

● PSF

War Dept.: George C. Marshall

1941-42

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personal

PSF War Folder
marshall 2-41

September 23, 1941.

Dear George:-

I have not had a chance to send you a line in reply to your memorandum of September sixth. In effect you say:

- (a) The boys in camp are O.K.
- (b) The parental influence hurts the morale of many of them.
- (c) Please, Mr. President, do something about this weakness on the part of the civilian population.

Got any ideas?

Always sincerely,

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.


WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The present morale situation in the troops of the Army, resulting from the debates in Congress, as well as press and radio activities, presents a very difficult problem. While the troops in 90% of the organizations have weathered the storm in excellent shape - as a matter of fact in every instance where we have had good leadership in the higher command - nevertheless the home influence presents a continuing difficulty. Parents have been so confused as to the facts or logic of the situation and so influenced by what they read of a critical nature that something must be done to bring them to an understanding of the national emergency and of the necessity for a highly trained Army.

Within the War Department organization we are doing our best to counteract this weakness on the home-front, but as it relates to the civil population, I recommend that this phase of the matter be taken in hand by the Civilian Defense organization, to which it was assigned. In my opinion, Mr. President, prompt action is necessary.



Chief of Staff.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

PSF gen Marshall folder
way 2-4-43
file personnel
January 8, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Before I leave in the morning I wish to thank you for the autographed copy of your address to Congress with your gracious birthday greetings. This will be a prized possession of great historic interest, as is the autographed copy of your and Mr. Churchill's war address which you sent me on Xmas.

My hope is that in more peaceful days I may turn these pages and think back with deep satisfaction to those times when I have the privilege

of witnessing at close range the demonstration
of your great leadership in a world affairs.

Faithfully yours,

W. M. Thayer

*PSF
Marshall
War*

Published in Elliott Roosevelt,
FDR, His Personal Letters, 1928-45
page 1271.

RLJ 8/11/61

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

In view of the rather tense situation caused by the announcement of Wavell's appointment, without prior approval by the Dutch Government in London, I am wondering if it would not relieve the tension a bit if you could -- this afternoon -- go over the list of the Dutch request for munitions of war and make some releases to them, even though they be very modest, such as some light tanks, depth charges and sub-machine guns.

I think it is very important in our own relations with the Dutch that they fully understand that we are going to do everything we possibly can for them.

F. D. R.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

File
Confidential PSF
March 3
1-42

January 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

We are reinforcing the Maxwell and Wheeler Mission as rapidly as the transportation situation permits. Maxwell has asked in various cables for about 25,000 officers and men. At present there are 427 officers, enlisted men and civilians enroute to him by air or water or awaiting transportation, and we plan to send about 900 more in February and over 2,000 in March.

About 136 officers, enlisted men and civilian experts are enroute to Wheeler. 10 additional officers are leaving shortly by air, and over 2,000, mostly civilians, are awaiting transportation by sea with only about 400 passages allotted up to March 1. General Wheeler, incidentally, has not requested the large forces desired by General Maxwell.

With respect to materiel, there are 6 ships now enroute to North Africa and the Persian Gulf. 70,000 ship tons of materiel is awaiting shipment to Maxwell, and 68,000 tons to Wheeler. These shipments are scheduled to be made prior to March 1. The limiting factor, of course, is shipping. The 6 freighters above mentioned and one passenger vessel with a capacity of 500, but with very little cargo space, have been allotted to the two missions. Availability of other shipping in the immediate future is doubtful.

Our plans are to accomplish much of the work desired by the British in both the North African and Iranian areas by using personnel under contract. This reduces the number of Army personnel it would otherwise be necessary to ship, and we do not have in the armed forces the necessary numbers of skilled supervisors required.


Chief of Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-10-57

Signature- Carl S. Spencer

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

PSF Marshall Folder
~~SECRET~~ 1-42


January 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Coast Defense Armament for Latin America.

In response to your memorandum of January 21st, suggesting that Mr. Welles be wired at once the list of materiel that we can offer to Uruguay, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela, I had the matter checked with the Brazilian response to our immediate offer, and notified Mr. Laurence Duggan, of the State Department, yesterday afternoon of the list of materiel, ammunition, time requirement for displacement and set-up in new positions, and an approximate price on a scrap value basis of \$20 a ton. It was stated that this materiel is in first rate condition for the purpose for which it was originally installed, and that for the defense of coastal points in South America, it can be made highly effective.


Your directions and desires in the matter were stated, and it was requested that this information be transmitted by confidential cable at the earliest possible moment to the Under Secretary of State."


Chief of Staff.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4 - 22 - 66

Signature-



~~SECRET~~

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1-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL

Even though Brazil may not want those coast defense guns, your list is very impressive. I suggest you wire Welles at once telling him that he can offer some of these guns to Uruguay, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela, if he cares to do so. Give him also the ammunition on hand for them and the estimated time for dismantling and new installation.

F. D. R.


**WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

January 20, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With regard to our conversation yesterday as to seacoast materiel for Brazil, I find that that listed below - all of which is available, has been discussed with Brazilian representatives during the past six months, and that they were not much interested. General Miller, our representative in Rio, has recommended against our endeavoring to persuade them to take any old, what we term obsolete, coast defense equipment. However, I am having the list given below discussed with their representative here in Washington to see if there is any possibility of their wanting any portion of this:

No.	Caliber	Range : in yards	Sufficient : Ammunition Is : on hand for	Estimated elapsed time : to dismantle, transport, : build emplacements, and : install in new positions.
8	8-inch Guns	13,000	4 guns	3 months
43	10-inch Guns	14,000	34 guns	4 months
11	12-inch Guns	18,000	11 guns	4 months
28	12-inch Sea : coast mortars	14,500	:) :) 45 guns	:) :) 3 months
62	12-inch Rail- : way mortars	15,000	:) :)	:) :) 2 months


Chief of Staff.

PSF Wan Marshall Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
CHIEF OF STAFF:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
RETURN.

F.D.R.

Memo dated Jan. 24 from Lauchlin Currie
to the Pres. re: Chinese situation.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Marshall
Folder*

February 13, 1942.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL STARK and
GENERAL MARSHALL

This for your very confidential
information and return.

F.D.R.

FBI report sent Gen. Watson re New York

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 6 1972

PSF Marshall Folder

February 25, 1942

Dear George:

Apropos of the cutting of the Burma Road, I should like to know what is the exact status of the air transport route from Northern India to China.

When will the planes which General Stilwell took with him arrive and when will additional transport planes reach that area?

Could you also let me know the status of the planes which I authorized the Army to take from the commercial transport companies to put in our Ferry Service via Africa. It is obviously of the utmost urgency that the Ferry Service be vigorously prosecuted and that the pathway to China be kept open.

Very sincerely yours,

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
War Department.

HJH/lmb

*file
personal*

PSF *Marshall*
~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is the information we have from GHQ at this moment regarding the air alarm over Los Angeles of yesterday morning:

"From details available at this hour:

"1. Unidentified airplanes, other than American Army or Navy planes, were probably over Los Angeles, and were fired on by elements of the 37th CA Brigade (AA) between 3:12 and 4:15 AM. These units expended 1430 rounds of ammunition.

"2. As many as fifteen airplanes may have been involved, flying at various speeds from what is officially reported as being 'very slow' to as much as 200 MPH and at elevations from 9000 to 18000 feet.

"3. No bombs were dropped.

"4. No casualties among our troops.

"5. No planes were shot down.

"6. No American Army or Navy planes were in action.

"Investigation continuing. It seems reasonable to conclude that if unidentified airplanes were involved they may have been from commercial sources, operated by enemy agents for purposes of spreading alarm, disclosing location of antiaircraft positions, and slowing production through blackout. Such conclusion is supported by varying speed of operation and the fact that no bombs were dropped."

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EOO DIR. 5200.8 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-10-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

W. H. Hall
Chief of Staff.

~~SECRET~~

PSF Gen Marshall
files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Confidential memo from J. Edgar Hoover to Gen. Watson 3/4/42 re German Diplomatic Mission presently detained at Greenbrier Hotel in White Sulphur Springs; report that Gen. Friedrich Von Boetticher stated that he believed Australia would fall to the Japanese and that after that he believed the German Govt. would put pressure upon the Japs to have them aid the German Govt. against Russia.

PSF War Gen. Marshall Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

Will you speak to me about
this at your convenience?

F.D.R.

Secret memorandum 3/13/42 from Bill Bullitt
re Turkey and definite need for
an adequate air force.

Gen. Marshall Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

March 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

This message from Bern,
March 15, 1942, No. 1055,
should be attended to.

F. D. R.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 6 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Marshall Folder

1-42

March 31, 1942.

Personal and
~~Confidential~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL and
ADMIRAL KING

For your confidential
information.

F.D.R.

Memo to the Pres. from Ambassador
Alexander W. Weddell, (Spain) 3/24/42
re expeditionary force to Africa.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 6 1972

Confidential

SECRET

*PSF Marshall Folder
1-42*

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Message from General Marshall indicates good progress.

Salient parts of message are as follows:

"I sit with full Cabinet Monday,
13th and Defense Cabinet (Committee) Tuesday,
14th.

"Naval Person told me he accepts
our proposal. Make sure it is understood by
President and Secretary of War that this pro-
posal is the last draft I took with me from
Washington and not (repeat not for emphasis)
the preliminary draft submitted to the Presi-
dent. They are both the same in principle but
differ in language and method of presentation."

Joseph B. Morrison
Acting Chief of Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-10-59

Signature-

Carl L. Spicer

SECRET



PSF Marshall

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL

What can I tell Currie to
pass on to Madame Chiang Kai-Shek?

F. D. R.

Memo to the Pres. from Lauchlin Currie
April 20 with attached cable from Madame
Chiang Kai-shek re planes to China in
answer to the Generalissimo's plead.

Answer in China Folder

BF Marshall Folder

This memorandum is printed
in FDR: His Personal Letters,
Volume 2, 1928-45, pp. 1312-13. USE

WASHINGTON

April 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

I have read with interest the memorandum from General Vladislav Sikorski sent to me by you. In the main he is right though perhaps he underestimates the time required to establish the second front in Europe. I think he is correct in saying, as an illustration, that one armored division of the allies operating in Western Europe in 1942 is more effective than five such divisions in 1943.

I think he overestimates the value of insurrections in those countries which have been conquered by Germany.

However, his thesis of a general staff representing these countries is worth considering. Such a staff could not, of course, be led by an officer of any one of the occupied countries. I do not believe that a British officer would be accepted by all of them as readily as an American officer. Such an organization need not be a general staff at the outset. It might better

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

-2-

be called a planning unit under American leadership.

Do you think anything more need be done?

F. D. R.

PSF Marshall Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

Will you speak to me
about this?

F. D. R.

C O P Y

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to the attached cable from Stilwell via Madame Chiang, I am wondering if the time is not approaching when the question of providing for a unified command in Burma under Stilwell might not be taken up.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE

*file
Confidential*

*PSF Marshall Folder
1-42*

Copy

May 2, 1942.

In President's longhand:

"Gen'l. Marshall --

Send a good camouflage man to Chicago
to talk over & advise on whole matter of
camouflaging industrial plants - He should go
to Mayor Kelly directly.

F.D.R."

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GEORGE MARSHALL:
Chief of Staff

1. I have yours of May sixth regarding the Pacific Theatre versus "Bolero". In regard to the first paragraph I did not issue any directive on May first regarding the increase of combat planes to Australia to a total of 1,000 and the ground forces to a total of 100,000. I did ask if this could properly be done. I understand now that this is inadvisable at the present time and I wholly agree with you and Admiral King.

2. In regard to additional aircraft to the South Pacific Theatre, it is my thought that all we should send there is a sufficient number of heavy and medium bombers and pursuit planes in order to maintain the present strength there at the maximum. *rejection*

3. I do not want "Bolero" slowed down.

4. The success of raiding operations seems to be such that a large scale Japanese offensive against Australia or New Zealand can be prevented.



F.L.R.

FLR

Incl #1

(12)

1. Proceed with Stedehammer
stay in train if we can.
2. Get all U. S. Troops in action as
quickly as possible.
3. Proceed in all other theaters as
now planned.
4. Keep up fight to Russia but not too long.

End 2

2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1. Abandon Mediterranean 1942
2. Slow up Bolero 1943 for the coming three months.
3. Take all planes now headed from U.S. to England & transfer them to
 - (a) Middle East & Egypt. (majority)
 - (b) S. W. Pacific (minority)
4. Send 5 divisions to England slowly.
5. Send 5 divisions to Middle East fast.
6. Speed up Bolero preparations by October - so that Bolero Rampup will be ready April 1943.
7. Keep up aid to Russia, but win Basin

End

file
Stewart

Marshall Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

DECLASSIFIED

Secretary of War
The Chief of Staff
General Arnold
Secretary of the Navy
Admiral King
Harry Hopkins

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date JUN - 6 1972

1. This memorandum is not to be circulated or used beyond the above group.
2. I always think it well to outline in simple terms and from time to time complex problems which call for over-all planning. Therefore, I should like you gentlemen to read the following. We can talk it over from time to time. Because the world situation is changing so rapidly, this should be considered only as a memorandum covering the present situation on May 7, 1942.

A. The Pacific Theatre

The whole of the Pacific area calls, at the present time, fundamentally for a holding operation. This is the responsibility of the United States, backed by such assistance as we can receive from Canada in relation to the defense of British Columbia, Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, New Zealand and Australia in relation to the protection of their own territories and of the protective chain of Islands north and east of them, and China in relation to keeping occupied as large Japanese forces in China as is possible.

Defense of all essential points in the Pacific Theatre is the primary objective.

This defense calls for offense in two areas -- attacks upon the Japanese lines of communication and the bombing of Japan proper from east and west.

The objective of this defense strengthened by offensive actions is to destroy or damage as many Japanese naval vessels, merchant ships and airplanes as possible. In this regard, it is essential to maintain destruction or damage of a much larger number of Japanese ships and planes each month than they can replace. In other words, combat against Japanese ships and planes must be sought out in order to hasten the attrition of Japanese arms.

B. India and Burma Theatre

At the present moment, though this may be only a lull, we can very nearly separate India and Burma into a separate theatre of war.

This theatre is intimately connected in Burma and eastern India with the maintenance of air (and later highway) access to and from China. This theatre is also closely associated with the Near East only because of the necessity of withdrawing troops and materiel for its support from the Near East theatre. The responsibility for this theatre is primarily British, except that the United States must assure air connection with China and give such materiel assistance to British armies in India as possible.

Operations in this India-Burma theatre are also defensive in character and it seems premature to plan for any offensive action for the recapture of Burma or Dutch Islands.

C. Near East and East Africa Theatre

The responsibility in this theatre is British with the exception that the United States must furnish all possible materiel to the British in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria and must especially bolster up unloading and assembly operations in Egypt and in the Persian Gulf and in pushing transportation from the Persian Gulf to Russia.

D. The Atlantic Theatre

This divides itself into the Western and Southern Atlantic area where the problem is one of patrol and convoy and the European, including the British Isles, and the task of getting materiel through by the northern route to Russia. The responsibility is British and American, depending largely on logical geography.

At the present time, the principal objective is to help Russia. It must be constantly reiterated that Russian armies are killing more Germans and destroying more Axis materiel than all the twenty-five united nations put together. To help Russia, therefore, is the primary consideration. There are two essentials.

1. To maintain the flow of goods into Russia by the northern route. This should become easier during the months this summer and early autumn when the ice recedes to north of Spitzbergen.

2. The organization of a second front to compel the withdrawal of German air forces and ground forces from the Russian front.

In this operation, its primary success depends on control of the air over the Netherlands, Belgium, and France.

Presupposing success in obtaining control of the air, land operations can be conducted at one or many points on the basis of (a) raids based on commando operations using a comparatively small number of troops and withdrawing them within a few hours, or not more than twenty-four hours; (b) super-commando operations using a ~~much~~ larger number of troops -- even up to 50,000 with the objective of damaging the enemy as ~~well~~ ^{much} as possible and withdrawing this relatively large force within two days or a week; (c) establishment of a permanent front backed by a sufficient force to give reasonable certainty of adequate ~~re~~ reinforcements and the avoidance of being pushed into the sea.

This Atlantic theatre, therefore, calls for essentially offensive operations in the European area and is based on the thoroughly sound objective of aiding Russia in the destruction of as many Germans and German materiel as possible.

3. As regards timing, the general strategic plan in the Pacific Theatre, in the India-Burma Theatre, and in the Near East Theatre calls for a continuous day to day maintenance of existing positions and existing strength in these theatres at least for the next few months.
4. The Atlantic Theatre general plan calls, however, for very great speed in developing actual operations. I have been disturbed by American and British naval objections to operations in the European Theatre prior to 1943. I regard it as essential that active operations be conducted in 1942. I fully realize difficulties in relation to the landing of armed forces under fire. All of us would like to have ideal materiel to work with. Materiel is never either ideal, or satisfactory, or sufficient. We have to use "any old method of transportation which will get us to our destination".
5. The necessities of the case call for action in 1942 -- not 1943. In a recent memorandum of the United Nations it was stated that there was agreement on a second front -- provided the equipment and materiels were available. But they went on to say that it might have to be created any way, if Russia were to be seriously endangered even if the operation on the part of the British and the United States had to be called an operation of desperation.

- 4 -

6. If we decide that the only large scale offensive operation is to be in the European area, the element of speed becomes the first essential.

F.D.R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1942

H H's
draft

MEMORANDUM

I want to confirm in writing the decisions which have been made relative to the present strategic plan of the war.

1. The Middle East, including Syria, Iran and Iraq, to be fundamentally a holding operation under British control, with our assistance in terms of supplies. It will not be a major military or naval theater for U.S. forces.

2. India, Burma and China must likewise be a holding operation. The British are to hold Ceylon under all circumstances, we making every effort to send a limited amount of essential military supplies into China; the Chinese to hold on an appropriate strategic line. Every effort made to get Stilwell and as large a Chinese force as possible out of China and into India during the rainy season for training and later to attack on the Japanese flank, these troops to be not used for the defense of India proper.

Our main assistance both in China and India will be by air, the forces of which have already been agreed upon.

3. The Russian front will not be a theater of operations for U.S. forces but our supplies, particularly tanks and aircraft with ammunition, will be moved to Russia.

4. The Southwest Pacific to be fundamentally a holding operation, with the armies of the U.S., Australia and New Zealand defending those essential points and preparing in cooperation with the Navy for offensive action. The naval strategy to force Japan to keep the bulk of her fleet in the defense of Japan proper, to harass and break if possible her lines of communication and to destroy or damage as many merchant ships and naval vessels as our naval strength in the Pacific makes possible. To have sufficient forces in suitable

- 2 -

locations to be employed against Japanese task forces and to hold and keep open the line of communications between the U.S. and Australia.

5. In the Atlantic Theater to protect our lines of communication in the South Atlantic and the Northern Atlantic.

6. Bolero is our primary offensive strategic front and as such must henceforth have first priority for movement of troops and supplies and the immediate prosecution of the enterprise.

Box 100 - *Tully-Closed*

MARSHALL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

SECRETARY OF WAR
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
GENERAL ARNOLD
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
ADMIRAL KING
HARRY HOPKINS

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 6 1972

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3. As regards timing, the general strategic plan in the Pacific Theatre, in the India-Burma Theatre, and in the Near East Theatre calls for a continuous day to day maintenance of existing positions and existing strength in these theatres at least for the next few months.

4. The Atlantic Theatre general plan calls, however, for very great speed in developing actual operations. I have been disturbed by American and British naval objections to operations in the European Theatre prior to 1943. I regard it as essential that active operations be conducted in 1942. I fully realize difficulties in relation to the landing of armed forces under fire. All of us would like to have ideal materiel to work with. Materiel is never either ideal, or satisfactory, or sufficient. We have to use "any old method of transportation which will get us to our destination".

5. The necessities of the case call for action in 1942 — not 1943. In a recent memorandum of the united nations it was stated that there was agreement on a second front — provided the equipment and materiels were available. But they went on to say that it might have to be created any way, if Russia were to be seriously endangered even if the operation on the part of the British and the United States had to be called an operation of desperation.

6. If we decide that the only large scale offensive operation is to be in the European area, the element of speed becomes the first essential.

F. D. R.

*file
secret*

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

PSF

War

~~SECRET~~

*Marshall Folder
142*

May 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Political situation in
New Caledonia.

The attached message has just been received from General Patch, in command in New Caledonia. In view of the next to the last sentence it seems urgent that he be given an immediate reply. In case you have not seen his previous message on the same subject, I am inclosing it also.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.

John F. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-22-66

Signature-

Carl L. Spicer

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

C O P Y

From: Necal - New Caledonia
To: AGWAR, Washington, D.C.

No. 43, May 7th, 1942.

Further reference political situation here, incarceration of Ex-Governor Sautot and prominent citizens plus the deceptive means employed has so increased temper of population against D'Argenlieu and his mission that open violence is now more imminent.

From military standpoint resulting disorders can be highly favorable to enemy. The strike continues. I believe that demonstrations will continue and grow in intensity until source of trouble is removed by some means. The source of trouble is D'Argenlieu and his mission. I believe D'Argenlieu instigated the arrests previously reported and at most inopportune time. While professing an understanding of my neutral attitude he seeks and expects me to use American troops against the common people of New Caledonia to protect him and his mission.

If I use our troops to suppress this incipient rebellion against the present High Commissioner and his mission, I will lose the military support of the local militia and the entire population which is important to us militarily. The recent actions of D'Argenlieu, especially in view of the present military situation, now cause me to be distrustful of his motives. This is further accentuated by the fact that potential Fifth Columnists appear to be prominent amongst his new advisors. Does the international political situation permit delegating to me authority to place D'Argenlieu and his mission in protective custody as these disorders grow into an immediate and dangerous military threat? (Patch to Marshall)

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DDO LNL 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-29-70

Signature- JWA

SECRET

SECRET

From: New Caledonia
To: AGWAR

No. 33 May 6, 1942.

Marshall from Patch reurad NECAL 70 April 3. Report following change in local political situation. High Commissioner Admiral D'Argenlieu arrested Governor Sautot and 4 leading New Caledonian citizens and confined them aboard Free French gun boat "Chevereuil" about 7:30 p.m. last night. Chevereuil departed unannounced destination early today.

Population highly incensed and general strike has been called with public demonstrations protesting D'Argenlieu's action. High Commissioner has requested me to use Military Forces to assist in maintaining order. I have refused to intervene beyond the point necessary to protect United States property.

I believe that the events cited above have injured prestige of and local confidence in Free French movement. Action taken by D'Argenlieu was surreptitious and devious with implication of American support unjustified and unknown to me. I do not repeat not believe that action taken could have been accomplished had American troops not been present in New Caledonia. From a military standpoint this may have injured New Caledonian confidence in Americans and will seriously impair utility of militia as part of my force.

No sig

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-28-70

Signature- JWD-

SECRET

TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

May 8, 1942

Memo to General Marshall

Re New Caledonia To talk it over with the
State Department and that Mr. Welles suggests
we also talk with the British.

F.D.R.

W.H. F.V.

*file
personal*

BF Marshall Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5-8-42

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FORSTER:

General Marshall phoned the following message for the President:

"With reference to General Wainwright's supposed broadcast from Manila, Mrs. Wainwright and her boy heard it and are absolutely certain it was not Wainwright's voice.

"You have probably read General MacArthur's radio from Australia in which he states his doubt as to it being Wainwright."

ld

GCM

Marshall
Folder

G. M.

PSF

O.K.

May 8, 1942.

F. D. R.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Increase in strength of Army.

Reference your note on attached memorandum, there is shown below the schedule of increases of personnel:

Under Column a - as already recorded for January-April and as anticipated for May to December under the proposed authorized 3,600,000.

Under Column b as already recorded for January to April, and as recommended for May to December under the desired 4,350,000 total.

The figures in red indicate the monthly over-drafts on the 3,600,000 authorization which were necessary in order to provide the special units for the various island task forces.

(Enlisted strength January 1, 1942, 1,566,000)

Months 1942	<u>a</u> 3,600,000	<u>b</u> 4,350,000
January	193,000 (32,000)	193,000
February	246,000 (71,000)	246,000
March	217,000 (45,000)	217,000
April	155,000 (9,000)	155,000
May	210,000	210,000
June	213,000	213,000
July	220,000	280,000
August	220,000	280,000
September	175,000	280,000
October	105,000	275,000
November	80,000	240,000
December		195,000
	<u>3,600,000</u>	<u>4,350,000</u>

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DIR. 5200.8 (9/27/58)

(Sec) G. C. MARSHALL

Date- 3-10-59

Chief of Staff.

Signature-

Care of Spicer

MY

May 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Increase in strength of Army.

On January 13th last, you authorized an increase in the enlisted strength of the Army to 3,600,000 by December 31, 1942. Plans then visualized limited overseas movement during the year. Volume production of many items of critical equipment during 1942 was not firmly scheduled. Authorization for additional men in 1942 is now essential to our plans.

In the intervening four months our war effort has taken more definite form. It has been necessary to secure our lines of communication to Australia by numerous garrisons, and to rush reinforcements to Hawaii, Alaska, and Panama. The enemy internment problem has expanded greatly, as have the requirements regarding anti-sabotage measures, particularly where Japanese are involved. The "Bolero" plan requires a material increase in special troops, eventually requiring some 300,000 men for the ground forces alone to meet the special problems of that operation.

Combat and other units now in training should not be emasculated to furnish men for these new requirements in personnel. The need of 750,000 additional men for the Army during 1942 is now evident, making a strength objective of 4,350,000 by next January, instead of the 3,600,000 authorized last January 13th.

I recommend that you give your approval to this essential increase as an urgent war necessity.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

copy furnished G-3

Date- 3-10-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

MY

Increase in strength of Army

PST Marshall Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Copy of letter to Lauchlin
Currie from Edgar Snow in Cairo,
dated April 25, 1942, re the
vulnerability of the African
Air Supply Route.

Returned & in Currie's Folder

Marshall Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL
FOR YOUR CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION AND PLEASE RETURN
FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Confidential letter to General
Watson, dated May 27, 1942, re
the action taken by FBI in the
Western Defense Command.

*file
Confidential*


PSF *Marshall Folder*
SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached hereto is the first report received from the Commanding Officer of the Detachment which arrived at Nassau early Tuesday morning in accordance with your directive of Monday night, June 1st.


Chief of Staff.

Incl.
Report.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-22-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spear*



SECRET

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

June 3, 1942

FROM STATE DEPARTMENT
FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

No.	36	Dated:	June 3
From	Nassau		11 a.m.
		Rec'd:	June 3
			1:27 p.m.

The following is the report of Special Mission, 6th Cavalry, in accordance with general orders 16, Second Army Corps, June 2, and is transmitted for the War Department. The report is signed by David B. Goodwin:

I have attended a conference of United States construction heads, police, army officers and Colonial officials. Our relations with British authorities are satisfactory and they understand our Mission. The detachment is located at the British Colonial Hotel with the United States Construction Company and the quarters are satisfactory. No resistance has been met by our troops from the inhabitants. The American Consulate, homes of the consulate staff and American construction projects are guarded and I am keeping in close touch with the British Army unit and local militia.

Dye
American Consul

ACTION: OPD

INFO. COPIES: G-2, A-2, CG AAF, SGS, TAG, LOC, FILE
CM-IN-0937 (6-4-42) AM 12:35

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EOB DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-22-66

Signature-

Carl J. Spicer

COPY No.

SECRET

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

*RF
Marshall*

OPD 371 ETO

June 7, 1942.

*These instructions sent
by Radio June 8-1942
John R. Neane
Col GSC*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Your approval is requested on the attached draft of a radiogram addressed to the Commanding General of the United States Forces in the British Isles, which sets up a European Theater of Operations and designates him as the Commanding General, European Theater.

The instructions contained in this radiogram have been concurred in by the Secretary of War and Admiral King.

Joseph E. Mendenhall
Deputy Chief of Staff.

Incl.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-9-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*



Incl # 2
371. ETO ①

SECRET

①

SECRET

Proposed Message to be Sent to Commanding General of the
United States Forces in the British Isles.

June 8, 1942.

"Effective immediately, by direction of the President, a European theater of operations for the U. S. Army is established, of which the territorial limits will be exactly defined in a separate directive.

"The Commanding General, USAFBI, is hereby designated as the Commanding General, European Theater. He will command all U. S. Army Forces and personnel which are now in or may hereafter be dispatched to the European theater of operations, including any part of the Marine Corps therein which may be detached for service with the Army. By agreement between the U. S. War and Navy Departments, the Commanding General, European Theater, will exercise planning and operational control, under the principle of unity of command, over all U. S. Navy forces assigned to that theater for operations therein.

Military Attaches, other Army personnel attached to Embassies in the British Isles and Europe, and the U. S. Army representatives on the Munitions Assignment Board, London, are exempted from the control of the Theater Commander.

"The Commanding General, European Theater, is charged with the strategical, tactical, territorial, and administrative duties of a theater commander, subject to such limitations within the British Isles as are necessary to avoid any violation of British sovereignty. His

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SECRET

authority and duties include those devolving by law, regulations, orders, and custom of the United States upon the commander of an Army in the field in time of war and of a territorial department commander in peace and war.

"The mission of the Commanding General, European Theater, will be to prepare for and carry on military operations in the European theater against the Axis Powers, including their allies, under the strategical directives of the Combined U. S. - British Chiefs of Staff, as communicated to him by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

"In military operations against the Axis Powers, the Commanding General, European Theater, is directed to cooperate with the forces of the British Empire and other Allied Nations directed to the same mission, but in doing so the underlying purpose must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are to be maintained as a separate and distinct component of the combined forces. This fundamental rule is subject to such minor exceptions in particular circumstances as the judgment of the Commanding General, European Theater, may approve.

"The Commanding General, European Theater, will establish, after agreement with the proper British authorities, all necessary bases, lines of communication, depots, and other administrative facilities, and make all incidental arrangements essential to the reception, maintenance, administration, training, and operations of the U. S. Army Forces in the European Theater.

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Within the boundaries of the North Atlantic Treaty of Organization

"All missions previously assigned, and all authority to administer funds, supplies, or any other administrative or logistical matters, previously applying to the ^{CG ETO} Commanding General, USAFBI, or to any other office or officer of the U. S. Army who, under the preceding provisions of this directive, are subordinated to the Commanding General, ^{NATO} European Theater, are hereby vested in the Commanding General, European Theater.

^{NATO}
"The Commanding General, European Theater, will keep the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, fully advised of all that concerns his command and will communicate his recommendations freely and directly to the War Department."

"MARSHALL."

SECRET

①

*file
Confidential*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

I think the President would be
interested in reading this.

H.L.H.

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

TO: ADMIRAL KING:

I think you will be interested in Eamons' letter - attached, especially his last paragraph re Nimitz. Here is a report for you from a highly informed source.

G.C.M.

COPY

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

UNITED STATES FLEET

11 June 1942

General Marshall -

Thank you for letting me see
Emmons' letter. I think we are all
now well on our way to working
together against the enemy.

KING

Gen. Marshall Folder
PSF

COPY

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Office of Commanding General
Fort Shafter, T.H.

7th June 1942

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
United States Army,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Marshall:

Thank you very much for your letter of June 1, 1942. I am very appreciative of the efforts you have made to obtain promotions for some of my important Staff Officers. We have a very difficult administrative and tactical job to do and one that must be set up for twenty-four-hour operations. We not only have integrated the civilian population in our war effort here, but have spread ourselves pretty well over the entire Pacific area. We must have competent officers in these jobs and Heaven knows there are few enough of them and they must not be discouraged by being jumped.

The first phase of the battle of Midway is about over. I use the expression "first phase" because I think it is entirely possible that the Japanese will renew their attack. We are still uncertain as to the extent of victory. We will not know accurately for some days just what Japanese ships we can claim credit for, and just what our losses were. I do want to give you however a brief summary of the Army's participation in this battle to date. We employed approximately 60 B-17's, 4 B-26's and 3 C-53's. As there is only one flying field on Midway with little opportunity for dispersion, we had to do much shuttling back and forth between Oahu and Midway. Our air operations were under Navy control, but our units while in the air were commanded by our officers. Reports indicate that the Army score to date in this battle is at least the following:

- 2 Torpedo hits in carriers by B-26's.
- 1 Carrier badly damaged by bombs. There is a possibility that there was still another damaged by our bombs.
- 3 Battle ships damaged, one badly.
- 1 Cruiser sunk.
- 1 Heavy cruiser damaged.
- 1 Destroyer badly damaged, probably sunk.
- 2 Transports (1 described as being of the NORMANDIE class) damaged, - set on fire.
- 2 Hits on a carrier which was on fire.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-10-59

Signature-

Carl H. Spicer

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1045 2011121
Office of the Commanding
NAVY/NAVY/NAVY/NAVY/NAVY
JULY

- 2 -

Our combat crews covered themselves with glory! They flew many hours and in many cases to the point of exhaustion. They attacked without thought of risk. Our losses so far can be summarized briefly as follows:

- 2 B-26's with crews.
- 2 B-26's badly shot up, crashed on landing.
Crews saved.
- 3 B-17's, one crew saved.

In addition, an unknown number of our B-17's were damaged by enemy action. Although the execution done by the Army in this battle was large, I believe that much greater credit should be given to our land-based heavy bombers. I offer the thought confidentially that I do not believe that the Navy would have risked their three carriers in this battle against the superior hostile force which had four or five carriers had not they been assured of the support of land-based aviation. Had the Navy not risked their carriers we might have suffered a defeat rather than an overwhelming victory.

I have felt for some time that we should make an attack on Wake Island for obvious reasons. We did not have ships of sufficient range until a few days ago when four LB-30's arrived from the mainland. These airplanes are now at Midway and will, if conditions permit, attack Wake Island just before daylight tomorrow morning. We will flash you the results. Incidentally, I am glad to say that General Tinker will personally lead this flight. I am sorry that I cannot go along.

I will submit to you a complete report of the battle of Midway with the lessons learned as soon as we can get our crews back and brief them. It will require some time to make a complete and accurate analysis from the briefs.

General Richardson stopped by and I had many interesting talks with him. I am very grateful to you for supplying the information which General Richardson conveyed. Much of it I had surmised but there was a great deal that was new. All of it was of extraordinary interest.

In closing let me tell you that the Army, Navy and the Marine Corps worked as a team in this battle. Cooperation was excellent! Admiral Nimitz proved himself to be a leader of the highest quality and an inspiration to us all. He is giving the Army full credit for the part it played.

With warmest personal regards, I am
Sincerely yours,

/s/ EMMONS
DELOS C. EMMONS
Lieutenant General U. S. Army
Commanding

PSF War: Marshall Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN McCREA:

Will you give this to me at
the next Pacific War Council meeting?

F.D.R.

Secret memorandum for the President from
General Marshall, June 11, Subject:
Proposed visit of General Arnold to
Australia.

Marshall Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

**GENERAL MARSHALL ✓
GENERAL ARNOLD
GENERAL EMBICK**

FOR RECOMMENDATION

F. D. R.

Memo from Mayor LaGuardia, Chairman
American Section, Permanent Board on Defense
(secret) enclosing for the President's
consideration the Twenty-sixth Recommenda-
tion of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense
dealing with the air ferry routes in North-
east Canada. All of correspondence sent to
General Marshall

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 6 1972

TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

July 14 1942

THE PRESIDENT

General Marshall requests that the following message be sent to the President at Hyde Park by telegraphic secret code.

QUOTE

John R Dean, Colonel General
Staff; Secretary General
Staff;

To the President

Reference your telegram to me, a
STRATO-LINER will be available for our
flight at any time after eight a.m.,
Wednesday, July fifteen.

(Signed) MARSHALL

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-10-57

Signature- Carl T. Spencer

PSF
file
Confidential Marshall
Folder

PSF War: Marshall Folder
1-42

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

Aug. 8, 1942.

FILE MEMO:

The President returned to Gen. Marshall with following notation:

"G.C.M. -- O.K. go ahead -- F.D.R."

Secret Memo from the Chief of Staff to the Pres., with whole file from Hull and Welles re General de Gaulle making certain proposals on a projected invasion to take place in French territory.

General Marshall suggests that the Secy. of State be informed of this and fact that leakages frequently result from discussions with Gen. De Gaulle.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CORDELL HULL:

Is any action necessary
on this?

F.D.R.

Let. of July 30 from Sumner Welles to
the Pres. enclosing telegrams No. 3398
and No. 4190 from Winant in London re
General de Gaulle making certain proposals
with regard to a projected invasion to take
place on French metropolitan territory.

July 30, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

On July 21 Monsieur M. Tixier, the Free French representative in Washington, called on me and delivered a message from General de Gaulle making certain proposals with regard to a projected invasion to take place on French metropolitan territory. In consultation with the Secretary we came to the conclusion that it would be well to have the views of the British Government before proceeding further in the matter. A telegram was sent, therefore, on July twenty-second to Ambassador Winant, a copy of which is attached hereto. This telegram sets forth the essential points of General de Gaulle's message.

I have now received from Mr. Winant a report of his having taken up the subject with Mr. Eden. I am also enclosing herewith a copy of Mr. Winant's report as contained in his telegram no. 4190 of July 27, midnight.

As you will see from Mr. Winant's telegram, General de Gaulle had also presented proposals in general similar to those he conveyed to us, though not identical in form with the message Monsieur Tixier read to me.

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Under Secretary

Enclosures:

Telegram no. 3398,
July 22, 1942 to
London.
Telegram no. 4190,
July 27, 1942 from
London.

The President,
The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

What do you think?

F.D.R.

Memo from Welles, July 30, together with
Winant's telegram re Gen. de Gaulle making
certain proposals with regard to a projected
invasion to take place on French territory.
Also memo from Hull dated Aug. 4th.

August 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

It is suggested that both the British Government and M. Tixier, the Free French representative in Washington, be told that with respect to de Gaulle's proposals regarding Free French participation in an invasive movement in Western Europe, discussion as to details be left with the British Government. They might also be told that the High Command of the American forces in Great Britain will be ready to consider questions which might arise in the pursuit of such discussions with a view to referring to Washington any such questions which might involve decisions or actions by the American forces.

A true copy of
the signed original.
not.

CH

*PSF
War: Marshall Folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS:

TO DO THE NECESSARY.

F.D.R.

Secret memo from the Chief of Staff
Subject: Air Reinforcement Middle East
and Aid to Russia.

Marshall Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 25, 1942.


MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR
MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Cable dated Aug. 22 from London No. 4705
from Winant re public relations with
ref. to increasing numbers of troops
arriving.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 6 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*File
Confidential*

August 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This memorandum from General Marshall is merely a comment on Wayne Coy's memorandum to you and not in reply to the note which you sent to General Marshall last night.

I think, therefore, this can be filed pending your conference with General Marshall.

H.L.H.

WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS:

Will you speak to me about
this today?

F.D.R.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

PSF 7 March 42
2-42

August 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Mobilization Plan 1943.

The Acting Director of the Budget has furnished me with a copy of his memorandum to you on the subject of the 1943 (calendar year) Mobilization Plan.

I agree with Mr. Coy's comment that the strength of the Army must be related to the man power requirements of the Navy, and I have taken action to present the plan to the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

However, I must disagree with his recommendation that this plan be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Combined War Production and Resources Board.

The procedure outlined is cumbersome and must result in too much of delay.

In the formulation of this program the considerations mentioned by the Director of the Budget were not ignored. Informal inquiry indicated that the plan was well within the limits of the estimated man power availability of ten million men in 1943. The supply requirements are in the main less than programs already projected. There will be a revision downward in many items of the 1943 supply program as a result of the approval of this Mobilization Plan.

Subject to the agreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the man power issue, upon which I will inform you subsequently, I recommend approval of the plan as submitted without review by any international agencies.


Chief of Staff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (8/27/58)

Date- 3-10-59

Signature- Carl L. Spier

SECRET

PSF War: Marshall Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS:

Will you speak to me about
this today?

F.D.R.

Memo (secret) from the Chief of Staff
Aug. 25 - Subject: Mobilization Plan
1943

August 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL MARSHALL

FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Donald Nelson relative to aircraft production for the balance of 1942 and for 1943.

A supplement is attached showing a breakdown by types of planes. You will note that the probable production of all types for the balance of this year and next is greatly below the original Victory Program and substantially below the War Production Board's 8-K objective.

Enclosures.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By AK

Date

APR 10 1973

COPY

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Office of
DONALD M. NELSON
Chairman

The President
The White House

My dear Mr. President:

Your letter of August 12th to the Secretaries of War and Navy and to myself on the subject of aircraft production has received our most careful attention. It is desirable now to re-appraise our position from the standpoint of past deliveries, retarding factors and remedial measures necessary to secure the more rapid acceleration we all desire.

The replies to your letter from Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox were prepared in cooperation with representatives of the Aircraft Production Division of the War Production Board and, I believe, give you a correct picture of deliveries compared to schedules during the first seven months of 1942 and, in addition, list the main factors that have contributed to the prevention of greater accelerations.

There are a number of matters pertaining to the aircraft program of such vital importance that I am taking the liberty of presenting them here, since they were discussed and agreed upon at the "clinic" which you requested be held by representatives of the several agencies involved.

1942 Program

On January 3rd of this year you announced an aircraft program objective of 60,000 planes for 1942. This has subsequently served as our directive, toward the attainment of which every effort has been made. Although many of our associates have from the first indicated that they considered it unlikely that we could reach this figure, I have, nevertheless, felt it would be unwise to advise you of their doubts until the time had arrived when we could give you convincing evidence of what within closer limits the final figure would be. That time has now arrived.

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (M)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72

By *pt*

Date APR 10 1973

Under the existing conditions of aircraft priority assignments, manufacturing facilities, and material supplies available to aircraft, it is probable that our 1942 deliveries will not exceed 48,000 planes. The flow time of materials in the aircraft industry is from five to seven months, so that it is not now possible greatly to accelerate output during the remainder of 1942. Every additional plane that can be turned out will be, so as to add as many possible to this number. I suggest a "green light" for the whole aircraft program, except primary trainers. With a stimulus, for instance, such as would be given by extending special preference to every item required for aircraft whether tool, material, or equipment, I believe our 1942 total airplane deliveries can be raised to something over 50,000, of which approximately two-thirds will be tactical airplanes (56% combat and 10% cargo and communications). The remaining 34% will be trainers.

1943 Program

Your announced directive for 1943 was 125,000 airplanes. Although little can be done to improve 1942 output, drastic steps taken now will substantially increase 1943 production. There are, however, several factors involved of which we feel you should be cognizant, and these together with attainable objectives, will be briefly touched upon in following paragraphs.

Weight Increase

As our program progresses, the percentage of heavy bombers will increase and training airplanes diminish. The disparity of weight is so great that, whereas the average airframe weight was about 4,000 lbs. at the beginning of 1942, it will be almost 9,000 lbs. at the end of 1943. For 1942, the average weight will be approximately 5,600 lbs., which will increase to an average of 9,000 lbs. for 1943. A 108% increase in number of airplanes produced (60,000 to 125,000) would represent almost a 200% increase in terms of airframe weight, and an increase of the same general order in the productive effort required. It is also important to note that, with an increasing proportion of bombers, the number of engines used will increase more than in proportion to the number of airframes.

Spares

The global war in which we are engaged makes necessary the establishment of great numbers of bases, widely separated. To keep our airplanes flying at these bases under war conditions, it has been necessary continually to increase percentages of spares. The latest directive for spares requirements for 1943 as established by the Services calls for very greatly increased percentages compared to those scheduled or actually being received in 1943. The manufacturing load is increased proportionately, with attendant reduction in the program of completed airplanes.

Engines

One of the major limiting factors in the aircraft program is the production of high horsepower engines. Facilities for the manufacture of these are being rapidly expanded. In addition to the engines which are being manufactured for original installation in planes, it is necessary for us to manufacture an additional fifty percent which are to be used as spares.

Gliners

The glider program, introduced subsequently to the announcement of your program, is competitive with the aircraft schedules in instruments and in some equipment and materials. Its importance has given it a high priority position.

Changes

Combat experience makes changes necessary although it is always the aim to incorporate alterations at a stage of production which will cause the least possible interruption of manufacturing flow. This postponement of the time when changes are incorporated is not always a wise or practicable policy from the standpoint of military effectiveness. Changes will remain always an uncertain element in production forecasts.

The Program

Under the existing priority position for the aircraft program, and indications of the material supplies available, and with due consideration for the above factors, our forecast of probable 1943 deliveries is 92,000 airplanes. Although your directive of 125,000 airplanes for 1943 has remained as our ultimate objective and is being used as the basis of planning expansion of facilities, nevertheless, our target schedule for materials and equipment allocations is 107,111 (about 16% higher than our forecast so as to permit maximum possible delivery increase consistent with proper allocation policy, but 14% less than the ultimate objective). To attain this quantity, 107,111 will require that the unqualified "green light" signal for aircraft in all of its components including facilities, machine tools, basic materials and all other factors entering into the completed airplane, described above in the discussion of 1942 problems, be continued through 1943. I suggest that the aircraft program as a whole be preferred over all other production and that great caution be taken to avoid the giving of highest priority to special projects believed to be of an emergency character. Only in this way can there be any reasonable assurance of obtaining the target objective.

- 4 -

We fully appreciate the need of aircraft in ever-increasing quantities and assure you of the continuing best efforts of us all in getting the largest possible number, yet I urge that you accept our judgment that the figure 107,111, which represents about what we are likely to deliver even with the "green light", is the maximum realistic target figure and should be adopted both for allocation and expansion purposes, on the premise that a target set too high above a feasible goal may result in establishment of more facilities than can effectively be used, and this would be to the detriment of the scheduled program. Materials and labor expended in obtaining such facilities will not only cause us to get less planes than we otherwise would have produced, but unnecessarily detract from other vital parts of the program.

However, it is important for you to know that by the end of 1943 our target schedule of 107,111 airplanes provides for an annual rate of production of just over your directive figure of 125,000, of which approximately two-thirds will be combat types.

Remedies

We have ordered a listing of all items of tools, materials and equipment, the lack of delivery of which is in any way retarding the aircraft program. Our "clinic" considers the aircraft part of our war production effort as so outstandingly important that we feel justified in giving every such item a priority position so high as to assure its delivery when required. Your approval of the program as outlined is requested.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ D. M. NELSON

Donald M. Nelson

Approved:

/s/ ROBERT P. PATTERSON

For the Army: Acting Secretary

/s/ RALPH A. BARD

Acting for the Navy:

1942 - 1943
AIRCRAFT PROGRAM ANALYSIS

1942

	President's program	W.P.B. 8-K Objective	Probable Production Under Existing Conditions	Gain by "Green Light" Support
Long Range, Heavy & Medium Bombers	11,300	7,464	6,824	557
Light, Dive, Torpedo & Scout Bombers	11,000	7,738	7,065	617
Pursuits	16,000	11,942	10,709	998
Observation & Transports	6,700	7,348	6,745	565
TOTAL TACTICAL	45,000	34,492	31,343	2,737
Total Trainers	15,000	18,079	16,272	
GRAND TOTAL	60,000	52,571	47,615	2,737
Total Under "Green Light" Support			50,352	

1943

	President's Program	W.P.B. 8-K Objective	Probable Production Under Existing Conditions	Gain By "Green Light" Support
Long Range, Heavy & Medium Bombers	30,000	22,525	19,272	3,653
Light, Dive, Torpedo & Scout Bombers	17,000	19,382	17,056	2,626
Pursuits	38,000	27,985	24,048	4,517
Observation & Transports	15,000	10,660	9,988	951
TOTAL TACTICAL	100,000	80,552	70,364	11,747
Total Trainers	25,000	26,559	21,668	3,332
GRAND TOTAL	125,000	107,111	92,032	15,079

Total Under "Green Light"
Support

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PSF Marshall Folder
1-42

September 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Reply to a letter from
Ambassador Winant relative
to the public relations be-
tween our troops in England
and the British civilian
population.

The questions raised by Ambassador Winant
affecting the public relations between our troops,
negro and white, in England, on the one hand, and the
British civilian and military population on the other
are under constant study by the War Department and
General Eisenhower.

It is recommended that the attached draft
of a letter to Ambassador Winant be signed and dis-
patched.

Marshall
Chief of Staff.

Enc.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 9-2-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

SECRET

September 10, 1942

The Honorable John W. Winant,
American Ambassador,
London, England.

Dear Winant: *WJ*

I was glad to have your recent telegram relative to the relations between the British public and our troops in England. The action of the British Parliament in giving us exclusive jurisdiction over members of our forces who commit criminal offenses should be helpful, and indicates a very sincere desire to extend to us every possible cooperation.

The Red Cross situation will, I am sure, be solved to the satisfaction of everyone. The Red Cross activities in England are, I believe, tremendously important.

There are, of course, many complications with regard to the use of negro troops. We will, of necessity, have to send a reasonable proportion of negro soldiers overseas, and present plans contemplate that the ratio of negro troops to white troops will correspond to that obtaining in the Army as a whole. This is approximately ten per cent. The dispatch of negro WAAC units to England is deferred for the present. General Eisenhower has withdrawn his recommendation that this action be taken, because the specific need that he had in mind for them has been met by the Red Cross. The question of other uses for negro WAAC units with troops in England is still under study in the War Department.

The relative affluence of our soldiers under the new pay rates has already been brought up by General Eisenhower. This is a troublesome question and one for which there appears to be no simple and wholly satisfactory solution. The War Department has for some time been encouraging soldiers to purchase War Bonds, and there has always been a constant effort to promote the sale of Government Life Insurance. There is no legal authority now for compulsory allotments of pay, except in a relatively limited number

of dependency cases. It is possible that some results can be obtained through encouraging soldiers to utilize the soldiers' deposit system in order to accumulate personal savings. Under present statutes such savings would be entirely voluntary on the part of troops. The War Department is corresponding with General Eisenhower on this subject, and you may be sure that we shall continue to strive for a suitable solution.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

PSF

Marshall Folder
1-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY

I have read your memoranda of September third in regard to civilian administrative section of General Eisenhower's staff.

In view of subsequent conversation, I take it that this has been worked out. Is there anything further I should do?

F.D.R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PSF

Marshall - Alder
1-47

file


WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

September 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is a message received this morning from General Maxwell in Cairo, addressed to the President.

"Your letter of August 25 has been published in general orders to this Command and read at exercises held in observance of the completion of one year since the issuance of your directive of September 13, 1941, which was the basis for the establishment of the United States Military North African Mission. It is greatly appreciated and is an additional inspiration to all ranks to continue with renewed energy our efforts to make United States participation a decisive factor in the Middle East Theater."


Chief of Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-10-59

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

PSF War: Marshall Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

I enclose a personal memorandum to me from Lauchlin Currie in regard to the reply from the Generalissimo. I wish you would talk the proposed reply over with Currie. Perhaps you can tone it down. Will you send for him?

F.D.R.

Secret from Marshall to the Pres. re: Support of China, together with Currie's memorandum to the Pres. re cable from the Pres. to the Generalissimo.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
personal*

10-12-42

Confidentially forwarded
to the President:

Chu
E.M.H.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PSF
Marshall file
2-42

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

October 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Newspaper for U. S.
Troops in the U. K.

Since my memorandum to you of October 9 regarding the publication of the "Stars and Stripes," I have received word from General Eisenhower that it will be published as a daily beginning November 1 at a cost of about two cents per copy. In view of the morale factor involved in such a paper I am arranging that any initial losses incident to its publication will be made up from profits derived from "Yank."


Chief of Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-10-59

Signature-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Carl L. Spicer

PSF Marshall folder
1-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

This should be got to
General Patton as soon as
possible even though there
may not be anything in it.

F. D. R.

State Dept. dispatch dated 11/9/42
No. 17 Nov. 9, 4 pm from Ciudad
Juarez signed Blocker "Antonio Balboa
Spanish refugee formerly with Spanish
Rep. military unit in Morocco advises"
large cache arms and ammunition in unde-
r ground arsenal back of Casablanca
said to be near village Bouskoura.
Number of small bungalows constructed
near arsenal as camouflage

*file
personnel*

*PSF Marshall folder
1-42*


WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message has just been received by me from Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, through General Eisenhower:

"I would be grateful if you would inform the President how honored I, the flag officers, captains, officers and ships' companies of His Majesty's ships feel at his appreciative reference to them and to their work. One and all have regarded it as a privilege to take part in this great undertaking under your command and feel great pleasure that the President has seen fit to associate the Royal Navy with the United States Forces in his message of thanks to those engaged in these operations."


Chief of Staff.

PSF War:

Marshall folder
2-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRIVATE

December 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

I do not think that General R. E. Wood should be put into uniform. He is too old and has, in the past, shown far too great approval of Nazi methods. If General Arnold wishes to continue to use him in a civilian capacity in the supply situation, I have no serious objection.

F. D. R.

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1942.


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Last September General Arnold, in an effort to straighten out the complicated supply situation of the rapidly expanding Air Corps, enlisted the services of Robert E. Wood of Sears Roebuck, to inspect the air supply set-up. I am now told that he has visited every supply activity, depot, etc., of the Air Command in continental United States and that his suggestions have resulted in marked improvements.

General Arnold now proposes that Wood be ordered to active service for employment in connection with the procurement, storage and distribution of Air Corps materials.

In view of his pre-war activity I am submitting this request for your approval.

General Wood has gone about this business quietly and in a highly efficient manner and I believe he has been of great assistance to the Air Corps.


Chief of Staff.