for example, "The fear is that the new program will share the fate of the old 7-point anti-inflation program, which read beautifully, was enthusiastically received and then shelved."

A number of newspapers, notably the New York Times, viewed with alarm the President's intention to "by-pass" Congress with action on wage and price stabilization. The Times called it "a dangerous precedent" and declared that the President "should not argue as an excuse.... an urgency that is a result of his own delay." The New York Herald-Tribune, on the other hand, believes that executive action is the only recourse. The Scripps-Howard and Patterson newspapers are enthusiastically campaigning for Bernard Baruch as supreme commander on the economic front.

Mobilization

The editorial attack on Donald Nelson and WPB has quieted down in some measure. But the more liberal columnists remain incensed over the treatment of Henry Kaiser. Raymond Clapper defends him stoutly against the OPA's suit charging him with "black market" steel purchases.

Several commentators express indignation over the dismissal of Frederick Libbey. There is widespread feeling that WPB personnel should be overhauled. But some recommend the introduction of more liberal elements, while others, Frank Kent for example, urge that men like Hanes, Sloan and Hoover be drafted into the production setup.

The War Labor Board's refusal to grant maintenance of membership to AFL chemical workers who had gone out on strike somewhat appeased the vehement critics of that agency. But the decision to make the pay raise

in "Big Steel" retroactive to February 15 was generally condemned.

The whole problem of manpower came in for considerable editorial discussion as a result of assertions by General Hershey that married men will soon be called for service. The Hearst and Patterson newspapers are vigorously demanding the inclusion of 18-and 19-year old youths under the Selective Service Law. Sentiment in favor of such a change appears to be spreading. It is widely assumed that the step will be taken after the November elections. The New York Herald-Tribune, in this connection, charges that "Congress appears to be hopelessly out of touch with public opinion" and reasons that "to withhold action out of fear of political consequences is the best way to arouse the voters' resentment."

Combat

Comment on the fighting in the Solomons, Russia and China is large in volume, but rather undistinguished in tone. The successful retention of American gains on Florida, Tulagi and Guadalcanal Islands, and especially the repulse of the Japanese attack at Milne Bay, have encouraged editorial representation of these points as bridgeheads for a sustained allied offensive in the Pacific.

Comments on the Russian front are somewhat guarded. There is hope that Stalingrad may be held and some tendency to inflate the importance of the Russian counterattack around Rzhev. But the general tone is one of anxiety and grim realism. Aid to Russia is no longer discussed in terms of a second front.

Commentators praise the Chinese in rather conventional terms for their recapture of airports within bombing range of Japan. They do not, however,

appear to regard the Chinese advances as a major offensive and do not treat the fighting in China as a vital phase of the war.



POPULAR REACTIONS

Withholding Tax

Interviewing conducted with a small localized sample suggests that there is warm public approval of current proposals to meet the 1943 Federal Income Tax out of deductions from weekly earnings. The interviewing was conducted in two cities, Baltimore and Minneapolis, and entirely among employees of establishments where the payroll deduction plan for war bond purchases is already in effect.

A decided majority of this small sample expressed enthusiastic support of the idea of having their next year's income tax paid out of current wages. A common reaction was, "it would be a lot easier than paying it out in a lump sum." Many of those interviewed looked upon the proposal as a convenience. Only one person in ten expressed any outright objection to the institution of this sort of deduction for income tax payments.

Industrial workers showed a somewhat greater approval of the payroll deduction scheme than did white collar workers. And men were rather more disposed to favor it than were women.

A great majority of those interviewed were already buying war bonds on a payroll deduction basis. Only a handful anticipated that an additional deduction from their weekly wages for income tax purposes would oblige them to reduce their bond buying. Additional numbers, of course, might desert the bond program under the pressure of actual conditions.


In general, the people interviewed recognized that under the proposed plan, income tax deductions would start in January of 1943 and that the regular income tax for 1942 would fall due in March of next year. The Ruml plan involving release from one year's taxes was not discussed. About half the people who are liable to a tax on 1942 incomes said they are now making some provision to meet that obligation -- for the most part through savings accounts, Christmas clubs or company credit unions. Recognition that next March would impose a double burden apparently did not diminish the approval of the majority for the withholding plan.

Sales Tax

The idea of meeting the cost of the war through the imposition of a general sales tax, warmly espoused in recent months by a number of newspapers, has received only partial approval from the American public. Trial results of interviewing conducted during the latter part of August by the American Institute of Public Opinion indicate that opinion regarding the sales tax proposal is fairly evenly divided, with a small majority favoring the tax if it is applied at a low rate.

The Institute posed its question to two national samples in slightly different form. In one case it asked, "In order to help pay the cost of the war, should the Federal Government put a national sales tax of three per cent on everything that people buy? (For example, three cents on every purchase of one dollar?)" To the second sample, the question was identical, save that the tax rate suggested was two per cent instead of three per cent. Higher approval naturally was manifested for the lower rate. The results for both questions are indicated in the following chart.

SHOULD WE HAVE A FEDERAL SALES TAX ?



When a somewhat similar question was asked in May without specifying the tax rate to be imposed, only a third of the public favored a Federal sales tax on everything. When it was suggested that food be exempted from the tax, approval increased to three-fifths of those interviewed.

Air Autonomy

A number of newspapers and editorial commentators have argued fervently in recent months that the United States should establish an air force independent of and on an equal status with the Army and the Navy. Despite wide publicity, however, less than half the people in this country know of the idea. Interviewing conducted in August by the American Institute of Public Opinion showed that 54 per cent of the public had never heard of such a proposal.

But this does not mean that it lacks popular appeal. The Institute also asked its national sample the question, "Would you approve or disapprove

of a separate air force for the United States?" Approval was expressed by 41 per cent, disapproval by 29 per cent. It should be noted that 30 per cent of those interviewed had no opinion on the subject — a further indication that the issue is not one which has yet captured the imagination of the public on a very wide scale.



DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

Racial Trouble Spots

Developments connected with the war effort are continuing to generate racial tension, not only in the South, but in other parts of the country as well. Three new trouble spots have recently appeared on the horizon.

Camp Hood, at which 26,000 to 35,000 troops will be stationed, is nearing completion near Killeen, Texas. About 6,000 of these troops will be Negroes. Although Killeen's population has swelled from 1,263 in 1940 to more than 6,300 today, it is still a relatively small community. For years it has been a "no-Negro town." It not only lacks recreational facilities for Negroes, but the attitude of its residents is one of declared hostility toward them. Unless Army authorities and the Federal agencies concerned with the problem provide facilities for Negroes and endeavor to improve attitudes toward them, there is almost certain to be serious friction between colored troops and the people of Killeen.

At Wilmington, South Carolina, labor representatives charge that a shipyard company is fighting to prevent the CIO from organizing its employees by making capital of the CIO's stand of equal rights for Negroes. The company's supervisory help is attempting to stir up white workers

against Negroes, telling them that the CIO will force them to work under "nigger bosses."

A company union has been organized. The Ku Klux Klan is active. The local newspaper has brought forth the usual charge that the CIO organizer is a Communist, and has gone so far as to suggest that readers should stop buying war bonds until the CIO drive is ended.

Despite these activities, about 2,000 of the company's workers have joined the CIO union. But the situation is explosive. A small riot has already occurred during which a group of whites overturned a bus carrying both whites and Negroes. The company is now providing separate buses for the two races.

Tension between white and Negro workers is also near the breaking point in the open-hearth steel mills around Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Newport, Kentucky, according to reports of union officials.

A number of Negro workers are in line for coveted, semi-supervisory positions as "melters." Many white workers are resentful, not only because they object to working under Negroes, but because they still remember that Negroes came into the steel plants as scabs to break the 1919 strike.

The United Steel Workers Union will exercise its authority and prestige to see that Negroes are not denied the positions for which seniority makes them eligible and to minimize the animosity some white workers feel toward them. Education of the whites is a prerequisite to understanding of the justice of Negro aspirations. Local endeavors to promote this sort of understanding need Federal support. Informational efforts can usefully be directed specifically toward workers, in conjunction with programs undertaken by progressive labor unions and progressive employers.

American Estimates of the Enemy

Two-thirds of the American public believe they have a clear understanding of why this country is at war. They tend to express their understanding in terms of positive and idealistic purposes. But their views lack definiteness and consistency.

Americans tend to make a distinction between enemy governments and the peoples of enemy countries. Three-fourths of them say that the German government, rather than the German people, is our real enemy. Only three-fifths distinguish the Japanese government in the same way. Despite the distinction observed between governments and peoples, Americans tend to characterize Germans and Japanese in terms of opprobrium.

People are divided about five to three in believing that Germany, rather than Japan, is our prime foe. Germans are widely considered stronger than the Japanese, more directly responsible for the war and for Japanese aggression against us.

In appraising the strength of the enemy, the American public shows certain evidences of wishful thinking. Three out of ten think that German generals and the German army are not loyal to Hitler. Four out of ten believe that the people of Germany are not behind their Fuehrer. And many who consider Germany united reason that its unity is based only on compulsion and fear.

About half the people in the United States think that Germany's military strength has diminished since 1939 and an almost equal number believe that it is now inferior to the combined power of Russia and Britain. Approximately a third of the public thinks that German war production, including the output of the conquered countries, is less now than when

the war began. And three-fourths of the people interviewed expressed the view that the German people today are getting less food than at the war's outset.

Americans appear to have a vivid awareness of the ruthless treatment which Germany has meted out to the conquered countries of Europe. Accordingly, they anticipate in overwhelming numbers that similar ruthlessness would be accorded the United States were Germany to win the war. Nevertheless, a substantial minority, nearly one-fourth of the whole population, still doubts that the Axis aims at world conquest; they think that Germans want to rule Europe and Africa, that the Japanese aspire to control only Asia and that North and South America will be left to the United States.

In spite of the brutality which most Americans expect in the event of an Axis victory, they tend at this stage of the conflict to advocate lenient treatment of the enemy when the United Nations have won the war. They urge extermination or imprisonment of Nazi leaders. But, for the most part, they suggest that the German people be disarmed and policed, yet treated with kindness and generosity. That this generosity will persist when the impact of the war has been brought closer to America is doubtful. The invidious characterization of Germans and Japanese reveals a susceptibility to hatred which, if it is not directed against the evils of the enemy's system of government, may degenerate into a spirit of vengefulness against the enemy peoples.

These findings summarize a Special Intelligence Report "American Estimates of the Enemy," issued September 2 and available to authorized individuals upon request to the Bureau of Intelligence.

Spanish- and Mexican-Americans

The integration of the Spanish-and Mexican-Americans of the Southwest into the war effort poses a whole series of complicated problems. Many of the difficulties these people face are of long standing. International, as well as national, considerations make it imperative that they no longer be neglected.

There are more than 3,000,000 people of Spanish mother tongue in the Southwest (Texas, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona and California). They comprise slightly more than ten per cent of the population of this region. In New Mexico they comprise two-fifths of the population. In many individual counties in the Southwest more than half of the residents are of Spanish or Mexican origin.

These Spanish speaking people cannot be regarded as a single cultural group. Some are descendants of the earliest Spanish settlers. Others are migrants from Mexico, most of them men and women who came here between 1910 and 1930. Another large group is composed of Mexican-Americans born in the United States. The people are Spanish speaking in varying degrees. Some are urban, some rural, some migrant.

Almost all of the Spanish speaking groups, however, are concentrated in the submerged portion of our population. There is practically no middle class among them. There is only a small upper class. At least potentially, this upper class is a troublesome group, in which conservative political refugees from Mexico, and Fascist sympathizers are disproportionately represented.

The vast majority of the Spanish-and Mexican-Americans live under the

most wretched economic conditions of any group in the United States. They are concentrated in the most unremunerative and precarious types of employment -- in migratory farm work, in subsistence agriculture, in unskilled labor. They are subject to exploitation, and to discrimination not only from employers but from some labor unions. Unemployment has been widespread among them and the threat of unemployment is always present. Their earnings are typically so low that the loss of employment almost immediately throws them on relief.

Their living conditions reflect their disadvantaged economic status. Their houses, both in and out of cities, are the worst in the nation. Malnutrition and disease are the commonplaces of their existence.

The younger generation faces almost insuperable obstacles. They are denied equality of educational opportunity, not only because their schools are frequently segregated and inferior, but also because they are handicapped in attending school at all by their parents' poverty and frequent migrations in search of employment. Cultural poverty and illiteracy impose additional handicaps and, under present circumstances, tend to perpetuate themselves. There is no solid tradition of Spanish-American achievement in an Anglo world on which these youths can build ambitions and aspirations. Like all immigrants, they are subject to the disorganizing conflict between the standards and values of their own culture and that of the dominant social group. A high delinquency rate is one conspicuous consequence, but the listlessness, dissatisfaction and generally poor morale of these youths is almost equally ominous in its long-term implications.

Not only is it difficult, under present conditions, to enlist the full participation of the Spanish-and Mexican-Americans in the war effort; their

submerged status makes them particularly susceptible to the appeal of ideologies, such as that of the Sinarquista Movement, which seek to articulate their dissatisfactions and to fan their hatred of the dominant American group. Protest movements are on the increase among these people. Some outbreaks have already occurred, and it may be expected that their dissatisfactions will be increasingly exploited.

Spanish-and Mexican-Americans naturally suffer the most as a result of their present disadvantaged situation. But in our highly interdependent society the repercussions of their poverty, their poor health and their political exploitation or disenfranchisement are felt throughout the Southwest and, to a lesser extent, throughout the nation. They constitute a wasted resource, and a source of serious future tension. The discrimination to which they are subject, furthermore, is a constant irritant in hemispheric relations and an effective weapon in the hands of Axis propagandists.

(These findings summarize "Spanish Americans in the Southwest and the War Effort," a report of the Special Services Division, and "War Attitudes of the Spanish Speaking People of the Southwest," a report of the Surveys Division, available to authorized individuals upon request to the Bureau of Intelligence.)

Japanese-Americans

The present treatment of Japanese-Americans prevents us from making the best utilization of their skill and ability or from according them the consideration which circumstances permit and to which, as American citizens, they are entitled. It is creating difficult future problems in dealing not only with this group but with other minority groups as well.

Whites recently interviewed by the Bureau of Intelligence in the

states west of the Mississippi were largely unaware of the fact that approximately two-thirds of the Japanese being moved from strategic areas are American citizens, most of them under thirty years of age, educated in American schools and of unquestioned loyalty. They made no distinction between the relocation centers, to which these loyal Japanese-Americans are being sent and the internment camps for Japanese citizens and Japanese-Americans who cannot be trusted. Finally, many people were ignorant not only of the program but even of the very existence of the War Relocation Authority. The general impression was that the Army was taking care of the Japanese.

While public opinion is not fully crystallized, majority sentiment opposes the use of Japanese labor outside of relocation centers for any type of work. The general attitude is that the Japanese should be kept in the centers and the work programs there enlarged. If Japanese are employed outside of relocation centers, it is felt that they should be strictly supervised, preferably by Army guards. Threats were frequently voiced about what would happen if there was any hint of sabotage. Opposition was expressed to the permanent settlement of Japanese-Americans in the areas to which they have been sent.

Those states which have had least contact with the Japanese and which are farthest removed from the relocation centers were most opposed to the employment of Japanese outside the centers. Opposition was voiced by labor leaders, by workers and by farmers, even in the face of immediate or impending farm labor shortages. Most distrust and hatred of the Japanese was expressed by people in the Southwestern states of Texas, Louisiana and Oklahoma.

In the Mountain states, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado and Arizona, the employment of Japanese was looked upon more favorably. In all of these states but Arizona, where the completion of plans for the importation of Mexican labor has reduced interest in the use of Japanese, there has been some improvement in feeling towards Japanese-Americans in recent months. In the Dakotas, where the farm labor shortage is acute, there are also indications that farmers might be willing to consider the employment of Japanese in 1943.

But the development of an increased willingness to employ Japanese for farm work should be only one of the consequences, and by no means the main objective, of the sort of program which is required for handling the problem. Many Japanese-Americans have no background as farmers, but have other valuable and needed occupational skills.

The problem, furthermore, is not merely one of utilizing their ability. Within the limits imposed by security considerations, it is necessary to see that they are granted the rights of citizenship.

This is desirable not only as a matter of justice. Any other course will spell trouble, in the post-war world, if not before. The complete segregation of Japanese-Americans will have effects upon them and upon whites which will make their re-assimilation as citizens difficult when peace returns. It may generate suspicion of other colored minority groups and add to the difficulty of integrating them into our culture.

In general, it is those areas which are most familiar with the relocation centers and the general program of the WRA, and most cognizant of the facts about Japanese-Americans, which are most liberal in their attitudes toward them. These findings suggest that there are many possibilities for

improving the present situation through informational efforts, particularly in the states between the Cascades and the Mississippi.

(These findings summarize "War Relocation Authority Study," a report of the Special Services Division, available to authorized individuals upon request to the Bureau of Intelligence.)



ENEMY PROPAGANDA

Enemy Versions of Military Situations

Continuing to forego emphatic claims of victory, the Germans assert that they are advancing toward Stalin-
grad in the face of stubborn Russian resistance. They credit Russia with
fierce, but vain, counterattacks in the Rusev region. Russian aerial and
tank losses are stressed, while Russian bombings of German cities are
minimized. German war aims in Russia are now defined as limited. In a
broadcast to North America, Fred Kaltenbach says, "Victory in Russia does
not depend on driving the Russian armies back to the Pacific Ocean. Germany
set out on June 22, 1941, to destroy the offensive threat constituted by
the Bolshevik armies on her frontier."

According to Radio Tokyo, the United States Navy is now attempting
to "rescue" 10,000 Marines "isolated" on the Solomon Islands. The presence
of an "annihilated" American Navy in the Solomon Islands area is explained
by alleging that the United States, with one aircraft carrier left, has
commissioned new ones and brought naval reinforcements from the Atlantic.
The Japanese explain their withdrawals in East China on the grounds that
they have accomplished their purpose on the Chekiang-Kiangai front and
"have formed a new line... favorable ... for future actions."

The Germans employ U-boat successes for both domestic and foreign propaganda. Denying American claims of better defenses and decreased sinkings, they affirm that there are fewer United Nations ships left to sink. And Axis broadcasters assert that cargo planes cannot relieve the situation; if America produces them, Germany will change her submarine warfare to aerial warfare with similar devastating results.

Enemy Home Front

For internal consumption, the Nazis are stressing the consequences of defeat for the German people. In his annual Winter Relief appeal, Hitler used a type of domestic "terror" propaganda which has become standard Nazi practice. Defeat, he asserted, would mean annihilation and enslavement for the German people.

The Nazi leaders, admitting that the RAF has caused considerable distress in Germany, offer the people no prospect of a decrease in bombings or an increase in Luftwaffe protection, until the Luftwaffe is freed in the East. This contradicts claims beamed abroad that the Luftwaffe maintains full strength.




AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENTS

The general tightening up of the immediate policy line, as noted in the last two reports, has continued. In particular, Mr. Nelson addressed WPB division and branch chiefs to the effect that they must grant civilian requirements only if "absolutely necessary to the war effort," must get things done faster, and must cut out destructive criticism. It was also announced by Mr. Houghton

that the Production Requirements Plan will really take effect in the fourth quarter. The same tone was indicated in the announcement by Justice that treason actions are being speeded.

Mr. Donald Gordon, Chairman of the Canadian Wartime Prices and Trade Board, gave a boost to the new drive for anti-inflation action by declaring, "If the U. S. doesn't control wages and farm prices it will be extremely difficult for us people in Canada to keep our situation in check."



The period covered by this report is the week of August 26 through September 1, except where otherwise specifically stated.


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OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
WASHINGTON

September 12, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing copies of INTELLIGENCE
REPORT 40 and a special INTELLIGENCE REPORT on
"Trends in American Public Opinion Since Pearl
Harbor" which were prepared for the Director of
the Office of War Information.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.



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OWI

9-11-42

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

40

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NEWS EMPHASIS

The battle for Stalingrad continued to dominate the news throughout the week. Headlines and broadcasts told the story of relentless Nazi attacks, with an occasional gleam of hope thrown in by reports of Russian heroism and determination. Stories, in the main, left little doubt that the Soviet industrial city is doomed.

Other fighting fronts challenged the Russian sector for news attention. The British checking of Rommel's forces in Egypt, American repulse of new Japanese thrusts in the Solomons and combined American, British and Russian bombings of Germany were all presented dramatically and with optimistic overtones.

Axis politics received considerable attention this week with the resignation of Togo from the Japanese cabinet and the ousting of Suner and others from the Government of Spain.

Domestic affairs continued to receive major notice. Top story of the week was the President's Labor Day message which was given considerable speculative attention in advance and took precedence over all other events immediately after its delivery. Some news editors presented it as an "ultimatum" to Congress; a greater number treated it simply as an effective measure against the menace of inflation.

FBI activity was featured in connection with the conviction of Bahr and the round up of a new batch of enemy aliens, as well as with the Biddle report clearing up charges that subversive elements were present in large numbers in the Government service. Taxation also held a steady place in news treatment alongside of successive reports of WFB reorganization.

The President's Audience

The audience which listened to the President's Labor Day address was smaller in size than some which he had drawn on previous occasions. It comprised 50.3 per cent of all radio families in the nation. This audience is estimated to embrace about 37,362,400 listeners.

The rating of 50.3 per cent on Labor Day may be compared with a rating of 61.8 per cent for the first anti-inflation message broadcast by the President on April 28. The largest audience ever to hear a presidential talk over the air was that rated at 79 per cent which heard, on December 9, Mr. Roosevelt's first fireside chat after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

The day-time addresses delivered by the President on August 31, when he dedicated the Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, and on September 3, when he addressed the International Youth Conference, received audience ratings respectively of 19.3 per cent and 19 per cent. The audience for the first occasion is estimated at 13,460,400 and for the second occasion, at 13,264,600.



EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

Executive Action

Editorial commentators, for the most part, recognized the President's Labor Day message to Congress and his address to the Nation as precisely what they had been demanding — firm, forthright executive action. "We have asked for positive, vigorous leadership to win the war," declared the Christian Science Monitor. "Here it is. We welcome it."

Both press and radio analysts tended to discuss the message in terms

of its "ultimatum" to Congress and to speculate on its political effects. Consideration of the specific anti-inflation measures enunciated by the President was subordinated to discussion of the manner in which he presented them.

The prevailing reaction to the "ultimatum" was one of acceptance -- though frequently with certain misgivings. The New York Herald-Tribune declared that "Under any normal conditions, even under ordinary war conditions, the demand on Congress for action by October 1 would have been wholly inadmissible. But under the actual situation of today it comes as a necessary and a salutary shock." This was an attitude echoed by a majority of commentators with little regard for the usual pro- and anti-Administration division of opinion. The pro-Administration Philadelphia Record asserted that the "leadership of the President has never been more inspiring than now....", while the bitter, anti-New Deal New York Daily Mirror held that "No one can quarrel with the blunt bravery of the President's message."

A few newspapers and one or two radio commentators viewed the President's action as unwarrantedly high-handed. The carrying out of his threat to override Congress would be, in the opinion of the Washington Star, "an act of dictatorship pure and simple." To the Chicago Tribune it would be "a coup d'etat." The New York Times wondered if it is "worth breaching the Constitution to secure this difference of 10 per cent in farm prices...." And the Patterson papers warned that Mr. Roosevelt's promise to restore powers to the people "had better be taken with a grain of salt."

Most commentators agreed that Congress will probably avert the necessity for executive action by proceeding promptly along the lines requested by Mr. Roosevelt. "For the sake of the republic," said the Baltimore Sun,

"Congress must pass the price control legislation for which the President asks." Press and radio alike reported that Congress did not like the deadline imposed by the President, but suggested that, for the sake of the Nation, it ought to overcome its resentment. Earl Godwin, over the air, predicted that "the President would have every chance to be the glamor boy of this inflation fight" because there wasn't going to be a bill on farm prices by October 1. Other commentators considered the deadline too close at hand, but supposed that the President would extend it if Congress showed a real disposition to act.

While praising the vigor of the President's statement, a number of editorial writers were inclined to blame him for buck-passing. The Indianapolis Star argued that "The executive and legislative branches share in the blame for what has developed" and the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette remarked that "The President himself is partly responsible for the delay and temporizing which has marked attempts to control both wage and farm prices."

The specific complaint most frequently directed at the President concerned his failure to take any steps toward the stabilization of wages. Some argued that his promise to effect wage stabilization as soon as Congress acted on farm prices was too vague. They urged that Congress itself legislate respecting wages. The Scripps-Howard newspapers took the lead in this demand. "Congress," these papers reason, "should go further than the President asks it to go.... It should do now the complete job which, heretofore, in misguided deference to the demands of pressure blocs and to Mr. Roosevelt's insistence on keeping labor matters in his own hands, it has failed to do.... This is a time for Congress to be a legislative body and behave like one."

In general, it may be inferred from their comments that editors are relieved that the President chose to give Congress a fresh opportunity to cooperate with him. And, above all, whatever their uneasiness anent the constitutional issue, they are relieved that real measures to counter the danger of inflation now seem assured.

The Battle Fronts

The battle for Egypt and the Suez Canal took precedence in editorial minds this week, even over the defense of Stalingrad. In the repulse of Rommel's army, commentators found occasion for restrained confidence. They now show little fear that the Germans will be able to take Alexandria or push their way on to Suez.

Comment on Stalingrad now chiefly takes the form of praise for the heroism of the Russians. Losses suffered by the Germans in manpower, equipment and time have led news analysts to believe that, in the long run, the fighting in Russia will be on the credit side of the ledger for the United Nations. "The fate of Stalingrad still hangs in the balance," says the New York Times, "but one is moved to say that the fate of the Russian people does not."

While the President's remarks on inflation overshadowed the military report contained in his Labor Day address, commentators found cause for renewed optimism in his assertion that allied strategy has been determined. They praised his realistic assessment of the difficulties which lie ahead, but found hope in his prediction that the Russians will hold out and that an offensive against Germany on the battlefields of Europe will be undertaken.

Diplomacy

A good deal of speculation was engendered by the cabinet shifts in Tokyo and Madrid. The resignation of Japan's foreign minister touched off a sizeable volume of comment on the possibility that the Japanese may soon move into Siberia. It was generally agreed that this was a likely result of the cabinet change. Some analysts found encouragement in the reshuffling of General Franco's cabinet. But the prevailing view was that Spain continues to be bound to the Axis.

The State Department's sharp rejoinder to the Vichy Government's protest against American air raids on France was generally applauded. Virtually all commentators now recognize Laval and his colleagues as Nazi puppets.



POPULAR REACTIONS

Group Leader Attitudes Toward Inflation Control

The President's second anti-inflation message came at a time when the leaders of competing economic groups were ready, and even uneasily eager, for drastic steps to regulate wages and farm prices. Labor, farm and business leaders have displayed a growing sense of urgency based on a recognition that inflation control to date has been inadequate. All of them demand action on the entire anti-inflation front, even though they know that such action must affect their own group interests. None of the group leaders voiced any doubt that inflation can be brought under control by vigorous governmental action.

These views constitute a digest of opinions expressed by more than 800 spokesmen for farm, labor, business and civic groups interviewed, off the

record, during the latter part of August by field representatives of the Bureau of Public Inquiry. The readiness which members of each group expressed for anti-inflation measures was tempered by an insistence that their special interests be protected against any sacrifices not imposed upon rival groups. No doubt the readiness for regulation which the leaders manifested was due, in part, to a desire to voice patriotic sentiments. All of the group leaders naturally continue to jockey for concessions favorable to their own interests.

Agricultural spokesmen were insistent that the imposition of price controls on farm products be accompanied by strict wage regulation. They exhibited a rather bitter feeling that the Administration is "coddling" labor. They were critical of high war industry wages and fearful that farm labor will be drained away to the cities.

Labor leaders expressed strong dissatisfaction over price control, especially in relation to food products, and insisted that wage stabilization be flexible. They recognized that wage controls are inevitable, but insisted that sub-standard wages be raised and that wage adjustments keep pace with the cost of living. They expressed fear that wage control might weaken collective bargaining and undermine the strength of labor unions. All labor spokesmen vigorously opposed a sales tax and urged strict curbs on profits. The increase in Eugene Grace's salary was frequently mentioned as a sore point. The \$25,000 limitation on individual salaries is generally regarded by these men as a symbol of equality of sacrifice.

Business leaders showed less concern about farm prices than about wage stabilization. A majority of them expressed recognition of the need for flexibility in wage control to permit adjustment of sub-standard wages and

other inequalities. Although more and more vocal in demanding a sales tax, they think of it as a revenue, rather than as an anti-inflation, measure.

Group leaders believe that anti-inflation measures should be presented with emphasis on patriotism -- as the contribution to the war effort of the home front battleline. The next most effective appeal, in their minds, is self-preservation -- the danger of inflation to the individual pocket-book. They agree that inflation control will be accepted in a healthy spirit if it is put into effect among all groups simultaneously and equitably.


Satisfaction with Domestic Affairs

The President's Labor Day address was delivered in an atmosphere of considerable popular discontent over the general progress of events on the home front. Sizeable minorities of the American public -- from one-quarter to one-third of the whole population -- felt that factory managers, factory workers and Government officials were not fulfilling their responsibilities in the war effort. More than half of the public believed that the leaders of organized labor were not doing all they could do to help win the war.

Respecting factory executives, workers and labor leaders, the Bureau of Intelligence has asked an identical question on four occasions since last March: "Do you feel that, as a whole, the people in charge of the factories -- the executives -- are doing all they could do right now to help win the war? How about the labor leaders? How about the workers in the factories?" Satisfaction was down in March, up in early June and back down again in July. The Bureau's latest interviewing on this subject, conducted at the end of August, shows little change from the July figures.

"Government officials in Washington" were included in this question for the first time in the most recent poll. About a third of the people questioned expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which these unspecified federal authorities are discharging their responsibilities. The chart below shows the degree of public satisfaction with the several elements of the war effort:

IS EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BEING DONE TO HELP WIN THE WAR




Government Supervision

Popular readiness for tight federal regulation of domestic affairs is indicated by the responses given to another question posed by the Bureau of Intelligence at the end of August: "At the present time, do you think the Government has too much control or not enough control over our way of doing business in this country?" As is shown in the following chart, people were nearly twice as prone to complain that federal control is not rigid enough as they were to charge that it is too rigid. A full third of the whole sample said they believed that the Government has not enough control


over our way of doing business at the present time.

OPINIONS ABOUT PRESENT GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF BUSINESS



It is noteworthy also that the public seems inclined to take it for granted that the Government will exercise increased supervision over the conduct of private business in the future. The Bureau asked: "Right after the war, do you think the Government will have more control or less control over our way of doing business than it has now?" The chart below reveals that more than half of those interviewed anticipate increased Government regulation when the war is ended.

EXPECTATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL





DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

The Irish in Boston

Irish-Americans in the city of Boston constitute a minority group seriously disaffected from the war effort.

Their concentration in a single area, their identification with Irish folkways and national politics, their sense of religious separateness combine to set them apart from the dominant Yankee Protestant culture surrounding them.

Where Irish-Americans have not concentrated into isolated neighborhood groups, no such problem has arisen among them; they have contributed richly to American culture and have been assimilated into it readily. But in Boston, where they are the largest ethnic minority and also the dominant political element, their attitudes revolve around the twin poles of allegiance to Eire and devotion to the Roman Catholic Church. Leadership among them is bound to these two poles. As a consequence, the clergy's influence is social and political, as well as religious.

Since last spring, Boston has become the capital of the Christian Front. Dissolution of the Christian Front did not mean elimination of the Christian Fronters; they continue to act in Irish associations by controlling key positions. The Irish in Boston expressed their isolationism in pre-Pearl Harbor days by strong support of Father Charles Coughlin. They now respond with devotion to the leadership of Father Edward Lodge Curran. On Saint Patrick's Day, the Irish associations chose to celebrate, not only their patron saint, but the evacuation of Boston by the British.

Prominent among the voluntary associations in which the Irish population

of Boston is organized is the semi-secret body called the Clan-na-Gael which faithfully follows the policies laid down by the Irish Republican Army; it has a reputation for the promotion of terrorism and informal violence. Most nationalistic of the Irish organizations is the Knights of Saint Finbarr. The Irish tend to associate also in bodies representing the particular counties of their origin in the homeland. And they are joined in influential national associations, such as the Knights of Columbus and the Ancient Order of Hibernians. The multiplicity of these organizations and their interlocking in different fields creates a variety of national issues out of specific local issues. Irish grievances are translated into political campaigns.

The whole development of American foreign policy has been interpreted by the Boston Irish as inimical to their group and religious interests. Lend-lease, the Atlantic Charter and even American participation in the war have been construed as anti-Irish measures. These measures supported the prime enemies of Irish nationalism and Roman Catholicism — Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The concentration of American troops in northern Ireland has, of course, fanned the flames of Irish resentment and has been widely interpreted in Boston as endorsement of the British policy of partition.

The influence of the church has been devoted, in addition to promoting a hatred of Communism, to an emphasis on pacifism. International affairs are seen in religious terms — specifically as a part of the conflict between Roman Catholics and Protestants in which the Boston Irish feel they are engaged. The failure of the Vatican to speak forcefully against Nazism has encouraged a belief that the anti-Catholic policy of the Hitler regime

has been grossly exaggerated. The rest of the Nazi record fails to impress the Irish, who tend to approve of Hitler's persecution of the Jews and of his war against Britain. Finally, appeals for peace which have been made by the Vatican have led the Irish Catholics to view the war in moral terms, to denounce it as evil, regardless of the issues involved, and to celebrate masses for peace.

There is a pronounced tendency among the Irish in Boston to see the war in terms of narrow, sectional problems. The New England fuel problem is much more discussed than the problem of a second front in Europe. Political leaders do not ask for victories — they ask for gasoline. Clerical leaders discuss the war in terms of its effects on the morals of young women. This distortion of war issues into petty local issues is so constant as to hamper and forbid an understanding of what is genuinely at stake.

One other grievance adds to the resentment of the Irish population. The development of a foreign policy with which they are out of sympathy has been accompanied by an estrangement between the Administration and certain prominent Irish political leaders. The Irish tend to regard men like Jim Farley and Joe Kennedy as symbols of Irish influence and are incensed over their elimination from national affairs.

Despite the extremity of disaffection in Boston, there are elements of the Irish population there, both among the clergy and the laity, which are sincerely concerned with the situation and which can be utilized to remedy it. But the activities of these elements are diffused. They require coordination and encouragement from outside pro-democratic forces.

The attitude of the Boston Irish stems unmistakably from ignorance

and from twisted information. Much of what these people believe about the war is derived from rumors consciously spread by divisionist elements. Their influence can be replaced by an informational program directed specifically toward the Irish population. A radio program may have important beneficial results. Because the Irish are not a foreign language group, they are overlooked in the OWI foreign language programs and no English-language radio program is dedicated to them except under commercial sponsorship. Other informational efforts are, of course, needed as well. Possibly a house-to-house campaign to challenge the misapprehensions based on rumors could be effective in promoting a better understanding of the war's real meaning.


The conversion to support of Administration foreign policy recently expressed by the Very Reverend Robert I. Gannon, President of Fordham University, suggests the possibility that liberal elements of the clergy in Boston might be persuaded to foster a clearer understanding among the Irish of the war's true implications.

Strike Wave in the News

The President's recent suggestion that news of wildcat strikes was being overplayed is borne out in a study conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence. Although the total number of man-days lost in strikes, according to War Labor Board figures, was, on the whole, below average during the last two months, the amount of strike news sampled in a group of Eastern newspapers was well above average. In addition, editorial discussion of strikes, together with attacks on WLB wage policies, mounted in both frequency and fervor even prior to the rise in news reports of strike activities.

Anti-labor news and comment in the media of information have been stimulated by the National Association of Manufacturers. In a news release of August 25, this organization charged that there were 222 strikes in defense plants during July, as compared with 192 in June and 27 in January. It argued from these figures that labor is flagrantly violating its "no strike" pledge. "In steadily climbing percentages," said the NAM, "strikes in war industries have now reached a point where they are 722 per cent higher than in January."

These figures fail to take into account the fact that, between January and July, the number of man-days worked more than doubled. The time lost by strikes, in relation to man-hours worked, has risen only five one-hundredths of one per cent since January and only one one-hundredth of one per cent since February. The chart below indicates the relationship between the number of man-days lost by strikes during July and August and the volume of news space devoted to strikes during the same period as compared with averages for June and July. National unity can be advanced by informational measures designed to clear up the confusion on the strike issue.



* 100 = weekly average man days lost by strikes June & July (38,870)
 100 = weekly average number of column inches of strikes news June & July (276)



ENEMY PROPAGANDA

The Axis Answers President Roosevelt

Axis propaganda is attempting to counteract the effects of President Roosevelt's recent speeches. To answer the speech addressed to the youth of the world, Baldur von Schirach, Nazi youth leader, asserted that the President had no right to speak to youth since American youth are allegedly hungry, illiterate, unemployed and immoral. Von Schirach announced a meeting of European youth representatives for September 14-15 in Vienna to demonstrate the alleged community of interest between the youth of the world and the "young nations" of the "New Order."

The President's Labor Day speech is characterized by Axis broadcasters to North America as a tyrant's demand for further dictatorial powers. Roosevelt is depriving the American people of their liberties and reducing their government to a "puppet government." Congress is pictured as resentful of the "ultimatum," and the American people are urged to guard Congress' prerogatives zealously.

The President's speech is interpreted as meaning that the United States, "the richest country in the world," is on the verge of an economic chaos that portends defeat. Axis broadcasters contend that Roosevelt is responsible for this "catastrophic situation," but is making Congress his scapegoat.

"Roosevelt made no bones last night about his intention to spill American blood on foreign soil," says Kaltenbach. Germany will "slaughter... America's best" cheerfully, he promises. The President's assurance of a second front was only deemed worthy of a "horse laugh" in a Rome broadcast.

Three Years of War

Axis broadcasters celebrate the third anniversary of the war by proclaiming the all-round excellence of the Axis position. They retail the victories which they claim assure the Axis economic self-sufficiency through control of the European continent and the southwest Pacific. Reiterating the justice of its cause, the Axis claims that the war was forced upon it by Democracy's warmongers: Churchill, Eden, the Jews, the international bankers, and, above all, Roosevelt. Although they leave no doubt that they expect to win the war eventually, Axis broadcasters are chary of predictions concerning the fourth year of the war.

The German press tempers the above themes with the opinion that the war will be long and hard, demanding many sacrifices on the home and fighting fronts. Victory was expected after the French campaign, according to the Frankfurter Zeitung, but the war with Russia started and has lasted longer than anticipated. A Swiss paper commenting on the anniversary remarks that the extreme character of German war-aims completely excludes any possibility of a negotiated peace.

Enemy Propaganda Policy

In a home broadcast the Nazis reveal their faith in radio as a propaganda weapon. Goebbels describes radio as "one of the most powerful means of guiding nations in modern times." Dr. Herbert Schroeder reports that Germany has 56 transmitters broadcasting to Europe in 29 languages. In 100 news bulletins a day the Nazis "treat the most important events of the day or spread the German view on them."

In a Western Hemisphere broadcast the Nazis review three years of

work by the "propaganda companies" which prepare "Front Reports" to "make known the nobility and fortitude of the German fighters at the front." Radio Lyons reports to France, "The Japanese radio is increasing the number of its broadcasts abroad and in particular for America, in order to keep Americans informed about the real developments that are taking place in East Asia, and especially about the military situation." Vichy says that Laval "submitted themes and precise instructions" to Delegates for Propaganda in Occupied France, to enable the delegates "to develop and back the action of the government."

Wedge-driving

The Nazis use Churchill's recent speech to the House of Commons to stress the conflict of interests among the United Nations. "Churchill confirmed...that the Soviets neither trust the English nor the Americans and that he...flew to Moscow actually to dispel the Kremlin's doubts about English and American willingness to help."

Axis propagandists exploit the hanging of Thomas Williams, presumed member of the Irish Republican Army, to cast England in the role of the persecutor of Ireland. American troops stationed in Ireland are portrayed as the objects of an Irish plot to attack them as well as the British. If necessary, claims the Axis, these American troops will be used to quell Irish rebellion.



AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENTS

The trend toward a more energetic tone noted in the last three of these reports, was brought to fruition by the

Message to Congress and the President's address on Labor Day. The keynote was on the inflation problem, but the assertion of readiness to act carried implications for all war problems, not just a single one.

Mr. Henderson followed up with a speech in New York in which he took the main issue as settled and declared "We now begin a new offensive..."

The Treasury moved as a member of the team, proposing a new and stiff "spending tax" to the Senate Finance Committee, and supporting it in a detailed speech by Mr. Paul in New York.

The fog of war was lifted for an instant when Assistant Secretary McCloy dropped a concrete fact, there are now "over half a million men" outside the United States. His statement lends sobriety to an estimate recently made by Rear Admiral Percy Foote that half of the 10,000,000 fighting men whom the U. S. must provide in this war will be casualties.