

MR 000.7, Sec. 2 -- PUBLICITY AND PRESS

DECLASSIFIED

Jan-Dec, 1964

MR 000.7, Sec. 2 -- PUBLICITY AND PRESS

Jan-Dec, 1944

Map Room
Box 46
Folder 9

Box 46

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
OM COMINCH AND CNO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY R S EDWARDS		CINCPAC	PRIORITY
DATE 31 DEC 44			RRRR
TOR CODEROOM 1918/30			DEFERRED
DECODED BY		COM 7TH FLT	PRIORITY
TYPED BY KULKAI KEANAN			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
301900			☐
NCR 49549			

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

WHEN RELEASE OF TYPHOON LOSSES IS MADE DEPARTMENT WILL DO IT. YOUR 292351. INTEND WITHHOLD ANY ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE PRESENT.

ACTION		
F-0		22
F-00		23
F-01		24
F-02		25
F-05		26
F-07		27
F-1		28
F-2		29
F-20		30
F-3		31
F-30		32
F-31		33
F-32		34
F-33		35
F-34		36
F-4		37
FX01		38
FX37		39
FX40		40
IG-00		41
VCNO		42
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E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10, 1973

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

301900

OPNAV 10-67

000.7

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] TOT

From: US Military Attache, London, England

To : War Department

No : 23479

30 December 1944

MILID sr nr 23479. From Tindall

Churchill's return Athens followed by British public's disappointment no agreement among factions or termination fighting has resulted. While announcement all parties and Churchill back regency regarded as some progress this not considered to advance solution much.

Liberal papers wondering why Eden returned so quickly as presence high ranking British figure might aid negotiations undertaken by Archbishop. Also ask why truce was not made first Churchill effort in Athens.

Churchill's personal standing probably helped by trip. He had been subject much criticism for belligerent and uncompromising attitude on Greek situation which Athens trip has partly removed. Conservative papers take position Churchill and Eden have done all they can and now Greeks bear onus for continuing Civil War.

End

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF, OPD, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-29731 (31 Dec 44) 0407Z bjm

000.7

COPY No.

42

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] UHR

From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey.
To : War Department.
CG, US Army Forces in Middle East, Cairo, Egypt.
Nr : 542 29 December 1944.
Number MILID 542 AMSMF 1220.

Story of Editorials in Turk Press partly due to error in published translation has greeted President Roosevelt remarks recently about Atlantic Charter. Writers state that policies pursued by great powers lately in Europe are causing uneasiness and if idealistic eight points of charter are to be abandoned altogether in favor of self interest then there will follow, says Tanin of Istanbul, "Social, economic and political troubles of a graver character than the war itself." New York Times reported statement that though unsigned the charter articles are as valid as the Wilsonian fourteen points also evokes misgivings in Turk Press. Vakit in Istanbul asks whether what happened to fourteen points in peace that followed last world war has been forgotten. In one of a series of bitter articles pro-Ally Yalcin in Tanin wonders if President Roosevelt intentions to "Clip into nothing" the guiding principles which might yet save the peace.

End.

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF
OPD
Col Park
Log

RECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May 2, 1972

CM-IN-29786 (31 Dec 44) 0522Z bjm RHP, NARS Data DEC 10 1973

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Telephone Ext. No. 7312	ADDRESSEES		MESSAGE PRECEDENCE	
From COMINCH and CNO	TO:		PRIORITY	☐
Released by RS Edwards	CINCPAC COMINTFLT		ROUTINE	☒
Date 27 DECEMBER 1944	COMSUBPAC COMSUBSTHFLT		DEFERRED	☐
Unless classified RESTRICTED this dispatch will be classified PLAIN.			PRIORITY	☐
If CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET use special blank.			ROUTINE	☒
			DEFERRED	☐

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

272118

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with DEFERRED precedence. Originator fill in date and time for DEFERRED and MAIL delivery. Date _____ Time _____ G. C. T.

TEXT:

AM TODAY RELEASING FOR PUBLICATION THE LOSS OF SEAWOLF (SS 197) X
 NEXT OF KIN HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED X PRESUMED LOST BECAUSE OVERDUE FROM PATROL

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) of (M)
 OSD letter, May 3, 1972
 By RHP, NARS Date **DEC 10 1973**

COPY TO: Op19...20...20M...25...BUPERS...BUREAU...BUORD...BUSHIPS...BUSANDA...

Kewside

THIS SPACE IS FOR ABSTRACT OF PREVIOUS REFERENCES. IF THIS IS A REPLY, REFERENCE NUMBERS OF INCOMING DISPATCH MUST BE SHOWN HERE.

Deliver to Communication Office. Will be returned to File Room after being receipt stamped in Navcom.

2

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-6000

000.7

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Military Intelligence
Joint Security Control
mfd 6456

30 November 1944

Commander in Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
Hollandia New Guinea

Commander in Chief
Pacific Ocean Areas
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Number WARX 70546

To MacArthur and Nimitz from Joint Security Control signed
Bissell

To accomplish objective in paragraph (A) of CINCSWPA's CX
52283 of 16 November and prolongation of threat against
Formosa desired in CINCPAC's 190426 (22 November 44) the
story to be implemented here is summarized as follows.
"U S high command is much concerned over setback to scheduled
operations resulting from determined Japanese opposition on
Leyte. Seizing on this fact and possibility MacArthur may
be prevented from engaging in further major operations for
considerable time, proponents of direct assaults on Japan
and China coast have strongly reasserted their views.

"Strong Japanese reaction in Philippines has upset our own
schedule but it is estimated that it has thrown enemy off
balance in Formosa. These facts are strong reason to change
next main effort to Formosa while MacArthur contains enemy
in Visayans with only limited means.

"Consideration is being given to target date within Christmas
holidays if logistics will permit. It is argued maximum tac-
tical surprise might be obtained on Christmas Day".

CM-OUT-70546 (30 Nov 44)

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

WARX 70546

PS 2

It is believed this story can be effectively implemented in short time available and will be supported by other activities in area and climaxed by carrier strikes in paragraph 2A (e) of fivesome. The implied difficulties of logistics and Leite campaign plus the possible crystallization of overall strategy will provide pegs on which to hang postponement and continuation of further threat, plan for which will be submitted later.

Concurrence or comments will be appreciated.

End

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

ORIGINATOR: Gen Bissell

INFORMATION: JC/S, Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Hull
Adm King (Adm Theband), C of S

CM-OUT-70546 (30 Nov 44)

2004Z

ben

COPY No. 36

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~_____~~ "AMUG"

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Main Versailles France

To: War Department

Nr: S 68651

28 Nov 1944

SHAEF signed Eisenhower cite SHPRD nil to AGWAR
rptd TROOPERS, Admiralty, EXFOR Main, COMZONE, SHAEF
Mission to Belgium, ANCXF S-68651 ~~TOPSEC~~

Subject our message S-68301 of 25th November covered
by press censor's guidance number 643 of 24th November
which forwarded you by courier. No release will be made
except as stated therein.

End

NOTE: S-68301 is CM-IN-24736 (25 Nov 44) Gen Surles

ACTION: Gen Surles

INFO: Gen Arnold
Gen Somervell
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Log

opening Antwerp

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY RT, DATE

DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-27505 (28 Nov 44)

1335Z

bem

35

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24-75784

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]
URGENT

AMUG
W. 18.

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department

Nr: S 68301

25 November 1944

SHAEF Main signed Eisenhower nil AGWAR, TROOPERS,
Admiralty, EXFOR Main, COMZONE, SHAEF Mission to Belgium.
Info ANCXF S 68301 [REDACTED]

It is understood that certain steps are contemplated
to publicize and feature in the press the opening of Antwerp.
These proposals have not the approval of this headquarters
at this time.

In view of continued attacks on Antwerp by "V"
weapons and urgent operational necessity of getting the
maximum tonnage through this port as early as possible there
should be no publicity on either the date or method of its
coming into use.

End

ACTION: Gen Surles

INFO: Gen Somervell; Gen Hull; Gen Bissell; Adm King;
Col Park; Log

CM-IN-24736 (25 Nov 44)

1808Z

ekk

[REDACTED]
DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY RT, DATE

DEC 10 1973
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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] IVI

PRIORITY

From: CG US Army Forces China Theater, Chungking China

To: War Department

Nr: CFB 27033

22 November 1944

To Marshall for Hull nr CFB 27033 from Wedemeyer

Korean civil censorship proposals outlined in ourad
WAR 63542 appear eminently practical.

I not only concur but affirmatively recommend such
procedure. China Theater not equipped to handle either
planning or implementation Korean civil censorship and
attempt to develop in that direction would merely arouse at
this time Chinese political hullabaloo.

End

ACTION: OPD

INFO : JCS
ADM LEAHY
CG AAF
G-2
CAD
ADM KING
C OF S

CM-IN-21827 (22 Nov 44) 2054Z mcs

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

0007 COPY No.

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31

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>COMTHIRDELT</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY <u>[Signature]</u>		CINCPAC <u>[Signature]</u>	Priority <u>pppp</u>
DATE <u>21 NOV 44</u>			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM <u>1700</u>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY <u>M MORRISON</u>		SECNAV	
TYPES BY <u>M MORRISON</u>			Priority <u>ppppp</u>
ROUTED BY <u>MATHES</u>			ROUTINE
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS			DEFERRED
By <u>RHP, MARK Date DEC 10 1973</u>			
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
	211020	NCR 0465	

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(ACTION CINCPAC INFO SECNAV FROM COM 3RD FLT.)

REFERENCE CINCPAC 21 216 TEXT OF MESSAGE.

"MEN AND WOMEN OF AMERICA", FROM THE WESTERN PACIFIC OCEAN
ALL HANDS OF YOUR FIGHTING 3RD FLEET JOIN YOU IN GIVING

THANKS ON THIS THANKSGIVING DAY.

IN SPITE OF HOMESICKNESS AND BATTLE AND PRIVATION THERE
IS MUCH TO BE THANKFUL FOR.WE GIVE THANKS THAT OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN BLESSED WITH
SUCCESS.WE GIVE GRATEFUL THANKS FOR THE TURN OF THE TIDE OF EVENTS
WHICH NOW IS CARRYING THE BANNERS OF DECENCY FORWARD - OVER-
RUNNING THE ENEMY'S DEFENSES - PRESSING ON TO THE SOURCES
OF HATRED AND OPPRESSION.WE GIVE THANKS THAT WE HAVE A DECENT HOMELAND TO FIGHT FOR.
WE GIVE THANKS THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO KEEP THE ENEMY'S
FEET AND HIS BLOODY HAND FROM TOUCHING THAT HOMELAND.AND MAY YOU AT HOME NEVER FORGET TO HUMBLY GIVE/THANKS FOR THE
UNFALTERING AND UNQUESTIONABLE COURAGE OF THE FINE YOUNG**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver in Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

000.7
OPNAV 19-61

211020

ACTION	
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F-01	24
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F-8	38
F-9	39
F-10	40
F-11	41
F-12	42
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F-15	45
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F-17	47
F-18	48
F-19	49
F-20	50
F-21	51
F-22	52

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		PRIORITY	2
DATE		ROUTINE	3
TOR CODEROOM		DEFERRED	4
DECODED BY			5
TYPED BY	INFORMATION	PRIORITY	6
ROUTED BY		ROUTINE	7
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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			11
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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

211 525

NCR 9465

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

AMERICANS WHO HAVE MADE THE SUPREME SACRIFICE THAT WE MIGHT
KEEP THE HERITAGE, FOR WHICH ABOVE ALL THINGS, WE ARE THANK-
FUL." HALSEY.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

OOR...COG

COMINCH...

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OPNAV 19-6E

211 525

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] CUM

From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta, Italy.

To : War Department.

Nr : F 55090 20 November 1944.

F 55090 signed McNarney cite NAAGO.

Thanksgiving Day proclamation of President is the subject.

None received in this theater to date. Will one be forthcoming.

End.

ACTION: OPD

INFO : COL PARK
LOG

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JCS LETTER, 7-8-78
BY RT, DATE

DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-19998 (20 Nov 44) 2228Z mcs
[REDACTED]

006

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Operations Div WDGS Policy Sec
WDOPD OPD 000.73 (15 Nov 44)
2971 B.B. 3E756

15 November 1944

Commanding General,
USAF China Theater,
Chungking, China

Number: WAR 63542

From Hull for Wedemeyer signed Marshall.

Joint Security Control has recommended that Joint Chiefs of Staff approve broad policy clarifying responsibility for planning and operation of civil censorship in Pacific-Asiatic area which proposes among other things that pending final determination of operating responsibility and interests of other United Nations, planning for censorship of civilian communications in Korea should be a responsibility of CINCPAC, who is similarly charged with Japan proper, Formosa, Southern Sakhalin and mandated islands.

Draft policy provides for transfer of plans for any areas in accordance with adjustment of theater boundaries during or subsequent to the planning stage. Similarly working censorship organization would normally be transferred when theater boundaries are altered after initiation of operations. CINCPAC now has censorship planning staff working in his area.

Your comment and recommendations are requested since proposition concerns an area within China theater.

End

ORIGINATOR : OPD

INFORMATION: JC/S
CG AAF
Adm. King
CAD
C of S

CM-OUT-63542 (16 Nov 44) 1505Z hy

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MAY 3 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

15 November 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General
U.S. Army Liaison Section
Kandy, Ceylon

Headquarters, Communication Zone
European Theater of Operations
Main Echelon
Paris, France

Commanding General
Central District
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number: WARX 63045

book message to Eisenhower Versailles, Wilson Caserta, and Mountbatten Kandy for action, to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information. This message is FACS 108 to Eisenhower and FAN 451 to Wilson from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. As there have recently been references in the press and on the radio to the existence of cover and deception plans, attention is again drawn to the need for maintaining

CM-OUT-63045

(15 Nov 44)

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo

By RAA Date DEC 10 1973

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Number: WARX 63045

Page 2

a high level of secrecy on all details connected with strategic and tactical deception planning and the secret methods of implementation used. The fact that the war against Germany is drawing to a close does not mean that there can be any slackening in security as methods successfully used against Germany may be needed to help defeat Japan. At the same time the necessity for inclusion in training manuals and courses of subject matter with respect to the use of special equipment and devices for tactical deception purposes is recognized. Progressive downgrading of classification presently provided by the controlling technical and training services in a manner similar to that for secret weapons and equipment is adequate and should be followed. Commanders-in-Chief abroad are requested to issue appropriate instructions within their commands.

2. All practicable steps shall be taken to prevent references to strategic or tactical deception by the press or radio.

End.

ORIGINATOR: General McFarland CC/S
INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
General Arnold
General Hull
General Bissell
Adm King
C of S

DECLASSIFIED

J.C.S. Regrading Memo

By RHP

Date

29 - 71

34 - 71

DEC 10 1973

CM-OUT-63045

(15 Nov 44)

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nob

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33

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

 IVI
PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Advance Command Post, France

To: War Department

Nr: CPA 90348

14 November 1944

For Under Secretary of War Patterson from SHAEF Adv
CP SHELLBURST for action AGWAR for info SHAEF Main CPA
90348

Have prepared talk for broadcast as requested.
It will require about three and a half to four minutes to
deliver. Will this cause any difficulty? Please let me know
at once whether it must be cut down.

Before the 19th I will send you text of speech by
radio, in the clear, to guard against possibility of break-
down in transmission.

End

ACTION: Mr Patterson

INFO: Adm Leahy
CG AAF
ASF
OPD

G-4
BFR
Log


DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY RT, DATE DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-13776

(15 Nov 44)

0248Z

pa

 18

000.7
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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM CINC PAC		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		INFORMATION FOR ACTION CINC SOWESPAC SECNAV COMINCH	PRIORITY
DATE 1 NOV 1944			ROUTINE
FOR CODER ROOM 0053			DEFERRED
DECODED BY ELY			PRIORITY
TYPED BY BROOK			RRRRR ROUTINE
ROUTED BY MORRIS			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
310549 NCR 8319			☐

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

INFO CINC SOWESPAC SECNAV COMINCH. CINC PAC SENDS.

IT IS DIRECTED THAT NO PUBLIC DISCUSSION TAKE PLACE OF JAPANESE SUICIDE PLANE ATTACKS. THE KNOWLEDGE OF POSSIBLE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH ATTACKS WOULD BE OF GREAT VALUE TO OUR ENEMY.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (M)

OSD letter, May 3, 1978

By RHP, MARB Date DEC 10 1973

COMINCH...COG

OOR...

~~SECRET~~

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OPNAV 12-07 000.7

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VCNO	

PIA

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

RAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
CINCPAC		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	GP CP CP CP
FROM		COMINCH	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE	25 OCTOBER 1944		DEFERRED
TON CODEROM	2039		
DECODED BY	SJOSTEN		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	SJOSTEN/BENNETT		ROUTINE
			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
252000			NCR 2816
			☐

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GET

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(CINCPAC HURLS ACTION COMINCH.)

AS AN EXCEPTION TO NORMAL PROCEDURE REQUEST AUTHORITY TO INCLUDE IN MY PRESS RELEASES COVERING CURRENT ACTION THE DAMAGE INFLICTED BY SUBMARINES ON ENEMY COMBATANT SHIPS IN THE FOLLOWUP PHASE. OTHERWISE REPORTS OF DAMAGE TO ENEMY WILL BE INCOMPLETE.

REMARKS

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (H)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 19-7

252000

ACTION	
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IG-00	
VCNO	
FDO	

008

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER **F-31**

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

PRECEDENCE

FROM **COMINCH AND CNO**

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

OP OP OP OPRELEASED BY **E. J. KING**

FOR ACTION

CINCPAC

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DATE **25 OCT 1944**TOR CODEROOM **1624**

INFORMATION

DECODED BY

TYPED BY

FISHE */Lash*

ROUTED BY

SORENSEN

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

251626**NCR 1600**IF OPERATIONAL
CHECK BELOW**XXX**

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

DO NOT DESIRE RELEASE COM 3RD FLEET 251226 UNTIL
SITUATION IS WELL CLARIFIED, WHICH IS NOT THE CASE
WASHINGTON.

F-0

F-01

F-02

F-05

F-07

F-1

F-2

F-20

F-3

F-30

F-31

F-32

F-33

F-34

F-4

FX01

FX30

FX37

FX40

IG-00

VCNO

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date **DEC 10 1973****COMINCH AND CNO.....ORIG****CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 10-53

000,7**251626**

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

19 October 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Rear Echelon
London, England

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number: WARX 49072

TOPSEC book message to SHAEF London and Versailles for Eisenhower for action, and to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FACS 97 from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to SCAF 103, there is no objection to the publication of photographs of artificial harbors provided that the pictures do not reveal details of design and construction and do not furnish information as to detailed dimensions.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
Gen. Arnold
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
Gen. Surles
CofS

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 84 - 71
By RHP Date DEC 10 1973

CM-OUT-49072

(19 Oct 44)

2036Z es

32
COPY No.

000.7
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DISPATCH

DRAFTER OP-13-1-B/MCM	EXT. 3355	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH AND CNO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY R S EDWARDS	FOR ACTION INFORMATION	CINCPA	PRIORITY
DATE 19 OCT 1944			ROUTINE
TOX CODEROM 2142/0026			DEFERRED
DECODED BY DIEBEL/ROWLAND			BASEGRAM
PARAPHRASED BY HIA RTZELL			PRIORITY
CHECKED BY HARTIGAN			ROUTINE
BY HARTZELL			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY HARTZELL			BASEGRAM
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL
192131	NCR 47464		CHECK BELOW
			☐
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP			(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

MY SERIAL 0252313 OF 12 OCTOBER EXECUTIVE ORDER TERMINATING
MARTIAL LAW IN HAWAII SIGNED 18 OCTOBER. ARRANGEMENT FOR
SIMULTANEOUS WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT AND PUBLICATION HONOLULU
ON 24 OCTOBER CONTEMPLATES NO PUBLICITY PRIOR THERETO.

COMINCH: COPIES #1 TO #8 INCLUSIVE.
COMINCH HAS DELIVERED TO NCR FOR FURTHER DELIVERY TO OP-13.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (M)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date **DEC 10 1973**

NO. 1 ADMIRAL.

NO. 2 FILE.

NO. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

NO. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

COPY NO.

OPNAV 19-78

000.7

192131

3

DISPATCH

DRAFTER	F Ø	EXT.		ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	COMINCH AND CNO			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY	ADM E J KING			CINCPA	PRIORITY
DATE	18 OCTOBER 1944				ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM	1758				DEFERRED
DECODED BY	ROBERTS/DIEBEL				BASEGRAM
PARAPHRASED BY	DIEBEL	CHECKED BY	ROWLAND	INFORMATION	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY		DITTOED BY	DIEBEL		ROUTINE
					DEFERRED
					BASEGRAM
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.					IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
181745					NCR 47437
					☐

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

LAST SENTENCE OF HALSEY'S 170352 HAS ATTRACTED MUCH FAVORABLE ATTENTION HERE AMONG THOSE ENTITLED TO SEE HIS DISPATCH AND IT IS DESIRED THAT IT OR A CLOSE PARAPHRASE THEREOF BE RELEASED TO PRESS AS SOON AS YOU FEEL THAT SECURITY OF CODE WILL NOT BE COMPROMISED.

COMINCH: COPIES #1 TO #8 INCLUSIVE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date ~~DEC 10 1973~~

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

COPT NO.

OPNAV 19-78

181745

10/20

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : ADMIRAL NIMITZ, INFORMATION ADMIRAL HALSEY

The country has followed with pride the magnificent sweep of your Fleet into enemy waters. In addition to the gallant fighting of your flyers, we appreciate the endurance and superb seamanship of your forces. Your fine co-operation with General MacArthur furnishes another example of team-work and the effective and intelligent use of all weapons.

Signed: Roosevelt

000.7

10/20

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

[REDACTED]

TO : GENERAL MACARTHUR

The whole American nation today exults at the news that the gallant men under your command have landed on Philippine soil. I know well what this means to you. I know what it cost you to obey my order that you leave Corregidor in February 1942 and proceed to Australia. Since then you have planned and worked and fought with whole-souled devotion for the day when you would return with powerful forces to the Philippine Islands. That day has come. You have the nations gratitude and the nations prayers for success as you and your men fight your way back to Bataan.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date DEC 10 1973

[REDACTED]

000.7

18 October 1944

COPY

THE FOLLOWING IS A COPY OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT OSMENA

QUOTE. The suffering, humiliation and mental torture that you have endured since the barbarous, unprovoked and treacherous attack upon the Philippines nearly three long years ago have aroused in the hearts of the American people a righteous anger, a stern determination to punish the guilty, and a fixed resolve to restore peace and order and decency to an outraged world.

Until we were attacked at Pearl Harbor we had done our utmost to live as friendly self-respecting neighbors of the Japanese in the Pacific.

For half a century, in spite of signs of a decadent and militaristic Japanese leadership, we studiously avoided any acts that might provoke distrust or alarm. Our decency was mistaken for weakness.

Our plans for the dignity and freedom of the people of the Philippines have been ruthlessly - but only temporarily - brushed aside by Japanese acts of exploitation and enslavement. When the Japanese invaders have been driven out, the Philippines will take their place as a free and independent member of the family of nations.

On this occasion of the return of General MacArthur to Philippine soil with our airmen, our soldiers and our sailors, we renew our pledge. We and our Philippine brothers in arms - with the help of Almighty God - will drive out the invader; we will destroy his power to wage war again, and we will restore a world of dignity and freedom - a world of confidence and honesty and peace. UNQUOTE.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date DEC 10 1973

000.7

10/20

~~At~~ ~~eleven~~ this morning American troops landed on the island of Leyte in the Philippines. The invasion forces, under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, are supported by the greatest concentration of naval and air power ever massed in the Pacific Ocean.

We have landed in the Philippines to redeem the pledge we made over two years ago when the last American troops surrendered on Corregidor after five months and twenty-eight days of bitter resistance against overwhelming enemy strength.

We promised to return, we have returned.

In my last message to General Wainwright, sent on the fifth of May 1942 just before he was captured, I told him that the gallant struggle of his comrades had inspired every soldier, sailor and marine and all the workers in our shipyards and munitions plants. I said that he and his devoted followers had become the living symbol of our war aims and the guarantee of our victory.

That was true in 1942. It is still true in 1944.

We have never forgotten the courage of our men at Bataan and Corregidor. Their example inspired every American in the stern days of Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Salerno and Normandy. And in every campaign - on battlefield or homefront - we remember those men, and their memory spurs us to greater effort.

Nowhere has the desire to avenge their comrades been stronger than among the forces of the Southwest Pacific. Leyte is another rung in the long ladder General MacArthur's men have been climbing for two years.

Starting on the underside of New Guinea in the autumn of 1942 when

of release to the
[REDACTED]

Australia herself was in danger, pushing over the Owen Stanley Mountains, burning and blasting the Japanese out of Buna and Gona, digging them out of Wewak, starving them at Hollandia - the advance has been a slow, tough struggle by our jungle fighters.

Now they have reached Leyte.

In the six years before war broke out, the Philippine government, acting in harmonious accord with the United States, made great strides towards complete establishment of her sovereignty. The United States promised to help build a new nation in the Pacific, a nation whose ideals, like our own, were liberty and equality and the democratic way of life - a nation which in a very short time would join the friendly family of nations on equal terms.

We were keeping that promise. When war came and our work was wrecked, we pledged to the people of the Philippines that their freedom would be redeemed and that their independence would be established and protected. We are fulfilling that pledge now. When we have finished the job of driving the Japs from the Islands, the Philippines will be a free and independent Republic.

There never was a doubt that the people of the Philippines were worthy of their independence. There will never be a doubt.

The Filipinos have defended their homeland with fortitude and gallantry. We confidently expect to see them liberate it with courage and audacity.

Under the leadership of President Manuel Quezon whose death came on the eve of his country's liberation, and now under the leadership of their President Sergio Osmena, the Filipinos have carried on, and are carrying on,

with gallantry - even in midst of the enemy.

We are glad to be back in the Philippines but we do not intend to stop there.

Leyte is only a way station on the road to Japan. It is 700 miles from Formosa. It is 850 miles from China. We are astride the life-line of the war-lords' empire; we are severing that life-line. Our bombers, our ships and our submarines are cutting off the ill-gotten conquests from the homeland. From our new base we shall quicken the assault. Our attacks of the last week have been destructive and decisive, but now we shall strike even more devastating blows at Japan.

We have learned our lesson about Japan. We trusted her, and treated her with the decency due a civilized neighbor. We were foully betrayed. The price of the lesson was high.

Now we are going to teach Japan her lesson.

We have the will and the power to teach her the cost of treachery and deceit, and the cost of stealing from her neighbors. With our steadfast allies, we shall teach this lesson so that Japan will never forget it.

We shall free the enslaved peoples. We shall restore stolen lands and looted wealth to their rightful owners. We shall strangle the Black Dragon of Japanese militarism forever, - ~~so that the Japs will never be able to make war again upon a peace-loving world.~~

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date ~~DEC 10~~ 1973

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] UHR

From: U.S. Military Attache, Guatemala City, Guatemala
To: War Department
Nr: CDC 518 19 October 1944
To MIS and CDC 518.

Danger of general strike has passed. Arevalo and principal aides leaving country. This is great relief to both govt and civilian groups.

Cruse

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF, OPD, Col Park ✓

CM-IN-18703

(20 Oct 44)

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COPY No.

42

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

IVI

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Rear, London, England.

To : War Department
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Main, Versailles, France.

No : RR 12793 19 October 1944

AGWAR for Combined Chiefs Staff for Surles and for
Byron Price information Public Relations Division SHAEF Main
for Public Relation Division from Allen signed Eisenhower
ref nr RR - 12793 cite SHPRD Rear.

OPS Rear 47 is reference.

Francois Williams sent EMPAX for Butler from MINIFORM
cable dated 19th October with reference number 543. Release
time for publication of photographs and films of artificial
harbors has now been fixed for 1500 British Summer Time Sunday
22nd October. An official set of 24 photographs has been
placed in the hands of photo and film censors and all other
picture material will be censored on the basis of these
official photographs and the following guidance.

Pass:

(A) Pictures which give design in only a very general
way.

(B) Panoramic or aerial views which give design only
in a general way.

Stop:

(A) Any picture which gives the exact detail of de-
sign or construction of individual components or any picture
showing any interior construction of any components.

CM-IN-18434 (19 Oct 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 1978
BY RL DATE DEC 10 1973 40

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] IVI
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page TWO-

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Rear, London, England.

No : RR 12793 19 October 1944

(B) Any dimensions of individual components or dimensions of the port as a whole. This is to be interpreted as allowing no dimensions in captions and will only allow such dimensions as may be assessed by comparing components with ships or other objects of known dimensions in the picture.

(C) Any close-up or any picture which shows how components are joined or fitted together.

(D) Any purely technical detail.

(E) Any aerial pictures showing full extent of destruction caused by gale. End stops.

Censors will note that this guidance for dealing with picture material does not in fact allow any additional specific detail besides that allowed in the original guidance for written material and will continue to follow that guidance for written material. Cancel paragraph eight under stops of original guidance.

End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
CG AAF
OPD

G-2
Adm King
BFR
CofS
DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-8-78
BY RT, DATE

CM-IN-18434 (19 Oct 44)

2231Z bjm
[REDACTED]

DEC 10 1973

40

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

19 October 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Rear Echelon
London, England

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number: WARX 49072

TOPSEC book message to SHAEF London and Versailles for Eisenhower for action, and to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FACS 97 from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to SCAF 103, there is no objection to the publication of photographs of artificial harbors provided that the pictures do not reveal details of design and construction and do not furnish information as to detailed dimensions.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
Gen. Arnold
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
Gen. Surles
CofS

DECLASSIFIED

J.C.S. Regrading Memo 34 - 71

By RMP Date DEC 10 1973

DEC 10 1973

CM-OUT-49072

(19 Oct 44)

2036Z

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33

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] TOT

URGENT

From: General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area
Hollandia New Guinea

To: War Department

Nr: C 19703 18 October 1944

C 19703 from GHQ SWPA sgd MacArthur to AGWAR
[REDACTED]

Subject is CINC's recordings reurad W 48263 October 19th attention Bissell recordings of the CINC's personal statement and in addition the two other personal statements of President Osmena and Romulo were sent to OWI as standbys in case of failure of live broadcasts. They will be released only as specified by GHQ Forward Echelon.

End

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

ACTION: Gen Bissell

INFO: Gen Handy
Gen Surles
Adm King (ONI)
Gen Stoner

CM-IN-17330 (18 Oct 44) 2038Z 1-a
[REDACTED]

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12

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

Military Intelligence Division
Joint Security Control/WDCB
JKC/ahl 74878

18 October 1944

Commander-In-Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
Brisbane, Australia

Number: WAR 48263

For MacArthur from Bissell Joint Security Control

Avoidance of possible misunderstanding about who will release recordings is subject reference your C19679 request Joint Security Control be advised to what addressee specific instructions will be sent and will these instructions apply to the the 2 other recordings in W47835 referred.

End

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NAAS Date DEC 10 1973

ORIGINATOR : Gen Bissell

INFORMATION: Gen Handy
Gen Stoner
Adm King (ONI)
Gen Surles

ACTION F-2

CM-OUT-48263

(18 Oct 44)

1346Z

1s

COPY No. 12

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] - "TOT"

URGENT

From: General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Areas,
Hollandia, N. G.

To: War Department

No: C 19679 18 October 1944

[REDACTED] from GHQ SWPA to AGWAR attention Bissell
see your W 47835 the 17th. C 19679

Recording of CINCS personal statement is reference.
The recording of CINCS statement is to be released only
on specific instructions from here. Recording is official
and is intended as standby in case of failure of live
broadcast.

End

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 9(E) and 9(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May 3, 1978

By RHP, MARS Date DEC 10 1973

ACTION: General Bissell (JSC)

INFO : General Handy, General Surles, Adm King (ONI),
General Stoner.

CM-IN-16683 (18 Oct 44) 0728Z m/m

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ACTION F-2
COPY NO.

13

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Military Intelligence Division
Joint Security Control/WFO
JKC/gm 74878

17 October 1944

Commander in Chief
Southwest Pacific Areas
Brisbane Australia

Number WAR 47835

For MacArthur from Bissell Joint Security Control.

Subject is recording of CINCS personal statement reference ured
CR 50625 Joint Security Control was informed today by OWI that
their representative received from General Fellers a recording
concerning operation accumulation which was brought from
theater to San Francisco Office where 2 copies made and
brought here sealed. Upon breading seal an English text
of CINCS personal statement to Filipinos and recording found.
OWI states the release of this recording and 2 others which
arrived by Army courier at San Francisco Office on October 16
was contingent on receipt of instructions from theater. Request
Joint Security Control be informed if recordings are official and
when, in what form and to whom instructions for release will be
issued so as to coordinate instructions we have issued.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen Bissell (Joint Security Control)

INFORMATION: Gen Handy
Gen Surles
Adm King (ONI)
Gen Stoner

CM-OUT 47835 (17 Oct 44) 1920Z khc

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MAY 3 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] "IVI"
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

g

[REDACTED]

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Rear, London, England

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Main, Versailles, France

No: RR 12642 15 October 1944

Ops Rear 31 is reference. Refer our Ops Rear 30.
Ref no RR 12642 action AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff
for Surles and for Byron Price information SHAEF Main for
PRD from Allen signed Eisenhower cite SHPRD Rear. TOP SECRET.

Amendments to final draft prefabricated parts
official handout is subject. Amendments as follows:

Page 2 Para 1 Line 3 delete "Details of these
caissons are given in appendix A" line 8 add after word
drawings "were substantially completed by the 20th October,
all details being furnished" Para 3 Line 1 add after word
five "and a half" Para 3 Line 2 delete word ship and "only
a limited number of ships".

Page 3 Para 5 Line 4 delete "3500" and substitute
"hundreds of".

Page 5 Para 3 Line 4 read "in the setting down of
the harbour the Navy and Army worked hand in hand" Line 7
delete "1200" and substitute "hundreds of".

Page 6 Line 2 delete "were landed" add at end of
sentence after word troops "were landed over the piers".

CM-IN-14650 (15 Oct 44)

[REDACTED]

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JCS LETTER, 7-8-72
BY RT. DATE

DEC 10 1973

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

 "IVI"
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Rear, London, England

No: RR 12642

15 October 1944

Appendix A Page 1 Para 1 delete "5 fathoms"
substitute "5 1/2 fathoms": delete "was 204 feet long by
56 feet wide by 60 feet high" and delete "being 174 feet
by 28 feet by 25 feet" Para 4 delete "30" and insert "22"
and delete "a caisson" and insert "the largest size caisson".

Appendix B Page 1 Para 1 Line 4 delete "80 feet"
and insert "span": End line 6 start line 7 delete "with ball
and socket only" Para 3 Line 2 delete "200 feet long by 60
feet wide by 10 feet deep" Line 3 delete "1800 tons": delete
from "mechanically operated" to "with the tide" Para 5 after
"Glasgow" insert "4 being built by Royal Engineers at mili-
tary ports in Scotland" Line 3 before "Southampton" insert
"the Army depot at".


Appendix C Para 1 delete "200 feet long and weigh-
ing about 200 tons": delete "they were cruciform in section
and floated with one arm only above water".

New subject is amendments to censorship guidance
on qualified release artificial harbours. Amendments as
follows:

Page 1 Para 4 delete "weighing 7000 tons and more
than 200 feet long, 56 feet wide, 60 feet high, of monolithic
cellular construction" Para 8 delete "200 feet long, 60 feet
high and weighed 7000 tons".

Page 2 Para 11 second Line delete "80 feet":
third line delete "by ball and socket joints": fourth line
delete "and telescopic spans for tidal action: Para 12 line
2 delete "200 feet by 60".

CM-IN-14650 (15 Oct 44)


DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER 7-8-72
BY RT. DATE DEC 10 1973

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] "IVI"
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page 3

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Rear, London, England

No: RR 12642 15 October 1944

Page 3 Para 26 Line 4 delete "interior"; End of para add
"(3) with ships alongside or other material which would give
dimensions by comparison with object of known dimensions".

Page 4 Para 4 add after work guidance "particularly
any dimension or detail of design"; Para 5 Line 2 delete
"beyond that indicated in their guidance"; add after word
component "and no dimension or design of any component"
Para 7 add Para number 8 to read "any picture which would
give any dimension or design of construction of any component;
thus pictures with ships or other objects of known dimensions
which could be compared and thus give dimensions must be
stopped".

Our Ops Rear 30 giving agreed release and embargo
time for official handout first subject this message will
follow soonest.

End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Gen Surles

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER 7-8-72
BY RT. DATE DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-14650 (15 Oct 44) 2038Z ps

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

 IVI
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
Rear London England.

To : War Department
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Versailles France

Nr : RR 12648 15 Oct 44

Action AGWAR for Combined Chiefs Staff for Surles
and for Byron Price information SHAEF Main for PRO from
Allen signed Eisenhower ref no RR 12648 cite SHPRD Rear.

Ops Rear 30 is reference. Release time for
harbours now set for 0030 hours British Summer Time
Monday 16 October. Full restrictions on dimensions and
detail of design and construction being observed here
pending reply our request clarification. Amendments to
final draft of official handout and amendments to censorship
guidance already sent in separate cable our reference Ops
Rear 31. We are stopping publication of all still
photos and movie film pending receipt from Combined Chiefs
of Staff of clarification of restrictions on dimensions and
details of design and construction.

End

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Gen Surles
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY RT, DATE DEC 10 1973

OM-IN-14649 (15 Oct 44) 2018Z

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] "IVI"

URGENT

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department

Nr: 3 62187 14 October 1944

S 62187 to AGWAR signed Eisenhower cite SHPRD from
Allen, for Surles [REDACTED]

View Surles message W-46162 October 13 respect
harbors imperative we have immediate answer our cable
S-61794 October 11 regarding restrictions imposed release.
Propose release here 0030 October 15 but impossible
implement this pending your reply acknowledge.

End

ACTION: Gen Surles

INFO : OPD

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY RT, DATE DEC 10 1973

ACTION F-2

CM-IN- 13667 (14 Oct 44) 19522

vk
[REDACTED]

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19
COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 24-78744

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

War Department Bur of
ations - News Division
Branch JWH:ks 3887

13 October 1944

Commander in Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
Brisbane, Australia

Number: WAR 46133

To MacArthur for Diller from Surles signed Marshall.

We are transmitting here the proposed schedules of the networks for originations your theater for week of October 22nd. Networks advise us they have already relayed schedules to representatives for broadcasts to October 22nd. It is requested that you have officer at Hollandia who will handle the recordings advise network representatives in San Francisco on cue channel that due to recent violations of security in conversations on cue channel effective immediately no further conversations will be permitted on the cue channel. As a consequence they should be advised that they can only give the go ahead to their correspondents. Following are the schedules for each network.

1. For CBS October 22nd 13:08:30Z to 13:10:00Z. For October 23rd, 25th and 27th 12:08:10Z to 12:10:10Z and for October 26th 22:50:45Z to 22:52:45Z.
2. Blue Network schedule for October 21st is 23:08:16Z to 23:11:16Z. For October 23rd, 25th and 27th 12:35:16Z to 12:38:16Z. For October 24th and 26th 12:15:00Z to 12:18:30Z. All Blue broadcasts will be recorded in San Francisco for later transmission over network.
3. Mutual schedule October 23rd, 25th and 27th 23:22:20Z to 23:24:35Z.
4. For NBC October 23rd, 25th and 27th 23:20:00Z to 23:22:00Z.

CM-OUT-46133

(13 Oct 44)

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

COPY No.

22

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Number: WAR 46133 13 October 1944

For October 24th, 26th and 28th 12:08:19Z to 12:12:15Z.

All return cues same as for week of October 15th in schedules already sent by network.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen Surles

INFORMATION: JC/S, OPD, Gen Stoner

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

CM-OUT-46133

(13 Oct 44)

2125Z

ekk

22

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY

0013-2/EJG:mob

12 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN SAHN

Subject: Censorship Ban on Production of Military Currency.

1. Mr. Bell, the Under-Secretary of the Treasury Department, called me yesterday to say that production was getting under way immediately on the Navy's order for military currency and that he would think it advisable that the Navy asks the Office of Censorship to issue a nation-wide ban on publication of matters incidental to the production of currency. He explained that the Army had done so in each case where invasion currency had been prepared.

2. To find out how the Army handles such matters, I discussed the subject with Lt. Col. Hilliard, who explained that action had been taken in the past through the Public Relations Office of the War Department; but that the officer who had handled it in the past had been transferred. Col. Hilliard pointed out the urgency of the matter as a news leak might well take place on the first day of production.

3. The matter was referred to the Officer in Charge, who, after consultation with Captain Colclough, contacted Admiral Schurman. It was agreed that this officer should call immediately on Captain Heard.

4. At Captain Heard's office, I was informed that the captain was not in his office yesterday and I was referred to Captain Keisker (Room 4723, Ext. 4503). The latter thought I ought to get in touch instantly with Captain Fenn, but as the latter was not in his office, an appointment was made with Lt. Comdr. Nesbit (Room 518, Apex Building).

5. Comdr. Nesbit took me to see Mr. Byron Price, Director of Censorship. The latter was most cooperative, but explained that the matter of a censorship ban is not as simple as it sounds. He explained that to make it reasonably effective, about 10,000 people would have to be notified. While he thought such action might prevent publication in any responsible newspaper, he felt that it involved the danger that the information might get into the hands of undesirable persons. He also explained that notification to San Francisco and Sacramento newspapers alone might defeat its own purpose by pointing up the matter to papers in other centers and he emphasized that no method could be considered as giving 100% guarantee against publication. He also said that the Army ban had in the past been rendered ineffective by a statement given out by the President in a press conference. He finally expressed

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DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-8-72
DEC 10 1973

some doubt as to whether the security angle was as important as I thought. He said that statements from high ranking Army and Navy officers made it perfectly plain where we are going to strike in the Pacific, and that anybody interested in currency matters could guess that preparations would have to be made to provide invasion money. I told him that it was not for me to decide the security angle as the subject had been classified Top Secret and it was my duty to act accordingly. I pointed out, however, that any publicity at this time might well furnish a clue to enemy agents who could then check up on the timing, the amounts involved and could probably obtain valuable information by tracing the shipments to their destinations. Mr. Price appeared unconvinced about these arguments, except the one about timing.

6. In view of the mention of different methods of approach I told Mr. Price that we would have to leave it to him to make the ban as effective as possible, and that I would formulate the Navy's wishes as a request to him to accord the matter the same protection as has been given similar Army projects in the past. This was agreed to by Mr. Price.

7. Mr. Price pointed out the desirability of notifying the Public Relations Offices of the War and Navy Departments and he recommended that steps be taken through Admiral Leahy to prevent any news leaks at the White House press conferences. //

8. Captain Keisker called up this morning and said that Captain Penn had called to say that he thought Captain Sabin ought to see the President's Aide (at the Navy Department) and ask him to take the necessary steps through Admiral Leahy in respect to the White House. This step and a notification to the Public Relations Officer of the Navy Department are thus the only moves that remain to be taken. The Public Relations Office of the Army has been notified through the CAD.

Respectfully,

/s/ ERIC J. GLUCKSTADT

Eric J. Gluckstadt

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

C O P Y

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

AMUG
PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Rear London, England
United Kingdom Base Section, London, England

No: 3-61794 11 October 1944

Reference message WX 39375 dated 30 September 1944 authorizing restricted release MULBERRY. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, Center District UK Base Section for British Chiefs of Staff, for Information to SHAEF Rear signed Eisenhower SCAF number 103.

Public Relations request more detailed definition of restriction on publication dimensions of piers caissons and causeways plus their construction and design. Purpose is to permit efficient photographic and film censorship. Since dimensions assessable by comparison known dimensions other objects appearing pictures the present blanket restriction would result prohibition of publication all photographs and films. Furthermore most photographs would give general indication construction and design. Public Relations enquire if all photographs must be stopped or if intention withhold only details internal construction with specific dimensions. Matter has been referred to Inter-Services Security Board who request submit to you for clarification Public Relations.

ACTION: CCH ? ERd

INFO : ADM LEAHY, GEN ARNOLD, OFD, GEN BISSELL, ADM KING
C-6P-6

CM-IN-11645 (12 Oct 44) 20332 mon

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo
By *RAH* Date 34 - 71
DEC 10 1973

COPY No. 32

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 84-78784

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
CINCPQA		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	OP OP OP
RELEASED BY		CTG 30.2	ROUTINE
DATE	9 OCT 1944		DEFERRED
TOR CODER ROOM	0428		
DECODED BY	SEIFERT	COM 3RD FLT	OP OP OP
PARAPHRASED BY	D SMITH/ <i>Seifert</i>	CTF 38	ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
090216			☐
			NCR 8547

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

H O N O I N T E R C E P T

(CINCPQA SENDS ACTION CTG 30.2 INFO COM 3RD FLT AND CTF 38)

TO FURTHER DECEPTION DESIRE MAKE PRESS RELEASE
YOUR BOMBARDMENT TODAY. UNLESS YOUR SECURITY
JEOPARDIZED MAKE PRELIMINARY ACTION REPORT.

*Morans press release made at
0730 EWT.*

RECEIVED
R. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (E)
NND 760111
By SLR Date APR 23 1976

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 10-07

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090216

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F-4	
FX01	
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FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM CINCPAC		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		BAD WASHINGTON	PRIORITY
DATE 8 OCTOBER 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM 0444			DEFERRED
DECODED BY IMRIE			BASEGRAM
PARAPHRASED BY FISHER	CHECKED BY FISHER	BAS WASHINGTON (DQMG)	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY PIPP	DITTOED BY FISHER		ROUTINE
			DEFERRED
			BASEGRAM
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 1 OF 3			☐
072100 NCR 8116			
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP			(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(RDO WASH PASS ACTION BAD WASHINGTON WHO RELAYS INFO BAS WASHINGTON (DQMG) FROM CINCPAC.)

FOLLOWING FROM MAJOR THORP.

1. ARRIVED 6TH. ADDRESS CINCPAC FOR CAPTAIN TUFNELL.
2. SURVIVORS NOW ETA PEARL HARBOUR 12 OCTOBER.
3. USN PERSONNEL OF RESCUING SUBMARINES HAVE ARRIVED PEARL. DUE LARGE NUMBER PERSONS HAVING KNOWLEDGE THIS MATTER

CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL HEAD OFF CORRESPONDENTS HERE AND THEREFORE HAVE ISSUED STATEMENT AS FOLLOWS IN CONJUNCTION PRO CINCPAC.

"CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESS:

1. ON 11 SEPTEMBER (WEST LONGITUDE DATE) A US SUBMARINE TORPEDOED AND SANK THE JAPANESE SHIP RAKUYO MARU IN

THE CHINA SEA. ON BOARD WERE A NUMBER OF AUSTRALIAN AND BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR, WHO WERE BEING TRANS-

PORTED FROM SINGAPORE TO JAPAN. OUR SUBMARINES RESCUED 162 OF THE SURVIVORS, A PORTION OF WHICH

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET ACTION F-2

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 6 of the Regulations.

COPY NO.

OPNAV 19-78

072100

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 6-8-72

DEC 10 1973

5

DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM _____		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 2
DATE _____			DEFERRED 3
TOR CODEROOM _____			BASEGRAM 4
DECODED BY _____		INFORMATION	PRIORITY 5
PARAPHRASED BY _____	CHECKED BY _____		ROUTINE 6
	DITTOED BY _____		DEFERRED 7
ROUTED BY _____	BY _____		BASEGRAM 8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 9
PAGE 2 OF 3			10
072100			11
NCR 8116			12
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP			(Use G. C. T.) 13

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

HAVE RETURNED TO AUSTRALIA. ANOTHER GROUP IS BEING RETURNED TO ENGLAND VIA THE UNITED STATES.

2. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY ONE OF THE GREAT STORIES OF THE WAR, BUT FOR REASONS OF MILITARY SECURITY AND HIGH-

ER POLICY THE BRITISH AND AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE REQUESTED THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT TO CON-

TINUE IN FORCE THE SECURITY POLICIES PROHIBITING THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION OF THIS NATURE, IN THE

INTEREST OF THE ALLIED WAR EFFORT PRESS CORRESPONDENTS ARE URGED TO REGARD ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE

INCIDENT WHICH MAY COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AS BEING IN A HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CATEGORY."

REFERENCE BAD 0416472 OCTOBER TO CAPTAIN TUFNELL. CERTIFICATES WILL BE TAKEN ON ARRIVAL PEARL BUT EFFECTIVENESS ALREADY NUL-

LIFIED BY INEVITABLE CONTACT WITH US PERSONNEL ON BOARD TRANSPORT DURING PASSAGE SAIPAN TO PEARL.

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76 of the Navy Regulations, 1910.

OPNAV 19-76

072100

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter 5-3-72
DEC 10 1973

COPY NO.

3

DISPATCH

DRAFTER		EXT.	ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE
FROM			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		1
RELEASED BY					PRIORITY
DATE					ROUTINE
TOX CODEROOK					DEFERRED
					BASEGRAM
DECODED BY					7
PARAPHRASED		CHECKED			PRIORITY
BY		BY			ROUTINE
BY		DITTOED			DEFERRED
SIGNED BY		BY			10
					BASEGRAM

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL
CHECK BELOW

PAGE 3 OF 3

072100

NCR 8116

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

4. CAPTAIN TUFNELL SAW SURVIVORS SAIPAN. FULL NOMINAL ROLL WAS FORWARDED BY AIR ON 29 SEPTEMBER AND INTERROGATION

REPORT 4 OCTOBER, BOTH ADDRESSED BAD AND COPIES FOR ONWARD DESPATCH DNI ADMIRALTY WAR OFFICE. COPIES ALSO SENT ACNB

DIRECT. CONSIDER THIS SATISFIES PARA 3 YOUR ADM INSTR NO. 105.

5. PLEASE CABLE WO REPLY TO BAS 5146 PW 2 OCTOBER SOONEST POSSIBLE.

RECEIVED AS SECRET, RECLASSIFIED AS TOP SECRET ACCORDING TO CONTENT.

ORIGINAL NCR DISTRIBUTION.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (G)

BAD(#1)....ACT

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

COMINCH(#2-9)....16(#10)....

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

no. 1 ADMIRAL

no. 2 FILE

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 70, Navy Regulations.

072100

COPY NO.

OPNAV 19-78

5

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAPER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COM 4TH FLT		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PPPPPPPPPP
RELEASED BY	4 OCTOBER 1944	NOB RIO DE JANEIRO	PRIORITY
DATE	1552/04	NAVAL OPERATING FACIL-	ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM		ITY AT NATAL BRAZIL	DEFERRED
DECODED BY	FRANTZ	CNO	PPPPPPPPPP
TYPED	LOSCH		ROUTINE
BY	ROLL		DEFERRED
ROUTED BY			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 1 OF 2			☐
041254			
NCR 5191			

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FROM PRESS WIRELESS INC HICKSVILLE, NEW YORK AT
031400 0 RADIO RECIFE (NKM) PICKED UP FOLLOWING
BROADCAST OF

" NATAL BRAZIL (ASSOCIATED PRESS) A GERMAN
SUBMARINE WAS SUNK OFF THE BRAZILIAN COAST
ON 28 SEPT BY AN AMERICAN PLANE. IT WAS
FIRST U BOAT DESTROYED IN THESE WATERS IN
RECENT MONTHS. VICE ADMIRAL JONAS INGRAM,
USN HAS DECORATED THE PLANE CREW"

NOF NATAL ASCERTAIN WHO, WHEN, AND HOW INFO
RELEASED AT AND TRANSMITTED FROM NATAL. ADVISE BY
DISPATCH MAKING NOB RIO INFO ADDRESSEE. NOB RIO

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
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F-32	
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F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person.

(See Art. 76 (NAVJAGS.))

OPNAV 12-66

041254

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(a) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1978
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

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CNO

11-20 0128 800
FASING JAVAN
JAFAN TA YFI

NO 52701
AFR 735070G
COM NTA MOC

(1) NTA MOC

MESSAGE		NAVY DEPARTMENT	
EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
OM	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY	1
RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION	ROUTINE	2
DATE		DEFERRED	3
TOR CODEROOM			4
DECODED BY			5
TYPES BY	INFORMATION	PRIORITY	6
		ROUTINE	7
		DEFERRED	8
			9
ROUTED BY			10
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.		IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	11
PAGE 2 OF 2			12
041254			13
NCR 5191			14

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION	
F-0	21
F-01	22
F-02	23
F-05	24
F-07	25
F-1	26
F-2	27
F-20	28
F-3	29
F-30	30
F-31	31
F-32	32
F-33	33
F-34	34
F-4	35
FX01	36
FX30	37
FX37	38
FX40	39
IG-00	40
WCNO	41

Forward Subtel
Versailles, France

CHECK WITH ALL APPROPRIATE BRA AGENCIES AND ADVISE.

INFO NOT AN AUTHORIZED RELEASE AND ADMIRAL INGRAM GREATLY CONCERNED.

United Kingdom Base Berlin
London, England

Number WALK 39375

TOPSECRET back message to SHAW London, Versailles and
Com Zone, HIC, Paris for Eisenhower for action, to
District United Kingdom Base Berlin London goes to
For information, HIC 50 from the Com

DELETED

With further reference to E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (N) and
press release on WULFENBACH letter, May 3, 1973
the War Department has decided to release the information contained in WALK 39375.
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

16...C0G

COMINCH...20G...CNO...NAVAIDE...200P...

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

30 September 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
London, England

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Forward Echelon
Versailles, France

Headquarters, Communications Zone
European Theater of Operations
Main Echelon
Paris, France

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number WARK 39375

TOPSEC book message to SHAEF London, Versailles and Hq
Com Zone, ETO, Paris for Eisenhower for action, to Central
District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British
Chiefs of Staff for information, FACS 90 from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

With further reference to SCAF 79, FACS 79 and the
press release on "MULBERRIES" you furnished Secretary of
the War Department General Staff in response request
contained in WAR 32370, the Combined Chiefs of Staff now
authorize you to release the information contained in

CM-OUT-39375 (30 Sep 44)

DECLASSIFIED

J.C.S. Regrading Memo

Date DEC 10 1973

COPY No. 33

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~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE
~~SECRET~~

Number WARX 39375

Page -2-

the press release after deleting all references to dimensions of caissons, piers and causeways and details of design and construction thereof.

End.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
Gen. Arnold
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
OPD
CofS

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 34 - 71
By RAH Date DEC 10 1973

CM-OUT-39375

(30 Sep 44)

2048Z mk

~~SECRET~~
33

~~SECRET~~
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DISPATCH

DRAFTER		EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
COMINCH & CNO			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM	ADM E J KING	FOR ACTION	PRIME MINISTER	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY	28 SEPT 1944			ROUTINE
DATE	1700			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM	DIEBEL/LAWRENCE			BASEGRAM
DECODED BY	DIEBEL	INFORMATION	SCAEF WAR DEPT NAVAL AIDE	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY ROWLEY			ROUTINE
	DITTO BY DIEBEL			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY				BASEGRAM
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				IF OPERATIONAL
281655				CHECK BELOW
				☐

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THE US CHIEFS OF STAFF ARE TRANSMITTING THE STATEMENT ON
ARTIFICIAL HARBORS PREPARED BY SCAEF TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS
OF STAFF WITH THE RECOMMENDATION THAT SCAEF BE AUTHORIZED TO
RELEASE THE STATEMENT AFTER DELETING ALL REFERENCE TO DIMENSIONS
OF CAISSONS PIERS AND CAUSEWAYS TOGETHER WITH DETAILS OF DESIGN
AND CONSTRUCTION.

COMINCH: COPIES #1 TO #8 INCLUSIVE.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

IVI

PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Forward, Versailles, France.

To: War Department

Nr: FWD 15427

22 September 1944

From SHAEP Forward, ref FWD 15427, to AGWAR for
info SHAEP Main personal from Eisenhower to General Marshall

Please assure the President that upon the first
appearance of pictures of American troops fraternizing
with Germans I repeated USFOR orders against this practice
and sent personal messages to all commanders insisting
fraternization be suppressed completely.

In addition, I have placed on the censorable list
any pictures or stories of such occurrences. They con-
stitute direct violations of my specific orders as a
United States Commander and therefore should be dealt with
by disciplinary procedure.

Through personal conversations with Patton, Bradley
and at least one corps commander I am convinced that the
pictures in question were taken of an isolated incident
and they do not represent the general attitude of our soldiers.

End

ACTION: Gen Handy

INFO : Adm Leahy, Gen Surles, C of S

CM-IN-21387 (23 Sep 44) 0458Z jb

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY RT, DATE DEC 10 1973

COPY NO.

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSNA BUENOS AIRES		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 23 SEPTEMBER 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM 2221			DEFERRED
DECODED BY ROGERS			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY WINDORN			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY MORRIS			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
221355			NCR 6452

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

NEWSPAPERS HERE CARRY ARTICLE FROM WASHINGTON DATED 20 SEPTEMBER STATING: "NAVY DEPARTMENT TODAY CONFIRMED REPORT THAT ARGENTINE FLYING CADETS ARE BEING TRAINED AT U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION LOCATED AT CORPUS CHRISTI IN TEXAS. THE DEPARTMENT SAID THAT U.S., WHILE IT DISAPPROVES OF CURRENT ARGENTINE POLICIES, HAS NO QUARREL WITH INDIVIDUAL ARGENTINES. IT SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE FLYING PROGRAM WAS DESIGNED TO ACQUAINT A NUMBER OF ARGENTINES WITH U.S. PRACTICES". THIS HAS BROUGHT INQUIRIES FROM BRITISH NAVAL ATTACHE AND FROM ARGENTINE NAVAL CHIEF OF STAFF AS TO WHETHER IT MEANS THAT ANOTHER GROUP OF ARGENTINE NAVAL AVIATORS WILL BE INVITED. LAST GROUP RETURNED HERE SOME TIME AGO.

REQUEST CLARIFICATION.

16.....ACT
COMINCH. CNO. 200P. NAVALDE. 08 23 33. 13. 17..

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

3PNAY 19-66

221355

ACTION

F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

W5

Executive, Operations Division
3465

21 September 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Number WAR 34308

Personal to General Eisenhower from General Marshall.

The President desires that I transmit the following message to you: "There have appeared in the press photographs of American soldiers fraternizing with Germans in Germany.

These photographs are considered objectionable by a number of our people.

It is desired that steps be taken to discourage fraternizing by our troops with the inhabitants of Germany and that the publication of such photographs be effectively prohibited."

End

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
Gen. Surles
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date DEC 10 1973

CM-OUT-34308 (21 Sep 44) 2237Z ngs

17

COPY NO.

000.7
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

15-20000-1 GPO

DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM CINCPOA		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		CTF 32	PRIORITY 2
DATE 19 SEPT 1944			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOV 0603			ROUTINE 4
DECODED BY			BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY HARTIGAN	CHECKED BY	CTF 57 CTF 36 COMGENPOA CNO COMGEN 3RD PHIB CORPS COMGEN 1ST MARDIV COMGEN 81ST INFDIV	PRIORITY 8
ROUTED BY FISHER	DITTOED BY GLUNT		ROUTINE 9
			ROUTINE 10
			BASEGRAM 11
			12
			13
			14

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH **CTF 31** PRECEDENCE AND **CTG 32.2** INFORMATIONAL. IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐

AGE 1 OF 2 **182213** **NCR 3204** (Use G. C. T.)

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(CINCPOA SENDS ACTION CTF 32 INFO CTF 57 CTF 31 CTF 36
COMGENPOA CNO COMGEN 3RD PHIBCORPS. CTF 32 PASS INFO COM-
GEN 1ST MARDIV COMGEN 81ST INFDIV. CTG 32.2 ALSO INFO.

UR 180240. AFTER OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF IDENTITY AND
LOCATION OF ASSAULT UNITS ENGAGED IN STALEMATE OPERATION
BY CINCPOA COMMUNIQUE OR PRESS RELEASE PERSONNEL OF THE
ANNOUNCED UNITS PLUS PERSONNEL OF UNITS ATTACHED THERETO
INCLUDING CORPS AND GROUP STAFFS DURING THE ASSAULT PHASE
MAY DISCLOSE THEIR LOCATION AND RELATE THEIR PERSONAL EX-
PERIENCES IN THEIR PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE. NO RELAXATION
OF BASIC CENSORSHIP REGULATIONS IS AUTHORIZED. UPON COM-
PLETION OF THE ASSAULT PHASE DETERMINED BY DATE OF TRANSFER
OF COMMAND FROM LANDING FORCE COMMANDER TO ISLAND COMMANDER

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROO No. 2 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET **ACTION F-2**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76

OPNAV 19-78

182213

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OSD Letter 5-8-72
DEC 10 1973

COPY NO. 5

DISPATCH

TO	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY 2
DATE			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROM			DEFERRED 4
			BASEGRAM 5
			6
DECODED BY		INFORMATION	7
PARAPHRASED	CHECKED		PRIORITY 9
BY	BY		ROUTINE 10
ROUTED BY	DITTOED		DEFERRED 12
	BY		BASEGRAM 13

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL
CHECK BELOW

PAGE 2 OF 2

182213

NCR 3204

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FURTHER DISCLOSURE OF LOCATION OF ASSAULT UNITS IS
PROHIBITED. GARRISON AND DEVELOPMENT UNITS ARE NOT
AFFECTED AND SHALL OBSERVE FULL CENSORSHIP REGULATIONS
CONCERNING PROHIBITION OF REVELATION OF GEOGRAPHIC
LOCATION.

ORIGINAL NCR DISTRIBUTION.

ØØR(#1).....COG

COMINCH(#2-9).....16(#10).....MARCORPS(#11).....

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (G)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
RHP, NAME DE
DEC 10 1973
No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

COPY NO.

OPNAV 19-78

5

DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH AND CNO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY ADMIRAL KING		PRIME MINISTER <i>W.S.</i>	PRIORITY
DATE 18 SEPT 44			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 1839			DEFERRED
			BASEGRAM
DECODED BY		WAR DEPARTMENT NAVAL AIDE	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY JOHNSON	CHECKED BY DORSEY		ROUTINE
	DITTOED BY		DEFERRED
ROUTED BY	BY JOHNSON		BASEGRAM
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
181814			OPERA
NCR 46849			

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

YOUR 172016 REGRET THAT I DO NOT HAVE A COPY OF THE
 PROPOSED STATEMENT ON MULBERRY BY GENERAL EISENHOWER.
 IT IS BEING OBTAINED AS A MATTER OF URGENCY AND I
 SHALL COMMUNICATE WITH YOU AFTER THE TEXT IS RECEIVED.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date **DEC 10 1973**

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCL.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

OPNAV 19-78 **000,7**

181814

COPY NO.

3

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Jelle [REDACTED] - IVI

PRIORITY

From: OCTAGON

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

Nr: OCTAGON 41 16 Sept 1944

OCTAGON 41 to SHAEF London for Eisenhower for action,
AGWAR for information, PACS 79 from the Combined Chiefs of
Staff. [REDACTED]

With reference to SCAF 79 the Combined Chiefs of
Staff have agreed that security implications affecting
other Theaters preclude the release of information on
Mulberry.

End

NOTE: SCAF 79 is CM-IN-11043 (12 Sep 44)CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Somervell
Gen Bissell
Adm King

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 84 - 71
By *RH* Date DEC 10 1973

OPD
Log
CM-IN-15405

(17 Sep 44)

0035Z

bem

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
Col G G Epley W D Ext 77500

14 September 1944

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
London, England

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

OCTAGON

Victor 161

Number: WARK 31166

To Wilson for action, SHAEF London for Eisenhower, United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff and Headquarters Communication Zone Main for information, FAN 417 from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

NAF 729 is the reference. Present Combined Chiefs of Staff policy is as follows:

POLICY ON RELEASE OF RADAR EQUIPMENT AND INFORMATION

1. Information on any radar equipment (including IFF and Racons) in operational use, may be disclosed in conformity with Paragraph 5 below to United Nations' forces acting under United States or British Theater Commanders only to the extent and only when it is necessary for those forces to have such information in order to perform the operational role allotted to them. This does not include disclosure of radar equipment in research or development stages which is not yet available for operational use.

CM-OUT-31166 (15 Sep 44)

DECLASSIFIED 29 - 71
J.C.S. Regrading Memo

By R&P Date 29-10-1973

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
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[REDACTED]

WARX 31166

14 September 1944

Page Two

2. Radar equipment (including IFF and Racons) may be released under the above conditions where operational necessity exists.

3. Theater commanders and other authorities should inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff through their appropriate channels of any release of radar information or radar equipments.

4. a. In the case of foreign forces or their accredited representatives not operating under or in immediate conjunction with British or United States Theater Commanders the release of radar equipment (including IFF and Racons) or information shall be the subject of separate policy decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. Release of information to research, development or production personnel not covered by Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 a above shall be subject to a separate decision in each specific case by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. The following table is supplied for the purpose of applying the policy detailed in Paragraphs 1 to 4 above:

a. Countries to Whose Armed Forces and Accredited Representatives Disclosure is not Restricted.

(1) Great Britain, the Dominions (except Eire), India and the Colonies.

(2) The United States of America.

CM-OUT-31166

(15 Sep 44)

[REDACTED]
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J.C.S. Regrading Memo

By RHP Date 29 - 71
DEC 10 1973

33

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WARX 31166

14 September 1944

Page Three

b. Countries to Whose Armed Forces and Accredited Representatives Disclosure is Limited By this Policy, but Combined United States-United Kingdom Consent is not Required.

Country	Remarks
(1) Holland	Information in
(2) France	the case of each
(3) Belgium	country to be limited
(4) Greece	to sets which it is
(5) Norway	necessary to release
(6) Poland	to the Armed Forces
(7) Yugoslavia	of these countries,
(8) Czechoslovakia	while they are engaged
(9) Brazil and	in operations as part
Cuba	of, or in conjunction
	with, United Kingdom
	or United States Forces.

c. Countries to Whose Armed Forces and Accredited Representatives Disclosure is Limited by this Policy and Combined United States-United Kingdom Consent is Required. (See Paragraph 4)

(1) U.S.S.R.	United States-United Kingdom general policy has been agreed. A list of individual items released, or to be released, has been prepared.
(2) Portugal	
(3) Turkey	Normally to be limited to the lower frequency equipments of earlier type.

CM-OUT-31166

(15 Sep 44)

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By RHP Date SEP 10 1971

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
[REDACTED]

WARX 31166

14 September 1944

Page Four

(4) Italy

Normally to be restricted to sets employing wavelengths of eight cm. or over and which have been in operational use for at least one year and which are necessary for the Italians to perform any operational role allotted to them.

(5) Sweden

Some one and one-half meter early warning equipments have already been released to Sweden by the United Kingdom.

(6) China

Some SCR 695, 535 and 595 transponders, one SCR 602 and two GCI sets have been released by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, New Delhi. Information to be strictly limited to that which will assist Chinese in immediate prosecution of the war as defined in C.C.S. 432/1.

CM-OUT-31166

(15 Sep 44)

[REDACTED]
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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 29 - 71
By RAH Date DEC 10 1973

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

WARX 31166

14 September 1944

Page Five

d. Countries to Whom no Disclosure is Permitted.

All countries not listed in a, b, and c above.

NOTE: Release to the countries listed is to be conditional upon their treating all information released according to the current security grading for such equipment.

Any of these countries may be reconsidered for purposes of receiving equipment or information should circumstances make it desirable to do so.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S
INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
CG AAF
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Log

CM-OUT-31166

(15 Sep 44)

2135Z

ejm

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 29 - 71
By RHP Date DEC 10 1973

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16-59609-1 GPO

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
CC/S		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM		CG AFHQ CASERTA	PRIORITY
RELEASED 16 SEPT 1944		SHAEF MAIN ECHELON LONDON	ROUTINE
DATE 0547		CG UK BASE SECTION LONDON	DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM			
DECODED BY SHARPE			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY CONNORS			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
WARX 31166 14 SEPTEMBER 1944 NCR 11203			☐
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES			

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING MESSAGE HAVE HAND FROM ARMY BEGINNING TEXT

TO WILSON FOR ACTION SHAEF LONDON FOR EISENHOWER, UNITED KINGDOM BASE SECTION LONDON PASS TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF AND HEADQUARTERS COMMUNICATION ZONE MAIN FOR INFORMATION, FAN 417 FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.

NAF 729 IS THE REFERENCE. PRESENT COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF POLICY IS AS FOLLOWS:

POLICY ON RELEASE OF RADAR EQUIPMENT AND INFORMATION

1. INFORMATION ON ANY RADAR EQUIPMENT (INCLUDING IFF AND RACONS) IN OPERATIONAL USE, MAY BE DISCLOSED IN CONFORMITY

WITH PARAGRAPH 5 BELOW TO UNITED NATIONS' FORCES ACTING UNDER UNITED STATES OR BRITISH THEATER COMMANDERS ONLY TO

THE EXTENT AND ONLY WHEN IT IS NECESSARY FOR THOSE FORCES TO HAVE SUCH INFORMATION IN ORDER TO PERFORM THE OPERATIONAL

ROLE ALLOTTED TO THEM. THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE DISCLOSURE OF RADAR EQUIPMENT IN RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT STAGES WHICH IS

NOT YET AVAILABLE FOR OPERATIONAL USE.

2. RADAR EQUIPMENT (INCLUDING IFF AND RACONS) MAY BE

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
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F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	

SECRET

Make original 10 copies to Code Room Which Office in Room (See Art. 76 (4) of U.S.S.)

OPNAV-19-07

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BY

CLASSIFIED
U.S.S. Regrading Memo
Date DEC 10 1973

RELEASED UNDER THE ABOVE CONDITIONS WHERE OPERATIONAL NECESSITY EXISTS.

3. THEATER COMMANDERS AND OTHER AUTHORITIES SHOULD INFORM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF THROUGH THEIR APPROPRIATE CHANNELS OF ANY RELEASE OF RADAR INFORMATION OR RADAR EQUIPMENTS.

4. A. IN THE CASE OF FOREIGN FORCES OR THEIR ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVES NOT OPERATING UNDER OR IN IMMEDIATE CONJUNCTION WITH BRITISH OR UNITED STATES THEATER COMMANDERS THE RELEASE OF RADAR EQUIPMENT (INCLUDING IFF AND RACONS) OR INFORMATION SHALL BE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE POLICY DECISIONS BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.

B. RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT OR PRODUCTION PERSONNEL NOT COVERED BY PARAGRAPHS 1, 2 AND

4 A ABOVE SHALL BE SUBJECT TO A SEPARATE DECISION IN EACH SPECIFIC CASE BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.

5. THE FOLLOWING TABLE IS SUPPLIED FOR THE PURPOSE OF APPLYING THE POLICY DETAILED IN PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 4 ABOVE:

A. COUNTRIES TO WHOSE ARMED FORCES AND ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVES DISCLOSURE IS NOT RESTRICTED.

(1) GREAT BRITAIN, THE DOMINIONS (EXCEPT EIRE), INDIA, AND THE COLONIES.

(2) THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

B. COUNTRIES TO WHOSE ARMED FORCES AND ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVES DISCLOSURE IS LIMITED BY THIS POLICY BUT COMBINED UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM CONSENT IS NOT REQUIRED.

COUNTRY

REMARKS

- (1) HOLLAND
- (2) FRANCE
- (3) BELGIUM

INFORMATION IN THE CASE OF EACH COUNTRY TO BE LIMITED TO SETS WHICH

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J.C.S. Rescinding Memo 29-71
By RAM Date DEC 10 1973

Originator CC/S D/T 14 SEPT 41 CR 11203 Page 2 Of 4 Pages.

OPMAT-10-01
494106

CM-OUT-3116

~~SECRET~~

- (4) GREECE
- (5) NORWAY
- (6) POLAND
- (7) JUGOSLAVIA
- (8) CZECHOSLOVAKIA
- (9) BRAZIL AND CUBA

IT IS NECESSARY TO RELEASE TO THE ARMED FORCES OF THESE COUNTRIES

WHILE THEY ARE ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS AS PART OF, OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH,

UNITED KINGDOM OR UNITED STATES FORCES.

C. COUNTRIES TO WHOSE ARMED FORCES AND ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVES DISCLOSURE IS LIMITED BY THIS POLICY AND COMBINED UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM CONSENT IS REQUIRED. (SEE PARAGRAPH 4)

- (1) USSR

UNITED STATES- UNITED KINGDOM GENERAL POLICY HAS BEEN AGREED.

A LIST OF INDIVIDUAL ITEMS RELEASED, OR TO BE RELEASED, HAS BEEN PREPARED.

- (2) PORTUGAL
- (3) TURKEY

NORMALLY TO BE LIMITED TO THE LOWER FREQUENCY EQUIPMENTS OF EARLIER TYPE.

- (4) ITALY

NORMALLY TO BE RESTRICTED TO SETS EMPLOYING WAVELENGTHS OR 8 CM OR

OVER AND WHICH HAVE BEEN IN OPERATIONAL USE FOR AT LEAST 1 YEAR AND

WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR THE ITALIANS TO PERFORM ANY OPERATIONAL ROLE ALLOTTED TO THEM.

- (5) SWEDEN

SOME 1 AND 1/2 METER EARLY WARNING EQUIPMENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN

RELEASED TO SWEDEN BY THE UNITED KINGDOM.

- (6) CHINA

SOME SCR 695, 535 AND 595 TRANS-PONDORS, 1 SCR 602 AND 2 GCI SETS

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 29-71
By *[Signature]* Date DEC 10 1973

HAVE BEEN RELEASED BY THE COMMANDING
GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES,

NEW DELHI. INFORMATION TO BE
STRICTLY LIMITED TO THAT WHICH WILL

ASSIST CHINESE IN IMMEDIATE PROSEC-
UTION OF THE WAR AS DEFINED IN CCS
432/1.

D. COUNTRIES TO WHOM NO DISCLOSURE IS PERMITTED.

ALL COUNTRIES NOT LISTED IN A, B, AND C ABOVE.

NOTE: RELEASE TO THE COUNTRIES LISTED IS TO BE CONDITIONAL UPON
THEIR TREATING ALL INFORMATION RELEASED ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT
SECURITY GRADING FOR SUCH EQUIPMENT.

ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES MAY BE RECONSIDERED FOR PURPOSES OF RECEIVING
EQUIPMENT OR INFORMATION SHOULD CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE IT DESIRABLE TO
DO SO.

DECLASSIFIED

J.C.S. Regrading Memo 29 - 71

By RAH Date DEC 10 1973

COMINCH...COG

12...13...13-2... NAVAIDE.....

cc/s

14 SEPT 1944 11203

Originator

CM-OUT-31166

D/T Group

NCR

Page

Of

Pages.

OPRAY-10-51
AS4100

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] "IVI"

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
Forward on Continent.

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Nr: FWD 14565 11 September 1944

From SHAEF FORWARD, ref FWD 14565 Top Secret, to
AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff for info SHAEF MAIN
to British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite SHGBI this
is SCAF number 79

Consider time is approaching when there would be
no objection on the part of this headquarters to the release
of MULBERRY stories to the press but we are aware there may
be security implications affecting other theaters and we
shall not release unless so instructed by you. No evidence
that details construction, operation or capacity have been
compromised and all steps have been taken to continue to
safeguard security.

End

FOOTNOTE: This message relayed to OCTAGON.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Somervell, Gen Bissell
Adm King, Log, OPD

CM-IN-11043 (12 Sep 44) 2105Z ekk

[REDACTED]
DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo

By *BHP*

Date *34 - 71*
DEC 10 1973

COPY NO.

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
COMINCH		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY R S EDWARDS		COM 7TH FLEET	PRIORITY
DATE 5 SEPTEMBER 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED
DECODED BY		COMSUBS 7TH FLEET	PRIORITY
TYPED BY WALP/ J. Miller			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
052255			NCR 46611

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

IN VIEW LEAKS TO PRESS STATEMENT THAT ROBALO IS OVERDUE
AND PRESUMED LOST WILL BE RELEASED 6 SEPT.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)
OSD letter, May 3, 1973
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

ACTION	
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FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCN0	

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 10-87

000.7

052255

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOT

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: F 92072 4 September 1944

To AGWAR F92072 PWB AFHQ to OWI signed
Wilson cite FHPWO.

Following is text of statement shortly to be made
to Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece by Supreme Allied Commander
Mediterranean.

It is not-to be released until release date and time,
which we shall signal later.

Please arrange to have statement included in trans-
missions in these languages immediately following release.
Text follows.

"The Armies of the United Nations are advancing on
all fronts. The Germans are falling back everywhere toward
their own frontiers. Very soon all countries in Europe, in-
cluding the Balkan countries, will be free.

It is reported to me that some persons and some
political organizations in the Balkans are assisting the
Germans to escape. These persons and organizations are also
stopping patriots from performing their duties.

Such actions, of course, directly benefit the Ger-
mans. The Allies will not tolerate such persons or political
groups giving assistance to the Germans. This war will soon

CM-IN-3652 (5 Sep 44)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY

3 1974

Col Park

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOT

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: F 92072

4 September 1944

be over, and when it is over, you may be certain that war criminals, no matter what nationality, will be punished. (If there are misguided or badly informed persons or organizations in the Balkans who have in the past, through error, worked against the real interests of the Allies, let them desist now before it is too late. The day for reckoning with Germans, and those who assist Germans, is at hand. You have your warning."

End

ACTION: G-2 (OWI)
INFO : CCS
CG AAF
OPD
ADM KING
COL PARK
BPR
LOG

CM-IN-3652 (5 SEP 44) 0429Z mos

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

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TOT

URGENT

From: CG Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department

Nr: S-58760

30 August 1944

From Supreme Commander. SCAP 69. S-58760

Telegram to Combined Chiefs of Staff on result of operations in northern France between 6 June (D Day) and 25th August. Classification Confidential until date and time of release.

1. The following facts will be released here to the press at 1900 hours double British summer time on 31 August. They may be released in Washington and London at that time and hour.

2. (Report begins) Enemy losses.

The equivalent of five Panzer Divisions have been destroyed and a further six severely mauled, including one Panzer Grenadier Division. The equivalent of 20 Infantry Divisions have been eliminated and a further 12 very badly cut up and have suffered severe losses. Included in this total of Infantry Divisions are three of the enemy's crack parachute divisions. In addition one parachute division and two Infantry divisions have no hope of escape from the fortress ports of Brittany Peninsula in which they are

CM-IN-28224 (30 Aug 44)

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

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URGENT

Page -2-

From: CG Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

Nr: S-58760

30 August 1944

marooned. One Infantry Division is isolated in the Channel Islands.

3. Enemy casualties.

Total enemy casualties amount to over 400,000 killed, wounded and prisoners of war, of which over 200,000 are Prisoners of War. 135,000 of these prisoners have been captured since 25 July. The total continues to mount. 1300 enemy tanks and over 20,000 MT have been captured or destroyed. About 500 assault guns and 1500 field and heavier artillery guns have been captured or destroyed. In addition the enemy has suffered very heavy losses in Coast Artillery equipment.

The German Seventh Army and newly formed Fifth Panzer Army have been decisively defeated and into this defeat have been drawn the bulk of the fighting strength of First and Fifteenth Armies. Three Field Marshalls and one Army Commander have either been dismissed or incapacitated by wounds. One Army commander, three Corps Commanders, 15 Divisional Commanders and one Fortress Commander have been either killed or captured.

4. Enemy air losses.

In the air the Luftwaffe has taken a fearful beating since 6 June 1944 German aircraft have been destroyed in the air and 1,167 on the ground. In addition, 270 aircraft

CM-IN-28224 (30 Aug 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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URGENT

Page -3-

From: CG Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Nr: S-58760

30 August 1944

were probably destroyed and 1,028 aircraft were damaged in the air.

5. Enemy Naval losses.

At sea the enemy has been unable, in spite of his former boasting, to interfere seriously with the Invasion Forces. Enemy attacks on convoys have been driven off on very many occasions and losses to Allied shipping have been small. Of the enemy's Naval forces, some 300 vessels of all classes have been sunk or heavily damaged by Allied action. In addition, a number of enemy merchant ships have been sunk and the Germans themselves have been forced to scuttle, in their harbors, large numbers of all types of shipping, both Naval and mercantile.

A large proportion of the enemy's effort has been devoted to attack by mine laying. The sustained work of minesweepers has resulted, within three months in a "Mine-Bag" off the French beaches which totals one tenth of all mines swept in five years in all Theaters of War.

6. Allied team work.

Allied team work, extending through all services, has again demonstrated its ability to overcome the most adverse kind of conditions in defeating the enemy. Allied units from other countries have fought effectively alongside

CM-IN-28224 (30 Aug 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

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[REDACTED]
URGENT

Page -4-

From: CG Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

Mr: S-58760

30 August 1944

American and British Forces and the FFI have done much
valuable work.

The Command System has functioned smoothly in spite
of difficulties due to enforced separation of commanders
and of poor signal communications due to distances and
rapidly changing situation.

Many factors are woven into the warp and woof of
this great victory. Among these a few are listed below,
with no attempt to give their order of importance.

One was meticulous care in planning and preparation,
supported resolutely in all important aspects by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

Another was the fact that we achieved some degree of
surprise involving place, timing and strength of the attack.
The excellence and sufficiency of amphibious equipment, with
measures for dealing with beach defenses and obstacles, was
also important.

The brilliant preparatory work of the Air Forces,
a belief in the effectiveness of which was the very corner-
stone of the original invasion conception, began months ago
and reached its highest intensity at the very moment of land-

CW-IN-28224 (30 Aug 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

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URGENT

Page -5-

From: CG Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

Nr: S-58760

30 August 1944


ing. It is my conviction that except for this aerial preparation, including as a specific mission a prolonged campaign against the transportation systems of northwest Europe, the venture could not have logically been undertaken. The air support of Ground Forces has been most effective throughout the campaign. The supply and maintenance services have performed miracles.

But the greatest factor of all has been the fighting qualities of the Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the United Nations. Their valor, stamina and devotion to duty have been beyond praise. They will continue to be.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Adm. Leahy, CGAAF, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm. King,
BPR, Log

CM-IN-28224 (30 Aug 44) 2349Z jb


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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

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[REDACTED]
Joint Chiefs of Staff
77500

25 August 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR 86575

To Eisenhower from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

After consideration as indicated in FACS 59, it has been decided on U. S. side that the present time is not appropriate for the issue of the statement which SCAP 55 proposed.

End

DECLASSIFIED
[REDACTED]

ORIGINATOR: JC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
CG AAF
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
LOG

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

CM-OUT-86575

(25 Aug 44)

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CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTER
"TOP" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
London England

To: War Department

No: S 57813

17 August 1944

S-57813 action AGWAR for Surles signed Eisenhower
cite SHPRD. Reured W-79759.

Release of artificial harbors in Normandy, has been
under constant review by this Headquarters. Information
will be released when it is clear from German radio or
activity that they are familiar with facts concerning
harbors. War Department will be informed when release is
to be made. All that we can say now is what the Prime
Minister said in his last speech.

End

ACTION: Gen Surles
INFO: Gen Somervell
OFD
Gen Bissell
Log

DECLASSIFIED

JOS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IR-15562 (17 Aug 44)

1700Z

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COPY NO. 25

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HOLD FOR RELEASE

██████████: The following radio address of the President to be delivered at the Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Washington, on Saturday, August 12, 1944, MUST BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE and no portion, synopsis or intimation is to be published or given out until delivery has begun.

NOTE: Release is when the President actually begins speaking. The same release conditions mentioned above also apply to the radio as well as to the press.

EXTREME CARE MUST BE EXERCISED TO AVOID PREMATURE RELEASE.

Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President.

It is just thirty days since I left Washington but I have been at all times in close touch with the work there and also in daily communication with our forces in the European and Far Eastern theaters of war. It is good to come back to the Puget Sound Navy Yard, for as you know I have been coming here off and on since 1913 or 1914. Since my visit here nearly two years ago I am glad to know of the splendid progress that is being maintained both here and at many places on the Pacific Coast in turning out ships and planes and munitions of almost every other variety - and in the training of men for all of the armed services. So I have thought that you would be interested in a brief summary of my visit to Hawaii and to the Aleutian Islands and Alaska, from which I am about to step foot on shore in the continental United States.

When I got to San Diego, and for three days before going on board ship, I had the opportunity to visit many of the patients in the hospital there, a large number of whom were just back from the fighting in the Marshall and Marianas Islands. And also I witnessed a large practice landing operation on the beaches of Southern California between Los Angeles and San Diego - the kind of warfare which has been so successfully developed by us during the past two years. This is of a wholly new type, requiring all kinds of new equipment and new training, and I think I can safely say that no other nation in the world has worked it out as successfully as we have, as we have shown within the past few weeks in the capture of Saipan and Tinian and the recapturing of Guam, resulting in new threats against Japan itself and against all of their operations in the Southwest Pacific.

It takes a personal observation of a landing maneuver, such as I saw from a high bluff overlooking the shore below, to understand how well the application of experience is being carried out. The landing craft - a wholly new type of ship, came to the beach from the transports offshore under a cover of fog. They came on in waves, the Marines and infantry getting the first toe-hold, followed by other waves and then by all manner of equipment, ammunition and wire and tanks, all protected by air coverage, and preceded theoretically by a devastating bombardment from heavy ships lying

offshore. When a beachhead was obtained to a depth of a mile or two there followed the unloading of great quantities of supplies of all kinds, including tanks and trucks and Jeeps.

Timing is of the utmost importance in an operation of this kind together with instantaneous communication from the shore to the ships and planes. Here was demonstrated the perfect cooperation between all of the services - Army, Navy and Marines - and to this should be added the teamwork for the immediate care of the wounded and their quick transfer back to the hospital ships. We in our comfortable homes ought to realize that to all troops and Marines who are to conduct a new landing expedition on some far distant island in the Pacific as well as on the coast of France, this amphibious training is being given at a number of places in the United States before the expedition even starts. Hundreds of instructors are required, nearly all men who have participated in actual combat operations beforehand. Many of these instructors will, of course, accompany the troops in the actual operations of future landings.

The cruiser on which I went from San Diego to Hawaii is one of a number of what we call "post-treaty" cruisers - much larger and more powerful and faster than the pre-war cruisers, which were limited by treaty to ten thousand tons. This particular ship joined the Pacific Fleet less than a year ago but has already engaged in fifteen operations in the Western and Southwest Pacific. Her's is a magnificent record. Her skipper and crew have brought her through all of these many offensive missions unscathed, and because of the experience thus gained she is an even more powerful weapon than she was the day she joined the Fleet.

The voyage was uneventful and we arrived at Pearl Harbor on July 26th.

What an amazing change since my visit there ten years ago! Up to that time the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard had maintained a steady growth, like most of our other navy yards, but today it is capable of making repairs to the heaviest ships and employs a force nearly ten times as great, many of the mechanics coming from the West Coast. All of the battleships and smaller craft which were sunk or damaged in the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, have been raised with the exception of the ARIZONA. In her case, because of the explosion of her forward magazine, salvage was impossible but in her case her main battery of heavy guns was removed and remounted and now forms a part of the coastal defenses on the Island of Oahu.

All of the other ships are afloat and in service, most of them having been put back into commission here at Puget Sound and all of them greatly improved in fire power. They have been used in action in the Pacific and elsewhere - one of them indeed, the NEVADA, having taken part in the bombardment of the coast of Normandy prior to and during the landing operations there as lately as the sixth of June.

I spent three days on the Island of Oahu and everywhere, as at the navy yard, the war activities have multiplied almost beyond belief.

On the afternoon of my arrival my old friend General Douglas MacArthur arrived by air from New Guinea and we began a series of

interesting and useful conferences accompanied by Admiral Nimitz and my own Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, and General Richardson, the Commanding General of Army Forces in the Hawaiian Area and Admiral Halsey, Commander of the Third Fleet.

In these three days we talked about Pacific problems and the best methods of conducting the Pacific campaign in the future. The discussions developed complete accord both in the understanding of the problem that confronts us and in the opinion as to the best methods for its solution. All of us must bear in mind the enormous size of the Pacific area, keeping a mental map of the whole of it in mind.

The Hawaiian Islands used to be considered an outpost. We were not allowed to fortify Guam nor did we fortify Wake or Midway or Samoa.

Today the Hawaiian Islands are no longer a mere outpost. They constitute a major base from which, and from the Pacific Coast, front-line operations are being conducted twice as far away as the distance between the Coast and Hawaii. The Hawaiian Islands have helped to make possible the victories at Guadalcanal and New Guinea and the Marshalls and the Marianas. The Islands will make possible future operations in China, - make possible the recapture and the independence of the Philippines, and make possible the carrying of war into the home islands of Japan itself and its capital city of Tokio.

In a few minutes I want to say another word about the future of the Pacific.

During the rest of my stay in Hawaii I visited many activities, including the great air fields, the hospitals, and an ambulance plane at Hickham Field which had just come in with wounded men from Saipan; and I saw a large Army group which was going through a complete course on jungle warfare - an art which we have developed so expertly that our troops are more than a match in the jungle for any Japanese whom we have yet to meet. I am very proud of the basic training and the final training our sons are getting at home and overseas.

After rejoining our ship we headed for the Aleutian Islands, four days later arriving at Adak on one of the more westerly islands of the group. There again I found intense activity at what might be called a nearly completed advance base. It was from here that a great part of the expeditions for the recapture of Attu and Kiska started. Adak two years ago was a bleak and practically uninhabited island which, with the other Aleutian Islands, seemed relatively unimportant in the plans for the security of our own continent.

You here can well realize the commotion which followed the Japanese occupation of Attu and Kiska and you may have thought that the Chiefs of Staff in Washington were not paying enough attention to the threat against Alaska and the Coast. We realized, of course, that such a Japanese threat could become serious if it was unopposed, but we knew also that Japan did not have the naval and air power to carry this into effect without greater resources and a longer time to plan. Preparations to throw the Japanese from their too-holds had been laid even before the Japanese got there, and the rest of the story you know. It took great preparations and heavy fighting to

eject them from Attu and by the time the great expedition to recapture Kiska got there the Japanese had decided that discretion was the better part of valor; they decided retirement, and retreat was better for them than hari-kari. They abandoned the Aleutians.

The climate at Adak is not the most inviting in the world but I want to say a word of appreciation to the thousands of officers and men of all the services who have built up this base and other bases in the extreme Northwest in such a short time to a point where the people of our Pacific Coast, of British Columbia, and of Alaska can feel certain that we are safe against Japanese invasion on any large scale.

Delayed by fog and rain, we had to give up putting in at Dutch Harbor but we did stop at Kodiak, a large island off the end of the Alaskan peninsula. Here, also, the three services have completed a very excellent, though smaller, base. The first little town we had seen in Alaskan waters and the first trees made me think of the coasts of Maine and Newfoundland.

We were told that a number of officers and men at this and other ports are considering settling in Alaska after the war is over. I hope that this is so because the development of Alaska has only been scratched and it is still the country of the pioneer. Only a small part of its mineral resources have been explored and there is, of course, an abundance of fish and game and timber, together with great possibilities for agriculture. I could not help remembering that the climate, the crops and other resources are not essentially different from Northern Europe - Norway, Sweden and Finland - and the people of those countries in spite of the cold and, in winter, the darkness have brought their civilizations to a high and prosperous level. On my return to Washington I am going to set up a study of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands as a place to which many veterans of this war, especially those who do not have strong roots in their own homes, can go to become pioneers. It is a land with a small population but which I am convinced has great opportunities for those who are willing to work and to help build up all kinds of new things in new lands.

This trip has given me a chance to talk over the social and economic future of the Hawaiian Islands with Governor Stainback and the future of the people of Alaska with Governor Gruening. He asked me to assure you that the tan which I have acquired in the last few days has come from the Alaskan sun. Near Juneau I played hockey for three hours, went fishing and caught one halibut and one flounder.

Speaking again of the future of the defense of the Pacific and the use of its strongpoints in order to prevent attacks on us. You who live in the Pacific Northwest have realized that a line for sea and air navigation following the great circle course from Puget Sound to Siberia and Northern China passes very close to the Alaskan coast and thence westward along the line of the Aleutian Islands. From the point of view of national defense, therefore, it is essential that our control of this route shall be undisputed. Everybody in Siberia and China knows that we have no ambition to acquire land on the continent of Asia. We as a people are utterly opposed to aggression or sneak attacks - but we as a people are insistent that other nations must not under any circumstances through

the foreseeable future commit such attacks against the United States. Therefore, it is essential that we be fully prepared to prevent them for all time to come. The word and the honor of Japan can not be trusted.

That is a simple statement from the military, naval and air point of view. But with the end of a Japanese threat there is an excellent outlook for a permanent peace in the whole of the Pacific Area. It is, therefore, natural and proper for us to think of the economic and commercial future. It is logical that we should foresee a great interchange of commerce between our shores and those of Siberia and China - and in this commercial development Alaska and the Aleutian Islands become automatic stepping stones for trade, both by water and by cargo planes. And this means the automatic development of transportation to Alaska via British Columbia and as far north as the Yukon.

It is as long as ten years ago that I talked with Mr. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, in regard to the development of highways and air routes and even a railroad to Alaska via British Columbia and the Yukon. Great interest in both nations was aroused but it took the war to get quick action. Today the Alcan Highway is practically completed and an air route to Fairbanks enables us to deliver thousands of planes to our ally Russia by way of Alaska, Bering Straits and Siberia. These planes are an important factor in the brilliant and brave advance of the Russian armies on their march to Berlin. And I might observe also that our close relations and true friendship with Canada during these years has proved to be an illustrious example of working hand in hand with your neighbor for the general good.

South of the Alaska-Aleutians route the use of island groups must also be considered for defense and for commerce in getting to and from the American and Asiatic continents. We understand at last the importance of the Hawaiian Islands. It is important that we have other bases - forward bases nearer to Japan than they lie. The same thing is true in regard to the defense of all the American Republics from Mexico past the Panama Canal and all the way down to Chile. There are hundreds of islands in the South Pacific which bear the same relation to South America and the Panama Canal as Hawaii bears to North America. These islands are possessions of the British Empire and the French. They are important commercially just as they are from the defense point of view for they lead to New Zealand, Australia, the Dutch Indies and the Southern Philippines. With all these places we shall undoubtedly have a growing trade.

We have no desire to ask for any possessions of the United Nations. But the United Nations who are working so well with us in the winning of the war will, I am confident, be glad to join with us in protection against aggression and in machinery to prevent aggression. With them and with their help I measure that we can agree completely so that Central and South America will be as safe against attack from the South Pacific as North America is going to be from the North Pacific itself.

The self-interests of our Allies will be affected by fair and friendly collaboration with us. They too will gain in national security. They will gain economically. The destinies of the peoples of the whole Pacific will for many years be entwined with our own destiny. Already there are stirring among

hundreds of millions of them a desire for the right to work out their own destinies and they show no evidence of seeking to over-run the earth - with one exception.

That exception is and has been for many, many years that of Japan and the Japanese people - because whether or not the people of Japan itself know and approve of what their lords have done for nearly a century, the fact remains that they seem to be giving hearty approval to the Japanese policy of acquisition of their neighbors and their neighbors' lands and a military and economic control of as many other nations as they can lay their hands on. It is an unfortunate fact that other nations can not trust Japan, it is an unfortunate fact that years of proof must pass before we can trust Japan and before we can classify Japan as a member of the society of nations which seek permanent peace and whose word we can take.

In removing the future menace of Japan to us and to our continent we are holding out the hope that other people in the Far East can be freed from the same threat. The people of the Philippines never have wished and never will wish to be slaves to Japan. And the same thing is true of the peoples of Korea, that ancient kingdom which was over-run by the Japanese half a century ago, the peoples of Manchuria and all the rest of China. The same thing is true of the peoples of Indo-China, the people of Siam, the peoples of Java and even the most primitive peoples of New Guinea and of the so-called Mandated Islands which we are in the splendid process of throwing the Japanese out of.

I am glad to have the opportunity of taking this short trip, first for the conferences with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz and secondly for the first-hand view of certain bases which are of vital importance to the ending of the war and to the prevention in the future of any similar attack.

More than a million of our troops are overseas in the Pacific, the war is well in hand in this vast area but I can not tell you if I knew when the war will be over either in Europe or in the Far East or the war against Japan.

It will be over the sooner if the people of this country will maintain the making of the necessary supplies and ships and planes. By so doing we will hasten the day of peace. By so doing we will save our own pocketbooks and those of our children; by so doing we will save the lives of our sons and by so doing we will run a better chance of substantial unity among the United Nations in laying more securely the foundation of a lasting peace.

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

OPD 384 TS (23 Jul 44)
Operations Division, WDGS
Pacific Section, WDOPD 6454

25 July 1944

Commanding General
USAF Central Pacific Area
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Number WAR 70928

For Richardson from Marshall

Glance your [REDACTED] R 23199 dated 23 July 44.

Does CINCPAC concur in your request to announce to Army and Navy the presence of the advanced echelon of the 10th Army in your area? Since the rear echelon is to be dispatched to your area in the latter part of August or early September would it not be advisable for security reasons to withhold announcement of the location of the 10th Army until this move is completed? Administration could be facilitated by the assignment of a separate APO number to the forward echelon of the 10th Army.

End

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: Gen Lear
Adm King
Cofs

CN-OUT-70928

(26 Jul 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

20012

ACTION: F-1
pa

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CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF
LETTERS "TOT" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

SECRET
PRIORITY

From: Rear Echelon General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific
Area, Brisbane, Australia.

To: War Department

Nr: C 14977 17 July 1944

From GHQ SWPA sgd MacArthur C 14977 to Chief of Staff
War Department.

Replying your W 65257 14th. I favor release at the
discretion of a theatre commander of substantiated reports
of atrocities committed by the enemy.

End

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: G-1
BPR
OUS/W
Log

CM-IN-13686 (17 Jul 44) 0653Z bjm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (A)

OSD letter, May 2, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

*Col
Parker*

25

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMNAVEU		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		COMINCH	PRIORITY
DATE 12 JULY 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 1629			DEFERRED
DECODED BY FISHER		ADMIRALTY	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY FISHER/POWLEY			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐
PAGE 1 OF 2	121456	NCR 9657	

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(COMNAVEU TO COMINCH INFO ADMIRALTY.)

URDIS 102000.

ADMIRALTY PROPOSE RELEASE 1830 GMT THURSDAY, JULY 13,
FOLLOWING COMMUNIQUE:

THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY REGRET TO ANNOUNCE THE
FOLLOWING LOSSES IN ALLIED OPERATIONS FOR THE LIBERATION
OF EUROPE. THE NEXT OF KIN OF CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN IN-
FORMED.

DESTROYERS: HMS BOADICEA (LTCDR F. W. HAWKINS RN)
HMS SWIFT (LTCDR J. R. GOWER RN)
HNCORMS SVENNER.

FRIGATES: HMS MOURNE (LTCDR R. S. HOLLAND RD RNR)
HMS BLACKWOOD (LTCDR L. T. SLY RD RNR)
HMS LAWFORD (LTCDR M. C. MORRIS RN)

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
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FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Instructions to Code Room.)

10NAV 10-07

0007

SECRET
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
DEC 10 1973

TRAWLER: HMS LORD AUSTIN (LIEUT E. S. T. ROBINSON RNR)

AUXILIARY: HMS MINSTER (ACT LTCDR W. JACKSON RNR)

ADMIRALTY SUGGESTS SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT BY NAVY DEPT OF
AMERICAN LOSSES AS OUTLINED YOUR DESPATCH. ADVISE.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

DEC 10 1973

Originator COMNAVEU D/T Group 56 NCR 9857 Page 2 Of 2 1 ges.

OPNAV-10-51
124100

~~SECRET~~

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	F-25	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	COMINCH	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY	R. S. EDWARDS		COMNAVEU	ROUTINE
DATE	10 JULY 1944			ROUTINE
FOR CODEROOM	2441			DEFERRED
DECODED BY		CINCLANT		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	C. STRONG/JOHNSON		ROUTINE	
ROUTED BY			ROUTINE	
			DEFERRED	
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
102000				NCR 45458
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:				DATE
TIME				GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

NAVY DEPARTMENT PREPARED TO RELEASE TO PUBLIC AS RESULT OF ENEMY ACTION CURRENT OPERATION LOSS OF CORRY, MEREDITH, GLENNON, SUSAN B. ANTHONY, TIDE, PARTRIDGE AND RICH. WHAT IS INTENTION OF ADMIRALTY REGARDING BRITISH LOSSES. NAVY DEPARTMENT WILLING COORDINATE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT RESPECTIVE LOSSES. ADVISE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (M)

OSD letter, May 8, DEC 10 1973

By RHP, NARS Date

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
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F-20	
F-3	
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F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 19-67

000,7

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE


PRIORITY

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

To: War Department.

Nr: F 68149.

4 July 1944.

Re W 58685 from Thomson F 68149 PWB to OWI Thomson
and PWB for Woodward Jackson Sherwood signed Wilson cite
FHPWO.

Have had conversation with Henri Bonnet concerning
hard reports of execution of German prisoners by FFI. French
would like Allied radio to carry such hard reports factually
avoiding commentaries on subject or speculation on consequences
of action reported. For your information such executions bear
direct relation to treatment FFI prisoners taken by Germans.

There are reports that the Kommandantur in certain
sectors has accorded de facto recognition of regular military
status of FFI prisoners. FFI hope such de facto recognition
will be developed and therefore taking measures they consider
necessary to promote such recognition which may occasionally
involve executions as reported. They only desire that German
high command should have knowledge of this fact but they wish
avoid all unnecessary provocation.

Hence recommend sober factual treatment of news.

End.

ACTION: G-2 (OWI)
INFO : OPD, COL PARK, LOG
CM-IN-3109 (4 Jul 44) 2017Z mcs


DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

000.7

COPY NO. 30

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
PRIORITY

From: CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces
Caserta, Italy

To: War Department

No: 22494

26 June 1944

To Arnold from Baker cite 22494.

At a special press conference held yesterday at 15th Air Force General Salinas told correspondents that he had been impressed by the organization and efficiency of the 15th Air Force on every level. In answer to a correspondents inquiry, he said that plans were underway for the training of a Mexican Air Force unit in the United States for service in this theater.

I have put a censorship on the above statement until I get a definite clearance from you to release it.

End

ACTION: CG AAP

INFO : OPD

G-2

Col. Park

BPR

Log

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (K)

ORR letter, May 3, 1973

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-21460 (26 Jun 44) 1808Z vhm

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42

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

IMMEDIATE

21 June 1944

From: Chiefs of Staff
To : AFHQ Algiers
Info: J.S.M. Washington
COSMED 132

Following from Chiefs of Staff.

Question of publishing Italian long armistice terms is again under consideration. Military objections seem now to carry less weight. What are your views?

End

T.O.O. 211026A

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Gen Hildring
Log

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of SM 522-71,

8-12-71

By RHP Date DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-17504 (22 Jun 44) 0207Z jb

SECRET

370 Italy

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34

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

WB

[REDACTED]

✓

From: US Military Attache, London.

To: War Department

Nr. 13355

17 June 1944

Sr nr 13355.

Invasion, French problem and pilotless aircraft raids principal subjects discussed in London during past week. Churchill staved off Commons debate on French relations Wednesday but press campaign for recognition FCNL as provincial Govt continues and papers have prominently reported De Gaulle reception in Normandy. Press emphasizes potential threat post war Anglo-French relations of failure to deal correctly with current situation. Secret weapon raids calmly accepted as act of desperation on Germans part. Several newspapers advise against diverting any air strength from crucial invasion front to bomb pilotless aircraft installations because raids are uncomfortable but not vital to final issue. Friday home secretary Herbert Morrison successfully defended in Parliament his administration defense regulation 18B which authorizes imprisonment without trial persons deemed dangerous to national security including 1 MP Captain Ramsay. Morrison reported in 10 months prior 31 May detainees reduced from 429 to 226. Contrasts with 1426 in August 1940 which was maximum. B29 raids on Japan prominently reported British press. Current question of week: When will Stalin open first front?

End.

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF, OPD, Col Park, Log.

CM-IN-14750 (18 Jun 44) 10592 bjm

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) at (X)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

0007

COPY NO.

44

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Joint Staff Mission
To : Chiefs of Staff
Rptd: Middle East for Commanders-in-Chief and AFHQ for
General Wilson
Nbr : J.S.M. 101 14 June 1944

Reference J.S.M. 97

Washington Evening Star of June 13th carries
article stating that Marshal Tito, after being compelled
to flee from Yugoslavia, has now returned to "one of the
Yugoslavian islands in the Adriatic where he is attempting
to re-organise his headquarters".

T.O.O. 1419517

Note: JSM 97 is OM-IN-10035 (13 Jun 44) 008

ACTION: COS
INFO : General Arnold
OPD
General Bissell
Admiral King
Colonel Park
O or S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE DEC 10 1973

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
DEC 10 1973

OM-IN-11692 (15 Jun 44) 02512 eju

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24-75724

25X

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: US Military Attache, London, England
To: War Department
Nr: 13297 12 June 1944
Sr nr 13297.

British press continues demand for agreement with French National Committee on civil affairs administration. The Times in leading editorial today repeats arguments that De Gaulle organization has as good or better claim to recognition than other exile governments, that no alternative authority exists, and that present situation jeopardizing French military aid. Issuance invasion currency without prior agreement criticized in several papers. Behind British concern over present situation is desire for strong and friendly France after war and fear that current policy will embitter Frenchmen toward their liberators.

End.

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF
OPD

Col Park
Log

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-9694 (12 Jun 44) 1500Z ejm

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40

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PARAPHRASE OF STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE

From : Moscow

To : Secretary of State, Washington

Dated : 9 June 1944

Number: 2063

The Russian Press during May.

In the course of this month the usual hesitation of the Soviet press between friendliness and confidence in their Allies and distrust of the motives of the capitalist world and its reactionaries, inclined more toward friendliness than has previously been the case. The offensive in Italy and the increased preparations for invasion produced better appreciation of the military contribution which the Allies are making against the Fascists.

It became more apparent also that the USSR wishes to continue and broaden her political cooperation at this time, and in the days of peace. There were editorials on the second year of the treaty between Britain and Russia which stressed the success of collaboration over such matters as Italy and the warning which was issued jointly to the satellites of Germany. The press was more reserved toward international organization which is being planned, such as projects for a world currency. The newspapers made it clear that the peculiar nature of Soviet economics and finance must be taken into consideration even though Russia has now renounced the reticence which she used to preserve.

CM-IN-10047

(13 June 44)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date DEC 10 1973

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28
Col Parks.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: Moscow

Page 2

Re : 2063

9 June 1944

Adverse criticism was expressed in treatment of the British and U. S. policy toward Franco, and in the handling of the Fascist trials in the U.S. There were indications that those who direct Russian public opinion desire to preserve fear of the reactionaries and Fascists who have centers in all the states except in the USSR.

The principal interest in Europe was focussed on Yugoslavia and Poland. It is quite evident that Russia will consider popular movements in those countries as the only representative groups. In other places the press persisted in praising the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria, the Partisans in Italy, and so on.

There were some significant signs that there might be a rapprochement with the Vatican and the Catholic Church in reports of what Father Orlemanski said in Moscow and in New York when he declared that Stalin favored the Catholic Church and was opposed to any persecution of it in the USSR.

The press kept urging increased war production at home and stressed more and more the need for reconstruction.

Two themes were interwoven into this domestic propaganda. In one, the unique characteristics of the Soviet system were played up. It was declared that once a decision has been made by the Party the members are obliged to support this without dissent. Exhortations were made on the need for making a study of the theories of Marx and Lenin; there was one important article which summed up in a favorable fashion the year's work of the newly organized primary Party groups inside the Army. It is rather significant that most of the material printed on the political activity of the Party was concerned with the Army. In the armed forces there are millions of peasants and new Party members by the hundreds of thousands who require indoctrination.

CM-IN-10047

(13 June 44)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date **DEC 10 1973**

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 3

From: Moscow

Nr : 2053

9 June 1944

The second theme which was interwoven was expression of pride in the victories and achievements of Russia in past and present. In articles on ideology much was said about the superiority of Russian culture to that of the Germans.

Along with these themes was expression of Soviet patriotism (sic) which the papers claim is the finest now existing in this world. There is the "new Soviet man" who is representative of this. In the paper of the Komsomols there was an article which demanded that writers should form a new "modern hero" who will possess all these virtues.

Harrison (Ambassador)

End

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
Col Park
Log

OM-IN-10047

(13 June 44) 0250Z amb

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date DEC 10 1973

COPY No. 28

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
COMGEN SUPREME HDQTRS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES LONDON		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY 9 JUNE 1944	FOR ACTION	WAR DEPT	PRIORITY
DATE 2305			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED
DECODED BY PARAPHRASED BY HARRINGTON	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
NO 8 53516	9 JUNE 1944	NCR 19445	☐

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

RECEIVED FROM ARMY BY PRINTER

8 53516 PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MONARNEY FROM FRANK
MOGARTNY SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE 9H908.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WISH THE FOLLOWING
STATEMENT RELEASED TO THE PRESS AT ONCE NO
MATTER WHAT TIME OF NIGHT OR DAY.

"THE UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
GENERAL MARSHALL, ADMIRAL KING, AND GENERAL
ARNOLD, ARRIVED IN ENGLAND FRIDAY, JUNE 9TH."

CM IN 7316
COMINCH...COG

BUPERS...00R...CNO...NAVAIDE...00...200P...

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-3-72
BY RT, DATE DEC 10 1973

ACTION

F-0	
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F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
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FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-16

000,7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: CG Strategic Air Forces in Europe London England

To: War Department

Re: U 63028

6 June 1944

To Arnold sgd Spaatz U 63028.

Correction on Page 2, line 2.

"Story has now come from Stockholm that 5 American airmen were lynched yesterday by angry mobs before police could interfere. There is no confirmation of this story and it is felt it may well be part of new line of propaganda to which Goebbels has now resorted. It would be much appreciated if you would refrain from publishing it until we have confirmation it is true".

End

Supplement to CM-IN-1115 (2 Jun 44) BFR

ACTION: BFR

INFO: 1 CG AAF

OPD

G-2

Sol Park

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (M)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NAES Date DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-4738 (6 Jun 44) 1910Z mes

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42

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

Military Intelligence
Division, G-2 CB-JS/dm
72577

June 4, 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR 46193

Eisenhower for Betts from Bissell WDGBI signed Marshall reur
53139 of June 4th and WAR 46156 same date.

Erroneous Associated Press flash is subject of this
cable. Action by Combined Chiefs Staff not considered nec-
essary unless desired by Supreme Commander.

End

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS date DEC 10 1973

ORIGINATOR: Gen Bissell

INFORMATION: OPD
Adm King
LOG

CM-CUT-46193

(4 Jun 44) 1908Z amb

COPY No. 25

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~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Military Intelligence Division
G-2/CB/12577

4 June 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR 46156

To Eisenhower for Betts cite SHGBI from Bissell WDGBI
signed Marshall reference your 53139.

Erroneous Associated Press flash was carried on all major radio networks, short waved to Europe, and disseminated by wire and radio channels throughout Western Hemisphere before flashes to withhold publication and acknowledging error were received. Denials followed over same channels and newspapers ran accounts relating circumstances of transmission error. Public reaction this hemisphere was initial excitement and continuing confusion lasting several hours after first flash. Signal Corps monitoring of foreign frequencies negative except for same German broadcast reported by you. Reaction Combined Chiefs of Staff will be furnished soon as available.

End.

ORIGINATOR: General Bissell

INFORMATION: General Arnold

CCS

OPD

Col. Park

Gen. Surles

LOG

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

CM-OUT-46156

(4 Jun 44)

0914Z

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department

Nr: S-53139

4 June 1944

From SHAEF, S-53139, to AGWAR rpt to SHAEF CP to
Marshall for Bissell from Betts signed Eisenhower cite SHQBI
BIGOT.

Through error Associated Press sent by radio the following message from London to the United States at 2237B Saturday night, 3rd June 44. "Eisenhower's HQ announce Allied landings in France". Story cancelled by AP by 2300B with explanation that Joan Ellis, AP employee, while practicing setting type, set up the above message. A Russian communique was received by AP London and forwarded to the U.S. mistakenly including in it the above message. This AP release was broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System which reportedly cancelled the news upon advice from AP London. BBC Monitoring System picked up German Tel Service trans ocean broadcast of the above AP release and cancellation at 0150B, 4th June 44. Request immediate confirmation of broadcast news in the U.S. together with comments and recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Request immediate acknowledgement receipt of this message.

End

Footnote: Acknowledgement of receipt of this message was made by WDCMC at 0526Z.

ACTION: General Bissell

INFO: CC/S, General Arnold, General Handy, Colonel Park,
General Surles, Log

CM-IN-2647 (4 June 44) 0526Z Des

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-2-78
BY RT, DATE DEC 10 1973

22

COPY No.

1 June 1944

Summary of Statement to the Press by Mr. Stimson, 1 June 1944.

With 3,657,00* Army troops now overseas, "the period of decisive action is at hand."

Build-up of troops has followed over-all strategy laid down by JCS:

- (1) Initial shipments were to prevent further enemy expansion.
- (2) Means were then shipped to eliminate outer defenses and prepare bases for final phase of decisive action.
- (3) Hence Air Force and Service Force build-up came first and is now on decline after reaching its peak.
- (4) Final phase depends on Ground Forces, whose movement overseas will increase. "Increasing numbers of ground forces in England are now waiting to engage in battle."

Statistics.

Men overseas by end of this year - 5,000,000, or 2/3 strength.

Almost half of 2,357,000 Air Force strength now overseas.

More than half of 34,000 AAF combat planes overseas out of total of more than 75,000 planes.

AAF bases overseas - 925.

U.S. Forces overseas now exceed by 1,571,000 peak strength AEF, World War I.

Only 1,466,000, or 21% strength overseas year ago.

4,000,000 tons Army cargo shipped in May, 1944, nearly twice that a year ago same month.

* Figure checks closely with Status Report, dated 25 May 1944.

RP

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

May 29, 1944

To : Chiefs of Staff
Rptd : A.F.H.Q. for General Rooks J.S.M. Washington
for U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
From : A.F.H.Q. Adv. C.P. (Signed Wilson)
MEDC08 114

Following is text of on the record press conference which it is proposed General Alexander should hold at selected moment within the next few days.

BEGINS:

1. Heavy fighting on both the Fifth and Eighth Army Fronts has now been in progress since the night of 11th May and great victories have been achieved but this is not a new battle, rather it is in continuation of the operations which began in January. It is another step in the campaign for the capture of Rome and another nail in the German armed forces in Italy.

2. You will remember that when I spoke to you some time ago about the landing at Anzio, I said that all amphibious operations went through three phases: first, the establishment of a bridgehead; second, the defeat of the enemy's counterattacks; and, finally, the renewal of the offensive and the exploitation of success. You have seen all three phases at Anzio which has only differed from other successful amphibious operations by the time which elapsed between second and final phases. We are now reaping the advantage of the skill and daring of the Anzio landing and the valour and determination shown by the Allied troops in beating off the many fierce counter-attacks launched by the enemy.

3. My plan in the present battle was designed first of all to take advantage of the situation into which the enemy had

CM-IT-23052

(30 May '44)

DECLASSIFIED
BY MEMO. 11722
DATE 10 DEC 1973

Cal. Park
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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

MEMOOS 114

Page 2

been manoeuvred by the Anzio landing and by the heavy winter fighting on the Cassino and Garigliano fronts to destroy the right wing of the 10th German Army by pincer movement between the main front and the bridgehead and then to drive what remained and the 14th German Army north of Yugoslavia. You have seen for yourselves to what extent this plan has so far been successful.

4. No plan for landing operations can ever be completed unless it takes full account of the air situation and is framed in such a way as to take every advantage of the air support available. Throughout April and early May the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force supported by the 15th American Air Force attacked the enemy's rail and road communications interfering with his supply system and so reducing his fighting capacity. Since the battle began those operations have been coupled with relentless air attacks on gun positions, troop concentrations, road communications and convoys in the battle area. Throughout the fighting the co-operation between land and air forces has been excellent.

5. Co-operation between the two armies has been of the same high order. The regrouping of the armies to produce the offensive mass required to break the Gustav and Hitler lines on the narrow front between mountains and sea was no mean feat. It called for the very highest standard of goodwill and that has always been forthcoming. So too since fighting began everywhere I see evidence of that wonderful spirit of give and take which pervades the whole of the Allied Armies in Italy. The 5th and 8th Armies are two of the finest fighting machines the world has ever seen and they fight together as one. I am immensely proud of them both and of the fine spirit of comradeship and high sense of common duty which they share with the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force.

OM-IN-23052

(30 May 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE DEC 10 1973

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

MEDCOCS 114

Page 3

6. The Allied Navies have given every assistance to land operations. By their courage and skill they have not only maintained our armies in the Anzio Bridgehead since landing but have built up the large reserves of supplies and ammunition needed for the battle that is now raging. Bombarding by warships has also been a great help in repelling attacks on bridgehead and in support of land forces operating in coastal area in this offensive.

7. The Germans are still very strongly entrenched in the fortress of Europe. In this war we have got to dig them out and destroy the German armed forces. That means fighting, hard and bitter fighting. However good the plan, however well it may be prepared, once the battle is joined it can only be won by dogged determined fighting. We have made a good start. We have destroyed blank German divisions and severely mauled blank more. We have captured blank prisoners. But there is much to be done and the Allied Armies in Italy will go on raining blow after blow on the enemy. We shall go on digging them out and destroying them till our duty is done.

(Cabinet ?) request that approval be given at earliest possible moment.

T.O.O. 291510Z

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
SGS
Adm King
Col Park
LOG

CM-IN-23052

(30 May 44)

1517Z hrt

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE DEC 10 1973

34

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMNAVEU		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION CHIEF CABLE CENSOR	PRIORITY
DATE 24 MAY 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODER ROOM 1706			DEFERRED
DECODED BY SJOSTEN		FOR INFORMATION DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) OSD letter, May 3, 1972 By RHP , NARS Date DEC 10 1973	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY GIBSON			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY KNIGHT			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 1 OF 2		241607	NCR 278

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

CHIEF CABLE CENSOR FROM COMNAVEU - FOR PRICE FROM PATTERSON. [REDACTED]

ADMIRAL THOMSON ADVISES FOLLOWING PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL LETTER HAS BEEN ISSUED TODAY TO THE BRITISH PRESS:

"IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVASION THERE IS TO BE AN ADDITIONAL BBC PROGRAM FOR THE FORCES. PLEASE ON SECURITY GROUNDS MAKE NO REFERENCE WHATEVER TO THIS." ADMIRAL THOMSON ASKS YOU TO APPRECIATE THAT THE NEW PROGRAM WILL BE A JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN AFFAIR AND THAT THE PREPARATIONS FOR IT NOW BEING MADE ARE KNOWN IN CERTAIN QUARTERS IN THE USA. ALSO THAT IF THE ENEMY HAS THIS INFORMATION HE CAN MAKE USE OF OTHER KNOWLEDGE WHICH HE NOW MUST HAVE ABOUT CERTAIN BBC

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

000.7

TOP SECRET

AL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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DATE 24 MAY 1944			3
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DECODED BY			6
PARAPHRASED BY			7
ROUTED BY			8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			9
PAGE 2 OF 2 241607 NCR 273			10
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS. TOGETHER THEY WOULD PROVIDE
HIM WITH INFORMATION OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. IT IS
REQUESTED THEREFORE THAT YOU WILL ISSUE A SIMILAR
DIRECTIVE TO UNITED STATES EDITORS.

NRP/8

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) at (B)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NABS Date **DEC 10 1973**

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

CHIEF CABLE CENSOR (#1)....ACT
ADD NAVAIDE (#2).... (PER OP20)

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED**SECRET**

Make original only. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 2..

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

From: CG U S. Forces in the European Theater of
Operations London, England

To: War Department

No. E28401 18 May 1944

From Conrad signed Eisenhower ref No. E 28401 for
Joint Chiefs of Staff reur WAR 34261/9 avc-3998.

Proposed plan of Mr. Byron Price to Joint Chiefs of
Staff discussed and approved by all concerned this theater
as follows.

All service mail of United States forces including
V mail and parcels destined for the continental United
States will be subjected forthwith to an artificial delay
of 10 days, to be effected in the United States. All
APO traffic from United Kingdom to western hemisphere,
outside of continental United States, to be delayed at

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 2, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-13724 (18 May 44)

*Colonel
Park*

000.7

COPY NO. 62

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: CG U. S. Forces in the European Theater of
Operations London, England

No. E 28401

18 May 1944

Page 2

source. APO mail to Africa and Middle East not delayed.
This conforms exactly with British policy.

Discontinuance of transmission by cable or radio
of Expeditionary Force messages has already been accom-
plished. Senders composition messages 100 per cent base
censored and since no delay imposed on similar type civilian
traffic it is not deemed necessary to discontinue their
transmission.

Practice of passing through military censorship by
means of press dispatches of personal messages from
soldiers or sailors overseas will be stopped immediately.

Practice of permitting military personal overseas

CM-IN-13724 (18 May 44)

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NAHS Date DEC 10 1973

COPY NO.

62

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ANTON 122

RECORDED

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
MAY DELIVERED

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE


P R I O R I T Y

From: CG U.S. Forces in the European Theater of
Operations London, England

No. E 28401

18 May 1944

Page 3

to appear on exchange international broadcasts and send
personal messages over the air will be prohibited
effective immediately.

No Sig.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)

ORD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

ACTION: JC/S

INFORMATION: CGAAP, OFD, G-2, Adm. King, Col. Park, BPR, Log

CH-IN-13724 (18 May 44) 1946Z jb/ejv


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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

To : War Department.
CG, U.S. Forces in the European Theater of
Operations, London, England.

No : Unnumbered. 12 May 1944.

[REDACTED] Hall PWB to OWI AGWAR and OWI PWE USFOR
signed Wilson cite FHPWO ALWAE 12917.

There follows special directive on military developments in Italy. "The new Allied push must be reported factually following the information provided in the communiques. We should use Correspondents stories describing the fighting and emphasizing the aggressive spirit and confidence of the United Nations Armies. We must however avoid all speculation both as to the outcome and the strategic objectives of the operation. We must avoid presenting it as the battle for Rome or as an attempt to close the bridgehead. This means that both in our news presentation and in our military commentaries the offensive should not be dramatized. No invidious comparison to be made between the 8th and 5th Armies and the FEC.

Special attention Italian radio broadcasts:

1. Background.

We appreciate that resistance groups in Italy can only function for a short space of time unless conditions are really favorable and unless dramatic news can be given them to encourage their efforts.

CM-IN-9054 (12 May 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-8-72
BY RT. DATE DEC 10 1973

Col Park

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
[REDACTED]

Page 2

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

To : Unnumbered. 12 May 1944.

2. Directive.

We use every direct and indirect means to restrain resistance groups until substantial success has been achieved by the operation which shows that the battle is swinging in our favor. This period of waiting depends upon the course of military events and a new directive will be given when and if the time comes for us to incite the resistance groups to a supreme effort. It is most important that the above directive be scrupulously observed.

No Sig.

ACTION: Gen Bissell (OWI)

INFORMATION: CC/S
Gen Arnold
OPD
SGS
Col Park
Gen Surles
LOG

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JCS LETTER, 7-8-72
BY RT, DATE DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-9054 (12 May 44) 1959Z mmd
[REDACTED]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

MAY 12, 1944
No. 168

**FUTURE RELEASE
NOTE DATE**

RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION AT 11:00 A.M., E.W.T.,
FRIDAY, MAY 12, 1944. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY
PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.

TEXT OF DECLARATION BY THE AMERICAN, BRITISH AND
SOVIET GOVERNMENTS REGARDING THE FOUR AXIS
SATELLITES -- HUNGARY, RUMANIA, BULGARIA AND FINLAND

Through the fateful policy of their leaders, the people of Hungary are suffering the humiliation of German occupation. Rumania is still bound to the Nazis in a war now bringing devastation to its own people. The Governments of Bulgaria and Finland have placed their countries in the service of Germany and remain in the war at Germany's side.

The Governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States think it right that these peoples should realize the following facts:

1. The Axis satellites, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland, despite their realization of the inevitability of a crushing Nazi defeat and their desire to get out of the war are by their present policies and attitudes contributing materially to the strength of the German war machine.
2. These nations still have it within their power, by withdrawing from the war and ceasing their collaboration with Germany and by resisting the forces of Nazism by every possible means, to shorten the European struggle, diminish their own ultimate sacrifices and contribute to the Allied victory.
3. While these nations cannot escape their responsibility for having participated in the war at the side of Nazi Germany, the longer they continue at war in collaboration with Germany the more disastrous will be the consequences to them and the more rigorous will be the terms which will be imposed upon them.
4. These nations must therefore decide now whether they intend to persist in their present hopeless and calamitous policy of opposing the inevitable Allied victory, while there is yet time for them to contribute to that victory.

* * *

000.7

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Deal with press handling current drive in Italy

[REDACTED]
P R I O R I T Y

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

To: War Department

No. F 44250, 11 May 1944

F 44250 to AGWAR for Surles and OW * to Troopers
for D * to USFOR for PWE from Wilson cite PHINC.

To Public Relations Officers and Censors in
connection with Spring Campaign.

1. The Commander in Chief AAI attaches very considerable importance to the correct representation to the public by the press and the news services generally of the operations about to be undertaken in Italy. A correct representation will raise morale and facilitate success whereas the reverse may easily damage morale and the present excellent relationship which exists between American and British Troops.

2. The Commander in Chief AAI realizes that after a period of scanty news from the battle fronts in Europe that the opening of the battle in Italy may be seized upon by the press to fill the headlines without guidance from the start, unwise statements may appear and there may be a tendency to magnify early successes and anticipate events without building up in the minds of the public a true picture of the problem that confronts the Allied Armies in Italy. It would be most unfortunate if these had to be corrected later.

3. It is thought therefore, that the following guidance for all those responsible for briefing correspondents no matter how far removed from the battlefield, will be useful and will help the press and news services to keep in line with realities.

4. When the news of the opening of the battle is first released, stress should be laid on the magnitude of the task without anticipating either the early junction with the bridgehead and still less the early capture of

CN-IN-8287 (11 May 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

by RHP, NLR, Date COPY MIA

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3 1974

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page #2

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No. F 44250, 11 May 1944

Rome.

5. The attack should be presented as an attack against the Gustav Line and publicity should be given to the natural strength of this position which has been increased by concrete and field works for many months throughout the winter. Particulars of the Gustav Line will be given in on record.

6. The Gustav Line is considered to be the strongest line across Italy and represents the outer defense of Hitler's European Fortress in this Theater.

7. Behind the Gustav Line there is another very strong natural defensive position which the German military engineers have prepared for months past and strengthened to their utmost. To this line Hitler has given his name. It is considered that Hitler would not have given his name to such a line if he did not think that it was almost impregnable, as nothing would be so damaging to German morale as the breaking of the line which bears the Fuhrer's name. German troops will no doubt be ordered to hold the Hitler Line to the last man.

8. Even behind the Hitler Line the mountains which flank the road to Rome lend themselves to magnificent defensive positions and it is more than probable that even after the Hitler Line has fallen, one if not more fierce battles will be necessary before the Tiber is reached. The crossing of the Tiber against opposition will also be a most formidable task.

9. The Allied Armies in Italy are fully conscious of the magnitude of their task and that they are about to contribute greatly to the overall plan in the coming assault on the Fortress of Germany. It is as well, therefore, if the public have as clear a picture of the problem as they

CM-IN-8287 (11 May 44)

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By RHP, NLR, COPY NO.

3 MAY 1974
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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page #3

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No. F 44250, 11 May 1944

do themselves. No one in Italy expects to give the world news of spectacular advances as was the case in the North African Campaign. They do, however, expect to give the news after heavy fighting, of the breaking of successive defensive positions in Italy into the German Fortress. Progress must, by the nature of the country, be slow. It must be judged not in terms of miles, but by defense lines broken, strong points captured and the destruction of German soldiers and equipment which will be needed to man the successive defense lines in the rear.

10. As soon as the battle starts news will be available of the regrouping of the Armies in Italy which has taken place during the last 2 months in order to assemble our forces and to accumulate reserves for the battle. * , envisaged months ago, has been executed in a most skillful manner and completed without any enemy interference. No news of this could be released at the time for security reasons but the rather uneventful news from Italy has covered a period of intense military activity behind our lines. Publicity should therefore, be given to this and all the difficulties of the winter climate with snow, mud and rain which seriously interfered with movement and entailed considerable hardships on all the troops involved, should be recalled. In writing up this aspect the greatest care must however be taken to avoid disclosing or even indicating the present strength of the Armies in terms of Divisions or numbers of any kind.

11. The relationships between the 5th American Army and the 8th British Army are extremely good on all levels. Mutual confidence in each other's ability has been built up. This mutual confidence is probably the greatest asset we have in winning the War. What has been

CM-IN-8287 (11 May 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

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Page #4

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No. F 44250, 11 May 1944

achieved among Allies in Italy in this respect should be given publicity as an example which savours well for equal success on all other fronts. The Allied cause would be very seriously damaged if there were any unfavourable comparisons drawn between previous failures against certain sectors of the Gustav Line in less strength under winter conditions by one army and success in the same sector by another army under totally different conditions.

12. The enemy is fully conscious of his exposed flanks and may well be apprehensive of another sea or airborne landing to prevent his withdrawal when the time comes.

The press must, therefore, assist by not speculating as to the way this campaign will be fought, they must not attempt to forecast our future possible objectives or prejudge our prospects of success. These points are of the very greatest importance at all stages of the coming campaign.

13. To sum up, therefore, the following Do's and Don'ts apply:

Do's:

Portray a clear picture of the successive enemy defense lines.

Build up in the minds of the public the strength of each as they are approached upon which guidance will be given.

As each one is broken, proclaim it as a success as opening the way not to Rome or some more distant objective but to the next line of the fortress which is not many miles behind.

CM-IN-8287 (11 May 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

Page #5

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No. F 44250, 11 May 1944

The strength of the Hitler Line could well be magnified and in any case shown as greater than that of the Gustav Line.

The breaking of this line can then be used by us as great propaganda value to the enemy.

Don'ts:

Don't compare this Summer Campaign with desert warfare which almost always resulted in a spectacular advance after a successful battle before the enemy could stabilize again a long distance to his rear.

Don't expect a large number of prisoners to be taken as this country is unsuited to quick maneuver which alone results in the capture of much men and material.

Don't draw comparisons between success now and previous failures.

Don't speculate on the future conduct of the campaign.

Don't measure success in terms of some distant objective.

Don't magnify early successes. Play * the opening stages and as each successive line is broken proclaim the success in crescendo.

* Being Serviced.

No Sig.

ACTION: Gen Surles

INFO : Gen Handy, Gen Bissell for OWI, SGS, Log

CM-IN-8287 (11 May 44) 2015Z jb

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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Joint Chiefs of Staff
71469

May 9, 1944

Commanding General
USAF in European Theater of Operations
London, England

Number WAR 34281

To Eisenhower for action from Joint Chiefs of Staff

Security measures for impending operations is subject of this dispatch which please pass to Commander U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

The director of censorship, Mr. Byron Price, has suggested to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the following be urgently accomplished to eliminate dangers to security:

(A) Arbitrary delay at the source for at least 10 days of all mail including V-mail from Allied Military Personnel in U.K. to western hemisphere excluding U.S. To points in eastern hemisphere outside U.K. such mail would be delayed for 30 days. For mail addressed to U.S. the delay to be effected in the U.S. by Army and Navy Postal Services and from date you designate.

(B) Discontinuance of transmission by cable or radio in either direction of Expeditionary Force (fixed-text) messages (EFM) and senders composition message.

(C) Ending practice of passing through Military censorship by means of press dispatches of personal messages from soldiers or sailors overseas.

(D) Discontinuance of practice of permitting Military Personnel overseas to appear on Exchange International Broadcasts and send personal messages over the air

Joint Security Control recommends approval of these measures.

CM-OUT-34281

(9 May 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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Message No WAR 34281

Page 2.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff realize the seriousness of this situation, forward the suggestions of Mr. Price, and authorize such action as you deem appropriate. It is urgent that you give us your comments and advise us of action taken so that we may inform Mr. Price.

ORIGINATOR: JC/S

INFORMATION: General Arnold
OPD
General Bissell
Admiral King
Colonel Park
General Surles
LOG

CM-OUT-34281 (9 May 44) 2155Z mw

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

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ROUTINE

NCR 6890

FROM: STATE DEPARTMENT

TO: CNO

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date **DEC 10 1973**

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM LONDON DATED APRIL 24 1944

REC'D 855 PM

3362 24TH

ADMIRAL KING'S REPORT TO SECRETARY OF NAVY IS WIDELY REPORTED IN LONDON PRESS TODAY. ARTICLE BY NAVAL CORRESPONDENT OF TIMES REFERRING TO ADMIRAL KING'S CHAPTER ON ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF TRANSPIRIT THROUGHOUT ALL ARMS AND SERVICES IN CURRENT OPERATIONS, DECLARES THAT THIS IS INDEED DOMINANT NOTE OF HIS WHOLE REPORT, AND THAT "IT IS EVIDENT THAT IN THE VITAL PROVINCE OF INTEGRATION OF THE SEPARATE SERVICES, THE U.S. FORCES HAVE MADE PROGRESS WHICH COULD WITH ADVANTAGE BE EMULATED BY THEIR ALLIES." EDITORIAL IN DAILY SKETCH ASSERTS THAT ADMIRAL KING, IN HIS WAR PROGRESS REPORT, HAS PROVIDED ANOTHER BLOW TO THE ENEMY. CALLING HIS NARRATIVE "BOTH REMARKABLE AND ILLUMINATING" EDITORIAL STATES THAT "WE SHOULD BE UNGRACIOUS IF WE DID NOT PAY THE HIGHEST TRIBUTE, AS A SEAFARING NATION OURSELVES, TO THE MAGNIFICENT ACHIEVEMENT OF THE U.S."

(SIGNED) WIDMANN

DIST BY LT WIDMANN

STATE FILE 000.7

COINTEL...COG ADD: 16...NAVAIDE...00R... (PER 19)

01...CSD...230P... TCR TCR 3646/25

Copy to President via pouch.

Copy held in Maps Room

① Admin Low ^{Navy} 5945

② Comdr Campbell 61814

③ Duty Officer 2291

ADDRESS BY
REAR ADMIRAL FRANCIS S. LOW, U.S.N.
CHIEF OF STAFF TENTH FLEET
BEFORE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS

22 APRIL 1944

WASHINGTON, D. C.

0007

ADMIRAL LOW:

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am deeply honored by the opportunity to present to such a distinguished body of leaders of the American Press certain features of the status of the anti-U-boat war today.

Those of us charged with carrying on the fight against the U-boat have had to do our best to appear before the public only as "the little man who wasn't there." In our few and unavoidable contacts with the Press, we have found it to be in the National interest to give the impression that we were strange and curious individuals whose vocabulary consisted of only one word -- and that word was "no."

On this occasion I wish to correct that impression, at least partially, by saying "yes" to a few of the many questions that have been put to us and that I know must be in your minds.

This does not mean a change in policy as to security requirements. It does imply that we are now in a better position as to the German U-boat menace than at any time since the beginning of this war -- and that our position is not deteriorating.

Let us go back one year from this date. On April 22nd, 1943, exactly one year ago, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox made this statement:

"The Nazis are now using every submarine they have or can build in an effort to cripple our striking power before it can be aimed at their throat. We accept that submarine challenge; and, in accepting it, we are confident of victory. Therefore, this is in effect a warning to the officers and men of the Nazi submarines that each combat voyage they undertake will be more dangerous than the last. This is an honest warning to the crews of German U-boats that, each time they go out, there will be a sharply-increasing likelihood that they will not come back."

Perhaps these might have seemed to be strong words, particularly at a time when United Nations merchant ships were being sent to the bottom by the tens and by the score.

But, on April 28th, 1943, Admiral King, Commander in Chief, made the flat statement that the German submarine menace would be under control within from four to six months. As many of you may know, Admiral King does not use words lightly.

The thought that both the Secretary and Admiral King intended to convey to the American public was their conviction that the United States Navy could, and would, deliver the goods. This feeling was largely based on their knowledge that the tools needed to do the job -- in the shape of escorts, carriers and planes -- were being delivered. They knew that the officers and crews to man these ships and planes were already in uniform and were being intensively trained.

The ships were launched and commissioned. The planes were built and delivered. The weapons were tested, loaded and ready.

One might conclude that this was the simple answer to anti-submarine warfare -- enough ships and enough planes and enough men. It would be far more pleasant if that were so.

The tools and the personnel to operate ships and planes, however, are only the beginning. There must follow the constant, untiring and unglamorous grind of specialized instruction in a special kind of warfare. This specialized training is not completed until each officer and man knows his duty and how to carry it out almost, if not in fact, by instinct. This training is not completed until the ships, the planes, the weapons and the men are functioning in action as single units, smooth-working teams.

Once these teams finally get into action -- equipped with the best weapons that science can offer -- their component members expect to kill every U-boat that they contact. They have developed a fighting spirit and a determination that refuses to admit of any other possibility. That is the stage toward which our people were developing in the Spring of 1943 -- that is the stage they have reached today. Of course we do not kill every U-boat we contact; but those we contact but don't kill are likely to limp home badly bruised.

The German U-boat today is sinking considerably less than one-half of one per cent of the ships being convoyed across the Atlantic by the Navies of the United Nations.

We felt that we had achieved some measure of success when we raised our score to the point where we were sinking one U-boat for each Allied merchant ship we lost. In our parlance, this is called "the exchange rate." Today our exchange rate and our score is even better. According to the latest figures, the Germans are now losing a ratio of more than one U-boat for each Allied merchant vessel they sink. How long Hitler can keep up this suicidal type of warfare -- only Hitler seems to know. At least he knows his U-boat losses, although he cannot be certain of our merchant losses; and it should be obvious by this time that the flow of men, weapons and supplies across the Atlantic has not been stopped.

The average combat life of a German submarine today is far less than it was a year ago. In fact we believe that it takes the Germans two or three times as long to build a submarine as that vessel may expect to endure on combat patrol. Such a rate of attrition, it hardly need be added, is not conducive to winning wars and influencing neutrals. And I take pleasure in emphasizing that this comparison bears no relation to our own submarine losses.

There is the possibility, of course, that the Nazis are holding vast numbers of submarines in reserve. There is the possibility that these U-boats will be used in whatever final all-out effort in the Atlantic they consider will best serve in their own defense. We accept these possibilities, just as we accept the

certainty that the Nazis will continue to develop new inventions for use in their underwater warfare.

We can only say that, as far as forethought, effort and planning can extend, we shall do our best to be ready for either or for both.

During 1943 and 1944 we shall have built more than one hundred carriers of all types -- and aircraft carriers, especially the smaller types, have proved extremely useful in the war against the U-boat.

During 1943 and 1944 we shall have built well over two hundred hard-hitting, new-type destroyers.

During 1943 and 1944 we shall have built well over six hundred destroyer escorts.

You may well ask why there is still so much secrecy and security involved with relation to the entire anti-submarine question.

The answer is very simple.

Detailed, published information as to anti-submarine warfare is a two-edged sword. It is no secret to the Germans that their U-boat warfare has degenerated from a major offensive weapon to merely a controlled menace.

A typical point, however, is that in January Hitler attributed our anti-submarine successes to a secret weapon. Modern warfare, as you know, is a race of new weapon and counter-weapon in which we are aided by the best scientific minds in the country.

It should be plainly evident, therefore, that one authentic and specific word about our weapons very easily could give our enemies invaluable knowledge. And if the Germans were to learn specifically how we are sinking their submarines, there is every reason to believe that this knowledge would be turned against our anti-submarine forces and our merchant shipping. I am confident that not one of you here is willing to see this happen. I am confident that you will be eager to withhold information about our success in the anti-submarine field, when such information would endanger the lives of Americans who are responsible for that success and of those whom they are protecting.

I know that many of you think that we in the Navy seem to lean over backwards in matters of security as to anti-submarine warfare. We are not trying to deprive you or the public of legitimate information. We are trying, and trying desperately, to prevent the possibility of a leak -- however innocent a single morsel of information might seem -- that would aid the enemy and thus endanger the lives of our own people or reduce the effectiveness of their efforts.

Not long ago the news did leak out that the Germans were using an acoustic torpedo, an explosive device which tracks a vessel by the noises generated by the target ship. Both we and the British were aware of this possibility (the thought is as old as the hills) and we knew what to do about it. But we would have preferred to have the Nazis continue the use of this torpedo in ignorance, long after we had learned to counteract its effectiveness. Instead, the Germans quickly found out that they would have to try something else. And we, in turn, shall have to try our best to counter whatever new weapon they may bring out to take the place of the one which did not live up to their expectation.

It appears to be no secret that there is to be another front. Inevitably, part of the counter to that effort will be an intensified U-boat campaign. They will probably throw the book at us. We are prepared to strike back by also using the book -- or, if necessary, by throwing the book away. And while it appears quite certain that there may be heavy attrition on each side, we are confident that when it is all over the U-boats will still be under control -- and many of them under the sea.

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
~~SECRET~~

AC/AS, Intelligence Deputy
WCB/esa 4738

April 18, 1944

Commander in Chief
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number WAR 24639

For Eisenhower signed Arnold.

Summary of a Tokyo broadcast to Japanese home and empire, April 16 follows: Broadcast analyzes British and American Air Force operations as falling into 3 preinvasion stages. First phase indiscriminate bombing against important cities in the German mainland, second phase bombing of munition factories and challenging German Air Force to fight, third phase bombing of important rear supply points in vicinity of proposed landing places (This last is begun about a month before actual landing operations and increases in intensity) recent attacks by fighter sweeps on 9 and 15 April are considered significant. Estimated that the second stage is completed and third stage is in initial stage. Indicates that time for landing operations in European continent near. Predicted that this time might be within 1 month.

1708

ORIGINATOR: CG AAF
INFORMATION: OPD
G-2
Log

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and (D) or (S)
OSD letter, May 2, 1974
DEC 10 1973
By RHP, NARS Date

CM-OUT-24639 (18 Apr 44) 1717Z lee

*White
Horse*

38

000.7

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: US MA London, England
To: War Department
No. 12584, 12 April 1944
Serial nr 12584.

Favorable reaction here to Halls speech on foreign policy. Times Tuesday devotes leading editorial to address and diplomatic correspondent in another article comments approvingly on parts dealing with France and neutral countries. Times diplomatic correspondent probably reflects views of foreign office. Manchester Guardian also devotes leading editorial to speech commending Halls realistic and practical approach. Communist Daily Worker applauds Halls emphasis on 4 power cooperation but thinks attitude toward French National Committee still too cautious.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF
OPD
Col Park

CM-IN-8406 (12 Apr 44) 1533Z bjm

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (G)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

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40
COPY NO.

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

U R G E N T

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers

To: War Department
CG US Forces in the European Theater of Operations
London, England

No. F27897, 5 April 1944

F27897 Top Sec to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated to UNITY London and Hq MAAF for information from Freedom signed Wilson cite PHDSC.

1. I am much disturbed by a press report reproduced here today which is based on an Associated Press dispatch from Kansas City on 3 April.

2. Agency quotes Major General A D Surles US Army Public Relations Director as sending following reply to letter from Roy A Roberts, President of American Society of Newspaper Editors, and managing editor of Kansas City Star. This is MAF number 663. "News of the incident involving Lieutenant General George S Patton Jr was delayed because that General was to be used in a cover plan following his operations in Sicily. In view of that, the Theatre Commander was extremely desirous that his reputation should not be impaired by a wide discussion of the soldier-slapping incident".

3. This highly undesirable publicity exposes a ruse successfully employed in the cover plan for SHINGLE and puts the enemy on his guard against similar measures we may wish to use. The exposure comes also at a time when our deception machinery is being called upon for a maximum effort to assist OVERLORD.

CM-IN-3392 (5 Apr 44)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

000.7
FAN-NAF

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29

24-75724ABCD-25H

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers

No. F27897, 5 April 1944

4. I would request that all possible steps be taken not only to prevent recurrence of similar exposure of most secret matter but also to prevent General Surles statement giving rise to further press speculation on our use of deception. This latter aspect is to my mind of the greatest importance.

No Sig

ACTION: CCS

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Gen Surles
C of S

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-3392 (5 Apr 44) 1836Z mes

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

*President saw
30 Mar / 44
per Adm Brown*

P R I O R I T Y

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces London, England

To: War Department

Number S-50060, 27 March 1944

Personal from Eisenhower to General Marshall for
Eyes Only. S-50060.

For the second or third time I have noticed stories apparently originated by a man named Fertinax in the United States to the effect that I have either directly or indirectly criticized proposed instructions of the President involving dealings with the French. While I know that so far as you are concerned I do not have to deny any such absurd allegation, I still think it most unfortunate that any newspaper can be allowed to insinuate that Commanders in the field are tacitly insubordinate. It is probable that nothing at all can be done about such things, but after working for 2 solid years as hard as I know how for the development of the spirit and unification and complete teamplay, it is disappointing to think that any single individual in the whole United States could be led to believe that I would myself be guilty of even a whisper of insubordination. Whenever I might consider that any proposed instructions from higher authority are based upon misconception of fact I would naturally feel free to present my case to you or to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in

CM-IN-19332 (27 Mar 44)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

Col. Park

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White House

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces London, England
To: War Department
Number S-50060, 27 March 1944

the proper manner, but if I or any of my staff were guilty of direct or indirect criticism of the kind indicated in these stories I would personally relieve the offender from duty and would expect to have the same fate dealt out to me.

No Sig

ACTION: SGS

INFO : Gen Handy
Gen Surles
C of S

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-19332 (27 Mar 44) 1835Z jb

COPY No. 15

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FOUO A174

BULLETIN

LONDON IN ENGLISH AT 4:00 PM TO THE WORLD

3/26/44

(CHURCHILL SPEECH)

I HOPE YOU WILL NOT IMAGINE I AM GOING TO TRY TO MAKE YOU ANY EXTRAORDINARY ANNOUNCEMENT AND TELL YOU EXACTLY HOW ALL PROBLEMS ARE TO BE SOLVED. I ONLY HOPED YOU WOULD LIKE TO HEAR HOW WE ARE GETTING ON AND TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR KINDNESS IN SPITE OF MY SHORTCOMINGS.

IT IS A YEAR ALMOST TO THE DAY SINCE I SPOKE TO YOU. THIS HAS BEEN A TIME OF DISAPPOINTMENTS AND SUCCESSES BUT THE GOOD NEWS OUTWEIGHED THE BAD AND PROGRESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TOWARD THEIR GOAL HAS BEEN SOLID, CONTINUAL AND GROWING QUICKER.

WE CAN SAY WITH HOPE AND REASON THAT WE SHALL REACH THE END IN GOOD ORDER AND THAT THE TRAGEDY WHICH THREATENED THE WORLD AND MIGHT HAVE LEFT OUR DESCENDANTS IN DARKNESS AND BONDAGE WILL NOT COME TO PASS. HE IS A RASH MAN WHO TRIES TO PROPHECY WHEN, NOW OR UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS VICTORY WILL COME; BUT COME IT WILL.

IT IS CERTAIN THAT UNITY OF AIMS AND ACTION AND SINGLENESS OF PURPOSE AMONG US ALL WILL MAKE IT COME SOONER.

A YEAR AGO THE 8TH ARMY WHICH MARCHED 1,500 MILES ACROSS THE DESERT WAS IN BATTLE FOR THE MARETH LINE. THE 1ST BRITISH AND AMERICAN ARMIES WERE BEATING THEIR WAY TO TUNISIA.

WE WERE CONFIDENT OF VICTORY BUT DID NOT KNOW THAT IN LESS THAN TWO MONTHS THE ENEMY WOULD BE DRIVEN FROM AFRICA, LEAVING AT ONE STROKE 325,000 PRISONERS AND DEAD.

SINCE THEN THE SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN IN SICILY BROUGHT ABOUT THE FALL OF MUSSOLINI AND REPUDIATION OF FASCISM BY THE ITALIANS. MUSSOLINI INDEED ESCAPED. TO EAT THE BREAD OF AFFLICTION AT HITLER'S TABLE, TO HELP THE GERMANS REAK VENGEANCE ON THE ITALIAN MASSES OVER WHOM HE RULED FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS.

THIS FATE AND JUDGMENT, MORE TERRIBLE THAN DEATH, HAS OVERTAKEN THE DICTATOR. WHO STABBED FRANCE IN THE BACK, WHO THOUGHT HIS CRIME HAD GAINED HIM THE EMPIRE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN.

THE CONQUEST OF SICILY AND NAPLES BROUGHT IN THEIR TRAIN THE LIBERATION OF SARDINIA AND CORSICA. WE NOW HOLD ONE THIRD OF THE WHOLE OF ITALY.

OUR CAMPAIGN WAS NOT AS RAPID OR AS DECISIVE AS WE HAD HOPED. WE SHALL BE VICTORS BOTH AT ANZIO AND ON THE MAIN FRONT TO THE SOUTH AND ROME WILL BE RESCUED.

MEANWHILE, WE HAVE SWEEPED OUT OF THE STRUGGLE 66 ITALIAN DIVISIONS AND ARE HOLDING IN ITALY IN CLOSE ACTION NEARLY 25 DIVISIONS AND A NOTEWORTHY PART OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE. OTHER EVEN MORE IMPORTANT EVENTS WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE THEIR PRESENCE ARE IMPENDING ELSEWHERE.

WE HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED IN THE AEGEAN AND ITS ISLANDS, WHICH WE HAVE NOT DOMINATED, BUT THESE SETBACKS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ARE MORE THAN OFFSET BY PANIC IN HUNGARY, RUMANIA AND BULGARIA BY CONTINUED ACTIVITY OF GREEK GUERRILLAS AND BY THE HEROIC STRUGGLES IN YUGOSLAVIA UNDER TITO.

IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST WE HAVE CERTAINLY TRAVELLED A LONG WAY FROM THOSE AUTUMN DAYS OF 1940 WHEN WE STOOD SLONE, WHEN MUSSOLINI WAS INVADING EGYPT, WHEN WE WERE DRIVEN OUT OF SOMALILAND, WHEN ETHIOPIA WAS IN ITALIAN CHAINS AND WE WONDERED IF WE COULD DEFEND BRITISH EAST AFRICA.

THERE IS MUCH STILL TO BE DONE BUT I DO NOT DOUBT THE TASK WILL BE FINISHED IN A WORKMANLIKE MANNER.

WE IN THE BRITISH ISLES MUST CELEBRATE THE DELIVERANCE FROM THE SUBMARINE PERIL. THERE WERE OTHER DELIVERANCES. THERE WAS THE SEAWORTHY PERIL, WHICH HAS BEEN MASTERED BY SUPERIOR SCIENCE AND INGENUITY AND DEVOTION TO DUTY OF MINESWEEPER CREWS AND THOUSANDS OF SHIPS. WE HAVE BEEN DELIVERED FROM THE HORROR OF INVASION, WHEN ALMOST UNARMED. WE HAVE BEEN DELIVERED FROM THE AIR FURY. NOW THE TABLES ARE TURNED. WE HAD A LARGE AIR FORCE LAST YEAR; WE HAVE A LARGER ONE TODAY. BESIDES THAT, OUR AMERICAN ALLIES HAVE OUTNUMBERED US IN THE AIR FORCE HERE. THE COMBINATION IN BROTHERHOOD OF THESE TWO FORCES, AIDED AS IT WILL BE BY ANOTHER IN ITALY ALMOST AS LARGE, WHICH IS NOW ESTABLISHED THERE, WILL PRODUCE RESULTS IN THE COMING MONTHS WHICH WILL BE OF ENORMOUS ADVANTAGE TO THE ALLIED CAUSE. NOT ONLY HAVE THE AMERICANS THIS PREPONDERANCE IN NUMBER BUT ALSO BY SHARING ALL OUR SECRETS WITH ONE ANOTHER WE HAVE WON LEADERSHIP IN RADAR BOTH FOR ATTACK AND DEFENSE. SURVEYING THESE EVENTS ON LAND, SEA AND AIR IN THE WAR BY THE TWO WESTERN ALLIES, BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES AGAINST HITLERISM, WE ARE ENTITLED TO BE ENCOURAGED, THANKFUL AND TO RESOLVE TO DO BETTER THAN EVER.

ENCOURAGED, THANKFUL AND TO RESOLVE TO DO BETTER THAN EVER.

IT WOULD BE NATURAL IF OUR SOVIET FRIENDS AND ALLIES DID NOT APPRECIATE THE COMPLICATIONS AND DIFFICULTIES ATTENDING ALL SEA CROSSINGS-- AMPHIBIOUS IS THE WORD-- OPERATIONS ON A LARGE SCALE. THEY ARE THE PEOPLE OF THE GREAT LAND SPACES AND WHEN THE SACRED SOIL OF RUSSIA IS THREATENED THEY MARCH OUT BY LAND. OUR TASK IS DIFFERENT. THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN PEOPLES ARE FILLED WITH ADMIRATION FOR THE TRIUMPHS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES. I MUST TELL YOU THAT THE ADVANCE OF THEIR ARMIES FROM STALINGRAD TO THE DNIESTER WITH VANGUARDS TOWARD THE PRUT-- A DISTANCE OF 900 MILES IN A YEAR-- CONSTITUTES THE GREATEST CAUSE OF HITLER'S UNDOING.

SINCE I SPOKE LAST NOT ONLY HAVE THE INVADERS BEEN DRIVEN FROM THESE RAVAGED LANDS BUT THE CUTS OF THE GERMAN ARMIES HAVE BEEN LARGELY TORN OUT. THE PEOPLES OF ALL THE RUSSIAS HAVE BEEN FORTUNATE IN FINDING A WARRIOR LEADER IN MARSHAL STALIN, WHOSE AUTHORITY ENABLES HIM TO COORDINATE AND CONTROL THE MOVEMENTS OF ARMIES ON A 2,000-MILE FRONT AND IMPART UNITY TO THE ACTION IN THE EAST WHICH IS VERY GOOD FOR SOVIET RUSSIA AND HER ALLIES. WHEN I SPOKE OF IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE ALLIED CAUSE TAKING PLACE IN HUNGARY AND THE SATELLITES IN THE BALKANS, I WAS RESERVING ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT THE SOVIET ADVANCE HAD BEEN THE MAIN CAUSE OF HITLER'S DOWNFALL IN THOSE REGIONS.

I HAVE DEALT WITH THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY BUT I MUST ALSO SPEAK OF THE OTHER GIGANTIC WAR AGAINST THE EQUALLY BRUTAL JAPS. THIS IS WAGED IN PREPONDERANCE BY THE UNITED STATES. WE HAVE ACCEPTED THEIR LEADERSHIP IN THE PACIFIC AS THEY ACCEPTED OURS IN THE INDIAN THEATRE. WE ARE PROUD OF THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND CONTRIBUTION. THE DEBT OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FACT THAT THEIR OPERATIONS SHIELDED AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND FROM JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND MORTAL PERIL DURING THE TIME WHEN THE MOTHER COUNTRY WAS AT FULL STRETCH IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST GERMANY AND ITALY IS NEVER TO BE FORGOTTEN WHERE THE UNION JACK IS FLOWN.

REMARKABLE SUCCESS HAS ATTENDED THE AMERICAN NAVY'S WORK AND THAT OF THE AMERICAN AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND TROOPS. PROGRESS IN NEW GUINEA IS CONSTANT. THE AMERICAN VICTORIES IN THE PACIFIC AND SPECIALLY THE LIBERATION OF THE MARSHALLS CONSTITUTE SUPERB EXAMPLES OF THE COMBINATION OF FORCES. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC MAY PROGRESS MORE RAPIDLY. THE JAPANESE ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF WEAKNESS. THE ATTRITION OF SHIPPING AND AIR FORCES, ON ALL OF WHICH ROOSEVELT DUELT WITH FORESIGHT A YEAR AGO, HAS BECOME EVIDENT AND OBVIOUS. THE JAP HAVE NOT FELT STRONG ENOUGH TO RISK THEIR FLEET IN A GENERAL ENGAGEMENT. IN THIS THEY HAVE BEEN PRUDENT, CONSIDERING THE EXPANSION OF UNITED STATES NAVAL POWER SINCE THE JAPANESE ASSAULT ON PEARL HARBOR. WHAT FOOLS THE JAPANESE RULING CASTE WERE TO BRING ON THEMSELVES THE MIGHTY LATENT WAR ENERGY OF THE GREAT REPUBLIC, ALL FOR THE SAKE OF CARRYING OUT A BASE AND SQUALID AMBUSCADE.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE HAS PLEDGED TO FIGHT WITH THE UNITED STATES AGAINST JAPAN NO MATTER WHAT IT COSTS OR HOW LONG IT LASTS. WE HAVE SUFFERED FROM THE JAPANESE. IN OUR THEATRE IN BURMA AND THE BAY OF BENGAL WE SHALL STRIVE TO AID THE AMERICANS IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH CHINA AND TO ADD TO OUR OWN. THE MORE WE CAN FIGHT AND ENGAGE THE JAPANESE AND WEAR DOWN THEIR AIR POWER, THE GREATER THE DIVERSION FROM THE PACIFIC THEATRE AND THE MORE HELP TO THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES.

IN BURMA THOSE PLANS PREPARED LAST AUGUST AT QUEBEC ARE BEING PUT INTO PRACTICE. YOUNG MEN ARE AT HELM. MONTBATTEN HAS INFUSED ENERGY AND CONFIDENCE INTO THE FORCES. BY THAT MEANS THEY WILL DEFEND THE FRONTIERS OF INDIA AND REOPEN THE ROAD TO CHINA. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS ENABLE US TO ATTACK THE JAPS IN THE REAR. THEY HAVE ALSO GOT BEHIND OUR FRONT AND FIERCE FIGHTING IS GOING ON AT MANY POINTS. IT IS TOO SOON TO CLAIM RESULTS IN A JUNGLE AND MOUNTAIN AREA BUT WE ARE ALMOST ALWAYS ABLE TO COUNT 3 OR 4 TIMES JAPANESE DEAD-- WHICH IS WHAT MATTERS-- THAN WE OURSELVES HAVE SUFFERED. SUPERIORITY IN JUNGLE FIGHTING HAS PASSED TO THE BRITISH AND INDIAN SOLDIERS. FURTHER NORTH AMERICAN COLUMNS AND A CONSIDERABLE CHINESE ARMY UNDER STILWELL ARE PROGRESSING WITH EQUAL MASTERY. LATER I SHALL MAKE TO YOU OR PARLIAMENT A FURTHER REPORT ON THIS FIGHTING WHICH IS NOT DECIDED YET.

WE HAVE PLACED A POWERFUL BATTLE FLEET IN INDIAN WATERS TO FACE THE MAIN PART OF THE JAPANESE FLEET SHOULD IT TURN WEST AFTER DECLINING BATTLE AGAINST THE AMERICANS.

WHEN I SPOKE A YEAR AGO I DREW ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROLONGED INTERVAL BETWEEN THE COLLAPSE OF HITLER AND OF JAPAN. THERE WILL BE AN INTERVAL BUT NOT NECESSARILY AS LONG AS I THOUGHT THEN. BE IT LONG OR SHORT, WE SHALL GO THROUGH WITH OUR AMERICAN BROTHERS WITH UTMOST STRENGTH TO THE END.

I TRUST YOU HAVE GAINED SOME GLIMPSE OF THE SCENES AND HAVE A FEELING OF THE RELATIVE SIZE AND URGENCY OF WHAT GOES ON. THERE ARE A LOT OF THINGS GOING ON. I REMEMBER THAT WHEN I SPOKE ON MARCH 21

I TRUST YOU HAVE GAINED SOME GLIMPSE OF THE SCENES AND HAVE A FEELING OF THE RELATIVE SIZE AND URGENCY OF WHAT GOES ON. THERE ARE A LOT OF THINGS GOING ON. I REMEMBER THAT WHEN I SPOKE ON MARCH 21 LAST YEAR I GAVE UP THE MAIN PART OF MY SPEECH TO WHAT WE WERE PLANNING TO DO TO MAKE THE ISLAND A BETTER PLACE AFTER THE WAR. I SAID THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A GENERAL ELECTION AND A NEW HOUSE OF COMMONS AND THAT I SHOULD PUT TO THE COUNTRY A 4-YEAR PLAN TO COVER THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND TO BRING OUR SOLDIERS, SAILORS AND AIRMEN BACK TO OUR LAND WITH FOOD, WORK AND HOMES FOR ALL. I DWELT ON HOW WRONG IT WOULD BE TO MAKE PROMISES WHICH COULD NOT BE FULFILLED. I MENTIONED THE FIELDS WHERE ACTION WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN.

(CHURCHILL REVIEWS PART OF HIS SPEECH OF LAST YEAR--EDITOR).

ALL THIS WAS FOR AFTER THE WAR. NO PROMISES WERE TO BE MADE BEFORE HAND BUT EVERY PREPARATION INCLUDING LEGISLATIVE PREPARATION WAS TO BE SET ON FOOT. NOW, I AM A MAN WHO HAS NO UNSATISFIED AMBITION EXCEPT TO BEAT THE ENEMY AND TO HELP YOU IN ANY WAY I THINK RIGHT. DON'T THINK I AM TRYING TO GET VOTES OR GLORIFY ANY PARTY. BUT I MAY DRAW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT SEVERAL OF THESE LARGE MEASURES HAVE ALREADY BEEN SHAPED AND FRAMED AND PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT AND THE PUBLIC. YOU HAVE THE SCHEME OF IMPROVED EDUCATION, THE GREATEST EVER ATTEMPTED BY A RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. IT INVOLVES A HEAVY COST TO THE STATE BUT I DON'T THINK WE CAN MAINTAIN OUR POSITION AFTER THE WAR UNLESS WE ARE WELL EDUCATED AND CAN HANDLE THE PROBLEMS AND INVENTIONS OF THE NEW AGE.

THEN THERE IS THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT AND RECEIVED A CONSIDERABLE MEASURE OF ACCEPTANCE. WE SHALL LAY BEFORE YOU A PROPOSAL ABOUT THE EXTENSION OF INSURANCE. SO HERE YOU WILL SOON HAVE SOME IMPORTANT MEASURES ALREADY FASHIONED AT A TIME WHEN NO ONE CAN SAY WHEN THE WAR WILL END AND WITHOUT RELAXING THE WAR EFFORT OR CAUSING ANY PARTY STRIFE. BUT THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER LARGE PROBLEMS ON WHICH THE MINISTER AND THEIR ASSISTANTS HAVE TOILED AND WHICH ARE FAR ADVANCED. IF THIS GOES ON, THE FOUR-YEAR PLAN MAY BE PERFECTED BEFORE THE GENERAL ELECTION IS REACHED. I MUST SAY THAT I MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD RECEIVE MANY COMPLIMENTS ON THE PROGRESS MADE WITH THE WAR AND ON THE PREPARATIONS FOR SOCIAL AND DOMESTIC WELFARE AT THE ARMISTICE OR PEACE.

LAST OCTOBER I THOUGHT THE TIME HAD COME TO ASK THE KING TO APPOINT LORD WOOLTON TO A SEAT IN THE WAR CABINET. HIS RECORD DEMANDED RESPECT. BUT THERE ARE MANY PEOPLE NOT AT ALL BURDENED WITH RESPONSIBILITY WHO HAVE LEISURE ON THEIR HANDS AND FEEL SINCERELY THAT THEIR BEST EFFORT AT THIS TIME IS TO DELABOR THE GOVERNMENT WITH CRITICISM BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT READY AT ANY MOMENT TO PRODUCE A FULL SOLUTION TO FUTURE PROBLEMS, AS BETWEEN THE VICTOR AND THE VANQUISHED, CAPITAL AND LABOR, MAN AND MAN, ETC. THIS NATIONAL GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS LED THE NATION AND EMPIRE-- AND I HOLD-- A LARGE PART OF THE WORLD OUT OF MORTAL DANGER THROUGH THE DARK VALLEYS IN WHICH THEY WANDERED BACK ONTO THE BROAD UPLANDS, IS REVILED AS A SET OF DAWDLERS AND MUDDLERS UNABLE TO FRAME A POLICY, TAKE A DECISION OR MAKE A PLAN.

I KNOW YOU WILL NOT FORGET THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION FORMED IN AN HOUR OF DISASTER BY CONSERVATIVE LABOR AND LIBERAL LEADERS IN GOOD FAITH AND GOOD WILL, HAS BROUGHT BRITAIN OUT OF THE JAWS OF DEATH, BACK FROM THE MOUTH OF HELL WHILE ALL THE WORLD WONDERED. I KNOW YOU WILL NOT FORGET THAT

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

THIS OVERSIZE ITEM HAS BEEN
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.

THERE ARE TWO SUBJECTS OF DOMESTIC POLICY MENTIONED LAST YEAR ON WHICH I HAVE NOT PRODUCED AN ACCOUNT OF ACTION. THE FIRST IS HOUSING. WE SET BEFORE OURSELVES THE PROVISION OF HOMES FOR ALL WHO NEED THEM WITH A PRIORITY FOR SERVICE-MEN, AS AND WHEN THEY COME HOME FROM THE WAR. LET ME FIRST LAY DOWN AN ABSOLUTE RULE-- NOTHING CAN BE DONE WHICH BY WEAKENING OR CLOGGING THE WAR EFFORT PROLONGS THE WAR. NOTHING CAN IN ANY WAY HAMPER PROGRESS. THERE ARE THREE WAYS IN WHICH THE BUSINESS OF HOUSING PEOPLE COULD BE ATTACKED. I DO NOT TAKE THE VIEW MYSELF THAT WE ARE A NATION OF SLUM-DWELLERS. NEARLY 5,000,000 NEW HOUSES WERE BUILT BETWEEN TWO WARS. THE BRITISH PEOPLE, AS A WHOLE, WERE BETTER HOUSED THAN ALMOST ANY PEOPLE IN EUROPE OR IN MANY PARTS OF THE UNITED STATES. BUT NOW ABOUT A MILLION HOMES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY ENEMY. THIS OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REBUILDING OR REPLANNING AND WE HAD BETTER MAKE A CLEAN SWEEP OF THE AREAS OF WHICH WE SHOULD BE ASHAMED. I HAVE GIVEN MY WORD THAT SOLDIERS WHEN THEY RETURN AND THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN

BOMBED OUT, SHALL BE RESTORED TO HOMES AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. THE FIRST ATTACK MUST BE MADE ON DAMAGED HOUSES WHICH CAN BE REBUILT. THIS MUST GO ON DURING THE WAR. IT IS A WAR MEASURE. OUR ALLIES ARE HERE AMONG US AND WE MUST DO OUR BEST FOR THEM. THE SECOND ATTACK ON THE PROBLEM WILL BE MADE BY PREFABRICATED OR EMERGENCY HOUSES. THE MINISTRY OF WORKS IS WORKING WONDERS ON THIS. I HOPE WE MAKE UP A HALF MILLION OF THEM AND NOT ONLY PLANS, BUT PREPARATIONS ARE BEING MADE ON A NATIONWIDE SCALE. FACTORIES ARE BEING ASSIGNED MATERIALS ARE BEING FARMARKED, CONVENIENT SITES WILL BE CHOSEN AND THE WHOLE BUSINESS IS BEING TREATED AS A MILITARY MATTER HANDLED BY THE GOVERNMENT. I HAVE EVERY HOPE THAT SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND YOUNG COUPLES MAY MARRY AND MAKE THEIR OWN FOUR-YEAR PLAN. I HAVE SEEN A FULL-SIZED MODEL OF THE HOUSES AND STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO LET HOUSEWIVES EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS. THESE WILL MAKE A HEAVY DEMAND ON THE STEEL INDUSTRY AND ABSORB THE EXPANSION MADE FOR THE WAR. THEY ARE SUPERIOR TO THE ORDINARY COTTAGE. THEY HAVE GAS AND ELECTRIC KITCHENETTES AND THEIR WALLS CARRY FURNITURE WHICH TODAY IT WOULD COST 20 POUNDS TO BUY. STANDARD ARTICLES OF FURNITURE WILL BE MASS-PRODUCED SO THAT NO HEAVY CHARGE WILL FALL ON THE TENANTS.

OWING TO THE METHODS OF PRODUCTION I AM ASSURED THAT THESE HOUSES, INCLUDING PRETTY FURNITURE, WILL BE AVAILABLE AT A MODERATE RENT. ALL WILL BE PUBLICLY OWNED AND WILL NOT REST WITH ANY INDIVIDUAL TENANT TO KEEP THEM AFTER THEY HAVE SERVED THE PURPOSE. AS MUCH THOUGHT HAS BEEN AND WILL BE PUT INTO THIS PLAN AS INTO THE INVASION OF AFRICA, THOUGH I ADMIT IT DOES NOT BEAR COMPARISON WITH THE KIND OF THING WE ARE WORKING AT NOW. THE SWIFT PRODUCTION OF HOUSES IS THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE CAN BE MET IN FOUR OR FIVE YEARS AFTER THE WAR. IN ADDITION TO THIS AND REBUILDING, WE HAVE A PROGRAM OF PERMANENT REBUILDING WHICH THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAS RECENTLY OUTLINED AND BY WHICH WE SHALL HAVE TWO OR THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND HOUSES BUILT OR BUILDING. 200,000 SITES ARE ALREADY OWNED.

SIDE BY SIDE COMES THE QUESTION OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE BUILDING TRADES. WE DON'T WANT THE SPLURGE TO BE FOLLOWED BY CONTRACTION. I HAVE SYMPATHY WITH THE BUILDERS AND BRICKLAYERS. IN PEACE TIME THEY KNOW THAT WHEN A JOB IS FINISHED, THEY MAY HAVE TO LOOK FOR ANOTHER. OUR 12-YEAR PLAN FOR THE BUILDING TRADES ON WHICH BEVIN AND LORD PORTAL HAVE SPENT SO MUCH TIME TO GUARANTEE STEADY AND LONG EMPLOYMENT MUST BE CARRIED OUT.

SIDE BY SIDE COMES THE QUESTION OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE BUILDING TRADES. WE DON'T WANT THE SPLURGE TO BE FOLLOWED BY CONTRACTION. I HAVE SYMPATHY WITH THE BUILDERS AND BRICKLAYERS. IN PEACE TIME THEY KNOW THAT WHEN A JOB IS FINISHED, THEY MAY HAVE TO LOOK FOR ANOTHER. OUR 12-YEAR PLAN FOR THE BUILDING TRADES ON WHICH BEVIN AND LORD PORTAL HAVE SPENT SO MUCH TIME TO GUARANTEE STEADY AND LONG EMPLOYMENT MUST BE CARRIED OUT.

WE ARE TOLD BY BUSY WISEACRES--NOW CAN YOU BUILD HOUSES WITHOUT LAND WE ALREADY SAID IN 1941 THAT ALL LAND SHALL BE TAKEN AT PRICES BASED ON MARCH 31, 1940 VALUES. STOCKS AND SHARES AND MANY CLASSES OF REAL PROPERTY HAVE GONE UP. AGRICULTURAL LAND HAS ALSO RISEN IN VALUE. ON STATE HAS POWER--WHICH IT WILL ON NO ACCOUNT SURRENDER--TO CLAIM ALL LAND NEEDED BONA FIDE FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES AT VALUES FIXED BEFORE WARTIME CONDITIONS. THERE ARE HARD PLACES WHICH WILL BE BEST ADJUSTED BY PARLIAMENT. IN THE MAIN YOU MAY BE SURE THAT LAND WILL BE FORTHCOMING WHEN AND WHERE NEEDED FOR ALL HOUSES NEEDED FOR THE PEOPLE. NOBODY NEEDS TO BE DETERRED FROM PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE BY THE FEAT THAT THEY MAY NOT HAVE LAND. LEGISLATION TO ENABLE THE AUTHORITIES TO GET ANY LAND WILL BE PRESENTED AT THIS SESSION.

THERE ARE SOME PEOPLE WHO WANT TO PUT OFF EVERYTHING UNTIL A WHITE PAPER OR A BLUE PRINT IS MADE FOR THE REGENERATION OF THE WORLD BEFORE ASKING ELECTORS HOW THEY FEEL. THEY WOULD RATHER POSTPONE THE BUILDING OF HOMES FOR RETURNING TROOPS TILL THEY ARE SURE THE LANDSCAPE IS NOW SPOILED. IN WAR WE MUST FACE IMMEDIATE NEEDS AND STERN REALITY AND IT IS SURELY BETTER TO DO THAT THAN NOTHING WHILE PREPARING TO DO EVERYTHING.

THIS IS MY DIFFICULTY. I CANNOT TAKE ANYTHING THAT WILL HINDER THE WAR AND NO ONE, EXCEPT THE VERY CLEVER ONES, WILL END OR WHETHER IT WILL END SUDDENLY OR PETER OUT. THERE MUST BE AN EMERGENCY PLAN AND THAT IS WHAT THE MINISTERS HAVE BEEN WORKING AT FOR SOME TIME PAST. IN SPITE OF THIS I CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT EVERYTHING WILL BE PERFECT OR THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE AN INTERVAL WHEN THINGS WILL BE ROUGH. IT WILL NOT BE LONG AND IT WILL BE CHILD'S PLAY COMPARED TO WHAT WE HAVE BEEN THROUGH. THE TASK LOOKS LIKE A SMALL ONE COMPARED TO SOME WE HAVE HANDLED AND ARE HANDLING. THE VALUE OF LAND IS BETWEEN 1/20TH AND 1/30TH OF HOUSES. OUR POPULATION IS UNHAPPILY ABOUT TO ENTER A PERIOD OF NUMERICAL DECLINE WHICH CAN BE CHECKED ONLY BY THE MOST ROBUST TREATMENT OF HOUSING.

THERE IS ONE OTHER QUESTION ON WHICH I SHOULD LIKE TO DWELL BUT I SHALL UTTER ONLY PASSING REASSURANCE. I MEAN DEMOBILIZATION. I KNOW AS MUCH ABOUT THIS AS MOST PEOPLE BECAUSE I WAS ONE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR AFTER THE LAST WAR WHEN IN 6 MONTHS WE BROUGHT HOME AND RESTORED NEARLY 3,000,000 MEN. GREAT PLANS HAD BEEN PREPARED BEFORE THE ARMISTICE BY PLANNERS TO BRING HOME ALL KEY MEN FIRST AND ANY SOLDIER WHO COULD GET A TELEGRAM SAYING HE WAS WANTED FOR A KEY JOB HAD PRIORITY. THE TROOPS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAIR AND A CONVULSION OF INDISCIPLINE SHOOK THE WHOLE ARMY. I PERSUADED THE CABINET TO REVERSE THIS FOOLISH PLAN. DISCIPLINE WAS IMMEDIATELY RESTORED AND DEMOBILIZATION WENT FORWARD SMOOTHLY. BEVIN, FOR WHOSE SAGACITY I HAVE ADMIRATION, HAS DEVISED A LESS CRUDE BUT EQUALLY FAIR SCHEME IN WHICH I HAVE CONFIDENCE.

WHY AM I NOT GOING TO TELL YOU ABOUT IT? WHY WILL HE NOT TELL ABOUT IT SOON? THIS IS NO TIME TO TALK ABOUT DEMOBILIZATION. THE HOUR OF GREATEST EFFORT IS COMING. WE MARCH WITH ALLIES WHO COUNT ON US AS WE COUNT ON THEM. THE EYES OF OUR SOLDIERS, SAILORS AND AIRMEN MUST BE FIXED ON THE ENEMY. THE ONLY HOMEWARD ROAD LIES THROUGH THE ARCH OF VICTORY. THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES ARE HERE; OUR OWN TROOPS STAND AT THEIR SIDE IN EQUAL NUMBERS AND TRUE CONRADERSHIP; LEADERS ARE APPOINTED IN WHOM WE HAVE FAITH. WE SHALL REQUIRE FROM ALL CLASSES THE SAME COOL, STRONG NERVES, THE TOUGHNESS OF FIBRE, WHICH STOOD US IN GOOD STEAD WHEN WE WERE ALONG UNDER THE GERMAN BLITZ.

HERE I MUST WARN YOU THAT TO DECEIVE AND BAFFLE THE ENEMY THERE WILL BE MANY FALSE ALARMS, FEINTS AND DRESS REHEARSALS. WE MAY BE THE OBJECT OF NEW FORMS OF ATTACK. BRITAIN CAN TAKE IT; SHE HAS NEVER FLINCHED. WHEN THE SIGNAL IS GIVEN THE WHOLE CIRCLE OF AVENGING NATIONS WILL HURL THEMSELVES ON THE FOE, AND BATTER OUT THE WORST TYRANNY WHICH HAS EVER SOUGHT TO HALT THE PROGRESS OF MANKIND.

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ADMIRALTY		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		COMINCH	PRIORITY
DATE 19 MARCH 1944	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 191920			DEFERRED
DECODED BY KARABINUS	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY JOHNSON			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
IMRIE	190405A	NCR 9E14	☐
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(COMINCH FROM ADMIRALTY)

REQUEST YOUR CONCURRENCE TO THE RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION OF THE FACT THAT ALLIED AIRCRAFT ARE USING ROCKET PROPELLED WEAPONS.

- (2) IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE ENEMY MUST BY NOW BE FULLY AWARE OF THE TECHNIQUE EMPLOYED BY US WITH RP AGAINST BOTH SURFACE FORCES AND U BOATS AND THAT PUBLICATION WILL NOT THEREFORE BE OF ANY VALUE TO HIM.
- (3) NO DESCRIPTION OR DETAILS OF THESE WEAPONS WOULD BE PERMITTED.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE DEC 10 1973

ACTION		
F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
FX40		40
IG-00		41
VCNO		42
F25		43

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15

190405 000.7

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: CG U.S. Forces Kunming China

To : War Department

No : BH366 16 March 1944

To Bissel BH 366 for Johnston MIS-X from Wichtrick signed Dorn.

/// Accurate report dated February 1944 from Intel China gives reliable proof that release of Dyess report and other information concerning ill treatment of our POW by Japs has enraged Japs and has caused further ill treatment of POWS in Indo China territory.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2

INFO : OPD
Col Mathewson
Log

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1975

CM-IN-11373 (16 Mar 44) 2120Z Jb

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000.7

[REDACTED]

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: NA London
To: NILID

No. 7075 13 March 1944

Signed Peabody.

Reaction British Press on Irish question takes general line that Dublin being foolish to reject reasonable American requested but to be expected from previous attitude and Irish character. Manchester Guardian says Eire action hardening Ulster intransigence on partition, destroying any British opinion for United Ireland and forfeiting U.S. sympathy for Irish case. States that if Portugal can grant Azores bases without considering herself unneutral Eire can make some contribution to war on which her security rests. Times says De Valera reply to US characteristic and British travel ban natural result Irish attitude.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD

CG AAF

CG/S

COL. MATHEWSON

RELEASED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-8996 (13 Mar 44) 1500Z eng

COPY No.

000.7 THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 53

**WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE**

ins H.
has this one - not attached.

From: U.S. Military Attache Bern Switzerland

To : War Department

No : 1281

APRIL 3)
1st March 1944.

1281.

Source of Legation cable 1970 is Red Cross from official report which they have no right to release,

No Sig.

ACTION: G-2

INFO : OPD

CM-IN-627 (1 Apr 44) 1929Z mcs

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
GSD Letter, 6-8-72

MAY 3 1974

a.c. Parker
42

000.7
SECRET

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTM

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ADMIRALTY			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	COMINCH	PRIORITY
DATE 19 FEBRUARY 1944				ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 2154/19				RRRR
DECODED BY				DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY VALENTINE		INFORMATION	BAD WASHINGTON NSHQ	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY				ROUTINE
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				RRRR
				DEFERRED
			181228A	NCR 19806
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:		DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COMBINED ADMIRALTY AIR MINISTRY COMMUNIQUE
ANNOUNCING DESTRUCTION OF 3 USCOATS IN APPROACHES
TO AND STRAITS OF GIBRALTAR OVER A PERIOD OF
11 DAYS IN NOVEMBER WILL BE RELEASED 201430 BST.
NO CONVOY INVOLVED.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE DEC 10 1973

~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV NCR-15

181228 000.7

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
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F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
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F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-0	
VCNO	

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Kunming
To: War

No: W54FN 11 February, 1944

For Westlake Bureau Public Relations from Huyler and Chennault W54FN. Reference letter War Department Bureau of Public Relations dated 13th January to sender.

During the past few months this Headquarters has received numerous letters, such as the one referred to, requesting stories depicting the team work and battle experiences of air crews and individual fighter pilots. Having taken the matter up with the Intelligence Officer and the Operations Officer of this Headquarters, it is felt that, due to the fact this theater is unlike any other theater in which United States troops are operating, it is unwise to comply with these requests. Numerous instances have occurred in which the unorthodox treatment of our pilots and crew men, by the Japanese, has been brought out, instance in which Americans have been punished, perhaps by death, for deeds which in other theaters would be considered merely in line of duty. It is felt, therefore, that stories of this Air Force operating near and over the enemy line where danger of capture is imminent should, as far as possible, remain anonymous. This is necessary in order that they be protected from possible bodily injury. Instead of respecting man for his ability as a soldier and airman, the Japs express a desire to humiliate him, thereby, in their opinion proving the superiority of the Japanese.

Effort has been made, in this theater, also, to suppress stories of the escape from enemy territory of American personnel. Newscippings received from the states indicate that these stories are appearing, having originated in the

CM-IN-8510 (12 Feb 44)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

000.7

47

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

page 2

From: Kunming
To: War

United States itself -- note the case of Lieutenant Thomas Harmon. In this particular case stories under an Ann Arbor, Michigan, date line, and a radio broadcast by Lowell Thomas, gave details of the manner of escape and it has been brought to the attention of this office that, already, at least 50 Chinese Patriots have paid, with their lives, for the part they are accused by the Japanese of having played in the escape of this officer. It is requested that everything possible be done by the War Department, Bureau of Public Relations to assist us in the preservation of these men.

no sig

ACTION: BPR

INFORMATION: OPD
G-2
CG AAP
WHITE HOUSE
LOG

RECEIVED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)
OSD letter, May 2, 1973
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-8510 (12 Feb 44). 1849Z cng

White House

47

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

From: SHAEF London
To: War

No. B 105. 5 February 1944

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower reference FACS 4. This is SCAF 3.

Brigadier General Robert A McClure has been assigned head for the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Commanders Staff of Allied Expeditionary Force.

No Sig

ACTION: CCS Capt Royal, USN

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Asm King
White House
Log

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo **34 - 71**

By RHP Date DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-3514 (5 Feb 44) 1805Z ses

34

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COPY No.

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MAIL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM CINCPAC		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION CONCENPACFOR	OPPOP PRIORITY
DATE 04 FEB 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 0545/04		FOR INFORMATION CTF 51 CTF 53	DEFERRED
DECODED BY KIRKBRIDE			OPPOP PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY KURTZ			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐
		040243	NCR 8490
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

I-N-T-E-R-C-E-P-T

GEORGE JONES POOL PRESS STORY RECEIVED
3 FEBRUARY Z FROM CTF 51 STRESSED JAPANESE
SYMBOLICAL SELF DESTRUCTION. THIS SHOULD BE
AVOIDED FUTURE COPY. STORY ALSO VIOLATED
POLICY OF REFRAINING FROM MENTIONING SPECIFIC
DAMAGE INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS BLOCKHOUSES.
ADDITIONAL AP RTSURE PRESS MATERIAL EMANATING
YOUR COMMAND CONTAINS NO REFERENCE OR SPECULA-
TION FUTURE OPERATIONS.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of NN

memo, 11-15-77

By RAP Date 11-17-78

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
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F-1	
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F-20	
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F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

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OPNAV-NCR-15


040243 000.7

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

31 January 1944

~~SECRET~~
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

I have been advised by General Arnold's Office that he would welcome an opportunity to discuss this matter, should the President wish to do so.


L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date DEC 10 1973

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAL.
W.F.

From: Hq USSAF
To : AGWAR

No : K3374 29th January 1944

To Arnold from Spaatz.

Though I still believe it essential to revise reporting policy so far as American Air Forces are concerned, Portal does not concur for RAF after consultation suggested in your A5625 January 21. Principle reasons for continuing past policy are stated by RAF as follows:

A. Policy same as used in last war has been very expedient in this war in view of probability that it adds very little to knowledge which the enemy probably has anyway;

B. Change of policy on announcing losses would assist enemy propaganda charging excessive allied losses as cause for stopping the immediate announcement of our actual losses;

C. Public confidence now established would be weakened if not destroyed. I do not agree that those reasons are sound. Aircraft frequently disintegrate so thoroughly before hitting ground that widely scattered losses would be difficult to count even if all parts were found. Knowledge of German official claims in many instances confirms this belief that they sometimes cannot even approximately count aircraft we know were lost over Germany or occupied Europe.

CM-IN-19938 (30 Jan 44)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (S)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

0007

White House
COPY No. 46

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Hq USSAFE
To : ACWAR
No : K3374 29th January 1944

Page 2

Our announcement then enables enemy evaluation of his defensive effectiveness and insures thorough search for all possible wreckage and surviving crewmen. In view of past effect of enemy propaganda claims against naval and ground forces, all designed in part to taunt the allies into disclosing losses and dispositions, it is not understood why we should fear enemy propaganda concerning air operations if preliminary explanation is followed by frank stories and periodic announcements of our losses over a period. Heretofore the Air Forces have in effect been taunted into disclosing valuable information which no amount of public good will can counteract. Therefore believe it necessary to change American policy eventhough RAF attitude may necessitate special handling. Following procedure advocated:

A. Announcement of change of policy should be made by the President in press conference stating reasons frankly and pointing out similarity of ground campaigns to even one air operation on present large scale. He might also point to known future operations as requiring special precautions but major emphasis should be upon of Air Forces coming of age, now well beyond the puerile stage implied by the term raid which more properly describes offensive patrols and nuisance attacks. Suggest Presidents announcement be prepared by either Lieutenant Nohemkis formerly in office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Training, or by Major Merrill in AAF Branch WDBPRO, both of whom understand the desired slant. //

CM-IN-19938 (30 Jan 44)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: HQ USSAFE
To : ACWAR
No : K3374 29th January 1944

Page 3

B. Simultaneously with the President's statement there should be released a tabulation by months giving losses and claims in all categories by general types and theaters. This should include a statement that similar reports will be issued at least once a month thereafter and at shorter intervals when it can be done without indicating losses on any particular mission.

C. Continue to announce claims for our fighters on each operation but omit bomber claims of enemy fighters shot down and substitute statements to the effect that the air battle was or was not ferocious and bloody or words to that effect as now used by other forces.

D. Conduct a systematic campaign of public indoctrination in the real fundamentals of air war principles to promote for the Air Forces an understanding which long usage gives automatically to other forces. The initial effort on this matter must now come from Washington but the follow through must be from this end. This will require most careful steering and considerable indoctrination of correspondents in the theater by an officer who thoroughly understands the entire objective and method and who can devote full time to this function. Believe Lieutenant Nehemiah is one of the few who has the desired understanding as well as an unusual ability to express himself and that his services on this headquarters would be of great value to the Air Forces. Therefore request that he be ordered to report there at once on permanent duty for this purpose. This is realized to be unorthodox but the situation is unique and requires drastic action if the entire program is not to fail before it starts.

Ny Sig

ACTION: CG AAF
INFORMATION: OPD
G-2
BPR
LOG

CM-IN-19938 (30 J [REDACTED] Z CNG

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH AND CNO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY ADMIRAL E J KING		COMSOPAC	PRIORITY
DATE JAN 28 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 1444			DEFERRED
DECODED BY STONE/TOUSIGNANT		CINCPAC	
PARAPHRASED BY TOUSIGNANT			
ROUTED BY			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE			
281436		NCR 41969-S	
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PROTEST RECEIVED FROM AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT QUOTE IN THE AUSTRALIAN PRESS OF 20 JANUARY A REPORT IS PUBLISHED OF AN INTERVIEW WITH REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT CARNEY, CHIEF OF STAFF SOUTH PACIFIC FORCES IN WHICH HE STATES THAT THE NEXT OBJECTIVE OF THE FORCES IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREAS ARE RABAU AND KAVIENG UNQUOTE NOTE FURTHER STATES THAT AUSTRALIA VIEWS WITH CONCERN STATEMENTS OF THIS NATURE ON PLANS INVOLVING ITS FORCES AND APART FROM RISK TO ITS OWN FORCES IT IS EMBARRASSED SINCE HEAD OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT IS PROHIBITED FROM MAKING ANY STATEMENTS AND THAT BY HIS DIRECTIVE GENERAL MACARTHUR IS THE ONLY ONE AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE COMMUNIQUE. FORWARD BY AIRMAIL FULL REPORT OF INTERVIEW AND ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES.

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

281436 0007

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	DIO 11 NAVDIST	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY	26 JAN 1944	DNI	PRIORITY
DATE	2029		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM	STONE		DEFERRED
DECODED BY	KOHOUTEK	UNCLASSIFIED	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	PARMENTER	E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)	ROUTINE
ROUTED BY		OSD letter, May 3, 1972	DEFERRED
		By RHP, NANS Date DEC 10 1973	

261940

NCR 2194

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			
(DIO 11 NAVDIST SENDS ACTION DNI)			
MRS. SMITH, FNU, SUBJECT, DESCRIBED AS 5 FEET 2 INCHES, 108 POUNDS, 25 YEARS, GAUDY, LOUD, PEROXIDE BLONDE, WEARS HAIR COMBED UP, HAS PROMINENT DEFORMED BROKEN NOSE, WEARING BLACK HAT WITH PINK OSTRICH PLUME.			
SUBJECT ON SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRAIN 4 EASTBOUND, LEFT PHOENIX 25 JANUARY 1944 AT 0830 MOUNTAIN WAR TIME, OCCUPYING LOWER BERTH 2, CAR CF, WILL ARRIVE CHICAGO THURSDAY 27 JANUARY AM WILL DEPART CHICAGO FOR PHILADELPHIA AT 1630, 27 JANUARY. WILL BE MET IN PHILADELPHIA BY HER FATHER.			
A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT REPORTS SUBJECT AS MAKING THE FOLLOWING STATMENT IN PRESENCE OF GROUP OF PEOPLE ABOARD TRAIN "MY HUSBAND IS A LIEUT. CMDR. IN THE NAVY. HE SPENT 14 YEARS IN THE MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE AND WAS			
No. 1 ADMIRAL	No. 2 FILE	No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.	No. 4 SPECIAL
SEALED		SECRET	
Make original only. Deliver to Code Room watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)			
OPNAV-NCR 18			
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-50690-2			
261940 000.7			

ACTION F-20

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE
FROM		FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES		PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED
RELEASED BY					
DATE					
TOR CODEROOM					
DECODED BY		INFORMATION			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY					ROUTINE
ROUTED BY					DEFERRED

PAGE 2 OF 2

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

261943

NCR 2194

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			

COMMISSIONED IN THE U S NAVY AT THE OUTBREAK OF THIS WAR. HE SAILED FROM SAN DIEGO ON DECEMBER 28 WITH A CONVOY OF 50 SHIPS INCLUDING TROOP TRANSPORTS AND SUPPLY SHIPS BOUND FOR THE MARSHALL ISLANDS. BEFORE LEAVING HE TOLD ME TO WATCH THE NEWSPAPERS FOR AN ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE WHICH WOULD PROBABLY OCCUR ON FEBRUARY 5TH AS THEY EXPECTED TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE JAPS ON THAT DATE". NO ACTION TAKEN BY DIO 11TH NAVAL DISTRICT.

16.....ACT

GARBLED GROUPS HAVE BEEN SERVICED

ADD COMINCH....

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED**~~SECRET~~**

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OPNAV-NCR 18

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-50620-2

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: MA Ankara
To: MILID

NO: 915 22 January, 1944

From Tindall Ankara reyour 529

Reaction to Pravda report 17 January concerning alleged meeting British officials Ribbentrop in Spain summarized as follows:

Turkish diplomatic and other officials unanimously express opinion story was officially inspired. One Turk diplomatic source believes it may be beginning of Soviet war of nerves against allies. He said it indicated Soviet displeasure with Allies over something he did not know what.

Whatever Soviet purpose Turks are disturbed by this evidence of apparent lack of closest cooperation and agreement between Anglo Americans and Russians. They fear it means that apparent cohesion and mutual confidence at recent conferences was achieved by avoiding real issues. One comment was that perhaps as about Poland, United Nations after all have not perhaps agreed on policy about Turkey either.

Even before denials from London, Berlin and Madrid Turks did not believe story true. Their conviction that it was officially inspired is they say confirmed because Pravda is not known to have correspondent in Cairo, where report was stated in Pravda to have originated.

GM-IN-14704 (22 Jan 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2.

PRIORITY

From: MA Ankara
To : MILID

No : 915 22 January, 1944

From Tindall Ankara reyour 529

One Turk official in daily communication with Prime Minister believes Soviet purpose may have been two-fold, namely to provide smoke screen for Polish boundary issue and to retaliate for stories about German Russian peace feelers including story about British parachutists in Rumania. Another Turk official expressed astonishment any of Allies permit publication such stories since they obviously do much mischief to Allied unity. He approvingly quoted New York Herald Tribune editorial stating if editor of Pravda not yet enroute Siberia, he should be. Press comment conspicuously absent so far.

No Sig

529 is CM-OUT-6577 (17 Jan 44) G-2

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
LOC

CM-IN-14704 (22 Jan 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (K)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date **DEC 10 1973**

2349Z cng

32
COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMNAVEU		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		SECNAV	2 PPPPPP
DATE 15 JAN 44			3
TOR CODEROOM 1627			4
DECODED BY STONE			5
PARAPHRASED BY THOMAS			6
ROUTED BY KNIGHT			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
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			10
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151501 NCR 5511

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COMNAVEU ORIGINATES; SECNAV ACTION; INFO DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

STORIES ABOUT THE SEPTEMBER 7 RELIEF OF SPITZBERGEN BY J EDGERTON LEE INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE AND ARTHUR OAKSHOTT REUTERS TO BE RELEASED BY ADMIRALTY. CAN USS TUSCALOOSA BE NAMED OR FACT THAT US WARSHIP TOOK PART BE RELEASED. DITTO NAMES OF KEY OFFICERS TUSCALOOSA. HOLDING STORIES PENDING DECISION.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (M)

OBD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

00R...ACT

00MINCH...

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

151501 000,7

ACTION	GCT
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

PRECEDENCE

ASST DIR PUBLIC RELATIONS
FROM WESTCOAST (SANDIEGO)

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

PRIORITY

RELEASED BY

DATE 9 JAN 44

TOR CODEROOM

DECODED BY FORCE

PARAPHRASED BY WELLS

ROUTED BY HILL

FOR ACTION

DIRECTOR PUBLIC
RELATIONS

INFORMATION

ROUTINE
RRRRRRRR
DEFERRED

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL
CHECK BELOW

091745

NCR 1980

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

ASST DIR PUBLIC RELATIONS WESTCOAST
(SANDIEGO) SENDS ACTION TO DIR
PUBLIC RELATIONS

ADMIRAL HALSEY DEPARTED FOR EAST 0830 TODAY WEATHER
PERMITTING EXPECTS PROCEED DIRECTLY TO WASHINGTON VIA
FORT WORTH AND NASHVILLE. HIS JOB HERE SUPERB FROM
EVERY NAVAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS VIEWPOINT HE STOLE THE
ENTIRE SHOW MAKING 5 SPEAKING APPEARANCES IN ADDITION
TO RADIO BROADCAST AND PRESS CONFERENCE. UNDERSECT
OF WAR EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH NAVAL PARTICIPATION
IN EVERY PHASE OF PROGRAM.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) at (S)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

09R...ACT

COMINCH..200P..40..S02AER..0P03..34..31..36..SUPERS..

NAVAIDE..CNC...

~~SECRET~~

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OPNAV-NCR-15

091745 000.7

F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ADMIRALTY		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		COMINCH	2 OP OP OP
DATE 7 JANUARY, 1944			3 PRIORITY
TOR CODEROM 2036			4 ROUTINE
DECODED BY KARABINUS			5 DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY FORCE		BAD WASH NSHQ OTTAWA	6
ROUTED BY			7
			8
			9
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			10 OP OP OP
			11 PRIORITY
			12 ROUTINE
			13 DEFERRED
			14
			15
			16 IF OPERATIONAL
			17 CHECK BELOW
			18 ☐
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

071843Z

NCR 688

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(COMINCH RPTD BAD WASH NSHQ OTTAWA FROM ADMIRALTY)

COMMUNIQUE DEALING WITH DESTRUCTION OF 2 U-BOATS
ON NOVEMBER 6 BY ESCORT GROUP WILL BE RELEASED
081000BST. NO CONVOY INVOLVED NO DATE WILL BE
GIVEN.

RECEIVED BY PRINTER FROM BAD.

answered
1/9/44

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 147-78
BY RT, DATE DEC 10 1973

~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

071843

000.7

ACTION		
F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
FX40		40
IG-00		41
VCNO		42
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WDMC NR 1

FROM: OPD 7 JAN 1944 (NO DTG) NCR 12613 ROUTINE

ACTION: CINC SWPA BRISBANE AUSTRALIA 7 JAN 1944 EBC

INFO: G-2 CGAAF VCHD

NUMBER 2636 CM-DUT-2191

TO MACARTHUR FROM MARSHALL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS RECEIVED FROM THE SPANISH EMBASSY A JAPANESE ALLEGATION THAT A UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT (CONSOLIDATED B24) ATTACKED AND SANK THE JAPANESE HOSPITAL SHIP BUENOS AIRES MARU BY BOMBING AT 0810 27 NOVEMBER 1943 IN POSITION 2 DEGREES 40 MINUTES SOUTH LATITUDE AND 129 DEGREES 20 MINUTES EAST LONGITUDE X IN ADDITION TO THE MARKINGS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 5 OF HAGUE CONVENTION 1907, THE VESSEL BORE SPECIAL RED CROSS MARKINGS FOR AERIAL AND NIGHT IDENTIFICATIONS X THE JAPANESE STATE THE ATTACK WAS MADE AT AN ALTITUDE OF 1000 METERS AND THAT THE WEATHER WAS CLEAR AT THE TIME OF ATTACK X IT REQUESTED THAT AN INVESTIGATION OF THIS REPORTED ATTACK BE EXPEDITED

COMINCH...CDG

23...16...20G...20...OP01...OP02...NAVAIDE...13...19...19C...

FX37...39....FILE

RS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 9(E) and 9(D) or (M)

OSD letter, May 8, 1973

By RHP, NARS Date

DEC 10 1973

0007

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

War Intelligence Division
Bureau of Public Relations
6358

6 January 1944

CINC SWPA BRISBANE AUSTRALIA

Number 2623

To Diller from Surles.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May 3, 1973

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

Believe it necessary to keep you informed as to latest use of General MacArthur's name in news. In connection with present national discussion of disunity caused by strikes which you probably know yesterday's Washington Times Herald carried 72 point banner headline "MacArthur praises labor" then quoted General MacArthur as saying "Labor has never failed the Army or the nation. May God bless you all for your splendid patriotism". This morning's Times Herald and all other papers expose attempt by American Federationist official organ of AFL to create impression by means of telegrams to editors that statement had just been made. They then reveal fact that statement was made originally April 1st 1942 in response to pledge of war support by William Green and James Carey and that deliberate attempt was made to place General MacArthur in false position in present discussion. Above is sent you solely for fill in on current information.

ORIGINATOR: GEN SURLES
INFORMATION: OPD, C OF S

CM-OUT-2082 (6 Jan 44) 2109Z mos

*Col. Mathewson
White House*

COPY No. 16

000.7

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FORM 10-52204-1

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ADM OFFICE COM 4TH FLT	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY	6 JANUARY 1944	COMINCH	PRIORITY
DATE	1413		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM	SCHULTZ	CINCLANT	RRRRRRRR
DECODED BY	DUMMIT		DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY			
ROUTED BY			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
061112 NCR 9802			☐

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE PRESS RELEASE BE MADE THAT PLANES AND SURFACE SHIPS IN LAST 4 DAYS HAVE SUNK 3 GERMAN BLOCKADE RUNNERS IN SOUTH ATLANTIC AND THAT RELEASE HERE BE PERMITTED SIMULTANEOUSLY. NO NAMES OF SHIPS OR PERSONS. LANDING OF PRISONERS JANUARY 6 AT RECIFE CANNOT BE KEPT WHOLLY SECRET AND AM SURE GERMANS HAVE INFORMATION. BRITISH GOT MUCH FAVORABLE LOCAL PUBLICITY THEIR ACTION IN BAY OF DISCAY.

ACTION

F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
FX40		40
IG-00		41
VCNO		42

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-78
BY RT. DATE DEC 10 1973

~~SECRET~~

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OPNAV-NCR-15

061112 000.7

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMNORPAC	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		COMINCH AND CNO	2
DATE 4 JAN 44		CINCPAC	3
TOR CODEROOM 042100			4
DECODED BY FORCE	INFORMATION	NORPACFOR	5
PARAPHRASED BY		ATCOMNORWESSEAFRON	6
BY JOHNSON			7
ROUTED BY			8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			9
041937			10
NCR 8680			11
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(ACTION COMINCH AND CNO CINCPAC. INFO NORPACFOR
AND ATCOMNORWESSEAFRON. FROM COMNORPAC.)

PRESS NOTICE JANUARY 3RD STATES "ARMY BOMBERS
ATTACKED PARAMUSHIRUO" "REPORTED BY NAVY". IN
ORDER ELIMINATE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING, AND AS
STATED (MY 010935) ATTACK CONDUCTED BY LANDCATS
(NAVY PBY'S). NO COMBAT LANDCATS OPERATED BY
ARMY THIS AREA.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date **DEC 10 1973**

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
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SECRET

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OPNAV-NCR-15

041937

000.7

RC 16
25/0052Z
mjk

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WDCC
26 Oct
1818Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

fu

From: Moscow
To: AGWAR

No: 19 25 October 1943

For Marshall from Harriman signed Deane.

Stalin informed me today that he is most interested in having daily news Italian operations and on the progress of the bomber offensive. We have arranged to send daily summary which we now receive from the War Department. Because of communications, however, these summaries are received at best 48 hours following the events. While I do not wish to discontinue these I suggest that Eisenhower and Eaker be asked to send daily summary of operations direct to Moscow, including such matters as would be of interest to Stalin. I think this would be a measure of cooperation that would be appreciated and pay dividends.

ACTION: JCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

Nosig

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
LOG

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By E. H. Parks Date DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-15889 (26 Oct 43) 2233Z mcs

Russian Relations with U.S. + Britain
000,7

COPY No. 12

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NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

Op-16-F-2

December 5, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR the Naval Aide.

SUBJECT: Comparison of Japanese admissions of naval
losses with our estimates. .

1. The Tokyo Radio has announced Japanese losses in
the Solomons between August 7th and November 30th to have been:

- (a) 41 warships and transports sunk
- (b) 206 planes lost, 31 damaged.

2. Within the above period our estimates in the same
Japanese categories for purposes of comparison are:

- (a) 62 warships and transports sunk (42 warships
and 20 transports).
- (b) About 650 planes believed lost.

3. It will be seen from the above that in (a) the
Japanese claim is about 66 o/o of ours, and in (b) it is about
32 o/o. In our estimate of warships and transports sunk small
craft such as subchasers, etc., were not included. If such small
craft were included in the Japanese admission, the percentage would
be reduced accordingly.

E. Watts
E. Watts,
By direction.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973