

Oral History Interview
with
RICHARD D. WEIGLE

United States Army Air Force, 1942-46; Headquarters, G-2, G-3, Chinese Army in India, 1944-45; secretary, General Staff, Chinese Combat Command, 1945; and Executive Officer, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, 1946-49.

Annapolis, Maryland

June 11, 1973 by Richard D. McKinzie, Harry S. Truman Library

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MCKINZIE: Doctor Weigle, I wonder if you might begin our conversation by saying something about how you came to be interested in Far Eastern affairs? Perhaps you would like to go back and talk something about the events in your education which led you to become especially competent in that field?

WEIGLE: Well, when I graduated from Yale College in 1931 I thought that I would probably go on and make academic life a career, but I wanted to take a break from study. I was planning to go and teach in the Near East and then, suddenly, Yale-in-China became a possibility.

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I decided to accept an appointment there for two years and taught at Changsha in Hunan Province, China from 1931 to 1933. When I came back to this country, I took a little over a year in the Yale Divinity School and became, at the same time, associated with the home office of Yale-in-China. Eventually I became Executive Secretary of the Yale-in-China Association and returned to China in January of 1935 for six months in that connection, I finally decided that my studies should be in American diplomatic history, so I enrolled in the Yale graduate school in the fall of 1935 and received my Ph.D degree four years later. At the same time, I continued until the final year the Yale-in-China connection.

MCKINZIE: You studied under Samuel Flagg Bemis?

WEIGLE: I did work under Bemis, yes. On the influence of the sugar interests on American diplomacy in Hawaii and Cuba from 1893 to 1903. Then I went to Carleton College and taught there.

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One of the three courses that I taught was called, "Problems of the Pacific." When the war came along in 1942, I had to resign from Carleton because of college policy, in order to accept an appointment in the Army Air Corp.

MCKINZIE: College policy was not to give leave?

WEIGLE: Not to give people leave for the war: I don't know -- if one had challenged that that might have been overthrown. But I simply resigned at the time and that has a bearing on later events.

MCKINZIE: May I interrupt at this point to ask, at the period when you were teaching at Yale-in-China, from 1931 to 1933 and later when you returned, what kinds of basic ideas you came to have about Chinese politics or about China's place in the world? Was the nation on the verge of happening, already a great nation, a nation which you had any particularly strong feelings about?

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WEIGLE: Well, you see during the period that I was there the Chiang government was just beginning to come into its own. Roads were being extended, railroads were being built. One had the sense of more of an emerging or developing nation than a nation that was about to become a great power. I actually saw Chiang at close range though I didn't actually meet him. He came for some public event there in Hunan Province and opened a track meet that General Ho Chien the governor was host to. But you could understand, later in the decade, why the Japanese felt they had to move when they did. You felt that the Chiang government was finally beginning to develop a degree of unity in the country and a degree of power.

MCKINZIE: You didn't expect, I assume, to be sent back to China in your military service?

WEIGLE: Well, I didn't expect it, but I worked for it. I started off teaching the Norden bombsight in a ground school for bombardiers in

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Texas. I knew that Yale had a Chinese language school, so I applied for Chinese language work. I was accepted and went to Yale for three months of intensive training in early 1944. Then, of course, as soon as we were trained we were shipped out, initially to India to a replacement training center near Calcutta. I was assigned then to the Chinese Army in India. This was Stilwell's troops, who had fled out of Burma and who had then been reinforced by many recruits coming over the "Hump." When they flew supplies in from India, these troops would come back over the Hump. So I worked first there in the rear echelon, the training center at Ramgarh in Bihar Province, India as a kind of G-2, G-3 to the American staff of the training center. The chief of staff there, the head, was General [William] Bergin and later General Hadon L. Boatner. (Boatner in the '50s went to Kojima to settle a prison camp uprising during the Korean war, as you may know). Boatner had been relieved at Myittha because he

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apparently had been unable to make any headway there in capturing the city from the Japanese.

So, he was assigned to the rear echelon, and I became a kind of G-2, G-3 to him. Then I went over with him into China in about April of 1945 when he became the deputy commander of the Chinese Combat Command under General [Robert B.] McClure. The Chinese Combat Command was the American liaison command to General Ho Ying-chin, the commanding general of the Chinese ground forces.

One of my interesting little assignments then was to teach General Ho Ying-chin English once or twice a week. This I enjoyed a great deal.

MCKENZIE: How much did he learn?

WEIGLE: Not very much. There was not enough time for regular lessons. I was then the secretary to the general staff of the Chinese Combat Command. Later, when the war ended, Boatner made me his aide-de-camp, and so I came back

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to this country as his aide in the fall of 1945.

At that point, I was trying to decide what to do and whether to reapply to Carleton for a teaching position. I thought a little about applying for a research grant to write a book about the Chinese Army in India. Boatner said that he thought that I ought to consider going into the State Department. I'd never really thought about that, in spite of the fact that I'd worked so much on the State Department when I was doing my Ph.D thesis.

At all events, he asked whether I wouldn't be willing to explore the matter, and I said I would. He said that he knew quite well John Carter Vincent, then the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department. So, I came east from my wife's home in Janesville, Wisconsin and talked with Mr. Vincent, and especially with Mr. James K. Penfield who was the Deputy Director. Nothing seemed immediately forthcoming, although pressure was then on the

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political offices of the State Department to take on executive officers who would streamline operations and make them somewhat more efficient. This was being resisted by the Far Eastern Office. That had always been a rather small and intimate operation, They did not want to grow. There was suspicion that taking on some high level administrator or executive person would put them all in kind of a straight-jacket.

At all events, the fact that I had some substantive knowledge of the Far East and also had some administrative experience in the army seemed like a good combination to them. So, I guess that was why I was considered. The first thing that came through was an appointment with the Far Eastern Commission where Nelson [C.] Johnson was the head -- Executive Director, I think they called it. His right-hand man was Hugh [D.] Farley, who had once been my associate both in Yale-in-China and then later at Carleton College. Through Farley I was

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appointed the first Documents Officer of the Far Eastern Commission and set up the whole document situation there.

MCKINZIE: Do you recall at this point any of -- let's use the word morale, of the Far Eastern Commission? It didn't amount to much after awhile.

WEIGLE: There was no particular problem then. Everything was certainly moving well. The various staff members in Washington were meeting together and everything seemed to be going pretty well at that point. I was only in the Commission until around mid-January, not more than a month or six weeks. Then the appointment in State itself came through, so that I shifted to become the Executive Officer in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.

MCKINZIE: Was that a balancing off of professional considerations -- whether you should go to the State Department or stay with the Far Eastern Commission?

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WEIGLE: Well, I just felt that the Far Eastern Office in the State Department was a much more permanent thing and much more alive; and I'd always had high respect for the geographical offices of the Department. There were then five, I think, altogether: United Nations Affairs, European Affairs, Near Eastern and African Affairs, American Republic Affairs, and Far Eastern Affairs. Those were the five. It seemed to me that at best the Far Eastern Commission was a relatively temporary kind of situation, although an interesting one: and, of course, being a Documents Officer was nowhere near as exciting as being an Executive Officer in the Far Eastern Office.

MCKINZIE: That was, as you point out, a rather small operation with actually, I suppose, about a dozen men?

WEIGLE: Oh, there were more than that. I can't remember exactly how many we had, but my impression is that we probably had a good many

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more in the various divisions. We had CA, the Division of Chinese Affairs, NA, the Division of Japanese and Korean affairs, SEA, the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, and PI, as I think it was called, the Division of Philippine Affairs. There were four. Generally speaking there were from three to five officers in each of these divisions and then three to five secretaries. So that I doubt whether we had altogether in the Far Eastern Office more than about 40 to 45 people. The pressure, of course, over the years was to grow. You see, I was there from January of 1946 until the fall of 1949. In that period I suppose we must have grown to about 55 or 60 people. But then there was a big reorganization of the Department following a study, and everything was raised one level. The Office of Far Eastern Affairs became the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, with an Assistant Secretary, and the divisions became offices, with directors and all the rest of it. So the job which

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I had held, Executive Officer, was upgraded to Executive Director. As such it became a political job.

The man who was appointed then to take this post was a retired admiral named William Wright. Meanwhile, I had been appointed president of St. John's College, so it didn't bother me to lose my job to a political appointee. In fact, I tried to help Wright as much as I could in making this transition. I do have a very vivid recollection of a meeting which Wright went to in Mr. John Peurifoy's office. He was then Under Secretary of State, I think, for Administration. My policy as Executive Officer had always been to try to keep the office small and make an officer fight for a secretary or whatever else. When he came back from this meeting, he was mad as a hatter. He stormed into where I was sitting and said, "Weigle, I just don't understand what's been going on around here over these last several years. You've got everybody in the Department convinced that FE (Far Eastern Office) doesn't

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need as many personnel to run its affairs as the other geographical bureaus. And as a result I'm not getting our fair share of the personnel:" This I thought was quite a commentary on the way in which the Department was mushrooming and simply, in a bureaucratic way, growing larger. Well, that's kind of getting ahead of the story but I couldn't resist putting in this reminiscence.

MCKINZIE: Sure. Many historians have written about the special missions that went out and what those special missions did; but no one has really talked about how that affected the work back in the Department. When the Hurley Mission went to China; when the Wedemeyer Mission went to China; the Marshall Mission -- surely there must have been some kind of feedback; there must have been some effect of that in day-to-day office routine; it must have had some effect upon general procedure? Do you recall any of the Division's reactions to those many

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missions that went out?

WEIGLE: Well, not specifically, I'm afraid. The two missions that impressed themselves more on my consciousness than any others, I guess, were William R. Langdon going as political advisor to General Hodge in Korea -- and I used to see him with a fair degree of regularity when he was back in the Department. That was channeled into Japanese Affairs, where a young fellow named Williams was the desk officer on Korea. I think Korea was sort of a second-class citizen in a way. Not as much attention, it seems to me, was paid to Korea, and what attention was paid was perhaps more by the Deputy Director of the Office than by anyone else. Of course, it was still largely a military situation in Korea then.

The other mission, of course, was the Marshall Mission. I was quite aware of that. An interesting little sidelight there -- I was one of the first Americans into Nanking ahead

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of the Japanese surrender. When Boatner arrived a few days later, he and I went around in a car and he selected the house that he wanted to live in. Then it was up to me to notify the occupants of the house that the American Government wanted to use that particular house for one of its military staff. Well, it happened that this house was occupied by the German ambassador to the Chinese puppet government, a man named Wohramann, I believe. He was fully expecting to be ousted so there was no problem. But, I then did set up that house for Boatner, as the number two in the Chinese Combat Command, staffed it with servants and so on and got it running well. It turned out three months later when the Marshall Mission went to China, that General Marshall took that house over. It was where he lived for the period he was there. I never actually saw General Marshall in our office at any time in the State Department. The person that we did see was General Marshall Carter from the War Department -- I guess later, the Department of

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of Defense. But he was the principal liaison officer with the Marshall Mission and he had a desk in the Office of Chinese Affairs. That was apart from, and yet related to, the ongoing events in the Division of Chinese Affairs.

MCKINZIE: But being particularly concerned with the administrative matters, this did not pose any real problem?

WEIGLE: No, this imposed no problems, although Carter would be a very regular visitor to the Director, to Mr. Vincent. And, of course, later this job was taken on by Walton Butterworth, and Carter would see him. Later, after I had left, [Dean] Rusk came in as the Assistant Secretary.

MCKINZIE: May I ask you something about Japanese affairs? You mentioned that Korea was treated as something of a second-class citizen, partly because it was still a military situation in Korea. Japan was very much a military situation in a way?

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WEIGLE: But because of the Far Eastern Commission and SCAP, we were much more heavily involved with Japan. As a matter of fact, I have one little reminiscence which I think really ought to go down into history in the Truman Library. On one particular weekend, when we were still in Old State, in the old State-War-Navy building directly across the street from the White House,

Mr. Acheson was in Europe. He was the Secretary of State. Mr. Lovett, the Under Secretary, was on Long Island for the weekend, so Mr. Vincent, my boss, was the top-ranking man politically on anything having to do with Japan or MacArthur. A telegram came in which required notes to the various SCAP embassies in Washington, the British, French, Chinese, and so on. Mr. Vincent drafted a possible note for the President to send to these embassies and took it across the street to the White House to show to Mr. Truman. Well, the President was in swimming and Mr. Vincent couldn't see him at the time. So he left the telegram and

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the proposed note and came back to his office to await the President's pleasure.

A little after noon -- 12:30 or 1:00 o'clock, somewhere along in there -- the telephone rang. It was quite a surprise to the secretary, Betty Robinson, who was on duty that weekend in Mr. Vincent's outer office, to find that it was President Truman on the telephone. She practically dropped her teeth because this was a little unusual to get a call directly from the President. Mr. Vincent himself was surprised because he thought that Mr. Truman would just send for him to come back across the street. Well, the President said, "Mr. Vincent, I've read the telegram and I've read your proposed note. This is exactly the way I think we should handle the matters so if you'll get these notes ready for my initials we'll get them out to the embassies this afternoon."

Mr. Vincent said, "Mr. President, those notes must go out on White House stationery. We don't have any here and I rather thought that they'd

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be prepared in your office."

Whereupon Mr. Truman said, "But Mr. Vincent, it's Saturday afternoon and they've all gone off and left me and there's no one here who can type." This I thought was a great commentary on the way the President's office was then operated.

MCKINZIE: You were in this office at the time that China began to deteriorate rapidly and, in fact, when the Nationalist Government had to retreat to Formosa?

WEIGLE: Right. One of my jobs was to do the actual physical production of the famous China White Paper, the big thick volume. I think we had about 35 or 40 stenographers working on that to try to get it ready for publication.

MCKINZIE: Would you call yourself the editor of it?

WEIGLE: No. I wasn't the editor of it. It was simply getting the thing together and ready. The documents were all fed into me by the Division of Chinese Affairs.

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MCKINZIE: You were kind of the manager of the publication itself?

WEIGLE: Yes.

MCKINZIE: I see. I guess the question I'm trying to get at is when there would be some crisis event like the rapid military deterioration of the Nationalist forces in China, did such events as that sort of overshadow or eclipse the other work of your office?

WEIGLE: No. I don't think that that could be said.

MCKINZIE: I'm trying to get an idea of whether or not it was too big, in your opinion'

WEIGLE: No. We were aware that it was going on. It seemed to be a force that nobody could stop. The policy that the Department was trying to follow, in my opinion, was to attempt to leave our consular personnel in place and not move them out ahead of the Communist tide. This, of course, was followed with Consul General Angus Ward

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in Mukden, and others. But, of course, what happened was that they were held as virtual prisoners in the consulate generals. When it became clear that they couldn't function at all, our efforts were exerted in the direction of how to get them supplied, how to get them out, how to get them freed. But, originally, the thought was that we would just leave them in place in the hope that they could continue to function after this new government had occupied the territory.

Of course, even the British faced problems. They held their people in place and they faced great problems, too. There was lots of talk, of course, at the time. McCarthy was rampant and there was all sorts of talk about how "Red" the Far Eastern people were.

MCKINZIE: That was the next question I wanted to ask you. Some of the people who were in on some of the desks did get exposed to a good deal of public criticism and most of it was highly

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unjustified ?

WEIGLE: I think so. I think that events have shown that most of the officers who were accused of this were simply trying to report what they saw as facts. Jack Service, of course, had a hard time. I never really saw him in the Department at all. John Carter Vincent was supposed to be under the influence of Owen Latimore in the Office. On the other hand, on a number of occasions, I saw Teddy White there. He would come in and have luncheon with Vincent.

We did have only one occasion that I can recall, when an officer in the Far Eastern office was thought to be of possibly doubtful loyalty. As a result of that I was under instructions in that particular case to make excuses so that he never saw a top secret telegram. These were kept from him. I think that was a mistake in judgment. I've known him for a long time, known him since and I have no reason to question his

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loyalty. But at least there was that one instance that I can recall where we were asked specifically by a higher authority in the State Department to deny a person that particular security clearance.

The officer never knew that that was the case. He probably just thought there weren't any particular top secret telegrams coming in at the time.

MCKINZIE: Do you recall chronologically whether this was toward the beginning or toward the end of your tenure?

WEIGLE: I can't remember. I think that that was somewhat later on.

MCKINZIE: Were you yourself, by virtue of your affiliation with the Office ever questioned by anyone?

WEIGLE: I was never questioned, no. Never at any point. Now in that same connection I think I should go back to Kunming and the several months I spent there. During this time in

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mid-1945 I talked with a great many Chinese people. The thing that was amazing and disheartening in a way, was that even rather well-placed people who should have known better among our Chinese friends would say that the Chiang government was hopelessly corrupt and that nothing could be worse than the Chiang government. They were ready to take a chance with the Communists So one sensed that this was a kind of pervasive attitude, at least there in the Kunming area, which might well have been true of other areas of China as well. One could hardly say that was the fault of the Chiang government. Their funds had been pretty well cut off by the Japanese occupation of the whole seaboard. Inflation was the only way they could meet their obligations, and "squeeze" was the only way that poorly paid government officials could live. So you can see how the whole thing developed.

MCKINZIE: You're not as inclined to be as critical of Chiang as some other officials in the State

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Department were?

WEIGLE: No. I think he was doing what he could do. Now, I think he undoubtedly made some bad decisions. I've read this in the most recent book. I am sure that he wasn't as able as he should have been. I can remember another occasion this was in Chihchiang, our most advanced American airbase where I was present at the time that the Japanese sent their general from Nanking to negotiate for the surrender of the Japanese forces in China. We were there, and we began to get reports as to what Chiang planned in the way of sending troops and commanders into Manchuria. It was perfectly clear that he was sending the same old warlord types back into the same positions. The Americans in the military at that time simply said that this was a great tragedy and that they were just afraid that instead of treating the country as liberated territory these generals would start to oppress the people. This is, of course,

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exactly what happened.

Then, you see, a perfectly disastrous military decision followed. A man went into Mukden, we'll say, or Harbin, or some other place, and he began to act as he had acted and the people began to be restive. So he said, "I've got to have some protection." So he would get a regiment or a battalion of the crack new armies that the Americans had trained and equipped. The result was that this army think it was the new First Army that went into Manchuria, and the new Sixth into the Nanking area, I may be foggy on that, I can't recall exactly now -- but instead of having an army which could function as an army and which would have been a perfectly good match for the Chinese Communists, the Communists followed the wise strategy of simply moving all their forces against this regiment and then against that battalion. They just chewed it up piecemeal; so that we could see all that coming. So, there's no clear way in which you can say this is the reason that happened or

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that is the reason it happened. It was a combination of a lot of things.

MCKINZIE: This is a little out of context of what we were talking about before. You did say at one point you were puzzled over whether you might want to seek a Government career or to write a book on the Chinese Army in India. Obviously, you have been thinking about that. Have you ever written on the subject?

WEIGLE: I never have.

MCKINZIE: Did you at the time have any strong ideas for a theme on that prospective book?

WEIGLE: No. The only thing I've thought of now is that I did keep a very detailed diary of the events in, oh, roughly the week when the Japanese came to sue for surrender in Chihichiang, and then our trip down into Nanking. I thought at some point that, as source material, this might make an interesting small volume of 60 or 75 pages. That would be a kind of a

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specialized thing. It wouldn't be good for general reading. I paraphrased in the diary all of the telegrams that I had to send back to American headquarters, and telegrams then that came into us. So, it would just be useful source material. But, I don't even have time to do that, let alone thinking about a book.

MCKINZIE: Might I ask whether serving almost four years in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs served you well now as a distinguished academician? Did it have anything to do with your subsequent career?

WEIGLE: Well, it hasn't had too much to do with the subsequent career, except, of course, that you feel perfectly at home talking with Government types or army and navy people or anybody else like that. I think it's good preparation in a way for a college presidency because after you've been dealing with national and international problems the problems of a college

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you can put into lesser perspective, proper perspective, perhaps. You don't need to get so upset about some of these things. But I thoroughly enjoyed the 3 1/2 to 4 years. I wouldn't trade them. I still feel quite at home in Washington and in the Department, although it's changed a great deal now. And, of course, I made many wonderful friends that I've kept up with over the years. My wife and I have run into them now in ambassadorships around the world when we travel -- all that kind of thing.

I think in the end the decision to come back into the academic world was perhaps twofold. On the one hand, I think I had always been somewhat predisposed toward teaching. Yet, the administrative work that I had done in Yale-in-China, in the army, and in the State Department made a college presidency a likely choice. Especially in a small college like St. John's, where I thought I'd be able to teach as well as administer.

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And then the second factor, I think, had something to do with Government itself. That is, you begin to feel in a bureaucracy that if you have any ideas it is almost impossible to get them implemented: that you are up against a stone wall of red tape and of inertia: that you couldn't really accomplish what you'd like to see accomplished. Now, that might be different for a man who is Secretary of State or Undersecretary or even an Assistant Secretary of State. One felt a little bit as though the bureaucracy of the Government tended to stifle initiative. And the thing that seemed so intriguing to me about St. John's College was that I could be master of my own destiny, subject, of course, to the Board of Visitors and Governors. But here was an institution which was down and out and presented a tremendous challenge. It was something that I could do, whereas over there in State, especially with the institution of the bureaus and executive directors, and all of that, it looked to me as

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though it was just getting more and more difficult to coordinate messages and to get imaginative ideas across. I think that's one of the reasons why I finally decided to make the shift.

MCKINZIE: Thank you very much, sir.

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