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
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ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) [Folder 1] [3]

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Updated: 27-Oct-2000

Ministerial Communiqués

Press
Communiqué
S-1(91)86

Rome Declaration

on Peace and Cooperation

Issued
by the
Heads of
State and
Government
participating
in the
meeting
of the
North
Atlantic
Council
in Rome
8th Nov. 1991

Synopsis

New chapter in NATO history - Community of shared values between North America and the whole of Europe - Continuing role of the Alliance as agent of change, source of stability and guarantor of security - New security architecture - Framework of interlocking institutions in Europe and North America - Complementary roles of NATO, CSCE, EC, WEU and Council of Europe - Regional cooperation - Prevention of instability and divisions - Future role of the Alliance - New Strategic Concept - Dialogue, cooperation, collective defence - Military dimension of the Alliance - Broad concept of security - Collective arrangements for defence based on the integrated military structure, cooperation and coordination agreements, and appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces - Changes to conventional forces - NPG decisions at Taormina on 80% reduction in sub- strategic nuclear stockpiles in Europe - Political purpose of nuclear weapons - Consensus on positive effects of European security and defence role - parallel enhancement of transatlantic link - Strategic unity and indivisibility of security - Fundamental Alliance roles - Links and consultation procedures between EC, WEU and NATO eg. on peace efforts in Yugoslavia - Role of new Strategic Concept in facilitating complementarity - Preservation of operational coherence - Reinforcement of role of WEU - Strong new transatlantic partnership - Relations with Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe: qualitative step forward - Encouragement of democratic process - Political and economic reform - Practical assistance - Independence of Baltic States - Intensification and qualitative enhancement of the relationship with Central and Eastern Europe - Development of institutional basis for consultation and cooperation - Invitation to participate in joint meetings - Joint political declaration - Proposals for future cooperation - Commitment to strengthening the CSCE process - 1992 Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting - Consolidation and development of new CSCE instruments including CSCE Council, Committee of Senior Officials, Conflict Prevention Centre, Office of Democratic Institutions and Capabilities for protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law - Arms control - September 27 Bush initiative and Gorbachev response - Achievement of SNF arms control objectives - Early ratification of START agreement - Achievements in conventional arms control and disarmament - Paramount importance of CFE ratification and implementation - Objectives for CFE IA, CSBM and Open Skies negotiations - Arms control and disarmament goals for Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting - Dangers from weapons proliferation - UN Register for Conventional Arms Transfers - 1992 objective for Global ban on chemical weapons - Verification of biological/ toxin weapons - Global context of Alliance security - Addressing broader challenges through consultations and cooperation with other states - NATO founded for defence of territory and safeguarding and promotion of shared values - Opportunities for extensive Alliance contribution to new age of confidence, stability and peace.

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Rome to open a new chapter in the history of our Alliance. The far- reaching decisions we have taken here mark an important stage in the transformation of NATO that we launched in London last year.
2. The world has changed dramatically. The Alliance has made an essential contribution. The peoples of North America and the whole of Europe can now join in a community of shared values based on freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

As an agent of change, a source of stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members' security, our Alliance will continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe: a Europe of cooperation and prosperity.

A New Security Architecture

3. The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. Consequently, we are working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other. Regional frameworks of cooperation will also be important. This interaction will be of the greatest significance in preventing instability and divisions that could result from various causes, such as economic disparities and violent nationalism.

The Future Role Of The Alliance: Our New Strategic Concept

4. Yesterday, we published our new Strategic Concept. Our security has substantially improved: we no longer face the old threat of a massive attack. However, prudence requires us to maintain an overall strategic balance and to remain ready to meet any potential risks to our security which may arise from instability or tension. In an environment of uncertainty and unpredictable challenges, our Alliance, which provides the essential transatlantic link as demonstrated by the significant presence of North American forces in Europe, retains its enduring value. Our new strategic concept reaffirms NATO's core functions and allows us, within the radically changed situation in Europe, to realise in full our broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects, along with the indispensable defence dimension. Never has the opportunity to achieve our Alliance's objectives by political means, in keeping with Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty, been greater. Consequently, our security policy can now be based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue; cooperation; and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. The use, as appropriate, of these elements will be particularly important to prevent or manage crises affecting our security.
5. The military dimension of our Alliance remains an essential factor; but what is new is that, more than ever, it will serve a broad concept of security. The Alliance will maintain its purely defensive purpose, its collective arrangements based on an integrated military structure as well as cooperation and coordination agreements, and for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces. Our military forces will adjust to their new tasks, becoming smaller and more flexible. Thus, our conventional forces will be substantially reduced as will, in many cases, their readiness. They will also be given increased mobility to enable them to react to a wide range

of contingencies, and will be organised for flexible build-up, when necessary, for crisis management as well as defence. Multinational formations will play a greater role within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces committed to NATO will be greatly reduced: the current NATO stockpile of sub-strategic weapons in Europe will be cut by roughly 80% in accordance with the decisions taken by the Nuclear Planning Group in Taormina. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies remains political: to preserve peace, and prevent war or any kind of coercion.

European Security Identity And Defence Role

6. We reaffirm the consensus expressed by our Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen. The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. The enhancement of the role and responsibility of the European members is an important basis for the transformation of the Alliance. These two positive processes are mutually reinforcing. We are agreed, in parallel with the emergence and development of a European security identity and defence role, to enhance the essential transatlantic link that the Alliance guarantees and fully to maintain the strategic unity and indivisibility of security of all our members. The Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty. Recognising that it is for the European Allies concerned to decide what arrangements are needed for the expression of a common European foreign and security policy and defence role, we further agree that, as the two processes advance, we will develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance.
7. We welcome the spirit in which those Allies who are also members of the Twelve and the WEU have kept the other members of the Alliance informed about the progress of their ongoing discussions on the development of the European identity and about other issues, such as their peace efforts in Yugoslavia. Appropriate links and consultation procedures between the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance will be developed in order to ensure that the Allies that are not currently participating in the development of a European identity in foreign and security policy and defence should be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security. The Alliance's new Strategic Concept, being an agreed conceptual basis for the forces of all Allies, should facilitate the necessary complementarity between the Alliance and the emerging defence component of the European integration process. As the transformation of the Alliance proceeds, we intend to preserve the operational coherence we now have and on which our defence depends. We welcome the perspective of a reinforcement of the role of the WEU, both as the defence component of the process of European unification and as a means

of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, bearing in mind the different nature of its relations with the Alliance and with the European Political Union.

8. We note the gradual convergence of views in the discussions concerning the developing European security identity and defence role compatible with the common defence policy we already have in our Alliance. We feel confident that in line with the consensus in Copenhagen, the result will contribute to a strong new transatlantic partnership by strengthening the European component in a transformed Alliance. We will help move this development forward.

Relations With The Soviet Union And The Other Countries Of Central And Eastern Europe: A Qualitative Step Forward

9. We have consistently encouraged the development of democracy in the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We therefore applaud the commitment of these countries to political and economic reform following the rejection of totalitarian communist rule by their peoples. We salute the newly recovered independence of the Baltic States. We will support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards reform and will give practical assistance to help them succeed in this difficult transition. This is based on our conviction that our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe.
10. The Alliance can aid in fostering a sense of security and confidence in these countries, thereby strengthening their ability to fulfil their CSCE commitments and make democratic change irrevocable. Wishing to enhance its contribution to the emergence of a Europe whole and free, our Alliance at its London Summit extended to the Central and Eastern European countries the hand of friendship and established regular diplomatic liaison. Together we signed the Paris Joint Declaration. In Copenhagen last June, the Alliance took further initiatives to develop partnership with these countries. Our extensive programme of high level visits, exchanges of views on security and other related issues, intensified military contacts, and exchanges of expertise in various fields has demonstrated its value and contributed greatly to building a new relationship between NATO and these countries. This is a dynamic process: the growth of democratic institutions throughout Central and Eastern Europe and encouraging cooperative experiences, as well as the desire of these countries for closer ties, now call for our relations to be broadened, intensified and raised to a qualitatively new level.
11. Therefore, as the next step, we intend to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues. We invite, at this stage of the process, the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Romania, and the Soviet Union to join our Foreign Ministers in December 1991

in Brussels to issue a joint political declaration to launch this new era of partnership and to define further the modalities and content of this process. In particular, we propose the following activities:

- annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level in what might be called a North Atlantic Cooperation Council;
- periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ambassadorial level;
- additional meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial or Ambassadorial level as circumstances warrant;
- regular meetings, at intervals to be mutually agreed, with:
- NATO subordinate committees, including the Political and Economic Committees;
- the Military Committee and under its direction other NATO Military Authorities.

This process will contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the CSCE without prejudice to its competence and mechanisms. It will be carried out in accordance with the core functions of the Alliance.

12. Our consultations and cooperation will focus on security and related issues where Allies can offer their experience and expertise, such as defence planning, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil/military coordination of air traffic management, and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes. Our new initiative will enhance participation of our partners in the "*Third Dimension*" of scientific and environmental programmes of our Alliance. It will also allow the widest possible dissemination of information about NATO in the Central and Eastern European countries, inter alia through diplomatic liaison channels and our embassies. We will provide the appropriate resources to support our liaison activities.

The Conference On Security And Cooperation In Europe

13. We remain deeply committed to strengthening the CSCE process, which has a vital role to play in promoting stability and democracy in Europe in a period of historic change. We will intensify our efforts to enhance the CSCE's role, in the first instance by working with the other participating CSCE states to ensure that the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting in 1992 will be another major step towards building a new Europe. The CSCE has the outstanding advantage of being the only forum that brings together all countries of Europe and Canada and the United States under a common code of human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law, security, and economic liberty. The new CSCE institutions and structures, which we proposed at our

London Summit and which were created at the Paris Summit, must be consolidated and further developed so as to provide CSCE with the means to help ensure full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and other relevant CSCE documents and thus permit the CSCE to meet the new challenges which Europe will have to face. Our consultations within the Alliance continue to be a source of initiatives for strengthening the CSCE.

14. Consequently, we will actively support the development of the CSCE to enhance its capacity as the organ for consultation and cooperation among all participating States, capable of effective action in line with its new and increased responsibilities, in particular on the questions of human rights and security including arms control and disarmament, and for effective crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes, consistent with international law and CSCE principles. To this end, we suggest:
 - o that the CSCE Council, the central forum for political consultations, continue to take decisions on questions relating to the CSCE and the functions and structures of the CSCE institutions;
 - o that the Committee of Senior Officials serve as the coordination and management body between Council sessions and that it acquire a greater operational capacity and meet more frequently, with a view to ensuring the implementation of decisions;
 - o that the CSCE's conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities be improved: as one contribution, in addition to the functions entrusted to it by the Paris Charter, the means available to the Conflict Prevention Centre should be strengthened and made more flexible to enable it to fulfil the specific tasks assigned to it by the CSCE Council and the Committee of Senior Officials;
 - o that specific tasks based on a precise mandate by the CSCE Council or the Committee of Senior Officials might be entrusted to ad hoc groups;
 - o that the decisions taken at the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting ensure complementarity among CSCE activities in the security field including, inter alia, conflict prevention, arms control and consultations on security;
 - o that consideration should be given within the CSCE to develop further the CSCE's capability to safeguard, through peaceful means, human rights, democracy and the rule of law in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments, if necessary in the absence of the consent of the state concerned;
 - o that the Office for Free Elections be transformed into a broadly focused Office of Democratic Institutions to

promote cooperation in the fields of human rights, democracy and the rule of law;

- that the monitoring and promotion of progress on human dimension issues be continued in the form of periodic meetings of short duration on clearly defined issues;
- that further political impetus be given to economic, scientific and environmental cooperation so as to promote the basis of prosperity for stable, democratic development.

Arms Control

15. We strongly support President Bush's initiative of 27th September 1991 which has opened new prospects for nuclear arms reduction. We also welcome President Gorbachev's response. We particularly applaud the decision of both sides to eliminate their nuclear warheads for ground-launched short-range weapons systems. The Allies concerned, through their consultations, have played a central role in President Bush's decision which fulfilled the SNF arms control objectives of the London Declaration. They will continue close consultations on the process of the elimination of ground-based SNF warheads until its completion. We will continue to work for security at minimum levels of nuclear arms sufficient to preserve peace and stability. We look forward to the early ratification of the recently signed START agreement.
16. We note with satisfaction the recent achievements in the fields of conventional arms control and disarmament. We reiterate the paramount importance we attach to the CFE Treaty and call upon all CFE signatories to move forward promptly with its ratification and implementation. We urge our negotiating partners to work with us to reach substantial agreements in the CFE IA and CSBM negotiations, and remain dedicated to achieving concrete results by the time of the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting. We welcome the resumption of the Open Skies negotiations; we look forward to agreement on an Open Skies regime by the time of the Helsinki Meeting as an important new element in greater openness and confidence-building in the military field.
17. The Helsinki Meeting will mark a turning point in the arms control and disarmament process in Europe, now with the participation of all CSCE states. This will offer a unique opportunity to move this process energetically forward. Our goal will be to shape a new cooperative order, in which no country needs to harbour fears for its security, by:
 - strengthening security and stability at lower levels of armed forces to the extent possible and commensurate with individual legitimate security needs both inside and outside of Europe;
 - conducting an intensified security dialogue within a permanent framework and fostering a new quality of

transparency and cooperation about armed forces and defence policies; and

- o promoting effective mechanisms and instruments for conflict prevention.

18. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery undermines international security. Transfers of conventional armaments beyond legitimate defensive needs to regions of tension make the peaceful settlement of disputes less likely. We support the establishment by the United Nations of a universal non-discriminatory register of conventional arms transfers. We support steps undertaken to address other aspects of proliferation and other initiatives designed to build confidence and underpin international security.

We also deem it essential to complete a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons next year. We welcome the positive results of the Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in particular the decision to explore the feasibility of verification.

Broader Challenges

19. Our Strategic Concept underlines that Alliance security must take account of the global context. It points out risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage, which can affect Alliance security interests. We reaffirm the importance of arrangements existing in the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of our efforts including our responses to such risks. We will continue to address broader challenges in our consultations and in the appropriate multilateral forums in the widest possible cooperation with other states.

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20. The North Atlantic Alliance was founded with two purposes: the defence of the territory of its members, and the safeguarding and promotion of the values they share. In a still uncertain world, the need for defence remains. But in a world where the values which we uphold are shared ever more widely, we gladly seize the opportunity to adapt our defences accordingly; to cooperate and consult with our new partners; to help consolidate a now undivided continent of Europe; and to make our Alliance's contribution to a new age of confidence, stability and peace.

21. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of the Italian Republic.
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EU MILITARY STRUCTURES

HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL

ANNEX IV OF THE PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL 10 AND 11 DECEMBER 1999

Presidency reports to the Helsinki European Council on "strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence" and on "non-military crisis management of the European Union"

The Presidency has responded as a matter of priority to the mandate given by the Cologne European Council to strengthen the common European policy on security and defence by taking the work forward in military and non-military aspects of crisis management. The work has been based on the provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the guiding principles agreed at Cologne, which have been reaffirmed by the Member States.

Work has yielded *two separate progress reports* to the European Council, which are intended to be complementary. The reports propose concrete measures and provide guidance for further work to take the necessary decisions by the end of the year 2000 towards the objectives set at Cologne. During the Portuguese Presidency, consideration will be given as to whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary.

To assume their responsibilities across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the EU Treaty, the Petersberg tasks, the Member States have decided to develop more effective military capabilities and establish new political and military structures for these tasks. In this connection, the objective is for the Union to have an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.

Also in order to assume these responsibilities, the Union will improve and make more effective use of resources in civilian crisis management in which the Union and the Member States already have considerable experience. Special attention will be given to a rapid reaction capability.

All these measures will be taken in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and they will reinforce and extend the Union's comprehensive external role. With the enhancement and concertation of military and civilian crisis response tools, the Union will be able to resort to the whole range of instruments from diplomatic activity, humanitarian assistance and economic measures to civilian policing and military crisis management operations.

NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members, and will continue to have an important role in crisis management.

The development of the common European policy on security and defence will take place without prejudice to the commitments under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Brussels Treaty, which will be preserved for the Member States party to these Treaties. Nor shall the development of the common European policy on security and defence prejudice the specific

character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

Further steps will be taken to ensure full mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO.

The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Following up the principles and objectives of the OSCE Charter for European Security, the Union will cooperate with the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other international organisations in a mutually reinforcing manner in stability promotion, early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction.

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ANNEX 1 to ANNEX IV

PRESIDENCY PROGRESS REPORT TO THE HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL

ON STRENGTHENING THE COMMON EUROPEAN POLICY

ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE

Introduction

Recalling the guiding principles agreed at Cologne, the European Union should be able to assume its responsibilities for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the EU Treaty, the Petersberg tasks.

The European Union should have the autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The action by the Union will be conducted in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the principles and objectives of the OSCE Charter for European Security. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

For this purpose, the following has been agreed:

A common European headline goal will be adopted for readily deployable military capabilities and collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport will be developed rapidly, to be achieved through voluntary co-ordinated national and multinational efforts, for carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks.

New political and military bodies will be established within the Council to enable the Union to take decisions on EU-led Petersberg operations and to ensure, under the authority of the Council, the necessary political control and strategic direction of such operations.

Principles for cooperation with non-EU European NATO members and other European partners in EU-led military crisis management will be agreed, without prejudice to the Union's decision-making autonomy.

Determination to carry out Petersberg tasks will require Member States to improve national and multinational military capabilities, which will at the same time, as appropriate, strengthen the capabilities of NATO and enhance the effectiveness of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in promoting European security.

In presenting this report, the Presidency has taken note of the fact that Denmark has recalled Protocol no 5 to the Amsterdam Treaty on the position of Denmark.

Military capabilities for Petersberg tasks

Member States recall their commitment made at Cologne and their determination to give the EU appropriate capabilities, without unnecessary duplication, to be able to undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks in support of the CFSP. Such capabilities will enable them to conduct effective EU-led operations as well as playing, for those involved, their full role in NATO and NATO-led operations. More effective European military capabilities will be developed on the basis of the existing national, bi-national and multinational capabilities, which will be assembled for EU-led crisis management operations carried out with or without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. Particular attention will be devoted to the capabilities necessary to ensure effective performance in crisis management: deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility, mobility, survivability and command and control, taking account of the results of the WEU audit of assets and capabilities and their implications for EU-led operations.

To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline goal: by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces.

Member States have also decided to develop rapidly collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, areas also identified by the WEU audit. They welcome in this respect decisions already announced by certain Member States which go in that direction:

- to develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military means;
- to open existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from other Member States;
- to reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces;
- to prepare the establishment of a European air transport command;
- to increase the number of readily deployable troops;
- to enhance strategic sea lift capacity.

The General Affairs Council, with the participation of Defence Ministers, will elaborate the

headline and capability goals. It will develop a method of consultation through which these goals can be met and maintained, and through which national contributions reflecting Member States' political will and commitment towards these goals can be defined by each Member State, with a regular review of progress made. In addition, Member States would use existing defence planning procedures, including, as appropriate, those available in NATO and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of the PfP. These objectives and those arising, for those countries concerned, from NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) will be mutually reinforcing.

The European NATO members who are not EU Member States, and other countries who are candidates for accession to the European Union will be invited to contribute to this improvement of European military capabilities. This will enhance the effectiveness of EU-led military operations and will, for those countries concerned, contribute directly to the effectiveness and vitality of the European pillar of the NATO.

Member States welcome the recent progress made towards the restructuring of European defence industries, which constitutes an important step forward. This contributes to strengthening the European industrial and technological defence base. Such developments call for increased efforts to seek further progress in the harmonisation of military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms, as Member States consider appropriate.

Decision-making

The Council decides upon policy relevant to Union involvement in all phases and aspects of crisis management, including decisions to carry out Petersberg tasks in accordance with Article 23 of the EU Treaty. Taken within the single institutional framework, decisions will respect European Community competences and ensure inter-pillar coherence in conformity with Article 3 of the EU Treaty.

All Member States are entitled to participate fully and on an equal footing in all decisions and deliberations of the Council and Council bodies on EU-led operations. The commitment of national assets by Member States to such operations will be based on their sovereign decision. Member States will participate in the ad hoc committee of contributors in accordance with the conditions provided for by paragraph 24.

Defence Ministers will be involved in the common European security and defence policy (CESDP); when the General Affairs Council discusses matters related to the CESDP, Defence Ministers as appropriate will participate to provide guidance on defence matters.

The following new *permanent* political and military bodies will be established within the Council:

- a) - A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels will be composed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level. The PSC will deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP, in accordance with the provisions of the EU Treaty and without prejudice to Community competence. In the case of a military crisis management operation, the PSC will exercise, under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the operation. For that purpose, appropriate procedures will be adopted in order to allow effective and urgent decision taking. The PSC will also forward guidelines to the Military Committee.
- b) - The Military Committee (MC) will be composed of the Chiefs of Defence, represented by their military delegates. The MC will meet at the level of the Chiefs of Defence as and when necessary. This committee will give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC, as well as provide military direction to the Military Staff. The Chairman of the MC will attend meetings of the Council when decisions with defence implications are to be taken.
- c) - The Military Staff (MS) within the Council structures will provide military expertise and

support to the CESDP, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations. The Military Staff will perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces.

As an *interim* measure, the following bodies will be set up within the Council as of March 2000:

- a) - Fully respecting the Treaty provisions, the Council will establish a standing interim political and security committee at senior/ambassadorial level tasked to take forward under the guidance of the Political Committee the follow up of the Helsinki European Council by preparing recommendations on the future functioning of the CESDP and to deal with CFSP affairs on a day-to-day basis in close contacts with the SG/HR.
- b) - An interim body of military representatives of Member States' Chiefs of Defence is established to give military advice as required to the interim political and security committee.
- c) - The Council Secretariat will be strengthened by military experts seconded from Member States in order to assist in the work on the CESDP and to form the nucleus of the future Military Staff.

The Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR), in assisting the Council, has a key contribution to make to the efficiency and consistency of the CFSP and the development of the common security and defence policy. In conformity with the EU Treaty, the SG/HR will contribute to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions.

In the interim period, the SG/HR, Secretary General of the WEU, should make full use of WEU assets for the purpose of advising the Council under Article 17 of the EU Treaty.

Consultation and cooperation with non-EU countries and with NATO

The Union will ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with NATO and its non-EU members, other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU as well as other prospective partners in EU-led crisis management, with full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and the single institutional framework of the Union.

With European NATO members who are not members of the EU and other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU, appropriate structures will be established for dialogue and information on issues related to security and defence policy and crisis management. In the event of a crisis, these structures will serve for consultation in the period leading up to a decision of the Council.

Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets.

Other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU may also be invited by the Council to take part in EU-led operations once the Council has decided to launch such an operation.

Russia, Ukraine and other European States engaged in political dialogue with the Union and other interested States may be invited to take part in the EU-led operations.

All the States that have confirmed their participation in an EU-led operation by deploying significant military forces will have the same rights and obligations as the EU participating Member States in the day-to-day conduct of such an operation.

In the case of an EU-led operation, an ad-hoc committee of contributors will be set up for the day-to-day conduct of the operation. All EU Member States are entitled to attend the ad-hoc committee, whether or not they are participating in the operation, while only contributing States will take part in the day-to-day conduct of the operation.

The decision to end an operation will be taken by the Council after consultation between the participating states within the committee of contributors.

Modalities for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO will be developed. Initially, relations will be developed on an informal basis, through contacts between the SG/HR for CFSP and the Secretary General of NATO.

Follow-up for the Portuguese Presidency

The Portuguese Presidency is invited, together with the Secretary General/High Representative, to carry forward the work within the General Affairs Council on strengthening the common European security and defence policy. The Portuguese Presidency is also invited to report to the European Council in Feira on the progress made, including:

- a) - recommendations on the institutional development of the new permanent political and military bodies related to the CESDP within the EU, taking into account the paper on "Military bodies in the European Union and the planning and conduct of EU-led operations" and other contributions made;
- b) - proposals on appropriate arrangements to be concluded by the Council on modalities of consultation and/or participation that will allow the third States concerned to contribute to EU military crisis management;
- c) - proposals on principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and recommendations on developing modalities for EU/NATO relations, to permit co-operation on the appropriate military response to a crisis, as set out in Washington and at Cologne;
- d) -an indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary.

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ANNEX 2 to ANNEX IV

Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union

The Presidency was mandated by the European Council in Cologne to continue the work on all aspects of security including the enhancement and better coordination of the Union's and the Member States' non-military crisis response tools. Developments inter alia in Kosovo have for their part underlined the importance of this task. To this end, a thorough discussion has been carried out within the Council instances.

Work listing all available resources of the Member States and the Union has been initiated and has led to inventories of the tools available to the Union and to Member States, which are

contained respectively in doc. 11044/99 REV 1 for the Union and in doc. 12323/99 for the Member States.

The inventories which have been drawn up clearly show that Member States, the Union, or both have accumulated considerable experience or have considerable resources in a number of areas such as civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal rehabilitation, search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring, etc. This inventory should be pursued further. Regular updating will be necessary to better identify lacunae as well as strongpoints.

In order to be able to respond more rapidly and more effectively to emerging crisis situations, the Union needs to strengthen the responsiveness and efficiency of its resources and tools, as well as their synergy.

It is therefore appropriate to draw up an Action Plan which would show the way ahead and indicate the steps the Union has to undertake to develop a rapid reaction capability in the field of crisis management using non-military instruments.

ACTION PLAN

A. The Union should aim at:

- strengthening the synergy and responsiveness of national, collective and NGO resources in order to avoid duplication and improve performance, while maintaining the flexibility of each contributor to decide on the deployment of assets and capabilities in a particular crisis, or via a particular channel;
- enhancing and facilitating the EU's contributions to, and activities within, other organisations, such as the UN and the OSCE whenever one of them is the lead organisation in a particular crisis, as well as EU autonomous actions;
- ensuring inter-pillar coherence.

B. To that end:

Member States and the Union should develop a rapid reaction capability by defining a framework and modalities, as well as by pre-identifying personnel, material and financial resources that could be used in response to a request of a lead agency like the UN or the OSCE, or, where appropriate, in autonomous EU actions.

An inventory of national and collective resources should be pursued to give an overview of resources that could be marshalled within such a rapid reaction framework. In this process Member States and the EU institutions could, if they wish, highlight sectors in which they find that they have acknowledged expertise.

A database should be set up to maintain and share information on the pre-identified assets, capabilities and expertise within all areas relevant to non-military crisis management. The availability and quality of these assets would need to be clearly defined.

A study should be carried out, taking into account lessons learned, to define concrete targets for EU Member States' collective non-military response to international crises (e.g. the ability to deploy at short notice and sustain for a defined period a set number of civilian police as a contribution to civpol missions; to deploy a combined search and rescue capability of up to 200 people within twenty-four hours). This work should be taken forward by the Portuguese Presidency together with the SG/HR.

The inventory, the database project and the study should help identify areas of relative strength and weakness and could promote improved training standards, sharing of experience and best practice, as well as bilateral or multilateral projects between Member States (e.g. 'pairing' one Member State's helicopter lift with a specialist medical team from another).

A coordinating mechanism, fully interacting with the Commission services, should be set up at the Council Secretariat. It would run the database project and the different capabilities initiatives. In particular crises, depending on the EU's role, it may set up an ad hoc centre to coordinate the effectiveness of EU Member States' contributions. This should be a lean, efficient, non-bureaucratic structure permitting close interaction with the Commission (ECHO in particular).

In establishing a rapid reaction capability urgent consideration will be given to developing civil police capabilities.

Rapid financing mechanisms such as the creation by the Commission of a Rapid Reaction Fund should be set up to allow the acceleration of the provision of finance to support EU activities, to contribute to operations run by other international organisations and to fund NGO activities, as appropriate.

DECISION-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION

The Union should develop a comprehensive approach with a view to marshalling national and collective non-military instruments within the time limits called for by the situation on the ground.

For the coordination of civilian crisis management tools, the co-ordinating mechanism for a civilian crisis management will be established. This mechanism, which will be of inter-pillar nature, will provide expert advice in support of the management of crises. Decision-making and implementation of non-military crisis management tools under the first pillar will remain subject to institutions and procedures of the EC Treaty.

As an interim practice, this work to develop the co-ordinating mechanism for civilian crisis management may draw on experts from the Member States.

If appropriate, the Union will lay down general guidelines ensuring inter-pillar coherence and setting out the means which should be made available. Arrangements for rapid financing mechanisms for a prompt response to crisis situations could be devised in this context.

 EU MILITARY STRUCTURES**PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS****NICE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING****7, 8 AND 9 DECEMBER 2000****IV. COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY**

13. The European Council approves the Presidency report, plus annexes, on the European security and defence policy

14. The European Council calls on the next Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, to take forward work within the General Affairs Council, in accordance with the tasks assigned in the Presidency report. The objective is that the European Union should quickly be made operational in this area. A decision to that end will be taken by the European Council as soon as possible in 2001 and no later than at its meeting in Laeken. The incoming Swedish Presidency is requested to report to the European Council in Göteborg on all of these matters.

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■ EU MILITARY STRUCTURES

THE EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STRUCTURES

Building on the guidelines established at the Cologne European Council and on the basis of the Presidency's reports, the European Council in Helsinki set the following targets:

- cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of ensuring humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace making (the so called Petersberg tasks), in accordance with article 17 of the treaty on E.U.;
- new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework.

The following new *permanent* political and military bodies, as approved at the Nice European Council, are therefore established within the Council:

- a) The standing Political and Security Committee (PSC)
- b) The Military Committee (MC)
- c) The Military Staff (MS)

To develop European capabilities, Member States set themselves the Headline Goal. The work conducted since the Feira European Council has enabled the European Union to define the variety of measures needed successfully to carry out the full range of the tasks defined in art.17 of TEU, including the most demanding among these. It has made it possible to specify the EU's needs in terms of the military capability and forces required to attain the Headline Goal. The needs identified are outlined in a capability catalogue. As foreseen at the Feira European Council, NATO's military expertise has helped in drawing up this catalogue.

On 20 November 2000 in Brussels the Member States took part in a Capabilities Commitment Conference, making it possible to draw together the specific national commitments corresponding to the military capability goals set by the Helsinki European Council. In accordance with the guidelines of the Helsinki and Feira European Councils on collective capability goals, the Member States also committed themselves to medium and long-term efforts in order to improve both their operational and their strategic capabilities still further. The Member States committed themselves, particularly in the framework of the reforms being implemented in their armed forces, to continue taking steps to strengthen their own capabilities and carrying out existing or planned projects implementing multinational solutions, including in the field of pooling resources.

The European Union Military structures will continue to progress the work in all the above areas with a view to achieving fully the Headline Goal by 2003.

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Communiqués

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Meeting
of the North
Atlantic
Council
in Defence
Ministers
Session

Brussels,
13 June 1996

Final Communiqué

1. For the first time in 30 years NATO Defence Ministers met at the level of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 13th June 1996. This historic event confirms the vital importance of the Alliance as the principal foundation of stability, security and co-operation in the Euro-Atlantic area. We also meet as Alliance forces are participating in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR, the largest and most complex operation NATO has ever undertaken, a mission to help bring peace and stability to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Collective defence remains the core function of the Alliance; but today's challenges to our security and to the stability of Europe as a whole are more diverse and more complex than those NATO faced during its first four decades. To meet these challenges we require forces, structures and procedures that can respond effectively to contingencies ranging from collective defence to crisis management and peacekeeping, and contribute to the Alliance's broader approach to security issues.
2. The Alliance has made far-reaching changes since 1990 in adapting itself to the new security environment. We have significantly reduced our forces and readiness levels, and our forces have been realigned in accordance with the Strategic Concept to enable them to perform their missions more effectively. The decisions of our Heads of State and Government at their meeting in January 1994 were a landmark in the process of the Alliance's evolution in all its aspects, including the adaptation of its procedures and structures, its relations with its Partners and the intensification of efforts against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery.
3. We warmly welcomed the decisions taken by Alliance Foreign Ministers in Berlin on 3rd June to carry further the ongoing adaptation of Alliance structures. We endorsed and will oversee and take forward the defence and military aspects of these decisions. Our goal is to adapt the Alliance in order to ensure NATO's continuing effectiveness, efficiency and flexibility; to enable it to carry out its full range of missions with the participation of all Allies, based on our readiness to pursue common security objectives through the Alliance wherever possible; and to build, with the participation of all Allies, a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO. As Defence Ministers, we are determined to play our part in shaping the new NATO.
4. We welcomed the approval of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept and noted in particular that arrangements will be made for the participation of all Allies in CJTF nuclei established

in Alliance headquarters. CJTFs -- multinational and multiservice formations established for specific contingency operations -- will provide a more flexible and efficient means to enable the Alliance to generate forces at short notice. The CJTF concept will also help to improve co-operation with the WEU. It will in addition facilitate the participation of non-NATO nations in the Alliance's new missions.

5. We directed the NAC in Permanent Session with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities to take forward the implementation of the CJTF concept to the satisfaction of all Allies, as a matter of priority, including in particular the location, size, number and structure of CJTF headquarters elements and their operating procedures, taking into account the evolving work on the future NATO command structure. This should include facilitating participation by Partners in CJTF at an early stage. There should be continuing co-ordination with the WEU. We requested the Council in Permanent Session to report on progress at our meeting in December. We decided that, as part of this process, an exercise should be conducted as soon as practicable, based on the deployment of a CJTF for a NATO-led contingency operation. We also invite the WEU to work with NATO on the preparation for a subsequent CJTF exercise based on a WEU-led operation.
6. We instructed the Military Committee to develop rapidly the terms of reference for a Capabilities Co-ordination Cell. It will provide staff support to the Military Committee on contingency related matters and assist the Military Committee in providing planning guidance to the Major NATO Commanders. We have also instructed the NATO Military Authorities to develop the terms of reference of the Combined Joint Planning Staff which would perform centralised CJTF headquarters planning functions and co-ordination with all relevant headquarters, as well as with forces that might serve under a CJTF headquarters, and as appropriate with the WEU Planning Cell.
7. A key aspect of the Alliance's ongoing adaptation is the review of NATO's command structure. We welcomed the continuing progress of the Military Committee's Long-Term Study and in particular the approval of the Military Committee's revised directive for military implementation of Alliance strategy which provides the conceptual basis for continuing the process of adapting the military structure of the Alliance.
8. We directed the Military Committee to continue its work on the Long-Term Study on the basis of decisions taken in Berlin. This further work should also take account of the need for a single, multinational command structure, respecting the principle of unity of command, in which all nations should have an appropriate role, capable of performing its core function of collective defence and, through flexible and agreed procedures, of undertaking new roles in the changing circumstances, taking full advantage of the CJTF Concept; the need to improve NATO's effectiveness and flexibility; the continued involvement of the North American Allies across the command and force structure;

the development, with the participation of all European Allies, of the ESDI within the Alliance; the need to be able to absorb enlargement without major restructuring; and the need for cost effectiveness. Adaptations should not be driven only by savings but every attempt should be made to reduce running costs. Arrangements should be developed to provide for increased participation of Partner countries. We requested the Council in Permanent Session to provide any necessary further political guidance. We look forward to speedy progress in completing this task and have asked the Council in Permanent Session with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities to make recommendations on the possible outlines of the future command structure and related key issues for decision at our next meeting in December.

9. We welcomed the establishment of a Policy Co-ordination Group (PCG) which will, as directed, provide politico-military advice to assist the Council in managing and ensuring timely overall direction of Alliance military operations, particularly crisis management operations. It will also provide advice on related policy and procedures and contribute to Council decisions on other topics of a politico-military nature in the adaptation of the Alliance.
10. We associated ourselves with the tasking to the Council in Permanent Session given in paragraph 8 of the Communiqué of Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin on 3rd June. The Council should keep the progress of this work under close review and report with recommendations on decisions also to us at our next meeting. We asked the Secretary General to provide a progress report at our informal meeting at Bergen on 25th-26th September.
11. Further, as part of NATO's contribution to developing ESDI within the Alliance, we have tasked our Permanent Representatives, with advice from the NATO Military Authorities, and with participation of all Allies, to review the defence planning process to ensure that it continues to develop the forces and capabilities needed to conduct the full range of Alliance missions and in addition is able to support within the Alliance all European Allies in planning for the conduct of WEU-led operations. This work should be completed in time to be considered at our December meeting.
12. We have asked the Council to keep under review the work on the Long-Term Study, on the implementation of the CJTF concept and on the adaptation of the Alliance according to the principles agreed in Berlin, including the building, with the participation of all Allies, of the ESDI within the Alliance, to ensure they are conducted in a rapid, consistent and mutually compatible way and to report to us in December.
13. The Alliance is making a major contribution to the efforts of the international community to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia by leading the Implementation Force (IFOR) which has been mandated to ensure that the military provisions of the Peace

Agreement are fulfilled. All of the Allies and 16 non-NATO states are co-operating closely to carry out this demanding mission. The IFOR experience has highlighted the need to expand the scope of PfP missions beyond peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, and search and rescue to include the full range of Alliance new missions.

14. We applaud the achievements of IFOR. This complex operation has already contributed substantially to establishing a stable environment for building peace. It has been made possible because of the courage, skill and sacrifices of the forces of the Alliance and other participants in the operation. We pay tribute to the selfless efforts of these men and women and to their professionalism and determination. We affirm our confidence in their ability to perform their demanding tasks. We express our deepest sympathy to the families of those who have given their lives in the cause of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
15. We discussed the challenges IFOR is likely to face during the rest of its mandate. The last milestone stipulated in the military annex to the Peace Agreement occurred on 18th April (D+120). IFOR's military mission will remain of prime importance between now and the end of its mandate. We call on the parties to comply fully with the Peace Agreement and will insist on full adherence to the provisions of the military annex.
16. We noted with satisfaction that IFOR is providing increasing support for the civil aspects of the Peace Agreement within the limits of its resources and of the demands of its primary mission, in such areas as the conduct of elections, the return of refugees and displaced persons, and the maintenance of law and order. By continuing to ensure a secure environment and promote freedom of movement, IFOR will also make an important contribution to creating the conditions for free and fair elections. We will also continue to support the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The apprehending of war criminals and the investigation of war crimes are essential to bring justice and durable peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
17. We confirmed that given the magnitude of the task ahead, IFOR will be maintained at approximately its current force levels through September, when the elections are due to take place. Its overall capability will be retained until the end of its mandate. We invited the Council in Permanent Session to ensure that military planning proceeds accordingly.
18. We welcomed the contribution of arms control to promoting stability in the former Yugoslavia. The Agreement on Confidence and Security Building Measures is a promising starting point to foster co-operative and trustful relations amongst the parties. We called on the Parties concerned to build on this and to ensure that arms are at the lowest level consistent with the Parties' respective security and the need to avoid an arms race in the region. We regretted the fact that the Parties had not yet concluded an agreement on sub-regional arms control and urged them to

overcome their differences quickly and conclude the negotiated agreement.

19. We extend our appreciation to Admiral Leighton Smith on the occasion of his forthcoming retirement for his invaluable contribution to the operation as Commander IFOR.
20. Our defence efforts addressing proliferation risks are an integral part of the continued adaptation of the Alliance to the new security environment. These efforts will also play an important role in the enhancement of NATO's capabilities and will improve the Alliance's overall capacity to accomplish all of its required missions. In particular, we recognised the need for placing greater emphasis on the protection of deployed forces. While prevention remains our primary aim, we recognise that proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their delivery means poses risks to NATO and can pose a direct military threat.
21. In this context we noted with satisfaction the culmination of the work programme of the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) initiated at the 1994 Brussels Summit and endorsed the DGP's recommendations to improve Alliance military capabilities to address the risks posed by NBC proliferation. These capabilities will support NATO's central objectives for dealing with proliferation: prevent proliferation from occurring or reverse it through diplomatic means, deter use, and protect NATO territory, populations and forces from NBC attack. The substantial progress made by the DGP over the past two years provides a solid basis for continued co-operation among all Allies and, where appropriate, with Partners on relevant defence issues related to proliferation. An accelerated plan for action has been adopted, including arrangements for defining new force goals for the Allies concerned. We look forward to receiving follow-on reports from the DGP and other NATO bodies concerned on progress made in improving Allies' capabilities including prospects for common funding/procurement or multinational efforts and on further policy development.
22. We expressed our deep satisfaction with the overall development of Partnership for Peace which enhances security and stability within the Euro-Atlantic area. It has become a permanent element of the European security architecture. PfP will play an invaluable role in preparing new members for the responsibilities and requirements that accession to the Alliance brings. It will also serve as a means of strengthening relations with Partner countries which do not join the Alliance early or at all, thereby avoiding the creation of new dividing lines in Europe. We welcome the Council report on enhancements to the Partnership, and will play an active part in taking forward the defence and military aspects of these enhancements. We note our responsibility for providing resources to NATO's Partnership programmes, and request the Council in Permanent Session to provide recommendations for our consideration in December to ensure that appropriate resources are available to support the evolution of the

Partnership.

23. The Partnership Work Programme for 1996 to 1998 in particular represents a marked increase in the scope and number of PfP activities, all of which are designed to promote understanding between the Alliance and its Partners and the capacity -- and habit -- of common action in the interest of peace. We attach importance to the growth of defence-related co-operation in such areas as civil-military relations, defence procurement, air defence, the development of defence policy, and civil emergency planning. More extensive co-operation in these and other fields will strengthen the political-military character of the Partnership. We welcome the decision by Austria to take part in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the significant progress by the participants in this process in implementing their interoperability objectives.
24. The immediate practical value of the Partnership, has been vividly demonstrated in the course of operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where 12 Partners are co-operating in IFOR with the Allies and with other non-NATO nations. This operation has benefitted from the experience and increased interoperability gained through PfP activities, in particular joint exercises and the PARP.
25. We agreed on the need further to deepen and broaden the PfP programme and the PARP. We shall consider further steps in this direction in the light of the IFOR experience, including the extent to which interoperability objectives for Partners should be adapted to cover the full range of the Alliance's new missions. It is our intention to increase opportunities for Partners to assume greater responsibility in shaping co-operative programmes including an increased involvement of Partners in our efforts to promote security through regional co-operation. We tasked our Permanent Representatives to address and provide specific proposals for our meeting in December. In this regard we welcome and endorse the proposal for a joint Allied-Partner rolling evaluation of the lessons learned from political and military co-operation in IFOR with a view to applying such lessons to strengthening the PfP.
26. We reaffirmed our commitment to open NATO to new members, initiated by the meeting of NATO Heads of State and Governments in January 1994. The intensified dialogue with interested Partners now under way is an important step in this process. We welcomed the progress to date in this dialogue and expect it to continue in a manner that allows Partners to improve their understanding of specific and practical details of Alliance membership and NATO to learn more about possible contributions of individual Partners.
27. We noted the Secretary General's interim report on the internal adaptations for enlargement required to maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance. We agreed that it will be important in this work

to take into account other aspects of the Alliance's internal adaptation. We look forward to reviewing progress in this area at our next meeting.

28. In keeping with Russia's weight and importance, the development of a stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is an essential element in the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. We welcome the important NATO-Russia consultative and co-operative steps to date and wish to expand their scope and deepen our relations with Russia both on the political and the military levels, based on both multilateral and nationally-sponsored activities. We recalled the Alliance's proposals made last September for an enhanced dialogue and for a political framework to guide our security co-operation and consultations; and would welcome the development of permanent mechanisms for political consultations. We look forward to our discussions with our Russian colleague tomorrow.
29. The Alliance's co-operation with Russia in IFOR has been especially noteworthy. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to mandate NATO Military Authorities, in furtherance of our goal of enhancing contacts between the Alliance and Russian Military Authorities, to consider how to build upon the experience of close and purposeful collaboration in the IFOR operation including the possibility of a permanent liaison mission along the lines of that established for IFOR. Such collaboration can serve as a catalyst for the further development of the kind of NATO-Russia relationship we seek -- one of mutual respect, confidence, and friendship.
30. We attach great importance to the Alliance's relations with Ukraine. We are convinced that an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine has an important part to play in reinforcing European stability. We noted with great satisfaction that all nuclear weapons have now been transferred from the territory of Ukraine for dismantlement. The development of the enhanced relationship agreed last year is under way. We are pleased with Ukraine's active participation in the Partnership for Peace, and Ukraine is making a valuable contribution to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR. We would welcome still closer co-operation. We welcome Ukraine's engagement in bilateral and regional co-operation efforts such as the Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion and the recent Peace Shield exercise.
31. We welcome the progress achieved in the political dialogue with a number of Mediterranean countries as well as the programme of activities undertaken within its framework. We are convinced that this Mediterranean dialogue, which today is under way with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, contributes to a better mutual understanding with a view to providing stability in the region. We will endeavour for our part to provide our support to the further development of this dialogue.
32. We welcomed the successful outcome of the recent CFE Review


Conference in Vienna at which all 30 CFE states reaffirmed their commitment to preserve the integrity of the Treaty as the basis for stability and security in Europe and to its full implementation. We note with satisfaction that a solution was found to the flank issue in a co-operative manner, also reaffirming the continued relevance of the basic structures of the Treaty including the principle of zonal limitations. We now look forward to its full and timely implementation while underscoring the importance of full respect for the sovereignty of the States Parties involved. We welcomed the agreement by the States Parties to the Treaty to begin discussions aimed at defining the scope and parameters of a process aimed at improving the operation of the Treaty in a changing environment. We encouraged all participants to work co-operatively to this end, while also emphasising the importance of full compliance with all obligations under the Treaty and related documents as a contribution to continued good relations among all States Parties.

33. The Alliance's activities must be supported by adequate resources. The process of fundamental change in the Alliance, embracing both new initiatives as well as the traditional task of common defence, has created new requirements, as has the need to provide resources for the NATO common-funded share of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR. It is our firm intention to ensure the availability of appropriate human and financial resources for these important programmes, in order to sustain in the future the necessary flexibility and effectiveness of the Alliance and co-operation with our Partners. The achievement of this goal will be facilitated through the development of updated, appropriate and cost-effective structures and the rigorous application of priorities.
34. NATO armaments co-operation continues to play an important role in national efforts to meet the evolving military needs of the Alliance. In particular, during the past year, the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) has contributed to the preparation of Alliance forces to undertake an expanded range of missions by addressing the equipment implications of peacekeeping operations and NATO's defence efforts against proliferation. CNAD activities have also made an important contribution to PfP. This meeting of the Council noted the annual report of the CNAD, and we intend in the future to provide collective guidance on the direction of NATO armaments co-operation. We continue to support efforts to develop and procure an Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) capability, namely a minimum essential NATO owned and operated core capability supplemented by interoperable national assets, taking account, for example, of the need for affordability and cost-effectiveness and national planning and budgetary processes. We note that the NATO Military Authorities are examining the relative priority, timing and attendant rationale for this AGS capability.
35. The Alliance has begun a new phase in its history. With the far-reaching changes that have been put in train, a new NATO is emerging with renewed forces, structures and procedures. Based as before on a firm transatlantic partnership, it will also support

the development, with the participation of all the European Allies, of a European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance. But its fundamental purpose will remain unchanged: to ensure the security of its members and to make an invaluable contribution to international peace, security and stability.

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Updated: 07-Jun-2001

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Release
M-NAC-D-1
(2001)86

Final Communiqué

Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session held in Brussels

7 June 2001

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Defence Ministers Session in Brussels on 7th June 2001. We associate ourselves with the statement made by our Foreign Minister colleagues at their meeting last week in Budapest.
2. We concentrated on reviewing the situation in the Balkans and the progress achieved in implementing the decisions taken by the Heads of State and Government at the Summit meeting in Washington. With respect to the latter, we discussed in particular the implementation of the Defence Capabilities Initiative; work on the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and NATO-EU relations; major challenges with respect to the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as set out in the Alliance's Strategic Concept; and the Alliance's outreach and cooperation activities.
3. We particularly welcomed the strengthened prospects for progress on the various aspects of the Washington ESDI agenda arising from the intensified discussions on the participation issue, as noted at Budapest. We look forward to early completion of these discussions which should allow finalisation of the practical arrangements for NATO support of EU-led operations.
4. On missile defence, the United States Secretary of Defense briefed us on the United States assessment of the current and evolving threats from the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. We welcome the consultations initiated by President Bush and agreed that it was important that, as Defence Ministers, we continue to consult closely on the assessment of threats and the means to address them and related issues, including multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes, as well as international arms control and disarmament.
5. We have issued separate statements on the situation in the Balkans and on the Defence Capabilities Initiative.



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Updated: 18-Dec-2001

NATO Press Releases

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Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Final Communiqué

18 Dec. 2001

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Defence Ministers Session in Brussels on 18 December 2001.
2. We concentrated on the adaptation of the Alliance's defence capabilities to changes in the security environment, particularly in the light of the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September, and the situation in the Balkans, and have issued separate statements on these matters. We also discussed the status of work on the European Security and Defence Identity and NATO-EU relations. Our joint efforts in the Balkans have shown that close cooperation brings considerable benefits. Important work remains to be done on the arrangements for NATO support to EU-led operations in accordance with the decisions taken at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings. We remain determined to make progress on all the various aspects of the NATO-EU relationship, noting the need to find solutions satisfactory to all Allies on the issue of participation by non-EU European Allies. We note the commitment of the EU to finalise the modalities for consultation with Canada and for its participation in EU-led operations.
3. We also assessed the efforts to improve Alliance capabilities through the Defence Capabilities Initiative. While there has been some progress as a result of DCI, the full potential of the initiative has not yet been realised and we are accordingly determined to continue to give it our close personal attention along with the continuing adaptation of Alliance structures and procedures.
4. We exchanged views on missile defence and the global strategic environment. We took note of US and Russian statements that the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty presents no threat to the Russian Federation. The need to maintain strategic stability remains critically important. We welcomed that both sides have worked intensely and are continuing to do so to create a new strategic relationship based on mutual interests and cooperation across a broad range of political, economic, and security issues in order to contribute to global security and strategic stability. In this context, we welcomed the movement toward new, lower levels of offensive nuclear weapons made clear in both US and Russian statements. We look forward to continued consultations with the United States on these issues and welcome continued work within the Alliance on theater missile defence.
5. We also discussed NATO's co-operation activities including preparations for enlargement, the Partnership for Peace, the

Mediterranean Dialogue, and our relationships with Ukraine and Russia. We reaffirm that a confident and cooperative partnership between the Allies and Russia, based on shared democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, as enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, is essential for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We therefore welcome the decision of Foreign Ministers on 7 December to give new impetus and substance to the partnership between NATO Allies and Russia, with the goal of creating a new NATO-Russia Council to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20. To that end, the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session has been tasked to explore and develop, in the coming months, building on the Founding Act, new effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action. NATO's fundamental objectives remain as set out in the Washington Treaty, under which provisions NATO will maintain its prerogative of independent decision and action at 19 on all issues consistent with its obligations and responsibilities. As Defence Ministers, we are determined to enhance the NATO-Russia partnership in the defence and military field.

6. At their Prague Summit in November next year, our Heads of State and Government will launch the next round of NATO enlargement. We encourage the nine aspirant countries to press forward their preparations under the Membership Action Plan process, which include defence reform and improvements to military capability. Meanwhile NATO will undertake its own internal preparations for the admission of new members, on which the Council in Permanent Session is invited to report at our next meeting. We will continue the MAP process beyond the current cycle.
7. We fully agree with the statements made on these and other matters by our Foreign Minister colleagues earlier this month.





Updated: 06-Dec-2001

NATO Press Releases

Press
Release
M-NAC-
2 (2001)158

Final Communiqué

Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 6 December 2001

6 Dec. 2001

1. The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 resulted in the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the history of the Alliance. We deplore the loss of life which affected so many NATO members and partner countries. Today, we have issued a separate statement addressing NATO's response to terrorism and contribution to the campaign against this scourge. Against this background, we have taken stock of NATO's broad agenda, and given further guidance on its implementation in the run-up to the meeting of our Heads of State and Government in Prague next November.
2. Today we commit ourselves to forge a new relationship with Russia, enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest. We reaffirm that a confident and cooperative partnership between the Allies and Russia, based on shared democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, as enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, is essential for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We have decided to give new impetus and substance to our partnership, with the goal of creating, with Russia, a new NATO-Russia Council, to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20. To that end, we have tasked the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to explore and develop, in the coming months, building on the Founding Act, new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action. We intend that such cooperative mechanisms will be in place for, or prior to, our next meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002. NATO's fundamental objectives remain as set out in the Washington Treaty, under which provisions NATO will maintain its prerogative of independent decision and action at 19 on all issues consistent with its obligations and responsibilities.
3. We are pleased that Russia stands with us in the struggle against terrorism, and believe this will contribute significantly to our common goal of a strong, stable and enduring NATO-Russia partnership. We are intensifying our cooperation in this and other areas, including non-proliferation, export control and arms control matters, arms transparency and confidence building measures, missile defence, search and rescue at sea, and military-to-military cooperation, which represents a major step towards a qualitatively new relationship. We support Russia's right to protect her territorial integrity, and recognise her right to protect all citizens against

terrorism and criminality. We welcome the initial steps Russia has taken towards establishing a political dialogue over the conflict in Chechnya. We urge Russia to build on these steps to find a prompt and lasting political and peaceful resolution to the conflict and to respect and protect the human and legal rights of the population. We call on the Chechen side to cooperate in good faith in seeking a political solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take actions against it.

4. At their Prague Summit in November next year, our Heads of State and Government will launch the next round of NATO enlargement. We encourage the nine aspirant countries to continue focused efforts to prepare for possible future membership, making full use of the opportunities offered through our Membership Action Plan (MAP). We look forward to receiving a Consolidated Progress Report on activities under the MAP in 2001-2002 at our meeting next Spring. We will continue the MAP process beyond the current cycle. While aspirants continue their preparations, NATO is undertaking its own internal preparations for the admission of new members. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to report at our next meeting on the issues that need to be examined in order to prepare comprehensive recommendations for decisions by our Heads of State and Government at the Prague Summit.
5. We reaffirm our commitment to a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe, and our determination to oppose all violence, whether ethnically, politically or criminally motivated. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in South-East Europe. Working together with our Partners in SFOR and KFOR and with other international institutions, we will continue to promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, good neighbourliness, stable and secure borders, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). All persons indicted for war crimes by the ICTY must be brought to justice in The Hague.
6. Later this month, our Defence colleagues will review the status of NATO's operations in the Balkans and possibilities for rationalisation and an enhanced regional approach, recognising the need for continued close consultation with other international organisations involved. Our overall efforts have the ultimate aim of providing the foundation for self-sustaining peace and democracy in the region that no longer require the presence of international military forces.
7. Over the past year, the Alliance has played a particularly active role in promoting stability and security in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in close cooperation with the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In this context, we commend the neighbouring states, especially Albania, for their constructive approach. We welcome the voluntary disarmament and disbanding of the so-called NLA, the Parliament's adoption of changes to the country's

constitution, and the amnesty declared by President Trajkovski. We reaffirm our condemnation of the use of violence for political ends. We urge all parties involved to implement the Framework Agreement in full, and to continue to cooperate with the international community. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (¹). The Alliance stands ready to continue to contribute to security by providing support for the EU and OSCE monitors for a further three-month period, as part of its contribution to peace and stability in the country.

8. We remain firmly committed to the full implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and call on all political leaders in this country to continue to renounce separatism and violence, to support democratic institutions and to take on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement. We strongly endorse the respective efforts of SFOR and the ICTY to detain and bring to trial persons indicted for war crimes. In this context, we reiterate that the Entities carry primary responsibility for bringing to justice persons indicted for war crimes, and urge them to cooperate more effectively with SFOR to this end.
9. We welcome the Kosovo-wide elections of 17 November, in which all communities participated in significant numbers, as an important step towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic Kosovo, where all its people, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in democratic institutions. We encourage the newly elected leaders to exercise their new functions in strict compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and the constitutional framework for provisional self-government and in full cooperation with UNMIK and KFOR. We also call on them to establish effective cooperation with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
10. We welcome Belgrade's constructive support for the participation of the Kosovo Serb community in the recent Kosovo elections. We note with satisfaction the continuing progress towards reconciliation between the parties in Southern Serbia and will continue to pay close attention to the situation in that region. We welcome the steady improvement of our relations with the FRY and look forward to their further development. We reiterate our support for a democratic Montenegro within a democratic FRY.
11. In celebrating the tenth anniversary of NATO's policy of Partnership and Cooperation, we recognise the crucial contribution NATO's Partner countries are making to the Alliance's efforts to foster peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. We value, in particular, their contributions to our peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. We also appreciate the solidarity and support which our Partners, and in particular those in Central Asia and the Caucasus, have demonstrated in the international campaign against terrorism.


We want to further broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). We encourage all our Partners to seek a more active relationship with the Alliance. We also want to broaden and strengthen cooperation with our Mediterranean partners, and invite them to intensify their dialogue with us on security matters of common concern.

12. We continue to attach great importance to further developing and enhancing the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership. In this context, we encourage Ukraine to continue to take concrete steps to take its reform process forward and stand ready to assist it in this regard. We also wish to emphasise the importance of meeting our joint commitments and fulfilling our shared responsibilities in the Balkans.
13. We reaffirm our commitment to achieving a close, transparent and coherent NATO-EU relationship. Our joint efforts in the Balkans have furthered the achievement of peace and stability in that region and shown that close cooperation brings considerable benefits. The events of 11 September have underlined the importance of enhanced cooperation between the two organisations on questions of common interest relating to security, defence, and crisis management, so that crises would be met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management ensured. Important work remains to be done on the arrangements for NATO support to EU-led operations, in accordance with the decisions taken at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings. We remain determined to make progress on all the various aspects of our relationship, noting the need to find solutions satisfactory to all Allies on the issue of participation by non-EU European Allies. We note the commitment of the EU to finalise the modalities for consultation with Canada and for its participation in EU-led operations.
14. Events on and since 11 September show that our security is challenged in a variety of different, sometimes unpredictable, ways. Through our Defence Capabilities Initiative, we want to ensure that Alliance forces have the best possible capabilities to meet these challenges and are able to work together seamlessly. Enhancing European capabilities is central to this process.
15. We reaffirm that the Alliance must have the capability to defend appropriately and effectively against the threats that the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery can pose. Our response should be consistent with the indivisibility of Allied security. We will continue to work together to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts. In this context, the Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Alliance stresses the importance of abiding by and strengthening existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes and international arms control and disarmament accords. We will continue to actively contribute to the

development of agreements and measures in this field and pursue further arms reductions, transparency and confidence-building. We reaffirm our determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and will work towards a successful outcome of the upcoming review. We also support ongoing efforts to achieve an International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation before the end of 2002. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament along with deterrence and defence play an essential role in enhancing security against these new threats and challenges. In this context, the role that missile defence could play is being actively considered as we continue our consultations with the United States on this issue. In this regard, we welcome continued work at NATO on theatre missile defence.

16. Recalling the results of the second CFE Review Conference, Allies welcome Russia's planned reductions of its excess equipment in the North Caucasus to agreed levels, which must be transparent and verifiable, and progress in the reduction and withdrawal of Russian equipment from Moldova. We call for swift resolution of remaining issues between Russia and Georgia. Allies can envisage ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty only in the context of full compliance by all States Parties with agreed Treaty limits and consistent with the commitments in the CFE Final Act. We look forward to the entry into force of the Open Skies Treaty on 1 January 2002.
1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.





Updated: 06-Mar-2002

NATO Speeches

At the Hanns
Seidel Stiftung
Brussels

"Towards the Prague Summit and beyond"

Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson

6 March 2002

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Jean Monnet, one of the fathers of the European Union, once said that "the lessons of history stay learned if they are embedded in institutions."

In terms of security, the lessons of the twentieth century have been clear. That cooperation and integration are the foundations of stability. That by working together, Europe and North America can face any security challenge successfully. And that effective and credible armed forces are absolutely essential to building peace and security.

Throughout its history, NATO has embodied those lessons -- and proved their wisdom. Throughout the Cold War, the United States remained a European power. European countries institutionalised their defence cooperation, so precluding the renationalization of defence.

And in meeting one challenge after the other -- from the Cold War, to stabilizing the Balkans, to assisting the transition of new democracies -- NATO countries proved that determination, unity and credible capabilities are the key ingredients of security.

Those lessons are as true now as they were fifty years ago. But today, we must also learn new lessons. September 11th proved Francis Fukuyama wrong, because history is certainly not at an end. On the contrary: the terrorist attacks demonstrated instead that our security is still under threat, but from new directions, and in devastating new ways. Make no mistake, the risks are real.

Our challenge, as a Euro-Atlantic community, is to produce an effective response. We must adapt our institutions to be better able to preserve our security in this new environment. But we must not forget the important principles on which NATO's success has been built: the stabilizing benefits of integration; the importance of preserving the transatlantic link; and the necessity of maintaining effective armed forces.

NATO's Prague Summit in November will accomplish all of these goals. It will mark a transformation in NATO's capacity to tackle terrorism, and other new or asymmetric threats. And at the same time, the Summit will also take forward major projects already underway in the Alliance to build peace and security right across Europe.

At Prague, NATO is not about to change direction one hundred and eighty degrees, jettison the rest of its agenda, and suddenly become the

world's premier terrorist hunter. NATO is not, and will not be, solely about terrorism. But NATO is about security -- and we are in an age where terrorism has gone from being a domestic police issue to a matter of national and international security. Which means that the Alliance has a key role to play in meeting this challenge, today and into the future.

The Alliance is already an essential part of the campaign against terrorism. Regardless of what the compulsive critics might say, the declaration of Article 5 was a powerful statement of transatlantic unity and a real commitment to offer practical support. It was also a unique signal to the world that the terrorists had posed a strategic challenge to the international community - and that the international community stood ready to respond.

Since then, NATO has provided direct political and military support to the US-led operations, including by patrolling US airspace. Individual Allies are also making key contributions. Troops from many NATO members are fighting alongside US forces in operations against Al-Qaida. And as we've seen in recent days again, these are serious operations, in which well-trained, well-equipped forces are a necessity.

NATO has also made a key contribution to the peacekeeping force in Kabul today. After all, the European members of the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul can work so effectively together, and with the United States, only because of decades of practical cooperation in NATO. And let us not forget that the assistance of the Central Asian countries, without whose airspace and bases success in Afghanistan would have been impossible, is the product of years of quiet work building partnership and trust in the Alliance.

Which brings me to a illusion which is getting a little too much airtime these days: that Afghanistan is an example or justification of super-power unilateralism. I say look again -- because Afghanistan proves just the opposite. It reinforces the fact that no large modern military operation can be undertaken without allies, partners and coalitions.

The US Administration knows this, which is why it has worked so hard to build the right coalition, in NATO, with individual Allies, and with important countries in the region and around the world. Far from going it alone, the US has relied on traditional allies, deepened ties with newer friends such as Russia, and developed links with new partners as well. Not exactly the definition of unilateralism!

But I am not trying to bury my head in the sand. Even if fears of rampant US unilateralism are unfounded, other concerns are being heard that make more sense. Two in particular are raised most often, and you are familiar with them: first, that as an Atlantic community, we don't have the military capacities we need to face modern challenges; and second, that Europe in particular doesn't have the capacities to pull its weight when it comes to security.

As I said a few minutes ago, NATO is about learning, and acting on the lessons of history. And the Alliance has always focused on developing the right military capabilities, and balancing burdens fairly among Allies. That is why the Alliance is hard

at work to try to address these two concerns, and the Prague Summit will be an important step forward in these efforts.

In countering terrorism, there is clearly an important role for the military. And hence for NATO, as the world's most effective military organisation. We are hard at work examining ways to improve our military capabilities to defend and strike against terrorists, and to develop our forces' ability to protect themselves against weapons of mass destruction.

In parallel, we are looking at how we can use our skills and capabilities more effectively to protect our populations, and to assist in civil emergencies. Our progress on all of these fronts will be examined, and taken forward, in Prague.

This new work is of course part of a wider effort to continue the modernization of European and Canadian forces.

In the wake of September 11, we find ourselves in the midst of a new, and serious burden-sharing debate. There are increasing voices in the US who are claiming that Europe will simply never shoulder its fair share of the burden of security. And while Europe has made more efforts in the past three years than in the previous thirty to improve its capacities, the truth is that European aspirations and ambitions are not yet being matched by resources.

Now, I know that this can be an unpleasant message -- especially for the finance ministers who will have to come up with the money for improvements. But there is no way to avoid the basic truth that improvements have to be made. And they have to be made quickly.

I am convinced that Europe must share the military burden because it is in the interests of Europeans to play a stronger role in the transatlantic partnership, and take on more defence and security responsibilities. We must ensure that European countries, in NATO and the EU, have a military capacity that better reflects their political and economic might.

I have spent the past few years acting on that conviction. The EU's European Security and Defence Identity conceived at St Malo was in part at least my brainchild. For the past two years, I have worked in NATO to build the sound, practical relationship between the Alliance and the EU on which a successful ESDI depends. And I spent much of last year in a double-act with the EU's Javier Solana to keep the fragile peace in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia .

This NATO-EU cooperation already now works quite well in practice - but it is still ad-hoc. We need to lock in these arrangements, by finding agreement on some key issues, such as assuring EU-access to NATO's defence planning on one hand, and on the other hand, the question of ensuring adequate participation of non-EU NATO members in EU-led operations.

Today's picture is not as bleak as some paint it. For example, on the ground in the Balkans, the Europeans are doing the lion's share. More than 85% of peacekeeping troops are Europeans, and the EU contributes

the bulk of reconstruction and development costs. Europeans filled the gap when the US needed to move forces to Afghanistan, including by rapidly redeploying French AWACS aircraft.

And in the coming months, we will see increasing efforts by the Europeans to further reduce the US share in the Balkans operations. There is real capacity in Europe, and real will to act.

But the reality remains that the need for effective capacities far outstrips the capacities themselves. We are hard pressed to maintain 50,000 European troops in the Balkans, even though Europe has 2 million people in uniform. Hardly any European country can deploy useable and effective forces in significant numbers outside their borders, and sustain them for months or even years as we all need to do today.

For all Europe's rhetoric, and an annual investment of over \$140 billion by NATO's European members, we still need US help to move, command and provision a major operation.

I am convinced that if we are to ensure that the United States moves neither towards unilateralism nor - equally damaging - isolationism, all European countries must show a new willingness to develop effective crisis management capabilities. That is also a clear lesson of history, and we must not forget it, in NATO or in Europe.

The choice for the Europeans - and Canada - is modernization or marginalisation. I am therefore sounding once again my clarion call of "capabilities, capabilities, capabilities". In preparing for Prague, we must look honestly at what we have achieved so far in NATO through the Defence Capabilities Initiative, and then produce a blueprint for redoubling our efforts.

My own inclination is to refocus on a much smaller number of absolutely critical capabilities, and Presidents and Prime Ministers know what they are, and to commit nations even more strongly to acquiring them. We absolutely must make sure we can at least work together, in NATO or in coalitions.

We cannot allow the gap between American forces on the one hand and European and Canadian forces on the other to become unbridgeable. The results of failure, for Washington and for Europe, would be stark: the choice of acting alone or not at all. And that is no choice at all. Between now and Prague -- indeed, as soon as possible -- we simply must make concrete progress on this.

But of course, Prague will be about much more than taking on terrorism, or improving capabilities. As I mentioned earlier, the twentieth century taught us the value of integration and cooperation for security. And at our first Summit of the twenty-first century, we will continue to act on that lesson.

Before September 11, the Prague Summit was commonly described as an enlargement summit. That was always a simplistic analysis. Now it is very clearly only part of the story. But it is an important part.

Without enlargement, Europe would remain unfinished business. Without enlargement, we would permanently frustrate the ambitions of countries of Central and Eastern Europe for inclusion in the transatlantic security and defence community. That would perpetuate an unnatural and potentially dangerous division between a prosperous, secure and self-confident West and an insecure and uncertain East.

NATO, like the EU, cannot evade this responsibility and this challenge. Integration remains as vital to security today as ever. That is why we have committed ourselves to taking in at least one new member at Prague. And because of the reforms they have undertaken with NATO's help, and because of the benefits of our cooperation in the Balkans, these countries will be ready to be security contributors, not mere consumers.

Of course, enlargement is more than a selection process. Managing enlargement also means keeping the door open for future members. And it means continued engagement with all our Partners, whether they aspire to NATO membership or not.

Over the past decade, NATO's Partnership initiatives have paid off their investment many times over. Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council have changed the face of European security. They have become political and military instruments for serious crisis management, as we see every day in our operations in the Balkans. And they have sowed the seeds of a true Euro-Atlantic security culture, as we saw in the wake of the September 11th attacks.

We need to ensure that post-enlargement, that value is retained, and enhanced, for all concerned -- Allies and Partners alike. At Prague, we will deepen our cooperation in new areas, such as on terrorism, and tailor the Partnerships even more closely to the challenges we all face today.

Hand in hand with a redefinition of Partnership will be a redefinition of NATO's relationship with Russia.

September 11th has created an entirely new context for NATO-Russia relations. It highlighted the fact that NATO and Russia share common interests and concerns -- and that they need to address these concerns together. In a sense, it has given us the opportunity to slam the door on outdated Cold War suspicions, and get down to work on practical cooperation.

Terrorism is at the core of our cooperation these days. Four weeks ago, I jointly hosted with Russian Defence Minister Ivanov a hugely successful joint NATO-Russia conference in Rome on military responses to terrorism. But we have a much wider shared agenda. Hence our determination to go beyond consultation and to work constructively together on all the issues where we have what President Putin calls "the logic of common interests".

A new forum for this cooperation, in which we can decide and act "at 20", should be ready well before Prague. Our aim is to have it operational by the time Foreign Ministers meet in Iceland in May.

Now, I have never been accused of being a dewy-eyed romantic, and I harbour no illusions about NATO's relationship with Russia. I know we will not always agree. I do not expect Moscow to enthusiastically welcome NATO enlargement. NATO countries will continue to be robust critics if we disapprove of Russia's policies and their implementation, including in Chechnya. And we will ensure that cooperation does not undermine NATO's cohesion and autonomy of action.

But this initiative does give us the chance to take advantage of our new cooperation after September 11th, and transform the strategic picture for the better. To paraphrase Henry Kissinger, we will take a tragedy and turn it into an opportunity. That is a real goal for a transformation summit.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have, I hope, demonstrated that the Prague Summit will be much more than an "enlargement Summit". It will deliver on all the key issues that affect European and transatlantic security alike. It will result in an Alliance geared towards the new challenges posed by terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

But it will also fine-tune NATO to pursue its wider agenda: creating long-term stability in the Balkans; helping to overcome Europe's Cold War division by offering membership and enhancing partnership; drawing Russia closer to the Alliance; and improving defence capabilities.

That is a tall order, but it is an agenda which no other institution than NATO can address. We will demonstrate, in Prague, that an old dog can learn new tricks -- and that in the Atlantic Alliance, the lessons of history have been learnt.

Thank you.



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The Amsterdam Treaty: a Comprehensive Guide

An effective and coherent external policy

Common Foreign and Security Policy

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INTRODUCTION

One of the main purposes of the inter-Governmental Conference which led to the signature of the draft Amsterdam Treaty was to make common foreign and security policy (CFSP) more effective and to equip the Union better for its role in international politics.

The reform seemed particularly urgent after the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. The tragic course of events there made it clear that the Union needed to be able to act to avert disaster and not merely react after the event. The Yugoslav crisis also threw into relief the weakness of uncoordinated Member State reactions.


The Amsterdam Treaty aims to overcome contradictions between the particularly ambitious objectives of the CFSP and the means available to the Union for achieving those objectives, which did not live up to expectations or provide adequately for the matters at stake.

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BACKGROUND

Throughout the successive stages of the construction of a European Community, the issues of political union, common foreign policy and common defence policy have regularly been put on the agenda by a series of policy proposals.

In 1950, the Pléven plan (named after the French Prime Minister) was to create an integrated European army under joint command. This plan was the subject of negotiation between Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community from 1950 to 1952, and led to the signature of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community. (EDC). The corollary of the EDC was a political project, presented in 1953, for creating a federal or confederative structure. The "European Political Community" would have created a two-house Parliamentary assembly, a European executive Council, a Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice. The political Community was to have very wide powers and



responsibilities and was, in the long run, to absorb the ECSC and the EDC. However, it never came to fruition, since it was rejected by the French National Assembly on 30 August 1954.

In the early sixties, tough negotiations were conducted on the basis of the two Fouchet plans presented one after the other in France, calling for closer political cooperation, a Union of States and common foreign and defence policies. A Committee established to draft specific proposals produced difficult, but nevertheless ambitious, compromises such as setting up an independent Secretariat and the introduction of qualified majority decisions on certain issues as a long-term goal. Unfortunately agreement could not be reached on the proposals of the Fouchet Committee and negotiations between the Member States foundered in 1962.

In response to calls by Heads of State and Government for a study of possible ways of moving forward on the political level, the "Davignon report" was presented in 1970 at the Luxembourg Summit. This was the starting point for European Political Cooperation (EPC), launched informally in 1970 before being formally enshrined in the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. The main feature of EPC was consultation among the Member States on foreign policy issues.

Three years later, the Copenhagen Summit presented a report on how EPC was working. Subsequently, meetings of Foreign Ministers and the Political Committee (made up of national political directors) were held more frequently. At the same time, a group of "European correspondents" was set up to monitor EPC in each Member State. Political cooperation was also assisted by access to COREU, the new telex network linking the Member States.

The establishment of the European Council in 1974 contributed to better coordination of EPC because of the role it gave to Heads of State and Government in defining the general orientation of Community policy. From that point the role of the Presidency and the publicity given to the work of the EPC reinforced each other through official Community statements of position.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran brought home to the Member States the growing impotence of the European Community on the international scene. Determined to strengthen EPC, in 1981 they adopted the London Report which required prior consultation by Member States of each other and the European Commission on all foreign policy matters affecting all Member States. In 1982, prompted by the same concern to affirm the international position of the Community, the Genscher-Colombo initiative proposed a draft "European Act" and led, in 1983, to the Stuttgart "Solemn Declaration on European Union".

In 1985 the Dooge Committee Report, drawn up in preparation for the inter-Governmental Conference which was to lead to the Single European Act, contained a number of proposals concerning foreign policy, in particular for greater concertation of policy on matters concerning security, and for cooperation in the armaments sector. It also called for the creation of a permanent Secretariat. In the end, the provisions introduced by the Single European Act did not go as far as the Dooge Committee proposals, but they did establish an institutional basis for EPC, the group of European correspondents and a Secretariat working under the direct authority of the Presidency. The objectives of EPC were also extended to all foreign policy issues of general

interest.

The intergovernmental conference on political union led to the inclusion in the EU Treaty of a specific Title on a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). With the Treaty's entry into force in 1993, the CFSP replaced EPC and a separate inter-Governmental pillar was created in the Community structure. This expressed the will of the Union to assert its identity on the international scene.

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TITLE V OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is governed by the provisions of Title V of the Treaty on European Union. The CFSP is also addressed in Article 2 (ex Article B) of the Common Provisions, which states that one of the objectives of the Union is to "assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence ".

The CFSP was introduced as the result of a desire to equip the Union better for the many challenges facing it at international level, by providing it with new means of taking action in areas of foreign relations other than the traditional Community ones (mainly trade policy and development cooperation).

Title V constitutes a separate pillar of the European Union, since the way it operates and its inter-Governmental nature distinguish it from the traditional pillars of the Community, such as the single market and trade policy. This difference is most striking in the decision-making procedures, which require Member State consensus, whereas in traditional Community areas a majority vote suffices. Other differences are the less important roles played by the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice in matters falling under Title V. The backgrounding of these institutions under the CFSP is in stark contrast with their powers and responsibilities in traditional spheres of Community competence.

To achieve harmony and avoid contradictions between these two types of activity (Community and inter-Governmental), Article 3 (ex Article C) provides that: "The Union shall ensure (...) the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency. They shall assure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers."

Nevertheless, in the first years after its introduction, Member States' joint action under Title V did not work as satisfactorily as they might have hoped. It was against this relatively unsatisfactory background that the negotiations at the 1996 inter-Governmental Conference aimed to introduce in the new Treaty the institutional reforms needed to make the CFSP effective.

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PROGRESS UNDER THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM

First and foremost, the CFSP's capacity for action has been reinforced through the introduction of more coherent instruments and more efficient decision-making. It is now possible to adopt measures by a qualified majority vote, with the dual safeguards of " constructive abstention " and the possibility of referring a decision to the European Council if a member state resorts to a veto. The Commission, for its part, is also more involved both on the representative side and in implementation.

Common strategies

The Amsterdam Treaty has added a new foreign policy instrument to the existing ones (joint action and common position), namely common strategies .

The European Council, the body that defines the principles and general guidelines of the CFSP, now has the right to define, by consensus, common strategies in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. The objectives, duration, and means to be made available by the Union and Member States for such common strategies must be specified.

The Council is responsible for implementing common strategies through joint actions and common positions adopted by a qualified majority. It also recommends common strategies to the European Council.

Decision-making

The general rule remains that CFSP decisions always require a unanimous vote in their favour. However, Member States can exercise "constructive abstention", i.e. an abstention which does not block the adoption of the decision. If they qualify their abstention by a formal declaration, they are not obliged to apply the decision; but they must accept, in a spirit of solidarity, that the decision commits the Union as a whole and must agree to abstain from any action that might conflict with the Union's action under that decision.

This mechanism does not apply if the Member States abstaining in this way account for more than one third of Council votes weighted in accordance with the Treaty.

The amended Title V of the EU Treaty does, however, allow for adoption by a qualified majority in two cases:

- for decisions applying a common strategy defined by the European Council;
- for any decisions implementing a joint action or common position already adopted by the Council.

There is a safeguard clause enabling member states to block majority voting for important reasons of national policy. In such cases, when the Member State concerned has stated its reasons, the Council may decide by a qualified majority to refer the matter to the European Council for a unanimous decision by heads of state and government.

The High Representative for the CFSP

The new Article 26 (ex Article J.16) of the EU Treaty introduces a new post intended to give the CFSP a higher profile and make it more coherent:

The Secretary-General of the Council has been assigned the role of High Representative for the CFSP. He is responsible for assisting the Council in CFSP-related matters by contributing to the formulation, preparation, and implementation of decisions. At the request of the Presidency he acts on behalf of the Council in conducting political dialogue with third parties.

Because of this new role, the Secretary-General's administrative tasks have been transferred to the deputy Secretary-General. It does not, however, stop the Council appointing special representatives with mandates covering specific political issues whenever it sees fit, as has already been done in the case of former Yugoslavia.

As regards the logistics of the new position, the High Representative is supported by a policy planning and early warning unit set up in the General Secretariat of the Council and placed under his responsibility.

The policy planning and early warning unit

The coherence of common foreign and security policy depends how Member States react to international developments. Past experience has shown that if reactions are uncoordinated, the position of the European Union and its Member States on the international scene is weakened. Joint analysis of international issues and their impact, and pooling of information should help the Union produce effective reactions to international developments.

With this in mind, it was agreed in a declaration annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam to set up a policy planning and early warning unit in the General Secretariat of the Council under the authority of the High Representative for the CFSP. Comprising specialists drawn from the General Secretariat, the member states, the Commission and the Western European Union (WEU), its tasks include:

- monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP;
- providing assessments of the Union's foreign and security policy interests and identifying areas on which the CFSP could focus in future;
- providing timely assessments and early warning of events, potential political crises and situations that might have significant repercussions on the CFSP;
- producing, at the request of either the Council or the Presidency, or on its own initiative, reasoned policy option papers for the Council.

The "Petersberg tasks", security and the Western European Union

The "Petersberg tasks" have been incorporated into Title V of the EU Treaty. This is a crucial step forward at a time when there has been a resurgence of local conflicts posing a real threat to European security (for example, former Yugoslavia), even though the risk of large-scale conflicts has fallen significantly compared to the Cold War period. The "Petersberg tasks" represent a very fitting response by the Union, embodying as they do the Member States' shared determination to safeguard European security through operations such as humanitarian and peace-making missions.

On the security front, the new Article 17 (ex Article J.7) of the EU Treaty also opens up prospects for two new developments, although neither seems imminent:

- common defence; and
- the integration of the Western European Union (WEU) into the European Union.

Specifically, the new text states that the CFSP covers all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to common defence, should the European Council so decide. Similarly, as regards rapprochement of the EU and the WEU, provision is made for the Union fostering closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possible integration of the WEU into the European Union, should the European Council so decide.

Financing of CFSP operational expenditure

Under the EU Treaty, CFSP operations were financed either from the Community budget or by the Member States, applying a scale to be decided case by case. This system gave rise to some criticism, particularly from the Commission, because of its complexity and inefficiency.

The Treaty of Amsterdam has addressed the problem, providing for expenditure on CFSP operations to be financed from the Community budget. The only exceptions are operations with military or defence implications, or if the Council unanimously decides otherwise. In this case, Member States that abstain and issue a formal declaration are not obliged to contribute to the financing of the operation.

Where expenditure is charged to the Member States, the cost is divided according to gross national product, unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise.

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9.2 -

Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy

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I. WHAT IS THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION?

WHAT IS THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY?

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The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

Following the signing of the Treaties of Rome, European construction focussed on economic aspects, i.e. the creation of a common market, although ideas for cooperation in the field of international policy were already in evidence. For almost forty years of European construction the very expression "common foreign policy" found no place in the Treaties. From October 1970 the Member States of the European Community cooperated and endeavoured to consult one another on major international policy problems. However, this was at intergovernmental level in the context of "European political cooperation". In 1986, the Single European Act formalised this intergovernmental cooperation without changing its nature or methods of operation. The change came at Maastricht where, for the first time, Member States incorporated in the Treaty the objective of a "common foreign policy". Since the Treaty's entry into force on 1 November 1993, the European Union as such can make its voice heard on the international stage, express its position on armed conflicts, human rights and any other subject linked to the fundamental principles and common values which form the basis of the European Union and which it is committed to defend.

The provisions on the CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force on 1 May 1999. Articles 11 to 28 of the Treaty on European Union are now devoted specifically to the CFSP.

An important decision in terms of improving the effectiveness and profile of the Union's foreign policy was the appointment of a High Representative for the CFSP (an innovation of the Treaty of Amsterdam), Mr Javier Solana Madariaga, who took up the post on 18 October 1999 for a period of five years.

The new Treaty of Nice, signed on 26 February 2001 and due to enter into force when it has been ratified by the Member States, contains new CFSP provisions.

The European security and defence policy (ESDP)

The Treaty also provides the Union with a common security policy that covers all matters relating to its security, including the gradual formulation of a common defence policy – i.e. the ESDP forms part of the CFSP. This common defence policy could lead to a common defence if the European Council were to so decide and a decision were adopted and ratified by the fifteen

Member States. The ESDP does not, however, affect the specific nature of the security and defence policies of certain Member States, and is also compatible with the policy conducted in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

The Cologne European Council meeting in June 1999 placed crisis management tasks at the core of the process of strengthening the European common security and defence policy; these are also known as the Petersberg tasks, so named after the place where the Western European Union (WEU) Ministerial Council that formulated them was held in June 1992.

They are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking. The European Council has decided that, to this end, "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO".

Each successive European Council (Helsinki, Feira and Nice) has gradually given substance to this desire to give the Union a capacity for autonomous action in international crisis management, where NATO as such is not engaged, in compliance with the principles of the UN Charter and acknowledging the prerogatives of the UN Security Council.

Thus, in December 1999, the Helsinki European Council set the headline goal in terms of military capabilities. For the Union this means being able, by the year 2003, to deploy within sixty days, and sustain for at least one year, up to 60 000 persons capable of carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks. It must be emphasised that the achievement of this goal does not involve the establishment of a European army. The commitment and deployment of national troops will be based on sovereign decisions taken by Member States.

The Nice European Council decided to establish within the Council new permanent political and military structures to provide political control and strategic direction in a crisis, viz. a Political and Security Committee and a Military Committee. In addition, the Council Secretariat now incorporates a military staff composed of military experts seconded by the Member States under the military direction of the Military Committee which it is to assist.

The Union has also defined arrangements for the possible participation of third countries (European Member States of NATO which are not part of the Union and other candidate countries for accession to the Union) and other potential partners in EU military crisis management.

In addition, permanent arrangements have been agreed for EU-NATO consultation and cooperation. Meetings between the Union and NATO are held on a regular basis in certain specific fields with a view to enabling the Union, where necessary, to launch operations using NATO assets and capabilities (notably planning capabilities and command options).

In the meantime, preparation of a programme of exercises to test the crisis management structures and assets and work out procedures is well under way.

The aim of all this work is that the Union should become rapidly operational. A decision to that effect will be taken at the latest at the European Council meeting in Laeken in December 2001.

The Union has also decided to develop the civilian aspects of crisis management in four priority areas defined by the Feira European Council: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection. Discussions continue on the implementation of the goals established for policing (Member States should be able to provide 5 000 officers by 2003 for international missions and to deploy 1 000 of them within less than 30 days) and on the definition of specific goals in connection with strengthening the rule of law.

These discussions reflect the Union's consistent overall approach to crisis management, enabling it to further develop the range of civilian instruments already at its disposal (for the most part under the responsibility of the Commission) while also being able to use military force.

This group of measures is called the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

II. WHY IS A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY NECESSARY?

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Since the 1950s the European Communities have developed strong economic links between their Member States and with the rest of the world. Progress in the economic field since the 1990s has enabled the Union to attain a level of economic integration unrivalled anywhere else in the world (for example via the creation of a single market without borders and a single currency), significantly developing trade relations with numerous countries and regions.

The Union's economic development has been accompanied by substantial contributions to other countries and regions in terms of development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction aid. The European Community and its Member States today provide more than half the funds for international development aid and more than 50% of world humanitarian aid. They finance one third of world aid to the Middle East (50% for the Palestinian Territories), almost 60% to Russia and the Republics arising out of the former Soviet Union, and 40% of the reconstruction effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This substantial aid is now supplemented by a political aspect: a contribution to international peacekeeping, using military force where appropriate, and the promotion of international cooperation, democracy and human rights.

The European Union, major economic and political player on the international stage

The root causes of the development of this political aspect are to be found in the events which, since the end of the 1980's have altered the shape of Europe and of the rest of the world, leading to an important change in strategic interests. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War eliminated the danger of a massive attack in Europe. However the conflict in the former Yugoslavia has made us more aware of the dangers of a major conflict on our doorstep.

These events have enabled us to identify the danger that regional conflicts represent for neighbouring countries and regions and for peace and international security and stability; this danger has largely replaced the risk of territorial aggression linked to the traditional concept of defence. In addition the Union must prevent and meet various threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms trafficking, contraband nuclear material, fundamentalism and extremism.

So Europe's defence needs have changed, and the Union has decided to take responsibility for its own security increasingly into its own hands.

The Union has therefore decided that it should be capable not only of acting independently in crisis management but also of intervening to prevent conflict, by endeavouring to address the causes, as well as contributing to reconstruction and stabilisation, an area in which the Community and its Member States were already taking significant measures.

III. HOW IS THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IMPLEMENTED?

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The common foreign and security policy is not implemented in the same way as Community policies (e.g. the agricultural, environmental, transport and research policies). In view of the sensitive nature of questions affecting international relations, the Treaty naturally attaches great importance to the Member States and the bodies of the European Union in which they participate directly, the Council and its competent bodies (committees, working parties).

The CFSP is part of a single institutional framework: the institutions are those which exist in the Community framework. However, the balance of powers between the Council, the Parliament and the Commission is different. From this point of view, implementation of the CFSP differs considerably from the implementation of Community policies. For example, the Commission is fully associated with the CFSP but does not have the exclusive right to submit initiatives. These come mainly from the Presidency, a Member State or the High Representative. The European Parliament is consulted by the Presidency on the fundamental choices of the CFSP and is briefed on how it is developing.

Agents of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

The European Council

The European Council brings together the Heads of State or Government of the Fifteen and the President of the European Commission. Members of the European Council are accompanied by the Foreign Affairs Ministers and by the European Commissioner responsible for external relations. Hosted in principle by the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council, the European Council lends regularity to the political life and development of the European Union by meeting at least twice a year (usually in June and December).

It occupies a position of the highest rank in the common foreign and security policy in that it determines the policy's principles and general guidelines, including those relating to matters with defence implications.

In the role of legislator conferred on it by the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Council decides unanimously on the common strategies which are implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important common interests.

The Council of the European Union

The Council of the European Union is composed of ministerial representatives of each Member State. CFSP matters are dealt with by Foreign Affairs Ministers in the General Affairs Council.

The Council has to take the necessary decisions concerning the formulation and implementation of the CFSP on the basis of the general guidelines or common strategies laid down by the European Council. To that end it adopts common positions and joint actions as well as decisions.

The Council is responsible for ensuring that the Union's action is unified, consistent and effective.

The proceedings of the General Affairs Council are prepared by the Permanent Representatives

Committee (Coreper). The Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors) act in this area in the same way as for the other Community policies.

The Political Committee and its permanent structure in Brussels, the Political and Security Committee, monitor the international situation, contribute to the formulation of policies by giving the Council opinions, either at the latter's request or on their own initiative, and also oversee the implementation of the policies that are agreed.

In the event of a crisis, the Political and Security Committee plays a central role in defining the Union's response to that crisis; it is responsible for the political control and strategic direction of all military operations, with the support of the opinions and recommendations of the Military Committee assisted by the Military Staff.

The Military Committee is responsible for the military direction of all military activities within the EU framework. It is composed of Member States' Chiefs of Defence (CHOD), represented by their military delegates in Brussels. The Chairman of the Military Committee is a four-star General, elected by the fifteen CHODs and appointed by the Council for a period of three years.

It may be noted that an innovation introduced by the Treaty of Nice will enable the Political and Security Committee, under certain conditions, to take certain implementing decisions with regard to crisis management, making the Committee's political control and strategic direction of operations easier.

The Presidency

Every six months a Member State assumes the Presidency of the European Union and in that capacity chairs the European Council, the Council of the European Union and the subordinate bodies responsible for preparing proceedings (Coreper, Political Committee/Political and Security Committee, committees and working parties). The Presidency provides the impetus and ensures follow-up. It represents the Union in CFSP matters; notably by conducting political dialogue with third countries on behalf of the Union. It is responsible for the implementation of CFSP decisions. It is on that basis that it expresses the position of the Union in international organisations and at international conferences.

The Presidency is assisted in these tasks by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in association with the European Commission. The Presidency may also be assisted by the Member State that will hold the following Presidency. These four agents are commonly referred to as the "Troika".

The Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy

The Treaty stipulates that the Secretary-General of the Council shall also be the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Sometimes referred to as "Monsieur PESC", the High Representative assists the Council by contributing in particular to the formulation, drawing up and implementation of political decisions and, where necessary, by acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency and conducting political dialogue with third parties.

The appointment of Mr Javier Solana Madariaga is sufficient proof that the High Representative is "a personality with a strong political profile"; a requirement laid down by the Vienna European Council in December 1998. Mr Solana is also Secretary-General of the Western European Union (WEU), some functions of which will be incorporated in the Union by the end of 2001.

The Deputy Secretary-General and the General Secretariat of the Council

The Secretary-General, Mr Javier Solana Madariaga, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr Pierre de Boissieu, are in charge of the General Secretariat of the Council, which assists the Presidency, prepares the Council's work at all levels and ensures that it proceeds smoothly.

The Directorate-General for External Relations (DG E), under the direction of Mr Brian Lee Crowe, Director-General, covers three major areas: external economic relations (Director-General Mr Cornelis Stekelenburg); CFSP geographical affairs; and the "politico-military structure" for the Security and Defence Policy. In addition to supporting the Council and its subsidiary bodies in all of their work, DG E is responsible for the preparation, participation in and follow-up to the political dialogue as well as the working relationship between the European Union and international organisations in the areas falling within its sphere of competence. In particular, relations are currently being strengthened with the United Nations, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO and the Council of Europe.

The "policy planning and early warning unit", now called the Policy Unit, set up by a declaration annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty, comes under the responsibility of the High Representative. The staff of the Policy Unit are drawn from the Council Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission and the Western European Union (WEU). The declaration annexed to the Treaty lists the unit's main tasks:

1. Monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP.
2. Providing assessments of the Union's interests and identifying areas where the CFSP could focus in future.
3. Providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations which may have significant repercussions, including potential political crises.
4. Producing, at the request of either the Council or the Presidency or on its own initiative, argued policy-options papers to be presented under the responsibility of the Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation in the Council.

The European Union Military Staff (EUMS), consisting of military experts from the Member States seconded to the General Secretariat of the Council, is attached directly to the High Representative. The EUMS is headed by Lieutenant-General Rainer SCHUWIRTH, Director-General, and by Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting, Deputy Director-General. The task of the EUMS is to provide early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for crisis management operations, including the identification of national and multinational European forces, and to implement policies and decisions as directed by the Military Committee it is to assist.

The European Commission

The Treaty on European Union stipulates that the European Commission is to be fully associated with the work carried out in the CFSP field. Such association is needed to ensure the consistency of the CFSP with external economic relations and development cooperation and humanitarian aid, which are Community policies in which the Commission plays a leading role.

The President of the Commission joins the Heads of State or Government within the European Council. The Commission participates in meetings of the Council and its preparatory bodies and in the political dialogue with third countries. Like the Member States or the High Representative,

it can lay before the Council any foreign and security policy issue and submit initiatives to it. However, its right of initiative is not exclusive as is usually the case with Community policies.

The Commission, like the Presidency, informs the European Parliament of CFSP developments.

The Member States

The Member States have undertaken in the Treaty to support the common foreign and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. Each Member State can lay before the Council any CFSP issue and submit proposals to it.

Member States ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions. They support these common positions, generally defended by the Presidency, in international fora. Where other Member States do not participate in the proceedings of international organisations and conferences, they keep them informed of all matters of common interest.

They undertake to uphold the joint actions. Their diplomatic services abroad cooperate to ensure compliance with and the implementation of common positions and joint actions.

The Council Secretariat, the Commission and the Member States' capitals are permanently linked by a protected communications system that enables them to exchange messages and hold consultations. The countries that are candidates for accession are also linked to the Council Secretariat by a protected computer network.

The special representatives

The Treaty allows the Council to appoint special representatives with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues. They are directly responsible to the High Representative for the CFSP. The Union currently has four special representatives: Mr Miguel Angel Moratinos (Middle East), Mr Aldo Ajello (African Great Lakes) and Mr Bodo Hombach (Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe), François Léotard (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Under the Treaty of Nice, they are appointed by qualified majority.

Instruments of the CFSP

The Treaty gives the CFSP several instruments: common positions, joint actions, decisions and the conclusion of international agreements. In addition, common strategies involve and facilitate recourse to CFSP instruments. Declarations and contacts with third countries also continue to be important diplomatic tools for the CFSP. The CFSP thus uses certain specific instruments: it does not have legal instruments such as the "directives" or "regulations" used for Community policies.

Common strategies

Common strategies are decided by the European Council, on a recommendation from the Council, in areas where the Member States have important interests. Each strategy specifies its objectives, its duration and the resources that will have to be provided by the Union and the Member States. The Council implements such strategies in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions by qualified majority (this does not apply however to questions with military or defence implications as in these areas decisions are always taken unanimously). If a member of the Council wishes to oppose one of these decisions for important reasons of national policy, the Council can appeal to the European Council, which then resolves the issue on the basis of unanimity.

So far the Council has adopted three common strategies: with regard to Russia, Ukraine and the

Mediterranean region.

Common positions

The Council can adopt common positions defining the Union's approach to a particular geographical or thematic issue, vis-à-vis a third country or at an international conference for example. The Member States then ensure that their national policies are in line with the common position.

Joint actions

The Council adopts joint actions in certain situations requiring operational action committing the Member States of the European Union. Each action specifies its objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, the conditions for its implementation and (if necessary) its duration.

Decisions

In the context of the CFSP, the Council can also adopt decisions which, like common positions and joint actions, are binding on the Member States.

The conclusion of international agreements

Where an agreement needs to be concluded with one or more States or international organisations in the CFSP sphere, the Council may authorise the Presidency to enter into negotiations. During such negotiations, the Presidency is assisted by the General Secretariat and, where necessary, by the Commission. The agreements are then concluded by the Council, acting unanimously, on a recommendation from the Presidency.

However, the Treaty stipulates that no agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall apply to them provisionally. Also, there is a declaration annexed to the Treaty to the effect that such an agreement may not imply any transfer of competence from the Member States to the European Union. The new Treaty of Nice will define the rules for decision-making in this area and specify that such agreements are binding on the Union's institutions.

The joint action concerning the Union Monitoring Mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), adopted on 22 December 2000, specifically states that the arrangements governing the mission's operations will be laid down in international agreements. This could be the first international agreement to be concluded by the European Union under the heading of the CFSP.

This monitoring mission, now called "EUMM" (European Union Monitoring Mission), consists of observers who monitor political and security developments in the Western Balkans, paying particular attention to border monitoring, inter-ethnic issues and refugee return. The High Representative plays a major role in defining the mission's tasks, supervising its operation and briefing the Council on its activities.

Declarations

Declarations give public expression to a position, request or expectation of the European Union vis-à-vis a third country or an international issue. This flexible instrument makes it possible to react very quickly to sudden incidents in a particular part of the world and to state the Union's point of view. They are entitled "Declaration by the European Union" where the Council meets

and adopts a position on an international issue and "Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union" where the Council does not meet.

Contacts with third countries

Contacts with third countries take place mainly through "political dialogue" meetings and "démarches". The European Union holds a political dialogue with a very large number of countries or groups of countries on questions of international policy. Such meetings, over 200 every year, take place at all levels: Heads of State, Ministers, Political Directors, senior officials and experts. The European Union can be represented at them by the Presidency (assisted by the High Representative for the CFSP), or by the High Representative alone at the request of the Presidency, or by the Troika (Presidency assisted by the High Representative for the CFSP and the Commission and, where appropriate, the next Presidency); or (in a limited number of cases) by Member States' delegates and the Commission representative. Démarches, which are confidential, are undertaken vis-à-vis third countries by the Presidency or the Troika, on behalf of the European Union. It is generally their purpose to resolve with the State in question matters relating to human rights, democracy or humanitarian action.

IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY ?

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The Common Foreign and Security Policy must be consistent with other policies and have an efficient decision-making procedure.

Consistency

Consistency in the CFSP field is ensured under two headings. First of all, the Treaty on European Union has provided a framework, resources, methods and patterns of work for implementing the CFSP, whilst keeping it within the single institutional framework, i.e. the framework that already existed in the Community's sphere of action. Such coordination is strengthened by the fact that the Commission is fully associated in discussions on the CFSP.

Secondly, it is for the European Council, by setting out guidelines for the development of the Union, to ensure the consistency of the CFSP with Community policies (including in particular external economic relations and development cooperation policy), which are conducted under the responsibility of the Commission.

Efficiency of the decision-making procedure


CFSP decisions are generally taken unanimously. This means that one Member State can block the adoption of a text. The Treaty however includes a number of measures intended to overcome this obstacle. While unanimity remains the rule, and is obligatory for the adoption of decisions with military or defence implications, there are two options for making decisions easier:

1. "Constructive abstention": When a decision is adopted, a Member State may couple its abstention with a formal declaration. In such a case, it is not required to apply the decision but acknowledges that the decision is binding on the Union.
2. The use of qualified majority voting: This has been extended to cases where the Council implements common strategies decided on by the European Council and to decisions on the

implementation of joint actions and common positions. When a decision is adopted by qualified majority, a Member State may nevertheless invoke important and stated reasons of national policy in order to oppose the adoption of the text. A vote will not then be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, refer the matter to the European Council for a unanimous decision. It is important to note that qualified majority voting in the CFSP field is, in a way, "reinforced qualified majority voting": for adoption, acts require 62 votes in favour cast by at least 10 members.

3. The Treaty of Nice introduces the concept of enhanced cooperation between several Member States: where the objectives of the Union and the Community cannot be achieved by the Member States as a whole, those Member States in a position to do so (at least eight Member States) may establish between them "enhanced" cooperation. In the CFSP field, this cooperation may relate solely to the implementation of a joint action or a common position, to arms initiatives or to security and defence initiatives contributing to the acquisition of crisis management capabilities.

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Updated: 29-May-2001

NATO Press Releases

Press
Release
M-NAC-
1(2001)77

29 May 2001

Final Communiqué

Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Budapest

1. At our meeting today, we took stock of the progress made in promoting the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and gave guidance for further implementation of the Washington Summit decisions. In particular, we have:
 - o reaffirmed our commitment to a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe, and our determination to oppose all violence, whether ethnically, politically or criminally motivated;
 - o continued our efforts to develop close and effective NATO-EU relations, in order to strengthen the transatlantic partnership; and
 - o decided to intensify our discussions on security challenges of the 21st century, including the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery, and how best to address them.
2. We reaffirm NATO's strong commitment to security, stability, peace, democracy and respect for human rights in South-East Europe. The Alliance will continue to pursue this objective vigorously, primarily through the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo and through security cooperation with the countries of the region.
3. We pay tribute to the men and women of all nations serving in SFOR and KFOR for their professionalism and dedication to the cause of peace and stability. We express our deep sympathy to the families of those who have lost their lives or been injured in the course of their mission. We are grateful to NATO's Partners and other nations for the substantial contributions they are making to our common effort.
4. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in South-East Europe. We emphasise our determination to promote long-term stability through regional reconciliation and cooperation, goodneighbourliness, stable and secure borders, protection of the rights of members of ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, a lasting resolution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

5. We welcome the steady improvement in our relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and look forward to their further development. We are encouraged by the positive steps taken by the democratically elected government and believe that its constructive attitude will contribute to long-term stability across the region and offer new opportunities for regional cooperation and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. We welcome the progress made by the FRY in improving its relations with its neighbours, and cooperating towards the full implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244. We welcome the FRY's more cooperative stance towards the ICTY and the positive measures already taken, and expect it to continue on the path towards full cooperation with the Tribunal in its work in The Hague, including through the adoption of an appropriate legal framework. All indictees must be held accountable for their acts in full compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 827 on the establishment of the ICTY. In this regard, we welcome the arrest of former President Milosevic.
6. We call on Belgrade and Podgorica to resume a constructive dialogue on their constitutional relationship and to seek solutions acceptable to both. We strongly discourage any unilateral steps that may threaten the political stability of not only the FRY, but also the region as a whole. We reiterate our support for a democratic Montenegro within a democratic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
7. We support the ongoing efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the problems in Southern Serbia, taking into account the peace plan of the FRY/Serbian authorities which seeks to address the legitimate grievances of the ethnic Albanian community. We are pleased that the efforts by the Secretary General's Personal Representative, and the close cooperation with the European Union, have been instrumental in this regard. NATO will continue to stay engaged in this process and we look forward to continued cooperation with the FRY/Serbian authorities in this respect. We are encouraged by recent positive developments following the decision by NATO to allow, as a further step to ultimately abolish the Ground Safety Zone, the controlled return of FRY forces into Sector B under COMKFOR's authority. In particular, we welcome the restraint shown by the FRY forces re-entering the Zone and the absence of major confrontations with armed groups. We also welcome the fact that many ethnic Albanians who previously belonged to armed groups have, under KFOR's supervision, relinquished their weapons and ceased their activities.
8. The successful completion of the process now under way in Southern Serbia and the longer term stability of the region require the early implementation of tangible and verifiable confidence-building measures. We applaud the first steps towards implementing the OSCE-sponsored multi-ethnic police training concept, the amnesty as announced by the Serb authorities, the demilitarisation statement signed by leaders of armed groups and their voluntary disarmament and dissolution. The strict political control over FRY forces in the region and the integration of ethnic

Albanians into local administrative and political structures are also important. For their part, ethnic Albanians must commit themselves fully to the political process aimed at reconciliation, to voluntary disarmament, to the dissolution of armed groups, and to the renunciation of violence. KFOR, in conjunction with UNMIK police, will continue its robust action to interdict the movement of arms and armed groups between Kosovo, Southern Serbia and other parts of the region, including the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾.

9. We reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of UNSCR 1244. We commend the excellent working relationship between KFOR and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in working towards establishing a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic Kosovo, where all its people, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in democratic institutions. We welcome the issuing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (SRSG) of the regulation concerning the constitutional framework for provisional self-government in Kosovo, which is an important step in the implementation of UNSCR 1244. This framework will provide the basis for Kosovo-wide elections to be held on 17 November. Kosovo's leaders should assume their responsibilities and make every effort to ensure that the elections take place peacefully in a secure environment. We urge all communities to participate in these elections and to take full part in the new political structures in Kosovo. All displaced persons should have the possibility to participate in these general elections.
10. We reaffirm the importance of creating conditions in which refugees and displaced persons, including Kosovo Serb and other ethnic minorities, can return to their homes in safety and security. We urge the political leaders of Kosovo to pursue this goal more actively in cooperation with KFOR and UNMIK.
11. The establishment of a secure environment for all the people of Kosovo remains a priority. We strongly condemn ethnically, politically or criminally motivated extremist activities by both ethnic Albanians and Serbs, as well as acts of violence perpetrated against the international presence. All such violence is inexcusable, and is contrary to the interests of Kosovo and the region as a whole. We call on all political parties and communities in Kosovo, in particular the Albanian ones, to condemn such activities unambiguously and to support the significant efforts by KFOR and UNMIK to combat extremism and strengthen the rule of law and deny the use of Kosovo as a base for extremist activities in the region. In this context, we also urge the early promulgation of an UNMIK regulation to enable more effective action against proponents of extremism and violence. Ethnic tensions in Mitrovica and the minority areas remain a matter of concern.
12. We also remain very concerned about the high level of organised crime and its links to extremism and external sources of finance.

Organised crime threatens healthy economic development in Kosovo and represents a major source of instability for the region.

13. The proper functioning of Kosovo's judicial system is a prerequisite for healthy democratic development and economic prosperity. We welcome the recent progress in strengthening the rule of law, but note that more improvements must be made. We commend the continuing work of the OSCE in helping to recruit and train members of the multi-ethnic Kosovo Police Service.
14. We welcome the recent release of ethnic Albanian political prisoners from Serb jails. We recall the need for Belgrade to release the remaining Kosovo Albanians who are detained in Serbia without proper legal grounds. We call for every effort to be made to account accurately for missing persons, regardless of ethnic origin, and stress KFOR's preparedness to work with the International Commission of Missing Persons.
15. We recognise that the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) remains generally compliant in fulfilling its civilian role, under the overall responsibility of UNMIK and the day-to-day supervision of KFOR. Nevertheless, there are serious concerns about cases of non-compliance by individual members and about involvement in organised crime, possession of unauthorised weapons and support to extremist activities in Kosovo and surrounding areas. We condemn these activities and recall the need for the KPC leadership to continue to take steps to end them and to clearly and publicly condemn extremist activities in Kosovo and the region. KFOR will continue to exercise close supervision over the KPC in accordance with the policies and priorities established by the SRSG. We attach the utmost importance to the strict enforcement of the KPC Code of Conduct.
16. We noted a report on KFOR's roles and missions and recommendations on its size and structure. We welcome its conclusions, particularly that, at present, no changes to the size and posture of KFOR are appropriate.
17. We remain firmly committed to the full implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We fully support the objectives of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and its determination to integrate Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single, multi-ethnic, democratic state, with strong and effective common institutions, into Euro-Atlantic structures. We will continue to work closely, in particular through SFOR, with the High Representative and with other organisations, including the UNHCR, the OSCE, the European Union, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the ICTY. We strongly endorse the respective efforts of SFOR and the ICTY to detain and bring to trial persons indicted for war crimes. In this context, we reiterate that the Entities carry primary responsibility for bringing to justice persons indicted for war crimes, and urge them to cooperate more effectively with SFOR to this end.

18. We welcome the participation, following the elections of last autumn, of moderate, non-nationalistic political parties in the new state and entity governments. The international community expects these new governments to make greater and more rapid progress towards a self-sustaining, multi-ethnic democracy. We call on the newly elected leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement and of preparing Bosnia and Herzegovina to integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures.
19. We condemn all forms of separatism and nationalist violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this regard, we are deeply concerned at the recent events in Mostar perpetrated by Croat extremists and in Trebinje and Banja Luka perpetrated by Serb extremists, which directly challenge the Dayton Peace Agreement and the legitimate state and entity institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We call on all political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in other countries of the region, to clearly express their condemnation of these events. We fully support the High Representative and SFOR in their efforts to counter this challenge. We call on all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to resolve their differences through peaceful, legal and democratic means. We also urge them to recognise that the interests of their community are best served within the existing institutional framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina and by cooperating with the High Representative and with the legitimate state and entity authorities. Violence by any group against these authorities, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina or SFOR troops and other representatives of the international community, will not be tolerated.
20. We urge Bosnian Croats not to pursue narrow, parochial objectives, but to realise that their interests are best achieved by working for the collective interests of the Bosnian community as a whole. We call on those Bosnian Croats who have left the Federation structures to return to them and commend those who have already returned for their commitment to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We welcome Croatia's policy rejecting the HDZ's attempts to form parallel institutions.
21. We encourage the Presidency to pursue the programme of defence reform as a matter of priority. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs armed forces with a unified command and control capable of joint deployment and joint action under international and regional security organisations. In this respect, we welcome the endorsement by the Presidency of a common defence policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. We reaffirm our commitment to further contribute to enhancing stability and confidence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to strengthen cooperation between the Entities' armed forces.
22. We urge the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement fully Annex I B of the Dayton Peace Agreement concerning confidence-building and security measures. We call upon the countries neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina to support in an open and transparent manner the full implementation of the Agreement, in

particular those countries that are signatories to this Agreement.

23. We welcome the contribution of the OSCE to the implementation of the Peace Agreement and to the creation of a framework for peace and stability in South-East Europe. We call upon the States participating in the negotiations on regional stability under the Agreement to make use of the fresh impetus generated by the participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the OSCE, with the aim of concluding their work as soon as possible. NATO stands ready to support the implementation of such an agreement within the framework of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe.
24. We noted a report on SFOR's roles and missions and recommendations on its size and structure. We welcome its conclusions, notably that it is not advisable at this time to consider major restructuring or reductions of SFOR, particularly in light of the current developments, but that, under certain circumstances as set out by the NATO Military Authorities, a moderate reduction in overall troop levels could be undertaken within the current force structure. We reiterate the recommendation from the report on the need to fully resource the Multinational Specialised Units to agreed levels.
25. We reiterate our full commitment to the security, stability and territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾. We strongly condemn the recent acts of violence by extremist Albanian groups, which have not only threatened the stability of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾, but also undermined the efforts of those ethnic Albanians who are working together with the international community to bring peace, democracy and stability to the troubled Balkan region. We urge the leaders of ethnic Albanian communities in the region to condemn unambiguously these acts of violence. The extremists must immediately cease their violent activities.
26. We are encouraged by the refusal of the overwhelming majority of the population in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾ to support those who believe their goals and objectives should be reached through violence. We support the authorities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾ in their efforts to isolate the extremist elements in a manner which promotes a peaceful solution. We look to the authorities to avoid the excessive use of force and expect them to take every precaution to avoid civilian casualties.
27. We welcome the creation of a broad coalition government. We urge the parties to take quick, concrete steps in the ongoing inter-ethnic dialogue under President Trajkovski's auspices, with the participation of political parties of all ethnic groups, with a view to meeting legitimate concerns, consolidating inter-ethnic relations and ensuring a better future for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin. In this regard, we note the steps by the government to establish Albanian language higher-level education, an Albanian-language television channel and enhanced local self-

government.

28. Cooperation between international organisations has resulted in a coordinated response and an unambiguous signal of the international community's determination to support stability in the region. We particularly welcome the close cooperation between NATO and the EU, as exemplified by the joint missions to Skopje by the NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative.
29. We welcome the fact that increased patrolling and enhanced KFOR force levels on the Kosovo side of the border have improved KFOR's ability to detect, disrupt and deter any transfer of men and materiel from Kosovo to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (¹). KFOR is determined to continue these activities vigorously. The Alliance has recently appointed a Senior Civilian Representative to foster communications and coordination with the authorities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (¹) and other political leaders in the country.
30. We welcome the improved military coordination and the exchange of military information with the Ministries of Defence and Interior in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (¹), as well as the establishment of a NATO Cooperation and Coordination Centre led by NATO's Senior Military Representative to facilitate the exchange of information and act as a clearing house for assistance efforts. We also note with appreciation the efforts by Allies to step up bilateral assistance to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (¹). The Alliance will continue to look for practical ways to enhance assistance in all these areas.
31. We reiterate our great appreciation for the ongoing efforts of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (¹) in supporting KFOR and welcome the recent agreement defining the legal status of KFOR personnel whilst on the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (¹).
32. The development by the countries in South-East Europe of self-sufficient national capabilities to guarantee the control and the security of their borders is critical for the security and the stability of the region. The Alliance has taken concrete steps to assist the governments of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (¹) and Albania in this regard, and is using the existing frameworks of the EAPC and the South-East Europe Initiative (SEEI) to engage with Partners in a dialogue on this issue.
33. We received the Consolidated Progress Report on the Development of the SEEI and Contributions of the Alliance to the Objectives of the Stability Pact. We noted with satisfaction that many of the activities begun under the SEEI have matured and are producing valuable results in support of regional cooperation, as well as the efforts by individual countries to further integrate into the Euro-Atlantic Community, and thus support and complement the objectives of the Stability Pact.

34. We welcome the adoption later today of the Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities (SEECAP) which is designed to develop realistic security policies and the reform of security establishments by countries of the region. We also welcome the continued efforts of the South-East Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group (SEEGROUP) as a valuable regional initiative in support of NATO's SEEI and the Stability Pact for South-East Europe. We are encouraged by the progress made by South-East European countries in developing their own regional peacekeeping force and note the declaration of operational readiness of the Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe on 1 May.
35. We are pleased that, in addition to Bulgaria and Romania, Croatia now also benefits from the successful programme launched by the Alliance and the World Bank, and facilitated through the Stability Pact, to retrain and reintegrate former military personnel into the civilian economy.
36. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to continue to pursue the efforts under the SEEI and the Alliance's contributions to the Stability Pact, in particular in the area of defence reform, and look forward to further progress by the time of our next meeting.
37. The Alliance has taken very seriously the public concerns about reports of possible effects of depleted uranium on the health of military and civilian personnel involved in NATO operations, and that of civilian populations. An extensive exchange of information, involving the Allies, the countries of the region, all contributors to SFOR and KFOR, and relevant international organisations, has indicated no evidence of such a link. Allies will continue to share information, and to cooperate with United Nations agencies, in particular the United Nations Environment Programme, and other relevant international institutions on this matter.
38. We reviewed progress achieved to date in implementing the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The goal of the DCI has remained unchanged: to provide the forces and capabilities the Alliance requires to meet the security challenges of the 21st century, across the full spectrum of Alliance missions. NATO Allies must continue to increase defence capabilities and interoperability through improvements in the deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, their sustainability, survivability and effective engagement capability, and the effectiveness of their command and control. A sustained commitment is required to meet these ambitious goals - both at NATO Headquarters and in capitals. We remain determined to support this work fully, noting in particular that the efforts of the Alliance and Allied nations to implement DCI and the efforts of the EU to enhance European capabilities are mutually reinforcing. Because Partners have an important part to play in future NATO-led operations, we welcome their current engagement in elements of the DCI.
39. We took stock of the progress made to date on the development of

the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) in accordance with the decisions taken at the Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings. We reaffirmed our determination to reinforce NATO's European pillar and remain committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership. We share the EU's commitment to a genuine strategic partnership in crisis management between NATO and the EU. The Alliance will remain the foundation of the collective defence of its members and continue actively to play its important role in crisis management as set out in the Strategic Concept. The partnership between NATO and the EU and the development of a capable and effective ESDI, in accordance with the principles set out at the Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings, will strengthen the Alliance through which we remain ready to pursue common security objectives wherever possible.

40. We reaffirm our commitment to a transparent, coherent and cooperative NATO-EU relationship that ensures the Alliance's continued military effectiveness and Allied cohesion. Enhancing European capabilities is central to this process. Both NATO and the EU have a common interest in ensuring the coherent development of the military capabilities of their member states.
41. We welcome the intensification of the dialogue between the Alliance and the European Union since our last meeting in Brussels. The close consultation and cooperation between the two organisations and the mutually reinforcing steps taken by them in responding to the situation in the Balkans show that NATO and the EU have engaged in successful practical cooperation on questions of common interest relating to security, defence and crisis management. Continuing such practical cooperation between the two organisations will help ensure that crises can be met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management ensured. In this context, we welcome the high level of coordination and cooperation between the Secretary General and the EU High Representative, in particular their joint missions and those of their Personal Representatives to the region. We look forward to the first formal meeting of Foreign Ministers of NATO and the European Union on 30 May.
42. At our December meeting, we inter alia noted and welcomed the proposals made by the European Council at Nice for permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency, consultation and cooperation between NATO and the EU. We agreed that consultations and cooperation would be developed between the two organisations on questions of common interest relating to security, defence and crisis management, so that crises would be met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management ensured. We looked forward to the early establishment of such mutually satisfactory arrangements based on the principles enunciated in Washington and at subsequent Ministerial meetings, which would be taken into account in the framework agreement establishing these arrangements. These arrangements would be key to a close, confident and transparent relationship between the two organisations as foreseen in the Washington Summit. Following the results of the NATO

Ministerial meetings and the Nice European Council, an exchange of letters took place in January this year between the Secretary General and the EU Presidency. Not less than three meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the EU Political and Security Committee and not less than one Ministerial meeting will be held during each EU Presidency. Either organisation may request additional meetings as necessary. Both organisations are committed to stepping up contacts and meetings in the emergency phase of a crisis.

43. We welcome the four meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the EU Political and Security Committee that have taken place and we look forward to further such meetings. We also welcome the progress made to date in the NATO-EU Ad Hoc Working Groups. We look forward to their future work, taking into account all relevant matters, including those related to participation.
44. We note the successful implementation of the NATO-EU interim agreement on the security of information established last year and welcome the progress made in preparing a permanent security agreement between the two organisations, including the productive work in the NATO-EU Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Issues. We reiterate our readiness to conclude a permanent security agreement between NATO and the EU as a matter of priority.
45. The European Allies are committed to further strengthening their military capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar. This will enhance their ability to contribute both to the Alliance's missions and to EU-led operations for Petersberg tasks where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. We note that this process does not imply the creation of a European army and that the commitment of national resources for EU-led operations will be based on sovereign decisions.
46. We welcome the further efforts made in the EU towards meeting its Headline Goal by 2003 as set out at the Helsinki European Council, thus contributing to the improvement and strengthening of European military capabilities. The significant additional contributions offered by non-EU European Allies to the pool of forces available for EU-led operations are important and will enhance the range of capabilities potentially available to the EU. We welcome the bilateral meetings held between the EU and the non-EU European Allies in order to clarify and evaluate their contributions to European crisis management on the basis of the same criteria as those applying to EU member states and look forward to the further development of this practice. We note the EU's recognition of the need for further capability improvements. The Alliance's Defence Capabilities Initiative is also supporting the enhancement of European capabilities. The objectives arising from NATO's DCI and the EU's Headline Goal are mutually reinforcing. We note with satisfaction that NATO, upon request by the EU Presidency and on the basis of a Council decision, agreed to support for the duration of the Swedish EU Presidency the work of the HTF Plus through a team of experts open to national experts of those Allies who wish to participate in this work. In order to continue this important work during the next EU Presidency,

NATO stands ready to provide, subject to an early Council decision, further expert advice upon request by the EU.

47. We continue to underline, as we did at the Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings, the importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies to the issue of participation. Allies welcome the fact that meetings between the EU and non-EU Allies have started. Allies look forward to further broad and effective practical implementation of the arrangements agreed by the European Council at Nice for dialogue, consultation and cooperation with non-EU European Allies on issues related to security and defence policy and crisis management as well as the modalities for participation in EU-led military operations. We welcome the EU's commitment to intensify consultation in times of crisis, which will also enable non-EU European Allies to raise their concerns when they consider their security interests might be involved. It is particularly important in this context that non-EU European Allies can request meetings with the European Union and submit proposals for agenda items. Consultation and cooperation are particularly important with the EU Political and Security Committee and the EU Military Committee and, as appropriate, with the EU military staff, so as to ensure that the Allies concerned derive maximum benefit from them and to enable the Allies concerned to contribute effectively. In this context, in accordance with the Washington Treaty, we continue to stress the importance we attach to respecting the security interests of all Allies and the obligations which they have to each other as Allies.
48. We welcome the progress made in developing dialogue, cooperation and consultation between Canada and the EU on the full range of security and defence issues of mutual concern. This includes a joint commitment to intensify consultation in times of crisis, particularly when the EU is considering an operation using NATO assets and capabilities. Canada and the EU have agreed to continue their dialogue to finalise the modalities for consultations with Canada and its participation in operations led by the EU.
49. Taking into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU, work on ESDI is continuing within the Alliance as directed at the Washington Summit and agreed at subsequent Ministerial meetings. It is proceeding on the principle that nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed - the participation issue is also relevant in this context. On this basis, and consistent with the decisions taken at Washington and subsequent Ministerial meetings, intensified discussions on the participation issue since our last meeting in December have strengthened the prospects for progress on the various aspects of the Washington agenda and specifically on arrangements for:
 - o assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;
 - o the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;
 - o the identification of a range of European command options

for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; and

- o the further adaptation of the Alliance's defence planning system.

Important work remains to be done which we will pursue intensively, taking account of relevant activities in and proposals from the European Union.

50. Recalling the decisions taken at the Washington Summit, and looking ahead to the review of the enlargement process which will be undertaken by NATO Heads of State and Government at their Prague Summit in 2002, we reaffirm the Alliance's commitment to remain open to new members. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Washington Treaty will be excluded from consideration regardless of its geographic location, each being considered on its own merits.
51. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) process underlines NATO's commitment to its Open Door policy by assisting the nine aspiring countries in their own efforts to prepare for possible future membership. The streamlining of this process, which we have undertaken in consultation with aspirants, has improved its efficiency and effectiveness. We are pleased that aspirants have taken full advantage of the opportunities provided by the MAP.
52. Following meetings of the North Atlantic Council this Spring with senior members of the governments of each of the aspiring countries to examine progress made, we have now completed the second annual cycle of the MAP. We received today a Consolidated Progress Report on the results of the second cycle, as part of our ongoing review of the enlargement process, including the implementation of the Membership Action Plan. The report highlights the progress made by the aspirants in their preparations for possible future membership - and challenges still outstanding - in all areas covered by the MAP, including political and economic issues, defence and military issues, resource, security and legal issues. We welcome the extent to which the aspirants have used the MAP as a tool to promote reform, and the progress they have made in their reforms.
53. As we move towards the third cycle of the MAP, we encourage all aspirants to continue focused efforts to prepare for possible future membership of the Alliance, building on the progress they have achieved so far and pursuing vigorously the challenging goals they have set themselves. In this regard, we urge all aspirants to continue their efforts to define and implement realistic and

affordable goals, including for defence reform. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to consider, in consultation with the aspirants, if any further alterations are needed to make the implementation of the MAP more effective.

54. We remain firmly committed to strengthening the EAPC and PfP to enhance cooperation, transparency and confidence among all the members of the Euro-Atlantic community. Partnership is pivotal to the role of the Alliance in promoting security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and contributes to the enhancement of the Alliance's capabilities in crisis management. The common commitment of the Alliance and its Partners to cooperative efforts to deal with shared Euro-Atlantic security concerns has been amply demonstrated in the Balkans, where many Partner countries provide valuable contributions to both SFOR and KFOR, and are supporting the efforts by the Alliance and the broader international community to bring about lasting peace in the Balkans. To this end, we look forward to welcoming Foreign Minister Svilanovic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a guest to address tomorrow's meeting of EAPC Foreign Ministers.
55. We note with satisfaction the many EAPC/PfP activities to promote practical regional cooperation in South-East Europe, as well as in the Caucasus and Central Asia. We recognise Croatia's commitment to active participation in the EAPC and PfP and its declared interest in possible future NATO membership; and welcome its intention to begin an Intensified Dialogue on membership questions with the Alliance. We welcome Tajikistan's intention to join PfP and look forward to its early signature of the PfP Framework Document. We value the role of the Regional Ad Hoc Working Groups on South-East Europe and the Caucasus in promoting and supporting regional cooperation, and would welcome the use of this mechanism for the promotion of regional cooperation in other areas of the Euro-Atlantic region. We welcome continued efforts in the EAPC/PfP framework to support broader efforts underway to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and in support of global humanitarian mine action and the promotion of International Humanitarian Law, among other EAPC priority areas. We welcome the launch of the first project undertaken through the PfP Trust Fund on Anti-Personnel Landmine Stockpile Destruction, which will destroy Albania's entire stockpile of 1.7 million anti-personnel landmines. We welcome this continued emphasis upon result-oriented, practical activities. We stress the importance of ensuring that the work of the EAPC takes into account and complements efforts undertaken in other Euro-Atlantic security fora, such as the OSCE. In this context, we take note of ongoing initiatives aimed at fulfilling this objective.
56. We took note today of reports on the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership, and the implementation of the Operational Capabilities Concept. The process of enhancing and making the Partnership for Peace more operational will further strengthen our common ability to manage crises effectively. We look forward to reviewing further progress on these initiatives at our next meeting. We welcome continued progress in providing effective and

targeted support to the efforts of Partners to reorganise and restructure their defence establishments and armed forces. We remain strongly committed to the full implementation of the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations. Within this Framework, we attach importance to enhancing the role of Partners in the political guidance and oversight, planning, and command arrangements for NATO-led crisis response operations. We received today a report on progress achieved in implementing the Political-Military Framework. The current state of implementation is a significant advance on that 12 months ago. However, it is necessary to continue to refine and practise the procedures of the Framework to reap the maximum benefit for NATO and contributing Partners alike. The full implementation of the Framework is a process that ultimately contributes to making NATO-led operations with Partners more efficient. The next full-fledged review of the implementation of the Framework should be conducted by the end of this year, with a report in time for the 2002 Spring Ministerial meetings.

57. Four years after the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in Paris, the Alliance remains committed to building a strong, stable and enduring partnership with the Russian Federation on the basis of the principles of transparency, reciprocity and mutual trust. We welcome the progress achieved in our consultations and cooperation in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC).
58. We attach great importance to the continued and improved dialogue on issues relating to the situation in the Balkans. We note with satisfaction the continued excellent practical cooperation with Russian forces in both SFOR and KFOR.
59. We value our ongoing consultations and cooperation with Russia in the framework of the PJC on such issues as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, defence reform, disarmament and arms control related issues, including CFE and Open Skies, scientific and environmental issues, civil emergency preparedness, and the retraining of discharged military personnel. We welcome active cooperation in search and rescue at sea based on the programme of cooperation between NATO and Russia on this issue agreed by PJC Defence Ministers in December 2000. We look forward to further consultations on the Russian proposal regarding missile defence and Allied suggestions regarding nuclear CSBMs. We welcome enhanced Russian participation in the EAPC and encourage Russia to participate more actively in PfP.
60. We welcome the opening of the NATO Information Office in Moscow as an important step towards improving public understanding of NATO and its partnership with Russia. We look forward to developing NATO's information activities in Russia. We attach great importance to the further development of military-to-military cooperation and, to this end, are pursuing our consultations with Russia to establish a NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow, as called for in the Founding Act.

61. We remain seriously concerned about the ongoing conflict in Chechnya. We recognise Russia's right to preserve its territorial integrity and to protect all citizens against terrorism and criminality, which we condemn in all their forms. We urge all parties to take immediate steps to halt the ongoing fighting and to seek as a matter of urgency a political solution. We are deeply concerned about the continued reports of widespread human rights violations in Chechnya and urge the Russian Government to carry out systematic investigations of these reports and to prosecute all perpetrators. We call upon Russia to respect all its international obligations regarding the protection of human rights. We welcome the Russian Government's preparedness to expedite the OSCE Assistance Group's return to Chechnya and urge Russia to meet its commitments to facilitate the Group's work under its existing mandate. We also urge Russia to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance in order to relieve the suffering of displaced persons. We call on the Chechen side to cooperate in good faith in seeking a political solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take actions against it.
62. We remain committed to our distinctive partnership with Ukraine, based on our support for an independent, democratic, stable and market-oriented Ukraine. We encourage Ukraine to take concrete steps to move the reform process forward and, in this context, ensure the full respect of democratic values and freedoms, human rights and the rule of law, consistent with Ukraine's international commitments. We value Ukraine's good relations with its neighbours, including Russia and members of the Alliance, which contribute to stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and also welcome Ukraine's wider contribution to ensuring stability in Europe as a whole.
63. We reiterate our appreciation for Ukraine's continuing contribution to KFOR, as an expression of Ukraine's commitment to our joint effort to build peace and stability in the Balkans. We note with satisfaction the progress achieved in the implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, signed four years ago in Madrid. We are satisfied with the successful implementation of military and non-military cooperative and consultative activities under the NATO-Ukraine Work Plan for 2001 so far. We note the improved cooperation in the fields of retraining of retired officers, civil emergency planning and in the science for peace programme, and encourage Ukraine to continue the critical work on defence reform, making full use of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform. Ukraine's decision to participate fully in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) to support its plan for defence reform is a positive development.
64. We are determined to build on these achievements. In this context, we welcome Ukraine's state programme of cooperation with NATO for 2001-2004, underlining Ukraine's commitment to a strong NATO-Ukraine relationship. We continue to attach particular importance to the role of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, established to increase public

awareness of the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership throughout the country, and to the NATO Liaison Office, facilitating Ukraine's participation in PfP and its efforts to implement defence reform.

65. We reiterate our firm belief that security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. We underline the importance we attach to our Mediterranean Dialogue, which is part of the Alliance's overall cooperative approach to security and reinforces and complements other international efforts.
66. We welcome the successful completion - in March 2001 - of the first round of visits by NATO Senior Officials to Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The visits were conducted with the aim of exchanging views on NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as getting a better appreciation of each Dialogue country's specific objectives and priorities. We encourage interest from Mediterranean Dialogue countries in political consultations and practical cooperation with our Alliance. In this regard, we look forward to establishing appropriate arrangements with all Mediterranean partners on the security of information.
67. We reaffirm the progressive nature of the Dialogue, and will continue to consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of our cooperative relations with all the Mediterranean partners in accordance with the Washington Summit decisions, in areas where NATO can bring an added value and where partners have expressed interest. We received today the progress report on the Mediterranean Dialogue and note with satisfaction the growing interaction between the Alliance and its Mediterranean partners.
68. We welcome the significant role played by the OSCE in the Euro-Atlantic area, notably in South-East Europe. We also welcome the progress made on implementation of the commitments undertaken and the initiatives launched at the 1999 Istanbul Summit for strengthening the OSCE's operational capability, thus improving its crisis management capacity. We recall NATO's support for the Platform for Cooperative Security, in which the OSCE declared its intention to work with other institutions. We welcome the substantial progress made in the implementation of the Platform, particularly the enhanced contacts and cooperation between NATO and the OSCE on matters of common interest. In that regard, we appreciate the close and fruitful cooperation between NATO and the OSCE in promoting stability in Southern Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
69. As we meet in Budapest, the States Parties of the CFE Treaty are conducting the second CFE Review Conference in Vienna. This is a significant occasion to reaffirm the vital importance of the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security and stability. The Conference is reviewing the operation of the Treaty and the elements mentioned in the Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1999. We hope it will be possible to record important progress on issues relevant to achieving entry into

force of the Adapted Treaty. Confidence in the full and timely implementation of all CFE obligations and related commitments is essential to the continued viability of this Treaty.

70. We note with satisfaction that the Russian Federation has met its East-of-the-Urals commitments to destroy agreed amounts of equipment, while continuing to destroy battle tanks as required. We remain particularly concerned that Russia continues to exceed equipment levels in relation to the Treaty's Article V ("Flank") limits. We note that Russia has notified withdrawals from the North Caucasus. However, Russia has not provided "maximum transparency" including detailed information on equipment withdrawn and remaining in the region and additional inspection opportunities to monitor equipment withdrawals. This is most regrettable. We continue to emphasise the importance we attach to fulfilment of the November 1999 commitment by the Government of the Russian Federation that Russian equipment levels in the North Caucasus would be reduced to the Treaty's agreed levels of armaments and equipment as soon as possible, in conditions of maximum transparency and in a manner consistent with agreed counting rules and procedures. Those conditions currently do not exist sufficient to enable other States Parties to verify with confidence Russian TLE withdrawals from the region and resulting equipment levels.
71. We welcome the Russian Federation's completion of the first phase of its Istanbul commitment to reduce and withdraw forces from Georgia. An important deadline of 1 July 2001 is approaching as by then the Russian military bases at Gudauta and Vaziani will have to be disbanded and the forces withdrawn, as was agreed at the Istanbul Summit. We look for early completion of the negotiations regarding the duration and modalities of the remaining Russian military bases consistent with the Host States rights under Article IV Paragraph 5 of the current CFE Treaty. We underline the need for substantive and early progress on Russia's Istanbul commitment to withdraw its military forces and equipment from Moldova. The deadline will approach at the end of this year for completion of the first phase of this commitment, the withdrawal and/or destruction of Russian TLE, which has not yet begun to be implemented.
72. The full implementation and verification of the CFE Treaty is essential for ensuring the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. The early entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty will ensure the continuing viability of the CFE Treaty in this role and will permit accession by other states. We are committed to that end. However, we have consistently stated that for us ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty's agreed levels of armaments and equipment, and consistent with the commitments contained in the CFE Final Act.
73. We welcome the positive steps towards ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies by Russia and Belarus. This Treaty is one of the widest ranging international arms control efforts to date to promote openness and transparency regarding military forces and activities.

We are pleased that the Treaty is closer to entry into force and encourage both Russia and Belarus to complete the ratification process.

74. The preparation of the first United Nations International Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, in All its Aspects in July 2001 is the focal point of all international efforts this year to come to grips with the uncontrolled spread and destabilising accumulation of small arms and light weapons. Allies agree that the conference should aim for a programme of action that will best facilitate bilateral and international assistance to the most affected parts of the world. The approach within the Alliance is that these problems must be addressed as part of a long term process with a particular focus on stockpile management and support for the destruction of surplus weapons and associated munitions. The PfP Trust Fund on Anti-Personnel Landmine Stockpile Destruction has been expanded to cover the destruction of surplus munitions and small arms and light weapons. This will further facilitate the programme of activities under the Partnership for Peace work programme chapter on small arms and light weapons.
75. We welcome the regional initiatives of the European Union and the OSCE on this issue particularly the OSCE's milestone Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons which focuses on the development of norms, principles and measures covering all aspects of the issue. We support the implementation of measures included in the OSCE Document by all member states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
76. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery continues to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance as it poses risks to international and regional security and can pose a direct military threat to Allies' populations, territory and forces. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members remains unchanged: to prevent proliferation from occurring, or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. In this context we continue to place great importance on non-proliferation and export control regimes, international arms control and disarmament as means to prevent proliferation. Accordingly, the Alliance will continue to enhance its efforts to reduce dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
77. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We confirm our full support for the NPT, including agreement on the importance of universal adherence to and compliance with the Treaty, and on the commitment of all States Parties to disarmament, strengthened IAEA safeguards, and peaceful nuclear cooperation under effective non-proliferation conditions and safeguards. Alliance nations have dramatically reduced nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and reaffirm their commitment to work for the further reduction of nuclear weapons globally. More broadly, we reaffirm our determination to contribute to the implementation of the

conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

78. We remain strongly committed to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Zangger and Nuclear Suppliers Groups as important elements in our efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery. We encourage all countries to adhere to and implement unilaterally the MTCR Guidelines and Annex and to the corresponding guidelines and control lists of the other regimes. We also welcome and support ongoing efforts to achieve an International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation that we hope will be a universally subscribed mechanism to promote missile non-proliferation.
79. We reaffirm that the Alliance's defence posture must have the capability to address appropriately and effectively the threats that the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery can pose. Our response should be consistent with the indivisibility of Allied security. We will continue to work together to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts. In this context multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes, as well as international arms control and disarmament, are important.

We welcome the consultations initiated by President Bush on the US strategic review, including missile defence, with Allies and with other interested parties, and will continue substantive consultations in the Alliance on these issues. The consultations with Allies will include appropriate assessment of threats and address the full range of strategic issues affecting our common security, and the means to address them, including deterrence and offensive and defensive means, and enhancing the effectiveness of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as diplomatic and counter-proliferation measures. We intend to pursue these consultations vigorously, and welcome the United States' assurance that the views of Allies will be taken into account as it considers its plans further.

We also welcome continued work in NATO on Theatre Missile Defence for point and area defence, in particular on the feasibility study on a possible system for the defence of deployed NATO forces. We will continue consultations in the Alliance on TMD issues.

80. Recognising the achievements of the START process so far, we strongly support the ongoing process of achieving further reductions of the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Russia. Allies concerned will continue working for even lower levels of nuclear forces while maintaining the minimum sufficient to preserve peace and stability. Given the need to reduce the uncertainties surrounding substrategic nuclear weapons in Russia, we believe that a reaffirmation of the 1991/92 Presidential Initiatives might be a first, but not exhaustive, step in this direction. The Alliance welcomes the US commitment to achieve a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with US and Allied security needs. We

remain committed to the immediate commencement, in the Conference on Disarmament, of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in accordance with the Mandate of the Special Coordinator. As long as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not entered into force, we urge all states to maintain existing moratoria on nuclear testing.

81. We continue to emphasise the importance of universal accession and adherence to, as well as full compliance with and implementation of, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). While the Russian Federation is responsible for the destruction of its chemical weapons, we confirm our support to Russia in the area of chemical weapons destruction. We welcome the efforts in the Ad Hoc Group of the BTWC to agree on measures, including possible enforcement and compliance measures, to strengthen the Convention. We remain fully committed to pursue efforts to ensure that the BTWC is an effective instrument to counter the growing threat of biological weapons.

Also, we appeal to all states to participate constructively in the Conference on Disarmament and in its different activities.

82. The December 2000 Report on options for confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament demonstrates the long-standing commitment of the Alliance to the goals of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The Council in Permanent Session is following up on the recommendations contained in this report and particularly those for confidence and security-building measures related to nuclear issues with Russia through the PJC.
83. We are pleased that NATO's WMD Centre continues to contribute to improving co-ordination of all WMD-related activities at NATO Headquarters, including the strengthening of our commitments to arms control and non-proliferation. After its first year of work, we note with appreciation the contribution of the WMD Centre in supporting the tasks of the NATO Senior Groups on Proliferation. The WMD Centre also provides information to Partner countries on proliferation issues; of particular note are ongoing consultations with Russia on the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.
84. We strongly condemn terrorism in all its manifestations. Terrorism constitutes a threat to internal and international security, to peaceful relations between States and to their territorial integrity, to the development and functioning of democratic institutions throughout the world and to the enjoyment of human rights and civil liberties. We reiterate our strong determination to combat terrorism, in full compliance with all our international commitments and national legislation. In this context, we appreciate and support the work in the United Nations designed to overcome this menace.
85. We have agreed on new Ministerial Guidance for Civil Emergency

Planning, which provides concrete recommendations to nations and the relevant NATO bodies on how to move forward with the continuing adaptation process. We will take concrete steps, including in terms of structures and procedures, to implement this new political direction and look forward to involving our Partners in this process.

86. We welcome the valuable role played by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) in supporting Partners and Allies. We are pleased with the good progress made by the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Initiative (DPPI) under the Working Table on Security Issues of the Stability Pact, which has been supported by the EADRCC. We applaud the cooperation across institutions and nations that DPPI has fostered and stand ready to further contribute NATO expertise and support to this important regional project.
 87. In line with NATO's ongoing adaptation to the changing international environment, and its expanded agenda, the Secretary General has launched an initiative ("NATO+") to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Organization. We received today a first report by the Secretary General on this initiative and strongly support his efforts to make a good organization even better. We place great importance on the continuing modernisation of NATO and accordingly will follow the progress of this initiative through the Council in Permanent Session.
 88. We welcome the fact that, further to the Ministerial tasking from December 2000, work has progressed to improve the transparency and efficiency of NATO's Civil Budget, notably by adapting the budget to an output or objectives-based format to reflect Alliance priorities. We task the Council in Permanent Session to report to us on this issue at our next meeting.
 89. We underline the importance of maintaining progress on the project to provide the Organization with a modern and efficient headquarters for the 21st century.
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90. We express our deep appreciation to the Government of Hungary for hosting this meeting.
 1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

