

Oral History Interview

With

OSCAR R. EWING

Attorney, Hughes, Hubbard & Ewing, New York, New York, and predecessor firms, 1919-1947; Assistant Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 1940-42; Vice Chairman, 1942-47; Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General, 1942 and again in 1947; Acting Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 1946; Administrator of the Federal Security Agency, 1947-53; and organizer and member of an unofficial political policy group during the Truman administration, 1947-52.

Chapel Hill, North Carolina

April 29, April 30, May 1, and May 2, 1969

by J. R. Fuchs, Harry S. Truman Library

The Harry S. Truman Library

Independence, Missouri

July 1971

This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written, word.

RESTRICTIONS

This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

[1]

Oral History Interview

With

OSCAR R. EWING

Chapel Hill, North Carolina

April 29, 1969

by J. R. Fuchs, Harry S. Truman Library

FUCHS: Mr. Ewing, I wonder if you would mind beginning with a statement of your background, when and where you were born, your education and anything else that you think might be of interest to history.

EWING: Well, I was born in Greensburg, Indiana on March 8, 1889. My father was a merchant. His name was George M. Ewing and he was one of fifteen children. His father and mother had migrated from Kentucky to Indiana in 1826.

The Ewing family, so far as we know their story, began in about 1665. A William Ewing, who had been born in that year near Stirling Castle, Scotland, as a young man migrated to Londonderry, Ireland, where he was married to a Scottish girl living in Ireland. We know that this William Ewing fought in the battle of Londonderry, which I think was about 1689.

In about 1725 , two or three of the sons of William Ewing migrated together to America. One of these sons was Joshua Ewing, who settled in Cecil County, Maryland,

[2]

near Elkton.

Joshua Ewing had a number of sons and daughters. One of these was my ancestor, Captain Patrick Ewing. The youngest son of Joshua Ewing was Nathaniel Ewing. He was the grandfather of Adlai Ewing Stevenson, who was Vice President of the United States from 1893 to 1897 and the great, great grandfather of Adlai Ewing Stevenson who was the Democratic candidate for President in 1952 and 1956.

My ancestor, Captain Patrick Ewing, lived in Cecil County, Maryland and was a soldier in the Revolution. The story is that he was commissary general under Washington when his army was at Valley Forge. I used to boast a good deal about that until I realized that the American Army at Valley Forge had nearly starved to death, so I stopped bragging about this ancestor.

Captain Patrick Ewing had a large number of children. The son through whom I trace my ancestry was named Putnam Ewing. He married a Jane McClellan from the adjoining county, Chester County, Pennsylvania. Jane McClellan Ewing was, by tradition, a woman of great beauty and fine intellect. In our family it was for a long time thought that she was closely related to General George B. McClellan, a commander of the Union Army of the Potomac in the Civil War. I mentioned

[3]

this to General McClellan's son, the former Mayor of New York, George B. McClellan, Jr., when I sat beside him at a lunch back in the 1920s. He said the relationship must be rather remote. He explained that originally there were three McClellan brothers who had migrated from Ireland to America. One settled in Maine, one in Connecticut and one in Chester County, Pennsylvania. Mayor McClellan said that his branch of the family was descended from the brother who settled

in Connecticut while Jane McClellan Ewing, being from Chester County, Pennsylvania, was undoubtedly descended from the brother who had settled in that county.

Putnam Ewing and his wife had two sons born in Maryland. One of these was my grandfather, Patrick Ewing, born July 28, 1803. Shortly after his birth the family migrated to Bath County, Kentucky, where Patrick grew to manhood amidst nine brothers and sisters.

On September 5, 1826 Patrick was married to Lydia Morgan. About a year after their marriage they migrated to Decatur County, Indiana where they thereafter resided.

Lydia Morgan Ewing had an interesting family background. Edward Morgan, his wife and two children, shortly after 1700, crossed the Atlantic Ocean from Wales and settled near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The older child was a son, David, who

[4]

was grandmother Lydia Morgan's ancestor. The other child was a daughter, Sarah, who in 1720 married Squire Boone and was the mother of Daniel Boone.

In "Annals of North Carolina" (Petree, 1804), Squire Boone is reported to have stated that his wife had another brother, Daniel, who was one of the great American generals in the Revolutionary War. In the first battle of Saratoga, as a colonel commanding a regiment of sharpshooters, Daniel Morgan had ordered his men to pick out the Redcoats wearing epaulets (officers). As a result so many of Burgoyne's officers were killed that he could not handle his troops adequately during the second Saratoga battle, which contributed much to that great American victory in October 1777. Subsequently, Daniel Morgan retired from the army being piqued by the promotion of certain officers over him whom he felt less deserving.

After the fall of Charleston, South Carolina on May 12, 1780, Congress passed a resolution calling on Morgan to join the Southern Army then commanded by General Horatio Gates under whom Morgan had served at Saratoga. At Gates' urging Congress made Morgan a Brigadier General and he was made head of a Special Service. After Gates' defeat in the battle of Camden, South Carolina, August 16, 1780, he was

[5]

replaced as Commander of the Southern Army by Nathaniel Greene. Greene gave Morgan an independent command and with these troops he battled a British force under Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton at Cowpens, South Carolina on January 17, 1781 and won one of the most brilliant American victories of the Revolution. Out of some 1,100 men the British losses were 600 prisoners and over 200 killed and wounded while the American losses were 72 killed and wounded out of less than 1,000 troops.

As before stated, my grandfather Patrick Ewing and his wife, Lydia Morgan Ewing, migrated from Kentucky to Indiana in 1826. Grandfather had walked from Bath County, Kentucky to Cincinnati where he crossed the Ohio River, then from Cincinnati out to Decatur County, Indiana

and there he entered 80 acres of Government land. He paid a dollar and a quarter an acre. He chose this particular land because a half uncle, David Douglas, had already entered an adjoining tract of land. David Douglas was a farmer and a part-time preacher.

FUCHS: Is that near a settlement with a name?

EWING: Yes, it was quite near Greensburg, Indiana, about five miles west of Greensburg, and was very good black land. Having chosen his land Grandfather started on a return

[6]

trip going first to Brookville, Indiana, where the Government land office was located and there paid his \$100, and formally entered the land. From Brookville Grandfather walked back to Cincinnati, re-crossed the Ohio River and walked back to Bath County. A Bath County neighbor loaned him a horse for the trip back to Indiana. Grandmother rode the horse holding one child. Grandfather led the horse. These were, as I calculated, about a hundred and sixty-five mile trips. They got back to Decatur County, Indiana somewhat late in the fall so that Grandfather only had time to build a three-sided log cabin before winter really set in. The family spent that first winter in that three-sided log cabin with the south side open and exposed to the sun. In the spring, Grandfather rode the horse back to Bath County and then walked back to his new land in Decatur County.

Grandfather and Grandmother had fifteen children. Every one of them lived to have children of their own. At one time I had fifty-four first cousins, two on my mother's side and fifty-two on the Ewing side.

FUCHS: Isn't that amazing?

EWING: Yes, it is. My father was one of the younger sons. He was the twelfth child. He left the farm rather early

[7]

and went into Greensburg and became a merchant. He had a farm, also, a little way out from Greensburg; and he continued as a merchant. It was sort of a general grocery store and hardware and almost everything. Then he sold that out when I was quite young and went into farmer's supply business. That continued until his death.

FUCHS: Did you live on the farm any?

EWING: No. Father and mother had gone to housekeeping in a little house in Greensburg that her father had given them, and that's been in the family ever since. My sister lives in it now. I was born in that house and so was she.

FUCHS: Who did your father marry?

EWING: Father married Jeanette Ross. She was a local girl in Greensburg and really a very superior woman. She had had one year at Western College, in Oxford, Ohio, and was really a woman of fine literary tastes and just a thoroughly fine person.

FUCHS: You say that was Western College?

EWING: The Western College, that was a ladies college at Oxford, Ohio.

[8]

FUCHS: Where Miami University is now?

EWING: Yes, yes.

FUCHS: Is Western still there?

EWING: It's still there, yes.

I personally had a very happy boyhood in a small midwestern town doing the usual things that a kid does. I attended the public schools in Greensburg through high school. In high school I took part in the usual school activities, particularly debating. I never was very much for athletics. I never had any particular competency there. I was president of my senior class in high school. From there I went on to Indiana University entering the freshman class in 1906. I joined the Beta Theta Pi Fraternity and lived in the Beta house for the four years I was at I. U.

I became rather active in college politics and in my junior year I ran for president of my class and was elected, and again in my senior year I ran for president of my class and was elected. I understand that I am the only student in the history of Indiana University who has been elected president of both his junior and senior classes. I had a very happy time at the University. I was valedictorian of my class and this was an unexpected honor because I simply

[9]

assumed that many of my classmates had better academic records than mine. However, when the faculty named me valedictorian I asked no questions.

FUCHS: You graduated in what year?

EWING: I graduated in 1910. Then...

FUCHS: What did you major in?

EWING: I majored in philosophy.

FUCHS: Did you take that as a good background for your going into law or did you think of that as good background for politics, or how did you decide on philosophy?

EWING: Well, it so happened that one of the best and most interesting professors was head of the philosophy department. I think it was in my second year that I took a general course in philosophy under Professor Lindley and he was so interesting that I--I mean he made the whole subject so interesting, that I decided to major in it. I was very glad that I had done so because the whole trend at that time and even today is, toward scientific courses which involve analysis, breaking down, analyzing this and that and the other. Whereas philosophy, its main purpose is synthesis, trying to put

[10]

things together and make sense out of them, getting the meaning of the whole rather than breaking down the parts and concentrating on those. Synthesis is needed so much, I don't say more than analysis, but there is much less emphasis put on it and I think it is equally needed.

After I graduated from college at Indiana University in 1910, I determined to go to Harvard Law School. I had always known, since I was a youngster, that I wanted to be a lawyer.

FUCHS: What influenced your thinking that way, do you recall?

EWING: Well, I had two uncles and three cousins who had been lawyers and one of these uncles particularly was almost my idol. He was wonderfully nice to me and I was extremely fond of him, so much so that I named my first son for him, James Ewing.

FUCHS: Was he in Greensburg?

EWING: He was in Greensburg. He'd been a judge of the Circuit Court there and really influenced me very much. I had taken one or two law courses at Indiana University, which I was allowed to do, and apply the credits to my A.B. degree. I wanted to go on to Harvard. My father was very much opposed to this. He didn't feel that he could afford it. He also

[11]

felt that I could do like my uncles and cousins had done and that was read law in some lawyer's office; that they had been quite successful and there was no reason why I couldn't get my legal education in the same way.

FUCHS: I suppose there was no law school in Indiana at the time?

EWING: Yes, oh, yes there was a law school at Indiana University, but I don't think there was any question but that at that time Harvard Law School was the best in the country. I thought that if I was to go to a law school I might just as well go to the best. My father said he would not help me financially, and so I got a job taking subscriptions for the *Saturday Evening Post* and the *Ladies Home Journal*. My sister helped with that. As a result, I saved up about four hundred dollars that summer. This was enough to get me started in Cambridge where I also got a job

waiting table in Randall Hall. In the meantime, my father had agreed to go on my note at the bank for what I would have to borrow to see me through.

FUCHS: Was it difficult to gain admittance to Harvard Law School at that time?

[12]

EWING: No, at that time if you had an A.B. degree Harvard Law School would admit you. Oh, I think one had to stand reasonably well in college but I had been valedictorian of my class, so I had no problem on that score. The first year in law school I did pretty well and made an A grade, so that made me eligible to be an editor of the *Harvard Law Review*.

In the fall of my second year I was made a member of the Choate Club. If my memory is correct, each fall the club took in five second year men who were graduates of Harvard College, five of Yale, five of Princeton and five all-American, that is graduates of any other colleges. Besides monthly meetings at which a third year man would read a scholarly paper, the club had two big dinners a year, one in the fall and another in the spring. At the first dinner I attended I was the only member not dressed in a tuxedo. Naturally, I felt uncomfortable. Then, just before the Christmas vacation, Jim Dennis, one of my classmates who lived in Morristown, New Jersey., invited me to spend the vacation with him. I wanted very much to accept but I knew a tuxedo was essential, so I went ahead and bought one at Brooks Brothers in New York. Well, when my father heard that it made him so mad that he said he

[13]

was not going on my note anymore.

Shortly after my return to Cambridge after Christmas the mid-term bill arrived and I didn't have the money to pay it. Several people in Greensburg had offered to help me if I needed it. But when I needed help one of them had died, another had lost his job and the others all had excuses. I was in a desperate situation. I had explored every source of a loan that I could think of and in my desperation I went into Dean Thayer, and asked him if the Law School had any loan funds that were available.

I had got to know Dean Thayer early in my first year at the Law School by reason of a peculiar combination of circumstances. I had been admitted to the bar in Indiana on my twenty-first birthday, in March before I graduated from Indiana University and...

FUCHS: You had been admitted to the bar?

EWING: Yes, in Indiana at that time the only qualifications required for admission was that the applicant be twenty-one years old and of good moral character. So I was admitted merely on a motion. About a month after I first arrived in Cambridge in the fall of 1910 I got a telegram from the Democratic county chairman in Decatur County

[14]

that the man that they had nominated for Prosecuting Attorney in Decatur County had had to resign. He had been accused of some trivial crime--I think it was rape. So the Democrats decided that he wouldn't be a very good candidate and they wanted to nominate me for his place on the ticket. I didn't know what to do, it was a pretty flattering offer, it would mean \$1,000 or \$1,200 a year which was big money in those days in a county seat. I went in to ask Dean Thayer for his advice as to what I should do. Apparently it was rather unusual for a first year law student to be offered the nomination as a prosecuting attorney but nevertheless Dean Thayer said he would advise me to stay in law school. He said, "If I didn't believe in a law school education I wouldn't have given up the practice myself to become Dean." And so I followed his advice and refused the nomination.

FUCHS: What was his first name?

EWING: Ezra Ripley Thayer. So when I went back to him to ask if any loan funds were available he knew something of my background. When I told him what a bind I was in, he wanted to know how much I needed. I said, "Two hundred and twenty-five dollars for my mid-term bill." And I

[15]

saw him take his checkbook and then he handed me a check for two hundred and twenty-five dollars. I said, "Dean Thayer, I didn't come in here to borrow money from you."

He said, "I know, that's all right." He said, "I'm glad to do it." Then he added: "Do you think if I took over the indebtedness at the bank that your father's already obligated on, it would relieve his mind?"

I said, "Yes, I'm sure it would, but you're not going to do it because he's hooked for that and he's going to stay hooked."

"Well," he said, "if you ever need any more, don't hesitate to come back."

And the next year I did have to borrow another hundred dollars. So that made my indebtedness to him three hundred and twenty-five dollars. I gave him a note for it and he said to pay it back whenever I was able. Unfortunately, he had a bad breakdown in 1915. While the first Mrs. Ewing and I were on our honeymoon that fall, I read in the paper that he had committed suicide. He had found that he had cancer of the throat and it was inoperative. Apparently he suffered terribly and no one can blame him for what he did. When I read of his death I wrote to Mrs. Thayer a letter of condolence and also referred to my indebtedness.

[16]

I said I knew that they would want to settle the estate and if she would have her attorney calculate the interest and let me know the amount, I would arrange to take care of it. Well, she wrote back the most beautiful letter I almost ever received. She said that Dean Thayer was so

fond of me that she wanted that indebtedness to be her contribution to the new Ewing menage. She did it in such a way that it would have been rude not to have accepted. But over the years the debt was on my conscience. So, a number of years ago, I don't know how long ago, I set up a loan fund at Harvard in memory of Dean Thayer, and altogether I've given it something over a hundred thousand dollars.

FUCHS: Very interesting.

EWING: Well I...

FUCHS: Was she still living when you did that?

EWING: She was still living when I started it; I don't think she's living now. I just felt that I owed it and I owed very much to Harvard Law School.

FUCHS: I would like to go back just a bit. Did you have brothers and sisters?

[17]

EWING: One sister still living and...

FUCHS: I see.

EWING: Another who had died before I was born.

FUCHS: I believe when you were quite young you had some political experiences. I think that I've read that you gave a speech as early as your eleventh year.

EWING: Yes. Well, really that wasn't a very creditable performance. One of my uncles who had a farm was going to have a Democratic pole raising in the campaign of 1900. They would raise a hickory pole, you know, for Old Hickory Andrew Jackson and my uncle wanted me to make the speech. I tried to commit to memory a speech my mother had written for me. When I got up and was declaiming it, I got about half way through and forgot the rest. I don't know that it contributed to the defeat of Mr. Bryan in 1900 but I know that it didn't help him any.

FUCHS: You were already a strong Democrat.

EWING: Yes. The Ewing family, on the whole were very strong Democrats. You see my Grandfather Ewing, when he left Kentucky, left five brothers behind and every one of them

[18]

served in the Confederate Army. When the heat and emotion of the Civil War came along in Indiana there was a lot of bitterness and anyone who was a Democrat was castigated and viewed with suspicion. I think that experience hardened all the Ewings against the Republican Party. And that feeling has persisted down through succeeding generations. In my own youth, people

would come up to me and say, "How can any intelligent person be a Democrat?" Well, it would make me so mad that I couldn't be a Republican.

FUCHS: Then I believe you had another political experience attending one of the conventions?

EWING: Yes. That was in 1904, when the World's Fair was going on at St. Louis and the Democratic National Convention was held there. By that time I was fifteen years old and really very much interested in politics. So, two of my friends, boys about my age, and I, we all went--supposedly to the fair. I went to the fair one day and attended the Democratic National Convention five days. That year the Democrats nominated Alton B. Parker for President. After I got back to Greensburg, there were so few supporters of Parker that they couldn't get enough Democrats to fill the committee offices; so they had elected me secretary of the

[19]

county committee in Decatur County. That was a very, very interesting experience and a liberal education for politics at the grass roots. We had no money and would have to pass the hat when we needed to buy postcards to notify the county committee of a meeting. But I learned to carry a poll book and do the chores of politics in that way.

FUCHS: What was the population approximately of the town or village, and of the county? Do you recall?

EWING: Well, at that time it was probably around four thousand in Greensburg and I dare say that the county was, oh, probably twelve thousand, something like that.

FUCHS: Do you think this was the experience that caused them to offer you the nomination for county prosecuting attorney?

EWING: I dare say it was. I had worked with the organization and I knew all the other workers. Yes, I have no doubt it had something to do with it.

FUCHS: Were there any other political experiences that you recall prior to your graduation from Harvard Law?

EWING: No, because I made up my mind then that I would not spend much time on politics until I had become established

[20]

as a lawyer and was financially independent. I don't think anyone should go into politics and give it all his time until he has got to the point where he's independent financially. It is only then that you can be completely free of the pressures of politics and can tell anybody to go to hell.

FUCHS: Before we went back away, you were commenting about the advantages of graduating from Harvard Law School in those days.

EWING: Well, at that time I think, 1910 , when I was considering where to go, I think that Harvard was the pre-eminent law school of the country. Today, there are other very, very fine law schools; Yale and some of the midwestern schools are top-notch. So that going to Harvard isn't anywhere nearly as important today as it was in those days, although I still think it's probably the best law school in the country.

FUCHS: I believe that you had some interesting classmates at Indiana University.

EWING: Yes. Well, the two most prominent were not classmates but they were fraternity brothers of mine. When I was a

[21]

senior Paul McNutt was a freshman. He was also a Beta and his first year I saw a great deal of him since we lived in the same house. I liked him very much and admired him. He was a very handsome man, a good student, a hard worker, and I got to know him very well. Then Wendell Willkie was in Paul's graduating class but he was not taken into the fraternity until his senior year. That meant that I had graduated three years before he joined the fraternity. I entered Indiana University in 1906 and he entered in 1909. Both Paul and Wendell entered in the fall of 1909. But Wendell wasn't taken into the fraternity until 1912, the fall of 1912.

FUCHS: The enrollment was large enough by then that you wouldn't necessarily have known him then even if he was there.

EWING: That is true. I did not know him at all in college. He had a sister and a brother who were contemporaries of mine and I did know them because they were a class ahead of me or maybe two classes, but at least I got to know them. But I didn't know Wendell in college. I got to know him very well later in New York.

FUCHS: What about prominent classmates at Harvard Law?

[22]

EWING: Well, I had a lot of them there, because I think truly the class of 1913 at the law school probably was one of the best classes of all time for the prominence of its graduates. Bob Taft was in our class; he was president of the *Law Review* in my last year on it. Charles Evans Hughes, Jr. was president of the *Law Review* my first year on it. Then we had Jim Kem who practiced law in Kansas City and was later United States Senator from Missouri. Owen Brewster of Maine, was Governor of Maine and Senator for a long while--he was a member of our class. We had a large number of judges. Harold Stevens was judge of the United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia. I think he was chief justice, if I'm not mistaken, for part of his time. I can't think of the others but there were quite a few that made really great names for themselves.

FUCHS: Do you recall any incidents, humorous or otherwise involving any of these people, Taft or Hughes, Jr., that might be of interest as a little footnote? What were your impressions of Taft when he was in law school?

EWING: Well, I was a great admirer of Bob Taft. He was a brilliant man, and when you got to know him you found him

[23]

to be really a very warm person. He didn't have that public image but he was really a very warm person and we were very good friends. When I was nominated by President Truman as Federal Security Administrator, Bob at that time was the Republican leader of the Senate and the Republicans controlled both the House and the Senate. Bob took me in and introduced me to the Finance Committee which passed on my nomination and urged my nomination. He couldn't have been nicer. Later I did a thing that offended him and I have always regretted it deeply. Bob was running for re-election to the Senate in 1950 and Mike DiSalle was his Democratic opponent. Mike asked me to make a speech for him in Toledo and I told him I would. So, I had someone on my staff, I forget who it was, draft a speech for me. When I read the draft I found it was bitter and full of personal attacks. So I completely rewrote the speech and tried to take out everything that was personal or that could possibly be offensive. None the less Bob was greatly offended by the speech. He introduced it in the *Congressional Record* as an example of a carpetbagger's speech. I was a carpetbagger coming from New York out to Ohio to make a speech against him. Well, I knew there was nothing that I

[24]

could say. I always felt we had a right to our political differences. I wouldn't for the world have said anything personal against him but there was apparently something to which he took offense and I regretted it. But there was no use even apologizing because...

FUCHS: Did you review the speech to see if you could possibly isolate what it was?

EWING: Oh, yes, I went over it again even afterwards because I was very much upset by his reaction.

FUCHS: Wasn't there some other gentleman there that said that he concurred with you that you didn't think Taft had any reason for...

EWING: Yes, that happened at one of our class reunions later on. Paul Alexander, also of the law school class of 1913, was judge of the Juvenile Court in Toledo. We were both attending our class reunion in 1953 and were raising money for a memorial for Bob Taft to be located right across the street on the vacant lot north of the Capitol and west of the Old Senate Office Building.

FUCHS: Is this the carillon?

EWING: It's a...

[25]

FUCHS: Bell tower.

EWING: No, no, it's a--oh, what do they call those things that...

FUCHS: The only thing I can think of is pyramid. I was thinking they erected a bell tower in his honor, but I must be thinking of someone else.

EWING: Well, whatever its name it was the memorial for Bob Taft that we were raising money for, and in the course of a discussion I told my classmates about this unfortunate experience I'd had of unintentionally offending Bob. Judge Alexander of the Juvenile Court in Toledo and a member of our class, spoke up and he said, "Why, Jack, I heard you make that speech and I can't recall a single thing that I could think would be offensive to anyone."

FUCHS: Do you think maybe it was just that as a former classmate he felt that you shouldn't say anything?

EWING: Probably, he probably felt that way, but after all he certainly knew I was a Democrat because he had recommended my appointment to the Senate Finance Committee. And he knew I had been appointed Federal Security Administrator by a Democratic President.

[26]

FUCHS: You think he was thinskinmed politically?

EWING: No, I don't know. We had been such good friends that I think the fact that I had spoken for his adversary would perhaps hurt him. I didn't mean to. Some people are that way and some people are very much influenced by those things.

When I was Vice Chairman of the Democratic National Committee I was still a partner in my New York law firm of Hughes, Hubbard and Ewing. The senior partner of that firm was Charles Evans Hughes, Jr. Apparently one of our clients, I never knew which one, took great offense at my being active in Democratic politics. This man went to Charlie Hughes and told him that their company was going to take their business away from the firm unless they completely took my name out of the firm name and eliminated me from the partnership. I thought Charlie's answer was a marvelous one. He said, "Well, Mr. So-and-So, we would hate very much to lose your business, because your company is a good client, but you know, we here in this office only have one thing to sell, and that's our legal talent. Our political views are not for sale." I don't know whether the man left with his business or not, but that was the answer that he got.

[27]

FUCHS: What were your relations with Senator Taft after this incident?

EWING: I don't think I ever saw him after that. I'm pretty sure I didn't.

FUCHS: You think that any of the subsequent legislation that came under the purview of Congress, more or less through the aegis of the Federal Security Administration might have been opposed by him and a little bit more vehemently on account of this incident?

EWING: I have no reason whatever to think so. Actually, I think he had taken all of his positions on welfare legislation before I ever was in office.

FUCHS: To go back, after you graduated from the Harvard Law School in 1913 what were your first moves then?

EWING: My first year out of law school I taught in the University of Iowa Law School. I greatly enjoyed this experience although I learned much more than my pupils did. My faculty associates were friendly, attractive men with whom it was a pleasure to work. Nevertheless, although I had intended to teach for at least two years,

[28]

before the end of the first year I was restless to get into active law practice, and hence I declined reappointment. My father thought my decision was very foolish. At that time teaching law had been given an added aura by reason of President Taft accepting a professorship at the Yale Law School at the end of his term as President in 1913. My father was greatly impressed by this and also by the fact that I was giving up a salary of \$1800 for nine months work, much of which would be applied to my bank loans on which he was an endorser.

In the fall of 1914 I went to Indianapolis and accepted a clerkship in the office of Whitcomb, Dowden and Stout at \$50 a month. That firm passed on the title of real estate on which the Prudential Insurance Company were making mortgage loans. I did much of this work and also assisted the senior partner in trial work. After about a year I joined up with Carl Wyle and Charles Jewett (a former Mayor of Indianapolis), in the firm of Wyle, Jewett and Ewing. The inclusion in the firm name of my own was not because I was a partner. I was really on my own. I just had a desk in the office and got what business I could, which was not much.

FUCHS: What year did you marry, sir?

[29]

EWING: I was married to Helen E. Dennis on November 4, 1915. Her home was in Morristown, New Jersey and she was a sister of a classmate at Harvard. Of course, Mrs. Ewing's father had to help us out financially at first. He was a director of the Pennsylvania Lines West of Pittsburgh. About a year after Helen and I were married I was offered the position of Assistant Counsel of the Vandalia Railroad Company, a subsidiary of the Pennsylvania Lines West of Pittsburgh. My salary was to be \$3600 a year. This meant moving to St. Louis which we did in the spring of '16.

We remained in St. Louis for about a year when I was made Assistant Counsel of the Pennsylvania Lines West of Pittsburgh and moved to Pittsburgh. About this time World War I began and I again got restless, feeling that I ought to get into the service. By that time I had a wife and a child, but nevertheless I wanted to get into uniform, and Helen encouraged me to do it. So I went into the Army. I was given a First Lieutenant's commission and was made a Contracting Officer of Aircraft Production. Later I was promoted to the rank of Captain. Another Captain and I were the two officers who made most of the contracts for American aircraft in World War I.

[30]

FUCHS: Where were you stationed?

EWING: In Washington.

FUCHS: What building were you in at that time, do you recall?

EWING: Yes. The building is still standing. It is one of those little temporary buildings designated by the letter "D". Even after I was Federal Security Administrator that building was standing right across from the Federal Security Agency's building. One of the columnists said that he knew that I was a "red" because the only three old World War I buildings still standing near our building were building "R", building "E" and building "D".

FUCHS: But they did tear down some more of those tempos, didn't they?

EWING: Oh, yes.

FUCHS: I believe I saw some place that you wanted to go into welfare work at one time.

EWING: Yes, that was when I was in St. Louis. Well, first I got a taste of it in Indianapolis. When I was living

[31]

there I became a voluntary probation officer of the Juvenile Court and that taught me a lot. The first boy that was assigned to me was a bright kid from a good family. His father was an engineer on one of the railroads and his mother was a very nice person. He had stolen a bicycle. It had just been a boy's prank and he was soon straightened out. The second boy was a rather overgrown young man. I suppose he was sixteen or seventeen. He was overgrown, had adenoids and just wasn't too bright. He lived in a very poor house. His mother was slovenly, "rushed the growler," if you know what I mean by that.

FUCHS: How was that?

EWING: Rushed the growler. Well, she would go to a saloon and get a bucket of beer and carry it home and drink it.

FUCHS: How did that term apply?

EWING: I haven't any idea. But it was a well understood colloquial expression. I just didn't get anywhere with this boy. He needed an adenoid and tonsil operation, and a good deal of medical care. I was unable to

[32]

accomplish any improvement in him. Finally I went to the Judge. I said, "I just give up on that case. I don't see that I have made the slightest bit of progress."

"Well," he said, "you needn't be surprised. You're the third officer that's tried to work with him and the other two have failed also."

In St. Louis, they had a charity organization, I forget what the name of it was. Roger Baldwin was the active director and he resigned to become the director of the American Civil Liberties League. I knew Roger had done a great job in St. Louis and when he resigned I got the idea I might like to succeed him. I applied for the job but they didn't take me, so I kept on in the law. I'm sure that they did me a favor by letting me go on with the law. But emotionally the other job had appealed to me very much.

FUCHS: Were there any experiences in World War I in Washington that left a distinct memory with you that might be of interest?

EWING: No, I don't think there are. It was a routine job where you had to exercise a good deal of judgment, but Captain Schnacke and I, who were the two contracting

[33]

officers, our work was largely routine. They had negotiating officers who would negotiate the contracts and settle the terms, so that our functions were largely just embodying into proper form what had been negotiated. It was just what any lawyer does when his corporate client has negotiated a contract. It was really a little easier than that because, to a large extent, we followed accepted forms.

FUCHS: Then when you came out of the Army what were your next experiences?

EWING: Well, I went to New York and shopped around the larger law offices to try to get a job. I had made up my mind I wanted to practice law in New York.

FUCHS: Anyone influence you in that respect?

EWING: Yes, what had happened was that my father who was living at the time I got out of law school was very anxious for me to practice law back in Greensburg. Well, I didn't want to do that

but he was very anxious for me not to be too far away. It was this fact that had largely influenced me in going to Indianapolis in the first place, although to a person who had been raised

[34]

in Greensburg, Indianapolis looked like a pretty big city.

While I was in the office of Whitcombe, Dowden & Stout I had helped the senior partner of that firm try a case. We spent a week preparing the case for trial, we spent a week trying it, we had to spend a week getting ready for an appeal, and the whole case only involved \$1400. It seemed pretty small. By the time I got out of the Army, my father had died and the urge to go back to Indiana had evaporated, I had had my experience there. I wanted to get where the big law business was and that was New York.

FUCHS: Was all your experience in civil law?

EWING: No, I had had a few small criminal cases. When I went to New York I made the rounds and was offered a job by Cravath & Henderson, which was probably then the biggest firm in New York. Then I was offered one by Hughes, Schurman & Dwight. At that time Charles Evans Hughes was the senior partner. Also I was offered a position with White & Case. That was another big firm in New York. They were counsel for J. P. Morgan & Co. and many large corporations. But I went with the Hughes

[35]

firm and never regretted it. I had some very pleasant experiences there. The personal relations were so very pleasant and it was a delight to get to know Judge Hughes well. He had been twice elected Governor of New York and had resigned in 1910 to become an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. He resigned from the court when the Republican Party nominated him for President in 1916. Judge Hughes had gone back to the firm January 1, 1917, after he had been defeated for the presidency by Woodrow Wilson in 1916. Of course, he immediately drew a very large clientele of important clients. As a result the firm was very busy all the time on big things.

FUCHS: What type of cases were they?

EWING: Well, they were largely corporate. In one case Judge Hughes was asked to defend John L. Lewis, the head of the United Mine Workers. Shortly after the close of World War I the union had called a nationwide strike. It paralyzed the country badly. There was a Federal district judge out in Indianapolis, Judge Albert Anderson, who was an excellent lawyer but pretty much of a tyrant in his court. If he was for you he tried your case. If

[36]

he was against you, God help you. Judge Anderson had caused a grand jury in Indianapolis to indict Lewis and other officers of the miner's union for alleged violations of the anti-trust laws

and the defendants had asked Judge Hughes to defend them. Judge Hughes asked me to help him on the case but I couldn't because I was tied up on some other work. The reason he wanted me was because of my Indiana background. I knew the ropes out there better than anyone else in our office in New York. But I did tell Judge Hughes one thing about Judge Anderson. I said, "Now, you're going out there to argue a motion to dismiss the indictment and I want to give you a tip on what you will be up against with Judge Anderson. If he's against you, and he is against you in this case, you'll start to make an argument and he'll begin asking you questions and he'll keep on asking questions so you'll never be able to finish your argument."

"Well," Judge Hughes said, "thank you. I'm glad to know that."

I didn't go out with him when he argued his motion to dismiss the indictment, but I got the story afterwards and it's still a classic story in Indiana. Things happened just as I had predicted. Judge Hughes got

[37]

started on his argument and he had only spoken a few minutes when Judge Anderson asked him a question. Judge Hughes answered, "If your honor please, I'll answer your question when I come to it in the course of my argument." This happened four or five times with a question and the same reply. Finally, Judge Anderson leaned over the bench and said in a very sneering voice, "Mr. Counsel, this court has asked you five separate questions and all the answer I've got is that you will answer the question in the course of your argument. I don't think that's showing proper respect to this court. I insist that you answer those questions now."

Judge Hughes said, "If your honor please, I'm fully aware of the respect and courtesy that counsel owes the court. I am also fully aware of the courtesy that the court owes counsel to allow him to make his argument in his own way. I'll answer your questions in the course of my argument." Judge Anderson sank back and didn't ask another question.

FUCHS: That's good.

EWING: I had a number of, what to me were interesting cases. One case involved Ivar Kruger. If you'll remember, he

[38]

was the Swedish match king and he was supposed to be one of the richest men in the world. The Swedish firm of Kruger and Toll had match monopolies in many countries all over the world. Kruger's representative came in to me and wanted me to handle a case for him. It had some very interesting facts.

HESS: About what year would this have been?

EWING: Well, it was after the depression started, I'd say around 1930 or 1931. Kruger was negotiating back in the middle 1920s with the Bolsheviks for a match monopoly in Russia. The

negotiations had strung along for some time and finally Kruger became convinced the negotiations would be successful. One provision of the deal was that the Bolshevik government would assume the obligations of outstanding bonds of the old Czarist government. When it looked like this arrangement would be made Kruger got together with a banker in St. Petersburg named Lessine. Lessine was to go out and buy up as many of these old Czarist bonds as he could get hold of. Lessine did so and invested his own money in Czarist bonds and as much as he could borrow. When the Bolsheviks backed out of the deal it bankrupted Lessine.

[39]

Under these circumstances Lessine's creditors were very anxious to find every asset of his that would help pay them off.

One position the creditors took was that Kruger was a partner in Lessine's purchase of Czarist bonds. If this contention were proved Kruger would be liable for all the debts of the partnership. Kruger vigorously denied the existence of any such partnership.

In their pursuit of satisfaction of their claims against Lessine his creditors learned that he had a possible claim for damages against the National City Bank of New York. It seems that Lessine had had about three million, two hundred thousand dollars of American securities in a safety deposit box in the St. Petersburg branch of the National City Bank, and when the Bolsheviks had captured St. Petersburg they had opened all safety deposit boxes and taken their contents, including those belonging to Lessine. Lessine claimed that the National City Bank had been negligent and not done all that it should have done to protect his securities. Lessine's creditors were very anxious to have this claim prosecuted against the bank but they did not want to put up the money that would be required to do this. Finally a

[40]

solution was found for both problems. In consideration of Lessine's creditors giving up their claim that Lessine and Kruger were partners in the making of the contracts to purchase Czarist bonds, Kruger agreed to pay all expenses incurred in prosecuting Lessine's claim against the National City Bank.

It was this case that I was asked to take. I gave it a lot of study, and finally decided that the claim could not be sustained. Kruger, however, was under contractual obligation to prosecute the case and to pay for the cost of the prosecution. I, of course, was very reluctant to attempt to prosecute a claim which seemed to me to have very little merit. On the other hand I felt that I had no right to insist that a client give up a claim for three million two hundred thousand dollars just on the advice of counsel. So, I finally said that I would take the case. I insisted, however, that Kruger pay our fees in advance, because no client enjoys paying a lawyer's bill after his case is lost. So, I insisted on Kruger giving our firm a retainer of \$10,000, which was to be renewed from time to time as the case proceeded. The crash finally caught up with Kruger and he became so involved that he committed suicide. That, of course,

[41]

for all practical purposes, ended the prosecution of the case because there was no one who would pay the cost. Incidentally, just shortly before Kruger shot himself, we had received another refresher of our retainer so I think that probably our firm were the only people in the world that owed money to Kruger when he died. The balance that was left of the retainer that was not used up when Kruger died was more than used up in further work we had to do to wind up the case.

FUCHS: Would a firm such as this always operate on a retainer basis rather than a contingency?

EWING: As far as I recall, in the twenty-seven years that I was in the firm, I think that we had contingent fee cases only when we were representing Indian tribes in claims against the United States Government. If a lawyer represented Indians in a claim against the Government he had to take it on a contingent basis. This was because the tribes had no money and the Government wanted the Indians well represented.

The facts of the first of our Indian claims cases were interesting. In 1868 the Government made a treaty with the Sioux Indians setting apart certain territories

[42]

for the "absolute and undisturbed use" of the Indians The territory was known as the Great Sioux Reservation and included the Black Hills in western South Dakota. In 1874 General Custer, in violation of the treaty of 1868, entered the Black Hills and explored them. His report of finding gold was such as to cause an immediate large influx of miners into the region. The Government also, in violation of treaty rights, refused to permit the Indians to utilize other hunting grounds. These hunting rights were the only thing that stood between the Indians and starvation. In the winter of 1875-76 many Indians were hunting buffalo in areas where they had a treaty right to hunt. In December 1876 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs ordered the Indians who were hunting to come to their agencies by January 31, 1876 or they would be regarded as hostile. It was impossible for the Indians to comply with this order. Even the runner sent out by one agency to notify its Indians was not able to return himself until February 11, 1876. Notwithstanding this, the Indians were declared hostile.

[43]

On March 17, 1876 an Indian village on Powder River was destroyed and a large number of Indians were killed. On June 26, 1876, General Custer attacked an Indian encampment near the mouth of the Little Big Horn River in Montana. He was defeated and he and his entire force were destroyed. Subsequent operations resulted in the complete defeat and surrender of the Indians with the exception of Sitting Bull and some of his followers who made their escape to Canada.

The foregoing is a brief statement of the facts relating to the claim of the Sioux Indians. Over the years many people had become convinced that the Indians had been grossly mistreated and that the Government should make amends. Finally, in June 1920, Congress enacted a Jurisdictional Act permitting the Sioux Indians to submit to the Court of Claims "all claims of whatsoever nature which the Sioux Tribe of Indians may have against the United States..." and "...if any

claim or claims be submitted to the said courts. they shall settle the rights therein, both legal and equitable..."

Shortly after the enactment of the 1920 Jurisdictional Act, the Sioux Indians held a tribal powwow out in Kansas for the purpose of selecting counsel to represent them in

[44]

the prosecution of their claims against the Government. A Washington firm of lawyers hoped they might be selected. Accordingly, their representatives attended the powwow, supplied several beeves and liquid refreshments for an Indian feast. The lawyer hosts were promptly chosen as counsel for the Indians.

Since the Indians were, and still are, wards of the Government all their contracts must be approved by the Secretary of the Interior. This office was then held by Lindsey Garrison, one of the most distinguished men ever to hold it. He expressed great reluctance to approve the contract and, while not refusing, urged the Indians to employ Judge Hughes' firm which they finally did. One of the partners, A. L. Richards, was assigned to the case. He gave his entire time for at least a year to digging up the facts and preparing a memorandum of the law and facts. His conclusions were, in substance, that the rights of the Indians in all the vast territories of the Great Sioux Reservation were merely "hunting rights" and that any recovery would be limited to the value of jack rabbits, buffalo, etc., of which the Indians had been deprived. Furthermore, Richards felt that the Jurisdictional Act provided

[45]

for Government counterclaim's against the Indians that would completely wipe out any damages they might establish. This ended our firm's participation in the Sioux litigation. We lost a year's earnings of one of the firm's most competent lawyers with no compensation whatever.

FUCHS: Well, is this after the Indian Claims Commission was in existence?

EWING: I think we prosecuted that in the Court of Claims, if I'm not mistaken.

FUCHS: What year would this have been?

EWING: Oh, 1920 or 1921.

FUCHS: Yes, well that would have been.

EWING: We finally collected years afterwards in other cases as a result of what we learned in the Sioux case.

FUCHS: Oh, you did?

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: I guess the Claims Commission didn't come in until

[46]

the early '40s , somewhere along there, middle ' 40s.

EWING: I don't know.

FUCHS: The other partner in the Hughes, Sr. and Dwight firm was Schurman?

EWING: Yes, George W. Schurman. He was a brother of Jacob Gould Schurman who at one time was president of Cornell and was later Ambassador to Germany.

FUCHS: Yes. I was wondering and who was Dwight?

EWING: Dwight was of the family of Church and Dwight, you know that make Arm and Hammer soda?

FUCHS: Yes, sir.

EWING: He was of that family and he was a very fine lawyer. One of the best I ever ran into. I'd rather have his guess on the law of a case than most other lawyers' mature judgment. He was an extremely good lawyer.

FUCHS: Very good, sir. We've gone about an hour and a half, would you like to rest a bit? Take a break now? Or do you wish to go on?

EWING: Well, I think I'll take a break and eat some breakfast.

[47]

FUCHS: Very good, sir. Thank you.

FUCHS: Mr. Ewing, I believe you have something more to relate about the Kruger match king case?

EWING: There was one amusing thing that happened when I was working on that case. I had to go to Paris to take some depositions. I had worked with a Russian named Ratchkovitch who was Kruger's representative. He was there in Paris to help me. In Paris visiting counsel are expected to follow a standardized routine. He first is required to call on the French lawyer, and not a word is said about the business in hand on that first visit. Then the two lawyers get together on the third day and get down to business. Another formality that Ratchkovitch arranged was having a

dinner in my honor. This was held at the Nouveau Circ Club. I understood that this was a very exclusive club to which only the French nobility belonged. Kruger was not a member so he got his friend Baron deBony to host the dinner. As I recall there were about a dozen men guests altogether.

As we were going into the club Ratchkovitch asked me if I would like to play bridge after the dinner.

[48]

Well, in college I had majored in bridge but when I went to law school I decided that I had wasted so much time at the game that I wasn't going to play anymore. And from that day to this I have not played except when I got into a situation where it was embarrassing not to play. So when Ratchkovitch asked me if I wanted to play I said, "No. I'd rather not." And then I thought, "Well, after all, I'm the guest of honor and it isn't polite to refuse to play." So I said, "Well, if you need me for a fourth I'll play, but I'd rather not."

After dinner, which was a very wonderful gastronomical adventure, Ratchkovitch came to me and said they did need me for a fourth. So, four of us sat down: Ratchkovitch, myself, a young Frenchman whose mother had been a Miss Spreckels from San Francisco, and the fourth man, I don't recall his name, but they said that he had been a former Minister of Finance of France.

FUCHS: This was the Spreckels family--sugar?

EWING: Yes, she was one of that family from San Francisco. So, we sat down and I understood enough French to realize that the other three men were talking about the stakes.

[49]

Soon Ratchkovitch turned to me and said, "Well, we're making the stakes a tenth of a franc if that's all right." I said, "Certainly," because a franc at that time was worth four cents so it meant playing for a quarter of a cent a point. Well, when we played three things happened. I don't think I ever held worse cards in my life. Every trey and deuce in the deck seemed to turn up in my hand. Secondly, I was playing for the first time with French cards and the face cards are different from ours. This was confusing and I couldn't take in my hand at a glance. And third, and lastly, I had just had enough wine so I couldn't quite remember what cards had been played. The result of these three things was disastrous.

FUCHS: I understand that you don't drink. Was this--did you not drink at that time but you did partake on this occasion or...

EWING: Yes, I took some wine and when you're in France wine tastes very good. I don't care much for it over here for some reason. But when we finished playing and counted up the score I owed \$7.80, which was, after all, getting out with a pretty small loss. All the other gentlemen had gone by the time we had finished, except us

[50]

four. We left the club and were walking down Quai d'Orsay when Ratchkovitch pulled me over to the curb and said, "Monsieur, may I give you a little tip?"

I answered, "Why certainly."

"You are sure you will take no offense?" he asked.

I replied, "No. What is it?"

"Well," he said, "I will tell you. If a gentleman in Europe invites you to his club to play a game of chance, he has a right to name the stakes. Now, when we first sat down there and were talking about what the stakes should be, the other two gentlemen wanted to play for ten francs a point. Fortunately, our host, Baron de Bony was not in the game so I could protest and we made the stakes one tenth of a franc. Had we played for ten francs a point you'd have lost \$780 instead of \$7.80. Now, monsieur, you're sure that you will take no offense? Well, if in the future a gentleman in Europe invites you to his club to play a game of bridge, tell him you do not know how."

FUCHS: That's pretty good. What were your impressions of Mr. Kruger?

[51]

EWING: He was quite a man. I sat in with him on some other negotiations and I thought he was one of the best negotiators that I had ever seen. He would throw out a proposition and explain what the possibilities of profits were, and he would get everyone interested. Then he would proceed to point out that there were certain dangers involved which must not be lost sight of. He would tell some of the dangers of the investment and soon some of the men to whom he was talking would be arguing that these dangers were not serious. In other words, he'd get his listeners to argue his case. He was very, very clever that way.

FUCHS: Was he an impressive man?

EWING: Yes, he was a fine looking man. All of six feet, maybe a little more. And very personable.

FUCHS: You recall your first meeting with Charles Evans Hughes?

EWING: Senior?

FUCHS: Yes.

EWING: Oh, yes. It was when I was looking for a job in

[52]

New York. I had a letter of introduction to one of his partners. The firm at that time was Hughes, Rounds, Schurman & Dwight. An uncle of Mrs. Ewing was a great friend of Mr. Rounds, and it was this uncle who had me contact that firm. And Mr. Rounds took me in to meet Judge Hughes. It was merely a casual introduction. He was very cordial. Judge Hughes was wonderful to work with. If you were a junior helping him on a case, he took you into every detail of it, held talk over everything with you. You'd go to lunch with him. He didn't often talk business at lunch. Sometimes I would have dinner with him downtown when we had to work at night. He was really wonderful that way. Of course, if he was absorbed in one case, he didn't like to be interrupted. He had the most marvelous concentration of any man I have ever known. He was a very fast reader. Sometimes it seemed to me he'd just inhale a page. He was very thorough.

I remember the first matter that I ever helped him with, shortly after I had begun work in the office. The Judge had been asked for an opinion as to whether or not a New York testator might insert a provision in his will denying his executors any compensation for their

[53]

services notwithstanding a New York Statute that specified the commissions to which they were entitled. The facts were that the testator was a very rich man. His son and son-in-law were to be executors of the will and since they would be getting millions anyhow, the testator felt that they were being amply compensated for whatever services they would be called on to perform. Well, I examined every decision by any New York court that might have any bearing on the problem. One Saturday morning, the Judge called me into his office to report what I had found. I told him about the New York cases and when I finished he said, "Well, now what have you found from the other states?"

"Oh," I said, "I didn't look them up."

He asked, "Why not?"

"The testator," I replied, "is a resident of New York and I didn't think cases from other states would be applicable."

"Oh," the Judge said, "I want every state in the Union looked up."

Well, I had to hurry out, get in the library and see what I could find. It wasn't as hard as I feared it might be because many states didn't have the statutory

[54]

commission and in those states the compensation of executors was left to the discretion of the court. And so, I merely had to examine the decisions of courts of states that did have statutory commissions for executors. And how right the Judge was in making me do this because the best case I found in the whole United States was an opinion by what in New Jersey is called an "Ordinary." He is like a surrogate or a court that handles wills and estates and all that. The

opinion of that Ordinary was by all odds the best one I'd found. He traced the history of statutory commissions from Roman times down through medieval times and right up to modern times. And Judge Hughes gave an opinion to the client largely based on that decision. And I had learned a lesson in thoroughness!

Judge Hughes was a delightful raconteur. After he had been appointed and confirmed as Chief Justice in 1930, we were having a firm dinner. We had one once a year at which the partners would discuss office matters, salary raises of staff, and all of that. Judge Hughes had been confirmed as Chief Justice but had not yet taken the oath. So we had invited him to sit in with us; he didn't often do it, but he came down that night and I never s

[55]

aw him in better form. And he told one story that I've repeated many times because to me it is priceless.

He said that after his defeat for the Presidency in 1916, he came back to New York and re-entered the old firm on January 1, 1917. Shortly after that he was elected president of the Union League Club in New York. At that time the war clouds were gathering and the Germans were sinking our ships and things were looking very ominous. He said the Union League Club had a number of patriotic meetings during the spring and summer. He added that as a matter of fact the club was very belligerent, having declared war on Germany sometime before Congress did! But in August after war had been declared the club had a particularly enthusiastic meeting. The night was very hot and after the meeting had adjourned a small group went down into the grill to have some beer before going home. There was Judge Hughes, Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, Chauncey Depew, and James Sheffield (who had been Ambassador to Mexico). This was at the time Theodore Roosevelt was anxious to go abroad and lead a division in the war against Germany. President Wilson, at the urging of General Pershing, wouldn't let him go; and you could understand it because

[56]

if Roosevelt went he would be giving orders to Pershing instead of Pershing giving orders to him, and Pershing didn't want that. But as the party sat at the table in the grill, Judge Hughes said Teddy was very emotional, he would lean over and slap the Judge on the back and say, "Charlie, you've got to make the President let me go, I've got to go." And the others would change the subject. Soon Teddy would turn around and slap Mr. Root saying, "Elihu, you've got to make the President let me go, I've got to go." Again they would get him off the subject. Finally, he became very emotional and said, "I've got to go. I know what it means to go. I know if young Teddy goes, he won't come back. If Archie goes, he won't come back. If Kermit goes, he won't come back. If Quentin goes, he won't come back. If I go, I won't come back."

Senator Root interjected, "Well, Theodore, I think if you can convince President Wilson of that, he'll let you go."

FUCHS: That's pretty good. Hughes was quite a storyteller.

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: I know that you were connected with meetings in

[57]

Geneva to draw up the narcotics convention in the early ' 30s. Would you mind relating that?

EWING: Well, at that time I was counsel for the American manufacturers of narcotics for medicinal purposes. They were Merck & Co., Inc., Mallinckrodt Chemical Works of St. Louis, and the New York Quinine and Chemical Co. The United States had the best system of narcotics control of any country in the world. None of the raw materials were grown on this continent, so the Government strictly limited the importation of opium and coca leaves. The principal opium derivatives were morphine and various other opium derivatives, as for example, heroin and codeine. Cocaine is the medicinal derivative of the coca leaf. Our Government had a system of control whereby they would allow the manufacturers, and they only allowed these three particular manufacturers, to import raw materials. The Government would assay that raw material at the customs house, and the chemical assay would tell almost to a fraction of a grain how much of the derivative could be produced. After the derivatives had been manufactured they could only be sold to people who were licensed to buy the product, such as wholesalers,

[58]

hospitals, doctors, etc. Before a manufacturer was permitted to buy a new supply of opium or coca leaves he had to show that his previous supplies had all been used in making derivatives that had been sold to licensed buyers. This was an excellent system of control. As a matter of fact, never in a year since the United States has had this system of control have the narcotics of American manufacture seized in the illicit traffic exceeded one half of one percent of total seizures. The small amount of American manufactured narcotics seized by the police was almost invariably stolen from a doctor's office or a drugstore.

During the first three decades of this century the illicit trade in narcotics had grown to alarming proportions. There were narcotic manufacturers in Germany, France, Italy, Britain, Holland, and Japan in addition to the three in the United States. While the American manufacturers were strictly controlled this was not true of those located in Europe and Japan. These foreign manufacturers monopolized practically all of the legitimate narcotics business. They would sell to the world's legitimate markets (except the United States) at very low prices because they needed some legitimate business as a

[59]

smokescreen for their purchase of raw materials to make narcotics that disappeared through the back door into the illicit market. They sold in the legitimate export markets at almost give-away prices knowing that losses incurred thereby would be made up many times over by their profits from the backdoor business. As a result the American manufacturers had no export business.

In 1930, the old League of Nations decided that it would try to draft a convention that would limit the manufacture of narcotics throughout the world. A group of representatives of the manufacturing countries was appointed, under the chairmanship of Sir Malcolm Deleveyne of Britain, to draft a convention which would be the basis of discussion at a conference to be held in Geneva in 1931.

The American manufacturers received an early copy of this draft. They were interested in it purely from the point of view of the possibility of their getting into the legitimate export business in narcotics at some future time.

FUCHS: The Government actually participated in this drafting process?

[60]

EWING: Yes. This draft scheme of control was to have every country in the world once a year send to the Opium Control Board in Geneva an estimate of the amount of legitimate narcotics that they would need for its own medicinal requirement, minus what that country would manufacture internally. Then in Geneva they would add all these net figures together and the total constituted the so-called "world export total." This world export total was to be divided up among the manufacturing countries on a quota basis determined by each country's past export business. They had it in the draft that no country could export narcotics unless it had a quota based on its past export business. If a country didn't have a quota and wanted to go into the export business, there were two ways in which it could get a quota. It could first go to those other countries who had quotas and ask for a share of their quotas. You know how far they would get that way--zero. Failing that, the country that wanted an export quota could ask for an arbitration. Here was the catch. The draft convention provided that the decision of the arbitrator had to be based on the past export business of the applicant country. In other words, a country couldn't export unless

[61]

it had a quota and it couldn't get a quota unless it had a past export business. This meant that the American manufacturers would be barred from any export business for all time.

When the American manufacturers had studied the proposed convention, we got in touch with Government officials in Washington who handled narcotics matters. The State Department had already chosen its delegates to the Geneva conference. The chairman was a man named John C. Caldwell. He was a career man in the Consular Service and had been supervising opium importations for a number of years. The Department had originally designated Under Secretary Joseph P. Cotton to be chairman of the delegation, but he died before the delegation got organized. This necessitated the designation of a new chairman and Mr. Caldwell was selected because he was more familiar with opium matters than anyone else in the Department. In these delegations, the chairman is all powerful. There were to be four delegates, Mr. Caldwell was chairman. Then there was Harry Anslinger, who was Commissioner of Narcotics; a Doctor

Treadway, an Assistant Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, and a State Senator from California named Sanborn

[62]

Young. Senator Young had been very active in anti-narcotic work in California and was a friend of President Hoover.

At their request the American manufacturers were given a hearing before our Government's delegates to the Geneva conference. We went to Washington for the hearing, and presented our views of the proposed convention. We advised the delegation of our objections to the quota system of control and urged that all countries should be required to adopt the same system of control that was used in the United States.

We found that Mr. Caldwell was quite unsympathetic to our argument but that the other three delegates seemed to agree with us. Later we discovered the reason for Mr. Caldwell's lack of sympathy. He had been going to the annual meetings of the Opium Control Board in Geneva each year and while on his way, he would stop off in England and be entertained very elaborately by Sir Malcolm Deleveyne, who was the British member on the control board. Apparently there was some kind of a hero worship that Mr. Caldwell had developed for Sir Malcolm and Caldwell was for anything that Sir Malcolm was for.

[63]

At the conclusion of the conference of the American manufacturers with the American delegation in Washington, Mr. Anslinger and Dr. Treadway called me aside and said, "We're very interested in the method of control you proposed and wish you'd go with us to the conference in Geneva. In the meantime we suggest you draft a convention along the lines that you propose so that we can have something to work with." Mr. Anslinger also added, "Be sure and bring your own secretary because public stenographers in Geneva are the greatest source of intelligence between governments in Geneva." So, I arranged to go and did take my secretary, and on the boat trip over made a draft of a convention to control the traffic along the line of the American system.

We got to the convention, as I recall, early in May, 1931. The formalities took several days. The chairman of each delegation had to make a speech. Then they got down to business. There was a great deal of wrangling over the whole scheme that the committee had drawn up, this quota system. After three or four weeks the conference seemed to be getting nowhere. One day I was walking from the conference back to my hotel for lunch, and I overtook a man who was with the Japanese

[64]

delegation and whom I had seen often in New York at the Savarin Lunch counter. This was in the basement of the Equitable building at 120 Broadway, where I often ate lunch. I didn't know the man, but I picked up with him and we passed the time of day, etc. I asked him how he felt the

conference was going and he answered, "We think it's terrible." He added, "We are very unhappy with the whole affair. We have no export narcotics business and this draft, if it's adopted, would shut us out of narcotic business forever. We're very frustrated and don't know what to do about it.

FUCHS: When you saw him in New York did you know that he was connected with drug or narcotic business?

EWING: No, I had no idea. I think the Japanese consulate was in the Equitable building at that time.

FUCHS: He was there as a diplomat, then?

EWING: Yes, and he would come down to get lunch every few days and I would see him.

I said to him, "Well, we have a plan that we think would meet your objections."

Then he asked me to explain. I said to him, "We're

[65]

in the same position as your Japanese manufacturers. This scheme of control in the draft will eliminate the Americans from all future export trade in narcotics."

FUCHS: Had the Japanese been a manufacturing country?

EWING: Yes. I proceeded to explain to him how we control the narcotics trade in America. "Oh," he said, "That's wonderful. Would you mind coming over to the Japanese embassy this afternoon and explain it to Baron Sato who is our chief delegate?"

I answered that I could not do that because under American law, it is a crime for a private citizen to talk to representatives of other governments on a matter that's already in our government's hands. But I added, "I'll send over some of our delegates, and they can talk to you."

"Oh," he said, "please do so."

I don't know who all went, I think all three of our delegates, as I recall, other than Mr. Caldwell, went over. Anyhow, the Japanese thought it was a wonderful idea and they asked for our draft. Our delegates explained to Baron Sato that the chairman of the American delegation was opposed to this plan and

[66]

they were consequently unable to get it before the conference for discussion. Baron Sato immediately said he would introduce it. So from the next day on as each paragraph would be taken up Baron Sato would offer as an amendment these various paragraphs that I had drafted, and finally the whole conference adopted that scheme and that today is the convention to limit

the manufacture of narcotics. Now in that process, the conference improved greatly what I had drafted, because I had not been able in the time I had to draft it to think through everything. But the convention as finally adopted is the scheme of control that the whole narcotic trade of the world is operating under today.

FUCHS: This is to say that Caldwell would not accept what you were submitting to him so it was entered through the Japanese. Did he immediately recognize it as your work?

EWING: I don't know whether he did or not. Before the Japanese began helping, when Mr. Anslinger or one of the other delegates would hand him a paragraph that I had drafted, he wouldn't even read it. He'd say, "Did Ewing prepare this?"

They'd say, "Yes."

[67]

And then he'd throw it back without even reading it.

FUCHS: I was wondering how the impetus towards narcotics control began in the period prior to this.

EWING: Well, there was a Dr. Hamilton Wright, who was a medical missionary in China, I think in the 1890s and certainly in the first decade of this century. He saw the devastation that narcotics worked among the Chinese and he really started the world crusade against the abuse of narcotics. Narcotics, used properly, are a gift of heaven, to relieve suffering in terminal cases and things like that; but they are also subject to terrific abuse. Dr. Wright saw what the evils of addiction were and he really started the crusade against narcotics back in--I forget the year but it was during President Taft's term. Dr. Wright persuaded the President to call the first International Opium Conference at The Hague in 1911 to do something about this illicit traffic. Dr. Wright died in 1917 and after his death his widow, Mrs. Hamilton Wright, continued his work. She was a most persuasive and valiant fighter for the cause.

A year after the Geneva conference in 1931, in

[68]

1932, there was to be a conference in Bangkok to draft a convention to limit the manufacture of smoking opium. The American manufacturers, however, weren't interested in that conference. Of course, smuggled smoking opium would be found occasionally on the West Coast, largely I think among the Chinese there. But it was not a great problem in the rest of the country and the American manufacturers had nothing to do with it.

One weekend Mrs. Ewing and I were invited to be the guests of some friends of ours in Greenwich, Connecticut. Saturday afternoon our host and I were playing golf at one of its country clubs when suddenly a bellboy came running across the golf course with an urgent message for me. I went into the clubhouse to the phone, and it was Mrs. Wright. She was all

excited and said: "Mr. Ewing, you've got to come in to town right away, I've got to talk to you; it's very, very serious and I need your help desperately." As she was a very good friend I told her that I would drop everything and return to town, which I did. I met her in the lobby of the Biltmore Hotel. She said, "Oh, the most terrible thing has happened! The conference to limit the manufacture of smoking opium is to open in Bangkok in a

[69]

couple or three weeks and the State Department has gone and appointed this horrible man, John C. Caldwell, as chairman of the delegation and he won't do anything. The whole thing will be a futile gesture because Portugal and the British have such a large source of revenue from smoking opium they will never consent to real control and Caldwell will just play their game. You've got to stop this Caldwell man from representing the United States at that conference."

"Well," I said, "I don't know whether I can do it or not, Mrs. Wright."

"But," she said, "you've just got to try."

So I said I would. I thought over what I might do. At that time Henry L. Stimson was Secretary of State and one of his law partners, Allen Klots, was Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Allen had been a classmate of mine at Harvard Law School. We both had been editors of *Harvard Law Review* and I knew him very well. So, I telephoned Allen and said I'd like to see him as soon as possible about a rather urgent matter. I gave him a little hint over the telephone of what I wanted to talk about, and he said, "Well, come down tonight on the train and have breakfast with me Sunday morning."

[70]

He said, "I'll get Harvey Bundy over to join us." Harvey Bundy was an Assistant Secretary of State at that time, and he was a class behind Allen and me in the Harvard Law School and on the *Law Review* with us. By the way, Harvey Bundy was the father of McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy.

FUCHS: You knew him quite well?

EWING: Oh, yes. We were on the *Law Review* together. I knew him very well. So the three of us had breakfast together Sunday morning at Allen's house. This gave me a chance to explain the whole situation. When I had finished Allen Klots said, "Well, I'll see what I can do." He added, "It so happens that I'm having breakfast with Secretary Stimson tomorrow morning and I'll take this matter up with him at that time. If you can wait over, I will try to telephone you at your hotel at least before eleven o'clock and let you know the answer."

So he called me about eleven o'clock the next morning and said that he had talked with Secretary Stimson but the Secretary thought that it was so late that it would look very bad for him to pull Mr. Caldwell practically off of the gangplank when he was to sail

[71]

day after tomorrow.

So, that was that, and there wasn't anything more I could do. Caldwell took off as scheduled and of course he went by way of England. First he went to London and then he and the British delegates went on to Marseilles where they got a boat that went around through the Suez Canal and on to Bangkok. Well, I'd say about ten days after that, Harry Anslinger, who was Commissioner of Narcotics, got a telephone call from William Castle, who was Under Secretary of State, asking Mr. Anslinger to come over to the State Department, that they had something very important to discuss with him. Mr. Anslinger went over and Mr. Castle showed him a telegram that President Hoover had received from a Mark Requa. Mark Requa was the Republican National Committeeman from California and had played an important part in helping Mr. Hoover get the Republican nomination for President in 1928. It seems State Senator Sanborn Young, who had been one of the American delegates to the Geneva conference the year before, knew that the Hearst papers were bitter enemies of the illicit narcotic trade. Young had gone to the Hearst people and told about the appointment of Caldwell to head our delegation to the

[72]

Bangkok conference, and of his seeming subservience to the British. As a result the Hearst San Francisco papers, and their papers all over the country had blasted the President for appointing such a man as chairman of the American delegation. Requa's letter had related all of this to the President, adding that such an appointment would damage him politically very much. Mr. Castle said to Mr. Anslinger, "Why didn't we know about this? Nobody told us about it?"

Mr. Anslinger replied, "Well, you were told about it. ""

"Why," Mr. Castle answered, "we were not."

Mr. Anslinger said, "Mr. Ewing came down here and explained all this very fully to Mr. Klots and Mr. Bundy, and Mr. Klots took it up with the Secretary and the Secretary decided that he could do nothing about it just two days before Caldwell was to sail."

"Well," Castle said, "we've got to do something about it. What can we do?"

Mr. Anslinger then remarked, "Well, you know you can tell Mr. Caldwell what he's to say."

"That's a good idea," Castle said, "Will you draft the kind of statement you think he should make? If you'll

[73]

draft it, by God, I'll make him say it."

So. Mr. Anslinger telephoned me after he'd returned to his office and asked me to come down and help him prepare the statement. By the time I got down there I think a draft was about completed and it had been well done. By the time Mr. Caldwell's boat reached Bangkok, his speech was already prepared for him and quite different from what he would have liked to have made.

FUCHS: Very interesting. This brings us down to approximately 1932 when Franklin Roosevelt ran for President. Did you know Mr. Roosevelt then?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: When did you first meet him?

EWING: I think I had met him at a dinner before he was nominated but it was nothing but an introduction. That was when he was a candidate for the nomination. I'm sure I didn't have any contacts with President Roosevelt until the 1940 campaign.

FUCHS: Were your years between 1932 and 1940 occupied solely with the law?

[74]

EWING: Yes. I did not become active in politics until 1939 and 1940. Paul McNutt had been elected Governor of Indiana in 1932 and as I have explained, Paul was a great friend of mine and I had gone out to Indianapolis for his inauguration on January 1, 1933. Then I followed his administration out there simply as a friend, no more than that. Paul's term as governor expired January 1, 1937, because in Indiana a governor can't succeed himself. A lot of Paul's friends, including myself, thought that he would make a great candidate for President in 1940 at the end of President Roosevelt's second term. Several of us actively promoted the idea and there was more or less publicity regarding the McNutt candidacy. Paul had been National Commander of the American Legion before he was elected Governor of Indiana. This had given him nationwide publicity and his Legion friends were enthusiastic in his behalf. Finally, I'd say along in '39 some of us got together and...

FUCHS: You say "us?"

EWING: Yes. Well, the principal ones were Frank McHale in Indianapolis, and Wendell Willkie, who was a Democrat at that time, Clarence Jackson, Wayne Coy, Fowler

[75]

Harper, there were a lot of others--Bowman Elder. We decided that there should be an organized effort on Paul's behalf. Frank McHale headed up the activities in Indiana and very ably, and then I became eastern manager. This was in 1939 I'd say, about the middle of 1939.

FUCHS: Did you ever meet as a group in New York or Indiana?

EWING: What would happen was that I would go out to Indiana from time to time and meet with McNutt and McHale, maybe some of the others out there, Bowman Elder, Judge Fansler-- Paul had quite a group of boosters out there. I don't recall all their names. And then down in New York, McHale or McNutt or some of the others might come down and we'd all get together there.

FUCHS: McNutt was not a reluctant candidate?

EWING: Oh, no. No, no he was intrigued by the idea. As a matter of fact, he was a very forceful politician. Along in the summer of '39 we felt we had to raise a little money. So, I got a group together in New York one time when Paul was to be in New York, and gave a dinner for them at the University Club. I suppose that there were eight or ten people there who were all good friends of

[76]

Paul and whom I thought might be able to make contributions. Willkie was one of them. We had a very nice evening and broke up about half past nine. I had agreed to give a thousand dollars, Willkie had agreed to give a thousand dollars and one or two of the others had also offered donations. After dinner Willkie and I walked away together from the Club up Fifth Avenue, in the course of which Willkie said to me: "You know, Jack, you and I will never be as close to anyone who really has a chance at that job as we are to Paul McNutt."

I replied that I thought that was true.

Well, the very next day, Ray Clapper's column came out saying that the utility people were going to try to push McNutt for the Democratic nomination for President and that Willkie was helping bring that about. So, Wen telephoned me and he said, "You know, Jack, I think if I'm active in helping Paul it's going to hurt him more than help him. Now, I'd better not make that contribution, I'd better pull out of any active participation." I couldn't argue with him, it was for him to make his own decision. He did pull out and by the next spring he had taken over the Republican Party.

[77]

FUCHS: How did that come about in your opinion or to your knowledge?

EWING: Well, I think the Republicans had suffered such a stunning defeat in 1936 with Governor Landon as a candidate that they wanted to pick a winner for 1940.

FUCHS: Who else was mentioned?

EWING: Both Senator Taft and Tom Dewey were sparring for the nomination but both lacked the charisma that Willkie possessed. He was very attractive personally, and had a bluff honesty that was appealing to people. Willkie was a very able man, and a man of great ability. His nomination was an extraordinary triumph by a group of suddenly organized amateur zealots over the steam-rolling political bosses of the Republican Party.

FUCHS: Just when did he make the switch from the Democratic to the Republican Party?

EWING: I don't think he made the switch until a real interest in his candidacy had developed. I'd say somewhere around January of 1940. Just when it was, however, I don't know.

[78]

FUCHS: You never discussed it with him?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: Good.

EWING: No, I don't think I had any further communication with Willkie until after he was nominated. Then I got a telegram from him asking me to come out for him. I've got that correspondence I think someplace.

FUCHS: He knew that you were a good Democrat didn't he?

EWING: Yes. I answered Willkie's telegram saying that I was very fond of him personally but that he had chosen Senator McNary of Oregon as his candidate for Vice President and Joe Martin of Massachusetts for chairman of the Republican National Committee. They both held very strong isolationist views and I simply could not vote the Republican ticket. Then afterwards, I became assistant chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

FUCHS: Now, I would like to continue with the candidacy of McNutt unless you want to bring this out someplace else.

EWING: As to the candidacy of McNutt for President we had

[79]

really built a pretty good organization. We kept boosting McNutt for President on the assumption that President Roosevelt would not run for a third term. When it finally became clear that he was going to run, we tried to get McNutt the nomination for Vice President. But there we ran into a stone wall because President Roosevelt just did not want to have Paul with him on the ticket. He wanted Henry Wallace.

FUCHS: Why?

EWING: There were some tax matters of which I do not know the details. Anyhow it was enough to convince President Roosevelt that it wouldn't be wise to have Paul on the ticket.

FUCHS: Did he personally, to your knowledge, like McNutt?

EWING: I think so. He'd appointed him Federal Security Administrator.

FUCHS: That was in 1939?

EWING: That was in 1939. I think there was never anything personal about it. I think it was just a matter of judgment. He thought they could bring something up

[80]

against McNutt that might hurt the ticket.

FUCHS: Why was McNutt selected for Administrator of FSA?

EWING: After McNutt's term for governor had ended, Roosevelt sent him to the Philippines as High Commissioner. He returned from there about the middle of 1939. President Roosevelt at that time was setting up the Federal Security Agency by executive order, and he offered Paul the job of Administrator. Those of us who were Paul's friends all thought that it would be wise for his own political future if he were to accept the job. I remember Paul, Wayne Coy and I drove over to Maryland one summer day in 1939 to discuss Paul's situation with Harry Hopkins. Harry Advised him to accept the appointment as Administrator. He thought it would be good politically for Paul. Mind you in all this time Roosevelt had not said he would run for a third term. So it was an uncertain situation in which we were operating.

FUCHS: Did you favor a third term?

EWING: I had no objection to it. I think the American people have a right to choose whoever they want for President, and I believe the Constitutional amendment

[81]

prohibiting a third term was very unfortunate; and it came back to haunt the Republicans because they would have liked to have nominated Eisenhower for a third term. They really got hoisted on their own petard.

FUCHS: Did McNutt ever exhibit any bitterness?

EWING: No, he never did to me. He possibly felt it. But he was a very good sport about it. You see after the Philippine independence, President Truman appointed him as the first ambassador to the Philippines, and Paul, of course, having been High Commissioner before the war, knew the Philippine situation very thoroughly.

FUCHS: You might have seen that year then in 1940, two Indiana University classmates and fraternity brothers running for President against each other.

EWING: That's right.

FUCHS: ...if it hadn't been for Roosevelt tossing in his hat.

EWING: That's right.

FUCHS: Very interesting. How did you come to be appointed as assistant chairman of the Democratic National Committee?

[82]

EWING: Well, if you'll recall, Jim Farley resigned as National Chairman in 1940 because he was so opposed to the third term, and Ed Flynn was made National Chairman. Some of Mr. Roosevelt's friends in New York, particularly Judge Ferdinand Pecora, whom I knew very well, knew of my activities in the McNutt organization. Judge Pecora felt that Mr. Flynn, while he had a very wide acquaintance and great political strength in New York State, he did not know the rest of the country very well. Judge Pecora believed it would be wise to get someone in the National Committee to help Mr. Flynn who knew other parts of the country. So Judge Pecora made a trip to Washington and spoke to Mr. Roosevelt about it, the President spoke to Mr. Flynn who sent for me and asked me to become Assistant Chairman.

FUCHS: Judge Pecora proposed your name then to Roosevelt?

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: You had just met Roosevelt briefly up to that time?

EWING: I may have shaken hands with him but it was nothing more than that up to that time. It was only after this

[83]

that I got to know the President.

FUCHS: Was Judge Pecora a strong political figure in New York?

EWING: Oh, yes, very much. He later ran for mayor of New York City in 1950 .

FUCHS: What was the source of Judge Pecora's power? What was his political base there?

EWING: Well, he had been a judge of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. He had a very attractive personality, and was very able. Also he was a man of great integrity and active in many good movements. He had been counsel for the House Banking Committee. It was he who was examining J. P. Morgan when the little dwarf jumped into Mr. Morgan's lap when he was testifying. You remember that?

FUCHS: Remember of it, yes. Had you known Ed Flynn prior to this?

EWING: No, that was the first time I'd ever met him.

FUCHS: What were your impressions of him when you first met?

[84]

EWING: Oh, very good. Ed was a man of great ability. He made up his mind quite quickly and generally had good judgment.

FUCHS: What did he assign to you when you first assumed that job?

EWING: It wasn't any very definite assignment. Actually, I more or less took care of the overflow of things that he didn't have time to handle. Then they would be referred to me. Also I think I helped in other ways. He'd come in and talk about a problem and it was an outlet for him to have someone with whom he could talk things out.

FUCHS: Were you continuing to practice law?

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: Did you spend much time in Washington then?

EWING: No. Not that year. My activities were practically all in the headquarters at the Biltmore Hotel in New York.

FUCHS: The Democratic National Committee had its headquarters there?

[85]

EWING: Yes, the headquarters were in New York. They are almost always there in campaign years. Ever since I can remember the National Headquarters have been in the Biltmore Hotel in New York during a presidential election year.

FUCHS: Whom do you recall working with on the committee, if anyone? In '40 to '42 say.

EWING: Charlie Michelson was in charge of publicity and he was really a terrific publicity man. He knew how to put the dagger in and turn it, and he had an unerring aim for the jugular. A gnome-like figure, but smart as a whip and a very loveable personality when you knew him. I remember saying to him one time that he should write his memoirs, that he'd met so many interesting people and I couldn't imagine anyone who could write a more interesting autobiography. "Oh," he said, "I wouldn't think of it. If I told the truth, I'd lose half of my friends, and if I didn't tell the truth it wouldn't be worth writing."

"But," I said, "Charlie, why don't you write the book and not allow it to be published, say, until twenty years after your death or something like that?"

[86]

I think you owe it to posterity to do this."

Quick as a flash he answered, "Charlie Michelson owes it to posterity? What the hell's posterity ever done for Charlie Michelson?"

FUCHS: What was his background?

EWING: He had been, I think, one of the principal editors, correspondents and writers for the Hearst papers.

FUCHS: Was there anyone else that you remember in those days, '41 to '42?

EWING: No, no, I don't think so. But it was in 1941 that the Aluminum Company of America asked me to do some legal work in Washington.

FUCHS: Yes.

EWING: The air Battle of Britain in 1940 had vastly increased the need for aluminum. Existing capacities were being taxed to the utmost and Alcoa had, therefore, considerably enlarged its own facilities. In February 1941 aluminum was placed on the list of priorities and this meant that Government licenses had to be obtained for aluminum building materials and equipment. Alcoa decided to further increase its own production facilities by, if my memory is correct, about 200,000,000 pounds per year. It intended to finance this expansion out of its own resources and without cost to the Government. When, however, the company applied for the necessary licenses for building material and equipment they were not issued. Secretary Ickes and Attorney General Biddle were accusing Alcoa

[87]

of having a United States monopoly in the manufacture of aluminum and they therefore opposed any Government action that would increase Alcoa's production capacity. Despite the desperate need for aluminum by British and American aircraft manufacturers, Messrs. Ickes and Biddle considered it more important to destroy the Aluminum Company than to defeat Hitler. Naturally, all of this greatly disturbed the officials of the company and they asked me to go to Washington and try to get the roadblock removed.

The reason I was asked to do this job was because my law firm in New York, Hughes, Hubbard & Ewing and its predecessor firms had been New York counsel for Alcoa since sometime in the first decade of this century. I understood the relation started before Judge Hughes first became Governor of New York. Ordinarily, Alcoa's

[88]

Pittsburgh attorneys would have been asked to do this work but they were very short of manpower at that time and hence my firm's employment.

When I got to Washington I joined Mr. Arthur V. Davis, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Alcoa, and Mr. I. W. Wilson, then Senior Vice President and later President of the company. We worked there together until the end of the war. Each of these men was extremely able and each was a delightful companion. Each was also, what I would call, a business statesman. In their negotiating they naturally were vigilant in protecting Alcoa's interests, but time and again I saw them sacrifice Alcoa's interest when something else was better for the country.

My first task was to acquaint myself with all the facts and background of the controversy-- Alcoa's desire to help satisfy the desperate need for more aluminum by expanding its production facilities at its own expense; its failure to obtain the necessary licenses for expansion; the fact that the officials in charge had no other plan to increase aluminum supplies. With these facts I prepared a memorandum addressed to Harry Hopkins, whom I knew well, but really for the President.

[89]

I took this memorandum to Mr. Hopkins who was then living in the White House. When he had read it he saw the point immediately and said, "I'll see what I can do about this." Our talk was on Thursday. Friday we got word that the President had ordered the people who were in charge of increasing aluminum supplies to have a report on the President's desk by Monday morning. Apparently the report was there, because we were advised that the Government had decided to build the needed aluminum plants itself and lease them to the various companies that had the ability to operate them.

With the overall program settled, there were then negotiations regarding the building of the plants for the Government. As a matter of fact Alcoa was the only organization in the United States with the know-how to build the plants. The Aluminum Company therefore offered to build the new plants without any profit to itself, free of charge insofar as its services were concerned. The Aluminum Company asked for no option to buy any of the plants or anything else. After the war was over, the new plants were to be completely at the disposal of the Government. This offer was accepted by the Government. Then we found that we had to have

[90]

a separate site and each had its individual problems. As a result I spent the rest of the war down in Washington as counsel for the Aluminum Company on these contracts. But I was not busy all the time. I would have a rush job that might take a week or two weeks or maybe a month, then I might be free to do other things during intervals. In this way I was able to continue on as Assistant Chairman of the Democratic National Committee and do things there when I was not busy with my professional work for the Aluminum Company.

FUCHS: How did you meet Harry Hopkins?

EWING: Well, I think I met him first through Paul McNutt and Wayne Coy. He was a very good friend of both Paul and Wayne. Then I was spending most of my time in Washington and I saw Harry fairly frequently.

FUCHS: What was Wayne Coy doing at that time?

EWING: Wayne was a special assistant to the President working in the White House.

FUCHS: Well, then in '42 I believe you resigned your position with the Democratic National Committee?

[91]

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: Well, first I wanted to ask you. Did you come in touch with the Truman Committee in connection with the aluminum investigation?

EWING: Yes, yes the Committee examined us and we got along all right with them. I think on the whole, the Committee did a lot of good.

FUCHS: Did you attend any hearings?

EWING: Oh, yes, and I testified, because the Committee wanted to know about these contracts for building the Government plant and all the details of them. I had virtually lived in Washington from the time I went down there in 1941 until the end of the war in 1945. Mrs. Ewing didn't move down but she'd come down from time to time. I had an apartment at the Carlton Hotel and so did Mr. Davis and Mr. Wilson.

FUCHS: Did you meet Mr. Truman at that time?

EWING: The first time I met Mr. Truman was in the campaign of 1940. He came into the Biltmore Hotel where the Democratic National Committee headquarters were and asked

[92]

to see Mr. Flynn, who was chairman. Mr. Flynn was on the West Coast. Then he asked to see me and he came into my office and was mad as hops. He said he had a grievance against the Democratic National Committee and I asked him what it was. He said that he was a candidate for renomination as Senator from Missouri and Governor Lloyd Stark, who was the Democratic Governor of Missouri, was a candidate against him; that the Democratic National Committee had booked Stark for some speeches around the country and that he was spending more time damning Truman than he was supporting the Democratic ticket. Senator Truman said he wanted those speaking engagements cancelled. I said, "Well, if he's doing that, Senator, we'll certainly cancel them." So I went into the Speakers Bureau and found out where we had booked Governor Stark for speeches. Apparently the Bureau had arranged for the Governor to speak in a number

of places over the country and also at a number of spots in Missouri. So I went back out to Senator Truman and said, "Senator, the Speakers Bureau has not only booked Governor Stark for some speeches outside of Missouri, but it has also booked him for some speeches inside of Missouri. Do you want those cancelled?"

[93]

"Oh," he said, "hell, I don't want them cancelled. Everybody in Missouri knows that Lloyd Stark is the biggest liar in the state. I want him to keep on talking there because the more he talks there the more it's going to help me."

Perhaps I should now jump to 1942. Early in that year I was asked by Attorney General Biddle to undertake the prosecution of William Dudley Pelley in Indianapolis for sedition. Pelley had originally come into prominence in Asheville, North Carolina, where he published several books and magazines. He was a very good writer. But he was a man who had an absolute phobia about Jews and he had established an organization known as the Silver Shirts. It was a fascist setup copied after the Brown Shirts of Hitler. Pelley had great emotional and intellectual admiration for Hitler and the whole Nazi apparatus. Pelley had been in trouble in North Carolina. I think it involved some Blue Sky Law violations. He had been tried, convicted and his case was being appealed when he moved to Noblesville, Indiana, where he began publishing a magazine. The magazine was very anti-government, rabidly anti-Roosevelt, pro-fascist and really very revolting to those of us who felt much less sympathetic to what

[94]

Hitler was doing. Pelley finally crossed the line with some of the things he wrote. He was printing just plain Nazi and fascist propaganda, picking it up from German and Italian publications or broadcasts and copying their content word for word. So the Department of Justice decided to prosecute Pelley for sedition. This was in the early part of 1942.

FUCHS: When did you resign from the assistant chairmanship?

EWING: Sometime early in 1942 since the case was tried in the summer of 1942. Attorney General Biddle asked me to go out to Indianapolis and take charge of the prosecution. The Department had a United States Attorney with whom they were having some differences. He was really a very good lawyer and when he felt he was right, he stood by his guns. The Department had wanted to prosecute an Indianapolis citizen for some act, I forget what, and the District Attorney felt that prosecution was not justified and he refused to act. This was embarrassing to the Department, and they didn't want to run into anything like that in connection with Pelley's case. It was for this reason that they decided to send in a special assistant to try the case, and because of my

[95]

Indiana background, I was asked to do it. I presented the case to the Grand Jury, obtained the indictment and then tried the case. It was a very interesting experience. We convicted Pelley of

sedition and he was sentenced to jail for from five to fifteen years. The judge felt that the war would be over in five years, that Pelley couldn't get out of jail before then and that he should not be in jail unless a war was going on where he could do the country some harm. Well, when that case was finished I was again appointed an officer of the Democratic National Committee, this time as Vice-Chairman.

FUCHS: Were there any interesting aspects to that case? What did you base your case on?

EWING: Yes, there were some very interesting aspects. I got immersed in the whole law of propaganda. I found that the Nazi and the fascist propaganda was divided up into fourteen definite categories. One category was anti-semitism, another was anti-war, another was spot news. I forget what the eleven others were. But one could take any piece of their propaganda and he would find that it fitted very neatly into one of those

[96]

fourteen categories. Pelley's publications, in many instances, were following the Nazi or fascist lines in what he was printing. Before I ever got into this case, the Department of Justice had obtained a warrant to search Pelley's plant in Noblesville and they had collected a lot of material which was taken to the courthouse in Indianapolis, where it was examined by agents of the F.B.I. But the week before we went to trial I got to thinking about all those seized papers and decided that they should also be looked over by a lawyer. All this material had been stored in the attic of the courthouse and with all the August heat I hated to ask any of my assistants to make the examination. But I had to do it. The young man to whom I assigned the job could not have been more cooperative. When I asked him if he minded doing it he answered "Not a bit." On the second afternoon of his work in the attic he came rushing down almost shouting. "I've got it." He had found a typewritten copy of a broadcast that had been made from Rome, Italy and which Pelley had copied word for word in the next issue of his magazine. This was conclusive evidence that he was deliberately and consciously following the enemy

[97]

propaganda line.

When we tried the case the defense called Charles Lindbergh as a witness, because he had been making speeches along the same line as Pelley's articles in his magazines. Lindbergh, as you may recall, was opposed to our getting into the war. He felt that the German Air Force was so strong that they would crush us right away. Well, the fact that Lindbergh had been subpoenaed as a witness by the defense caused a lot of national interest in the case. As it turned out, I objected to most of the defense counsel's questions and the Judge sustained my objections. Such questions were obviously irrelevant. When I refused to cross-examine, nothing that Lindbergh had said helped the defense or hurt the prosecution. Pelley was convicted and the Judge sentenced him to a term in prison of from five to fifteen years.

FUCHS: What was the source of Pelley's funds? Did he have money...

EWING: He had his organization of Silver Shirts and quite a lot of followers who would send in money.

I had resigned from my job as assistant chairman of

[98]

the Democratic National Committee to take on this Pelley case as a Special Assistant to the Attorney General. After the trial was over Mr. Flynn, the Chairman, asked me to come back to the Committee as vice-chairman; and I did. Not too long after I got back, one day my secretary came in and said Mr. Elmer Benson of Minnesota wanted to see me. I had never met Mr. Benson but I knew who he was, of course, because he had been Governor of Minnesota and also United States Senator from that state. He came in and said, "Mr. Ewing, I've never met you but we have some mutual friends who know you, and they tell me I can trust you." He went on to tell me about the political situation in Minnesota, how the liberal vote in that state was divided between the Democratic Party and the Farmer-Labor Party with the result that the Republicans were winning all the elections. He said, "I have come to the conclusion that the Democratic and the Farmer Labor Party should combine, but this will be difficult to bring about because the chairman of the Democratic State Committee in Minnesota has no confidence in me and I have none in him. We are in a situation where we need an honest broker to try to get the two parties together and I hope that you can

[99]

undertake the job."

"Well," I said, "Senator, I appreciate what you say and I'll let you know in a day or two."

The chairman of the National Committee at that time, I think, was Frank Walker, and he was away on an extended trip. I didn't want to take on a major job like that without his approval or the approval of President Roosevelt. So, I went over to see President Roosevelt to ask him if I should undertake this assignment and he said, "By all means do it." As a result, from early in 1942 until practically the time of the Democratic National Convention in 1944 I spent quite a bit of time in Minnesota trying to get the two parties together. I found that there was a Minnesota statute under which they could merge so there would be no need for legislation of any kind. But there were long and difficult and tedious negotiations involved. We finally got it worked out barely in time for the new Democrat-Farmer-Labor Party to send delegates to the Democratic National Convention in 1944.

Elmer Kelm, who was the Democratic state chairman, was very suspicious of anything that Senator Benson said, and Senator Benson was equally suspicious of

[100]

anything that Chairman Kelm would say. Hubert Humphrey was an assistant to Kelm. He was a young eager beaver at that time but he was of great help in bringing about the merger. When Mr.

Kelm would take an intransigent position on some point, Mr. Humphrey could do more to bring him around than anyone else. That merger of the Democrat and Farmer-Labor Party was the thing that made possible Humphrey's later political career as well as the careers of Orville Freeman and all the other Democrats in Minnesota who have been elected to office since that time.

FUCHS: Were you selected for this primarily because of your legal ability or your political ability or a combination?

EWING: I really don't know, they just thought I'd be a good intermediary. It was Senator Benson, encouraged by some of his friends, who decided to ask me to do it. I know who these friends were and they were good friends of mine and I knew them very well.

FUCHS: Partly because of your midwest or Indiana background?

EWING: No, it was people who were in Washington and back and forth. They were Minnesota people who were working in...

[101]

FUCHS: I mean, do you think you might have been selected in part because you were from Indiana which was...

EWING: No. No, no, the main chap who was involved in this, was a man that I knew in the labor movement and he was from Minnesota. I think he was still active in labor matters in Minnesota quite as much as in Washington.

FUCHS: Who?

EWING: His name was Freeman. I don't remember his first name. It wasn't Orville. Then there was Mrs. Vera Barnes, who was with the women's division of the National Committee and was originally from Minnesota. She was on the same team as Freeman, and both were friends of Senator Benson. I'm quite sure it was they who caused me to be asked to do this. I am sure both sides were very happy about what was accomplished.

FUCHS: Very good. Thank you very much.

EWING: Yes, sir.

[102]

Second Oral History Interview with Mr. Oscar R. Ewing, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, April 30, 1969. By J. R. Fuchs, Harry S. Truman Library.

FUCHS: Do you have something to add about the Minnesota episode?

EWING: Well, yes, as I said the merger of the two parties in Minnesota was completed just before the Democratic National Convention in 1944. After the election and after around the first of the year, Mrs. Ewing and I were at the White House for lunch with President Roosevelt and others. As we walked in, of course President Roosevelt was sitting down. As Mrs. Ewing went up to greet him, he pulled her head down so that he could whisper and I wouldn't hear, and he said to her, "Helen, your husband is a miracle man."

Naturally she was surprised and replied, "What do you mean, Mr. President?"

"Well," he said, "I have been trying to get the Democratic Party and the Farmer-Labor people in Minnesota together for the last twelve years and I got nowhere, and your husband did it in two years. He's a miracle man."

That was, of course, very nice for the President

[103]

to say. It certainly showed how appreciative he was of any help one gave him.

FUCHS: Very interesting. What else do you recall about the 1944 convention and what part did you play in that?

EWING: In the 1944 convention it was all set that Roosevelt was to be renominated for a fourth term. The real fight was over the vice-presidency. In 1940 Henry Wallace had been elected Vice President along with Mr. Roosevelt as President, and when the 1944 campaign came around Mr. Roosevelt indicated that he would again like to have Henry Wallace as the candidate for Vice President. There was a great deal of opposition to Mr. Wallace's renomination and Bob Hannegan, who was National Chairman at the time, was a strong booster for Mr. Truman. There were various other candidates, too, such as Jimmy Byrnes, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, shipbuilder Henry Kaiser and a few favorite sons. Mr. Hannegan was so busy with his activities on behalf of Mr. Truman's candidacy that he really had very little time to arrange for the convention. As a result, I as vice chairman, had to more or less arrange the program and attend to other details such as arranging

[104]

for the resolutions that had to be adopted and so forth. The mechanical details of the delegate's rooms, the convention hall and all similar things were managed by the treasurer's office. Ed

Pauley was treasurer. But actually because of Mr. Hannegan's involvement in the fight for the vice-presidency I had a great deal to do with the actual running of that convention. The way things went I had to make sure that all necessary material was with the platform committee, as an example of what I'm talking about. Then there were some matters that were bitterly controversial and it was necessary to appear before one committee or the other, so that the committee members would know what was the administration's position on the contested issues.

FUCHS: Do you remember any of these specifically?

EWING: Well, as I recall, there was the matter of the seating of the delegation from South Carolina. An all white delegation had been certified by the state authorities and there was a Negro delegation which was contesting the action of the state authorities. There were similar matters, for instance, a similar contest

[105]

[105]

regarding the Mississippi delegation.

FUCHS: Yes.

EWING: There was nothing of earth shaking importance. These were just routine details.

FUCHS: Had you come in touch with Mr. Truman other than the incident that you related yesterday regarding the speeches by Stark and then your appearance before the Truman Committee? Had you come in touch with him in any other way during this period from the 1940 campaign of his up to 1944?

EWING: Well, there had been various social how-do-you-dos. But I don't recall anything special. We had, however, got to know each other fairly well. One thing I remember distinctly. During the 1944 convention, in Chicago the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee were in the Stevens Hotel and I had an office there. One day, I think perhaps the first or second day of the convention, Senator Truman and Senator Tunnell of Delaware came into my office. Senator Truman said to me, "Oscar, some of my friends are trying to nominate me for Vice President and I do not want it. If there's anything you can do to prevent them from

[106]

doing it I would appreciate your help. I want to stay in the Senate, I don't want to run for Vice President."

I replied, "Well, Senator, I don't know whether I can do much, but I'm glad you told me what your desires are. "

And that was all, because I did speak to Bob Hannegan and told him what Senator Truman had said. Mr. Hannegan was all hot and bothered about getting the nomination for Senator Truman, so he paid no attention to anything I said, and I knew he wouldn't.

FUCHS: Did you talk to Hannegan about this before Truman's call?

EWING: Oh, yes. He was full of it. Every time I would see him he would say something about it. And Ed Pauley, who was treasurer of the National Committee, he was just as enthusiastic for Truman for Vice President as Bob Hannegan was.

FUCHS: Why do you think that they were so enthusiastic for Truman?

EWING: Well, number one, I think they felt that Henry Wallace would not be a good candidate and you can't beat somebody

[107]

with nobody. They believed that, all things considered, Senator Truman was the best man for the job. Of course, Mr. Hannegan took the lead because he had been prominent in Missouri politics and his support of Truman in the 1940 primary when the latter was running against Governor Stark for the Democratic senatorial nomination contributed much towards Truman's victory. It was therefore, quite natural for him to take the lead in trying to get the vice-presidential nomination for someone from his own state. Mr. Pauley, I think, was genuinely fond of Truman and very sincerely thought that he was the best man that could be got for the nomination.

FUCHS: I wonder how Pauley became acquainted with Mr. Truman, how he became so enamored with Mr. Truman?

EWING: I am not sure that I know. Pauley knew every angle of the petroleum business and rendered invaluable assistance to our Government on petroleum problems from about the time World War II began in Europe. This kept him in Washington much of the time and I imagine he got to know Senator Truman during this period. Anyone who got to know Truman could not help but like and admire him.

FUCHS: Do you recall attending any meeting in which they

[108]

were planning their strategy to get Truman the nomination?

EWING: Not particularly. You see, we were there in headquarters and I might be asked to sit in on the discussion of some problem or might have casual talks in the hall but actually I was so busy with the details of the convention that I had little time to devote to who would be nominated for Vice President.

FUCHS: You didn't attend any in the months prior to the convention, say starting in January 1944 on through when Hannegan, Pauley and some of the others were conspiring to do this?

EWING: Yes, I am sure I did but I do not recall any specific sessions. In any event, I wouldn't call it a conspiracy.

FUCHS: Well, it wasn't a conspiracy, a poor choice of words.

EWING: On the planning you mean. I don't recall. I have a feeling there were one or two but I don't remember any details. We're talking about things that happened twenty-five years ago.

[109]

FUCHS: Yes, it's very difficult. Did you have any intimate knowledge of the call that Mr. Roosevelt was supposed to have put through to Hannegan which Mr. Truman was supposed to have overheard, in which he asked Mr. Truman to run and Hannegan said that Mr. Truman was against it and Mr. Roosevelt was supposed to have said, "Well, all right, if he wants to wreck the Democratic Party they can always make excuses." Did you ever talk about that with Mr. Hannegan? The reason I ask is that there are several different stories about it as to whether Mr. Truman actually talked with Mr. Roosevelt or whether he just overheard this.

EWING: Well, I'm not sure that I have an accurate recollection of just what happened. I was very busy on the details of the convention and I wasn't deeply involved in the vice-presidential nomination. In fact I would say that most of what I know of those details was accidentally acquired. But there was a great deal of talk at the National Committee's headquarters obviously. If my memory is right, the President was passing through Chicago on his way to San Diego. Before he had left Washington, I think Mr. Hannegan had had a talk with him and I think the President still indicated he preferred Mr. Wallace. His

[110]

train was to go through Chicago at the time the convention was in session or just a day or two before. The President did not leave the train and I think it was in the course of that conversation that the President told Mr. Hannegan that if he were a delegate he would vote for Henry Wallace but that if the convention felt otherwise he would accept either Senator Truman, or Bill Douglas. Is that right?

FUCHS: That's right.

EWING: And that was the word with which Mr. Hannegan came back from that train talk with President Roosevelt. And then he and the people who were working with him for Mr. Truman felt that they had the permission of the President to nominate, in addition to Wallace, either Senator Truman or Mr. Justice Douglas. This gave a great lift to activities for Senator Truman. The labor people were very active at this time and I had been in close touch with the labor people right along. I recall that Sidney Hillman asked me to arrange for him and some of the other labor

people to have breakfast with Mr. Hannegan, and I may also say that I think this took place a day or two before Hannegan's talk with

[111]

the President to which I just referred. At that time the labor people were pushing very hard for Henry Wallace. As I understood it, Mr. Hillman wanted to talk with Mr. Hannegan and express labor's views in the hope that he would stop urging Senator Truman so strongly and go along with the nomination of Vice President Wallace. Of course, I'm sure that Mr. Hannegan at the breakfast still maintained his position and I got the impression that the labor people were very unhappy about that.

FUCHS: You didn't attend the breakfast?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: Was this at the Stevens, the breakfast?

EWING: I think it was. It could have been at the Palmer House or .someplace else. I've just completely forgotten where they did hold that. I know I did not attend, but Mr. Hillman did afterwards express his disappointment that he hadn't made more of an impression on Mr. Hannegan.

FUCHS: Did you have any contact with Jimmy Byrnes at this time who, as you know, had aspirations?

[112]

EWING: No, I did not. I did not. I always had a very high opinion of Mr. Byrnes, Governor Byrnes, Senator Byrnes, Mr. Justice Byrnes and still do. I think he had been encouraged by Mr. Roosevelt to seek the vice presidency after the President had begun to have doubts about Henry Wallace as a candidate. The labor people were dead opposed to Byrnes and still wanted Wallace but had indicated that if it could not be Wallace they would take Truman.

I well remember the Thursday night of the convention. President Roosevelt had been renominated and had accepted the nomination by radio. All the galleries had been packed by Wallace followers. At the conclusion of the President's acceptance speech there was a tremendous demonstration which soon turned with great shouts for Wallace and demands that the convention proceed with the nomination of the vice presidential candidate. The tumult was so great that Senator Samuel Jackson, of Indiana, the Permanent Chairman, warned the crowd that they were packing the aisles until it was becoming dangerous. I realized that if the convention remained in session it might very well nominate Henry Wallace. So I went to Chairman Jackson and said, "Senator,

[113]

you've got to adjourn this convention tonight and let the nomination go over until tomorrow."

He shouted back, "Why, I can't. There's too much noise here to even put a motion."

I said, "Well, now listen, I'll go down on the floor and find Dave Lawrence," who was Mayor of Pittsburgh and chairman of the Pennsylvania delegation. "I'll ask Dave to make a motion to adjourn. No matter how much noise there is you recognize Dave and put the motion, declare it adopted and walk off the platform. Nobody can stop you, and everybody will soon walk out."

In this way we got the convention adjourned until the next morning and Senator Truman was nominated on the second ballot.

FUCHS: Do you recall anything then that occurred after Mr. Truman received the nomination? I mean there in Chicago?

EWING: No, I don't. No, I don't. I know later, and I'm not sure how much later, but the labor leaders came around to me and told me how they were for Truman all the time.

FUCHS: How did your duties as vice chairman differ from—

[114]

besides managing the convention--from those you had as assistant chairman?

EWING: Not at all.

FUCHS: Was there more than one vice chairman at this time?

EWING: Yes, but they were completely inactive. Frank Hague, as I recall, was a vice chairman; then the head of the Women's Division was a vice chairman, Mrs. Tillett. Whether there were any others I do not recall but I'm sure that Mrs. Tillett and I were the only two that were active.

FUCHS: What part did you play in the campaign?

EWING: Well, I made a number of speeches and rode on the President's train on one speaking trip. Things would come up in one state or another where someone from the National Committee was needed to do something. I don't remember any specific things. I was just, more or less, a trouble-shooter.

FUCHS: What do you recall of the years from November 1944, say, up until the time you became Federal Security Administrator in August of 1947, almost three years there?

[115]

EWING: Well, I recall nothing in particular. With the end of the war in late 1945 I'd finished my work as counsel for the Aluminum Company of America in Washington and went back to full

time with my law firm in New York. I was still able to do chores for the National Committee. Bob Hannegan was still National Chairman. After President Roosevelt died and Mr. Truman became President, there were gradually a number of changes in the Cabinet. In one of these changes Mr. Hannegan was made Postmaster General.

FUCHS: Didn't you serve as acting chairman in 1946 when Mr. Hannegan had a serious illness?

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: Do you recall anything of that--anything that came up then or any problems you had? Any appointments that you were consulted about?

EWING: Well, no, there were a lot of routine appointments that went through the National Committee all the time, and Mr. Truman was very punctilious about getting the opinion of the National Committee on practically all

[116]

appointments. I don't think this applies to Cabinet appointments or things like that which were quite personal, but routine appointments such as United States Attorneys and judges, postmasters, etc. I think it was after Mr. Truman took office that Attorney General Biddle resigned and Tom Clark was made Attorney General.

FUCHS: How did you view that appointment?

EWING: Oh, I thought it very good and it certainly proved so. He had the pleasure of seeing his own son made Attorney General by President Johnson, and to me Ramsey Clark made a great Attorney General.

FUCHS: Did you approve of the Supreme Court appointment for Clark?

EWING: Oh, yes, I thought it was fine. Tom Clark was a good lawyer and made a splendid Supreme Court Justice.

FUCHS: Did you feel that they were nominating a future President when Mr. Truman was nominated for Vice President?

EWING: Well, I was very concerned about Mr. Roosevelt's

[117]

health. I had had an experience that had given me a warning about that. During a Presidential campaign, as you know, it is customary for the Democratic candidate for President to go to New York the Thursday before the election, and make a trip around through the five boroughs, ending up at Madison Square Garden for a rally and a major speech. In the 1944 campaign, President Roosevelt's train arrived in Jersey City early that morning and was ferried over to the Brooklyn

Navy Yard where he got off of his train and the motorcade around the five boroughs started. I was in the motorcade in the car directly behind the President along with Steve Early, the President's Press Secretary, and Admiral Ross McIntire, who was the President's physician. During the trip around the boroughs an incident happened that involved a joke on Admiral McIntire. Late in the afternoon the cavalcade ended down in Washington Square in New York where Mrs. Roosevelt had an apartment at the time. Steve Early could hardly wait to tell the President this joke on Admiral McIntire. A couple of months later on the very day the President started for Yalta, at noon he had a luncheon for the campaign workers at the Democratic National Committee.

[118]

Mrs. Ewing and I sat at the President's table and I reminded him of this episode with Admiral McIntire and he didn't recall it. I was sure Steve Early had told him about it and I knew that it was an event that he would normally remember as the President greatly enjoyed jokes on members of his staff. His failure to remember this joke on Steve was a tip to me that he was not his old self. Afterwards, after President Roosevelt's death, Admiral Swanson, who was Surgeon General of the Navy and had accompanied the President to Yalta told me how sick Roosevelt was on that trip.

FUCHS: Where were you when Roosevelt died?

EWING: I think I was in Washington. I am sure I was, because I attended the funeral ceremony in the East Room of the White House.

FUCHS: You went back to New York at the end of 1945?

EWING: Yes. I went back to my old firm of Hughes, Hubbard & Ewing and was there all of 1946 and until August 1947 when I was appointed Federal Security Administrator.

FUCHS: I have a copy of a telegram here that was addressed

[119]

to you, at Indian Road, Fieldstone, New York 63, New York, by J. Donald Kingsley. It's dated January 3, 1947, and it reads:

All members of our group including Clifford and Connelly can meet Thursday night January 9. I have therefore set up our meeting for that time. Letter follows.

Recall what that would have been as early as January 1947?

EWING: Oh, yes. The 1946 election had turned out very badly for the Democrats. We lost control of both the House and the Senate and naturally that was a slap at the President. President Truman had been in office since, I think, May of '45 when President Roosevelt died. Some time after President Truman took office, I went up to New York with him. He was to speak up there

and we rode in from the airport to the hotel. He rode in an open car and sat on the top of the back seat. As we drove through the streets no one seemed to pay the slightest attention to the President. That concerned me greatly because if it had been Roosevelt the streets would have been blocked. But this was characteristic of the attitude all over the country towards President Truman at that time. He was not given credit for the qualities he had. He was following an outstanding

[120]

President with great popular appeal, and was compared to Roosevelt to his, Truman's, disadvantage. The public at that time had more or less the attitude that they would endure Truman because they had to. This, taken with the loss of the House and the Senate in '46, worried me very much and I felt something had to be done about it.

At this time I was Acting Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. The loss of Congress had so upset Bob Hannegan, who had high blood pressure anyhow, that he nearly had a breakdown. He went to Florida for about six months to try to get his strength back. It was during that time that I was the Acting Chairman. It seemed to me that we had to do something that would create a better image of President Truman.

In my gropings for what might be done I remembered an experience that I had had in the 1940 campaign. President Roosevelt had come up to New York to make a talk and he had brought a group of newspapermen along with him, in fact a whole trainload I think. After the President's speech they all rushed down to the Pennsylvania Station to take the train back to Washington. It seems that when the newspapermen, who were headed by

[121]

Steve Early, attempted to go down to the train the gates were closed and the police would let no one through. Well, Steve was a hot-headed Virginian, very able, I'm not criticizing him at all; but he was hot-headed, and he got angry. A Negro policeman was on duty at the gate they were supposed to use and Steve got into an argument with the officer and kneed him. Well, that caused the greatest furor that you can imagine. The Republican papers took it up from one end of the country to the other, and you'd almost think that Roosevelt himself had assaulted the policeman from the furor that they raised.

About a week after that, Ed Flynn, who was chairman of the Democratic National Committee at that time, called me into his office and asked me to have lunch with him alone. He started off by saying, "Jack, I'm terribly worried about this Steve Early matter. If it had been anybody except a secretary of the President, the man who kicked that policeman would have been in jail. Steve was completely wrong in what he did and it is hurting Roosevelt. I have told Roosevelt that he's got to fire Steve Early."

I said, "Oh, Ed, great goodness, I'm afraid that will make this matter worse instead of better."

[122]

"No," replied Mr. Flynn, "we're being put in the position of defending a wrongdoer. That's an untenable position and we shouldn't permit it. Steve Early should get out of the way and not hurt Roosevelt's campaign."

We talked along a little longer and then Charlie Michelson came in. He was head of the Publicity Department of the Democratic National Committee, and had a telegram from Chicago saying that Willkie had cancelled all of his speaking itinerary in that part of the country and was returning to New York where he would speak in Harlem the following night, Philadelphia the next night, and Pittsburgh the next night, Akron the next night, Detroit the next night, and then in Chicago again. Well, this news disturbed Mr. Flynn even more.

FUCHS: What was the significance of this change of itinerary?

EWING: He was coming back to speak in the Negro areas of those cities. The three of us talked along a little further and suddenly a thought occurred to me and I said, "Ed, have you had the views of our Negro leaders up in Harlem?"

"No," he said, "that's a good idea. Get some of them in here this afternoon. Let's see what they think."

[123]

By then it was two o'clock I suppose, and I was able to reach two of the leaders in Harlem by telephone. They were the only ones I could contact on such short notice, Herbert Bruce and Danny Burroughs. They said they would be at my office at four o'clock. When they arrived we started discussing the problem immediately. Mr. Bruce and Mr. Burroughs told me that they really did not know how their people felt about Steve's mixup with the Negro policeman. Both men told me they had had their captains in the night before and tried to find out what their people were thinking, but about the only answer they got was that people were saying nothing. This troubled Mr. Burroughs and Mr. Bruce because they said that when the Negro wasn't saying anything it was ominous. After considerable discussion Mr. Bruce spoke up and said, "Mr. Ewing, I happen to know that policeman pretty well. If you'd like to get a statement from him, I think I can arrange it."

"Oh," I answered, "that would be wonderful, please do it."

"Well," he said, "you dictate the statement you want him to make."

So we got a secretary in and dictated a statement.

[124]

We tried to make it as near as we could to what the policeman might say. One sentence was: "The Republicans are trying to make a political football out of me." When we got the statement written Mr. Bruce left to try to contact the policeman. About eight o'clock that night he called in

and said he'd seen the policeman. The policeman was perfectly willing to sign the statement, but he was under strict orders from the police department to sign no statement and give no statement to anyone. This obviously meant that we would have to get approval of the police department. So I telephoned Dave Niles. Dave Niles was one of President Roosevelt's secretaries who had taken time off to act as liaison officer between the Norris-La Guardia Committee (which was to help in re-electing President Roosevelt) and the Democratic National Committee. I asked Dave if he would contact Mayor La Guardia and ask him to arrange for the policeman to sign the statement. Dave called back in a few minutes to say that Mayor La Guardia had made a speech that noon in Detroit and was now on the train, on the Detrouiter, returning to New York. He was to arrive at Grand Central Station at eight o'clock the next morning. I, therefore, asked Mr. Niles if he would be good enough

[125]

to meet the train and try to clear the matter with Mayor La Guardia early the next morning. Dave said he would.

Next morning I was down in my office early, before eight o'clock, and shortly after that time the telephone rang. It was the Mayor and he said, "Mr. Ewing, I understand you have a statement you want that policeman to sign."

And I said, "Yes, Mr. Mayor."

"Well," he continued, "Mr. Ewing, I'm going to be at 1234 Broadway at 9:26 this morning, and I don't mean 9:25 and I don't mean 9:27, I mean 9:26, and I want you to have someone there with the statement so that I can go over it first."

I said, "I'll have someone there, Mayor."

So, I did. About 9:30 I had a telephone call and it was the Mayor. "Oh, Mr. Ewing," he exclaimed, "that's a wonderful statement. It's fine, I'll see that it's issuance is authorized." Then he asked, "How do you plan to put it out?"

"Well," I said, "we were hoping that the Police Department could put it out because we don't think it would look so good for the Democratic National Committee

[126]

to be issuing it."

He answered, "Good! I'll take care of that."

The next thing I knew, oh, it was about half past one, Police Commissioner Valentine called me and said, "Mr. Ewing, I've got this statement that you want this policeman to make but we can't put this statement out. "

I asked, "What's the trouble Commissioner?"

"Why," he replied, "it's political and we don't want to get into politics and we just can't do it."

I said, "Well, how is it political, Commissioner?"

"Why," he answered, "you have that sentence in there that 'Those Republicans are trying to make a political football out of me.' If you take that sentence out we'll be glad to put the statement out."

"Well," I said, "Commissioner, the Mayor went over that statement and he called me back to talk about how it should be put out and he said, 'Don't let anyone change a word of that statement. It's perfect as it is.'" I said, "If you can get the Mayor's consent to eliminate that sentence it's perfectly all right with me."

He says, "Oh, hell, I'll put it out."

[127]

This experience had a lesson for me, because when election day came, Roosevelt carried those Harlem districts thirteen, sixteen to one. Now, the Negro up there couldn't tell their captains anything, they were inarticulate, but all they knew deep in their heart was that Roosevelt was pitching on their team; and that's the greatest asset a politician can have. So, the memory of all this came back to me when I was trying to think, in early 1947, of some line of action that would make great masses of voters feel that Mr. Truman "was pitching on their team." I decided to get a group together and see if we could think of things to do that might create this feeling. I got the Secretary of Agriculture, Charles Brannan; Leon Keyserling, who was a member of the Board of Economic Advisors; Dave Morse, who was Under Secretary of Labor; Jebbie Davidson who was Under Secretary of the Interior; Clark Clifford who was the President's personal counsel; Wayne Coy who, I think at that time was a special assistant to the President in the White House.

FUCHS: Now this letter was from J. Donald Kingsley. Was he included in that?

[128]

EWING: Yes. Don Kingsley was my Assistant Federal Security Administrator.

FUCHS: Now, was that later on or was that as early as January '47? I was wondering if this group started as early as January of '47 or if this letter could have been...

EWING: No, this group was started before I was appointed Federal Security Administrator. Several months before I started the group in my capacity as Acting Chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

FUCHS: Kingsley was then in the White House, apparently.

EWING: I think that that's right.

FUCHS: This is a White House letterhead.

EWING: That's right.

FUCHS: Had you been a friend of Kingsley's for some time?

EWING: Yes, he was more a friend of my older son, Jim, but I had met Kingsley through Jim and had a very high opinion of him and particularly his political

[129]

acumen. When I became Federal Security Administrator I asked him to become Assistant Administrator, and he did. But that must have been just about when the group was getting started.

FUCHS: Who made the selection of these members?

EWING: I think I did very largely, in fact I know I did, but it was in consultation with Kingsley and others.

FUCHS: Who did you first propose the idea to? Do you recall?

EWING: Well, it may have been Kingsley, I'm not sure. It may have been my son, Jim. I'm not sure.

FUCHS: Matt Connelly was included in the original group?

EWING: I asked Matt, originally, to join us and he came to one meeting, and right away said to me, "Clark Clifford is the one from the White House who should be in that group." I don't think Matt attended a meeting after that.

FUCHS: Connelly has been accorded by some students to have been rather astute politically. Would you corroborate

[130]

on that or not?

EWING: Oh, yes, oh, yes. He was of great value to the President. He was Appointments Secretary and to see the President you had to go through Connelly. He had a very keen ability to let the people see the President who ought to see him and keep out those who just use up the President's time.

FUCHS: Did he go into the President's office much when Mr. Truman had someone there with him or did he just always remain outside at his desk.

EWING: Oh, I think he practically always remained outside unless the conference was about something in which Matt was already involved. He never intruded. For instance, sometimes when I'd see the President, I might ask Matt to sit in because it was to be something that I wanted him to know about. But he certainly never intruded.

FUCHS: You think that he felt that one, or maybe two, if Kingsley was going to be there as well as Clifford, was a sufficient number from the White House that he

[131]

didn't feel that he could add anything?

EWING: No, I don't think it was that. I think he felt that Clark Clifford, who was counsel to the President, was really more involved than he was with policy matters, and that of all people in the White House Clark Clifford would be the best liaison between our group and the President.

FUCHS: So, how did this group develop then?

EWING: Well, we met at my apartment in the Wardman Park every Monday night. We would meet at six o'clock for dinner, my secretary would call all the members beforehand to find out if they were coming and what they would like for dinner. She would put the order in during the day and the food would be all ready when we got there. As soon as we finished eating we would discuss various things that we thought might help the President politically.

FUCHS: Did you tell him of this when you started?

EWING: Oh, yes.

FUCHS: Did you ask him if it was permissible?

[132]

EWING: Yes. The President knew all the time what was going on. After we got started Clark Clifford carried on most of the liaison work between our group and the President. But every so often it would be more appropriate for someone else to discuss a particular matter with the President, for example, Charlie Brannan if it was something to do with agriculture. Later on when I became Federal Security Administrator, if it was something in my bailiwick, why, I would take it up with the President. But if the subject was something general Clark would be the one who would talk to the President about it. For instance, things involving the military, Clark would handle that. That was clear out of my field.

One of the matters that we took up involved civil rights. The Civil Rights Commission had brought out their report and they had made quite a number of suggestions for action by the

Government. We had all read the report and some one had the idea that there were many recommendations in the report that would require legislation, but that there were a great many others that the President could make effective by Executive order. Whoever it was that brought this up

[133]

went on to suggest that we advise the President to actually proceed to issue such orders. The President took that advice and did it. For instance, the report recommended abolishing all segregation in the armed services. As Commander in Chief the President could order this. I remember working with Clark Clifford and Secretary Forrestal in the preparation of that order. Finally we got it in shape as far as the President and we were concerned. Secretary Forrestal suggested that before it was issued it ought to be cleared with the heads of the three services, that is the Army, the Navy, and the Air Service. Secretary Forrestal said when we were discussing this that he was perfectly sure that the order would be satisfactory to John Sullivan, who was at that time Secretary of the Navy; he was also sure it would be satisfactory to Stuart Symington who was the Secretary of the Air Service. He was a little concerned about Secretary Royall, who was Secretary of the Army, and he turned to me and said, "Jack, you know Secretary Royall well, would you mind clearing this with him?"

I said, "No. I'll be glad to."

And I did. I called Secretary Royall up for an

[134]

appointment and then went over to his office. He read over the draft order once, then he read it over again, and then turned to me and said, "Jack, you can tell the President that this order is entirely agreeable to me. Not only will the Army go along but we will do so enthusiastically." As an afterthought I could not understand why the Secretary of Defense should ask me to clear something with one of his subordinates, and I don't know to this day why it was. But that's what happened.

FUCHS: What were your thoughts about Secretary Forrestal at that time?

EWING: Well, I admired him very much, very much. I did not know him in New York, but I got to know him quite well in Washington and I thought very highly of him. I think he was the Under Secretary of the Navy when I first got to know him. It was after the Allies had crossed over from Africa to Sicily and were beginning to move up the Italian peninsula, and the question arose as to what kind of civil government should be established behind the army as it moved further up the Italian peninsula. Dean Acheson was Under Secretary of

[135]

State at that time. Shortly after the middle of 1943, Mr. Acheson and Mr. Forrestal came over to see me at my hotel and asked me if I would consider the appointment as, I think they were going

to call it Governor General of Italy or something of that kind, but anyhow it would be to head the civil government behind the army as it moved on north. I told them that this was not a post that would interest me. I did not speak Italian, although Mrs. Ewing spoke it fluently; but I just did not feel that this was a job that I could do well and I preferred not to be considered.

FUCHS: Do you recall who was given the appointment?

EWING: Yes, Charley Poletti, who had been governor of New York. He was lieutenant governor and when Governor Lehman resigned to become head of UNRAA, Mr. Poletti became governor of New York. It was an excellent appointment. Governor Poletti spoke Italian and could understand the nuances of what went on much better than I could.

FUCHS: You said your group would have dinner. Did you generally eat first?

[136]

EWING: Yes, that would be purely social and we didn't start business until after we had eaten. Then we'd talk till sometimes pretty late, half past eleven, twelve.

FUCHS: Did you have a prepared agenda?

EWING: No. What would happen during the week was that each member of the group would be on the lookout for something that should be discussed and, at the meeting, the subject would be brought up and considered. Sometimes it would be an idea that we couldn't do anything about and we'd drop that subject. Someone else would always be ready with another subject for discussion. We never lacked for matters to consider.

FUCHS: Was the press aware of this?

EWING: I think there were times when the press got wind of our activities, because I've seen where some columnist would make a reference to them; but we were very careful not to let anything get out to the press and that's why no notes were kept, no minutes or anything else.

FUCHS: No records at all were kept of this.

EWING: No. The only record I think is the one my secretary

[137]

kept of who was coming to a meeting so she could order dinner for the group.

FUCHS: One writer, Cabell Phillips I believe, has said that this group disbanded after the 1948 election?

EWING: No. That is not correct. We kept on practically until Governor Stevenson's nomination in 1952. Obviously there wasn't much for us to do after that because he was running the show. I

think he was very reluctant to associate himself with what we might be doing because, as you remember, at the end of President Truman's term, his popularity had sunk considerably and I think Governor Stevenson felt that it would be wise to stay a little aloof from him.

FUCHS: Could you succinctly, but not too briefly, state your concept of the function of this policy committee?

EWING: Yes. In organizing the group it was my idea that we should try to develop a pattern of things for the President to do that would convince the various groups of voters that President Truman was pitching on their team, just as those Harlem Negroes felt towards President Roosevelt in 1940. For instance, one of the early sub-

[138]

jects that we considered was whether or not President Truman should veto the Taft-Hartley Bill. He was under great pressure from the leaders in Congress and I think from all of his Cabinet, except the Secretary of Labor, to go along with that bill and approve it. Our group, after discussing it, felt very strongly that it was unwise for him to approve the bill. We argued that labor was very much opposed to it, that the chances were the bill would be passed over his veto anyhow and thus become law so that he would lose nothing by the veto. Our view finally prevailed and the President vetoed the bill. Congress promptly overrode the veto but Truman had greatly increased his popularity with labor thereby.

FUCHS: It might be important if you recall anyone who opposed the veto, or what was the situation in the White House as you might have known it--people outside the group. Who was advocating it if any?

EWING: Well, I think all of the Cabinet were opposed to the veto except the Secretary of Labor, and the leaders in Congress were urging the President to approve the bill such as Speaker Rayburn and the Democratic Majority Leader John McCormack.

[139]

FUCHS: What about John R. Steelman?

EWING: I don't recall what if any position he might have had on it, because John was not in our group but he would have been very much in favor of anything he thought would help the President. He was very loyal to the President.

FUCHS: Was there anyone in your group that favored signing it or who played the devil's advocate particularly?

EWING: Well, I'm sure the arguments in favor of the President signing the bill were weighed. I don't recall that any one person pressed them. If an argument occurred to any one of us which he thought should be considered he would bring it up simply to be sure that all angles were discussed.

FUCHS: Did you generally just arrive at a consensus or did you take a vote?

EWING: No, there would always be a consensus on any action that was recommended. I don't recall that in a final showdown if anyone ever dissented from a conclusion of the group. The last thing we'd do was to decide who would take the matter up with the President. And as I

[140]

said, it was generally Clark Clifford, but if the subject was in someone else's field, why, he would be asked to discuss the matter with the President.

FUCHS: Did Charley Murphy, as assistant to Clifford in Clifford's office, attend any of these meetings?

EWING: At first, he did occasionally. Clark would ask Charley to attend if for some reason he, Clark, could not. But when Clark resigned as counsel to the President, Charley Murphy took his place and he was regularly in attendance from then on. I think Clark attended some meetings also even after he had resigned as counsel to the President.

FUCHS: There is a memorandum which has received considerable notice by scholars lately, I believe that it was first, to my knowledge, mentioned by Cabel Phillips in his book on Mr. Truman's presidency, and then subsequently has been mentioned by Irwin Ross and Arthur Krock, to the effect that Clark Clifford wrote this memorandum of November 19, 1947 outlining the strategy for the campaign. Are you aware of this memorandum?

EWING: Yes.

[141]

FUCHS: Would you comment on the authorship of that and what you know about that.

EWING: I think Clark wrote that, as far as I know, himself. I'm sure I wasn't involved in it in any way, although much of its contents had been discussed in our group. Clark didn't have to have the approval of our group to write that memorandum; he was free to send any memorandum to the President. I know some of the things that were in that memorandum had been discussed in our group. It was a very, very able piece of work and very prophetic as to what might happen.

FUCHS: Did you see the memorandum prior to the election?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: Did you know that it had been written?

EWING: No. Clark may have told me about it. I tried to think of that, but my best answer would be that I did not know about it. It's so hard after all these years to know just when you found out something. But I know that when I saw these recent references to it my mind

[142]

was a perfect blank. I did recall, when I read it over, various things that I knew we had discussed in our group. But what, if any knowledge I had of the memorandum at the time, I just draw a blank.

FUCHS: So then, the next question is whether Mr. Truman had ever mentioned it, but obviously you recall nothing about it.

EWING: Oh, he never mentioned it to me.

FUCHS: When this group started you were still residing in New York, you had gone back to New York?

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: But you kept this apartment in the Wardman Park ever since your...

EWING: No, when I terminated my work with the Aluminum Company of America in Washington at the end of '45 I gave up the apartment in the Carlton Hotel. It was after I became Federal Security Administrator in August of 1947 that Mrs. Ewing and I took an apartment in the Wardman Park.

FUCHS: Well, if this group started to meet in early 1947,

[143]

where were you meeting then?

EWING: Well, I dare say that I just went down to Washington and got a suite at the Carlton. That must have been it. I'm sure that's what it was, because that's where I always stayed in Washington.

FUCHS: Do you recall any other particular matters, such as you already have on Taft-Hartley and civil rights, that this group considered prior to the nomination and the election?

EWING: Well, at one time or another I believe we discussed every issue that arose between January 1947 and the middle of 1952. Among these were national health insurance, national fair employment legislation, unification of the armed services, massive housing legislation, overhaul of existing labor legislation. Other issues were also discussed but I do not recall them now. On the whole I believe the group's deliberations and recommendations contributed substantially to

President Truman's re-election in 1948. Clark Clifford wrote me a congratulatory note on my 70th birthday in which he refers to the work of the policy group. This letter is as follows:

[144]

February 1959

Dear Oscar:

I am delighted to be even a small part in the celebration of your seventieth birthday. It must be tremendously gratifying to you to look back over those seventy years and realize what a unique contribution you have made to your friends, your party and your country.

If I had to select the outstanding service you have rendered in your notable career, I would choose the contribution you made to the Truman Administration as the organizer and leader of the policy group that played such an important part in those exciting years. The influence you had on the men around President Truman was of inestimable value to him and will be remembered always by all of us.

You have my best wishes for many more fruitful years and my affectionate regards.

Faithfully yours,

(signed) Clark M. Clifford

FUCHS: Did you take part in the speechwriting, say for instance the President's civil rights message of February 1948?

EWING: Well, I did work on some messages, Not a great deal. I worked on his campaign speeches in 1948. I would answer your question by saying that I'm sure I took part occasionally in some message that would be dealing with subjects within my bailiwick in the Federal

[145]

Security Agency, but I don't recall any one of them specifically.

FUCHS: How did your appointment as Federal Security Administrator come about?

EWING: Well, Bob Hannegan had been close to Mr. Truman politically for many years. In Mr. Truman's campaign for re-election to the Senate in 1940, Bob had rendered important aid at a very critical time. Furthermore, Bob had headed the fight to get Mr. Truman the Vice Presidential nomination in 1944. After Mr. Truman became President, Hannegan, as Democratic National Committee Chairman and Postmaster General, occupied a very influential position. He was particularly anxious to have the new President surrounded by people who would be completely loyal to the President.

I remember the night before President Roosevelt's funeral. Bob Hannegan and I were together in Flynn's hotel room. We all agreed that the most important thing that Mr. Truman as President could do was to surround himself first of all with people who were loyal to him. Hannegan carried that message to Mr. Truman and there was a gradual shift of personnel

[146]

surrounding the President. Of course, Mr. Truman at first asked all the Cabinet to remain but gradually he moved them out and got his own people installed. That's absolutely essential for a President to do. Any contrary practice is ruinous. A President has got to have people who are loyal to him or they will cut his throat. In 1947 Mr. Hannegan urged Mr. Truman to appoint me Federal Security Administrator. I'm sure it was primarily as a result of Mr. Hannegan's activities that I was appointed.

FUCHS: Why was the then Federal Security Administrator, who had succeeded, I believe Paul McNutt, who was the original one, why was he leaving?

EWING: That I don't know. The President gave him another position.

FUCHS: This was...

EWING: Watson Miller. I forget what job he was given.

FUCHS: I believe he became Commissioner of Immigration.

EWING: No, it wasn't that but it was something like that.

FUCHS: You know of no other reasons why Watson Miller was

[147]

given another position and room made for you in FSA?

EWING: No, what I think the President had in mind was this: The Federal Security Agency was politically a very sensitive position. Its activities affected every man, woman and child in the United States, and the President wanted someone heading the Agency who would be alive to the political consequences of what might be done. Watson Miller was a perfectly grand person but he did not have that particular quality.

FUCHS: On the policy group again, did you deal in foreign affairs. Did you discuss foreign affairs at all?

EWING: No, not the policy group. I got involved very much in one phase of foreign affairs.

FUCHS: But not at this time?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: On the 13th of August 1947 you wrote the President and said that you had just talked with Tom Clark on the telephone and that he had told you that all preliminaries were arranged, and that Mr. Truman was ready to announce your appointment as Federal Security

[148]

Administrator when you were next in Washington. I wonder why this came through Tom Clark. In the same letter, I might mention, you also noted that: "The position gives me an unique chance to help politically; but I know that first and foremost I can help most by doing a bang-up job with the agency--and I promise to do this." Do you care to comment on how Tom Clark came into this. I believe you have already gone over the political angle. Another letter of the same date written to John Steelman says that Tom Clark had just told you that Steelman had all the preliminaries arranged in regard to the appointment.

EWING: I had completely forgotten those letters but seeing them brings back that I had just previous to that time of August of 1947 finished the prosecution of Douglas Chandler in Boston for treason.

FUCHS: What was that case?

EWING: Tom Clark was Attorney General at the time and he had appointed me Special Assistant to the Attorney General to prosecute that case. Mr. Clark was a great friend of Bob Hannegan's, and this would indicate that

[149]

he knew what was going on in regard to my possible appointment. John Steelman as Assistant to the President, I remember, he was the man that the President had asked to get things straightened out with Watson Miller. Apparently that's why I wrote to him. That's the way he was involved, in any event.

FUCHS: I see. Would you care to go over the prosecution of Douglas Chandler? I think that that would be interesting, how you happened to come into that.

EWING: Yes. I've already told about working on the prosecution of William Dudley Pelley for sedition out in Indianapolis in 1942. That prosecution necessitated my making a study of Nazi propaganda. As a result of that study, I got the idea that we ought to prosecute those American citizens who were broadcasting Nazi propaganda and Fascist propaganda from abroad. So, I went to Attorney General Francis Biddle and suggested that these broadcasters be indicted for treason. He answered my suggestion by saying "I don't think we can make a case stick because there are some Civil War cases which hold that mere words do not constitute the overt act that is an essential element of the crime of treason. "

[150]

FUCHS: Now Biddle's resignation was effective June 30 , 1945. But you did take this up that early?

EWING: Oh, yes. This talk with Attorney General Biddle was not too long after I finished trying the Pelley case in 1942. In this talk I explained to Mr. Biddle why I thought we could make the case. I argued that those Civil War cases involved nothing more than a man getting on a stump and talking to a crowd of people that were within the normal range of his voice. I felt this was quite different from words spoken into a microphone that could project the words all over the world; furthermore, that propaganda had become a definite weapon of warfare, and that anyone who used that weapon against his own country should be prosecuted for treason. When I had finished, the Attorney General said, "Well, I think you've got a point. Will you prosecute them?"

I told him I could not. I explained that it would not be fair to my law firm for me to be away from the office for the time required to prepare these cases for trial and try them.

He thought a moment then said: "I'll tell you what we will do. We'll monitor all these broadcasts that

[151]

come in from Axis stations and see what they look like."

So, he arranged to have all of these broadcasts monitored by a monitoring station located in Maryland near Washington,. Obviously there was nothing much the Government could do until it could arrest the broadcasters. In the meantime, however, the F.B.I. was monitoring the voice of Douglas Chandler and others, and then had witnesses in Washington identify the various voices. On the basis of voice identification, several of the broadcasters were indicted in the District of Columbia. After the war these broadcasters who had been spewing Axis propaganda were captured. The Department then sent investigating teams over to Europe and they procured very convincing evidence which built up very strong cases of treason against them. But there was an interval between the time I talked with Francis Biddle about indicting these broadcasters in early 1943 and the end of the war when the further investigation could be made in Europe and the broadcasters could be reindicted on the new evidence. This accounts for the interval of time and why in early 1947 I would be working with Tom Clark who had, in the meantime, succeeded Francis Biddle as

[152]

Attorney General.

FUCHS: You probably didn't take this up with Biddle in 1945, during the some two and a half months that he served as Attorney General in the Truman Cabinet.

EWING: No. No, I did not.

FUCHS: Then did you approach Tom Clark about the prosecution of Douglas Chandler and Robert Best, who was the other one you were to prosecute, I believe?

EWING: Well, first I was asked to be prosecutor in all eight cases. I said I couldn't do it and then they finally asked me if I would take the first case. At one time the Department planned to prosecute Best and Chandler together and then we realized we couldn't. I, therefore, took the Chandler case and it was to be the first one to be tried. This would present an opportunity to get a court's reaction to our theory that mere words could be the overt act required for a treason conviction when the words had been spoken into a radio microphone for all the world to hear.

FUCHS: Best broadcast from where?

EWING: I don't remember, because I never got into that

[153]

case. It was very obvious to me from the start that we couldn't try Chandler and Best together because they broadcast from different places.

FUCHS: You just tried the one case?

EWING: I only tried the one case.

FUCHS: So then, Clark asked you to come in on it?

EWING: I think that's the way it happened.

FUCHS: Anything you recall that might be of interest about this case as it developed?

EWING: Oh, yes. It was a very interesting case. The group that the Department of Justice sent over to Europe after the war to collect the evidence, they did a marvelous job. Chandler was a very handsome man, but he had made a failure of almost every business venture he had undertaken. He had tried many things, being a stockbroker, being an insurance agent--I don't recall the others but in every case something happened that made it a failure. Chandler always blamed the failure on a Jew. As far as I could see no Jew had anything to do with any of the failures, but that didn't make any

[154]

difference in Chandler's mind. It was because of his violent anti-Semitic feelings that he applied first to the Italian and then to the German governments to broadcast for them. Before the war Chandler had married a woman from Pittsburgh who was fairly well-to-do. As the clouds were gathering, they had moved to some little place in Austria near Trieste. There he nursed his anti-Semitic feelings and first applied to the Italian government for a job of broadcasting to America.

The Italians turned him down. Then he made a trip to Berlin to apply personally for a job of broadcasting to America for Radio Berlin.

FUCHS: Did he do this partly because he needed money or was it solely because he wanted to work against Jews?

EWING: I think it was the latter. I believe his wife had an income on which they could live comfortably, but not extravagantly. One reason they went to Austria was because the cost of living made it an attractive place for them. When he applied to Radio Berlin they employed him at the highest salary that they paid any broadcaster.

[155]

The crew that the Department of Justice sent over to Europe dug up all of this. They dug up the details of the workings of Radio Berlin. It was all under Goebbels, Hitler's Minister of Propaganda. The Germans had divided their radio activities into various sections. There was Radio North America, Radio South America, Radio North Africa, Radio Southeast and Radio East. Each one of those sections had a head man and then there would be various broadcasters who worked under the head. The heads of the various sections had a meeting with Dr. Goebbels every morning at eleven o'clock, and he gave them what was to be the line for that day. They, the heads of those sections, would go back to their office, call in their broadcasters and tell them what were the lines for the day. The broadcasters then went off to prepare their broadcasts. They might work at home or they might work there at the station. In the late afternoon they would return to the station and make recordings. The recordings would be put on the air at various times in the evening, depending on whether they were broadcasting east to Asia or to the Near East or Africa or America. The broadcasts for America were put on late in the evening because of the

[156]

difference in time.

FUCHS: What were they normally, fifteen minutes or half hour stints?

EWING: I would say they were about fifteen minutes.

FUCHS: They didn't have the long playing records?

EWING: I don't recall whether they had them or not.

FUCHS: It's not important, I just wondered. Then how did the prosecutions case go. What was Chandler's defense?

EWING: Insanity. When the army took over Germany, Chandler had been arrested and put in jail in Paris. Then on the basis of the new evidence collected in Europe by the investigating team Chandler was reindicted in the District of Columbia. After that he was brought back to this country. This was done by flying him first from Paris to the Azores and from there to Gander.

We were very insistent that the army, in bringing him back to the District of Columbia, fly over no United States land until they got to Chesapeake Bay and then fly up over the Potomac River to the District.

[157]

The reason for that was because under Federal Law if a Federal crime is committed outside of the territories of the United States and the accused is captured and brought back into the country, he must be tried in the United States District Court of the District into which he is first brought. We wanted to try this case in the District of Columbia and that was why we asked the Army to be sure that the plane didn't cross any United States territory until it came up the Potomac River. Even then we could not be sure because a court might hold that the Potomac River would be in either Maryland or Virginia.

FUCHS: Were there precedents for this that even though they didn't land in a district that if they flew over it...

EWING: No. That is what we were hoping for but we didn't want to take a chance of flying straight down over land. Notwithstanding all of our requests that this route be followed, the pilot of that plane had a girl in Boston so the next thing that we knew he had landed at an airport near Boston, Westmoreland Field I think it was.

FUCHS: I really don't know, sir.

[158]

EWING: Well, it was near Boston, Massachusetts. The result of this was that we had to bring all the witnesses from Germany back again to Boston and reindict Chandler in Boston so we could try him there. We didn't want to take a chance of a possible reversible error if we tried him in the District of Columbia.

FUCHS: Why was that?

EWING: Well, simply, it would give him a legal point. There was no question that we had to try him in the district in which he was first brought, and there was no question as it turned out that he was first brought into the district of Massachusetts. That's why we had to reindict him up there because of what this darn pilot had done. We later found out that he had this girlfriend in Boston, that's why he brought the plane down there. He claimed that he couldn't get his wheels retracted and that it slowed him down so much that he couldn't get any further than Boston. He couldn't make the District of Columbia. And I'm sure this bloop of his cost the United States Government at least a hundred thousand dollars because of the expense of bringing the witnesses back again from Germany.

[159]

FUCHS: What happened to Chandler?

EWING: Chandler put in a defense of insanity. His lawyer claimed that this obsession about the Jews was a paranoid form of insanity. The defense brought in expert witnesses who said that Chandler's violent anti-Jewish feeling was a symptom of paranoia. We had witnesses who testified that he didn't have a lot of other symptoms that a true paranoia would have to have. And so the jury convicted him. The judge was then obligated to sentence him and could impose the death sentence. I thought if there were ever to be a death sentence in any case Chandler deserved it because his propaganda was so vicious. He deliberately tried to disrupt the morale of the men in the armed forces as well as the morale of their wives and children and families at home. His main theme was to tell the men in the Army and Navy that their wives were running around with other men in America, then he'd make a broadcast to America addressed to the wives and sweethearts of boys in the armed services and telling them that their men were playing around with the girls in foreign countries. It was a nasty, mean thing, and I felt very strongly that the Judge should have given him

[160]

a death sentence if there were to be any death sentences for any crime. But the Judge only sentenced him to life imprisonment and he's still in the hoosegow as far as I know.

FUCHS: Was it weighed that maybe he was only giving what Goebbels told him to, that they were not actually his words?

EWING: No, no that defense was never made. The Constitution is very specific in its definition of treason. It's adhering to the enemy, giving him aid and comfort. That's the substantive part of the crime. Then the procedural requirements for the crime are that there must be the testimony by two witnesses to the same overt act. We ended up proving, as I recall, about twelve overt acts of broadcasting. We would have a witness who would testify that Chandler made a certain recording and then we'd play the record of that broadcast to the jury so they could hear his voice and what he said. We had to bring witnesses over from Germany who could describe to the jury exactly how Radio Berlin operated, how it was set up and how when a man spoke into the microphone a recording was made and when the recording was played

[161]

how the wires took the words to the broadcasting apparatus. The Department's investigators did a beautiful job.

FUCHS: I believe that I've read that the average time served on a life sentence is fourteen years? I may be wrong on the exact figures. It's now been twenty-two years, I guess. Has he come up for parole?

EWING: Well, the only thing that I know is that after Chandler had been in jail five or six years, one of his daughters came to see me. This was when I was still Federal Security Administrator so it must have been prior to January of '53. His daughter asked me to recommend that her father be paroled or possibly pardoned. I told her I didn't feel that I could do it, that I felt what he had

done was really a very serious crime and that I was not willing to recommend his release. As far as I know he's never applied for parole again.

FUCHS: Do you know where he is confined?

EWING: He was in a Federal prison in Connecticut. There's a Federal prison there in which he was confined.

[162]

FUCHS: Was he a young man when you prosecuted him?

EWING: No, he was a man, oh, I'd say fifty years old.

FUCHS: What ever happened to Pelley?

EWING: Pelley had been sentenced for a term of five to fifteen years. I believe he served only a little more than five years because he was a good prisoner and behaved himself.

FUCHS: Is he still living?

EWING: I don't know. It seems to me that I've seen that he died. But I'm not sure of that.

FUCHS: Do you care to cut this off now?

EWING: Well, we might.

FUCHS: It's four-thirty and I don't want you to get too tired, and you have a meeting and you haven't had your dinner yet. It's up to you, sir.

[163]

Third Oral History Interview with Oscar R. Ewing, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, May 1, 1969.
By J. R. Fuchs, Harry S. Truman Library.

FUCHS: Mr. Ewing, I'd like to ask you a little bit more about your policy strategy board or political strategy board. Did you have a common term that you applied to this little group that met on Monday nights in your apartment?

EWING: No. Various terms were used, "advisory group" and "strategy group," I think that's about the only two descriptions that I could recall.

FUCHS: Yes, well...

EWING: But we certainly had no formal name.

FUCHS: Yes. I was wondering if certain other individuals met with you, such as Dave Bell?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: George Elsey?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: David Lloyd?

[164]

EWING: No.

FUCHS: No other advisors that you could think of met with this group. What about Oscar Chapman?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: He never met with the board?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: Who did you consider to be Mr. Truman's chief political advisors before the formation of this strategy group?

EWING: Well, I'm sure Bob Hannegan was as long as he was active. John Snyder, I'm sure that the President relied on him a great deal. Fred Vinson, until he became Chief Justice, I don't know how much the President consulted him after he became Chief Justice.

FUCHS: What about Tom Clark, do you think he had any political influence with Mr. Truman?

EWING: Yes. Yes, I think he did, particularly with reference to Texas and the Southern states.

FUCHS: What about George E. Allen?

[165]

EWING: I don't think George had any particular political influence. George was a delightful companion and I think the President enjoyed being with him, but I don't think the President looked to him for political advice.

FUCHS: David Noyes?

EWING: Well, towards the end Dave was in Washington often. I think in the 1948 campaign he was around a good deal and did advise the President on political matters and various other things. David had had very wide experience in public relations and was, I'm sure, quite helpful to the President.

FUCHS: You were associated undoubtedly with Bill Boyle when you were vice chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Do you think he was a political influence on Mr. Truman?

EWING: Oh yes, in a way. I think--well, I don't know how much weight the President gave to Bill Boyle's advice and I don't say that negatively, I simply don't know. Bill, however, was more of a person to carry out the President's desires than to be offering constructive

[166]

advice. But he was very loyal to the President and in every way did the best he could.

FUCHS: Was there anyone that you would have considered to have been rather a poor one to advise Mr. Truman, someone who was perhaps too conservative or too liberal?

EWING: Well, it would be hard for me to say. I think some of his advisers were much more conservative than I was, than our group was. I think, for instance, John Snyder was, probably Charley Sawyer when he was in the Cabinet. That, however, was an honest difference of opinion between our group and the conservative members of the administration. The conservative members of the administration were just as honest in their views as we were in ours.

FUCHS: The conservatives, such as Snyder and later on Sawyer, didn't attend any of your policy meetings I gather.

EWING: No.

FUCHS: Did they know of your group?

EWING: Oh, I suppose they did.

[167]

FUCHS: You know of no similar group among the conservatives or any attempt to organize such a group?

EWING: No. As far as I know it was individual contacts with the President that they had. Nothing in the way of a group.

FUCHS: Mr. Boyle had been serving in Mr. Truman's office as secretary. Do you know why he went over to the Democratic National Committee with Hannegan?

EWING: No, I do not.

FUCHS: Now, I believe you resigned your position as vice chairman when you were appointed to be administrator of FSA.

EWING: Yes. Well, I think I resigned to become Special Assistant to the Attorney General when I undertook the prosecution of Douglas Chandler for treason. When that was finished I think I was reappointed vice chairman of the committee. But that would be only for a short time.

FUCHS: I see.

EWING: I know I was not vice chairman at any time that I

[168]

was Federal Security Administrator.

FUCHS: Yes. What about Leslie Biffle, were you acquainted with him?

EWING: Oh, very well. He was the Secretary of the Senate and was very helpful to the President in any problems that the President had with the Senate. Of course, Senator Barkley, first as the Democratic leader of the Senate and later as Vice President, was very helpful to the President. Mr. Biffle was often the liaison between the President and Senator Barkley and other Democratic senators.

FUCHS: Did you feel that he exerted a strong influence on Mr. Truman?

EWING: I don't think so. The President always made up his own mind. I can't say that anyone really had great influence with the President. If some one had advice that the President thought was good, why, he'd take it. But I don't believe anyone really could influence the President to do anything that he didn't think was right and proper. He was his own man.

[169]

FUCHS: Well, I was thinking primarily of political advice. He is generally credited, of course, as being an astute politician. What would your views of that be?

EWING: Well, there's no doubt about that. His political judgment was, in a way, unerring. I think that that was particularly true when he had received, perhaps, a lot of different advice from different sources some of it which was conflicting. He would unquestionably come out with the right decision. Now, perhaps there were a few instances, none of which I recall, where one side or the other had not had a chance to give him their views before he had to act, he might have made an occasional faux pas as any of us might do; but when the President had all the facts he was unerring in his political instincts --judgments.

FUCHS: Of course, you've heard the charges that he had gathered a gang of Missouri cronies around him. How would you view that?

EWING: Well, it is only natural that a President wants men around him who are loyal to him. A President needs those above all things. You've got to remember that President Truman was mighty loyal to his friends, as

[170]

he should have been. I think the matters in which some of his friends perhaps took advantage of him were trivial matters that didn't affect the public interest in any way.

FUCHS: Who do you have in mind?

EWING: Well, perhaps General Vaughan, I think the refrigerator episode was not too smart. It wasn't anything like as important as the Republican press tried to make it. That was simply a situation of where a manufacturer had some refrigerators that were defective in some minor respect and he didn't want to sell them, so he gave them away. I think General Vaughan was the one who the manufacturer had contacted about it or--I don't remember the details but I'm sure it was played out of all proportion by the Republican press.

FUCHS: Yes. Any other instances that you can think of?

EWING: No. Not offhand.

FUCHS: When it became necessary for President Truman to find a replacement for Chief Justice Stone were you consulted on that?

[171]

EWING: No. No, I was not consulted. President Truman told me, however, how he came to select Fred Vinson for Chief Justice. The President said he requested former Chief Justice Hughes, whose resignation as Chief Justice had opened the place for Justice Stone, to stop by the White House for a talk. The President asked Mr. Hughes if he had any suggestions as to who would make a good Chief Justice. Mr. Hughes immediately replied, "Why you've got a man here in your own Cabinet who is eminently qualified for the place, and that is Fred Vinson. He's been the Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeals. He is a fine lawyer, and I wouldn't think that you had to go any further." And so Mr. Truman took Judge Hughes' advice. I am sure it was advice that he was happy to receive because the President had a very high opinion of Judge Vinson.

FUCHS: Go back just a little bit. What were your thoughts when Roosevelt died and Mr. Truman became his successor? At the time how did you feel about that?

EWING: Well, I think we all were filled with intense grief over President Roosevelt's death although I knew that he was a very sick man and I was not completely unprepared

[172]

for his death. Then when the shock came and Mr. Truman was sworn in as President, I thought his conduct was exemplary. I had great confidence in his latent capacity to measure up to the job. Many people did not. I remember one newspaper correspondent who talked to me about it, and insisted that Mr. Truman was physically a little man and mentally a little man. I tried to argue him out of it but he was very insistent. But time proved that Truman's admirers were right rather than his critics.

FUCHS: Yes. At the time you were nominated for the Federal Security Administration post a newspaper article I saw said that perhaps you were slated for something larger in the long run other than staying in the FSA. Do you recall anything of that and is there anything you know about that that it might have been a truthful report?

EWING: No. I never even heard of it. The Federal Security Agency was a job that I welcomed. I know the President hoped to make it a Cabinet position. He sent two reorganization plans up to Congress that would have made the agency a department. Other than that I'm

[173]

quite sure President Truman had nothing in mind for me. I think that had the Agency been made a department during his term he would have nominated me for the secretaryship. In fact, I'm quite sure of that, but as to anything outside of that I never heard of it.

FUCHS: What are the chief reasons that you felt FSA did not achieve Cabinet status, I believe it was to be called the Department of Health, Education, and Security during Mr. Truman's time?

EWING: Oh, it was the opposition of the American Medical Association unquestionably. Both times the reorganization plans were sent up to Congress the AMA. staged campaigns to prevent the agency being made a department. Their main argument was that they did not want me given a higher platform from which to argue for national health insurance.

FUCHS: Did they base their attacks on you solely or largely on principles or personality?

EWING: No. You see, national health insurance had been proposed by President Roosevelt in the very first social security bill introduced in Congress back in 1934.

[174]

Later President Roosevelt dropped his support of national health insurance. I think he did this largely because he thought that including national health insurance in the bill might make it more difficult to get the social security program through Congress and that it would be better to take a step at a time, get what he could, and later try to get the more controversial parts of his program, such as national health insurance, adopted.

FUCHS: How did Mrs. Roosevelt, who we know was greatly interested in welfare type projects, feel about this earlier approach to health insurance?

EWING: I can say something about that that I learned from Arthur Altmeyer, who was a member of the first Social Security Board, and later when the Board was abolished, he became Social Security Administrator. I think Arthur knew what he was talking about when he told me this. He said that at the time the social security legislation was first introduced including the provision for national health insurance, some doctor friend of Mrs. Roosevelt had a talk with her and convinced her that it was very unwise to push for national health insurance; and that she convinced the President that it was unwise

[175]

and accordingly he withdrew his support for the proposal. Later Mrs. Roosevelt changed her mind, apparently, because she became an active member of the Committee for the Nation's Health which was very strongly in favor of national health insurance. You see, even at that time, the United States was the only civilized nation that didn't have a national health insurance program in operation. National health insurance was started by Bismarck in Germany back in the 1880s and similar programs had been gradually adopted by other countries one after another. There had been ample experience so that we who were pushing it could say that it was a workable program that would fill a very great need.

FUCHS: Do you have any knowledge of how it worked in Germany, and was it continued under the Hitler regime and is it still in?

EWING: Oh, yes. It's worked very well there. And the interesting part of it is that, say from the 1880s on up until the American technology caught up, it was out of Germany that came all of the great medical advances. I wouldn't say that today nor would I say it of the time since World War II, but German medical research

[176]

from the 1880s on was outstanding.

FUCHS: Was theirs linked with the social security type system?

EWING: I think it was. It is all part of a social insurance program.

FUCHS: Yes. Do you recall who the doctor was that exerted this influence on Mrs. Roosevelt?

EWING: No, I never knew, and Mr. Altmeyer, I don't think he told me who the doctor was. At least I don't remember.

FUCHS: Was the feeling on Mr. Altmeyer's part that the doctor had done it because of medical interest or that it would be politically unwise?

EWING: Oh, it was medical interest. Completely. Someone suggested that it might have been Doctor Cushing, the great brain surgeon of Boston. Jimmy Roosevelt had married a daughter of

Doctor Cushing. I'm quite sure Dr. Cushing's name was not mentioned because I would have recognized it and it would have stuck in my mind.

[177]

FUCHS: AMA was also opposed to the Government getting into medical research. What were their principal arguments there?

EWING: Well, the American Medical Association wanted to be the exclusive sovereign of medicine. They didn't want the Government to have a thing to do with medicine. They opposed every bill that was introduced in Congress that even remotely would involve Government in medicine. They had a very powerful lobby. They were opposed to the Federal Government supporting any kind of medical research. In order to stave off the Government giving support to medical research, they proposed that the doctors would raise ten million dollars a year for research. Well, they tried it and the first year they raised about six hundred thousand dollars and that ended that. When I left the Federal Security Agency, the Government was giving the Public Health Service and other areas of medical research about a hundred million dollars a year. Today they are giving them well over a billion dollars a year and that money has done more for the advance of medicine than any other single factor.

[178]

FUCHS: Did the doctors propose to raise this through their individual contributions or by solicitation of the general public?

EWING: I think they had in mind probably tapping the pharmaceutical manufacturers for a large part of it. They also had in mind raising part of this fund by their own contributions and a public appeal, too. Anything to keep Government out of it. They raised the awful specter of Government control. As a matter of fact Government didn't want control, I know, because I was in the driver's seat at that time. We had plenty to do without wanting to control medical research. We wanted to help it. We wanted to encourage it and we wanted to furnish money for it, but we had plenty to do besides controlling the medical profession.

FUCHS: Do you know when they first tagged it "socialized medicine" and how that came about?

EWING: I'm not sure but I think that what I will now say is correct. In California, Governor Warren back in the early 1940s had proposed a program of health insurance for the residents of California and he had

[179]

legislation for it introduced into the California legislature. The California Medical Association staged a campaign in opposition. They spent a great deal of money for billboards, newspaper advertising, radios, etc. Their opposition was directed by a public relations firm in San Francisco known as Whitaker Baxter. That was a husband and wife team. Clem Whitaker was the head of it

and his wife, whose maiden name was Baxter, was the other partner. That fight took place before I was Federal Security Administrator, before I even got interested in national health insurance. Until I became Administrator the problem was one that I had had no reason to consider. After I became Administrator, I realized that President Truman was strongly in favor of national health insurance. It was, of course, my job to push any program that he wanted pushed. Then I soon came to realize that health insurance was an important subject and that I should know more about it and the country should know more about it. Accordingly, at the request of the President, I called a conference to consider the health problems of the country, not merely national health insurance but every phase of health problems that

[180]

faced this country.

FUCHS: What year was that?

EWING: The conference was held in May of 1948 and covered the whole spectrum of medical problems.

FUCHS: Whose idea was it to call this conference?

EWING: Well, it originated in my office. I think it was Don Kingsley, my assistant administrator, who first suggested it. It's very hard to remember just who suggested an idea to you, but I know Don was very much interested.

The question you asked me is how the term socialized medicine came to be used and I was trying to give you a little background about that. It was sometime in early 1948 that I began publicly advocating national health insurance and it was becoming a controversial issue all over the country. This story that I am now telling you was told me much later. It was about this time that a friend of mine, Mike Gorman, was working on a paper in Oklahoma City, and he wrote an article for his paper that was quite favorable to the idea of national health insurance. The next morning he was called in by his

[181]

publisher and fired. Mike's family lived in Los Angeles, so he returned there. He had been there only a few days when he received a telephone call from Clem Whitaker in San Francisco. Clem told him that the firm of Whitaker & Baxter had just been employed by the American Medical Association to conduct a hard-hitting fight against national health insurance and he would like Mike to join his staff and help in the fight. Mike replied, "Clem, I'm not sure. I don't think you can beat it. I'm convinced that it's the right thing to do and such a program will eventually be adopted and you can't stop it."

"Oh," Whitaker said, "that's easy. We've been through this fight with Governor Warren's proposal for a state health insurance program and it's a cinch to beat it. In order to do so, there are only two things that you have to have. First you have to give the program a bad name and

we're going to call it 'socialized medicine' because the idea of socialism is very unpopular in the United States. We'll give it this bad name. No one wants to be, or at least very few want to have the tag socialist attached to them. Then the second thing you have to have is a devil. You have to have a devil

[182]

in the picture to paint him in all his horns and we've got that man chosen. We first thought we would center the attack on President Truman, but we've decided he is too popular; but we've got a perfect devil in this man Ewing and we're going to give him the works."

So, apparently that is where the large scale use of the term "socialized medicine" all started.

FUCHS: Why did they feel that they had a perfect devil in you? Have you any idea?

EWING: Well, I think they had to center their attack on someone who was close to the program and was prominent in promoting it and since they had decided not to attack the President, my being second in the line, caught the fire.

FUCHS: When did you become acquainted with Mike Gorman?

EWING: It was some time after this episode when he came to Washington and told me about it. I did not know him at the time it happened. It was perhaps a year or so afterwards that he told me.

FUCHS: The thing that strikes me as rather odd is that there

[183]

is a man who has just been cashiered from his paper because he wrote in favor of national health insurance and a public relations firm which was going to oppose national health insurance wanted him to work for them.

EWING: Well, Mike was a very competent person and if he could be enlisted in any cause he would do a good job.

FUCHS: Why were the pharmaceutical manufacturers so against national health insurance?

EWING: The reason for that is quite simple. In the original draft of the bill, which has been prepared in the Federal Security Agency, largely under the immediate direction of Dr. Isadore Falk, there had been included a provision to the effect that if the price of drugs became excessive the Government could step in and fix prices. That was a perfect anathema to the Pharmaceutical manufacturers, and I think it was unfortunate that it was put in. I say this because it instantly created a solid opposition from the pharmaceutical manufacturers and it wasn't necessary at that time. What should have been done was to make no mention of price control, get the program adopted and then if the manufacturers began charging

[184]

excessive prices, that would be the time to consider legislation to control the situation. Later, I remember making a talk to the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and I told them I thought they were very foolish to oppose the bill because it would mean a great deal more widespread distribution of health services and that would necessarily mean a much greater market for their products; that they would have dollars instead of dimes running through their cash registers. Actually I think that argument proved quite effective because shortly afterwards the pharmaceutical manufacturers, who had been the chief financial supporters of a so-called "National Physicians Committee for the Extension of Medical Service," withdrew their support. The National Physicians Committee was really the propaganda arm of the American Medical Association. You see, under the tax laws, contributions to an organization that uses its money for the purpose of influencing legislation cannot be considered a charitable deduction. The Physicians Committee had been set up because the American Medical Association didn't want to impair a ruling it had obtained to the effect that gifts to it were charitable gifts and therefore

[185]

tax deductible. Actually, I think the AMA would have lost its tax-free gift status had they kept operating the Physicians Committee, because it was doing nothing but carrying on propaganda to influence legislation. Dr. Fishbein, the Executive Director of the AMA., was on the board of directors of the National Physicians Committee and there were other interlocking officers and directors.

FUCHS: Was he the principal man in the National Physicians Committee?

EWING: No. Dr. Morris Fishbein had been for many years the AMA's principal mouthpiece. He was a very .vocal man and really brilliant.

FUCHS: Who do you recall as being the leaders of the National Physicians Committee?

EWING: I really don't recall a single name. It was disbanded shortly after I made that talk. Whether my talk influenced it or not, I don't know, but I know the pharmaceutical manufacturers withdrew their support.

FUCHS: About what year was this?

[186]

EWING: I would think it was probably in 1948 or 1949.

FUCHS: The implication is that when the manufacturers withdrew their financial support from the NPC then the committee folded?

EWING: Oh, absolutely. The pharmaceutical manufacturers then organized the Health Information Foundation. It was an organization to which they made contributions that previously had gone to the Physicians Committee. The Foundation did statistical work, furnishing information on the general economics of medicine and all that, and in no way attempting to influence legislation. They did very valuable work in producing various statistical studies.

FUCHS: The Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill in 1943, which did contain, in addition to many other provisions, one for setting up a system of national health insurance. Would you care to comment about that? It was before your time, I realize, in the Federal Security Agency. Then, as you know, there was a later bill somewhat modified that Wagner, Murray, and Dingell introduced in 1945 under Mr. Truman.

[187]

EWING: I am not too familiar with the legislative history of the various Wagner-Murray-Dingell bills but I am under the impression that the first one was introduced shortly after President Roosevelt's death. He died April 12, 1945. I think the first Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill to be introduced in Congress was in the latter part of May 1945. I understand that a little while afterwards Arthur Altmeyer, Wilbur Cohen and some others from the Agency went to the new President and urged him to consider backing the bill. They gave all the arguments and in a few days sent them an answer saying that he would support the program, but until the war with Japan was finally terminated he didn't want anything to divert him from his concentration on that job. When the VJ Day came and a few months had passed President Truman sent a special message to Congress in November 1945 recommending legislation to provide for national health insurance.

FUCHS: Why do you think he separated this from the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill?

EWING: I do not know. Possibly, he wanted something different from what that bill provided.

[188]

FUCHS: Yes. Well, in his *Memoirs*, he indicated that he thought that the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill was too comprehensive; and he did introduce his proposal for a separate national health plan in his speech.

EWING: Well, that might be. That was before my time.

FUCHS: Yes. Of course, the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill didn't do too good. It was eventually killed by the 79th Congress. The National Health Assembly resulted in what?

EWING: Well, we divided the work of the Assembly among the various committees in such a way that each segment of the health problems of the country would be given specific consideration by a specific committee. Each committee made its report to the full Assembly and on the basis of these reports I prepared a full report to the President. I might say that those recommendations were all unanimously adopted except the recommendation of the section that

dealt with national health insurance; and I think, as I recall, they endorsed the insurance principle for meeting medical expenses, hospital expenses. The committee of the

[189]

Assembly that dealt with medical care made absolutely no recommendation regarding the health insurance program.

FUCHS: These representatives were selected at, I assume, a lower level but have you any knowledge of how representation was decided upon for this National Health Assembly in 1948?

EWING: Yes. We tried to make the Assembly as representative as we could, and I'm sure we did because we were complimented by the American Medical Association on the conference itself. I got a telegram from Dr. Fishbein saying it was the best conference that had ever been held in this country on health problems. We had, as I recall, around eight hundred people brought in to represent every interest that could be involved in the health problems of the country. There were representatives of medical schools, representatives of the hospitals, public health, labor unions, etc. Then we had a smaller executive committee composed of some of the most distinguished people in the health field. We left out no one if we could help. We had representatives of the insurance companies, state health officers, the National

[190]

Grange. We had the General Federation of Women's Clubs represented. We made it as broad as we possibly could.

FUCHS: Were the doctors of osteopathy invited?

EWING: They probably were but I don't recall specifically.

FUCHS: I saw a letter in the files--I'm trying to remember whether it was related to this Assembly or some other commission, but I thought it was to this Assembly in which an osteopath wondered why they weren't represented, and the answer from the White House was, as I recall it, that although they had tried to get representation from every group there were so many groups that were connected with medicine in one way or the other that it couldn't be accomplished. My reaction was that doctors of osteopathy are a pretty large group compared to some of the others that might have been represented. Now, I just wondered if you had a recollection on that and I may be connecting it with the wrong conference but I do think it was the National Health Assembly.

EWING: I have a feeling that it might have been--I think the question of the osteopaths did come up but I cannot for the life of me remember anything more.

[191]

FUCHS: Yes, sir. Do you have any anecdotes or other reminiscences about this assembly, the dinner for it, which I believe Mr. Truman attended, or anything else in connection with it that comes to mind?

EWING: The only somewhat dramatic incident that I remember occurred in our final session of the assembly when we were adopting the various committee reports. Dr. Fishbein had asked for the floor--I was presiding--and he got up and made quite a vigorous talk against national health insurance. Nelson Cruikshank, who was a delegate, asked for the floor to answer Dr. Fishbein. I tried to persuade Mr. Cruikshank not to press his request to be heard because the conference had really had no friction and had gone so smoothly that I was hoping that it could be left in that way. But Nelson insisted and he made quite a vigorous answer to Dr. Fishbein. It was the only time during the conference that any sparks really flew.

FUCHS: Who was Nelson Cruikshank?

EWING: Nelson Cruikshank was a representative of the CIO at that time and until quite recently he has been head of social work for AFL-CIO. He reached retirement age,

[192]

certainly within the last year, and has now been elected president of the Senior Citizens Council of America. He took the place of Mr. John Edelman who had been the president for some years.

FUCHS: What are the dimensions of the Senior Citizen's Council? What is their particular thrust for?

EWING: They were organized along in 1956. It may have been 1954, I'm not sure. But, with the end of the Truman administration also came the end of any really active pressures for national health insurance. Mrs. Hobby, who succeeded me as Federal Security Administrator, and later became the first Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, she had proposed one or two different plans, none of which caught hold. The truth of the matter was that the doctors in the American Medical Association were highly and efficiently organized and could exert great pressure on Congress. Naturally a Congressman is interested in votes because if he can't get re-elected he can't be very effective in any way. The fight that the American Medical Association had put up against President Truman's proposal for national health insurance had been very effective. Their main appeal

[193]

was to tell about how much political influence the country doctor had with his patients.

I had realized that if we were ever going to get any program through, Medicare or anything of the like, there had to be support of an organization that had real political power. It was with this thought in mind that I toyed with the idea of organizing the American Patients Association. But when I dropped that in 1953 the opposing forces rested until along in 1954 or 1956 when Congressman Aimee Forand of Rhode Island and some others organized this Senior Citizen's

Council. They took up the cause of Medicare, of the bill that I had had introduced in early 1952, which they had reintroduced in Congress with certain modifications. It was undoubtedly better than the bill I had had introduced, because they had had four or five years experience in between from which they could profit.

FUCHS: What year did you conceive, if you recall, of the American Patients Association and why did you drop that?

EWING: Well, I realize that something had to be done to organize a public support for national health insurance

[194]

or even for medicare ; and as my term as Federal Security Administrator was coming to an end, I played with the idea of organizing the American Patients Association which I discussed with some of my friends. I knew the chief financial support would probably have to come from the labor groups.

FUCHS: Do you recall any of these friends?

EWING: I know the one with whom I discussed it most was Jacob Potofsky. He was head of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. I talked with Mr. Potofsky about a Patients Association and he said that labor would support such an organization. They would make contributions and support the program, but he added, "Oscar, you've got to remember that we might get tired and if we did you might find yourself in a situation where you'd have to assume personally all expenses." Naturally, that didn't encourage me. Then I talked to another friend and he thought if I had anything to do with such an organization that, because I had become such a controversial figure, I would hurt the program.

FUCHS: Who was that?

[195]

EWING: I'll have to furnish the name.

FUCHS: Well, fine. What was your next step then? Did he convince you to drop it then?

EWING: Well, he didn't convince me. It was taking all these considerations together that convinced me that I had better lay low for awhile. Then in '54 or '56 Congressman Forand came along with the Council of Senior Citizens. I asked him if I could give them any help and he answered, "No, not at present." I think that he felt that I would be a liability instead of an asset, and again I didn't want to be a hindrance so I just bowed out. I have been a member of the Senior Citizens Council and have made my yearly contributions, but otherwise I have not been active.

FUCHS: This bill that you had introduced in ' 52 , what was the title of that and how did that differ from Mr. Truman's earlier insurance proposal?

EWING: Well, it Simply covered the over sixty-five group. Mr. Truman's earlier proposal involved everyone from cradle to grave.

FUCHS: Could you discuss that a little bit? This was an

[196]

attempt to get something instead of nothing?

EWING: Yes. Because I knew they had us licked on the big program for national health insurance. But I find as of today there is a great deal of support for extending Medicare to everyone. Governor Rockefeller has come out for that program within the last few months.

FUCHS: In '52 , they didn't use the term Medicare at that time did they?

EWING: No, that was just a nickname that somebody gave it.

FUCHS: But that just came in with the later bill, the Forand proposal. Or was Medicare used then?

EWING: No. Our proposal in 1952 got very little public attention. Senator Kerr's bill to increase Social Security benefits across the board completely blanked it out.

FUCHS: Who introduced your bill?

EWING: Senator Murray in the Senate and Congressman Dingell in the House. That was John Dingell the father of the present Congressman Dingell.

[197]

FUCHS: Was Senator Kerr against national health insurance and was his bill an attempt to place him in a position of...

EWING: No, first Senator Kerr was definitely opposed to national health insurance. He was a very good friend of mine but I think he had given some commitment to the medical people of Oklahoma that he would oppose the bill. The Democratic National Committeeman from Oklahoma was a Dr. R. B. Robins. He was very active in the American Medical Association's opposition to the bill.

FUCHS: Have you anything more to say about Dr. Robins?

EWING: Nothing.

FUCHS: Did the National Health Assembly report have any influence on the Hill-Burton Hospital Construction Act?

EWING: Well, that had been enacted some time before and the program was working extremely well.

FUCHS: It was.

EWING: And as I recall, the section of the report of the

[198]

National Health Assembly in 1948 that dealt with hospitals strongly supported the Hill-Burton program and urged its expansion.

FUCHS: How did the Public Health Service view national health insurance, the leader of the Public Health Service naturally?

EWING: Well, I think it was this way: The Public Health Service personnel were largely medical men, and they were a little reluctant to oppose their professional fellows and were on the whole neutral. There were a lot of them, though, that were enthusiastic for the program. Dr. Scheele, who was the Surgeon General, helped us in every way he could, and there were many of the Public Health Service people who helped us greatly.

FUCHS: What do you recall of the replacement of Dr. Thomas Parran by Dr. Scheele during your administration?

EWING: Well, Dr. Parran was Surgeon General when I became the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency in August of 1947. The statute describing the duties and responsibilities of the Administrator stated that all of the units

[199]

in the Agency were to act under the supervision and direction of the Administrator. The Public Health Service had been put into the Agency when the Federal Security Agency was established by President Roosevelt by means of an Executive Order in 1939. There were a number of other governmental agencies that were brought in, too. The Office of Education, the Social Security Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and so forth. Those separate units had been scattered through other departments. The Public Health Service had been in the Treasury Department. The Food and Drug Administration had been in the Department of Agriculture; the Office of Education had been in the Department of Interior. All of the various bureaus of the new agency had come from other departments of the Government, and the heads of those bureaus really didn't like the idea of being under anybody's supervision and direction and they more or less resented it.

The day I was sworn in as Administrator, the various bureau chiefs came in to congratulate me. Dr. Parran was one of them. We had a very nice chat, and to make conversation, I told him of an experience that Mrs. Ewing had had. She had high blood pressure, hypertension,

[200]

but had got wonderful relief from a Doctor Walter Kempner who was at Duke University Hospital. When Mrs. Ewing first went down to Duke she couldn't walk three hundred yards, and by the time she left three months later, she could walk three miles a day. It was a miraculous improvement. I'm sure Doctor Kempner kept her alive for us for a number of years. I told all of this to Dr. Parran, who said, "I think the National Institutes of Health are making Dr. Kempner a grant for some research he is doing."

And I answered, "Well, that's very nice."

And a few days later I received a letter from Dr. Kempner congratulating me on my appointment. In answering his letter I included a statement that, "I understand the Public Health Service is giving you a grant and I'm very glad to hear that." I got a letter back from him saying, no, the Public Health Service was not giving him a grant, that he had applied to the Public Health Service for a grant and also to the insurance companies for a grant. The insurance companies had made him a grant but not the Public Health Service.

Later I saw Dr. Parran and told him what Dr. Kempner had written me. "Well," he said, "I thought we were but

[201]

I'll make a check." He came back in a day or two and told me it was true that the Public Health Service was giving no grant to Dr. Kempner.

I asked, "Don't you think you ought to? This is marvelous work he is doing."

From then on, because the Administrator had suggested a grant, Dr. Parran was determined that no grant would be made.

FUCHS: What was his reply to your suggestion, immediate reply?

EWING: Oh, at first, he said he'd look into it, and then he said that the advisory committee had turned down the application for the grant and there was nothing that he could do about it. He had a dozen reasons why it couldn't be done. He had one of his assistant Surgeon Generals come and talk to me about it.

I didn't want to interfere or make any suggestions that were not justified; and certainly I wouldn't, as a layman, normally know anything about what ought to be done in this research field. But it just so happened that because of this experience with Mrs. Ewing I knew more about Dr. Kempner's work than anyone in the Public

[202]

Health Service, and I felt, therefore, justified in insisting that they make Kempner a research grant. After all, high blood pressure was one of the great killers. But Dr. Parran was determined to make no grant. Well, I got very annoyed with Dr. Parran over this. It was about this time that the Surgeon General had to fill vacancies in several of his advisory committees in the various Health Institutes. For instance, we had the Cancer Institute, we had the Heart Institute, the Dental Institute, there were five, I think, at that time. The advisory group personnel would change from time to time. There were vacancies that Dr. Parran wanted to fill and the appointments had to be approved by the Administrator. I just wouldn't act. The situation got rather critical. Some of the Institutes couldn't function because their advisory committees could not muster quorums. As a result, Dr. Parran came into my office one day mad as a hornet. He announced, "You've got to approve these appointments."

I asked, "Who is going to make me?"

"Why," he replied, "you've got to do it under the law."

"Well," I answered, "I'm not going to until

[203]

you can do something about this grant for Dr. Kempner."

"I can't do anything," he replied. "That advisory group doesn't meet until the first of the year." It being then, I'd say, mid-October.

I said, "Well, all right. That's all right."

So he left my office in a storming rage. As he went out my executive assistant, Mrs. Keyes, stopped him. She said, "Dr. Parran, you're making a big mistake if you get into a fight with the Administrator."

He answered, "Well, I can't do anything. That advisory group doesn't meet until January."

She replied, "There's a long distance telephone, Doctor. You can clear the grant quite quickly if you want to."

So, in a few days, about three or four days later, I was told that the advisory group had approved a grant for Dr. Kempner.

That whole experience annoyed me so much that when Dr. Parran's term as Surgeon General expired the following May, I did not recommend him for reappointment. I recommended Dr. Leonard Scheele. The President knew Dr. Scheele and was very happy to appoint him.

FUCHS: What had his position been?

[204]

EWING: He was an assistant Surgeon General, and a very able man.

FUCHS: You didn't ask Dr. Parran for a recommendation when you told him you weren't going to recommend him for reappointment?

EWING: When I called him up and told him that I was not going to recommend him and had decided on someone else he asked who it was. I told him it was to be Dr. Scheele. Dr. Parran was highly complimentary of Dr. Scheele. He was, I think, pretty bitter at me and quite understandably so. But as a matter of fact, I got him the job that he went into after he left the position as Surgeon General. I found out that the Mellons had set up a research organization in Pittsburgh and they were looking for a director, and I recommended Dr. Parran for the job. I called him up to ask if it would interest him. Apparently he had been to a cocktail party so he told me in no unmistakable terms that he'd like me to keep my nose out of his business. But he took the job.

FUCHS: Well, now did the Mellon people write you as Federal

[205]

Security Administrator for a recommendation?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: You did this on your own?

EWING: The head of that institution was a man who had been in the department previously and I knew him. He had come down to talk to me about the possibility of Dr. Parran and it was his thought that they might use Dr. Parran very well. Dr. Parran took the job and stayed there for several years.

FUCHS: Did you formally recommend him by letter after Dr. Parran had told you to mind your own business?

EWING: No. What had happened was that the man who was helping the Mellons find personnel for the project they would finance at the University of Pittsburgh came to me. He had read in the paper of Dr. Parran's resignation and asked if I thought Parran would be a good man to head the work. He remarked that Dr. Parran had a national name and was known as a very competent man and would I recommend him. I said, "Most assuredly." Then I thought I ought to advise Dr. Parran of the inquiry that had been made of me and of the recommendation that

[206]

I had made. And he told me to keep my nose out of his business. But he took the job.

FUCHS: Did you ever have any conversation with him after that?

EWING: Oh, I saw him three or four times after that and he was very nice and there was no evidence of any acrimony then.

FUCHS: When you first called him and said that you were not going to recommend him for reappointment as Surgeon General did he remonstrate with you or just how did he accept it?

EWING: Well, I think he was surprised but I don't recall that he offered any objection. He had been there for twelve years, and wholly apart from this personal controversy that had arisen between him and me there was a question of policy involved which was whether it was wise to keep one man as head of an organization like the Public Health Service indefinitely. There are younger men coming up and if they feel that they have no chance at the top job, they would be more likely to go off to other positions. From my own

[207]

experience where I was Administrator five years, I became thoroughly convinced that a man had contributed about all he can in five years. Actually, you run out of ideas and I don't think it's good to have a man in that kind of position too long.

FUCHS: I believe, of course, that that last reason was the one that was given out more or less officially to the press according to an article I have here, which was headlined, incidentally, TRUMAN DECIDES TO DROP ANOTHER HIGH NEW DEALER. Also, this article said that there were rumors some weeks ago, and this is dated February 12, 1948, that Dr. Wallace Graham, who was the President's personal physician, was being considered for the head of PHS but had been dropped because of an inquiry on Capitol Hill. Do you recall any of that, sir?

EWING: No, I don't. No, I'm sure Dr. Graham was not considered. No, no. There's nothing to that. Dr. Graham would not have considered an administrative job.

FUCHS: Of course, the inquiry had to do with Dr. Graham's transactions, trading in futures. I wondered if you had

[208]

considered Dr. Graham.

EWING: Well, I think that inquiry came long after the appointment of a new Surgeon General.

FUCHS: What about Public Health Service under Dr. Scheele, any major problems develop? How did that appointment work out?

EWING: Oh, fine. Dr. Scheele was just as cooperative as anyone could be. If he had a problem he always came in and discussed it with me. He was a most satisfactory bureau chief.

FUCHS: Did you have any particular problems with the Social Security Administration?

EWING: No. No, none at all.

FUCHS: Arthur Altmeyer was a good administrator?

EWING: Oh, yes. He was tops.

FUCHS: How did you feel about the line-up of the bureaus in the Federal Security Administration when you took over? Did you have any feelings one way or another that certain bureaus might better be in another department or other department bureaus might better be in FSA?

[209]

EWING: No, when I first went in I, of course, was completely ignorant on that score. Naturally I got one after another of the bureau chiefs in, talked over their problems and tried to get acquainted with them. I would go see their shops, look them over and listen to any suggestions. But it took several months before I really got my teeth into the job. This problem with Dr. Parran came up fairly soon after I took office. It was early in the first year of my administration. Then the President told me that he wanted to move the Office of Unemployment Insurance over to the Department of Labor. It had been an Office in the Social Security Administration. I talked to Arthur Altmeyer and others and they were inclined to oppose the transfer. I knew, however, why the President wanted to transfer it and I felt he was the boss. Accordingly, I endorsed the transfer and it went along very smoothly. The truth of the matter was that the Federal Security Agency, when it was an agency much smaller than the Department of Health, Education and Welfare is now, had more work than the Agency could do well. We could let the Office of Unemployment Compensation go without hurting the organization one iota.

[210]

FUCHS: Who was the head of that?

EWING: I don't remember.

FUCHS: There was an endorsement in February 1948 by you for a National Public Health Nursing Week. You and Surgeon General Parran had endorsed it to Mr. Connelly; and Wallace Graham wrote a memo to Secretary Hassett saying: "I am surprised that this National Public Health Nursing Week was ever approved in the first place, but since it has been, you can count me in, too!" Then he continues to approve Hassett's letter, but he said, "But I am against the principle of this letter, Bill." And the letter, of course, was one for Mr. Truman to sign praising National Public Health nurses and endorsing the week. Why would Graham be against something like that?

EWING: I don't know. I don't know anything about that.

FUCHS: I thought it was rather interesting that he would be so against something like that. Back to health insurance and the National Health Assembly in particular. The report was brought out on September 2 , 1948 and announced by Mr. Truman in a press conference, which

[211]

was just a couple of days prior to his leaving on a campaign trip, and it has been written by some that this report may have been purposely delayed until this time as a political factor. Did you consider that at the time?

EWING: No, no, no. It took an enormous amount of work to get the conference organized, get the delegates selected and have all the preliminary work done. I suppose it took three or four months to do all of that. We had to get the consent of people we wanted to act as delegates, decide what committees we would have and determine the membership of each committee. It was a terrific job. And then after the conference was closed, I had to prepare my report to the President. The reports of the committees were written by the men who had acted as secretaries of the various committees. They would prepare a draft of the section that dealt with their subject and then I would go over it. It might have been gone over by one or two other people before it ever came to me. The only section of which I really wrote practically every word myself, was the section entitled "An Equal Chance for Health," that was the one dealing with the health insurance. The other sections

[212]

I went over very carefully and made sure that they contained everything that should be in my report. Naturally, I took the work of others where it dealt with technical subjects but where there were recommendations of the professional staffs then I had to make sure that these expressed my own thinking.

FUCHS: So it was just more or less coincidental that this report came out so close to the President's departure on this specific political tour?

EWING: Absolutely. I don't recall that the political aspect was ever given a thought. You know in Washington everything you do, somebody will accuse you of doing it for political reasons.

FUCHS: Certainly. I would like you to comment upon the positions of these people or any conversation you may have had with them upon national health insurance. David Dubinsky.

EWING: Oh, he was all for it.

FUCHS: What about Sidney Hillman?

EWING: I think Sidney Hillman died a couple of years or so before I became Administrator.

[213]

FUCHS: How about Phil Murray?

EWING: He was strong for the program.

FUCHS: And George Meany?

EWING: Oh, I had many contacts with George Meany. Well, that isn't quite an accurate statement. I saw him in my dealings with labor groups. I don't think I ever worked with him closely on anything.

FUCHS: Did you have private conferences with members of the AMA when you were going into this health insurance program? Also, what was their position towards voluntary insurance? Anything you might point up about this?

EWING: I did not have many talks with members of the AMA or with any of their representatives. My position was made clear in public statements so that they didn't try to persuade me one way or another. They showed their opposition in the literature that Whitaker & Baxter prepared for them and also by their active lobbying against the proposed legislation. They brought a lot of pressure on individual Senators and Congressmen. They particularly tried, I think in most cases successfully, to have a Congressman's individual

[214]

doctor contact that Congressman and convince him what a terrible thing national health insurance would be. That was their technique. Whitaker & Baxter would prepare resolutions for various organizations to adopt. The local doctor would get--well, say the Daughters of the American Revolution to pass one of these prepared resolutions.

FUCHS: Did they work through any voluntary insurance companies such as Blue Cross or any other companies that you know of, to put on a campaign?

EWING: I'm sure that they did everything they could to defeat the bill. If any organization anywhere was susceptible to their wiles, why they would take advantage of it.

FUCHS: Doctor Robins, whom you mentioned before, in April 1950 was a Democratic National Committeeman from Arkansas, wrote the House Appropriations Committee and also the Department of Justice saying that your activities, "in promoting public meetings, traveling around the country, disseminating propaganda...diverting the agency's appropriations improperly...to stampede Congress into...the Socialistic compulsory health insurance

[215]

program were improper and should be probed." Do you remember that?

EWING: Oh, vaguely. Those things were coming so fast that I don't remember Robins particularly. It was just one of many.

FUCHS: One of many.

EWING: As a matter of fact, we didn't spend a penny in public money propagandizing this program.

FUCHS: How did Louis Pink come into this story?

EWING: Well, simply because he was head of Blue Cross and Blue Shield in New York and when I was groping around for some less inclusive health plan than national health insurance I discussed the problem with Mr. Pink. He was a good friend of mine; he'd been a client of mine when he was Superintendent of Insurance in New York and I knew he would give me the best advice he could because he was a man of great integrity. As far as I know he was only involved in that one conversation and it was he who suggested that the Government try to develop some actuarial data regarding health insurance for the over

[216]

sixty-five group.

FUCHS: There were the New York hospitals and a John Connorton who also entered into the story, I believe. What was his part?

EWING: John Connorton, he was secretary of the New York Hospital Association. He came to me one time and said that the New York City municipal hospitals on the whole were in very bad shape; that several of them were over a hundred years old, their buildings were antiquated; that they were without adequate plumbing; that some didn't have hot and cold running water throughout their buildings. Mr. Connorton wondered if the Government could do anything to help them. I replied, "Well, John, I would be glad to try to see if there are ways to help. Just exactly what do you want?" Well, he didn't exactly know. So I suggested that he get this group together and I would come up to New York, meet with them, go over their problems and see if we could work out some means to help them. It might be Hill-Burton assistance or maybe we could think of something else. Mr. Connorton said that he thought this was a good idea.

In a short time Connorton telephoned me that he had

[217]

set up a meeting for a certain date. He had collected the heads, or business managers of a large number of New York hospitals. We had a session in which these hospital administrators explained their problems. They did not, however, have any definite idea of what action the Government might take to help them, so I suggested that they put their heads together and see what they could come up with, suggestions of things the Government might do. I offered to come back and we'd talk it over again. About a month later Mr. Connorton asked me to come up to New York for another meeting with this group. When I got there I found the administrators merely wanted to tell me that they did not want any Government money or assistance of any

kind. Apparently, the American Medical Association had got to them and blackmailed them into refusing any Government aid. The hospitals always felt very much at the mercy of the American Medical Association. To me, this was a stupid position to take because doctors need hospitals quite as much as hospitals need doctors. It has only been within the past two years that the American Hospital Association has had the guts to take independent positions from the AMA.

FUCHS: I believe there was a dinner at Hearst's that you

[218]

mentioned. Do you recall something about that?

EWING: Oh, that was a cocktail party over at Bill Hearst's house, William Randolph Hearst, Jr. He had invited me over for cocktails and it was at the time I was searching around for some less inclusive program than national health insurance. He and I were talking and he said, "You know, Jack, I'm very much in favor of your idea for national health insurance. But the thing that worries me about it is that if anything went wrong, if it didn't work, the upheaval that would result would be catastrophic because we would have a completely different system of medicine." Then he added, "Isn't there some small segment of the problem that you could pick out, apply your health insurance program to it, use it as a pilot plant operation." This suggestion made a great deal of sense and it started me on my search for a more limited program.

FUCHS: Do you recall when and where this party was?

EWING: Well, it was at Mr. Hearst's house in Washington. I would say it was in the fall of '51.

FUCHS: Had you known Mr. Hearst a long time?

[219]

EWING: Oh, yes. Purely socially. I think it resulted from the fact that newspapermen make it their business to become acquainted with Government officials whose activities might be of public interest.

FUCHS: What about the Committee for the Nation's Health? Do you recall that?

EWING: Oh, yes.

FUCHS: Michael Davis?

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: Any comments on its part in this?

EWING: I really know almost nothing about the activities of the Committee for the Nation's Health other than the fact that it existed. I remember seeing a list of their membership and there

were a lot of very prominent people in it. I'm sure they helped in any way they could to support the program. As to any details about their activities, I'm very vague. I knew Dr. Davis, Dr. Michael Davis. He was a very dedicated man and quite effective, quiet but very effective.

[220]

FUCHS: How did Dr. Altmeyer view the over sixty-five plan and its tie in with Social Security?

EWING: Well, after my talk with Bill Hearst, I had a conference with Arthur, Wilbur Cohen and Isadore Falk, to ask them if there was some part of our program for national health insurance that we could pull out, get it going and use as a pilot plant operation. They came back in a few days and said that they couldn't think of any. It was after that that I had my talk with Louis Pink, and he had suggested that the Government try to do something for the over sixty-five group so that the health insurance companies would have some actuarial data that would enable them to insure the over sixty-five group. He said that without such actuarial data an insurance company wouldn't know what premiums to charge or what risks the insurance should cover. After my talk with Mr. Pink, I conferred again with Mr. Altmeyer, Mr. Cohen, and Mr. Falk, and asked if we could take the sixty-five group out and have a health insurance program for them which could be used as a pilot operation. Well, they wanted to consider that for a few days. Mr. Altmeyer came back in three or four days and said that they'd discuss it

[221]

and thought it would be all right, that it could be done. I knew from the fact that Arthur came back within so short a time that they had considered this possibility earlier because it wouldn't be possible to come to a mature judgment on the problem and all its ramifications in such a short time. So, I have no doubts that the matter had been previously considered.

FUCHS: I believe that you participated in a "Town Meeting of the Air" debate with Nelson Cruikshank, Morris Fishbein and Senator Alexander Smith. Do you recall anything about that of interest?

EWING: Oh, yes. I'm not just sure when that took place but it was fairly early in my administration. "Town Meeting of the Air," was a radio program. Mr. Cruikshank and I had a number of sessions getting ready what we would say. As a result we came fairly well prepared. We knew that Dr. Fishbein wrote a syndicated column called "Dr. Fishbein's Diary," something after the manner of Dr. Pepy's Diary. Mr. Cruikshank had found one of Dr. Fishbein's so-called diaries in which he described a recent visit he had made to England. In the course of our debate Dr. Fishbein had described the horrible confusion that

[222]

existed in the British Health Service that had recently been established in Britain. He told of the utter confusion that he found existed when he was in England a few weeks previously; that there were long queues in every doctor's office, that doctors were overburdened with paper work; that a mother who wanted an extra allowance of milk for her sick child had to get a doctor's

prescription for it and then go to the Health Department for permission to buy the milk. Dr. Fishbein painted a picture of complete confusion. He described all these details as a result of a question Mr. Cruikshank had had planted in the audience which was: "Do you know how the British Health Service is operating now?" After Dr. Fishbein had described all these horrible details he found existing when in England a few weeks earlier Mr. Cruikshank pulled out this particular diary of Dr. Fishbein in which he described his last visit to London. He had arrived in London Friday morning and that afternoon had gone out to spend the weekend with Lord and Lady so-and-so at their country place; that he'd come back to London Monday morning, had stopped by the Health Department to pick up some papers, and had gone on to catch the noon plane for Paris. So the questioner

[223]

then asked, "Well, is your appraisal of the British Health Service based on those few hours in London?" The question was a stinger and pretty much discredited Dr. Fishbein.

FUCHS: Did the press comment upon this "Town Meeting of the Air?"

EWING: I think it did but I don't recall. The press usually commented on all of their programs.

FUCHS: You don't recall how they felt that the opponents came out?

EWING: No, I don't know. But it wasn't too long after that that Dr. Fishbein resigned from his position with the American Medical Association.

FUCHS: Mr. Ewing, we can go ahead now. Do you have any other comments about Dr. Fishbein?

EWING: No. My personal relations with Dr. Fishbein were always very cordial.

FUCHS: Did you feel at any time the public had become somewhat apathetic about national health insurance either as a result of other matters or because of AMA's

[224]

campaign?

EWING: Yes. But the latter part of 1950 I had become convinced that the public was not in a mood to support it. The AMA propaganda against it had been pretty effective and I had come to believe that we could not get our program enacted. Actually, the only way Medicare got enacted in 1966 was because an organized group, the Senior Citizen's Council, really got in the fight and showed some real political power.

FUCHS: Was Forand still living then?

EWING: I don't know. I know he'd dropped out of Congress.

FUCHS: I was wondering if he had been at the signing of Medicare, which I believe you attended.

EWING: No, I don't think he was.

FUCHS: I was there but I don't recall Mr. Forand being there.

The Whitaker & Baxter Public Relations group initially served the National Physicians Committee as the lobbying organization, did it not? Or is that a true statement?

[225]

EWING: No. The National Physicians Committee was disbanded prior to the time that the American Medical Association employed Whitaker & Baxter for propaganda purposes.

FUCHS: How long did Whitaker & Baxter serve them as a public relations lobbying organization? For the AMA?

EWING: I think their employment ended about the time I left office which was with the change of administrations on January 20, 1953.

FUCHS: How did Mr. Truman receive your proposal for the over sixty-five plan?

EWING: Well, at first he didn't like the idea because he didn't like to give up. At first he didn't like the idea at all and then I talked to him further. My point was that I was completely convinced that we could not get the national health insurance program through that Congress, or any other Congress for some time, and that we ought to try for something less rather than lose everything. I think the President rather thought it would be better to lose everything at that time and that future events would later force the adoption of

[226]

some form of national health insurance. But he finally said, as I recall, that he'd follow my recommendations if I really thought it was the wise thing to do.

FUCHS: One scholar has written in a study on national health insurance that though Mr. Truman came out in several major speeches in favor of the concept, that he really didn't push it vigorously in press conferences or any other means. Do you have a comment on that?

EWING: Well, I don't think that statement is justified at all. I never had any feeling that President Truman wasn't wholly and completely committed to the program. In fact I'm sure that's true. If he didn't do something that this correspondent thought he ought to have done, I'm sure he had a good reason for not doing it.

FUCHS: This writer's implication was not that, as I saw it, that he was not committed to the program but that he didn't use all the powers of the office in forwarding the program.

EWING: That would be just a matter of judgment. I'd trust Mr. Truman's judgment more than I would that correspondent's.

[227]

FUCHS: In 1951 Mr. Truman felt that there was need for further study of the health needs of the Nation and set up a Presidential commission with that title, essentially. He put Dr. Paul Magnuson in as chairman of it, and incidentally I have found a note that it was in connection with the composition of this committee that the doctors of osteopathy were omitted rather than the National Health Assembly. Would you have any comments about the setting up of this, the initiation of the idea and so forth?

EWING: I think that was largely the result of Mrs. Mary Lasker's activities in the health field. Albert Lasker, who was the husband of Mrs. Lasker, was a very rich man and was spending his energies and considerable sums of money to advance the health of the country. In other words, he wanted his benefactions to go toward improving the health services of the country and Mrs. Lasker was equally dedicated to that. But at the time that this--what did they call it, the health...

FUCHS: President's Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation.

EWING: Well, by the time that that came up Mr. Lasker had

[228]

died, and the commission was Mrs. Lasker's idea. Mrs. Lasker had got a little miffed at me because I wouldn't accept her recommendations completely for persons who were to be members of the advisory councils of the various Institutes of Health in the Public Health Service. We had eight or ten Institutes and each one of those had an advisory commission consisting of ten members, five professionals and five laymen. Naturally, I looked to the Surgeon General to recommend those appointees for my approval. I said to him that as far as I knew his recommendations were all right but that I did not propose to appoint anyone to a Presidential Commission who was going up and down the street damning President Truman. So, I had checks made and of seventy people recommended there were probably three or four who were violently anti-Truman and were expressing themselves quite emphatically. I therefore struck them off the lists, and this caused Mrs. Lasker to take great offense. It was she who thought it might be a good idea to have another health conference. The President was so interested in anything that would improve people's health that he went along with her suggestion. I imagine possibly her arguments were--and

[229]

this I do not know, I'm only speculating--that I had become such a controversial figure that it would be well to have another health conference with which I was not connected. I was not opposed to this at all, in fact, I cooperated in every way I could.

FUCHS: Was FSA asked to advise on the composition of the commission, and so forth?

EWING: Yes, oh yes. That would be normal and I personally went over the list of their proposed delegates to make sure that no one was appointed who was openly hostile to national health insurance. The recommendations of the conference were much the same as those contained in my report to the President on the Nation's health in September 1948. They naturally had to recommend something a little different but it was in essence the President's program. Mrs. Lasker was always for the President's program and I think Dr. Magnuson was also. Dr. Magnuson had come to me previously, several years previously, when he was still Chief Surgeon of the Veteran's Administration and suggested that the whole health program for the country be turned over to the medical schools. This did not seem to me to be very

[230]

practicable.

FUCHS: Who proposed Dr. Magnuson for chairman?

EWING: I don't know, probably Mrs. Lasker. The same Mike Gorman I previously referred to, became the Executive Director of the Magnuson Committee. He was a very able man whom I liked very much. He was one of those delightful fast-talking Irishmen.

FUCHS: There was a conference of the aging called, I believe rather late in your administration, maybe you can supply the date, and what was the relationship between that and the over sixty-five bill, if anything, and how did Clark Tibbitts come into this?

EWING: Under date of June 2 , 1950 the President wrote me a letter asking me to explore with all the appropriate groups, both within and outside the Federal Government the problems incident to our increasingly older population, and to report to him our findings and recommendations. The conference opened August 13, 1950. Clark Tibbitts was chosen as the Conference Director and he did a splendid job.

FUCHS: Who was he?

[231]

EWING: Clark Tibbitts was probably the most experienced gerontologist in the country. He had previously conducted a national health survey for the Public Health Service, taught gerontology in several universities and written a number of books on the subject.

FUCHS: Did this conference, do you think, have any influence upon the reception of the over sixty-five bill?

EWING: I don't think so. This dealt with the problems of aging and many of those are not within the health field. The older generation have environmental problems, problems with relatives, and many other problems outside the health field.

FUCHS: A minute ago you mentioned deleting certain proposed advisory council people because they had opposed President Truman. Did you ever have brought to your attention the fact that Dr. Parran's wife was always saying to him there would only be one President, President Roosevelt?

EWING: No, I did not. You see, Dr. Parran, if I recall correctly, had been the head of the health department of the State of New York when Mr. Roosevelt was Governor of that State so they had had a long relationship together.

[232]

FUCHS: In 1949 the Federal Security Agency proposed some legislation entitled, "Children's Act of 1949," and the Bureau of the Budget, of course, made a report on this and the gist of it was, the report to the President, that they might have to make a decision if the implications of this bill were that eventually enough funds might be appropriated under its provisions, if it were passed as an act, to provide complete free medical care for all mothers during the maternity period and for all children through eighteen years of age. And that this might redound to a bad effect on the other Presidential proposals for national health insurance. Do you recall anything about this matter?

EWING: No. Your question implies that the legislation came out of the Children's Bureau?

FUCHS: The bill "would provide outside the Social Security Act, a new and broader charter for the Children's Bureau," and it was legislation proposed by the Federal Security Agency entitled, "Children's Act of 1949," and through the Children's Bureau the administrator would be authorized to make grants and other things that would under the provisions eventually, if enough funds were appropriated,

[233]

enable this free medical care. The Budget Bureau reported, in one paragraph, "it appears necessary for the administration to decide now whether to adhere firmly to the advocacy of health insurance as the basic medical care program, or to give active support to specialized programs which have a better chance of early enactment even though this weakens the possibility of achieving a health insurance program. This is primarily a political determination." I just wondered if this came to your attention to any degree and do you have any recollections of it?

EWING: I have no recollections of it.

FUCHS: What were, if any, some of the other problems you had with bureaus, such as the Federal Food and Drug Administration? Was there anything there that caused you problems during your five years as administrator?

EWING: Well, I had a problem that flared up in the Office of Education. John W. Studebaker was Commissioner of Education at the time that I took office, and he had been appointed commissioner by President Roosevelt in 1934. At that time, of course, the Office of Education was in

[234]

the Department of Interior. Studebaker had previously been Superintendent of Schools in Des Moines, Iowa and there was some question, I think, about his capacity for the job. But the thing that really brought me to the point of trying to find someone else for that job has a background.

When the new Department of Interior building was constructed, it included a library for the Office of Education, which was really a beautiful room with top-notch library facilities. After the Office of Education was put into the Federal Security Agency, the Agency moved into a new building of its own. Studies had been made which showed that by consolidating all the libraries of all of the units of the Agency into one place in our building, we could save the Government about a quarter of a million dollars a year. The biggest saving, I think, of around a hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars would come from consolidating the library of the Office of Education with the other libraries there in the Federal Security building. Well, Mr. Studebaker was determined that that library should not be moved. He seemed to have an obsession on this subject. When I would walk down the hall he would come out from behind

[235]

a pillar, join up with me and tell me what a terrible catastrophe it would be for education if that library were moved from the Interior building over to the Federal Security Building. He certainly gave the impression that it would not only ruin the American educational system but all the educational systems of the world. Finally, I was so fed up with his attitude that I decided to try to get rid of him and find a new Commissioner. But I didn't want to make any move in that direction until I had cleared it with the President. My reason for being so cautious was because when the Office of Education was in the Department of Interior, Secretary Ickes had tried to fire Studebaker several times. But Studebaker had an in with Mrs. Roosevelt and whenever Ickes would propose to the President that Studebaker be fired Mrs. Roosevelt would intervene and talk the President out of approving his dismissal. I didn't want anything like that to happen if I attempted to fire him. So, I went over to see President Truman and said to him, "Mr. President, I have a Commissioner of Education in the Agency who I feel has outlived his usefulness."

[236]

Mr. Truman answered, "Do you mean John W. Studebaker?"

I said, "Yes."

"Well," he replied, "Good, I never did like him."

From this I was confident that if I let Mr. Studebaker go the rug would not be pulled out from under me.

FUCHS: So, what was the upshot?

EWING: Well, Mr. Studebaker got wind of the fact I was looking for a new commissioner and he resigned. A few days later he wrote a letter to one of the Congressional committees complaining very bitterly about me. This all happened in the Joe McCarthy days. Mr. Studebaker thought he should urge all the schools of the country to include a course of instruction on the evils of Communism. As I recall, he had had some teaching material prepared which contained statements about American policy. While I didn't disagree with their substance, they were definitely statements that should come only from either the President or the State Department and not from a bureau chief. I, therefore, insisted that those particular statements

[237]

be eliminated. Mr. Studebaker, thereupon, charged before this committee in Congress that I was soft on Communism.

FUCHS: This was after he was out?

EWING: This was after he was out, yes. So, that committee of Congress had a number of hearings and the committee completely vindicated me.

FUCHS: What did Studebaker do then?

EWING: There was another reason why I felt that he ought to be replaced. He and his son, as I understand it, a year or more earlier, had bought a radio station in San Diego, California. I learned that Mr. Studebaker was spending a very large amount of time in San Diego. The obvious explanation of that was that he was spending his time on his own affairs rather than attending to his job as Commissioner of Education.

FUCHS: In the administration of the Federal Security Agency did you have to deal with any other controversial matter that might be of interest?

EWING: Yes. There was quite a controversy over fluoridation

[238]

of water supplies in the United States. For a number of years the dental profession had been urging that all water supplies for human consumption should contain a small quantity of fluoride. It had been observed that in certain sections of the United States children's teeth contained fewer cavities than teeth of children in other parts of the country. This was believed to be due to the

presence of a small quantity of natural fluoride in the water used in those areas showing the smaller number of cavities. The dental profession was therefore urging that municipal water supplies that were deficient in fluoride should have small quantities added. I believe that they urged that there be at least one part of fluoride for each one million parts of water.

In 1945 before I became Federal Security Administrator the Public Health Service had instituted a very extensive research project to determine the value of fluoridation of water in preventing caries in children's teeth. Newburgh and Kingston, New York, were chosen as sites for the experiment. Their water supplies showed virtually identical analyses. School children of both cities were examined for caries and

[239]

the results were practically identical. Fluoride was added to Newburgh's water supply. This test was to be run for a period of ten years. By the end of the fifth year a re-examination of the school pupils in Newburgh and Kingston showed that the Newburgh children had approximately 65% fewer cavities than the children of Kingston.

The report of these findings was made public over my name and the opponents of fluoridation took after me. The first I heard of this opposition was a speech made by a Congressman A. L. Miller on the floor of the House of Representatives. He was a doctor who had turned Republican politician. In March 1952 he stated on the floor of the House that the Aluminum Company of America was selling fluoride; that the law firm of Hughes, Hubbard & Ewing, of which I had been a partner, represented that company; and he therefore wanted to know whether "Oscar R. Ewing still gets a cut of the melon or not."

The truth of the matter was that my firm and its predecessors had been New York counsel for the Aluminum Company of America since sometime during the first decade of this century. I had been counsel for

[240]

the Aluminum Company in several matters but when Congressman Miller made his accusation I was not even aware of the fact that the company manufactured fluorides.

The anti-fluoridation crowd seemed to concentrate their wrath on me because I had made public the results of the five-year testing at Newburgh and Kingston. They ran newspaper advertisements saying that fluoridation of water was first conceived in Russia to dull the minds of prisoners and steadily weaken their bodies; that the Russians passed on the idea to Harold J. Laski, a prominent Englishman, who had transmitted the information to Sidney Hillman in America, who was head of the War Production Board; that Hillman turned the big idea over "to his friend, Oscar Ewing, one of the attorneys for the greatest fluoride factory in the world." Drew Pearson in his column had reported that the Aluminum Company was paying me \$1 million a year to represent it in Washington in connection with the preparation of contracts for the construction of aluminum plants. The anti-fluoridationists reduced this figure to \$700,000 a year, which hurt my pride. It was not easy to have one's salary cut \$300,000 a year even though

[241]

it was only in someone's imagination! As a matter of fact, the charges of these opponents of fluoridation were really fantastic. Let me quote here from a sheet that they distributed on the streets of downtown New York.

ROCKEFELLER AGENTS ORDER FLUORIDE-(RAT-) POISONING OF NATION'S WATER. Water fluoridation is the MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE COLD WAR THAT IS BEING WAGED ON US - CHEMICALLY - FROM WITHIN, BY THE ROCKEFELLER-SOVIET AXIS. It serves to blunt the intelligence of a people in a manner that no other dope can. Also, it is GENOCIDAL in two manners: it causes CHEMICAL CASTRATION; and it CAUSES CANCER, thus killing off older folks...This committee did no research or investigation on the poisonous effects of water fluoridation. They accepted the falsified data published by the U.S.P.H.S. on the order of boss Oscar Ewing, who had been "rewarded" with \$750,000 by fluoride waste producer, Aluminum Co. He then developed the 'public spirit' that impelled him to take a \$17,500 job as Federal Security Administrator. He immediately demanded of Congress an appropriation of \$2,500,000 for promotion of fluorides by his U.S.P.H.S.

Some of the opponents of fluoridation requested the Bureau of Internal Revenue to investigate my income tax returns to see whether I had included these fantastic sums in my report of income. Of course, I had not reported them because they only existed in the imagination of the opponents of fluoridation.

The fluoridation controversy was pretty well

[242]

summarized in a paper submitted to the New York Institute of Clinical Oral Pathology on December 12, 1955 by Dr. Herman E. Hilleboe, Commissioner, New York State Department of Health. After describing the preliminaries which led to the ten-year study of the comparative effects of fluoridated and unfluoridated water in the respective cities of Newburgh and Kingston, New York, Dr. Hilleboe said:

...Despite the comprehensive studies in the laboratory and among human populations in New York State and elsewhere on effectiveness and safety, there has developed a vociferous minority which has succeeded in some areas in delaying the initiation of local water fluoridation programs, and in others, actually reversing favorable action.

The opposition stems from several sources, chiefly food faddists, cultists, chiropractors, misguided and misinformed persons who are ignorant of the scientific facts on the ingestion of water fluorides, and,

strange as it may seem, even among a few uninformed physicians and dentists. One very effective opposition speaker in the West, purported to be a research chemist who saw water fluoridation as a Communist plot to sabotage our country, was actually an escaped inmate from an Illinois mental institution. In Connecticut, a woman who calls herself a "research scientist" trained at Harvard and Columbia, was discredited by the authorities of both universities. She is, in fact, a person who has been charged by the police with impersonation.

Another exponent of the opposition group is a dentist in Ohio who never attended a dental college but was blanketed into the dental profession in 1910 when Ohio started to license dentists. This person has been active in other opposition campaigns

[243]

such as the unwarranted claims that using aluminum cooking utensils causes cancer...

FUCHS: Have you any comments about the Truman administration and Federal aid to education?

EWING: No, except that we favored the Federal Government giving schools all the aid it properly could. The toughest part of this problem was and is the Constitutional question of whether or not the Federal Government can aid denominational schools. And that question has not been solved yet.

FUCHS: Anything come to mind anecdotal or otherwise about problems?

EWING: No, no.

FUCHS: The Children's Bureau sponsored these, I believe, White House conferences on children?

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: Do you recall anything about those that might be of interest?

EWING: Well, I think there was only one such conference while I was Administrator and that went off very well.

[244]

I don't recall any particular problem.

FUCHS: Anything about the Children's Bureau and its problems that come to mind?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: Its placement in FSA?

EWING: No, it had been put into the Federal Security Agency before I became Administrator and Miss Katherine Lenroot was the head of it at that time. She was a very efficient person; managed it very well. She got into one or two controversies with the Catholic hierarchy, which we were able to settle. Then after Miss Lenroot retired I appointed Miss Martha Elliott as head of the Children's Bureau. She was a medical graduate and did a very fine job. She had been in the Children's Bureau and then had served for a time with the World Health Organization in Geneva and I asked her to come back to be head of the Children's Bureau.

FUCHS: Back to Studebaker for a moment. When he resigned and gave the public reason that he could no longer afford to remain in Civil Service, a David Rankin Barbee,

[245]

Secretary of the Committee on American History, according to a newspaper article welcomed the resignation as "enabling the return of the Office of Education to its lawful function." That was reference to this matter of anti-Communism in the schools solely, or were there other things that you can think of that he was distorting the purpose of the Office of Education?

EWING: Studebaker had built up what was largely a personal organization and surrounded himself with syncophants. The result was that his organization had become pretty antiquated and out of touch with reality, and I think the professional educators were conscious of that.

FUCHS: You appointed Dr. Earl McGrath to succeed him. Who were his principal boosters, who recommended him, do you recall?

EWING: Earl McGrath. Yes, Don Kingsley, the assistant administrator had recommended him, and Dr. McGrath was a real addition to our organization. I think he was very much handicapped in his operation by the organization that Studebaker had built up, because they had tenure and it was pretty difficult for Dr.

[246]

McGrath to control them. Tenure has its advantages and good features but it has some awfully bad ones, too. Once a man gets tenure he gets very independent. I once had a run-in with two of my people. It was in connection with some Food and Drug regulations which I was required by law to issue. I had asked two men to prepare a draft of the regulations and told them the substance of what they should contain. They brought me back a draft that was the very opposite of what I wanted. They then redrafted the regulations using new language but meaning just what

the first draft meant. Then I blew up and threatened to transfer them to Alaska. I had a right to move an employee to another location but did not have a right to fire him.

FUCHS: You were a good friend of Paul McNutt and as he was the first head of the Federal Security Agency did you have occasion to talk over problems, did you consult with him?

EWING: No. You see, after the independence of the Philippines on July 4, 1946, Paul was made Ambassador to the Philippines. He returned to this country during the time I was still Administrator and would drop in my office

[247]

from time to time. But he had not been associated with the Agency for a number of years and I don't think I ever discussed any of my problems with him, simply because he was out of touch with what was going on so that it would take longer to explain problems to him than he had time to give.

FUCHS: Very good. I guess we had better quit now, it's 1:30.

EWING: All right.

[248]

Fourth Oral History Interview with Oscar R. Ewing, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, May 2, 1969.
By J. R. Fuchs, Harry S. Truman Library.

FUCHS: Mr. Ewing, I thought that we would go ahead with a few more matters concerning your administration of the Federal Security Agency and might start by asking about an attack on you by Representative Daniel A. Reed, a Republican from New York who, I believe, demanded that Mr. Truman recall you from a London Health Conference. Do you recall anything about that, sir?

EWING: Yes, I had gone to England and a number of other places in Europe to get firsthand information about how their health services were functioning and how well they were succeeding. In London I learned that the Medical Society of Muncie, Indiana had been sending money to a group over there that was opposing the British health service. At a press conference I was asked questions about it and I said that I thought it was no business of the Medical Society in Muncie, Indiana to be taking sides on the medical problems of Britain. That apparently stirred up some controversy. Lord Horder, who was the physician to King George VI, who was on the throne at that time, got into the controversy

[249]

in some way. I don't recall the details because the incident wasn't very important. After I returned home I learned that Representative Reed had demanded my recall but I don't think I even knew of it until I got back home.

FUCHS: What year was that, sir?

EWING: I think that was late in '48 or early in '49.

FUCHS: I see. The Social Security Act of 1950 was generally accorded to have been one major Fair Deal accomplishment, and I believe you appeared as a witness before committee hearings in regard to that. Do you recall anything of that situation?

EWING: That was the bill where we were able to get Social Security benefits extended to people who were permanently and totally disabled. That was something that was very much needed. If a man died who was sixty-five or over leaving surviving dependents, those dependents would get certain benefits. But if he were twenty-five and became permanently and totally disabled there were no benefits payable to him or to his dependents, yet the man was economically dead, just as much as if he had been buried

[250]

in the ground. We felt the law should be amended so that people who became totally and permanently disabled could draw benefits, and if they died their dependents should get certain benefits, too.

FUCHS: I believe that the state relief boards were against this rather strongly. Do you recall anything of that and how did you overcome this opposition?

EWING: I don't recall.

FUCHS: In 1948 you worked out an agreement, I believe, in which Gallinger Hospital in Washington, the municipal hospital, would be open to Negro doctors and that they would be accepted for residency or internship. Do you recall anything about how this came about? And the implementation of it?

EWING: Oh, yes. At that time there were only two Negro medical schools in the United States, one of which was Howard University in Washington and that was within the bailiwick of the Federal Security Agency. Shortly after I became Administrator, it was brought to my attention rather vividly that there was a great shortage of doctors in the United States and a necessity to find

[251]

ways and means to get more of them. But I was particularly concerned when I learned that there was really an acute shortage of Negro doctors. There were various counties in the South where there was not a single Negro doctor and on the whole Negroes got short shrift from the white doctors. For instance, examples were given me where Negro workmen would go to a doctor for a shot of some kind and the doctor would give him the shot right through his work overalls.

I conferred with Dr. Mordecai Johnson, the president of Howard University, and also with the dean of the medical school at Howard to find out if there was anything that we might do to increase the output of Negro doctors by Howard University. Dr. Johnson told me that the output of graduate doctors of Howard Medical School was severely limited by a rule of the American Medical Association, that required a medical school to have a certain number of clinical hospital beds for each student. He said that in Washington the only teaching hospital for Howard medical students was Freedman's Hospital, which was also under my jurisdiction. It wasn't a large hospital so the result was that Howard Medical School could only educate the number of students for which Freedman's Hospital

[152]

could supply the required number of clinical beds. Dr. Johnson added that in Gallinger Hospital, the great municipal hospital in the District of Columbia, the teaching privileges were only given to Georgetown University Medical School and the George Washington Medical School. Gallinger did not extend teaching privileges to Howard professors. Well, I thought that was something I might do something about. So, I first got in touch with the commissioners of the District of Columbia. They were the governing body of the city, and they recognized the problem but seemed reluctant to do anything unless I could get the two universities, that is George Washington and Georgetown Medical Schools, to agree to some change. I then discussed the problem with the presidents of the two universities. I got the most cordial cooperation from both of them and also from the dean of the medical school of George Washington, but the dean of Georgetown was very much opposed to allowing Howard medical professors having teaching privileges in Gallinger.

FUCHS: Internships?

EWING: No, they weren't internships. It was a question of

[253]

whether or not Howard professors could take their students into Gallinger and the patients there could be used for clinical teaching.

FUCHS: Was not the privilege of interning there also involved?

EWING: It was. It was involved but it was more important to get this privilege for medical professors at Howard University to take their students into the hospital in order to have clinical cases to show their students. It's an essential part of teaching in a medical school. And, as I say, the dean of Georgetown was very much opposed to it.

FUCHS: Why?

EWING: He just didn't want Negroes in the school, it was a pure racist attitude.

FUCHS: In the hospital?

EWING: Yes, I mean in the hospital. So, I went back to Father Guthrie, the President of Georgetown, and had no trouble whatsoever with him. I simply said, "Father, this is a religious medical school. It is a medical

[254]

school run by a church. The dean of your medical school is opposed to allowing Howard professors bringing their medical students into Gallinger Hospital for teaching purposes. I just don't see how a Christian organization can take that position."

"Well," he said, "I don't either." And he straightened that out in no time so the Howard University Medical School was given the teaching privileges.

There was also a question of how the patients would be assigned. The dean of the Georgetown Medical School argued that no white patient would consent to having a Negro doctor. I took the position that that was up to the patient, and not up to the dean of the medical school to decide in advance that the patient wouldn't want a Negro doctor. I asked what system they were then using in assigning patients between Georgetown and George Washington Medical Schools. I was told that number one was assigned to George Washington, number two to Georgetown and so on, alternately.

"Well," I said, "why don't you just include Howard as number three?"

That was finally agreed to and they had no trouble. I learned afterwards that there were a few white patients

[255]

who did not want a Negro doctor and some Negro patients who didn't want a white doctor. And it balanced out all right. So, it's been a great help to Howard University. I think they were able to increase their graduating class from seventy-five to a hundred. That figure sticks in my mind, but it could be something different.

FUCHS: Now, do you know that Negro interns were accepted in 1948 at Gallinger Hospital?

EWING: When you pin it down to 1948, I would say no, for the simple reason that even after Howard got this right to take their medical students into Gallinger, Howard made a very cautious approach. They started by taking over services only in subjects where they had really topnotch teachers. There were a few areas, I don't remember what they were, I just say pediatrics for example, I don't know that that was it, where they would be weak and they didn't take on that service until they got their own house in order and had a strong faculty in the particular subject. I'm not sure just at what point they began taking interns but it did come I'm sure.

FUCHS: The original agreement did provide that interns

[256]

would be taken on, as you recall?

EWING: As I recall, yes. And residents, too. But Howard University handled it very well. They were quite sure that they could do their part before they undertook any service.

FUCHS: Yes. Well, I have a somewhat deep interest in this because of the work one scholar is doing on civil rights and he was wondering about some of the statements made about this and when it was actually implemented; and your current biography in the 1948 issue of *Current Biography* stated: "Washington's Jim Crow policy toward hospital doctors was ended on February 16, 1948 when Ewing announced Gallinger Hospital would be opened to Negro doctors and that Negroes would be accepted for residencies or internships. (They had accepted Negro patients.)" Then a recent book by Constance Green called *The Secret City, Civil Rights in the Nation's Capitol*, published in 1967, stated: "In 1951, the head of Gallinger Hospital agreed to accept some Negro interns, but otherwise except for a few half-hearted gestures..." and then it goes on to talk about integration in Washington and I wondered if that were just simply an incorrect

[257]

date. Then there is a letter in the files dated November 29, 1948 from the corresponding secretary of the Washington chapter of the Unitarian Fellowship for Social Justice which complimented the President for the part he took in the negotiations: "Which resulted in the admission of Negro interns from Howard University Medical School to Gallinger Hospital. Previous arrangements were obviously inequitable and impractical. We feel that much benefit to

many will result from the action taken." Now, I wondered if you had any comment about this which was in November 1948, and also about the ' 51 date given by Miss Green in her book?

EWING: Well, after I got the arrangements made, I more or less put it out of my mind. The only thing I recall, two or three times Dr. Mordecai Johnson, who was president of Howard University, told me that everything was going fine. I really have no knowledge, after I got through with the original agreement, I have no firsthand knowledge of what happened afterwards other than what Dr. Johnson told me.

FUCHS: In regard to the statement that in 1951 the head of the hospital agreed to accept some Negro interns,

[258]

would you say...

EWING: No, I think that date's wrong.

FUCHS: You commented earlier about the transfer of the Bureau of Employment Security, which contained the U. S. Employment Service and the Unemployment Compensation program, to the Department of Labor in June '49. The Bureau of Employees Compensation functions were transferred to the Secretary of Labor in May 1950 under the Presidential Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1949 , do you recall anything about that or were you in favor of that transfer?

EWING: I do not recall that at all because if the President wanted to transfer something out of my bailiwick he had a perfect right to do it and I would gladly go along. I wasn't trying to build an empire. I had headaches enough.

FUCHS: There was a controversy in 1951 regarding the making public of records in regard to welfare in the states. Do you recall anything of that?

EWING: Oh, yes.

[259]

FUCHS: Would you care to go into that a bit sir?

EWING: Well, that controversy chiefly involved the State of Indiana. I don't recall that any other state was involved. I've always been interested in things that go on in Indiana because it is my native state and I have a sister living there. Also I have a farm in Indiana and I am out there once or twice a year.

In order to explain the controversy to which you refer, I will have to give you some background. As originally enacted, the Social Security law contained no provision regulating the inspection of relief rolls and therefore anyone could look at them. In an election in Kentucky held in the late 1930s the Democrats got the names of all the persons on relief. These persons were called upon

by party workers a day or two before election and were told that any person on relief who voted the Republican ticket would be taken off the rolls. This was cruel and utterly unjustifiable political pressure. It so shocked a Democratic Congress that they passed an amendment which prohibited the inspection of relief rolls by anyone except for official purposes. The amendment also provided that if any state permitted inspection for any other purpose the Federal Security

[260]

Administrator must cut off further payments of Federal funds for relief to the offending state.

During the late 1940s and the early 1950s two Indianapolis newspapers, the *Star* and the *News*, were conducting a vicious campaign against the relief program. The *Star* assigned to the job one of its reporters who was an expert hatchet man. He traveled about Indiana digging up cases in which relief was being given to persons who, in his opinion, were not entitled to it. For example, one case which he blew up to gigantic proportions was that of a woman on relief who had a fur coat. He would have a reader believe that mere possession of a fur coat was positive proof that that owner was illegally getting relief. It never occurred to him that someone may have given the woman the fur coat.

As a result of this campaign of the *Star* and the *News*, both of which were owned by Eugene Pulliam, a bill was introduced in the Indiana legislature at its 1951 session, which if enacted would open the relief rolls to inspection by anyone. My office warned the appropriate officials of Indiana that enactment of the law would compel me to cut off Federal relief funds to

[261]

the state. These amounted to about twenty million dollars a year. The legislature, nevertheless, under the goading of the *Star* and the *News* enacted the bill. This was a plain act of defiance of Federal law and I promptly issued an order cutting off Federal relief funds to the State of Indiana. The Attorney-General of Indiana then filed a suit against me in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to compel me to release the funds but the Court upheld my action. The Attorney-General took an appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which affirmed the ruling of the lower court. With the refusal of the courts to overrule my action, Indiana then took its case to Congress. Senator William Jenner, of Indiana, was able to get an amendment attached to a bill which permitted inspection of the relief rolls under certain specified conditions with which Indiana complied. With the approval of the amending bill by the President, I promptly released the funds. This ended the controversy insofar as the State was concerned, but not insofar as the Pulliam papers were concerned. Their hatchet man reporter went down to Greensburg,

[262]

Indiana, and visited my farm near there. His account of this trip included a number of suggestive questions. Where had I obtained the money with which to buy the farm? Where had the money come from that paid for all the improvements I had made on the place? The obvious insinuation implied in these questions was that I could not have come by the money honestly. They entirely

overlooked the fact that I had practiced law in New York reasonably successfully for some twenty years. Even later Pulliam's papers continued to vent their spleen on me. In a later Indianapolis municipal election they were making a fight against the city installing parking meters in front of private residences. They referred to this as arbitrary official action just like that which Oscar Ewing had exercised when he cut off Federal relief funds from Indiana.

FUCHS: How was Jenner, and I believe Halleck was involved, how were they able to marshal sufficient support to pass an amendment; your position had been entirely legal?

EWING: Oh, yes, my actions had been tested in the courts. Jenner got the amendment through some way. I don't

[263]

think we particularly opposed it, because the amendment as they had drawn it did leave certain restrictions on divulging these names. We felt that the restrictions were enough for us to live with at least until we could see how they worked. As a matter of fact, I got a report a couple of years after the amendment had been in effect and in the whole state there had only been two applications to inspect the welfare rolls. So, it was a rumpus that two newspapers had kicked up over nothing.

FUCHS: In 1952, March, you appointed as an aide, Mr. E. L. Shainmark?

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: Was he brought in for a specific job, or what were his special qualifications?

EWING: The man who was handling our publicity functions had resigned. I say publicity functions because the Agency wanted to make public various activities about which the public should know. And the man who had been handling that resigned. It was quite a job.

FUCHS: Who was that, do you recall?

[264]

EWING: No. I don't recall his name. Mr. Shainmark had been a very successful newspaperman. He had been employed in the Hearst chain of papers as managing editor of one or two of its papers. I had called Bill Hearst to ask him about Mr. Shainmark and Mr. Hearst gave him a very warm endorsement; and it proved correct because Mr. Shainmark did fine work.

FUCHS: Donald Kingsley had served in 1948 to '49 as your assistant?

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: Then in 1949 he went to the International Refugee Organization. How did that come about?

EWING: Oh, I just think he was offered this position and it was a job that challenged and intrigued him, and he wanted to go.

FUCHS: You don't know who recommended him for that position?

EWING: No, I have no knowledge about it.

FUCHS: Dr. Scheele came up for reappointment in March of

[265]

1952. Was there any thought about not reappointing him? Was there any problem involved with that?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: You addressed a memo to the President on February 19 referring to a conference you had in which you recommended Dr. Scheele and pointed out that the previous Surgeon General had served--I think the minimum time was eight years--and he thought he needed more time. I wonder if the President had considered, possibly, asking you to consider someone else.

EWING: No, I don't think so at all.

FUCHS: Coming back now to the 1948 campaign, although we've already discussed the political strategy board, among other things, what part did you play aside from the political strategy board, in the campaign?

EWING: Well, in early 1948, say January, I think President Truman was in the nadir of his popularity, and those of us who believed in him and wanted to see him re-elected, were doing what we could to bring about his renomination and then the next step would be his election. But at that time there were a lot of the Democratic

[266]

leaders who were openly opposed to President Truman's re-nomination. Frank Hague of New Jersey, he was the Democratic National Committeeman from New Jersey; Jack Arvey of Chicago, he was Democratic National Committeeman from Illinois; and there were a number of other Democrats influential in the party who felt that it would be a mistake to re-nominate Mr. Truman, that he couldn't be elected. I think of two sons of President Roosevelt, Jimmy and Franklin, Jr., and I think Franklin, Jr. had come out publicly opposing Mr. Truman's re-nomination. Mrs. Roosevelt, however, never wavered in her loyalty to President Truman.

Those of us who were interested in President Truman's re-nomination, felt that we had to really get busy and do something about it. Howard McGrath, who was a Senator from Rhode Island at that time, was also Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. He and I were the two

people who I think were most concerned about getting the re-nomination of the President, although there were others, too. But Chairman McGrath and I were the two people who were perhaps in positions to do something about it. As a matter of fact, he and I traveled about

[267]

the country extensively trying to get these recalcitrant Democrats, these influential Democrats back in line.

FUCHS: You mean, you did early in '48 go to such individuals as Hague and Jake Arvey, personally, and...

EWING: Oh, indeed. And there were many others because you often didn't know what position the national committeemen would take, so we were doing missionary work everywhere we could.

FUCHS: Do you recall any specific conversations, any objections say that Jake Arvey might have given to Mr. Truman's re-nomination?

EWING: No. I think that in all instances it was a feeling that he couldn't be re-elected. The argument that Howard McGrath and I used, was that whether anyone liked it or not the Democratic candidates had to run on the Truman record. The Democrats couldn't take the position that, "Well, we made a mistake last time but give us another chance." This would be a confession of political bankruptcy. If they didn't re-nominate the man that had served as President for almost four years, they were just

[268]

making a Republican success certain. I don't think that we converted Jake Arvey, to whom I talked two or three times, or Frank Hague; but as February came along and March came along, and April, the opposition to President Truman was gradually diminishing. Then the President made his first cross-country whistlestop speechmaking tour and that was really a great success. Truman was a fighter and when he got out on those whistlestops and laid his facts on the line, he created a warmth towards himself that had been lacking before.

FUCHS: Now, you're speaking of the so-called non-political tour of June 1948?

EWING: That's right.

FUCHS: Did the political strategy board have anything to do in recommending that he make such a journey?

EWING: Oh, yes, we urged him to do it. We didn't have to do a great deal of urging. He was delighted. I think it was on that trip that he went to a plowing contest in Iowa. There was an enormous crowd of farmers present because it had been advertised that the President would be making a farm speech. It was

[269]

in that speech that he picked up and made an issue of a matter that had been brought to his attention by Secretary Brannan. The 80th Congress, which of course, was President Truman's chief political opponent at that time, had appropriated nothing with which to build storage bins in which farmers' grains might be stored. The support program contemplated that the farmer would store his grain in a Government bin and then receive the support price. If the market price of the grain went above the support price the farmer could retain his grain and sell it at the higher market price and repay the Government loan. If the price of the grain went down the Government could sell the grain without any obligation on the part of the farmer to make up the loss. The President made the most of the failure of the 80th Congress to provide the necessary storage space. I remember his classic expression was that the 80th Congress had put a pitchfork in the farmer's back. I know the President repeated this all through the campaign and it did much to help him carry many western states on election day. And that contrasts sharply with the 1968 election when Vice President Humphrey really had no issue that particularly appealed

[270]

to farmers. His defeat was largely due, in my opinion, to this fact. He lost too many of those midwestern farm states that Truman carried in 1948. Had he had a good farm issue, I think Mr. Humphrey would have been elected.

FUCHS: There just was none that could be picked up, is that the way you feel?

EWING: Apparently not. I was not in touch with the campaign. I'm only observing the results.

FUCHS: You told me yesterday that Oscar Chapman never attended any of the strategy board meetings?

EWING: That's right.

FUCHS: But, as you know, he was very active in the campaign. What do you recall of that and was he in touch in any way with your strategy board?

EWING: No. He did an excellent job as advance man for the President. Oscar would go ahead of the President to places where the President was scheduled to speak and would make sure the proper arrangements were made. Then he would move on ahead of the President and do

[270]

the same thing at the next place. He was a most efficient advance man.

FUCHS: There was a research division organized in the Democratic National Committee. Do you know anything about how that came to pass?

EWING: Yes, I think Senator McGrath as chairman of the Democratic National Committee had that organized, and, if I'm not mistaken, the head of it was a William Batt, Jr. He had sat in on some of our strategy meetings and, of course, it was very necessary for the National Committee to have a research division. When the campaign came on there were a lot of matters that had to be studied and researched that were outside the purview of our strategy group.

FUCHS: Who was Bill Batt, and had he sat in on some of your strategy board meetings before the research division was organized, and by whose invitation?

EWING: I think he had sat in with our group before the research division was organized because he was in some position where he was active in politics. I'm not sure but that he was employed by the National

[271]

Committee before that research division was set up. I just am not sure but he was the son of William Batt who was...

FUCHS: You don't recall who suggested that such a division be set up and who suggested Batt's name as potential director for it?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: Did you personally recommend anyone for the staff of the research division?

EWING: I don't think so.

FUCHS: Did you become acquainted with any of the staff such as Kenny Birkhead or--you knew Batt of course.

EWING: Batt is the only one I knew.

FUCHS: Johannes Hoeber?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: Or Frank Kelly?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: You didn't have personal contact with the research

[273]

division?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: What about the strategy board, was there any relationship there after the research division got started?

EWING: Well, there was a great deal of contact with Bill Batt. I think he sat in with us very often.

FUCHS: So, any recommendations to the research division would have been made through Bill Batt?

EWING: Oh, yes. He would be the liaison.

FUCHS: The campaign was, as you know, largely oriented towards the issues rather than personalities. Was this part of the recommendation by the policy board and was there any one who felt it should be more personality oriented?

EWING: No, no. You see Governor Dewey was so confident that he would be elected that his whole campaign pitch was to tell what the next administration would be doing, and his campaign never really got down to the gut issues. Mr. Truman, on the other hand, was pounding on the gut issues very hard. I don't recall that any

[274]

personalities were involved one way or the other. It was a very clean campaign in that respect.

FUCHS: You, as a member of a policy board, and the policy board as a whole, felt that you should dwell on the issues rather than aiming at Mr. Dewey and other members of the opposition?

EWING: Well, I don't recall that that question came up, it was just the way those things go. Your campaign develops just naturally in a certain way. Surprises come in and you meet those when they come because you haven't anticipated them. I don't recall any discussion of personalities being involved at all. I don't think they were.

FUCHS: The campaign involved two matters I'd like to dwell on a bit. One was the Palestine, Israel question and, of course, civil rights. Taking up the first to a degree, in 1948, March, Ambassador Austin in the U.N. gave a speech rather unexpectedly putting the United States on the side of trusteeship although earlier in '47 the U.N. voted for a partition and we had favored that. I believe a meeting was held and, it

[275]

has been written that you attended this meeting. Do you recall anything of that, after the Austin speech?

EWING: No, I draw a complete blank on that. I can tell you that whole story if you're interested.

FUCHS: I certainly am.

EWING: For a proper background one must go back to World War I. Turkey had ranged herself with the Central Powers and Lord Allenby headed the Allied army that was fighting the Turks in Palestine. In the fall of 1917 the Allies were advancing rapidly and, on November 2, 1917, the British Government issued the famous Balfour Declaration, saying that they "view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object." In September, 1918, the Turks were finally expelled from Palestine and the Balfour Declaration was incorporated in the Treaty of Peace, having previously been endorsed by all the Allied Powers and President Wilson on behalf of the United States. The victorious Allied Powers delegated to the League of Nations the disposition of

[276]

the territories that General Allenby had captured from the Turks. The League then designated Great Britain as the mandatory power for Palestine. The powers of the League of Nations were later vested in the United Nations.

Early in 1948 Albert Lasker, whom I knew well, came to me and said: "Jack, unless the President gets this Palestine matter settled pretty soon, the Jews will clobber him in the election this fall." Mr. Lasker talked so seriously about the situation that I thought I ought to repeat his conversation to the President. When I did the President said, "I know what Lasker says is probably true. But I am in a tough spot. The Jews are bringing all kinds of pressure on me to support the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state. On the other hand the State Department is adamantly opposed to this. I have two Jewish assistants on my staff, Dave Niles and Max Lowenthal. Whenever I try to talk to them about Palestine they soon burst into tears because they are so emotionally involved in the subject. So far I have not known what to do."

I then said, "Mr. President, the settlement of the

[277]

Palestine problem is completely outside of my bailiwick and I know what I read about it in the newspapers, but if it would be any help to you I will be glad to study the facts and tell you what I think."

"Oh," the President answered, "I wish you would, I wish you would. It would help a lot."

The study proved fascinating. Being a lawyer, naturally I investigated the legal claims that the Arabs and Jews respectively had to the land in question. I found that under international law, when land is taken by conquest, the conqueror can dispose of it as he wishes. For instance, after the Norman conquest of England in 1066, William the Conqueror granted lands to his various

lords and the titles to land in England today start with these grants. Therefore, the grant of sovereignty given by the Allies to the Jews of lands conquered from Turkey had the same validity as had similar grants of sovereignty to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. The claim of the Arabs that Palestine had been their land for thousands of years was untrue. For several hundred years it had been Turkish territory and with Allenby's conquest in World War I the territory became Allied territory

[278]

for the Allies to dispose of as they wished. When the title of the Allies to a part of this conquered land was transferred to the Jews, their title to it became indisputable; and I so advised the President.

At the close of World War II Great Britain found herself in a precarious financial position. In order to curtail expenses, she began to withdraw from many of her worldwide military commitments. She withdrew her troops from India, Pakistan, the Middle East and notified the United Nations, which had succeeded to the rights and powers of the League of Nations, that she, Great Britain, would surrender the mandate for Palestine on May 14, 1948. As a substitute for the military forces she withdrew, Great Britain sought to establish close relations with Moslem nations of the area in the hope that this would give her friendly allies from East Pakistan, west across Asia Minor, the Middle East and on across the North African littoral to the Atlantic Ocean on the West.

FUCHS: As you undoubtedly know, Mr. Truman in his public statements dwelt mostly on the fact that, one, he was willing to leave the ultimate solution of the Palestine

[279]

problem in the hands of the United Nations where the British had dumped it. Two, he was mainly interested in achieving the entry of at least one hundred thousand refugees from the persecuted Jews in Europe very quickly into Palestine. How did this enter into your considerations?

EWING: Well, I don't recall exactly what his public statements were. But as a practical matter vis-a-vis the State Department, the State Department was urging him to capitulate completely to the Arabs, and our group advised the President to take a position to the effect that he would not consent to any modification of the boundaries as set up by the United Nations as a successor of the League of Nations.

FUCHS: Under the partition plan?

EWING: Yes, that he would not consent to any modifications of those boundaries except as it was agreeable to Israel.

FUCHS: Now this was after, you are thinking of after the creation of the state in '48?

[280]

EWING: No, I'm thinking even before then. I think he didn't use the word Israel, I think it was the Jewish Agency that was representing Jewish interests at that time.

FUCHS: That is correct.

EWING: So that left things as they were, as the United Nations had determined; and the Jews accepted the boundaries that the United Nations had fixed. The Arabs refused to accept them. They said that they were going to war unless those were changed. They went to war the very day that the State of Israel was proclaimed and President Truman had recognized the new State of Israel within a matter of hours after it was proclaimed.

FUCHS: What do you recall of Secretary of State Marshall's position in this?

EWING: Well, perhaps I could answer that if I continue this narrative. As you know, in the war, where the Arabs attacked on May 16, 1948, the Jews really crushed the Arab forces and expanded their own territory. They captured territory in West Galilee and the Negev,

[281]

particularly, that the November 29, 1947 resolution had given to Arab nations. Then a truce was made under which Egypt was allowed a slice of land clear over to the Dead Sea. This strip of land crossed a strip that was to be held by Israel for access to the Negev. Of course, such an arrangement was bound to bring another conflict.

FUCHS: Did the original partition plan of the U.N., November ' 47, give the Negev to Israel?

EWING: No, it did not. The Israelis captured it in the first conflict. Then the United Nations after a truce had been made, sent Count Bernadotte of Sweden to Israel to try to come up with a peace arrangement that would be satisfactory to everyone. He finally formulated his recommendations which were very pro-Arab. They gave the Negev back to Egypt and the West Galilee territory back to the Arabs.

FUCHS: Trans-Jordan?

EWING: Well, Trans-Jordan was divided up in the original assignment of territories by the United Nations in their resolution of November 29, 1947.

[282]

FUCHS: In the partition? In '47?

EWING: Yes. And that proposal of Bernadotte's was completely unacceptable to the Jews. But during this time emotions got out of control and Count Bernadotte was assassinated. His immediate successor as mediator was Ralph Bunche. Mediation got nowhere and in the hope of

making progress a conference was called of the Foreign Ministers of the states involved to consider the Bernadotte plan. The Conference met in Paris in, I think, September of 1948. President Truman was still maintaining his position that he would consent to no modification of the boundaries of Israel except as was agreed to by Israel. While the conference was going on in Paris the President was making campaign trips every week out of Washington. He would return on Thursday or Friday and we would all work over the weekend on his speeches for the following week. On Sunday, October 17th, 1948, I had just started from my apartment in the Wardman Park Hotel to go down to the White House to work on the speeches for the following week. I was met in the lobby by a Western Union boy who said that he had a cablegram for me. I reached out for it but he said, "There are collect

[283]

charges of \$86 on this cable."

"Well," I exclaimed, "in that case you can keep the cable as far as I'm concerned."

FUCHS: I don't blame you.

EWING: Then he answered, "I can give it to you because the charges are guaranteed."

So, I opened the cablegram and saw that it was signed by Lillie Shultz. Stupidly I didn't place Miss Schultz right then. I should have because I had had previous correspondence with her. She was a correspondent for the magazine *The Nation*. The publisher of *The Nation* was Miss Freda Kirchwey. In the message Miss Shultz said that notwithstanding the President's instructions General Marshall as chairman of the American delegation to the Foreign Ministers Conference, was planning to agree to the Bernadotte plan. I didn't know what to do but I went on down to the White House, and at the first opportunity showed the cable to Clark Clifford. Clark said, "I don't understand this but we had better wait until we break up at noon and show the cable to the President." Which is what we did. The President read it and said, "Why, I can't

[284]

believe this. I just can't believe that General Marshall would do that." After a moment he said: "What do you suggest I do about it?"

I spoke up and said, "Mr. President, I have a suggestion. It is that you ask General Marshall to submit to you for approval any statement that he proposes to make before he makes it."

The President thought that was a good idea and replied, "Do you and Clark mind drafting such a cable during the lunch hour and let me see it; we'll get it in shape and send it off." When we convened after, lunch, Clark and I showed the President our draft, he approved it and it was sent off. That message read as follows: [Mr. Ewing, at this point in the interview, referred to Volume II, page 167 of the *Memoirs of Harry S. Truman*.]

October 17, 1948

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I request that no statement be made or no action be taken on the subject of Palestine by any member of our delegation in Paris without specific authority from me and clearing the text of any statement.

That cable was sent and we assumed everything was under control. At least I thought so because I was not in touch with everything that might be going on at the

[285]

White House.

We now jump to the Thursday before the 1948 election. As you know, the Democratic candidate for President always goes to New York that day, makes a tour of the five boroughs and ends up in the evening making a speech at Madison Square Garden. That day I again came down into the lobby of the Wardman Park Hotel and was again met by a Western Union boy with a cablegram--no collect charges this time. But it was again from Miss Shultz. It said that notwithstanding the President's instructions tomorrow (Friday) General Marshall will agree to the Bernadotte plan unless he receives counter instructions. Well, I knew that President Truman was in New York on his tour of the five boroughs. I knew Clark Clifford had gone up with him. After thinking it over, I decided to hop a plane and go to New York. I got there about two o'clock, went over to the Biltmore Hotel where the President was stopping and where Democratic headquarters were, hoping I'd find Clark. When I got there I was told that he and Mrs. Clifford were out on a shopping tour. There was nothing I could do but sit down and wait, which I did. Clark got back to the

[286]

Biltmore, I'd say around five o'clock, and I showed him Miss Shultz's telegram. "Oh, that woman is crazy," he said. "Marshall sent a draft of a statement that he proposes to make and I thought it was all right." He suddenly added, "By the way, I've got Marshall's proposed statement right here in my briefcase." He got it out and read it over twice. Then he turned to me and exclaimed, "Well, I'll be damned. She's right. This proposed statement starts off 'In line with the President's instructions' and so forth and I've got to confess I was too busy to read it to the end, but the cracker is in the end. He proposes to go along with the Bernadotte plan. There's nothing we can do about it until the President comes back and we can take it up with him." So we waited around and it was about eight o'clock before the President returned to the hotel. You know, a President is always surrounded by hangers-on who want to shake his hand or say something to him. It was about half past eight before Clark and I were able to discuss the matter with him. The cable upset the President very much and after a short silence he asked, "What on earth can we do to prevent this?"

[287]

I said, "Well, Mr. President, I made a suggestion before, which didn't work out too well, but I've got another one. Why not this time tell General Marshall what to say."

"That's a good idea," he answered. "Do you and Clark mind missing the speech at Madison Square Garden tonight and use the time to draft a statement for General Marshall to make?"

"Of course," we said, "we'd be glad to."

So, we did. It wasn't hard because we were both so familiar with the whole problem that we could do it very quickly.

The President was quite late in getting back to the Biltmore that night because he went on the air at eleven o'clock, and it was at least half past twelve by the time he returned to the hotel and got rid of the people that wanted to see him. We were then able to show him what we drafted and he thoroughly approved it. He asked that one word be changed. We had put in the draft "You are directed to make the following statement." He said, "Change that word 'directed' to 'requested.' I don't have to direct Marshall."

[288]

With that I went off to bed and Clark had the job of calling the Under Secretary of State, Bob Lovett, at his home in Washington and got him out of bed. Apparently before an open window, Mr. Lovett took down Clark's dictation of the message. Then the Under Secretary had to call the State Department coding office, they had to code the message and get it on the wire. Mind you, there was six hours difference in time between Washington and Paris so it would be nip and tuck as to whether the President's message would reach General Marshall before he had delivered his statement to the conference.

Well, I knew nothing about what happened in Paris after that except I saw in the paper that General Marshall had made the statement we had drafted for him.

It was several months later when my secretary came in and said that there was a Miss Lillie Shultz and a Miss Freda Kirchwey outside who would like to see me. I said, "Well, I would sure like to see them." So, they were brought in with Miss Shultz saying, "Mr. Ewing, I thought you might like to know what happened in Paris after the new instructions came to General

[289]

Marshall."

And I answered, "I certainly would."

"Well," she said, "I knew General Marshall was to make his statement that Friday. I had awakened with a rotten headache and also felt terribly frustrated. I thought I knew what was

going to happen, that much of what we were struggling for was going down the drain. About half past nine I received a telegram from New York saying that new instructions had been sent General Marshall." She went on, "I didn't know what the new instructions were. But I got dressed hurriedly, grabbed a taxi and rushed to where the conference was being held. The session hadn't started but the audience was there and the delegates were up on the platform. I rushed in waving the telegram and shouted out loud, 'Has the American delegation received their new instructions?' This caused considerable consternation, as I walked down and I handed the telegram to the person at the Secretariat's desk. He read it over, walked over and gave the message to Ralph Bunche. Then a thing happened that I understand never happened before and never has happened since. The chairman of the meeting decided that the translations of statements

[290]

that were being made should be made consecutively rather than simultaneously. It was a beautiful filibuster to give the American delegation time to get their new instructions. The result was that General Marshall wasn't asked to make his statement until after the instructions had been received. I'm perfectly sure that this is what saved the Negev and some of the other territories involved for the State of Israel. "

Just to add a little human touch to this. Several years later Mrs. Ewing and I were invited to have dinner with some friends of ours in Scarsdale, Jewish friends, and one of the guests was a man named William Epstein. He was a Canadian, but he had been attached to the Secretariat's office of the United Nations. When we were talking after dinner, I related this story much as I have told it here. I noticed that Mr. Epstein was very nervous as though he wanted to say something. When I finished he leaned over he said, "Mr. Ewing, I was in charge of the Secretariat's desk of the conference that day and it was I to whom Lillie Shultz handed that telegram. And it was I who walked around and gave it to Ralph Bunche."

[291]

FUCHS: Did you ask Miss Shultz how she was so well apprized of what Marshall was going to do originally and also how she received premature notice that Marshall's instructions had been changed?

EWING: No, I didn't ask her. She was a newspaper correspondent and they have their sources of information. She did not tell me from whom she got the telegram but I'm pretty sure that I knew. Carl Sherman was the treasurer of the New York Democratic State Committee at that time, and I saw a good deal of him that day in the Biltmore. I'm quite sure I talked things over with him. I noticed that after he knew what I was working on he stuck very closely to me for the rest of the day. So, from that I simply assume that it was Carl Sherman who cabled Miss Shultz. He knew Miss Shultz very well and as he was Jewish he was naturally very much interested.

FUCHS: You said that Lovett took this message down in front of an open window.

EWING: In longhand. You see he was in Washington. Clark was in New York.

[292]

FUCHS: Why did you mention the open window?

EWING: Well, no significance other than the torture that it put to the Under Secretary of State.

FUCHS: Oh, he didn't catch cold or anything?

EWING: Not that I know of, but I am sure he was quite uncomfortable. I think he indicated that to Clark later and Clark told me.

FUCHS: Why did Miss Shultz, who had, you said, written you before, cable you and why had she written you before and also what about Miss Kirchwey having been in touch with you before?

EWING: No, Miss Kirchwey had not been in touch with me. You see, after the President asked me to get into the Palestine matter and make a study of it for him, I think this got noised about in Jewish circles and they knew I was in touch with the situation. I'm sure they knew that after my study I was in sympathy with their position, and they felt that it was a direct means of contact with the President on this particular issue. I assume that.

[293]

FUCHS: Was it in the press that you were advising on the Palestine situation?

EWING: No, I don't think so. I don't think so.

FUCHS: You originally went, you said, to President Truman in connection with this as a political matter?

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: Had you knowledge of Zionism? Had you favored the Zionist position prior to this?

EWING: No. I really knew nothing more than the casual newspaper reader. I don't recall that I had any strong feeling one way or the other. It was as a result of this suggestion of Albert Lasker's that I had my talk with the President, and his saying that he was getting conflicting pressures and wished he could get some impartial advice, that I offered my services. The President welcomed them and I went to work and brought Clark Clifford in on it.

FUCHS: How much would you say political consideration entered into your final judgment as to the rightness of the two parties in the conflict?

[294]

EWING: I don't think any at all. I investigated the conflict as impartially as I knew how because I wanted to give the President completely impartial advice. I might have thought that one thing would have been better from a political point of view but you don't consider that when you are advising the President of the United States, and he didn't want political advice from Clark or me.

FUCHS: Yes. It has been charged that much of the President's White House position on Israel was based on politics, as you know that would be largely in consideration of the large Jewish vote in New York and other metropolitan areas.

EWING: Well, a President, I don't care what President, whether it was Truman or someone else, if he took any stand in any controversy he'd be accused of politics in some way or other. We tried to give him the most unbiased advice of which we were capable. And that was the kind of advice he wanted. He wanted complete justification, legally and morally, for any position that he might take. He did not allow any political consideration to influence his position.

[295]

FUCHS: We originally started this discussion by my asking you about the meeting which was held, as I understand it, rather hurriedly convened to decide what to do to counteract Austin's statement putting the United States on the side of trusteeship whereas President Truman had just come out giving Chaim Weizmann assurances that we stood for the U.N. partition scheme and you don't recall that meeting; however, it comes to my mind, and I'm not certain of this, that at least at one meeting, and I believe that it was Secretary Marshall who pointed out that political considerations were involved and he said to Clark Clifford--I'm not certain this was Marshall, but someone said to Clark Clifford, "You wouldn't be here if it wasn't political:" Do you recall anything of that?

EWING: Yes. I am sure General Marshall said that, but I am not sure whether he said it in a meeting I attended or whether Clark told me what General Marshall had said. I believe it was the latter. I think Senator Austin made his statement without approval from the President and I'm quite sure that the President was upset by it.

[296]

Your specific question was whether I had attended a meeting, and I don't think I did.

FUCHS: What were your views of General Marshall as the Secretary of State in general and in relation to Israel?

EWING: Well, number one, General Marshall was a great general. One of the greatest that we have ever produced in this country. He temperamentally, having come up through the military, handled everything by staff work. The advice that would come to him as Secretary of State would come through channels. That was the way he was accustomed to working. The State Department itself was very pro-Arab. At that time the Near East desk was headed by Loy Henderson, and Mr. Henderson was a very vocal protagonist for the Arab cause. In all of our conferences, of which there were quite a few with the President, it was General Marshall, Mr.

Henderson and Dean Rusk who represented the State Department while Clark Clifford and I would be there defending the President's position.

FUCHS: These were in the President's office?

[297]

EWING: They were in the Cabinet Room.

FUCHS: Did he have Niles in attendance?

EWING: No. No, nor Lowenthal. As I have said that while he was very fond of them and had every confidence in them, this was an issue in which they were so emotionally involved that he felt their advice might not always be the best.

FUCHS: Did Sam Rosenman enter into the...

EWING: I don't think he was involved in this at all.

FUCHS: Why do you think Mr. Henderson was so pro-Arab?

EWING: Well, I can only speculate but I can do that. You see, Mr. Henderson was very pro-British and when the British had to pull in their military forces from the Far East, the Near East and the North African littoral, the British substituted for their military presence alliances with Moslem countries across that same area. I think that Mr. Henderson's support of the Arab cause was due to the fact that he wanted to help the British in their alliances with the Moslem countries. Now that is pure speculation on my part, but I cannot explain it

[298]

in any other way.

FUCHS: What about Secretary Forrestal of Defense?

EWING: I don't recall that he was ever involved in these discussions.

FUCHS: Would you care to go on a little bit about your meetings with Marshall and the others? We were talking, I believe of Marshall.

EWING: Well, you asked me what I thought of him. Marshall, as I say, he wanted everything to come up through channels and he wanted everything decided that way. If a proposition came to him, he referred it down to the staff so that it would come back to him through channels. He said several times in our discussions that there was to be no politics in the State Department. He was inferring that our point of view was based on political considerations. General Marshall overlooked one thing in this attitude and that is that foreign affairs are simply the extension of

the politics of the Government into the external world. To attempt to handle foreign affairs in a political vacuum is an utter absurdity.

FUCHS: You just can't stop at the water's edge?

[299]

EWING: No, it's carrying out your domestic policies.

FUCHS: Anything else about General Marshall?

EWING: No, no.

FUCHS: Would you say there was anything cynical about the statements of the President in subscribing to a more or less tacit agreement with the Arabs, that I believe started with President Roosevelt, that no unilateral action would be taken in regard to Palestine that would change the basic situation there. That he would consult both the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arabs, and yet came out strongly for the admission of a hundred thousand refugees. I just wondered if you would have viewed that as a change in the basic situation?

EWING: I believe all that happened before I got involved in the Palestine question at all.

FUCHS: Yes. Well, this was prior to '48 that most of these statements were made. Of course, coming out for partition, accepting that, was a change in the basic situation as it existed prior to Mr. Truman coming into office; but, of course, he had said that

[300]

we would abide by the United Nations and that was their decision. I just wondered if you had views upon that. Getting back more directly to the '48 campaign. Do you know anything of the reported and disputed story that Mr. Truman approached General Eisenhower to take the nomination in 1948?

EWING: I understood it was true. I had no connection with it. At that time President Truman had a very high opinion of General Eisenhower and General Eisenhower's politics were not then known. No one knew whether he was a Democrat or a Republican.

FUCHS: Cabell Phillips, as you may recall, in his book *The Truman Presidency* said that Kenneth Royall was in conversation with Mr. Truman and said that he couldn't support Mr. Truman if Eisenhower were available and Mr. Truman asked Royall to go and make the bid to Eisenhower, which was turned down; but Mr. Phillips does not give a source for this. He said that the statement was submitted to the principals, Royall, Eisenhower, and Mr. Truman when he was writing the book, and Royall said the account was essentially accurate but he did not say that he could not support

[301]

Mr. Truman if Eisenhower were considered for nomination. Mr. Eisenhower said that you would have to refer this to Mr. Truman, in so many words. He didn't want to comment on it, and Mr. Truman said the story is not true. Of course, this leaves the natural question, where did Phillips get this story. As a responsible scholar he should be willing to identify his source but he just slides over it. Did you ever hear this before about Royall?

EWING: No, I never heard about Royall. I read that in Phillips book, but I have no knowledge of it except that it was generally understood that President Truman had told General Eisenhower that he would support him. Now if he says he didn't do it, why I would accept his word for it.

FUCHS: Well, this is not the first instance where its been recorded that he said that he did not make an approach to General Eisenhower. Did you ever discuss the Eisenhower potential candidacy with Mr. Truman?

EWING: I have a feeling that I did but I have no recollection of what that conversation consisted.

[302]

FUCHS: Early in that year when you did visit some of these Democratic leaders who were not looking too favorably on Mr. Truman as a candidate did you ask them who they wanted for President?

EWING: Oh, no. I was selling a candidate. I was trying to line them up for the President.

FUCHS: You never said, "Well, now that you don't want Mr. Truman, who would you prefer?"

EWING: No.

FUCHS: That would be a negative approach.

EWING: Well, I felt there was only one person that should be nominated.

FUCHS: Did you play an active part in the '48 convention?

EWING: I did somewhat but, you see, I was in office then. I was not a delegate. I think I appeared before the Resolutions Committee on some issue, I don't even remember what it was; but it was something controversial and we felt that it was desirable for someone from the administration to present the administration's view to the Resolutions Committee. I don't remember for the life

[303]

of me what it was.

FUCHS: What about the platform making?

EWING: Well, that would be done by the Resolutions Committee.

FUCHS: Did you have anything to do with the civil rights plank?

EWING: I don't think so. I don't think so. I remember the controversy over that very well, and that was when Hubert Humphrey made his minority report--I am not sure whether it was a minority report or whether he just got up and said that a group of liberals felt that the plank that had been drafted by the committee was too mild. They were successful in getting the convention to adopt the plank that they thought ought to be put into the platform and a number of the Southern delegations got up and walked out.

FUCHS: Do you know how Mr. Truman felt about the two planks?

EWING: Yes, I think I do. Naturally, as the prospective candidate, he wanted a plank that, if possible, would satisfy both sides of the controversy. This was the

[304]

plank that had been drafted by the Resolutions Committee. I think the draft that Senator Humphrey urged probably in the end was more beneficial to Mr. Truman's candidacy than had he run on a platform containing the plank that tried to give something to both sides.

FUCHS: Why do you think it turned out that way?

EWING: Well, the Negro vote turned out to be almost solidly for Mr. Truman.

FUCHS: Did you travel on the campaign train?

EWING: I was on two or three trips, but not all of them because I had a job to do.

FUCHS: Any anecdotes that come to mind?

EWING: No, not particularly. The President was very effective as a campaigner. He was not good at reading a prepared speech and our group, particularly those of us who were working on speeches, urged him to speak from notes or off-the-cuff because he was very effective that way. His personality got over to the audience then, whereas when he was reading a prepared speech--he never had good eyes and it was difficult for

[305]

him to read a thing like a speech. Often the text would be so far off he couldn't see it--but he was very effective when he talked off-the-cuff or from notes on cards.

FUCHS: You say your group did urge him, was that a message that was carried to him by Clark Clifford?

EWING: Yes, oh, yes.

FUCHS: At the recommendation of your policy strategy board?

EWING: I think it was. It was a common feeling, but I think it was more particularly the opinion of those of us who were actually working on the President's speeches.

FUCHS: Scholars are always interested in speechwriting. I wonder if you could tell a little bit about how you entered into that in this campaign? And the group of course.

EWING: Well, all of the speechwriting was done under Clark Clifford's supervision. In other words it all headed up there. There were a number of the President's assistants who made contributions, George Elsey, Dave Lloyd.

[306]

FUCHS: Wasn't he in the research division at this time?

EWING: I don't know. I know he helped us on the speeches. I thought he was working in the White House at that time.

FUCHS: What about David Bell?

EWING: Dave Bell, yes, very much. And one or two other men who came in when there might be a particular subject that someone from, let's say the Interior Department, might have particular knowledge. If so, he would be brought in.

FUCHS: Now, was Charlie Murphy involved?

EWING: Oh, I think he was, very much. He was assistant to Clark Clifford at that time and I think he was very much in the picture.

FUCHS: Did Clifford travel on the train?

EWING: Yes, he did, because I know this, that as we divided up the work, when they'd be out on the train, by and large if they wanted something in Washington they would communicate with me, and I would try to

[307]

get whatever they wanted. It might have been a bit of information or it could have been almost anything. They didn't always communicate with me, they might communicate directly with someone else.

FUCHS: Did you participate in speechwriting sessions in the White House?

EWING: Oh, yes. We worked there practically every weekend, all through the weekends of the whole campaign.

FUCHS: Where did you work?

EWING: In the Cabinet Room. There would usually be several of us there working on a speech. Clark would make a draft, this was the usual course, somebody else might make a draft, but by and large the draft that we were presented with usually came from Clark. Often we had been given a copy of the draft in advance so that we could come prepared with any comments we might have. But I think more often the draft was given to us when we gathered in the Cabinet Room, and then it would be read out loud. The President always sat in on those sessions. It would be read out loud and anyone would stop the reading if he had

[308]

any comment to make, and if they'd make a change or eliminate or add to it this would be done right there.

FUCHS: Who would generally read the speeches?

EWING: Generally Clark. In fact, I think he always did. But it was always the President who decided things and the speeches were always his speeches.

FUCHS: Saturdays and Sundays?

EWING: Well, it might be if the President got back on Thursday, it might be Thursday, Friday, Saturday or Sunday. We just had to adapt ourselves to his itinerary.

FUCHS: Now, your meetings Monday night in the Wardman Park continued throughout the campaign?

EWING: Oh, yes.

FUCHS: No speechwriting sessions were held in the Federal Security Agency?

EWING: No. They were always held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

FUCHS: The speech you gave before the National Urban

[309]

League in Richmond, Virginia on September 10, 1948, I believe had a mixed reception. Do you recall anything about that?

EWING: What was it about?

FUCHS: Well, you spoke largely about civil rights and the Negro vote. That they should support President Truman, and as reported in the *New York Times*: "When Mr. Ewing completed his speech there was mild but brief applause from about half of the audience. The audience at no time applauded any of Mr. Ewing's references to President Truman as the champion of Negro rights." I thought that this was rather strange in view of the nature of the National Urban League and this address being before three hundred of its delegates.

EWING: I have no recollection of that.

FUCHS: Are there any things that stand out in your memory about any of the speeches that you worked on?

EWING: There's only one incident that I recall. We were working on a speech that the President was to make in Boston. I don't recall before what audience. That particular speech had been drafted by someone who did

[310]

not usually work with us. I don't remember his name, but I think he was Jewish. The speech that he had drafted went completely overboard for the Jewish cause. I felt that from the point of view of a candidate for President that there was no sense in making extreme statements. We argued that out. Those things that I felt were too extreme were eliminated. This was a group that was all working for a common cause and there was the best of feelings all the way around on it.

FUCHS: Do you recall any feeling between, say, the conservatives represented by Snyder and the liberals represented by you and Clifford? Points that you discussed?

EWING: No. As far as I know, I don't think Mr. Snyder was ever--in fact I know he was never in on any speechwriting sessions. He may have talked to the President about something in the speeches but he never sat in on any of the writing sessions.

FUCHS: What about Sam Rosenman?

EWING: No.

[311]

FUCHS: Jonathan Daniels?

EWING: I'm not sure that Jonathan was in the White House at that time.

FUCHS: No. Let me refresh your memory. He had been out of the White House but he did come back on the train, I believe, but you didn't come in touch with him.

EWING: Well, I may have. Jonathan was there at the latter part of President Roosevelt's term, before he died, and I know that he came back afterwards. I think he became President Roosevelt's Press Secretary when Steve Early died.

FUCHS: He came back as a consultant in the '48 campaign.

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: Traveled on the train, at least part of the time; and there was another gentleman, J. Franklin Carter, did you come in touch with him?

EWING: If I did I don't recall it.

FUCHS: What about David Noyes at that time?

[312]

EWING: I don't think Dave was ever on the train. He could have been. Dave was very helpful, but whether he was in on the speechwriting I am not sure. I think he occasionally was or at least contributed ideas.

FUCHS: Did you ever come in touch with Sam Brightman in the research division?

EWING: Yes, Sam was at that time, I think, publicity director for the Democratic National Committee. And he would obviously be in touch with the research committee of the National Committee.

FUCHS: Do you recall a William J. Bray on any of your campaign trips?

EWING: That name's familiar.

FUCHS: Nothing stands out in your memory?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: Mr. Ewing, do you recall the statement by Mr. Truman that he made in his acceptance speech about recalling Congress?

EWING: Oh, yes.

[313]

FUCHS: Do you know how that came about. Who proposed that session?

EWING: I think Clark Clifford did, at least that was my impression at the time. I think that the President very readily, instantly, saw the political advantage in doing it, and it turned out very well politically.

FUCHS: Do you recall seeing a memorandum about the proposal to recall Congress? We have a copy of it in the Library in, I believe, Sam Rosenman's files which is unsigned and, of course, it wouldn't have necessarily have been written by him.

EWING: No. I'm sure that it was Clark that told me about it. Whether it was his idea or not I don't know. I knew about it before he made that speech.

FUCHS: Did you ever hear the suggestion that Bernard Baruch had something to do with it?

EWING: Oh, no. I wouldn't think that because he and Mr. Truman didn't get along at all.

FUCHS: Do you know Bernard Baruch?

[314]

EWING: Oh, I know him very well.

FUCHS: Do you recall anything in connection with him in the Truman administration that might be of interest?

EWING: After I became Federal Security Administrator, I know Mr. Baruch came to see me a number of times with various suggestions. I don't recall what they were, I just know he did. What had happened was that when the 1948 campaign started to get under way, I believe the President asked Mr. Baruch to become treasurer of the Democratic National Committee, or at least participate in fund raising, and that Mr. Baruch declined and indicated that he would not be in favor of the President's candidacy. I think the Presidential relations with Mr. Baruch up to that time had been rather friendly. I gathered that the President felt Mr. Baruch's refusal was a slap in the face, and after that Mr. Baruch's approaches were more or less rebuffed by the President.

FUCHS: Did you know of this approach to Mr. Baruch at the time or just from later reading or tales about it?

EWING: No. The President told me about it.

[315]

FUCHS: Did he ask for suggestions for...

EWING: I think Baruch's approaches were after the election. I don't think Mr. Baruch's attitudes changed until after Mr. Truman had been re-elected, and I know the President felt he was trying to get back on the bandwagon again in coming to me and asking me to make certain suggestions to the President.

FUCHS: Did J. Howard McGrath attend many of your meetings, or any?

EWING: Yes, he attended a few and he knew what was going on all the time. He encouraged us in our work.

FUCHS: You had a good relationship with McGrath?

EWING: Oh, it couldn't have been better.

FUCHS: Who did you favor for the vice-presidential nomination in 1948?

EWING: Well, the President talked to me about that. I may have brought the subject up with him, but I know that I discussed it with him, because he was giving real consideration to who would be politically the best person to have

[316]

as a vice-presidential candidate. I would say, about two weeks before the opening of the Democratic National Convention in 1948, he asked a group to come over to the White House on Sunday afternoon and discuss the whole question of who would be the best candidate for Vice President. We sat on the south portico on the second floor that President Truman had had installed. There must have been a dozen or fifteen people there. Senator McGrath, Chief Justice Vinson, Clark Clifford, Oscar Chapman, and quite a few others whose names I do not recall. We sat around for quite awhile discussing various names and got nowhere, there was no consensus. So, the President asked Howard McGrath, as chairman of the Democratic National Committee if he would appoint a committee from out of the group that was present that afternoon to give further study to it and try to come up with a recommendation. When we broke up, I had my car there and I asked Howard if I could give him a lift to his apartment. And he said, "Yes." As soon as we got into the car he said, "Jack, about this committee, I would like you to be chairman of it if you will. But," he added, "I've heard your name urged and, of course, if you're interested in the vice-presidential

[317]

nomination, why, I should not appoint you as chairman of this committee."

And I said, "Well, Howard, forget that. I'm not interested at all."

Then he continued, "Well, then if you'll chairman the committee, why, I'll appreciate it."

Our committee met. I forget who all were on it. Clark Clifford was, I think Oscar Chapman was. I can't recall the others. You see, this was twenty-one years ago. At the outset we put down on a yellow pad the name of every person who might be given consideration, and discussed each person on the list, the pros and cons. When we decided that the person being considered would not do we would strike his name from the list. I have that yellow sheet on which I wrote those

names somewhere in my papers but I've looked for it recently and can't put my hands on it. In any event, we finally eliminated everyone except Mr. Justice William Douglas and Senator Barkley. We finally decided that our first choice was Justice Douglas. The controlling consideration in that decision was our concern about the labor vote and we thought that Mr. Justice Douglas would have more appeal to the labor vote than Senator Barkley.

[318]

FUCHS: Was this decision made in the one meeting? Where was the meeting?

EWING: I don't remember that. I have no recollection of where that meeting was held, but I know I've got that yellow sheet and name after name was stricken off except those two.

FUCHS: You came down to the two in that one meeting?

EWING: There was more than one meeting and then probably we telephoned back and forth between each other, and anyhow when we got all through we had narrowed the choice to those two names. President Truman said he would accept our recommendation and he tried to get in touch with Justice Douglas to ask him to run for Vice President. By this time it was oh, probably the Thursday or Friday before the convention opened. The President found that Mr. Douglas was out in the State of Washington on a hunting trip, and wasn't able to get hold of him until, I think, Friday night. Mr. Douglas said he'd like to think the matter over until the next day. The next morning Mr. Douglas telephoned the President saying that he would prefer to stay on the United States Supreme Court. With Douglas' refusal

[319]

of the nomination the President was perfectly willing to go along with the nomination of Senator Barkley.

The Democratic National Committee gave a dinner in Philadelphia at one of the hotels on the Saturday night before the convention opened. There had been quite a buildup for Senator Barkley for Vice President among his senatorial friends and that movement was led by Leslie Biffle. I remember very well Mr. Biffle accosting me at the dinner as I was walking between tables, and giving me merry hell because our committee had chosen Douglas. He was violent. He didn't know that Douglas had refused. I didn't want to say anything about it until the President had telephoned Barkley asking him to run. Apparently the President had not talked with Barkley by the time of the dinner or at least Biffle didn't know about it. But the whole point of it was that we just stopped doing anything about trying to get the nomination for Douglas.

FUCHS: How did Biffle know that you had decided on Douglas?

EWING: I don't know. He got the word some way. I have no idea how he got it.

FUCHS: How did you mollify Biffle at the time?

[320]

EWING: I didn't mollify him. After he had spoken his piece he went on back to eat. Many of Senator Barkley's colleagues were for him so that when you had President Truman's approval for his nomination, why, there was no problem.

FUCHS: Anything else that stands out in your memory about the convention, perhaps in regard to the civil rights plank, or anything else that occurs to you?

EWING: No, I don't think so.

FUCHS: It's been said that the campaign was aimed largely at four groups: The farmer, the Negro, labor, and consumer. Would you agree with that and did your policy strategy board have anything to do with zeroing in on these

EWING: Well, in a national campaign you've got to direct your efforts at these great, large groups. Political management of a campaign means trying to get just as many under the tent as you possibly can. Even though they may be at completely opposite poles. We had made a real drive at labor that started off with the President's veto of the Taft-Hartley bill.. We made a real

[321]

drive for the Negro vote that started off by the President putting into effect all of the recommendations of the Civil Rights Commission's report that could be done by executive order. The President also recommended legislation to carry out all of the committee's other recommendations that required legislation. We, of course, had the Jewish vote in mind. What we did on that I've described in considerable detail already. There was the farm vote, I've already described how President Truman appealed to them on the things that the 80th Congress had not done. There were various other smaller groups that I don't recall. There were some things that we did in hope of gaining the support of the Mexican vote in the Southern states along the Mexican border. I'm sure the Democratic National Committee had a minority group division. I don't recall specifically anything that they did but I'm sure they were working.

FUCHS: There were two executive orders issued that touched on civil rights but they were not released until after the convention. The first, 9980, was issued July 26, '48 in regard to fair employment practices within the

[322]

Federal establishment and then Executive Order 9981, establishing the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. And it had been charged that these were ready for release before the convention but were held up until after the convention for obviously political purposes. If so, do you know if this is true?

EWING: Well, I know I worked on that executive order relating to the armed services to require complete integration of the armed services. I think I described that to you before.

FUCHS: This was the order establishing the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity.

EWING: You mean in the armed services?

FUCHS: Yes.

EWING: Well, there wouldn't have been two executive orders. That must have been the one on which I worked, but I don't recall that it involved anything but integration. It may have very well. Whenever we got those executive orders in final shape, I think they were issued. I don't

[323]

recall that any of them were withheld.

FUCHS: You don't think that anyone said, "Well, let's wait till after the convention and this will make a good splash or kickoff for the campaign in line with our plank on civil rights."

EWING: No. I don't think so.

FUCHS: What about the finances of the campaign. Did you come into touch with that? Have any remarks about the difficulty or non-difficulty of raising funds? Or Mr. Louis Johnson who was appointed treasurer.

EWING: Well, about my only contact with money raising was that I was asked to make a contribution and I did. Louis Johnson wasn't treasurer that year was he? Well, he might have been. Ed Pauley was the treasurer of the '44 campaign. That's right. Louis Johnson was treasurer in 1948. I remember very well we were pretty hard pressed for money in the 1944 campaign and had accumulated quite a debt. When Roosevelt was re-elected, Ed Pauley sent out telegrams to any number of people who hadn't contributed anything previously in which he asked them to help make up the deficit; and the money

[324]

just poured in.

FUCHS: This was in '44?

EWING: Yes, 1944.

FUCHS: What about in '48, then?

EWING: I really was not in touch with that. I don't know.

FUCHS: How did you originally meet Bernard Baruch?

EWING: I think he just asked for an appointment with me and came in to see me, when I was Federal Security Administrator. I don't think I'd met him before.

FUCHS: Were you acquainted with Louis Johnson?

EWING: Oh, yes. Yes, I had known him for some time. I don't remember when I first met him. He was active in the National Committee before he was treasurer. I think he helped raise money. I'm not just sure who was treasurer before he was but I think he succeeded Ed Pauley. It's a little hard to keep all the change of officers straight in my mind.

[325]

FUCHS: Was there anyone you recall at the time that you felt was dragging his feet in regard to Mr. Truman's candidacy?

EWING: In '48?

FUCHS: Yes, sir.

EWING: There were a few people to whom Mr. Truman had been very good that I thought were dragging their feet. But I'd rather not mention their names.

FUCHS: How did you feel about the press in regard to the party's efforts in '48?

EWING: I don't think the attitude of the press was any different in 1948 from what it is in almost every election. An overwhelming majority of the press usually supports the Republican candidate. That is something we Democrats just have to take in stride. I have always questioned how much influence the press has. I think their influence is inclined to be exaggerated. Voters generally vote emotionally and then they look around for reasons to justify their emotional desires; and to a certain extent I suppose the news media arouses these emotions but do not create

[326]

them. The press may stimulate them but I don't think they change many of them. They stimulate those that are already there rather than change them.

FUCHS: As you know, the 80th Congress became sort of President Truman's "devil" in the '48 campaign. Was this ever brought up as a concrete suggestion or proposal in your policy board meetings, that you recall?

EWING: No, I think that was a thing that originated with Mr. Truman himself. He really made a lot of this issue on his first whistlestop trip to the West Coast, which was before the convention. At that time, of course, the Republicans hadn't chosen their candidate and, since he had to have an antagonist he used the 80th Congress. That was the only Republican record that the President

had to attack. After Governor Dewey was nominated as the Republican candidate for President his campaign was so innocuous, he was floating around in the upper stratosphere most of the campaign and didn't make much of an object for attack. Mr. Truman had found the response to his strategy of attacking the 80th Congress so successful that he continued the attacks throughout the campaign.

[327]

FUCHS: In regard to, one, the Dixiecrat movement and the Henry Wallace challenge, did your policy board have any suggestions how they might best approach these two factors?

EWING: Well, as I recall, as far as the Dixiecrat movement was concerned, we just felt we had to let that take its course. There wasn't much we could do there without going back and retreating from our civil rights positions, and I think we played it down hoping that the normal Democratic majorities in the South would be adequate. Of course, they were not because the Strom Thurmond Dixiecrat ticket did capture a few of those southern states. As to Henry Wallace, we didn't know of anything more than had already been done to attract the labor vote, which was where Mr. Wallace's strength primarily lay. That didn't prove enough in New York; we lost New York, but we felt there was nothing more we could do. But you see, it was the farm vote in the midwest and western states that gave Mr. Truman his majority even with the loss of New York.

FUCHS: What about the itineraries for Mr. Truman's so-called "whistlestop" tours. Did you have anything to

[328]

do with the planning of them?

EWING: Nothing whatever.

FUCHS: Do you recall any specific responses suggested by your board during the course of the campaign to certain things that Mr. Dewey might have said or done?

EWING: I do not recall any. There probably were some but I don't recall any.

FUCHS: Did John Steelman play any part in the campaign that you recall?

EWING: I don't think so. John kept the homefires burning while the rest of us were politicking.

FUCHS: Do you think the Jewish vote came across for Mr. Truman in New York? Of course, as we know, you felt there was nothing more you could do, and the Democrats did lose New York.

EWING: I feel quite confident that Truman got a very heavy percentage of the Jewish vote.

FUCHS: By that time the State of Israel had been created and he had recognised it immediately, and it seems logical

[329]

the Jews would have voted for him although there were still disputes over there.

EWING: I think President Truman lost New York very largely because of the Wallace movement. Wallace had a great deal of support among labor and based his whole campaign largely on appeals to labor. Not all laborers supported him but many did.

FUCHS: What about the role of Gael Sullivan in 1948? Do you recall anything that might add to the story about him?

EWING: Gael I think was executive director of the Democratic National Committee.

FUCHS: I believe that's correct.

EWING: I think he had that title, and Gael was a smart cookie and did his job well. You see, Senator McGrath had his senatorial duties to do and Gael stayed in National Committee headquarters and ran that office. Senator McGrath couldn't possibly attend to all those details.

FUCHS: Did Mr. Sullivan ever meet with your group?

[330]

EWING: No.

FUCHS: What about [John M.] Jack Redding?

EWING: He never met with our group.

FUCHS: You knew him?

EWING: Oh, yes.

FUCHS: In 1947 there is a memo to Mr. Connelly dated December 17th, from the White House papers, which said that you had phoned to say that you had just returned from a trip to the west and had various and sundry things to talk with the President about as soon as you could see him. Do you recall that trip or what you might have been bringing back?

EWING: What's the date?

FUCHS: December 17, 1947.

EWING: Well, I think it was on that trip that I talked first with Jake Arvey about the President's re-nomination.

FUCHS: I just thought it might ring a bell.

EWING: I know that of all the people I talked to on that trip it was from Jake Arvey that I first ran head on into opposition to the President's re-nomination.

FUCHS: There was a letter, on February 2nd, to you from

[331]

Matthew Connelly in which he forwarded a photograph and he said: "...also as a halo seems to be a glistening above your brow, let me contribute this as my memento in connection with your candidacy." And then you replied on February 4 , '48 thanking him for the picture of the President signing the proclamation in regard to juvenile delinquency which he had forwarded to you, and you said, "If you keep kidding me, I am liable to begin to take my alleged candidacy seriously. Wouldn't that be awful!!" What were you kidding about?

EWING: I don't remember.

FUCHS: You don't think that was in connection with the potential vice-presidential candidacy, might have been joshing about at that early date?.

EWING: I don't think so. There was considerable talk about the possibility of my being the Democratic candidate for Governor of New York in '50, and actually there had been talk about it probably before '48. Ed Flynn, who was the undoubted Democratic leader of New York, had publicly stated that he wanted me to be the candidate for Governor in '50. But mention of my name in connection with the

[332]

number of my friends spoke to me about it. I did not take the suggestion seriously but I did decide to speak to Ed Flynn about it. He was undoubtedly the most important Democratic leader in New York State and any New Yorker's candidacy for national office would have to have Flynn's support. When I broached the subject to him, he exclaimed: "For God's sake, Jack, don't allow that to happen. Truman is going to be the worst defeated man who ever ran for President. It will ruin you politically and I want you to be the Democratic candidate for Governor of New York in 1950." After that whenever anyone mentioned my being a possible candidate for Vice President I just pooh-poohed the idea.

FUCHS: You went to New York on a trip with Mr. Truman to speak at a St. Patrick's Day dinner in March of 1948 . Do you have any recollection or anecdotes about that?

[333]

EWING: No, none that I recall.

FUCHS: When did you become confident, if you did, in 1948 that the President was going to be successful in his bid for re-election?

EWING: Well, a couple of months before the election I became confident that he would be re-elected. That was no particular feat of intelligence on my part because I had some pretty sound bases for my prediction. At that time the State of Maine held its state and congressional elections in September. When you put the combined vote of the three Democratic congressional candidates together in both 1946 and 1948 they showed marked increases in the Democratic vote over what it had been in the 1944 election; and if we held that same percentage of gain throughout the country we should have carried the Congress in 1946. But what happened between the 1946 September Maine election and the November elections elsewhere, was the extension of the draft and meat rationing. There was so much opposition to those two things that we lost both Houses of Congress. In 1948 in the Maine election in September, if you put the votes of the three congressional Democratic

[334]

candidates together, it showed a very sharp increase even over 1944. And those were real polls. They were real votes. It wasn't any Gallup poll or anything like that. This was real.

FUCHS: It showed an increase over '46, too?

EWING: Oh, yes, very much over '46. So. I had no hesitancy in feeling that if nothing happened between September and November in 1948, that the President would be re-elected. In 1948 we tried to be very sure that nothing happened between September and November that would upset the applecart. We succeeded in this and Truman was elected.

FUCHS: Did other members of your group share your confidence?

EWING: I really don't know. I'm pretty sure they did. I know India Edwards, who was Vice Chairman of the National Committee and head of the Women's Division, on the basis of the same reasoning, was quite confident that Mr. Truman would be re-elected.

FUCHS: She a good friend of yours?

EWING: Oh, yes.

[335]

FUCHS: Do you feel she played a considerable part in the election?

EWING: Well, it's awfully hard to say, to answer that one way or the other. I think that she contributed as much to Democratic success as any chairman of the Women's Division could. It's awfully hard to say how much a national committee or even a local committee contributes to an

election. Actually, take a county committee, the only two things that a local organization can do to help win an election is to get Democrats registered and get Democrats to the polls on election day. Political organizations change very few votes, it's minimal. It's getting Democrats registered, and getting Democrats to the polls on election day that counts.

FUCHS: Where were you election eve?

EWING: You mean when election returns came in?

FUCHS: Yes. The election night.

EWING: I was at my apartment at the Wardman Park Hotel in Washington. We had a few friends in, and I remember staying up all night. It was daylight before I was sure, absolutely sure that President Truman had been re-elected.

[336]

FUCHS: Who was with you, do you recall? And when did you go see the President next?

EWING: I don't recall. Oh, there were a number of people at the apartment with us. There was a cousin of mine, she was a commander in the Waves, she was there. I think Don Kingsley and his wife were there, and I think John Thurston and his wife. I don't recall who else. I'd say we had a dozen or so people there.

FUCHS: Who brought John Thurston into FSA?

EWING: Don Kingsley brought him in, and then when Don Kingsley resigned John Thurston became the assistant administrator.

FUCHS: There's a memo in the file, dated January 3, 1950 that you were returning from your European trip about January 17th and on January 24th you were going to speak to the National Press Club and were anxious to see the President before you made this speech, and you asked for an appointment. Do you recall that trip and have any idea what you might have wished to take up with the President at this time?

[337]

EWING: I remember the trip, of course, very well and I remember this speech. I couldn't tell you what I said but I remember making it. That was--what was that date?

FUCHS: This trip was in January, 1950. Maybe you had left at the end of '49 but you were coming back on January 17th. I just wondered what that trip was, just a pleasure trip or were you on official business?

EWING: Oh, I'm sure it was official business. I'm trying to think.--I think that was the trip that--well, I made two trips and I can't straighten out in my memory what I did on each.

FUCHS: Well, there was one at the end of the administration when you went to, I believe, Europe and then over to India and various places.

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: That was in 1952 with Wilbur Cohen.

EWING: Yes. Well, then this is the trip that I made at the end of 1949--it was a rather extensive one. I was really trying to find out a lot of things. I went to London, and it was there I tried to find out all I could

[338]

about the British health service; and then we went to Ireland, and then to Scotland, because Scotland had a little different setup on the health service than England. Then I went to Stockholm to learn all I could about the Swedish health service; and from there I went to Switzerland, then to Rome, and then I went on to Israel. Israel had requested that we give them a lot of help on some of the education and welfare problems that they had. The request was such that I really had to know more about the local situation if we were to act on it. I did go out there and it happened that the American Ambassador to Israel at that time was a classmate of mine at Indiana University, James G. McDonald, and he entertained Mrs. Ewing and me. We were guests of his at the embassy. Mr. McDonald gave a dinner in our honor which was attended by the entire Israeli Cabinet. Ben Gurion was there, Mrs. [Golda] Meir, Mr. [Moshe S.] Sharrett, who was Foreign Minister. I don't recall the names of the others but the entire Cabinet was there. This gave me an excellent opportunity to talk to them. Then Mr. McDonald arranged for us to go down to President Weizmann's home at Rehovoth for tea. President Weizmann was very cordial. We had tea and then

[339]

he asked me to go into his study with him. He had had quite a long letter prepared which he wanted me to take to President Truman. He was greatly concerned about the way Egypt and some of the other Arab countries were rearming and--I forget the details. I still have that letter and I'm sure that I asked for that appointment with President Truman in order to deliver President Weizmann's letter to him and also to report to the President other things from other places which I would do verbally.

FUCHS: Is there anything that comes to mind about your speech before the National Press Club?

EWING: No. I don't remember. I think that speech dealt largely with national health insurance and telling what I had learned in other countries about their health services.

FUCHS: Just about a year later in 1951, February, your secretary phoned Mr. Connelly and asked for an appointment for you before the President went to Florida, and said that you had a report ready to make on New York judgeships and also the conversation you had had with

[340]

Governor Fielding Wright of Mississippi. Do you recall anything of that? Incidentally, they put a note on here that you were told to talk to Boyle instead.

EWING: My vague recollection is that the Democratic organization in New York had made a recommendation for a Federal District Judge, to whom there was considerable opposition. I think the Bar Association was opposing the man who had been recommended by the New York Democratic organization and the President or somebody had asked, I can't remember who did, somebody asked me to come up with a new recommendation. I think I recommended Lloyd Garrison if he would accept the judgeship. Mr. Garrison felt he could not accept it for personal reasons. I don't even recall what they were. Fielding Wright, Governor Wright of Mississippi, had come into my office to talk about some Mississippi welfare matters and again I must confess I don't remember details. But I was to be down on the Gulf Coast in Mississippi making a speech. What's that city down there?

FUCHS: Biloxi?

EWING: Biloxi, yes. Governor Wright heard that I would be

[341]

there and he invited me to come up to Jackson and spend the night at the mansion. He very kindly motored to Biloxi to pick me up and we rode back together to Jackson. I spent the night in the mansion and we talked out some of his problems on welfare.

FUCHS: Is there anything you feel I've overlooked about the '48 campaign that we should discuss?

EWING: I don't think so.

FUCHS: The Korean war, of course, coming along in 1950 resulted in a certain amount of upheaval in Government. How did it affect the Federal Security Agency, if in any way?

EWING: Well, I think it would affect our activities in maternal health and child care. We had a lot to do with those matters. Soldiers would go away and leave their wives, often in pretty desperate circumstances. And that was true if their babies were born while their fathers were in service. There were a lot of chores that the Child and Maternal Welfare Section had to do. Its workload increased quite a bit.

FUCHS: What about problems in connection with education?

[342]

EWING: Well, I'm sure there were some. I don't recall them.

FUCHS: Nothing springs to mind?

EWING: No, no.

FUCHS: How did you view Mr. Truman's differences with General MacArthur in the conduct of the war? I don't know if you came into that in any way. Your policy board didn't deal much with warfare, if any?

EWING: Oh, no, we didn't. I quite accidentally got involved, well, really, not involved because I was nothing but a messenger. This was at the time when General MacArthur was driving the North Koreans north towards the Yalu River, which was the boundary between North Korea and Manchuria.

After the battle of Inchon, MacArthur's troops had advanced to the 38th parallel. Advancing further into North Korea raised the possibility of Chinese intervention. After a pause, MacArthur undertook to drive all Communist troops out of North Korea. As his troops advanced up the peninsula the likelihood of intervention by China became more threatening and

[343]

he was repeatedly warned of this danger. All of his answers were to the effect that he was confident from his own intelligence sources that the Chinese were not going to intervene.

Bill Lawrence, who broadcasts now for ABC, at that time was in the *New York Times* Washington bureau. One day he came over to see me and said he had a message that Mr. Sulzberger wanted to be delivered to Mr. Truman and would I be good enough to convey the message. I said, "Why, yes, I would be glad to."

"Well," he said, "Mr. Sulzberger wants the President to know that every source of information that the *New York Times* has in the area of the Korean conflict tells us that the Chinese are going to intervene and that General MacArthur definitely should be prepared for Chinese intervention and should shape his actions with that in view."

When I repeated Mr. Sulzberger's message to the President he exclaimed, "I know that. I'm very much concerned about it. I cabled General MacArthur yesterday telling him virtually what you're telling me and here's the answer that I just got from him."

The President then showed me the telegram from

[344]

MacArthur saying that there was no possibility of the Chinese coming in; that his intelligence all indicated that they had no intention of coming in and then there were words to indicate that he knew the situation better than Washington, in effect saying, "Keep your shirt on. I've got everything under control." Actually, at that very moment the Chinese were already infiltrating over the mountain between MacArthur's two columns. It was within a day or two of when the Chinese struck. And as we know, it would have been a military disaster had not General Matthew Ridgway been put in charge, and it was he who was able to rally the American and other allied troops and contain the attack.

FUCHS: Did you by chance have prior knowledge that MacArthur was going to be dismissed before it appeared in the paper?

EWING: No, I think I knew that the President was considering it, because he was greatly disturbed about the situation, but I don't think I had any actual knowledge that he had decided.

FUCHS: You say there was a proposal that you run for

[345]

Governor of New York. Would you care to say a little about that?

EWING: Well, I don't know that there is much to say. As far back as 1942 Mr. Flynn talked to me about the governorship. He felt that if I were to be a candidate I would need a public build-up. I think it was he who spoke about it to Attorney-General Biddle and when the Justice Department was seeking someone to be a Special Assistant to the Attorney General to prosecute William Dudley Pelley out in Indiana I was given the appointment. In 1947 I was again appointed Special Assistant to prosecute Douglas Chandler for treason. These assignments, plus the fact that I was Vice Chairman of the Democratic National Committee led to my appointment as Federal Security Administrator in August 1947. When I told Mr. Flynn in early 1948 that some of my friends were talking to me about the vice presidency, he heatedly urged me not to consider it, that Truman would be badly defeated and if I were on the ticket with him I would be ruined as a future candidate for Governor of New York for which he wanted me to run in 1950. Later, when the fight for National

[346]

Health Insurance became so hot, I knew Mr. Flynn was opposed to it. Two or three times he came to me and said: "Jack, your fight for National Health Insurance is hurting you politically in New York."

The New York Democratic State Convention in 1950 to nominate candidates for governor and other state offices was held in Rochester. Right up to the time of the convention Mr. Flynn was saying publicly that he wanted me to have the nomination. My good friend Dan O'Connell, the Democratic leader of Albany County had my name presented to the convention but Mr. Flynn saw to it that the nomination went to Congressman Walter Lynch of the Bronx. Years later I received a letter from my good friend, Theodore W. Kheel, giving a sidelight on that situation.

Mr. Kheel is probably the outstanding mediator in labor disputes in the country and at this point I would like to quote part of that letter:

It's...almost ten years...since that eminently astute politician, Ed Flynn, made one of his major mistakes: his failure to support you for the Gubernatorial nomination in 1950. Since this was the first time in my career that I had anything to do with the great man and my experience with him related to that "bloop;" I remember it very clearly. Perhaps I told you about it at the time, but I'm not quite sure. But it's worth noting for

[347]

the record in any event, so here goes.

In the race for the nomination that year, the labor leaders had announced a list of five or six candidates whom they said were acceptable. You were not only on that list but were in fact the number one choice and somehow or other I was designated by the labor fellows to tell Mr. Flynn privately that you ranked in that spot among their preferences. And I did, and then listened as, with the wisdom that had come to him from his years of experience, he explained to me why you wouldn't do. 'Jack's a fine fellow,' he said. (I think he called you Jack, or perhaps it was Oscar--I don't remember that too clearly.) 'But with that medical issue, he just can't be elected.'

This was, I assumed, an observation born of careful study by the old pro. But he continued. 'Why, I was talking to my druggist the other day and he said to me, "Mr. Flynn, if you name that Ewing fellow for Governor, by God we're going to vote against you."' Up to that time I thought it was only amateurs like myself that based political judgments on what the driver of the last cab I was in had to say. Ed Flynn apparently used his druggist.

But there was more. 'Let me tell you the kind of a fellow who would make a perfect candidate,' he said. 'Congressman Walter Lynch. He's got a good voting record. Hasn't stepped on anyone's toes. And everybody likes him. He can't miss.'

The nomination the Democrats made that year is, of course, part of the official record, including Dewey's devastating observation immediately after the nomination was announced: 'Who's Lynch?' he inquired, and that was the end of the campaign.

I regretted the decision of Mr. Flynn all these years both because I'm sure you would have been elected and made a great governor and also because that campaign would have proven that the 'medical

[348]

issue' was the best one the Democrats could possibly have had.

I never held it against Mr. Flynn that he failed to support me for the nomination for Governor in that Rochester convention. A political leader's first responsibility is to win elections by an honorable means. No matter what Mr. Flynn had said to me in the past, if, when it came time for the nomination, he was convinced that I could not be elected and someone else could, it would be his duty to support that other man. I am sure there was nothing personal in Mr. Flynn's decision.

FUCHS: Did you ever run for any office, then?

EWING: No.

FUCHS: Now, on May 31, 1952 Ed Pauley wrote Matthew Connelly and wanted him to pass a letter on to the President that was to the effect that of all of the potential candidates that had been in California assisting the Pat Brown delegation and to carry on their own candidacy--and this is a quote--"Jack Ewing made the most friends and the most progress. They all liked him immensely and the liberal views for which he stands as well as his forthright

[349]

manner. They all regret that his national candidacy had not been more seriously considered up to this time." That referred to what?

EWING: Well, I think some people had suggested me for nomination for President in '52 . And as a matter of fact, my name was presented to the Democratic National Convention. But I didn't cut much of a figure in that. I didn't know Mr. Pauley had written that letter. It's very nice.

Perhaps I ought to explain how my name happened to be put in nomination for President in the 1952 Democratic National Convention. After President Truman had announced that he would not be a candidate for re-election, naturally there was a lot of conjecturing as to who the candidate might be. President Truman had offered Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois, to support him for the nomination, but Governor Stevenson refused the President's offer. Stevenson said he did not want to be President. This was like a slap in the face to Mr. Truman--that any man would seriously decline to be considered for the presidency. Personally, Mr. Truman was a humble man but he had enormous respect for the office of President. Stevenson's attitude left him

[350]

without a candidate. Obviously, he would have more influence on the choice of the person to head the Democratic ticket in 1952 than anyone else. In this situation, a number of men indicated they would like to run. There was Averell Harriman of New York, as well as three southern

Senators, Richard Russell of Georgia, Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, and Robert Kerr of Oklahoma.

In the midst of all this, Joseph E. Davies and I rode home together from some dinner one evening. He had been active for years in Democratic politics and had been American Ambassador to Russia for a time under President Roosevelt. Out of the blue he began urging me to seek the nomination for President. Evidently he had been giving this some thought because he presented a number of arguments why I should do so. The principal one was his belief that National Health Insurance could be made a winning issue. This was, of course, heady wine for me and started me thinking. Then several other friends of mine talked to me along the same lines. These were chiefly members of our little advisory group.

As I thought the matter over I decided to discuss

[351]

the problem with two close and experienced friends--Clark Clifford and Daniel P. O'Connell, the Democratic leader in Albany, New York. (I did not talk with Ed Flynn because he had told me that he felt the health insurance issue was political liability.) Clark was already committed to support Senator Kerr but he strongly advised that my name be presented to the convention because he said the picture was so confused that no one could tell who would be nominated. Clark was very close to President Truman at that time and I got the impression, whether rightly or wrongly, I do not know, that the views he expressed were those of the President.

After my talk with Clark, I went to Albany to discuss the matter with Dan O'Connell for whose political acumen I had great respect. He too felt that the situation with regard to the nomination was so confused that nothing might happen and he would have my name put in nomination by Mayor Erastus Corning of Albany. At the convention Mayor Corning made an extremely nice nominating speech. However, after my talk with Mr. O'Connell the tide began running for Governor Stevenson notwithstanding his reluctant attitude and statements like "Pray let this cup pass." Stevenson was nominated

[352]

and I got a few votes from personal and political friends of mine.

FUCHS: You had a debate, apparently, with Senator Capehart in May of 1952, and a gentleman wrote the White House and said that, "...if the Democratic party is as well equipped with other spellbinders in presenting the facts to the American public, between now and November 3rd, we will have no worries on Tuesday, November 4th, as to which party will be swept into office." Have you recollections of that debate with Senator Capehart?

EWING: I just remember that I had one. I recall no details.

FUCHS: Was this on primarily, National Health Insurance or Social Security or...

EWING: No, I don't know what I talked about, but it was a campaign speech rather than advocating a program.

FUCHS: Yes. Because this was prior to the convention, it being in May of '52.

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: What part did you play in the 1952 convention and

[353]

he proposals for various candidates, and so forth?

EWING: Well, nothing except that my name was presented. I was nominated by Mayor Corning of Albany in New York, and got a few votes, but by the time the convention had come, it was quite certain that Adlai Stevenson would be nominated.

FUCHS: Was your group still operating then?

EWING: I'm not sure when we stopped. I know we stopped when Stevenson was nominated, because he was inclined to disassociate himself from Mr. Truman at that time.

FUCHS: Did you think that wise?

EWING: I don't think it's ever wise. I don't think any man who is taking a nomination can succeed by repudiating his predecessor if his predecessor was of the same party.

FUCHS: Do you recall when you first learned that Mr. Truman would definitely not seek re-election?

EWING: No. I do not recall it. I think my first definite indication I had of it was when the announcement came. I knew he was considering what to do because he could if he desired, run for another term. The constitutional

[354]

ment that limited the President to two terms did not apply to him.

FUCHS: Do you recall him making a statement after the election in 1948 that he would not seek re-election in 1952 when he would be sixty-eight?

EWING: I don't recall that. I know this, that I talked with the President in probably March '52. We were talking politics and about who the Democratic candidate might be. At that time, he very emphatically said he would not support Adlai Stevenson for the nomination.

FUCHS: Who did he favor then?

EWING: He didn't know.

FUCHS: What part did you play then in the '52 campaign?

EWING: Oh, I think I made a lot of speeches but that was all.

FUCHS: At the end of your tenure you and Wilbur Cohen made a trip around the world which was brought under some censure by a particular Representative, H. R. Gross of Iowa. And I was wondering if you recall anything about that?

[355]

: Oh, yes. I was asked to make that trip by the State Department. The reason they asked me to do it was this: The Communists out in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia, had a line of propaganda that was to the effect that the Americans really weren't interested in people as people; that they were only interested in making dollars and Hollywood movies and various things of that kind, and that they were not interested in education or welfare, or things that would help people. The State Department wanted someone to go out there and make talks, particularly to the colleges and schools because that was where the Commies were spreading their propaganda and where it seemed to be having some effect. Secretary Acheson thought that it would be a good idea for me to go and try to combat this propaganda because I headed up the activities of the Federal Government in those fields. So, I went out and the expense of my trip was not charged to the Federal Security Agency at all but to the State Department. I haven't any idea how many speeches I made. I know I made seven in one day, I went to seven different schools and colleges. That was in Tokyo. In Delhi I made several speeches a day, as well as in other places in India. Then,

[356]

I had been invited to speak at an international conference on education in Bombay, so we planned the trip for me to arrive in Bombay at the time I had been asked to speak. Representative Gross--of course, he's a chronic nitpicker--made a speech about this in the House of Representatives and indicated that this was a misuse of Federal funds, and demanded that the Controller General investigate my accounts and disallow the payments. I got a telegram from the Controller General asking me to make a report on the trip. I wired back that when I returned I would be delighted to give him full details which I did when I returned to Washington. The Controller General held that the whole trip and everything about it was entirely proper. So that ended Mr. Gross' diatribes on the subject.

FUCHS: I believe you attended some Cabinet meetings?

EWING: Yes.

FUCHS: What were they like? How did Mr. Truman conduct them?

EWING: Well, I didn't attend many. I was only asked to attend when something was to be discussed by the

[357]

et that was within my bailiwick. I remember one particular Cabinet meeting--and Jim Forrestal refers to it in his memoirs.

In the latter part of January 1948 there was a good deal of public discussion about our military policy and there was a Cabinet meeting on January 30th where the President brought up the matter for discussion. Secretary Forrestal in his memoirs, rather his diary [Walter Millis (ed.) *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 368-69.] has this reference to that meeting of the Cabinet and I'm quoting:

The President invited discussion of universal military training. I said the principal suggestion I had to make was that there be a concentration in the National Military Establishment of responsibility for securing suggestions for embodiment in the legislation from other government agencies. I expressed the hope that there would not be too many of these, because of my feeling that to get any legislation through at this session was going to require steady effort and a good deal of legislative skill. I was particularly gratified to have Oscar Ewing, the Federal Security Administrator, say that he felt that any extraneous action such as social training would weaken the chances for the bill, and that, therefore, they should be excluded. It was his opinion that the bill could only pass on the grounds of being a military necessity. I expressed complete agreement with Mr. Ewing and said I hoped we would not be burdened with any of the kind of suggestions that Mrs. Roosevelt had tried to promulgate several years when the subject first came up--in the field of training in its broad social sense.

[358]

: Very interesting. Any other Cabinet meetings that you recall?

EWING: No. No, I don't.

FUCHS: What about the 1953 transition? Did any problems arise there, do you have any thoughts about that, from the Truman to the Eisenhower administration?

EWING: No. I took that trip around the world to which I have referred and we returned to Washington January 15th, 1953. I had learned of Mrs. Hobby's appointment as Federal Security Administrator by President Eisenhower while I was, I think, in Istanbul. I had sent her a cable offering to cooperate with her in any way I could. When I got back I found a very nice note, but that was about all. I then sent to the President my resignation as Federal Security Administrator effective on the termination of President Truman's term and received an extremely nice letter from him regarding my services. If I may I would like to put the text of that letter in this recording at this point.

The White House
Washington

[359]

January 19 , 1953

Dear Jack:

In accepting your resignation as Federal Security Administrator, effective January twentieth, I want to express my appreciation for your devotion to public service and your contributions to the cause of health, education and security.

Your administration not only has been dedicated to the highest ideals of democratic process; it also has been marked by practical contributions to good government. You have taken the initiative in promoting efficiency and economy throughout your Agency and have blazed a new trail in regional organization to improve your services.

In the past five years, the departmental stature of the Federal Security Agency has been repeatedly demonstrated. If the departmental name is still to come, you and I have the satisfaction of having laid the foundation.

In the past three years, social security has moved far toward the goal for which it was enacted eighteen years ago. Millions more now have the benefit of its insurance protection, and this protection has been increased. Meanwhile, there has been a gradual and healthy reduction in the number needing help under public assistance provisions and some increase [sic] in their payments. In education, Federal aid to schools in areas overburdened by Federal activity at least has helped these communities to meet some of their worst emergencies. Meantime people everywhere have been alerted to the school crisis confronting their own children. Public health and related services have made marked advances in medical research, control of chronic diseases, hospital construction, and rehabilitation of the disabled. You have performed a real service in strengthening food standards and in directing enforcement of the law against dangerous drugs--a job which has become doubly necessary in the current welter of

[360]

scientific developments, both harmful and beneficent.

One of your special personal contributions has been in identifying what still needs doing--as, for example, in the continuing movement to solve the problem of the cost of medical care. We are all indebted to you for your insistent reminders that the job is far from done--for children, for the aged, for the disabled, and for us all.

I know that you will find satisfaction in the assurance that you have fought the good fight, along with all of those who believe that the strength of the Nation lies not only in its armaments but still more in its citizens.

You have my best wishes.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) Harry S. Truman

FUCHS: You also, as sort of a capstone, received several awards for your public service. Do you care to mention those?

EWING: Well, I received the Sidney Hillman 1950 award for meritorious public service. And then I later received the Philip Murray award in 1953. There were various others.

FUCHS: You received two awards, then, named after very prominent labor leaders.

EWING: Yes.

[361]

FUCHS: And then, finally, Medicare or national health insurance of sorts was passed under the administration of President Johnson. Do you care to say something about that?

EWING: Well, by the time Mr. Johnson became President he supported Medicare very strongly. The proposed legislation embodying Medicare had been considered by the Ways and Means Committee in the House and the Finance Committee in the Senate. These Committees had made some excellent improvements in the bill and when it finally passed both Houses it was a much better bill than the one I had originally proposed in 1952. It was more comprehensive and did a better job. President Johnson was very gracious about one thing. In view of President Truman's having, in his administration, been the sparkplug that brought about the first introduction of the legislation, President Johnson went clear out to Independence, Missouri to sign the bill in the presence of former President Truman; and President Johnson asked me to accompany him on the trip.

FUCHS: Did you have a conversation with Mr. Truman on that occasion?

[362]

EWING: Well, I just went down the line with the others, and he got up and put his arms around me and he couldn't have been more cordial; so was Mrs. Truman. But I had no time for any words. It was a long line .

FUCHS: You say that you did speak in 1952 on behalf of Adlai Stevenson.

EWING: Oh, yes.

FUCHS: Did these requests for you to speak come through his headquarters or the Democratic National Committee in Washington?

EWING: It would be a request from the National Committee probably. It might be that a request for me to make a talk had come to the National Committee and they would ask me to take the assignment.

FUCHS: What about Samuel Rosenman. Did you have any relationship with him at some time?

EWING: Nothing except that we were very good friends. I had a great admiration for Sam, for his ability, and for him as a person.

FUCHS: What was the situation in regard to national health

[363]

insurance under President Kennedy in his short tenure? Did you know President Kennedy?

EWING: Oh, yes. Actually I had known President Kennedy since he was a little boy because the Kennedy family lived for a time in Riverdale, New York and that was quite close to my home there. My older son and Jack were classmates in the Riverdale country school. I didn't know him well, I merely knew him as a boyfriend of my older son. But, actually, Jim, my older son, had kept in touch with Jack. I don't recall having seen Jack when he was in the House, but I saw him a number of times when he was in the Senate, and after he was President, I saw him once. Governor Sanford of North Carolina and I had an appointment with him.

FUCHS: Do you recall what that was about?

EWING: Yes, it was about getting the Environmental Health Center located in the Research Triangle in North Carolina.

FUCHS: You wanted it located here?

EWING: Yes. It was to be one of the institutes of the Public Health Service. Governor Sanford had asked me

[364]

if I would help him in his endeavors to get it located in the Research Triangle; and I told him I would be delighted to give him any assistance I could. I made several trips to Washington and talked with the Public Health Service people about it. At first they were very anxious to have the Center located in Washington and, of course, we wanted it in the Research Triangle. I was completely convinced that Washington was one of the last places that the Center should be

located. One of the reasons for urging the Research Triangle location was that if there were a nuclear attack on this country it would be very important that there be an environmental health organization functioning to help solve problems that could not possibly have been foreseen. To have an organization functioning that could perhaps find solutions for some immediate unforeseen problems might save many thousands of lives. If there were a nuclear war you know perfectly well that Washington would be much higher on the target list of the enemy than Chapel Hill or the Research Triangle. Finally, the Johnson administration, through Larry O'Brien, got Congress to put a provision in the bill to the effect that the Center had to be located at least

[365]

fifty miles from the District of Columbia. That necessitated the Public Health Service re-appraising the problem of location, and they came up with a strong recommendation for the Research Triangle. I'm sure they are very happy with that decision.

FUCHS: It has been located here?

EWING: Oh, yes.

FUCHS: Just what is the Research Triangle?

EWING: The Research Triangle is a body of land that lies in about the center of a triangle consisting of the University of North Carolina of Chapel Hill, Duke University of Durham, North Carolina, and North Carolina State University at Raleigh. It's a body of about five thousand acres of land. They don't permit any manufacturing there, it's exclusively for research. All of the plants in the Triangle are engaged exclusively in research. Some of America's great corporations have research facilities in the Triangle. IBM has a big research center there, and also Celanese Corporation, Hercules, and others. Although the park has only been going about ten years, it's second in size in the

[366]

United States and is second in the number of scientists that are employed.

FUCHS: Now is this--are these research institutions taxable?

EWING: Oh, yes. Well, what happens is, take IBM, they come in and buy land. They've got about four hundred acres of land, and, of course, from then on their operation is subject to local real estate taxes and other local taxes. They're just like any other factory. Now the Research Triangle Foundation, which accumulated this land, and is selling it off, liquidating it, is not taxable for the simple reason that if they make any money or any profits at all it goes to the three universities. The foundation is a non-profit organization.

FUCHS: What was the purpose of setting up such a park? Provide jobs in the area aid a tax base or just what?

EWING: No, back in the middle 1950s some of the leaders in North Carolina were greatly concerned over the facts that the state's economy was based on industries--chiefly tobacco and furniture--that were not moving

[367]

forward. The state's industry was not involved in the new electronics technology, or polymers or any of those things. A professor at the University of North Carolina came up with the idea that the way to attract industry to an area was to encourage topnotch research concerns to establish themselves in that area and that production facilities would follow research into the area. Also, it was believed that research activities would be attracted to an area where they would have access to universities. This furnishes researchers with a backstop for their own activities. This was proved true. Very definitely, the Research Triangle has been a great success. You know, a company like IBM wouldn't come to the Triangle if they didn't think it was an advantageous location. Hercules has recently completed a research plant here. I keep saying here, but I mean in the Research Triangle. I happen to be a Director of the Research Triangle Foundation and a member of its Executive Committee.

I'm also a member of the Research Triangle Regional Planning Commission. That is a planning commission for the three counties: Wake County where Raleigh is located; Durham County where Durham is located, and Orange County

[368]

where Chapel Hill is located. our Commission can only recommend to a city council and the board of aldermen of these cities and to the county commissioners, any one or more, of the three counties that they do this or that. These municipal legislative bodies decide for themselves on any action that may be taken. But it's worked out very well because the mayors of each of the three cities are members of our commission. There's another member of the commission who has been chosen by the cities to represent them and we also have the chairmen of each board of county commissioners as well as another member of each board of county commissioners or a representative of them. Then there are three members at large who are appointed by the Governor. That's the source of my membership. I was chairman of the commissioners for four years. The original concept was that the chairmanship should be rotated every year but the Commission was good enough to ask me to serve for a longer time.

FUCHS: Is there compensation connected with these positions?

EWING: No, none. None whatever, for either position.

FUCHS: Did your connection with this have something to do

[369]

with your coming to Chapel Hill?

EWING: No. This all happened after I came to Chapel Hill. Mrs. Ewing and I came down here, because we felt that we ought to get away from New York City. Personally, I was very fond of New York City and still am, but the noise and dirt got so bad we could not take it any longer. I had retired when I got out of office in January of 1953.

FUCHS: You didn't go back to law practice after January 1953?

EWING: No. Mrs. Ewing and I discussed where we might go. She wanted to go to San Francisco because she loves San Francisco, and I like it very much; but my two sons were in the East and I didn't want to be quite that far away from them. I wanted to be far enough away so that we didn't get into each other's hair, but be near enough so if any emergency came up we could get together quickly.

FUCHS: Where are they located?

EWING: The older son, James, is in Keene, New Hampshire.

[370]

He and his partner publish three papers in New Hampshire.

My younger son, George, is located in Canandaigua, New York, and he has the local paper there. Both boys became newspapermen and neither had any interest in law. I had always felt that I wanted to live in a college town when I retired because there is always a lot of intellectual activity around. We finally settled on either Charlottesville or Chapel Hill. Then I finally decided that I didn't want to live in the same state with Harry Byrd, so we came to Chapel Hill.

FUCHS: Did anyone influence you in coming here or was it just a selection of yours?

EWING: No, I knew it was very attractive, and it was a liberal university, and the town itself appealed to me very much. There's no industry here at all. The only industry is the university, and the servicing of the university, so it makes it a very attractive community.

FUCHS: Your son, Jim, I believe you said, sat in on some of the meetings of your...

EWING: No, it was George.

FUCHS: Oh, George, your younger son.

[371]

EWING: Yes. He was in Washington most of the time I was there and I just asked him to sit in with us.

FUCHS: Did he participate?

EWING: No. No.

FUCHS: I heard a story that Cole Porter was a classmate of yours at Harvard.

EWING: No. He was a classmate of Paul McNutt's; and at Harvard one of the professors was named "Bull" Warren. He was a little overweight, had a big, thick neck, red faced--but he just scared the life out of his students. On the first day that he met a first year class he'd say, "Now, gentlemen, would you turn and look at the gentleman on your right. Now, would you turn and look at the gentleman on your left. One of you three will not be here next year." And he really put the fear of the Lord in your heart.

FUCHS: You had him for a professor?

EWING: Well, I'd had him in my first year at law school.

FUCHS: Yes.

EWING: So, as Paul McNutt related it to me, he and Cole

[372]

Porter were attending a class in Property I which Professor Warren taught. That particular day Professor Warren called on Cole to give the syllabus of one of the cases that was in the textbook and Cole wasn't prepared. So, he didn't make a very good presentation at all and it irritated Warren very much. Finally Warren leaned over his desk and said in a very supercilious way, "Mr. Porter, why don't you give up the law and play the fiddle."

And Cole Porter got up out of his seat right then and walked out of the room and never went back to the law school. But he didn't do so badly.

FUCHS: I did sort of get off the track when I asked you about progress towards national health insurance under Kennedy. Did you have any reflections upon that?

EWING: No. I don't recall any particular efforts that were made during his administration. I have no doubts that bills were introduced because by that time a Senior Citizen's Council was becoming a political force. They didn't become really strong until President Johnson's administration.

FUCHS: I only have one remaining question and that's how

[373]

did you get your nickname "Jack?"

EWING: Well, my father's favorite uncle was named Andrew Jackson Ewing, and when I was on the way into this world my father and mother decided that if the child were a boy they would

name him Andrew Jackson Ewing. About a month before I was born a cousin of mine, who was a lad about eighteen years old and a great favorite in the family, died. His mother, who was more or less a major domo of the Ewing family, was very insistent that his name be carried on and that I have that burden. So, I was named Oscar for this dead cousin. My middle name, Ross, was my mother's maiden name. So that's how I got my name; but father from the day I was born called me Jack and all my friends call me that. I never liked the name Oscar, and when I first went to Indiana University I thought seriously of using only the name Ross Ewing. But I didn't do it and I've managed to bear my burden.

FUCHS: Very well. Anything that you can think of that I've overlooked? I'm sure there's much but...

EWING: Oh, I think you've done an excellent job in your inquisition.

[374]

FUCHS: Thank you very much, sir. I certainly appreciate it and have enjoyed it.

[375]

INDEX

Acheson, Dean, 134, 355
Africa, 134
Aging, Conference on, 230-231
Agriculture, Department of, 199
Akron, Ohio, 122
Alaska, 246

Albany County, New York, 346, 353
 Albany, New York, 351
 Alcoa (Aluminum Company of America), 86-90, 115, 142, 239-240
 Alexander, Paul, 24
 Allen, George E., 164-165
 Allenby, Edmund Henry, 276, 277
 Altmeyer, Arthur, 174, 176, 187, 208, 209, 220-221
 Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), 86-90, 115, 142, 239-240
 Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America , 194
 American Broadcasting Corporation, 343
 American Civil Liberties League, 32
 American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 191
 American Legion, 74
 American Medical Association (AMA), 173, 181, 184, 189, 192 , 197, 213, 217, 223, 251
 attempts to raise money, 177-178
 National Health Insurance, opposition to, 213-214, 223
 Whitaker and Baxter, as public relations representatives; for, 225
 American Patients Association, 193, 194
 Anderson, Albert, 35-37
 "Annals of North Carolina", 4
 Anslinger, Harry, 61, 63, 66, 71, 72-73
 Arkansas, 214
 Arvey Jacob M., 226, 267, 330
 Asheville, North Carolina, 93
 Austin, Warren, 274, 275, 295
 Austria, 154

 Baldwin, Roger, 32
 Balfour Declaration, 275
 Bangkok Conference, 68-73
 Bangkok, Thailand, 68-69
 Barkee, David Rankin, 244
 Barkley, Alben, 168, 317, 319-320

 [376]

 Barnes, Vera, 101
 Baruch, Bernard, 324
 Truman, Harry S., relationship with, 313-315
 Bath County, Kentucky, 3, 5, 6
 Batt, William, Jr., 271-272, 273
 Bell, David, 163, 306
 Benson, Ezra Taft, 99
 Benton, Elmer, 98
 Berlin, Germany, 154
 Bernadotte plan, 282, 283, 285, 286

Best, Robert, 152-153
Beta Theta Pi, 8
Biddle, Francis, 87, 93, 116, 149-150, 151, 152, 345
Biffle, Leslie, 168, 319-320
Biloxi, Mississippi, 340-341
Biltmore Hotel (NYC), 68, 84, 85, 91, 285-286, 287
Birkhead, Kenny, 272
Bismark, Otto Eduard Leopold Von, 175
Black Hills in South Dakota, 42
Blue Cross, 214
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 215
Blue Sky Law, (North Carolina), 93
Bolsheviks, 38
Bombay, India, 356
Boone, Daniel, 4
Boone, Squire, 4
Boston, Massachusetts, 157, 158, 209
Boyle, Bill (William), 165-166
Brannan, Charles, 127, 132, 269
Bray, William J., 312
Brewster, Owen, 22
Brightman, Sam, 312
British Health Service, 222-223, 248, 338
Bronx, New York, 346
Brooks Brothers, 12
Brookville, Indiana, 6
Brown Shirts, 93
Bruce, Herbert, 123, 124
Bryan, William Jennings, 17
Budget, Bureau of, 232, 233
Bunche, Ralph, 282, 290
Bundy, Harvey, 70, 72
Bundy, McGeorge, 70
Bundy, William, 70
Bureau of the Budget, 232, 233
Bureau of Employment Security, 258

[377]

Burgoyne, John, 4
Burroughs, Danny, 123
Byrnes, James F., 103, 111-112

Caldwell, John C., 61, 62, 65, 66
 Bangkok Conference, efforts to stop his influence at, 68-73
California Medical Association, 179

Cambridge, Massachusetts, 11, 13
Camden, South Carolina, 4
Canada, 43
Canandaigua, New York, 370
Cancer Institute, 202
Capehart, Homer, 352
Carlton Hotel (Washington, D.C.), 143, 143
Carter, J. Franklin, 311
Castle, William, 71, 72
Cecil County, Maryland, 1, 2
Celanese Corporation, 365
Chandler, Douglas, 148, 167, 345
 background of, 154
 prosecuted for treason, 148-162
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 368-369, 370
Chapman, Oscar, 164, 270-271, 316
Charleston, South Carolina, 4
Chester County, Pennsylvania, 3
Chicago, Illinois, 110, 122, 266
Child and Maternal Welfare Section of the Federal Security Agency, 341
"Children's Act of 1949", 232
Children's Bureau, 243-244
China, 67
 Korea, intervention in, 342-344
Choate Club, 12
Cincinnati, Ohio, 5, 6
Civil Rights, 274, 309, 321
 Truman, Harry S., and, 132-134
Civil Rights Commission, 132, 321
Civil Rights Plank, in the Democratic convention platform of 1948, 303-304
Clapper, Ray(mond), 76
Clark, Ramsey, 116
Clark, Tom, 116, 147-148, 151, 164
Clifford, Clark, 119, 127, 140, 141, 143-144, 305, 306, 310, 313, 316, 351
 Ewing, Oscar, attends meetings at the apartment of, 129, 131, 132
 Israel, problems involved with, 283, 285-295
Cohen, Wilbur, 187, 220, 337, 354

[378]

Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 42
Committee for the Nation's Health, 175, 217
Confederate Army, 18
Congress, 269, 326
 Eightieth, recall of, 313
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 191

Congressional election of 1946, 119, 120

Congressional Record, 23

Connelly, Matthew, 119, 129-130, 330, 331, 332, 339, 348

Connorton, John, 216-217

Comptroller General of the United States, 356

Cornell University, 46

Corning, Erastus, 351, 353

Cotton, Joseph P., 61

Cowpens, South Carolina, 5

Coy, Wayne, 74, 80, 90

Cravath and Henderson, 34

Cruikshank, Nelson, 191, 221, 222

Current Biography, 256

Custer, George, 42, 43

Daniels, Jonathan, 311

Daughters of the American Revolution, 214

Davidson, C. Girard, 127

Davies, Joseph E., 350

Davis, Arthur V., 88, 91

Davis, Michael, 219

Dead Sea, 281

Decatur County, Indiana, 3, 5, 6, 13-14

Deleveyne, Malcolm, 59, 62

Delhi, India, 355

Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 99, 102

Democratic National Committee, 91, 92, 95, 97-98, 115, 117, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 128, 145, 165, 167, 266, 271-273, 312, 314, 316, 329, 362

Ewing, Oscar, assistant chairperson, of:

Appointed, 81-82, 95, 98

resigns from, 90, 91, 97-98

work as, 26, 84, 90, 128

headquarters of, 84-85

Democratic National Convention, 1904, 18

Democratic National Convention, 1944, 102

Mississippi delegation, 105

South Carolina delegation, 104

Truman, Harry S.; Attempts to nominate him for Vice President, 105-107

[379]

Vice President, contenders for the nomination at, 104, 105-107, 108-113

Democratic National Convention, 1948, 302-304

Civil rights plank at, 303-304

Democratic Convention, 1952, 352-353

Democratic Political Strategy Board, 268, 271

Dennis, Helen E., 29
Dennis, Jim, (James), 12
Dental Institute, 202
Depew, Chauncey, 55
Des Moines, Iowa, 234
Detroit, Michigan, 122, 124
Dewey, Thomas E., 77, 273, 274, 326, 328, 347
Dexter, Iowa, 268
Dingell, John, 196
Disalle, Mike, 23
Dixiecrats, 327
"Dr. Fishbein's Diary", 221, 222
Douglas, David, 5
Douglas, William O., 103, 110, 317, 318-319
Dubinsky, David, 212
Duke University Hospital, 200
Durham County, North Carolina, 367

Early, Stephen, 117, 118, 121-122
Education, Office of , 245
 library of, attempts to move the, 233-234

Edelman, John, 192

Edwards, India, 334-335
Elder, Bowman, 75
Egypt, 281, 339
Eightieth Congress, 269, 313, 326
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 81, 358
 Truman, Harry S., relationship, 300-301

Elliott, Martha, 244

Elsey, George M., 163, 305
Employment Security, Bureau of, 258
Epstein, William, 290
"Equal Chance for Health", 211
Equitable Building (NYC), 64
Ewing, Andrew Jackson, 373
Ewing, George M, 1, 370
Ewing, James, 10
Ewing, Jane McClellan, 2, 3
Ewing, Joshua, 1-2
Ewing, Lydia Morgan, 3, 4, 5
Ewing, Nathaniel, 2
Ewing, Patrick, 2, 3, 5
Ewing, Putnam, 2, 3
Ewing, William, 1

Ewing, Oscar, 182, 239, 240

Aluminum Company of America, does the legal work for, 86-90, 91

Army, joins, 29-30, 32-33

background of, 1-7

Bangkok Conference, stops the influence of John C. Caldwell at, 63-73

Bryan, William Jennings, gives speech for, 17

Caldwell, John C., stops his influence at the Bangkok Conference, 68-73

Chandler, Douglas, prosecuted for treason, 148-162

Democratic County Committee in Decatur County, elected secretary of, 18-19

Democratic National Committee, as Vice Chairman of:

appointed, 81-82, 95, 98

resigns, 90-91, 97-98

works as, 26, 84, 90, 128

Dennis, Helen E., marries, 29

family background of, 1-7

Federal Security Administrator, 23, 25, 27, 118, 145-146, 147-148, 167, 168, 172

fluoridation of water, a discussion of the opposition to, 237-243

Flynn, Ed, failure to support for Governor of New York , 345-348

Harvard Law School, attends, 10-15, 20, 22, 27

Hillman, Sidney, awarded the meritorious public service award named in honor of, 360

Hughes, Charles Evans, Sr., relationship with, 51-54

Hughes, Schurman and Dwight, cases handled as a lawyer for:

a discussion of , 35-45

Kruger, Ivan case, 37-41

Sioux Indians vs. the U. S. Government , 41-45

Indiana Bar, admitted to, 13

Indiana University, attends, 8-9, 10, 11, 20-21

Israel:

a discussion of the problems involved in the recognition of, 274-300

visits, 338-339

Kruger, Ivan, handles law case for, 37-41

Law School, attends Harvard, 10-15, 20, 22, 27

McNutt, Paul, supports as a candidate for the Democratic nomination for President, 74-77, 78-79

Meetings held at the apartment of, 131, 135-137, 139-140, 142-143, 163-164

civil rights recommendations made at, 132-134

function of, 137-138

memorandum of November 19, 1947, 140-142

people attending, 127, 129, 130-131

Ewing, Oscar (continued)

- Meetings held at the apartment of (continued)

 - reasons for creating 119-127

 - topics discussed, 143

- Minnesota, negotiating political divisions in, 98-103

- Murray, Philip, receives award in honor of, 360

- naming of, (nickname "Jack"), 372-373

- narcotics conference in Geneva, Switzerland, efforts to achieve international controls at, 57-66

 - national health insurance, a discussion of, 173-198

- National Urban League, speech to, 309

- New York:

 - desire to move to, 33-34

 - Governor of, mentioned as a possible candidate for, 331-332, 344-348

- Pelley, William Dudley, prosecution for Sedition, 93-98

 - philosophy, as a student of, 9-10

- Pittsburg, moved to, 29

- Presidential campaign, 1944, activities during, 114

- Presidential campaign, 1948, serves on committee to nominate individuals for the office of Vice President, 316-319

- Presidential campaign, 1952, suggested for nomination in, 349-352

- probation officer of the Juvenile Court, does voluntary work for in Indianapolis, 30-32

- prosecuting attorney, asked to be, 14, 19

- research triangle, discusses the origins of, 364-369

- St. Louis, Missouri, moves to, 29

- Studebaker, John W. made charges against, 236-237

- Taft, Robert, relationship with , 22-26, 27

- Thayer, Ezra Ripley, relationship, 13, 14-16

- trips abroad, 337-338, 354-356

- Truman, Harry S.:

 - cabinet meetings of, attends, 356-368

 - convinced of the re-election of , 333-334

 - efforts to stop opposition to, by Democrats during the 1948 Presidential election, 266-268

 - letter to, 358-360

- University of Iowa Law School, teaches at, 27

- Whitcomb, Dowden, and Stout, clerks for, 28

Ewing, Mrs. Oscar (Helen), 52, 68, 91, 118, 135, 199-200, 201, 338, 369, 370

Executive Order 9980, 321-323

Executive Order 9981, 321-323

[382]

Farley, James, 82, 83

Falk, Isadore, 183, 220

Farmer's issues in the 1948 election, 269-270
 Federal Aid to Education, 243
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 96, 151
 Federal Fair Employment Committee, 321-323
 Federal Food and Drug Administration, 199, 233
 Federal Security Administrator, 23, 25, 27, 118, 132, 145-146, 147-148, 161, 167, 168, 172, 179, 192, 194, 229, 238, 314, 345, 358, 359
 Federal Security Agency, 128, 129, 142, 147, 167, 168, 177, 183, 196, 198, 229, 232, 234, 244, 246, 250, 280, 308, 341, 355
 bureaus of , 199, 208-209
 Finance Committee of the Senate, 361
 First International Opium Conference at The Hague, 1911, 67
 Fishbein, Morris, 185, 189, 191, 221, 222-223
 Florida, 120, 339
 Fluoridation of water, opposition to, 237-243
 Flynn, Ed, 82, 83-84, 92, 98, 121-122, 145, 331
 Ewing, Oscar, fails to support for Governor of New York, 345-348
 Food and Drug Administration, 199, 233
 Forand, Aimee, 193, 195, 196, 224
 Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris, (Oct. 1948), 283
 Forrestal, James, 133, 134, 135, 357
The Forrestal Diaries, 357
 France, 58
 Freedman's Hospital, 251
 Freeman, Orville, 100

Gallinger Hospital, Negro doctors at, 250-257
 Gallup poll, 334
 Garrison, Lloyd, 340
 Gates, Horatio, 4
 Geneva, Switzerland, 244
 Narcotics Control Conference held in, 57-66, 67, 71
 George VI, 248
 George Washington University Medical School, 252
 Georgetown University Medical School, 252, 253-254
 Georgia, 350
 Germany, 46, 55, 58, 156, 158, 160, 175
 Goebbels, Josef, 155, 160
 Gorman, 180-181, 182-183, 230
 Graham, Wallace, 208, 210
 Grand Central Station, 124

[383]

Great Britain 48, 69, 71, 72, 86, 87, 276, 278-279, 297
 Health Service of, 222-223, 248, 338

Great Sioux Reservation, 42
Green, Constance, 256-257
Greene, Nathaniel, 5
Greensburg, Indiana, 1, 5, 7, 10, 13, 18, 19, 33, 34, 262
Gross, H. R., 354, 356

The Hague, 67
Hague, Frank, 114, 266, 267, 268
Hannegan, Robert E., 103, 104, 105, 107, 120, 145, 148, 164, 167
 Democratic National Convention, 1944, involvement at, 108-111
Harlem, New York, 122, 123, 127, 137
Harper, Fowler, 74-75
Harriman, Averell, 350
Harvard, 10-15, 20, 22, 27, 69, 70, 371
Harvard Law Review, 22, 69, 70
Hassett, William, 210
Health Conference, 179
Health, Education and Security, Department of, proposed, 173
Health, Education, and Welfare Department, 209
Health Information Foundation, 186
Health Institute, 202
Hearst newspaper chain, 71, 72, 86
Hearst, William Randolph, Jr., 217, 218-219, 220-221, 264
Henderson, Loy, 296
Hercules Corporation, 365, 367
Hill-Burton Hospital Construction Act, 197-198, 216
Hilleboe, Herman E., 242
Hillman, Sidney, 110, 111, 212, 240
Hitler, 93, 94, 155, 175
Hoerber, Johannes, 272
Hobby, Oveta Culp, 192, 358
Hoover, Herbert, 62, 71, 72
Hopkins, Harry, 80, 88, 89, 90
House Appropriations Committee, 214
House Banking Committee, 83
House Ways and Means Committee, 361
Howard University, efforts to train more Negro doctors, 250-257
Hughes, Charles Evans, Sr., 34, 35-37, 44, 46, 87, 171
 Ewing, Oscar, relationship, 51-54
 raconteur, as a, 54
Hughes, Charles Evans, Jr., 22, 26
Hughes, Hubbard and Ewing, 26, 87, 118, 239
Hughes, Rounds, Schurman and Dwight, 52
Hughes, Shurman; and Dwight, 34-35, 46
Humphrey, Hubert, 100, 269-270, 303, 304

Ickes, Harold, 87, 235
Immigration, Commissioner of, 146
Inchon, Korea, 342
Independence, Missouri, 361

[384]

India, 278
Indian Affairs, Commissioner of, 42
Indian Claims Commission, 45-46
Indiana, 95-101
 welfare records, inspection for the state of, 259-261, 262-263
 Indiana University, 8-9, 10, 11, 20-21
Indianapolis, Indiana, 28, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 74, 93, 94, 96, 149
Indianapolis *News*, 260, 261
Indianapolis *Star*, 260, 261
Interior Department, 44, 199, 234, 235
Internal Revenue, Bureau of, 241
International Business Machines, 365, 366
International Opium Conference, of.1911, 67
International Refugee Organization, 264
Iowa, 354
Israel, 328, 338
 recognition of the problems involved in, 274-300
Istanbul, Turkey, 358
Italy, 58, 134-135

Jackson, Andrew, 17
Jackson, Clarence, 74
Jackson, Samuel, 112
Japan, 58, 64, 65
Jenner, William, 261, 262
Jersey City, New Jersey, 117
Jewett, Charles, 28
Jewish Agency for Palestine, 280, 299
Jewish vote in the 1948 Presidential election, 328
Johnson, Louis, 323-324
Johnson, Lyndon, 116, 361, 364, 372
Johnson, Mordecai, 251, 257
Jordan, 277
Justice, Department of, 94, 96, 155, 214

Kaiser, Henry, 103
Keene, New Hampshire, 369
Kefauver, Estes, 350
Kelm, Elmer, 99, 100

Kem, Jim, 22
Kempner, Walker, 200-203
Kennedy, John F., 363

[385]

Kerr, Robert, 196, 197, 350, 351
Keyserling, Leon, 127
Kheel, Theodore, 346
Kingsley, J. Donald, 119, 127-129, 130, 180, 245, 264, 336
Kingsley letter, 127-128
Kingston, New York, 238, 240, 242
Kirchwey, Freda, 283, 288, 292
Klots, Allen, 69-70, 72
Korean War, 341-344
Krock, Arthur, 140
Kruger, Ivar, 37-41, 47, 51
Kruger and Toll, 38

Labor, Department of, 209, 258
Ladies Home Journal, 11
La Guardia, Fiorello, 124-125, 126
Landon, Alf, 77
Lasker, Albert, 227, 276, 293
Lasker, Mary, 227, 228-229, 230
Laski, Harold J., 240
Lawrence, Dave, 113
Lawrence, William (Bill), 343
League of Nations, 59, 275, 279
Lebanon, 277
Lenroot, Katherine, 244
Lewis, John L., 35, 36
Lindbergh, Charles, 97
Little Big Horn River, 43
Lloyd, David, 163, 305
London, England, 71
London Health Conference 1948, 248
Londonderry, Ireland, 1
Los Angeles, California, 181
Lovett, Robert A., 288, 291
Lowenthal, Max, 276, 297
Lynch, Walter, 346, 347

Mac Arthur, Douglas and the Korean War, 342-344
McCarthy, Joseph, 236
McClellan, George B., 2, 3

McClellan) Jane, 2
McCormick, John, 138
McDonald., James G., 338
McGrath, J. Howard, 245-246, 266, 267, 271, 315, 316, 329
McHale, Frank, 74, 75
McIntire, Ross, 117, 118

[386]

McNutt, Paul, 21, 82, 146, 246-247, 371
 Federal Security Administrator, as, 79-80
 Philippines:
 Ambassador to, Appointed, 81
 High Commissioner of, Appointed, 80
 President, as a candidate for the Democratic nomination, 74-77, 78-79
Madison Square Garden, 117, 285, 287
Magnuson Committee, 230
Magnuson, Paul, 227, 229, 230
Maine, 333-334
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works of St. Louis, 57
Manchuria, 342
Marseilles, France, 71
Marshall, George, 280, 295, 296
 Israel, involvement in the recognition of, 283-299
Martin, Joe, 78
Meany, George, 213
Medical Society of Muncie, Indiana, 248
Medicare, 193, 194, 196, 224, 361
Meir, Golda, 338
Memorandum of November 19, 1947, 140-142
Merck and Company, Inc, 57
Michelson, Charlie, 85-86, 122
Miller, A. L., 239, 240
Miller, Watson, 146-147, 149
Minnesota, political division in, 98-103
Mississippi, 340
 Democratic National Convention, the Delegation to, 105
Missouri, 92, 169
Morgan, Daniel, 4-5
Morgan, David, 3
Morgan, Edward, 3
Morgan, Lydia, 3, 45
Morgan, Sarah, 4
Morristown, New Jersey, 12, 29
Morse, David, 127
Muncie, Indiana, 248

Murphy, Charles, 140, 306
Murray, Philip, 196, 213, 360

Narcotics Control Convention held in Geneva, Switzerland, 57-66, 67, 71
The Nation, 283
National City Bank, 39
National Health Assembly, 188-190, 197, 198, 227,
report of, 210-212

[387]

National Health Insurance, 211, 229, 232, 233, 345-346, 350, 352, 363
American Medical Association, opposition to, 223
backers and opponents, 212-213
discussion of, 173-198
Germany, in, 175-180
pilot plan for, 220-221
sixty-five and over plan, 215, 216, 220-221, 225, 226
National Institute of Health, 200
National Military Establishment, 357
National Physicians Committee, 184-186, 224-225
National Press Club, 339
National Public Health Nursing Week, 210
National Urban League, 308-309
Nations Health, Committee for, 175, 217
Negev, Israel, 280, 281, 290
Negro doctors, shortages of, 250-258
Negro vote, 304
Newburgh, New York, 238, 240, 242
New Jersey, 266
New York, 12, 33, 34, 64, 75, 84, 85, 87, 115, 117, 119, 120, 122, 124, 134, 135, 142, 241, 248,
285, 289, 291, 294, 327, 328, 331, 340, 369
New York City Municipal Hospitals, 216-217
New York Institute of Clinical Oral Pathology, 242
New York Quinine and Chemical Company, 57
New York Times, 309, 343
Niles, David, 124-125, 276, 297
Noblesville, Indiana, 93, 96
Non-political trip of June 1948, 268-269
North Carolina, 93, 363, 365, 366-367
North Carolina State University at Raleigh, 365
Norris-La Guardia Committee, 124
Nouveau Circ Club, 47
Noyes, David, 165, 311-312

O'Brien, Lawrence F., 364

O' Connell, Dan, 346, 351
Ohio River, 6
Oklahoma, 180, 197, 350
Opium Control Board, 60, 62
Orange County, North Carolina, 367
Oxford, Ohio, 8

Pakistan, 278
Palestine, problems involved in the recognition of the State of Israel, 274-300

[388]

Palmer House, Chicago, IL, 111
Paris, France, 47, 156, 282, 288
Parker, Alton B., 18
Parran, Thomas, 198, 199, 200-203, 204, 205, 209, 210, 231
Pauley, Edwin W., 104, 106, 107, 323-324, 348
 Truman, relationship, 106
Pearson, Drew, 240
Pelley, William Dudley, 149, 150, 162, 345
 prosecuted for sedition, 93-98
Pennsylvania Lines West, 29
Pennsylvania Station, 120
Pershing, John J., 55-56
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 3, 122
Philippines, 80, 246
Phillips, Cabell, 17, 140, 300
Pink, Louis, 215, 220
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 29, 88, 113, 122, 154, 204
Poletti, Charley, 135
Policy Strategy Board, 273, 274, 305
Porter, Cole, 371, 372
Portugal, 69
Postmaster General of the United States, 115, 145
Potofsky, Jacob, 194
Potomac River, 156, 157
Powder River, 43
Presidential campaign, 1944, 114
Presidential campaign, 1948:
 Democratic National Committee, 271-273
 Jewish vote, 328
 press and, 325-326
 Truman, Harry S.:
 campaigner, as a, 304-305
 Chapman, Oscar, as advance man for, 270-271
 Democratic opposition, efforts to stop, 266-268

non-political trip of, June 1948, 268-269
Vice President, committee formed to nominate individuals for the office of, 316-319
voting, the impact of special interest groups, 320-321
Presidential Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1949, 258
President's Commission on the Health needs of the Nation, Creation of, 227-230
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, 322-323
Press, 325-326
Prudential Insurance Company, 28
Public Health Agency, 177

[389]

Public Health Service, 198, 199, 200-202, 206, 228, 231, 238, 364, 365
Pulliam, Eugene, newspaper chain of, 260, 261, 262

Radio Berlin, 154, 155, 160
Radio East, 155
Radio North America, 155
Radio Southeast, 155
Raleigh, North Carolina, 367
Randall Hall, 11
Rayburn, Sam, 138
Redding, Jack, 330
Reed, Daniel A., 248, 249
Rehovoth, Israel, 338
Requa, Mark, 71, 72
Research division of the Democratic National Committee, 271-273
Research Triangle, 364-369
Resolutions Committee of Democratic National Convention, 1948, 302, 303-304
Rhode Island, 266
Richards, A. L., 44
Richmond, Virginia, 309
Ridgway, Matthew, 344
Riverdale Country School, 363
Riverdale, New York, 363
Robins, R.B., 197, 214, 215
Rockefeller, Nelson, 196
Rochester, New York, 346
Rome, Italy, 96, 338
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 117, 174-175, 176, 235, 266, 257
Roosevelt, Franklin, 73, 74, 79, 81, 82, 88, 89, 93, 99, 102, 119, 120, 121-122, 124, 127, 137, 145, 187, 199, 231, 233, 266, 299, 311, 323, 350
death of, 171-172
Democratic National Convention, the contenders for the Vice Presidential nomination, 109-112

health of, 116-118
National Health Insurance, and, 173-175
Roosevelt, Franklin, Jr., 266
Roosevelt, James, 176, 266
Roosevelt, Kermit, 56
Roosevelt, Quentin, 56
Roosevelt, Theodore, 55-56
Root, Elihu, 55, 56
Rosenman, Samuel, 297, 310, 313, 362

[390]

Ross, Irwin, 140
Ross, Jeanette, 7
Royall, Kenneth, 133-134, 300, 301
Rusk, Dean, 296
Russell, Richard, 350

Saint Louis, Missouri, 18, 29, 30, 32, 57
Saint Petersburg, Russia, 38, 39
San Diego, California, 109, 237
San Francisco, California¹, 179, 369
Saratoga, New York, 4
Saturday Evening Post, 11
Saudi Arabia, 277
Savarin Lunch Counter, 64
Sawyer, Charles, 166
Scarsdale, New York, 290
Scheele, Leonard, 198, 203-204, 264-265
Public Health Service under the direction of, 208
Schurman, George W., 46
Schurman, Jacob Gould, 46
The Secret City, Civil Rights in the Nation's Capitol, 256

Senate Finance Committee, 23, 25, 361
Senior Citizen's Council of America, 192, 195, 224, 372
Shainmark, E. L., 263-264
Sharrett, Moshe S., 338
Sheffield, James, 55
Sherman, Carl, 291
Shultz, Lillie, 283, 285, 286, 288, 290-291, 292
Sicily, 134
Silver Shirts, 93, 97
Sioux Indians, case against the U.S. Government, 41-45
Sitting Bull, 43
Sixty-five and over plan (National Health Insurance), 215, 216, 220-221, 225, 226
Smith, Alexander, 221
Snyder, John, 164, 166, 310
Social Security, 173-174, 196
Social Security Act of 1950, 249-250
Social Security Administration, 174, 199, 208, 209, 259
Socialized Medicine, origin of the term, 181-182
Southeast Asia, 355
Stark, Lloyd, 92, 105, 107
State Department, 61, 71, 276, 279, 288, 296, 355
Steelman, John R., 139, 148, 149, 328
Stevens, Harold, 22

[391]

Stevens Hotel, 105
Stevenson, Adlai, 2, 137, 349, 351, 353, 362
Stimson, Henry L., 69, 70, 72
Stirling Castle, Scotland, 1
Stone, Harlan Fiske, 170-171
Strategy Policy Board, 273, 274, 305
Studebaker, John W., 233, 244, 245
 attempts to fire, 234-236
 Ewing, Oscar, makes charges against, 236-237
Suez Canal, 71
Sullivan, Gael, 329
Sullivan, John, 133,
Supreme Court of the United States, 116, 318
Sweden, 281
Swedish Health Service, 338
Switzerland, 338
Symington, Stuart, 133
Syria, 277

- Taft-Hartley Act, 138-139, 143, 320
- Taft, Robert, 77
 - Ewing, Oscar, relationship with , 22-26, 27
- Taft, William H., 28, 67
- Tarleton, Banastre, 5
- Tennessee, 350
- Texas, 164
- Thayer, Ezra Ripley, 13, 14-16
 - loan fund set up in honor of, 16
- Thayer, Mrs. Ezra Ripley, 15-16
- Thurmond, Strom, 327
- Thurston, John, 336
- Tibbitts, Clark, 230, 231
- Tokyo, Japan, 355
- "Town Meeting of the Air", 221, 223
- Trans-Jordan, 281
- Treasury Department, 199
- Truman, Harry S., 22, 81, 91-92, 115, 131-132, 137, 138, 142, 144, 146, 147, 179, 182, 186, 187, 192-193, 203, 232, 235, 243, 248, 265, 302, 325, 326, 330, 339, 349, 358, 361-362
 - advisors to, 164-168
 - Baruch, Bernard, relationship, 313-315
 - cabinet meetings of, 356-357
 - Chapman, Oscar, as advance man for, 270-271
 - civil rights, and, 132-133, 303-304

[392]

- Democratic Convention, 1944, Vice Presidential nomination:
 - contenders for, 109, 110, 113
 - reaction to attempts to nominate him, 105-107
- Eightieth Congress, recall of, 313
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., relationship with, 300-301
- Ewing, Oscar:
 - letter from, 358-360
 - Presidential election, 1948:
 - convinced of the re-election of, 333-334
 - efforts to stop opposition to, from Democrats, 266-268
- Federal Security Administration, desire to make it a Government department, 172-173
- health care of the nation, concerns for, 225-226, 227, 228, 229
- initial public reaction to, 119-120
- Israel, problems involved in the recognition of , 276-299
- Jewish vote, and, 329-330
- Korean War, and, 341, 342-344
- Pauley, Edwin W., relationship, 106
- political friends of, 169-170
- President, first becomes at the death of Franklin Roosevelt, 172

- Presidential election campaign, 1948:
 - campaigner, as a, 304-305
 - Chapman, Oscar, as advance man for, 270-271
 - Non-political trip of June 1948, 268-269
 - Presidential election 1952, decision not to run, 353-354
 - speechwriting for, 305-308, 309
 - Vinson, Frederick M., appointed to the Supreme Court, 171
- Truman, Mrs. Harry S. (Bess), 362
- Truman Committee, 91, 105
- The Truman Presidency*, 300
- Tunnell, James M., 105-106
- Turkey, 275
- Twenty-second Amendment, 80-81

- Unemployment Insurance, Office of, 209
- Union League Club, 55
- Union of Soviet Social Republics, 240

- [393]

- Unitarian Fellowship for Social Justice, 257
- United Mine Workers, 35, 36
- United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, 22
- United States Employment Service, 258
- United States Government, law case against the Sioux Indians, 41-45
- Universal Military Training, 357
- University Club (NYC), 75-76
- University of Iowa, Law School, 27
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 365
- University of Pittsburgh, 205
- United Nations, 276, 278, 279, 280, 281, 295, 300
- United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 135

- Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, 2
- Vaughan, Harry, 170
- Vinson, Frederick M., 164, 171, 316
- Vice President, 1944, contenders for the nomination, 108-113
- Vice President, 1948, committee formed to select the Democratic nominee, 317-319

- Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill, 186-188
- Wake County, North Carolina, 367
- Walker, Frank, 99
- Wallace, Henry, 79, 103, 106, 327, 329
 - Democratic nomination for Vice President, 1944, considered for the nomination, 109-112
- War Production Board, 240
- Wardman Park Hotel (Washington, D.C.), 282-285

Warren, Earl, 178, 181

Washington, D.C., 61, 62, 63, 90, 91, 118, 120, 142, 143, 151, 156, 157, 158, 165, 250, 252, 256, 261, 288, 291, 356, 358, 364, 365

Washington Square (New York City), 117

Ways and Means Committee of the House, 361

Weizmann, Chaim, 295, 338-339

Welfare records, inspection of, 258-261, 262-263

West Galilee, 280

Western College, 7

Westmoreland Field (Boston, Massachusetts), 157

Whitcomb, Dowden, and Stout, 28, 34

White House, 282, 285, 352

White And Case, 34

Whitaker and Baxter, 179, 181, 213, 214, 224

Whitaker, Clem, 179, 181

William the Conqueror, 277

Willkie, Wendell, 21, 74, 76-78

Wilson, I.W., 88

Wilson, Woodrow, 35, 55, 275

[394]

World Health Organization, 244

World War I, 275, 277

World War II, 278

World's Fair at St. Louis, 18

Wright, Fielding, 340-341

Wright, Dr. Hamilton, 67

Wright, Mrs. Hamilton, 67, 68-69

Wyle, Carl, 28

Wyle, Jewett, and Ewing, 28

Yale, 20

Yale Law School, 28

Yalta, 117, 118

Yalu River, 342

Young, Sanborn, 61-62, 71