

● PSF

War Dept.: George C. Marshall

1943-45

(463)

hmi

(Copy filed - Land folder 2-42)

PST War: Gen. Marshall folder
2-42

January 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL.

I am attaching copy of a letter to the Prime Minister which I wish you would make available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At the time Mr. Oliver Lyttelton was over here a substantial agreement was reached between the American Army and the British Army relative to a substantial part of the ground forces requirements.

Will you let me know what the status of the balance of these requirements is which were not considered at the time of the visit of the British Mission? I am anxious to get cleared up all our commitments to our several Allies, including the United Kingdom, as soon as possible.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Transmitting copy of letter which the President addressed to Hon. Winston Churchill under date of 11/30/42, in re relative need of merchant ships versus escort vessels.

(Miss Gully says that Mr. Harry Hopkins' office has a copy of the President's letter of 11/30/42 to Hon. Winston Churchill, and that it is not necessary for our files to have a copy) hmi

January 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LAND.

I am inclosing copy of a letter for your information which I sent to the Prime Minister at the time Oliver Lyttelton was here some weeks ago.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Transmitting copy of letter which the President addressed to Hon. Winston Churchill under date of 11/30/42, in re relative need of merchant ships versus escort vessels.

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

*PSF
Wav:*

2-20-43

GENERAL WATSON:

This secret message was brought up by Gen. Hull, Operations Division, War Department (acting for Admiral Leahy whose initials are on the second page).

In your absence Mr. Forster took it in to the President who "processed" it.

I phoned Col. McCarthy, who sent a special messenger (Sgt. Mills) to take it back to Gen. Marshall.

ld

4:45 pm

~~SECRET~~

Gen. Marshall folder
2-43

February 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Attached Message to General Eisenhower.

In three messages of February 18th and 19th, General Eisenhower urgently requests that he be given a definite policy to follow in his dealings with General Giraud concerning the equipping of French North African forces. General Giraud has raised with General Eisenhower the question of the attitude of this government as to the supply of materiel for his forces and expresses misgivings as to our intentions to furnish supplies to the French forces.

The attached message is submitted for your approval. It is to be sent under my signature.

Chief of Staff.

O.K. - See amendment p. 2.

F.D.R.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date-

Signature-

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~~SECRET~~

W. D. L.

DRAFT

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The President desires that you inform General Giraud (this is from Marshall for Eisenhower for his eyes only and refers to your 1453, February 17, 1620 and 1628, February 18) that it is the intent and desire of the United States Government that French North African Forces participate in the liberation of France shoulder to shoulder with American and other Allied troops, and that the French forces be equipped properly to do so; that the equipping of French North African Forces will be accomplished as rapidly as shipping permits; that the allocation of shipping to transport the materiel to equip French North African Forces can of necessity only be made in connection with consideration of the military needs of other forces in the area which this shipping serves; that the allocation of shipping between the requirements for the American Forces in North Africa, the civil population in North Africa, and the French military forces in North Africa must be determined by you.

In the conversations which took place at Casablanca, no commitments were made by the President, by General Somervell, or by me, as to how much equipment could be sent or when it would be sent. The paper entitled, "Resume of the agreements in principle resulting from the conversations at Anfa," prepared by General Giraud and submitted to the President was approved in principle by the President. This was not intended as an agreement that the specific amount of materiel would be shipped, nor ^{obviously} that it would be shipped within a ^{specific} definite period. Clearly it was to be sent as fast as possible, considering the whole war effort.

This paper contained the following statement: "In subsequent

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conversations with General Marshall and General Somervell it has been stipulated that this commitment will amount in all to sufficient materiel for three armored divisions and eight motorized divisions, as well as a first-line air force composed of 500 fighters, 300 bombers, and 200 transport planes; and that of this there will be delivered in the course of the next few weeks 400 trucks and the equipment for 2 armored regiments, 3 reconnaissance battalions, 3 battalions of tank destroyers, and 3 motorized divisions, and such aviation materiel as can be sent by air." Neither General Somervell nor I had made any detailed commitments as are directed in the paper submitted to the President. In our conversations with General Giraud, Somervell and I had dealt only in general terms, in which we did specifically agree to reequip the French forces in North Africa as rapidly as could be managed. We had informed General Giraud that because of the shipping limitations, the program which he proposed would be impossible of attainment immediately, particularly in view of our commitments with Russia and China and of our requirements in the southwest Pacific. The President had no opportunity to see either General Somervell or me after his receipt of the paper in question from General Giraud. The President's agreement in principle, therefore, was based on General Giraud's statement of a detailed arrangement with General Somervell and me which had not been reached. Furthermore, the President considered that his agreement quote in principle unquote did not involve detailed commitments.

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For your information your figure of 100,000 tons within the next three months for French in addition to 55,000 per month already set aside by you will be met. Plans are being made for a special convoy for French military supplies. This convoy will take care of Giraud's schedule of shipments to Morocco and Algiers as given in your 1628 of February 18.

Separate arrangements have already been made to ship the materiel for the French equipment for Ground Forces as listed in your 8496, February 2.

The 165,000 tons of French shipping which General Giraud has promised is being turned over slowly. Its availability will regulate the amount of equipment which will follow initial shipments. Energetic action must be taken to refit French tonnage and send it to the United States as fast as this can be accomplished. So far the availability of French tonnage is largely academic, only one ship being in operation at the present time.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-29-70

Signature- JWA

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Marshall folder

PSF

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON

I want to see Major [Gen]
Stratemeyer about this. Will you
give this to me when he comes in?

F.D.R.

*gen Watson mentioned
this to General Marshall
who took it up in
conference with the
President March 26-43*

OR,

ADDRESS REPLY TO
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Aircraft Available to the Army Air Forces.

1. Pursuant to your inquiry routed to this headquarters concerning aircraft available to the Army Air Forces, there are submitted herewith three Exhibits on this subject.
 - a. Exhibit 1 sets forth the overall distribution of those aircraft which are both modern and suitably modified to engage in combat with the Axis.
 - b. Exhibit 2 breaks down the distribution by theaters of those aircraft in Exhibit 1 which are enroute to, or in the various theaters.
 - c. Exhibit 3 reflects the entire combat aircraft picture, including unmodified, obsolete and obsolescent models, as well as the aircraft included in Exhibit 1.
2. The ratio of combat aircraft deployed in theaters will increase materially as our expansion and training programs near completion.

Geo. E. Stratemeyer
GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff

3 incls.
Exhibits 1, 2,
and 3.



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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 3-13-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

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THIS OVERSIZE ITEM HAS BEEN
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.

SECRET

EXHIBIT 1

MODERN AIRPLANES OF U.S.A.A.F. READY FOR COMBAT

(Latest Information As Of March 6, 1943)

Type and Model	Total	In $\frac{1}{2}$ Theaters	Enroute To $\frac{1}{2}$ Theaters	In U.S. At or Enroute To Departure Points	
<u>Heavy Bombers</u>					
B-17	752	457	36	299	
B-24	541	361	56	124	
Total Heavy Bombers	1293	818	92	383	
<u>Medium Bombers</u>					
B-25	534	319	141	74	
B-26	237	127	43	67	
Total Medium Bombers	771	446	184	141	
<u>Light Bombers</u>					
A-20	283	119	92	72	
Total Light Bombers	283	119	92	72	
<u>Dive Bombers</u>					
A-24	13		13		
A-36	88			88	
Total Dive Bombers	101		13	88	
<u>Fighters</u>					
P-38	742	498	176	68	
P-39	751	701	50		
P-40	1503	1191	274	38	
P-47	228	174	45	9	
P-51	35	35			
Spitfires	207	207			
Total Fighters	3466	2806	545	115	
TOTAL	5914	4189	926	799	
TRANSPORTS					
Model	Total	Troop Carrier		Air Transport	
		Outside U.S.	In U.S.	Based* Outside U.S.	Based ² / In U.S.
<u>4-Engine</u>					
C-54	26		1		25
C-47	6				6

Model	Total	Troop Carrier		Air Transport	
		Outside U.S.	In U.S.	Based * Outside U.S.	Based ^{2/} In U.S.
<u>4-Engine</u>					
C-54	26		1		25
C-75	5				5
C-87	60			17	43
C-98	4				4
Total 4-Engine	95		1	17	77
<u>2-Engine</u>					
C-46	59				59
C-47/53	875	392	224 ^{3/}	130	129
C-73	23				23
C-84	3				3
C-60	40	11		1	28
Total 2-Engine	1000	403	224	131	242
TOTAL TRANSPORT	1095	403	225	148	319

* Latest available information as of February 28, 1943.


^{1/} Details in Exhibit 2.

^{2/} Includes aircraft servicing foreign terminals and domestic airlines.

^{3/} Training airborne division, glider pilots, and new Troop Carrier units.

Air Staff, Management Control
Chief, Statistical Control
(AFMSC-20)

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (8/27/88)

Date- 3-13-59

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

EXHIBIT 2

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DOD DIR. 8200.9 (9/27/98)

MODERN AIRPLANES OF U.S.A.A.F. OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (READY FOR COMBAT)

(Latest Information As Of March 6, 1943)

Date- 3-13-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

Type, Model, & Series	Total			Northwest Africa		United Kingdom		Middle East		Australia		South Pacific		India-China		Hawaii		Alaska		Latin American		Atlantic Bases		Air Transport			
	Total	On Hand	En Route	On Hand	En Route	On Hand	En Route	On Hand	En Route	On Hand	En Route	On Hand	En Route	On Hand	En Route	On Hand	En Route	On Hand	En Route	On Hand	En Route	On Hand	En Route	On Hand	En Route	On Hand	En Route
Heavy Bombers																											
B-17	493	457	36	145	4	187	32			52		37		8		1		10		13		4					
B-24	417	361	56	1		83	12	64	13	51		27		44	31	44		24		23							
Total Heavy Bombers	910	818	92	146	4	270	44	64	13	103		64		52	31	45		34		36		4					
Medium Bombers																											
B-25	460	319	141	115	40	2		42	60	53	2	15	20	48	18			30	1	5		9					
B-26	170	127	43	74	19	13	24			28		12															
Total Medium Bombers	630	446	184	189	59	15	24	42	60	81	2	27	20	48	18			30	1	5		9					
Light Bombers																											
A-20	211	119	92	83	89	33	3															3					
Total Light Bombers	211	119	92	83	89	33	3															3					
Dive Bombers																											
A-24	13		13														13										
A-36																											
Total Dive Bombers	13		13														13										
Fighters																											
P-38	674	498	176	234	146	100	22			95	8	34						12				23					
P-39	751	701	50	162	50	56				157		103						3		162		17					
P-40	1465	1191	274	237	72	15		318	97	94		99		175	105	41		106		28		12					
P-47	219	174	45			174	45																				
P-51	35	35				35																					
Spitfires	207	207		122		85																					
Total Fighters	3351	2806	545	755	268	465	67	318	97	346	8	196		175	105	188		121		190		52					
TOTAL	5115	4189	926	1173	420	783	138	424	170	530	10	287	20	275	154	233	13	185	1	231		68					
TRANSPORTS																											
4-Engine																											
C-54																											
C-75																											
C-87	17	17																						11		6	
C-98																											
Total 4-Engine	17	17																						11		6	
2-Engine																											
C-46																											
C-47/53	522	481	41	161	4	26	3	51	1	67		13		31	2	5		22		6				49	31	50	
C-73																											
C-76																											
C-84																											
C-60	12	12								10										1						1	
Total 2-Engine	534	493	41	161	4	26	3	51	1	77		13		31	2	5		22		7				49	31	51	
TOTAL TRANSPORTS	551	510	41	161	4	26	3	51	1	77		13		31*	2*	5		22		7				60*	31*	57	

* Total 124. Also 3 C-48, 1 C-39 in theater; 6 C-47, 1 C-87, 1 C-46 scheduled to depart March 13, 1943.
1 C-87 crashed en route, replacement to depart by March 22, 1943, making total of 137. 25 C.N.A.C. transports not included.

SECRETAir Staff, Management Control
Chief, Statistical Control
(AFMSC-2C)

THIS OVERSIDE ITEM HAS BEEN
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.

EXHIBIT 3

DISTRIBUTION OF ALL TACTICAL A.A.F. AIRPLANES

(Latest Information As Of March 6, 1943)

SECRET

UNRESTRICTED MODELS

Type, Model, and Series	Grand Total	Ready For Combat (From Exhibit 1)	Not Ready For Combat					
			Total	At Factories	At Modification Centers	1/ Training	Maintenance Depots	2/ Other Activity
<u>Heavy Bombers</u>								
B-17	1596	752	844	16	166	517	122	23
B-24	1073	541	532	77	129	211	79	36
Total Heavy Bombers	2669	1293	1376	93	295	728	201	99
<u>Medium Bombers</u>								
B-25	1435	534	901	43	291	452	79	36
B-26	748	237	511	47	228	162	62	12
Total Medium Bombers	2183	771	1412	90	519	614	141	48
<u>Light Bombers</u>								
A-20	426	283	143	27	35	26	45	10
Total Light Bombers	426	283	143	27	35	26	45	10
<u>Dive Bombers</u>								
A-24	177	13	164	1	30	110	20	3
A-36	459	88	371	8	195	122	46	3
Total Dive Bombers	636	101	535	9	225	232	66	3
<u>Fighters</u>								
P-38	992	742	250	42	5	158	37	8
P-39	1402	751	651	245	14	281	101	10
P-40	2071	1503	568	9	2	438	105	14
P-47	584	228	356	28	6	301	18	3
P-51	56	35	21		1	10	4	6
Spitfires	207	207						
Total Fighters	5312	3466	1846	324	28	1188	265	41
TOTAL COMBAT	11226	5914	5312	543	1102	2788	718	161
RESTRICTED MODELS (Obsolete and Obsolescent)								
Heavy Bombers	73	28	45			33	9	3
Medium Bombers	890	196	694		45	491	143	15
Light Bombers	257	67	220		1	156	51	12
Dive Bombers	220	16	204		5	89	106	4
Fighters	803	194	609		48	471	75	15
Total Restricted Combat	2273	501	1772		99	1240	384	49

EX. 3

Total Restricted Combat	2273	501	1772		99	1240	384	49
TRANSPORT AND OTHER TACTICAL								
		Assigned Air Transport and Troop Carrier						
<u>Transport</u>								
<u>4-Engine</u>								
C-54	29	26	3			1		2
C-75	5	5						
C-87	62	60	2	2				
C-98	4	4						
Total 4-Engine	100	95	5	2		1		2
<u>2-Engine</u>								
C-46	92	59	33	21	10			2
C-47/53	944	651	293	13	96	146	78	
C-73	23	23						
C-76								
C-84	3	3						
C-60	104	40	64	14	50			
Total 2-Engine	1166	776	390	48	116	146	78	2
TOTAL Transport	1266	871	395	50	116	147	78	4
		Assigned Photo & Obsn.						
<u>Special Purpose</u>								
Photographic	209	105	104	6		64	32	2
Amphibian	40	14	26			12	4	10
Observation	284	51	233			222	9	2
Total Special Purposes	533	170	363	6		298	45	14
<u>Miscellaneous</u>								
Liaison	3315							
Utilities	808							
Obsolete 2-Engine Transports	334							
Total Miscellaneous	4457							
GRAND TOTAL	19755							

Note: Such models as B-19, B-29, B-40, etc., of which only a few planes exist, have been eliminated from the above.

- 1/ Essential for replacement, transition, and new unit training of pilots and crews. Includes Defense Commands.
- 2/ Anti-Submarine activities and test and development work.

Air Staff, Management Control
Chief, Statistical Control
(AFMSC-20)

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DOD DIR. 5800.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 3-13-59

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

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*PSP War: Marshall folder
12-48*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY HOPKINS

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

Secret memo to Gen. Marshall from the
Pres. together with Secret memo from
Gen. Marshall to the Pres.
Subject: Pres. note to Marshall of
March 8th reference to China. (secret)

(836)

PSF Gen. Marshall fdr.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F.D.R.

Copies of Memo, F.D.R. - 3-23 - which was
sent to Vice Pres, Speaker, Sen. Barkley,
Sen. Mc Carthy, Cong. Mc Connack, Cong. Jos.
Martin which is filed Congress folder

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCS
GCM

March 19, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to the proposed trip overseas of the Truman Committee, it is understood that the Committee proposes to make these trips into foreign theaters as an extension of the investigation of the defense program which it has been pursuing in the United States. It does not propose to concern itself with military or naval strategy or tactics. Appropriate departments and agencies of the Government will be consulted in preparing plans for these several missions. I am also informed that the delegation on this first mission will be limited to three or possibly four Senators.

So far as this particular Committee is concerned it is believed that the members will keep within bounds and that the visit will tend to satisfy Congressional curiosity or doubts as to conditions in the theatres visited, and I should be in favor of the plan. However, it is probable that a similar Committee from the House will be moved to propose similar visits, and quite possible that Senator Chandler's Subcommittee may also propose such visits.

If it could be arranged through the leaders on the Hill that not more than one Committee from each House will be accorded the opportunity for such visits and that the size of the visiting Committee be restricted to four members it would greatly simplify the problem for the Army, and presumably for the Navy.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.

akn

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-13-59

Signature- *Paul L. Spier*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PSP Marshall folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

The President told me today that in addition to taking up with you the attached memorandum regarding Fiorella LaGuardia, he wished also to discuss with you and the other officers present, the fact that there are too many Congressional Medals of Honor being given. Frankly, the President is afraid that this medal is going to be cheapened by too promiscuous donations.

In connection with the main topic of your conference, namely, aircraft, I am attaching a memorandum from General Stratemeyer. The President had originally said he wished to see General Stratemeyer, but he, Stratemeyer, thought today's conference would be the proper time to take it up and we agreed, as it does save the President's time by eliminating another appointment.

E. M. W.

What day would suit President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

26
11 30

March 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL
GENERAL ARNOLD

I should like to have a conference with both of you within the next two or three days and Pa will take up with you the actual day and time.

It will relate to the general distribution of American made planes throughout the world.

Therefore, would General Arnold be good enough to let me have definite information as to where the planes delivered from the manufacturers during the month of January and the month of February are at the present time — in other words, what the distribution has been of these combat planes?

Also, I should like to have the proposed distribution of manufacturer delivered planes for March and the following three months.

11/30 Friday

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

-2-

Finally, I should like to have a table showing what was done with all combat planes delivered during the year 1942 and their present location. I have had lots of figures but in no case do these figures show what has been done or is being done with all planes actually delivered by manufacturers.

It is only through the use of the figures I am requesting that I can make any final decision on distribution.

F. D. R.

March 26

11 30

5. At tomorrow's Conference Marshall.

✓ Arrived, so you wish Adm. Leahy?

(Yes)

940
hm

PSF Gen. Marshall folder
Box 122

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

Use your discretion about
ordering General Chennault to come to
Washington. I am entirely agreeable if
he gets here any time after April 29th.

F.D.R.

SECRET

**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**


April 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message has just been received from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek addressed to you:

"Chungking, China
April 10, 1943

"Many thanks for your reply to my note of March 25. All ground facilities are being rushed according to plan and I can assure you that they will be ready at the appointed time. In the meanwhile I would urge that you summon General Chennault to Washington to lay before you and General Arnold the plan I have been discussing with him. I believe this is most necessary in order to make effective our mutual desire to strike the enemy by air. I believe General Chennault could conveniently come now, since later it may not be feasible."



Chief of Staff.

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LJL DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 12-15-64

PSF

Marshall folder 2-43

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personal

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1943.


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following radio message has just been received from London:

"Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews' plane crashed near Grindavik (about 35 miles southwest of Reykjavik) in southwest Iceland on evening May 3rd.

"Ground party has reached scene of wreck. Only one enlisted man survived. Andrews killed. Have not received identification of other dead. Party consisted of General Andrews, nine other officers, Bishop Adna W. Leonard and four enlisted men. Will forward complete list of names immediately upon identification."

The Chief of Chaplains is notifying Mrs. Leonard.



Chief of Staff.

file

SECRET

PSF Marshall folder 2-43

**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

May 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message has been received from
General Eisenhower:

"Algiers
May 10, 1943.

"Will you please have the following
message delivered to the President of the
United States:

"I am sure that you will understand
how deeply I and my immediate subordinates and
every soldier, sailor and airman of the Command
appreciate your message. I am publishing it im-
mediately except for that part which will go
personally to Bradley, Patton, Spaatz and Doo-
little. I thank you sincerely for the gener-
osity of your terms in commending the Allied
Forces."

L. F. Marshall

Chief of Staff.

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MOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

PSE War: Marshall folder
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

Will you please speak to me
about this when I get back?

F.D.R.

Secret from Winant to the Pres.
unnumbered, 14 June Re: Gen. Devers'
being given overall information.

Marshall folder
2-43
PSF War:

July 14, 1943

Dear George:

I should like to have copies of the despatches of our Military Attaches which estimate or express any opinion regarding the probability or improbability of an outbreak of war, or which refer in any way to the estimates of potential military strength of any of the countries involved. I am concerned with those despatches dating from January 1, 1937 until such time as our Military Attaches left the following countries:

Germany, Japan, Italy, Bulgaria, Austria
Occupied France, Belgium

I should also like the similar despatches from England, dated from January 1, 1937 to the outbreak of the war in September, 1939.

I should like our despatches bearing on this subject from Russia from January 1, 1937 until the present time.

Sincerely yours,

General George C. Marshall
Chief of Staff
War Department
Washington, D.C.

(above ltr. also sent to:-

Hon. Cordell Hull

Hon. Frank Knox

and filed separately in State Dept. folder and Navy folder, 2-43)

*PSF Wav Marshall folder
file personal 2-48*
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7-22-43

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Marshall thought you might be interested in this report to him from M.I.D. on pro-DeGaulleists, giving their positions and reasons for their pro-DeGaulle sentiments.

EMW
E.M.W.

WAR DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
WASHINGTON

This may interest the President.

21 July 1943

Seu

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. The following further supplements the information relative to the recent public discussion regarding DeGaulle--Giraud, furnished you in a memorandum earlier today.

2. In addition to Walter Lippmann and Russell Davenport, it would seem that the following are the most active people in stirring up opinion in favor of DeGaulle:

a. Robert Valeur, associated with "France Forever" and with the DeGaulle faction in New York. A former instructor at Columbia University, he is in close touch with the NEW YORK POST, TIME, INC., and PM. His contact with TIME is through DeRochemont, brother of Louis DeRochemont of MARCH OF TIME. Valeur continually feeds anti-Giraud, pro-DeGaulle material to these three publications.

b. Johannes Steele, allegedly a Hollander, but said to be in reality a German, although I do not know if this is a fact.

c. Lisa Sergio, Steele and the Sergio woman, the latter with radio station WQRX, New York City, are especially active in anti-Giraud activities. Steele is said to have Communistic leanings and to have a natural tendency toward producing antagonisms and discord on all international subjects. The Sergio woman was the "Voice of Italy" for a number of years on the Rome radio broadcasting shortwave in the English language to the United States and to England. She was born in Florence, Italy, and came to the United States July 1, 1937, filing citizenship papers in February, 1938. At one time she was employed by the National Broadcasting Company. The opinion has been expressed that these two individuals desire to break down French unity rather than to lean toward DeGaulle.



3. With further reference to Walter Lippmann, his realistic opinion motivated more by "uplift" is said to be tempered somewhat by the emotional interest of Mrs. Lippmann, who is said to be impressed greatly by the ideals of DeGaulle.

4. This is furnished for information without any recommendation.

Stanley J. Grogan
STANLEY J. GROGAN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Acting Director

COPY

PSF: Gen Marshall folder
2-43

September 20, 1943.

My dear General:

You are absolutely right about George Marshall -- and yet, I think, you are wrong too. He is, as you say, far and away the most available man as Chief of Staff. But, as you know, the operations for which we are considering him are the biggest that we will conduct in this war. And, when the time comes, it will not be a mere limited area proposition, but I think the command will include the whole European theatre -- and, in addition to that, the British want to have him sit with their own Joint Staff in all matters that do not pertain to purely British island affairs.

More than that, I think it is only a fair thing to give George a chance in the field -- and because of the nature of the job we shall still have the benefit of his strategical ability.

The best way I can express it is to tell you that I want George to be the Pershing of the second World War -- and he cannot be that if we keep him here. I know you will understand.

As ever yours,

S/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

General John J. Pershing,
The General of the Armies of the United States,
Walter Reed Hospital,
Washington, D. C.

(Orig. comm. filed - Gen Comm. "P", 4-43)

COPY

JOHN J. PERSHING

WASHINGTON

September 16, 1943.

The President,

The White House,

My dear Mr. President:

I am so deeply disturbed by the repeated newspaper reports that General Marshall is to be transferred to a tactical command in England, that I am writing to express my fervent hope that these reports are unfounded.

We are engaged in a global war of which the end is still far distant, and for the wise strategical guidance of which we need our most accomplished officer as Chief of Staff. I voice the consensus of informed military opinion in saying that officer is General Marshall. To transfer him to a tactical command in a limited area, no matter how seemingly important, is to deprive ourselves of the benefit of his outstanding strategical ability and experience. I know of no one at all comparable to replace him as Chief of Staff.

I have written this, Mr. President, because of my deep conviction that the suggested transfer of General Marshall would be a fundamental and very grave error in our military policy.

With sincere regard and high esteem, believe me,

Faithfully yours,

S/ JOHN J. PERSHING

BF Marshall folder
2. 13

FERL

Personal

September 22, 1943.

Dear George:

I am delighted that you had such a successful trip in Mexico. I wish we could think up some method of using even a token force of Mexicans at some point outside of Mexico -- just as I hope we can devise some similar token force for the Brazilians.

By the way, I am enclosing a copy of General Pershing's letter to me, together with my reply, both of which are, of course, confidential.

I will be back the end of the week and hope to see you then.

As ever yours,

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure.

Indexed 5/28/68

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Visit to Mexico City.

I spent twenty-four hours as the guest of the Mexican Government, on the invitation of General Cardenas, Minister of War, for the 133rd Celebration of the notification of their independence. I arrived in Mexico City on the afternoon of the 15th, called on General Cardenas, and at 10:00 that night was received by the President prior to the formal celebration of the "Grito" which took place at 11:00 P.M. and was followed later by supper.

The following day, the 16th, I stood with the President and General Cardenas to review a military parade of some 25,000 troops. This completed the formalities.

The President desired me to convey his greetings to you and to state that while he understood that the United States evidently had sufficient troops for the operations in view, he wished you to feel that whenever the services of the Mexican military forces were required in the common cause they would be made available. He wished me to express his pleasure in the present course of events overseas, and also to say that he hoped very much you would give him the opportunity to entertain you in a seafishing expedition off the West Coast.


General Cardenas wished me to convey to you his respects and most cordial regards.

No requests were made to me for materiel or personnel or regarding the present basis of cooperation between the two governments.

I was received with great cordiality and was accorded the distinction of a position next to the President at each ceremony and at the table.

I should like to explain, Mr. President, that I made this trip without consulting you because the fact that I had given a tentative acceptance a month or more before had entirely escaped my mind and was not brought to my attention until after your departure for Hyde Park. I likewise had failed to advise the Secretary of War. I therefore sent a note to him last Saturday regarding the proposed visit and addressed a similar

note to the Secretary of State telling him that if he thought there was any question as to the advisability of my making the journey to please send word to the War Department and I could readily find an acceptable excuse for calling off the trip. I am sorry I became involved in such an affair without due and formal reference of the matter. The truth is, I was so deeply occupied in other matters that I must plead that as my excuse.


Chief of Staff.

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Marshall folder 2-43
PSF War
file
28 September 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The fall of Foggia has come exactly at the time when it is needed to complement our Bomber Offensive now hammering Germany from bases in the United Kingdom. As winter weather sets in over northern Europe, our heavy bombers operating in the fair weather from the dozen or more (13) air bases in the Foggia Area will strike again and again at the heart of German production not only in Germany proper but in Austria, Hungary and Rumania. For our bombers operating from England, this aerial "Second Front" will be a great assistance.

This new avenue of approach for our allied air forces adds something like 1200 miles for which the German must provide air defenses. He cannot possibly spread his air defense to the south and east to meet this threat and yet maintain his present degree of security in the north and west. In a matter of days now we will be in a position to strike into the soft side of Germany.

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DOD Doc 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-29-70

Signature- *9/102*

[Signature]
Chief of Staff



LEGEND

- FIGHTER PRODUCTION
- PETROLEUM PRODUCTION
- RUBBER PRODUCTION
- SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION
- BALL BEARINGS
- STEEL INDUSTRY
- ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
- NON-FERROUS METALS

~~SECRET SECURITY~~
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 DOD DIR. 13307.6 (9/27/56)

Date- 7-29-70

Signature- *gva*



~~SECRET SECURITY~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Secretary Early.

If the President speaks about the capture of Foggia this afternoon he may wish to use some of the following thoughts:-

The capture of Foggia is another important milestone on our road to victory because it brings our hard-hitting air force, with land and sea support, measurably nearer the heart of Germany. From Foggia our air forces can give closer cover for all of our operations in Italy and thereby hasten the day when the Hun may be driven from Rome. From Foggia our air forces can also blast new enemy and enemy-held territory. It is disclosing no military secret to say that we may be sure the German General Staff have drawn circles, as any of us may do, with Foggia as the center and radii of the known cruising distances of our planes. Try it yourself and see how many Nazis may sleep outside the vulnerable area where our planes may strike either from our northern bases or from our southern bases.

The Allied Nations have, indeed, every reason to be proud of the capture of Foggia. To attain its capture we have overcome two of the greatest problems of warfare - unity of action among allies and the tremendous difficulties of amphibious warfare. We have had unity of action among allies: the great Russian victories have helped us; the determined resistance of the Chinese have helped us; our successes have helped the Russians and have helped the Chinese. French strength is mobilizing and anti-Nazi Italians are joining against the common foe of mankind.

~~present~~ successful
Foggia stands as the high-water mark of three amphibious operations in the Mediterranean. This means that the armies, navies and air forces of the United States, Canada and England have developed team work that has been invincible to the veterans of Germany. While we must realize the difficulty of the road ahead, we may exult in the accomplishments of our armed forces and we may pray that our successes will continue.

WILSON BROWN.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

28 September 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN

In response to your request this morning, the following is submitted as general information concerning our taking over captured airfields in Italy. This information is furnished by the Statistical Control Division, Hdqrs, Army Air Forces.

Captured enemy airfields, when serviceable, may be used by our aircraft within twenty-four (24) hours of their occupation. As soon as the enemy has been driven from the immediate vicinity, airfields may be cleared, hastily repaired, and used by hospital planes, for landing commanding officers and staff observers near battle areas, and for ferrying of critical supplies. In at least one instance in Sicily, our fighter aircraft landed at a field while the enemy was still within gun range of the landing strip.

As soon as the enemy has been driven beyond gun range - thirty (30) to forty (40) miles from the vicinity, an airfield may be put in full operation to supply aircraft with fuel, ammunition, bombs, and other supplies. Maintenance personnel will be brought in to perform 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance, etc.

The time required to put an airfield in operation, either for limited or full use, will, of course, depend upon the need for it. Pertinent factors are degree of enemy aerial opposition, intensity of enemy ground effort, and availability of other airfields within easy range. Airfields usually can be put in operation for the landing of fighters, medium cargo ships and light bombers under emergency conditions within a few hours. Depending upon the terrain, enemy fields may be made serviceable for heavy bombers within a matter of weeks. Airfields will be put in operation according to the availability of supplies.

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POB 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-29-70

Signature- *gnd*


CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

~~SECRET~~

T-163

Copy of this memorandum sent to Gen. Marshall, 10/16/43

Marshall folder
2-43

PSF War

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.


14 October 1943

Personal and Most Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

As you are aware strong pressure and much publicity are being devoted to an attack on the War Department towards both reducing the number of officers on duty in Washington and sending those in the younger age group to duty with troops or overseas. The War Department has adopted a policy under the direction of General McNarney of relieving from duty in the District, so far as is possible without injury to our war program, officers under 35 years of age.

One of your Aides, the officer in charge of the Map Room, Lt. Col. Chester Hammond, comes within this policy as he is 33 years of age. Furthermore, he has had very little duty with troops. Under the circumstances, if we can provide a suitable replacement, I would suggest that you release him from his present duty in order that we can send him immediately to take a refresher course preparatory to troop assignment.



Chief of Staff.

B. C. M.
OK
JHP

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100 DRL 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-29-76

Signature- J.D.

T-162

PSF: Marshall folder
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

I am still pretty thoroughly disgusted with the India-China matters. The last straw was the report from Arnold that he could not get the B-29s operating out of China until March or April next year. Everything seems to go wrong. But the worst thing is that we are falling down on our promises every single time. We have not fulfilled one of them yet.

I do not see why it is necessary to use B-29s. We have several other types of bombing planes.

The enclosed comes from Mr. Soong. Evidently he had heard from the Generalissimo.

F. D. R.

(Copy of attached Secret memo, 9/27/43 sent with this memo to Gen. Marshall)

~~SECRET~~

September 27, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RE: CHINA AIR OFFENSIVE IN 1943

When General Chennault was here last May it was agreed that he would receive an additional two fighter squadrons and two medium bomber squadrons by July 15th in order to carry out a large-scale air offensive from China before the end of the good weather season in November.

Owing to delays in fighter shipments to India and in increasing air transports, the 14th Air Force has just now received one additional fighter squadron with another expected soon to follow, and the question of additional medium bomber squadrons is still unsettled.

The Generalissimo advises me that the 14th Air Force has in China as of September 5th only 85 operational fighters plus 20 repairable and one squadron of 16 medium bombers, only 9 of which are in commission. The Generalissimo feels that only a Presidential directive can now save the original plan for air operation in China agreed upon by all concerned. Otherwise important months and months will be lost.

The specific needs of General Chennault for this purpose are as follows:

- (1) One more fighter squadron immediately, plus 45 more fighters to bring up to full strength the 5 squadrons now in China.
- (2) Replacements of 35 fighters monthly.
- (3) Two more medium bomber squadrons immediately.
- (4) The exchange of an existing Chennault P-40 squadron for one of the P-51 squadrons just arriving in India so that General Chennault will have better fighters to meet the improved Japanese Zero now appearing in China. Arrangements have already been made to give General Chennault 16 P-51s, but he badly needs a second squadron.
- (5) Three more assistants specially skilled in the knowledge of Chinese terrain and Jap air tactics, to wit, Colonels Hill, Bond and Rector.

The Generalissimo understands that the shift can be made from India immediately because there are in India more than 250 fighters and three medium bomber squadrons. The requested shift of planes is needed now in order to enable General Chennault to carry out this year the plans approved by you.

DECLASSIFIED

gcs memo 2/10/75
by gS 5/29/70

~~SECRET~~

~~Franklin D. Roosevelt Library~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~DDO DIR. 0200.0 (2/27/00)~~

Date ~~3-13-59~~

Signature ~~Carl F. Spence~~

Oct. 16

MISS TULLY:

FOR YOUR FILES

d e krauss

~~SECRET~~ PSF: Marshall folder 2-V8

October 15, 1943

Dear George:

I have read your note of the 4th about the air cargo lift over the hump into China.

I have sent the attached cable to Churchill today and wonder if you could not wire Somervell to give this whole business his special consideration and attention.

Almost everything seems to have gone wrong with our program for supporting Chennault. I am sure that Somervell, when he puts his mind on it, can put a real punch behind it.

Very sincerely yours,

encl.

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff
War Department
rm 3E921 Pentagon Bg
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 20 1972

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OCTOBER 15, 1943

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I AM DISTURBED ABOUT THE BUILD UP OF OUR ^{AIR} ~~ARMY~~ FACILITIES AT ASSAM. THE DETERMINATION OF THE SUPPLIES THAT GO OVER THE RAILROAD FROM CALCUTTA TO ASSAM IS UNDER BRITISH CONTROL.

THE AMOUNT OF TONNAGE FLOWN OVER THE MOUNTAINS TO CHENNAULT'S AIR FORCE HAS BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTING TO ME. CHENNAULT'S AIR FORCE CANNOT OPERATE WITHOUT THE SUPPLIES AND HIS STRIKING FORCE IS THE ONE SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION THAT CAN BE MADE IN CHINA PROPER BY US DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

OUR OWN TRANSPORT PLANES HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTING.

I WISH YOU ^W COULD TAKE A PERSONAL ^{PART} ~~INTEREST~~ IN THIS BUSINESS BECAUSE I AM A BIT APPREHENSIVE THAT WITH OUR NEW PROJECT IN BURMA OUR AIR FORCE IN CHINA WILL BE FORGOTTEN AND I THINK THAT IS A GREAT MISTAKE.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 20 1972

~~SECRET~~

Gen. Marshall folder
2-48

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 12, 1948.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H.L.H.

TO READ AND RETURN FOR MY

FILES.

F.D.R.

Memorandum for the President, 10-4-48,
from Gen. Geo. C. Marshall, re Air Cargo -
India to China, showing tonnages carried by
India-China Army Air Transport Command and
China National Airways Corp., the total of
officers and men assigned to India-China
Wing, the runways, etc., and control of
rail movement.

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

October 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H.L.H.

TO READ AND RETURN FOR MY
FILES.

F.D.R.

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Air Cargo - India to China.

1. With reference to your comments Tuesday afternoon regarding the unsatisfactory state of air transport over the hump into China, the following data is submitted:

a. The following tonnages were carried by the India-China Army Air Transport Command and China National Airways Corporation as indicated below:

<u>Month</u>	<u>ICATC</u>		<u>CNAC</u>	
	<u>Planes</u> <u>On Hand</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Planes</u> <u>On Hand</u>	<u>Tons</u>
April	100	1,829	17	701
May	136	2,166	20	835
June	146	2,369	28	801
July	189	3,451	27	1,093
August	219	4,447	23	1,282
1-21 Sept.	230	<u>3,999</u>	23	<u>784</u>
Total Cargo		18,261		5,496

While the number of ICATC planes on hand is comparatively large, the planes actually in operation averaged only about 50% of the planes on hand. This was due to a number of factors, the principal ones being unanticipated serious mechanical difficulties in the C-46 type aircraft (which difficulties are in the process of being ironed out), lack of spare parts, maintenance difficulties due to lack of experienced maintenance personnel and unfavorable working conditions, inexperienced flight personnel and weather. CNAC tonnage is proportionately larger because of long-experienced and highly paid maintenance personnel and flight crews. Also CNAC did not have the problem of breaking in a new type (C-46) plane.

b. A total of 8,505 officers and enlisted men are presently assigned to the India-China Wing of the Air Transport Command. CNAC is operating under contract to General Wheeler.

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of SEC ARMY

BY TAG PER 720464

By PHD Date JUN 6 1972

[REDACTED]

c. Despite the difficulties of the monsoon season, 154 hard-standings have been constructed. 117 additional are required. On 3 airdromes the runways have been extended to 6,000 feet. The work now should go ahead much more rapidly before the termination of the rains, though we are in difficulties over General Auchinleck's proposed removal of some of the British engineers in supposed conformity with Quadrant priorities. This is being negotiated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

d. The British control every rail movement between Calcutta and Assam and they make the final decision as to what will and what will not move. This undoubtedly has affected the movement of necessary supplies to improve airports and will continue to affect movements over the hump in the future.


Chief of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of SEC ARMY

BY TAG PER 720464

By PAVER Date JUN 6 1972

PSF War

Marshall folder
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL:

I think the State Department would like to have Colonel J. W. Lang kept in Argentina as Military Attache, as they feel he is doing a splendid job and a new man at this time could not take his place.

Somebody said this would mean promoting him to Brigadier General. I know nothing about that question.

F.D.R.

15F Marshall folder 2-45

SECRET

file

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to your memorandum of October 15th concerning the air cargo lift over the hump into China, I have radioed Somervell instructing him to give the matter his personal attention and to report to me by radio.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 3-13-59

Signature- *Carl D. Spear*



SECRET

T-177

PSF War

Marshall folder
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

In regard to Colonel Lang,
Military Attache to Argentina, I
think you can proceed at any time you
wish with his promotion to Brigadier
General. I shall be glad to take it
up with the Chairman of the Military
Affairs Committee if there is any
question.

F.D.R.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your
note of Oct. 16th (attached) relative
to Col. Lang in Argentina, there
has been no question of his
relief. However, please see
the attached memo from us
on Oct. 1st relative to his
promotion.

10/14/43

W. H. H. H. H.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL:

I think the State Department would like to have Colonel J. W. Lang kept in Argentina as Military Attache, as they feel he is doing a splendid job and a new man at this time could not take his place.

Somebody said this would mean promoting him to Brigadier General. I know nothing about that question.

F.D.R.

~~SECRET~~

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-29-70

October 1, 1943

Signature- Gvd.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Promotion of Colonel John W. Lang.

I have received a message through General Watson that you are interested in having Colonel John W. Lang, Military Attache to Argentina, promoted to the grade of brigadier general.

Last April we experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining confirmation in the cases of Colonels Harris and Adams, Military Attaches to Mexico and Brazil, respectively. At that time, in urging favorable consideration of these two cases, I advised the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee as follows:

"In urging favorable consideration of these two cases, I can assure your Committee that no further recommendations of this nature are now contemplated, and none will be submitted unless urgent military necessity makes such action imperative."

I had wanted to advance Colonel Lang because of the disadvantage he has incurred by prolonged service at Buenos Aires, and once proposed him for promotion. To do so now may make difficulties on the Hill.

Colonel Lang's name will be included on the next list.

(Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff.

~~SECRET~~

PSF War
Mr. Marshall folder
file 2-46
Confidential

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

I have yours of December twenty-ninth in regard to German reprisals against airmen. In the last ten days, no new action has appeared from the other side. However, I agree with you absolutely that we should have a definite action in mind. It seems to me that such action need not be announced beforehand but that it should be put into effect the minute the Germans start anything. I think the American public would back this up.

I think I am right in saying that we and the British hold more German prisoners than they hold of ours. Probably the Germans hold more Russian prisoners than the Russians hold of German prisoners.

In regard to Japan we have a difficult problem but though it is horrible to contemplate, I fear that we must be definite and firm.

Will you be good enough to take up this question with the General Staff and also talk with the Secretary of State about it. I like your proposed statement.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

WAR DEPARTMENT

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Date- 7-29-70

Signature- JWS

December 29, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: German reprisals against American airmen.

Before the Russian Kharkov "trials" it was predicted that, as the effects of the bombing of Germany grew more serious, desperate measures would probably be employed to discourage further attacks. The recently announced intent of the Germans to try captive American and British airmen is concrete evidence of such intention. Just what action this Government and the Government of Great Britain should take remains to be determined, but I am of the opinion that such action should be prompt, whatever it may be. Also, it appears advisable in promulgating this action to address it to both German military and civil leaders and to the entire enemy population.

From the military point of view consideration naturally has been given to what line of action should be taken and the character of the statement to be made. It is believed unwise to specify any particular form of retribution. Any mention of chemical attack, for instance, or other specific measures might well play directly into German hands.

An important consideration in this matter is the fact that the German propaganda specifically excludes Russian airmen from the list mentioned. The probability is that the Germans recognize the fact that the Russians would retaliate immediately and in a manner that would be fatal to German interests. On the contrary the Germans have reason to assume that the pressures on the home front will tend to make the British and American reaction much softer. Whether or not the American public would at this time fully back reprisal in kind is a question, but it would appear that if we take a strong position in the matter the public will shortly be led to accept the necessity of such decision, particularly if documented cases of mistreatment and torture were published. It is considered advisable that we should go this far at the present time.

There is another very important point to be considered in this matter and that is the reaction of the Japanese. They are in great fear of the bombing of Japan. They hold large numbers of Allied prisoners, while we hold few of theirs and those few the Japanese would ignore in their considerations. I anticipate that the moment the bombing of Japan is started the Japanese will resort to every conceivable measure

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

to deter us from the continuation of that operation, to the extent of placing all of our people in their hands at the hazard. This will present a most serious situation and it should be considered at the present time in connection with the preliminary moves of the German Government to deter our bombing of their cities.

It is recommended that the Governments of the United States and Great Britain issue a statement to the effect that notice of the recent threats has been taken at the highest level and that immediate retaliatory action will be taken if such threats are carried out. A draft of such a preliminary statement is herewith submitted:

"The Governments of Great Britain and the United States have taken notice of the threats recently made by the German Government against British and American airmen captured by the German forces. Notice is hereby served on the German political and military leaders, and the civil population generally, that if these threats are carried out the Governments of the United States and Great Britain will adopt the most drastic measures to bring home to the German people a realization that any treatment of American or British prisoners not in strict accord with the recognized laws of warfare will be fatal to the future of the German people."


Chief of Staff

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-29-70

Signature- W.A.

~~SECRET~~

2/21/44

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

My dear Mr. President:

The attached memo
from me to Mr. Stimson
explains the reason for
the decision regarding the
reduction of Army Student
Training Program.

W. H. H. H.

SECRET

PSF

Marshall folder 2-00

C O P Y

10 February 1944

file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Subject: Serious personnel shortages.

At the present time the Army is short approximately 200,000 men due to the inability of Selective Service to deliver personnel as requested. The most serious aspect of this shortage is the fact that there is an urgent need in February for approximately 134,000 already basically trained men for units to be trained for shipment overseas before August 31st. These units are required for scheduled operations, the earlier ones are essential requirements of OVERLORD and ANVIL.

Further, General McNair has been unable, due to short deliveries from Selective Service, to provide the trained replacements required to keep current operations going. Therefore he has had to strip divisions of men - a most wasteful procedure. As a rule, the divisions now going to the base ports for shipment to England or into the Pacific receive two to three thousand men about two months before they sail. This necessitates a revamping of the training and in effect lowers the efficiency of the divisions below what would otherwise be the case were we able to keep them filled up. At the present time the Ground Forces are short 87,000 men.

I have been personally directing a careful canvass of the Air, Ground and Service forces to discover whether or not the present deficit in basically trained personnel can be made up from these forces. I have pressed MacArthur, Harmon and Nimitz to close up rear installations and economize in men sufficiently to obviate the necessity of sending certain quotas or units to them. I have part of Gasser's personnel Board in Africa combing over that situation and Eisenhower has been directed to exercise rigid economies. I am now convinced that we cannot provide the necessary men under present conditions. However, material savings in personnel to meet requirements for units to be activated after the 31st of August for the last half of 1944 can be managed. But it is the next six months, particularly February and March, that present the urgent problem.

Two weeks ago we reversed the policy carefully established to permit the rapid training of units by requiring divisions and other combat organizations to furnish a large percentage of the housekeeping details required in large cantonments. This means that company units, or even battalion units, may be removed from training for as long as two

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72

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months at a time in order to perform the guard, utility, and other jobs now handled by station complements. This was done in order to release a sufficient percentage of the station complement units of trained men to enable General Somervell to organize immediately troops that must be ready to sail for England and the Mediterranean theater at an early date; even so, they will only be sketchily trained for their specific jobs.

A considerable number of Air and Ground stations or installations are being closed. Even with these economies we have been unable to meet the requirements.

I am aware of your strong feeling regarding the Army Specialized Training Program. However, I wish you to know that in my opinion we are no longer justified in holding 140,000 men in this training when it represents the only source from which we can obtain the required personnel, especially with a certain degree of intelligence and training, except by disbanding already organized combat units. I recognize that it would be desirable, if circumstances permitted, to withdraw personnel from the Army Specialized Training Program only as they complete scheduled terms of instruction; however, our need for these basically trained men is immediate and imperative. It is understood that appropriate compensation would have to be paid to the institutions in the cases of students withdrawn prior to the completion of a term that has been commenced.

I therefore propose that a maximum limit of 30,000 students be established, this number being required largely for the supply of doctors and dentists and such other highly trained technicians as the Army may be unable to procure from other sources. Further, in order to take maximum advantage of the superior intelligence, education and training of the men whose release I am proposing, that they be employed in accordance with the following general plan:

a. Such numbers to be assigned to the Army Service Forces as can be employed immediately in new units as non-commissioned officers and highly rated technicians.

b. The majority to be assigned to the Army Ground Forces with the stipulation that the Ground Forces transfer an appropriate number of men of lower intelligence to the Army Service Forces for use as enlisted fillers in the new units required. An appropriate number of men relieved from the Army Specialized Training Program to be assigned in the Army Ground Forces to new units where it is expected they will provide the majority of the non-commissioned officers and highly rated technicians.

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72

SECRET

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The remainder of the men released from the Army Specialized Training Program to be assigned to divisions, and an equal number of men of lower intelligence to be transferred from the divisions to be used as enlisted fillers in new units.

The outstanding deficiency currently noted in our divisions is the number of non-commissioned officers who are below satisfactory standards of intelligence and qualities of leadership. The men from the Army Specialized Training Program made available by the foregoing proposal should materially raise the combat efficiency of the divisions now scheduled for shipment overseas.

If you feel that the Specialized Training Program must be continued approximately at present strength, then the following action must be taken immediately:

10 Divisions, 3 Tank Battalions and 26 Antiaircraft Battalions will be disbanded or deactivated. Even so we will still be short some 90,000 men and are now considering today whether or not we must disband combat units to meet the deficiency.

My recommendations apply only to the Army Specialized Training Program students who have been duly inducted into the military service and are included in the overall strength of the Army. It is not proposed at this time to withdraw 17-year olds from the Army Specialized Training Reserve Program or that we in any way curtail that program at present.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72

COPY

PSF

Gen. Marshall folder

Feb 21²⁻¹⁰
1944

file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: GENERAL MARSHALL

I have inquired into the question of premedical and predental men in colleges. They are included in those who are to remain.

Telephoned above
to Paul Macmillan -

PSF
CONFIDENTIAL

Marshall folder 2-44

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 29, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have your memorandum of February 28th concerning the hospitalization for our fliers in England and expressing the desire to send Major General N. T. Kirk, The Surgeon General of the Army, Major General D. N. W. Grant, The Air Surgeon, and Dr. Strecker to England. Arrangements will be made to get them off as soon as possible with directions to investigate this matter and make report with recommendations to correct any deficiencies that may be discovered.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-18-59

Signature- *Carl S. Speer*

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL

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back to War Dept
3/1/44 *28*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
pers mail*

February 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

I have had several complaints in regard to hospitalization for our fliers in England. Everyone over there seems to feel that our general hospital work there is excellent, but that the British are better than we are on the average of pilot and crew care.

It is my thought that we should send Dr. Kirk, the Surgeon General, and Dr. Grant over there together, and I should like to add to them Dr. Strecker, who sat on the recent Board with the two Surgeons General -- Army and Navy.

F. D. R.



WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 24, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

orig filed - Arnold folder 2-44

General Arnold has spoken to General Marshall about a letter which Marshall Field wrote the President recently. Transmitted with the letter were reports by three prominent civilian doctors to the effect that they did not believe the Army was doing the best possible job in rehabilitating officers and enlisted men returned from overseas. To the contrary, the doctors reported, the Air Forces had adopted a very intelligent program and were realizing good results from it.

General Marshall is naturally eager to have the whole Army benefit from such procedure as the Air Force has found so effective and, for this reason, he requests that he be permitted to see the letter from Mr. Field and its accompanying papers.

Could you let me know whether there is any objection or whether it will be all right for Mrs. Eben to let us see the papers.

J. McC.
McCarthy

MEMORANDUM--CONFIDENTIAL

February 8th, 1944

MEMO TO: MARSHALL FIELD
FROM: ALBERT DEUTSCH

I've delayed sending you this memorandum until I received certain documents, including the attached memorandum from Col. Murray. To avoid any possible misunderstanding, I do not intend to make any journalistic use of the material, verbal or written, received from Col. Murray. I am acting in this matter solely as a transmitter of information.

I spent several hours with Lt. Col. John M. Murray and Lt. Col. Roy R. Grinker, talking over the situation which Murray mentioned to you. Both men talked with complete frankness. Both are relatively young, highly regarded by mutual acquaintances. Col. Grinker, as you know, recently returned from the North African theatre of operations, and prepared a report which was published by the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation for restricted circulation. Both men are psychiatrists attached to the Army Air Forces. Both impressed me as sincere, soundly grounded psychiatrists, unmotivated by undue personal ambitions and concerned with the well-being of their charges in the AAF. Here's the story they told me in brief:

While James C. Magee was Surgeon General, (he was, as you know, an old wheel horse whose inefficiency almost created a scandal before the President had the sense to retire him), he didn't bother much with the development of medical services for the AAF. This proved to be a blessing, in a way. Gen. David M.W. Grant (medical chief of the AAF--a man of much ability) was able to build up a highly efficient organization with as good a psychiatric service

as was possible. Five general hospitals in the continental U.S. were built up for AAF service. A comprehensive program for giving special psychiatric training to flight surgeons was developed.

This training program was extremely important in view of the special psychological stresses in aviation, and the high psychiatric casualty rate among flying men. A fine esprit-de-corps existed between the medical personnel and the combat personnel of the AAF. Both Murray and Grinker exhibited this feeling for their men in an unusually high degree in their conversations.

Friction and trouble developed when Kirk became Surgeon General. Murray says he got the post through his personal friendship with Secretary Stimson, who pulled him out of an Army hospital to give him the Surgeon General's post. Kirk is regarded as an able hospital administrator, but other sources confirm the characterization made by Murray that Kirk is an irascible, dogmatic, quick-tempered individual, jealous of his power. Murray says he has good authority for a quotation ascribed to Kirk, made soon after he took office, that he was "going to show the AAF crowd their place".

He proceeded by having circulars 165 and 304 promulgated (July and Nov., 1943), which took away the five hospitals from the AAF and terminated the special psychiatric training program for flight surgeons. The circulars, in effect, integrated the AAF medical services and personnel with the regular army's. The AAF medical personnel was, in effect, thrown into the general Army medical pool, and wounded and sick AAF men were treated in the general Army medical facilities, the same as ground forces.

Grant and Kirk clashed bitterly. Lt. General McNarny got Kirk and Grant together, gave them both a bawling out and told

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them to make up and behave thereafter. But McNarny did act on Grant's complaint. Circular letters 165 and 304 were rescinded and replaced by circular letters 12 (January, 1944), which gave back the five general hospitals to the AAF. The special neuro-psychiatric training program for flight surgeons was reinstated in the continental U.S.

The situation is at present fairly straightened out as far as medical service in the continental U.S. is concerned. But here's what's happening in the active theatres, according to Cols. Murray and Grinker:

Wounded and sick fliers are sent to Army hospitals and mixed with hospitalized members of the ground forces. They say this is wrong, especially from a psychiatric viewpoint. The flying man's problems are peculiar, and should be treated in a differentiated manner. He is subjected to extraordinary stress. He is taking a terrific beating in winning the war for us. He has only one chance out of five of survival during a regulation tour of twenty-five missions. The strain shows in a high percentage of neuroses--especially that known as "operational fatigue", otherwise known as "flyer's fatigue" or "combat fatigue". AAF men in the theatres of operation show other psychiatric symptoms which are serious, though not serious enough to be diagnosed operational fatigue. There are longer periods of depression. There are heavy drinking bouts, among those who have never before indulged in alcohol. The physical ailments of these men often have a psychological component--in other words, are psychosomatic in character. Flight surgeons and psychiatric consultants in the AAF, who know the men, are familiar with these symptoms and are being especially trained to diagnose and

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treat them. The average Army doctor is ignorant of these peculiarities of the flying man. He often does not know how to treat them.

Flying men have a strong sense of identity with each other and with everybody connected with the AAF. This sense of identity is an important factor in recovery. Chances of recovery are lessened when AAF men are mixed indiscriminately with ground forces in hospitals. The sense of identity is weakened. The doctor-patient relationship is greatly strengthened when a flier knows he's being treated by an AAF doctor.

Hence, Murray and Grinker plead that the AAF be allowed to set up its own station hospitals in the theatres of operation, or at least be given special wards where AAF doctors can treat their own.

As the attached memorandum by Col. Murray shows, they want training courses in neuropsychiatry set up for flight surgeons in the theatres of operation. They think that a special 150-bed hospital for AAF neuropsychiatric cases should be set up in England and a similar unit be established in other theatres of operation.

There is another strong psychological element here. The average Army doctor, Murray and Grinker say, hasn't the strong tie--this sense of identification--that the flight surgeons and AAF psychiatrists feel for the men under treatment.

"We want to give our men the best we have", says Murray. "They're doing a great job. They're taking a terrific beating individually. They deserve the best. We want to return all we can to active duty. If we can't return them to duty, we want to send them out of the Army good enough to take a responsible place in civilian life. We owe it to them." Murray charges, and Grinker backs him up, "That the average Army doctor lacks the sense of identity with his

5.....

wounded and sick charges." There is a feeling that enlisted men can be gotten for a dime a dozen, and if an enlisted man is not returned to duty he can easily be replaced. He charges that the whole rehabilitation program is out of joint, partly on this ground. Rehabilitation should begin in the area of operations. It is vital to give the psychiatric casualty treatment promptly and efficiently at the earliest possible moment. It may not only save him for further duty, but can help restore him to useful civilian life. There is a tendency among many doctors to feel that if a man loses his military usefulness, he can be taken care of by the Veteran's Administration and by pensions.

"We feel differently", says Murray. "We don't want to build up an Army of dependents. We don't want to turn loose a lot of prospective fathers whose children will know them only as dependents of Uncle Sam. We want to rehabilitate them before they are mustered out."

This seems to be the spirit that animates the AAF medical man. It is an added argument for having psychiatric cases in the AAF treated by specialists in aviation medicine, in special hospitals or wards. Murray also cites the economic argument. It takes at least a year to train a flier, at an estimated cost of \$30,000 per man.

When in a ground hospital in a theatre of operations, the AAF man is thrown into the general ground forces pool. Upon recovery he may be sent into the ground forces instead of being returned to aviation duties. This is an economic and military waste. The situation has gotten so bad, Grinker says, that flying men in North Africa are advised by their flight surgeons that if they are sent from the hospital into a ground force, they should run away and rejoin their own squadrons where they will be taken care of.

Murray and Grinker say they are medical men, not politicians.

6.....

They know there is a big struggle for power going on among the top-hats in the Army. They know that Somervell is trying to corral as much power as possible. They know there is a struggle between the top-hats in the AAF and the regular Army generals on the question of independence or subordination.

"This struggle does not concern us", says Murray. "But we feel that the flying man is being victimized by it all. All we want is the chance to give him the best possible treatment when he is sick or wounded. We ask only that we be allowed to do it without restraints which can be traced back to the power-hungry guys."

Murray feels that nothing can be done from below, to solve this nasty situation. He and Grinker therefore ask you to put the problem to the proper person and see if some healthy decision can't be handed down from the top. In brief, they ask for more independence for the AAF medical service. Concretely, they ask for:

1) Special hospitals or wards for AAF men treated by AAF doctors, in the theatres of operation. (A 150-bed hospital in each theatre of operation would be ideal and practical.)

2) Unhampered development of the special training programs for flight surgeons.

3) Minimization of the antagonistic attitude on the part of Surgeon General Kirk toward the AAF medical services. (Here I should add, Murray and Grinker charge that Kirk's openly hostile attitude has caused serious demoralization among AAF flight surgeons by deliberate obstructionism of AAF medical programs--instanced by the issuance of circular letters 165 and 304, now rescinded, by pulling hundreds of AAF specialists into ground forces duty, and by fostering a spirit of hostility and suspicion among general Army

7.....

doctors toward flight surgeons.) I asked Murray if what he proposed did not tend to set the AAF man apart from his fellows, promoting the dangerous feeling that he was better than the ground force man and entitled to special treatment and privileges. Murray answered, "All we say is that we want to give our men the best. We want the ground force medical men to give their men the best. There should be no difference in treatment. It should all be the best. All the men deserve it. But no matter what the situation is in other departments, we want to be able to give the best possible treatment to the men we're responsible for."

It's been sometime since I've seen my friend Edward A. Strecker, who, as you know, is president of the American Psychiatric Association and psychiatric consultant to Secretary of War Stimson for the Army Air Forces. I plan to see him sometime next week, and hope for a full discussion on the subject, without mentioning my conversations with Murray and Grinker. Murray assured me, however, that Strecker is in full agreement with their position.

You will note, that the accompanying memorandum, which Murray asked to forward to you, is signed by Strecker and by Frank Fremont-Smith of the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation. Dr. Fremont-Smith, who has been in close touch with military psychiatrists, tells me he is in complete accord with Murray's position.

11 Some would be assigned A.D.

12 Some would be returned to this country to participate in teaching and training programs.

13 Some of these would be assigned to work at the treatment center and the hospital and working facilities as future needs indicate.

SUGGESTIONS FOR TRAINING OF FLIGHT SURGEONS AND AIR
FORCE MEDICAL OFFICERS TO DEAL WITH ACUTE WAR NEUROSES,
FLYING FATIGUE, EXHAUSTION STATES, AND SIMILAR SYNDROMES.

1. The present incidence in theatres of operations of acute anxiety states, war neurosis, flying fatigue, etc., already presents a serious problem which will increase rather than decrease in magnitude with increase in active operations.
2. The nature and treatment of these conditions is significantly different from the type of breakdown occurring in this country during the period of training. Experience with cases in this country is quite inadequate to prepare the medical officer to handle the increasing number of cases occurring in the theatres of operations.
3. It is not possible to provide a sufficient number of psychiatrists to handle these cases. Moreover, most psychiatrists have had little or no experience with this clinical picture.
4. The recognition, treatment, and particularly the prevention of breakdown in the theatres of operations must be the responsibility of the Flight Surgeon.

In order to train a sufficient number of Flight Surgeons to handle this responsibility, it is proposed:

- a. That there be established in each major theatre of operation one or more treatment centers for these cases, under the direction of a psychiatrist who is a rated Flight Surgeon and who has had first-hand experience.
- b. That small groups of Flight Surgeons be sent every four weeks to each of these centers for special training of eight weeks' duration (it would be wise to start with not more than five in each group) (this might be enlarged after the program is under way).

These Flight surgeons chosen because of special interest in this problem (the first group should include a few psychiatrists if possible), would act much as "clinical clerks" at the treatment center, at first observing, but within a few days actively participating, under supervision, in treatment. In addition to clinical duties the men would participate in group discussions and in the study of special literature, such as Grinker's monograph "War Neuroses in North Africa". At the end of eight weeks' special duty these men would be distributed as follows:

- 1) Some would be assigned as Flight Surgeons to units in active operation.
- 2) Some would be returned to this country to participate in teaching and training programs.
- 3) From the first groups a few would be selected to remain on the staff at the treatment center and thus enlarge its teaching facilities as future needs indicate.

These Flight Surgeons, trained to deal with the special psychiatric problems of the Air Forces, will be very valuable later, particularly during the post war period in the Convalescent Training Program. There will be a tremendous shortage of psychiatrically trained personnel unless steps are taken now to supply more such training.

While it is recognized that these men would not be fully trained psychiatrists, it is believed that they would have far more practical knowledge in dealing with the most prevalent and important neuropsychiatric disability occurring in the Air Forces, and would be better able to handle these cases successfully than the majority of well-trained psychiatrists who have had no actual contact with these patients.

5. It is also believed that in order to treat and actively rehabilitate the more severe cases who have become chronically ill and have been returned to this continent, it will be essential to have a considerable number of medical officers who have had first-hand experience with the acute phases of these war neuroses.

It should be recognized that while the problem of acute war neuroses, battle fatigue, etc., occurring in the Air Forces, is similar in many respects to the type of breakdown occurring in the Army Ground Forces, there are particular problems relating to flying personnel, especially, but also to all Air Force Personnel, which make it essential that the treatment of these cases from the outset be in the hands of Flight Surgeons who have, from first-hand experience, a knowledge of the special conditions to which Air Forces personnel is exposed by the special nature of air operations, and also who have a genuine understanding (which can only be obtained by first-hand experience) of the particular elements which go to make and to break morale in the Air Forces personnel.

It is impossible for a physician who has not lived with flyers to understand them, and the flyers are the first to recognize this fact.

6. It should be emphasized, therefore, that the training program here outlined is predicated upon the assumption that Air Forces casualties will be handled from the outset by the Flight Surgeon and other medical officers of the Air Forces.

* * * * *

4 January 1944

JOHN M. MURRAY, Lt. Col., MC

Dr. Frank Fremont-Smith

Dr. Edward A. Strecker

PSF War *PSF War - Marshall*
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I think General Marshall would like to get out of receiving this, but it seems to me he would stand a chance of offending the Russian Government.

E.M.W.
E.M.W.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

13 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Acceptance of decoration from the
Soviet Government by General Marshall

Last week the Russian Ambassador called on Mr. Stettinius and expressed the desire of the Russian Government to confer on General Marshall the ORDER OF SUVOROV, First Class. This is their highest military order, and has only been bestowed once on a non-Russian, the case being General Eisenhower. Admiral Giffen and General Spaatz received this order in the Second Class, and a number of other U. S. officers received it in the Third Class.

Mr. Stettinius informed the Russian Ambassador that the matter of acceptance of decorations had been under study and that he would consult with the Secretary of War.


The following regarding the acceptance of decorations by Americans bears on this case. General Marshall secured an informal agreement with Sir John Dill that during active hostilities no decorations would be exchanged between officers on duty in the War Department or British officers here or in the British War Office, and that the conferring of decorations on field commanders would be at the discretion of the Government concerned. Several complications arose under this arrangement due to the transfer of officers, and it was decided best to reduce the informal agreement to written form. Preliminary to that, representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments drafted a policy (attached) which has not been formally passed upon by the departments.

In addition to the foregoing, General Marshall had issued certain other orders regarding decorations. All Military Attaches were instructed that if there was any mention by the local government authorities regarding the bestowal of a decoration on General Marshall, they were to state that for a number of reasons he would not be free to accept such an honor and they were to be explicit in explaining the embarrassment that would inevitably flow from the acceptance of decorations from countries soliciting Lend-Lease material. He also issued instructions that officers concerned with

allotment of Lend-Lease materiel would not be permitted to accept decorations from the nations with whose representatives they were dealing in these matters.

It is understood that Mr. Harriman had been requested to use his best endeavors to discourage the Soviet Government from the bestowing of an award on any U. S. officer pending clarification of our policy. However he was not successful in the case of General Marshall and the present situation has developed.

As this matter somewhat concerns the general relations with the Soviet Government, I would like to have your views or instructions.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Henry L. Stimson". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "H".

Secretary of War

Attachment

It was agreed that the President should be asked to issue a directive as follows:

1. That the Department of State be eliminated from participation in the handling of awards made by governments of cobelligerent nations and the American Republics to members of our armed forces;

2. That officers and enlisted men of our armed forces engaged in transactions involving the allocation of Lend-Lease materials or credits to foreign governments be not permitted to accept such awards;

3. That for the period of the war, immediate awards from the British, and Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, should go only to members of our field or operating forces engaged with the enemy in active areas, and that awards covering services outside the field or operating forces should be held in abeyance until the end of the war;

4. That awards conferred by American Republics or, (if approved by the senior United States Army Commander or the senior United States Navy Operating Force Commander concerned), by any cobelligerent nation other than as specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 may be accepted without prior authorization from the War or Navy Departments;

5. That when there is doubt as to whether an entity which desires to make an award is to be regarded as a cobelligerent within the meaning of the act of Congress, the War and Navy Departments will be guided by the decision of the Department of State.

MAR 13 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Acceptance of decoration from the
Soviet Government by General Marshall

Last week the Russian Ambassador called on Mr. Stettinius and expressed the desire of the Russian Government to confer on General Marshall the ORDER OF SUDZHOU, First Class. This is their highest military order, and has only been bestowed once on a non-Russian, the case being General Eisenhower. Admiral Giffen and General Spaatz received this order in the Second Class, and a number of other U. S. officers received it in the Third Class.

Mr. Stettinius informed the Russian Ambassador that the matter of acceptance of decorations had been under study and that he would consult with the Secretary of War.

The following regarding the acceptance of decorations by Aesclepius bears on this case. General Marshall secured an informal agreement with Sir John Dill that during active hostilities no decorations would be exchanged between officers on duty in the War Department or British officers here or in the British War Office, and that the conferring of decorations on field commanders would be at the discretion of the Government concerned. Several complications arose under this arrangement due to the transfer of officers, and it was decided best to reduce the informal agreement to written form. Preliminary to that, representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments drafted a policy (attached) which has not been formally passed upon by the departments.

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Return to originating office in War Dept.
showing action

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As this matter somewhat concerns the general relations with the Soviet Government, I would like to have your views or instructions.

Wm. H. L. Stimson

Secretary of War

It was agreed that the President should be asked to issue a directive as follows:

1. That the Department of State be eliminated from participation in the handling of awards made by governments of belligerent nations and the American Republics to members of our armed forces;
2. That officers and enlisted men of our armed forces engaged in transactions involving the allocation of Lend-Lease materials or credits to foreign governments be not permitted to accept such awards;
3. That for the period of the war, immediate awards from the British, and Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, should go only to members of our field or operating forces engaged with the enemy in active areas, and that awards covering services outside the field or operating forces should be held in abeyance until the end of the war;
4. That awards conferred by American Republics or, (if approved by the senior United States Army Commander or the senior United States Navy Operating Force Commander concerned), by any belligerent nation other than as specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 may be accepted without prior authorization from the War or Navy Departments;
5. That when there is doubt as to whether an entity which desires to make an award is to be regarded as a belligerent within the meaning of the act of Congress, the War and Navy Departments will be guided by the decision of the Department of State.

Gen. Marshall folder 2-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

I fully realize the complexity of this, both in regard to the general rule affecting staff officers and the personal feeling of General Marshall with which I am most sympathetic.

Nevertheless, I do not want to offend the Russian Government, and Harriman has tried to defer the matter unsuccessfully.

My thought is that you could talk with Field Marshal Dill and explain the delicacy of the situation. If Dill thinks that General Marshall should go ahead and receive it, I personally think he should do it.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date ~~JUN~~ 6 1972

ATTN: Wilson + FDR
3-17-44

Gen. Marshall folder
file
Personal
PSF
W

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 18, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This seems all right now.
Will you send the necessary word
to Harriman?

F. D. R.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

March 18, 1944.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

I have just seen Field Marshal Dill in reference to the matter as to which you requested me last evening to see him, and he rose to the occasion magnificently. He said that in view of the importance of not offending Stalin, we ought not to hesitate a moment and he would undertake to make it clear to his people what the situation was. He said that he himself had been notified by his government of a somewhat similar decoration to himself by the Norwegian government which he had not been even consulted about beforehand but his government had notified him that it had been done. So you can send such word as you wish to Harriman in respect to it.

Henry L. Stimson

SECRETARY OF WAR.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-29-70

Signature- *me*

RETURN TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

March 18, 1944.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

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HENRY L. STIMSON

SECRETARY OF WAR

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Gen Marshall folder 2-44

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

*PSF
War*

file

March 20, 1944.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

file 1

Dear Mr. President:

Since my conversation with Sir John Dill on last Saturday morning about which I wrote you, he has handed to me a copy of a cable which he sent to the British Chiefs of Staff confirming what he had said to me on Saturday in regard to making clear to his people the situation about the proposed Soviet decoration.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War.

Since dictating the above, Dill has sent me a copy of the reply of the British Chiefs of Staff in which they say that Marshall can The President, The White House. not refuse the decoration and that his acceptance would in no way disturb the arrangements between us & the U.K.

ltv

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-25-70

Signature- *ml*

RETURN TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1944.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr. President:

Since my conversation with Sir John Dill on last Saturday morning about which I wrote you he has handed to me a copy of a cable which he sent to the British Chiefs of Staff confirming what he had said to me on Saturday in regard to making clear to his people the situation about the proposed Soviet decoration.

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Secretary of War.

The President.
The White House.

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H.L.S.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-28-70

Signature- *gms*

file

Gen. Marshall folder
2-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF
War

March 24, 1944.

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR Mrs. Brady:

The attached memo from General Marshall is in reply to an oral statement by the President to Marshall that he, the President, had been told that there is one source of quinine which if destroyed or isolated would seriously cripple the Japanese war effort.

The President did not say who told him and the attached memorandum is the best General Marshall can produce.

W.D.R.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- *7-29-70*

Signature- *W.D.R.*

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 21, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Quinine stocks in Netherlands East Indies.

It has been impossible to confirm that there are caches or stocks of quinine in the Netherlands East Indies. Potential production in that area, which was the chief source of the world's supply of quinine before December 7, 1941, is about 17,500 tons of cinchona bark, which is equivalent to some 70% of the total supply of quinine derivatives. The Bandoeng quinine processing plant in Java, reported partially destroyed by the Netherlands forces at the time of the evacuation in 1942, produced in 1941 about 1000 tons of quinine sulphate, or approximately 60% of the world's production.

Japanese broadcasts in 1943 claimed Java quinine production of 800 tons annually. A broadcast last September said production had risen to 170% of the pre-invasion output. Other evidence, including strict control over sales in Java, the use of substitutes by the Japanese Army, and unwillingness or inability of the Japanese to supply Germany more than a small percentage of the quinine the latter desired, indicate that the production is considerably below that claimed in the broadcast. The Japanese are reported now in a position to supply Germany about 250 tons of quinine during the next twelve months.


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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-29-70

Signature- *WR*


Chief of Staff.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

*Mrs Brady
Admiral Leahy*

March 21, 1944

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.

Date- 7-24-70

Signature- *JP*

Return to originating office in War Department showing action.

TOP SECRET

*Gen Marshall folder
2-44*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF War

March 31, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

Thanks. This is extremely
interesting.

F.D.R.

Returning to Gen. Marshall secret ltr.

3-17-44 to Gen. Marshall from Maj. Gen.

Enclosures. John R. Deane, U.S. Military
Mission in Russia, with enclosed secret report
from Lt. Col. Robert E. McCabe, of escape of
American internees in Tashkent.

*Gen. Marshall folder
2-44*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*PSF
Ward*

April 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL MARSHALL.

For recommendation as to the
advisability of assigning General Giraud
to duty on the Staff of General Eisenhower
in an advisory capacity.

F. D. R.

Secretary of State Memorandum, 4-19-44,
subject: Future plans of General Giraud.

PS F Marshall folder
2-44

May 26, 1944.

Dear George:

I discover the following with regard to the eleven cases referred to in your memorandum of May seventeenth:

Ten of the cases referred to have been received at the White House. Of these ten, nine have been dismissed as recommended. In the tenth case a suspension was granted on the recommendation of the Secretary of War and the Judge Advocate General. The eleventh case arrived today and will receive prompt attention.

I agree with you that we should tighten up on these Air Corps boys, on account of their temperamental dispositions and the necessity for strict compliance with all safety regulations. You may be assured that I shall do my best to carry out your request and that of the Chief of the Air Corps in considering the merits of these cases.

As ever yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

General George C. Marshall
The Chief of Staff
War Department
Washington, D. C.

HRH/c

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON

To prepare reply.

F.D.R.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.


17 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

We have had what is to me a distressing number of fatal accidents in the Air Corps due to violation of flying regulations by young pilots. I am informed that in the fourth quarter of 1943 98 aircraft costing \$5,500,000 were destroyed, and in the first quarter of 1944 140 aircraft were lost costing \$12,800,000, all as the result of violations of flying regulations. While the total financial loss of over \$18,000,000 is a sizeable sum, it is the loss of life that concerns me most, particularly from the viewpoint of controlling this matter in the future.

I had instructed General Arnold to take the most drastic measures to insure the observation of regulations in this matter, and as a result a number of pilots have been brought to trial, convicted and sentenced to dismissal. At the present time I believe there are eleven cases which have been submitted for your consideration with the recommendation of The Judge Advocate General that the sentence of a dismissal be approved. There are other cases pending.

I would recommend, Mr. President, that the sternest action be taken in this matter to conserve the lives of other men in the months to come, because I am convinced that only by such procedure can we control the youthful exuberance of these young men which causes them to disregard regulations with the consequent loss of life and property.



Chief of Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-18-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON

To prepare reply.

F.D.R.

SECRET

OCS
GCM

17 May 1944

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(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

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Chief of Staff.

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-18-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spear*

RETURN TO ORIGINATING OFFICE IN WAR
DEPT. SHOWING ACTION

akn

SECRET

Gen Marshall folder
2-44

*app't
arranged
4:30 PM*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

BSF War

May 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Colonel McCarthy telephoned
to say that Admiral Leahy suggested
to General Marshall that he ought
to see you this afternoon about
something. Could we make it right
after the Press Conference?

G. G. T.

PSF: War Dept
Marshall folder

To: The President
From: General Marshall

We have just had a flash
report that the Key in
Cherbourg Harbor is not as
badly destroyed as anticipated.

A considerable amount
of rolling stock has been
found intact.

June 28, 1944

PSF Gen. Marshall folder
2-44

~~SECRET~~

File

A WAR 271410Z WTJ

SECRET URGENT ✓

27 July 1944

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

From : Marshall

To : Richardson

W-71305-27th

Date- 3-18-59

Signature- *Carl F. Spicer*

Please see that the following message is delivered by
fastest possible means to Colonel Douglas C. McNair of the 77th
Division quote Your father was killed while observing the beginning
of an attack by a front line company in Normandy on Tuesday July 25.
Your mother is being informed as this message is being transmitted
to you. Burial in France. Along with my deep personal sympathy,
I send you the Army's sorrow in the loss of a great leader.
Signed George C. Marshall end quote.

THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER

File

HONOLULU

July 27.

Dear "Pa."

I have just received
the enclosed radio which
I am transmitting to you, as
I thought that you would
wish to convey this sad news
to the President.

Very sincerely -
Robert C. Richardson

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

ODD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-18-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

22 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Strength of the Army.

The Army is now 5% overstrength - that is, it totals 8.05 million. There will be a further increase, though slight, this month and next. Thereafter the strength should decline and gradually approach the authorized figure of 7.7 million.

The following factors are involved:

OVERLORD - ANVIL - A deliberate overstrength of 150,000 was arranged for in April to meet the expected casualties in the OVERLORD and ANVIL landings. As very heavy casualties were anticipated it was necessary, in order to be certain that the momentum of battle could be maintained, that we have fully trained replacements actually in the European - North African Theaters. This could not be managed under the ordinary, routine loss expectancy percentages.

Rotation Policy - The establishment of a rotation policy permitting men who have been overseas for prolonged periods or who were worn down beyond the point of usefulness involved us in personnel requirements beyond those calculated on at the time the ceiling for the Army was determined. For example, because of the time consumed on departure leave at home, in staging camps, in ports of embarkation, and in transit to and from theaters, and the fact that the replacements for men being returned had to be in the theater before the latter started home, it was found that 40,000 men had to be allocated to provide a monthly rotation of 6,000 from the Southwest Pacific. This figure varied for each theater according to its distance from continental United States but once the pipelines had been filled, additional allocations were not required. It is estimated that the rotation policy (which incidentally has been on such a limited basis that it has possibly caused more disappointment and hard feeling than it has accomplished good), has required 85,000 additional men.

Wounded, Missing, Pipeline - In maintaining divisions at a constant full strength it was found that we must permit division commanders to drop all wounded men from their effective strength total and requisition replacements accordingly. This meant that provision had to be made within the Army's ceiling to carry an estimated 60,000 men

SECRET

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Handwritten: P2 -
Handwritten: rough & lead

SECRET

(the figure will increase as more divisions are committed) who would normally have been charged against the Divisions. Further, the War Department, in estimating its total manpower requirements, did not take sufficiently into account the number of men who would be in hospitals, carried as missing, absorbed in transition camps and in transportation to and from the theaters. Possibly the most serious oversight in the original calculations of several years ago was the failure to realize the tremendous loss of immediately effective manpower involved in keeping the pipelines to all the theaters constantly filled. For example, the United States strength in India, Burma and China totals only 150,000, but virtually 28,000 men in the pipelines have been required to maintain this strength, or 12 % over and above the authorized theater strength. Much larger totals are involved in the principal theaters.

Lines of Communication - There was also a failure in War Department calculations to allow sufficiently for the absorption of men in establishing unexpected travel routes and for the prolonged period that is required to clean up or evacuate communication routes and installations. Africa, for example, finally involved us in three East - West routes. The second route established which went through Nigeria was abandoned almost immediately because of the successes in North Africa. Nevertheless, it not only absorbed a great many men but has required considerable time to close out the installations. The Hudson Bay, Greenland and Iceland ground set-ups were somewhat unexpected and likewise required their share of personnel.

Detached Forces - The requirements for maintaining forces to stand off isolated Japanese garrisons such as those in New Britain, Wewak, Bougainville, etc., have been heavier than anticipated - not so much divisional troops but rather the service units to maintain the divisional elements in their numerous isolated localities.

Accuracy of Strength Reports - The extremely complicated conditions under which the Army operates, scattered around the world and frequently dispersed in small units, have presented a perplexing problem as to the monthly accounting for personnel. General McNarney has had a group working for five months to develop the basis for a really accurate monthly check. We believe we now have it, and for the first time are reasonably sure of what the actual strength of the Army is. The new method has shown that the errors were practically all in the overseas theaters; not that the commanders were derelict at all, but that the conditions readily lent themselves to such errors and the necessity of maintaining fighting forces at full strength inevitably meant that there would always be a "report" loss of men who were not actively employed - hospital cases, rotational groups, etc.. One of the complications involved was the establishment of a procedure which would accurately determine who should

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SECRET

be charged with the man en route from the United States to an overseas theater or on the reverse journey. The tendency overseas was not to accept credit for a man until he stood in the organization to which he was assigned. The tendency on this side was to transfer credit the moment the man left his base camp. The previous rules appeared sufficient for an accurate check but were wholly inadequate. This has now been corrected.

Economies of Personnel - Tremendous economies in the utilization of men have been accomplished in the United States and in the Caribbean and are under way in Alaska and the Aleutians. The same is true in North Africa. It is not the case in Italy, France, England, India, China and the Pacific generally. We have an elaborate investigating system which operates directly under me and which has cleaned up pretty well conditions in the United States, though there is still more of economy that can be brought to bear in the Air service and this is now under way. I did not send a group of these investigating specialists into the Mediterranean theater until we were firmly established in Italy because it is exceedingly irritating to a commander in the field to be fighting a battle in his forward area while being investigated in the rear. We will proceed with these investigations in other theaters as rapidly as the situations permit. However, it is imperative that every fighting unit in an active theater be maintained at full strength and that depots close in rear be filled with the necessary fully trained men to provide automatic and immediate replacement for battle casualties. It is also necessary that we have immediately available in the theater the special troops ready to take over ports, railroads, utilities, etc., the instant the fighting troops conquer them. We cannot well tell a theater commander that our calculations do not permit us to give him sufficient men to do this or that even though such a course imposes a terrific strain on our personnel requirements. Yet we do cut their personnel estimates heavily. MacArthur's service troop estimate was reduced 50% and Eisenhower's OVERLORD replacement estimate was cut 90,000 men.

Strength Controls - Measures have recently been introduced to reduce the intake into the Army below anticipated losses. Although there is a monthly overseas requirement for 85,000 replacements, we have reduced our Selective Service calls to 60,000 a month, starting in September. This is the minimum figure which will furnish the young, able-bodied men who will be needed to maintain the combat arms if the war in Europe continues. The overseas theaters have been informed that they must produce from their own resources the additional replacements required to keep their service elements at effective

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- 3 -

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
SECRET

strength. Instructions have been issued to relax the present pressure recruiting for the Women's Army Corps and to seek only sufficient recruits for maintenance purposes. This will effect an eventual reduction in excess of 3,000 in our monthly intake of women. A further action which will tend to reduce our over-all strength is a stimulated discharge of men in low physical brackets. Last Spring when we were critically short of personnel, the policy was adopted of not permitting a man to be discharged who could conceivably render any useful service in the Army. The continued over-rigid adherence to this policy has resulted in a large accumulation of men who now can be released without detriment to the service.

Raising the 7,700,000 Ceiling - The proposition to ask for an increase of the authorized ceiling to eight million has been advocated by the War Department staff from time to time during the past six months. I have opposed this because I think, given more time, we can reduce the Army strength to the agreed ceiling of 7,700,000. There is always within any established ceiling a conflict as to the proportion which will be allotted to units and that which will be set up to cover personnel in transit, in hospitals and otherwise non-effective. We are presently well on the way to striking a proper balance between these conflicting pressures. The announcement of a new, higher ceiling at this time would be liable to undo many of the economies we have effected and would destroy the most effective means we have to prevent continued increases in strength. I consequently recommend that we adhere to the present ceiling and take no further action at this time.

Members of my staff keep the War Manpower Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, and Selective Service fully informed of all developments concerning Army strength. Today my Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel will see the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and go over the subject in detail.

Faithfully yours,



Chief of Staff.

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SECRET

Marshall folder 2-44
file
Confidential
PSF
War

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

AUGUST 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

(Copy of Gen. Marshall's memo trans-
mitted to Dir. of the Budget
with this memo. Orig. retained
for the file.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL GEORGE MARSHALL :

Can you let me have a memorandum
on this matter of over strength in the
Army?

F.D.R.

~~SECRET~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, 25, D. C.

AUG 2 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On November 13, 1943, you indicated approval on my memorandum for you of November 10, 1943, of a strength of 7,700,000 for the Army for the calendar year 1944. This strength had been recommended to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in memorandum of November 9, 1943. I am not advised that you have given approval for any strength in excess of 7,700,000.

Since preliminary strength reports for June 30, 1943, indicated a total strength of 7,980,000, or 280,000 in excess of your authorization, informal inquiry was made by members of my staff to the War Department General Staff as to whether the matter of over-strength had received your approval. Representatives of the War Department General Staff state that they are under the impression that you are aware of this over-strength, although they are not certain that it has received your specific approval. It is significant to note that the Army has filed requisitions with the Director of Selective Service for 80,000 men for August, and 60,000 for September, so that it is highly probable that by the end of September we shall have a total Army strength in excess of 8,000,000.

It seems to me that we should impress upon the Army the need for your prior authorization for any change in military strength in order that there may be over-all coordination of manpower. It is possible, of course, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff may have brought this over-strength orally to your attention, but, in the absence of information to that effect, I am writing you with the thought that you will wish to discuss the matter with the Chief of Staff.

[Handwritten signature]
Director

~~SECRET~~

Marshall folder
2-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL GEORGE MARSHALL:

Can you let me have a memorandum
on this matter of over strength in the
Army?

F.D.R.

Secret Memorandum for the President, 8-2-44
from Harold Smith, Director of the Budget,
re the over-strength in the Army - in excess
of strength approved by FDR Nov. 13, 1943.

Top
~~SECRET~~

Marshall folder

2-44

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, 25, D. C.

PSF War

file
SEP 1 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Returned herewith for your files is General Marshall's memorandum concerning strength of the Army.

Undoubtedly some of the overstrength resulted from deficiencies in early planning for control of strength reporting. However, I believe the steps now being taken by the Army to exercise control to be effective. I agree with General Marshall's recommendation that there be no official increase in the authorized ceiling.

W. W. B. Smith
Director

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 6200.9 (9/27/50)

Date- 3-18-59

22 August 1944

Signature-

Carl A. Spiller

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Strength of the Army.

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The following factors are involved:

OVERHEAD - ANVIL - A deliberate overstrength of 150,000 was arranged for in April to meet the expected casualties in the OVERHEAD and ANVIL landings. As very heavy casualties were anticipated it was necessary, in order to be certain that the momentum of battle could be maintained, that we have fully trained replacements actually in the European - North African Theaters. This could not be managed under the ordinary, routine loss expectancy percentages.

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Wounded, Missing, Missing - In maintaining divisions at a constant full strength it was found that we must permit division commanders to drop all wounded men from their effective strength total and regulation replacements accordingly. This meant that provision had to be made within the Army's ceiling to carry an estimated 60,000 men

SECRET

STANDARD
PAGE- 3 -
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SECRET

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Lines of Communication - There was also a failure in War Department calculations to allow sufficiently for the absorption of men in establishing unexpected travel routes and for the prolonged period that is required to clean up or evacuate communication routes and installations. Africa, for example, finally involved us in three East-West routes. The second route established which went through Algeria was abandoned almost immediately because of the necessities in North Africa. Nevertheless, it not only absorbed a great many men but has required considerable time to close out the installations. The Hudson Bay, Greenland and Iceland ground set-ups were somewhat unexpected and likewise required their share of personnel.

Isolated Forces - The requirements for maintaining forces to stand off isolated Japanese garrisons such as those in New Britain, Bomk, Bougainville, etc., have been heavier than anticipated - not so much divisional troops but rather the service units to maintain the divisional elements in their numerous isolated localities.

Accuracy of Strength Reports - The extremely complicated conditions under which the Army operates, scattered around the world and frequently dispersed in small units, has presented a perplexing problem as to the monthly accounting for personnel. General Koberney has had a group working for five months to develop the basis for a really accurate monthly check. To believe we now have it, and for the first time are reasonably sure of what the actual strength of the Army is. The new method has shown that the errors were practically all in the overcount thereby not that the commanders were delinquent at all, but that the conditions really lent themselves to such errors and the necessity of maintaining fighting forces at full strength inevitably meant that there would always be a "report" loss of men who were not actively engaged - hospital cases, rotational groups, etc.. One of the complications involved was the establishment of a procedure which would accurately determine who should

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be charged with the man en route from the United States to an overseas theater or on the reverse journey. The tendency overseas was not to accept credit for a man until he stood in the organization to which he was assigned. The tendency on this side was to transfer credit the moment the man left his base camp. The previous rules appeared sufficient for an accurate check but were wholly inadequate. This has now been corrected.

Replacement of Personnel - Tremendous economies in the utilization of men have been accomplished in the United States and in the Caribbean and are under way in Alaska and the Aleutians. The same is true in North Africa. It is not the case in Italy, France, England, India, China and the Pacific generally. We have an elaborate investigating system which operates directly under me and which has cleaned up pretty well conditions in the United States, though there is still more of economy that can be brought to bear in the Air service and this is now under way. I did not send a group of these investigating specialists into the Mediterranean theater until we were firmly established in Italy because it is exceedingly irritating to a commander in the field to be fighting a battle in his forward area while being investigated in the rear. We will proceed with these investigations in other theaters as rapidly as the situations permit. However, it is imperative that every fighting unit in an active theater be maintained at full strength and that depots close in rear be filled with the necessary fully trained men to provide automatic and immediate replacement for battle casualties. It is also necessary that we have immediately available in the theater the special troops ready to take over ports, railroads, utilities, etc., the instant the fighting troops conquer them. We cannot well tell a theater commander that our calculations do not permit us to give him sufficient men to do this or that even though such a course imposes a terrific strain on our personnel requirements. Yet we do cut their personnel estimates heavily. MacArthur's service troop estimate was reduced 50% and Eisenhower's OVERLORD replacement estimate was cut 90,000 men.

Strength Controls - Measures have recently been introduced to reduce the intake into the Army below anticipated losses. Although there is a monthly overseas requirement for 85,000 replacements, we have reduced our Selective Service calls to 60,000 a month, starting in September. This is the minimum figure which will furnish the young, able-bodied men who will be needed to maintain the combat areas if the war in Europe continues. The overseas theaters have been informed that they must produce from their own resources the additional replacements required to keep their service elements at effective

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strength. Instructions have been issued to relax the present pressure resulting for the Women's Army Corps and to seek only sufficient recruits for maintenance purposes. This will effect an eventual reduction in excess of 3,000 in our monthly intake of women. A further action which will tend to reduce our over-all strength is a stimulated discharge of men in low physical brackets. Last Spring when we were critically short of personnel, the policy was adopted of not permitting a man to be discharged who could conceivably render any useful service in the Army. The continued over-rigid adherence to this policy has resulted in a large accumulation of men who now can be released without detriment to the service.

Regarding the 7,700,000 Ceiling - The proposition to ask for an increase of the authorized ceiling to eight million has been advocated by the War Department staff from time to time during the past six months. I have opposed this because I think, given more time, we can reduce the Army strength to the agreed ceiling of 7,700,000. There is always within any established ceiling a conflict as to the proportion which will be allotted to units and that which will be set up to cover personnel in transit, in hospitals and otherwise non-effective. We are presently well on the way to striking a proper balance between these conflicting pressures. The announcement of a new, higher ceiling at this time would be liable to undo many of the economies we have effected and would destroy the most effective means we have to prevent continued increases in strength. I consequently recommend that we adhere to the present ceiling and take no further action at this time.

Members of my staff keep the War Empower Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, and Selective Service fully informed of all developments concerning Army strength. Today my Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel will see the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and go over this subject in detail.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.

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PSF Marshall folder
2-44

War Dept

September 9, 1944

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff
War Department
Washington, D.C.

My dear General Marshall:

There has been a good deal of discussion within the several Government Departments relative to our Lend Lease policy after the collapse of Germany.

It is my wish that no Department of the Government take unilateral action in regard to any matters that concern Lend Lease, because the implications of any such action are bound to affect other Departments of the Government and, indeed, our whole national policy. I am particularly anxious that any instructions which may have been issued, or are about to be issued regarding Lend Lease material or supplies to our allies after the collapse of Germany, be immediately cancelled and withdrawn.

I intend to give instructions to all Departments relative to the Lend Lease policy of this government at an early date.

Will you be sure, therefore, that your several bureaus and divisions are advised of my position at once?

I am sending identical letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration and the Administrator of the War Shipping Administration.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

(Copy filed - Lend-lease folder, dr. 3-44.)

(Gen. Marshall's reply of 9/18/44 filed - Lend-lease folder)

3 October 1944

Admiral Leahy showed this to
the President on the morning of
October 3. It is forwarded to you
herewith for file.

J.V.S.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

October 2, 1944.

Marshall folder
PSF 2-44
Full

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The evacuation of American Air Crew members from the Balkans has met with unusually good success. I believe you will be interested to know that in the Mediterranean Theater 3000 of our airmen have been evacuated, 2694 of them coming from the Balkans. Following is a breakdown of the sources:

Bulgaria	279
Greece	46
Rumania	1270
Albania	11
Yugoslavia	
From Mihailovitch Chetnik Territory	356
From Partisan Territory	732
Total	1088

The success of these evacuation operations is due to the joint efforts of the Air Crew Rescue Units of the Air Forces, the special teams of the Office of Strategic Services, and a number of British organizations.

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[Signature]
Chief of Staff.

Date- 3-18-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

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Date- 3-20-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spencer*

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WAR DEPARTMENT

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D. C.

28 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

When you turn to the selection of an officer to succeed General Watson as your Military Aide, I suggest you may wish to take the following into consideration:

Major General Stephen G. Henry

An Infantry officer, age 50, who came into the Regular Army in 1916 from the National Guard. Born in Louisiana and graduated from the Louisiana State University. Veteran of the First World War. During the present war he has commanded the Armored Force Replacement Center at Fort Knox, and activated and trained the 20th Armored Division. He organized the New Developments Division of the Special Staff in the War Department, and since August of last year he has served as head of the G-1 Division of the War Department as my Assistant Chief of Staff of Personnel.

Major General John T. Lewis

A Coast Artillery Antiaircraft officer, age 50, who came into the Army in 1917 from the National Guard. Born in Illinois and graduated from the University of Illinois. Veteran of the First World War. He has held a variety of Coast Artillery and Antiaircraft jobs in this country, and has been one of the leaders in the technical development of antiaircraft weapons. He served as an Assistant Secretary of the War Department General Staff in the early part of this war until May 1942 when, after a brief period of service at Camp Davis, North Carolina, he was appointed Commanding General of the Military District of Washington. In September 1944 he was assigned to General Eisenhower's headquarters as Chief of the Supreme Headquarters Mission for France.

Major General William W. Eagles

An Infantry officer, age 50, who entered the Army from West Point, graduated in 1917. Born in Indiana. From 1936 to 1940 he headed the Staff Section of the VIII Corps Area at San Antonio, Texas, in charge of CCC affairs. He later

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Gen Marshall folder

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
PSF War

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served as G-4 of the VIII Army Corps. He went overseas in 1942 as Assistant Division Commander of the Third Division and remained with this division during its campaigns in North Africa and Italy. In 1943 in Italy he was made Commanding General of the 45th Division and led this division in its assault in Southern France and commanded it with distinction until he was returned to this country for hospitalization as a result of wounds. He will be ready for full duty in about two weeks.

Brigadier General Robert McClure

An Infantry officer, age 48, who entered the Army from the Philippine Constabulary in 1917. He was born in Illinois and graduated from the Kentucky Military Institute. Served in the Philippines and China during the last war. He was our Military Attache in England in 1942 until he was made G-2 of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations. Later he was Public Relations Officer of the Allied Force Headquarters in North Africa, and when General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, he took General McClure with him and assigned him to head the Psychological Warfare Section of his staff.


Chief of Staff

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

15 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

On several occasions in the past, our Strategic bombers have inadvertently dropped bombs on Swiss territory. Following the last instance a few days ago, I directed General Spaatz to proceed to Switzerland and make appropriate apologies. I am enclosing two copies of a letter I have just received from him concerning his trip. I believe both the President and you will be interested in seeing a copy of his letter.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
Office of the Commanding General
APO 633

Date- 7-29-70

Signature- JWA

10 March 1945

SUBJECT: Report on Visit to Switzerland, 7-8 March 1945.

TO : Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, D. C.

Pursuant to the instructions contained in your WAR 47580 dated 5 March, I proceeded to Bern, Switzerland on 7 March, accompanied by my Chief of Staff, Brigadier General E. P. Curtis. We flew to Lyon and travelled from there by automobile via Annemasse to Bern. Brigadier General B. R. Legge, our Military Attache in Bern, met us in Annemasse and arrangements had been made for us to proceed directly without stopping at the Swiss border. On arrival in Bern, I reported to Mr. Leland Harrison, our Minister, and learned that arrangements had been made for a meeting with the Swiss authorities at nine o'clock on 8 March.

Present at this meeting were: Mr. Karl Kobelt, Minister of War; Mr. Petit-Pierre, Foreign Minister, General Henri Guisan, Commander-in-Chief, Swiss Army; General Rihner, Chief, Swiss Air Corps; Minister Harrison; General Curtis, and myself.

The Minister of War read a prepared statement thanking me in the name of the Swiss Government for making this visit and then proceeding to list in some detail the bombing incidents in Switzerland, beginning with the Schaffhausen attack down to the attacks of 4 March. He expressed the hope and belief that our meeting would result in new arrangements to prevent further violations in the future.

On behalf of the War Department and of the U. S. Strategic Air Forces, I expressed to the Minister of War our official and my personal regrets for these incidents and particularly for the Swiss lives which had been lost as a result. I gave a brief general explanation covering the difficulties of flying large formations of heavy bomber aircraft over great distances and through difficult weather, and explained that ever since the first attack at Schaffhausen strenuous efforts had been made to prevent any recurrence. These include the prohibition against bombing within 50 miles of the Swiss border unless the targets were positively identified, careful briefing of crews, and a clear statement to our Air Forces of the grave result in any such incidents.

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I thanked the Foreign Minister for his cordial reception and particularly for the treatment which the Swiss Government had accorded our interned and escaped air crews. I stated that the details of the further arrangements which were being made to prevent repetitions of these incidents involve details which it might be best to discuss with General Guisan and General Rihner.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs then made a brief speech covering mostly generalities, and the two ministers, together with Mr. Harrison, withdrew.

In the discussion with the military authorities I explained in much greater detail the weather and operational problems with which we were faced, without in any way attempting to minimize or excuse the attacks on Swiss territory. They were frankly told the exact steps which we had taken, including the establishment of a zone for the Eighth Air Force between 150 miles from the Swiss frontier and 50 miles within which there will be no attacks without positive identification of the target, and a zone 50 miles from the frontier within which no attacks will be made by the Strategic Air Forces except on specific authority from me, in which case we would take steps to see that only experienced crews were permitted to participate. I then explained the difference between the problem as far as the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces were concerned, due to prevailing winds and different distances which had to be flown from their respective bases. For this reason, only part of the zone prohibited as above would apply to the Fifteenth Air Force, but I feel that the restrictions for the Fifteenth are entirely adequate to prevent any trouble.

It was then pointed out that General Eisenhower had issued instructions to the Tactical Air Forces under his control prohibiting any attacks at all within 10 miles of the Swiss frontier, and attacks only after positive identification of the target in a zone extending 10 miles to 50 miles. Generals Guisan and Rihner seemed to be more than satisfied with the steps which had been taken and assured me that information with regard to the prohibited zone would be kept strictly confidential. It was pointed out that if the Germans should attempt to take advantage of the situation to conduct military or industrial operations in the prohibited zone, it might become necessary for me to authorize further attacks.

With the exception of Mr. Kobelt, Minister of War, who was reputed to have been at least somewhat pro-German, the attitude of all of the Swiss authorities was very understanding and even cordial. They seemed to be genuinely impressed with our visit and I believe it served a useful purpose.

The Swiss stated that in order to impress public opinion with the efforts being made by the Americans to avoid further difficulties, they proposed to

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issue a public communique after my departure covering the purpose of my visit in very general terms. This, I assume, has been done. In accordance with your instructions, I am making no statement whatever concerning the visit.

It seems evident to me that with the present restrictions which have been established, plus the fact that the importance of these incidents has been most forcibly impressed on our Air Forces, there should be little danger of any recurrence of any such violations of Swiss sovereignty. I need not tell you the deep personal regret I feel at the embarrassment which these incidents have caused our Government.

I desire particularly to mention the excellent arrangements, facilitating my visit and preparing the atmosphere for my presentation to the Swiss officials, which were from my point of view perfectly accomplished by Brig. Gen. Legge and by our Minister, Mr. Harrison.

/s/ Carl Spaatz
CARL SPAATZ
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

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Date- 7-29-70

Signature- *g/a*

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