

Oral History Interview #2

with

JOHN Joseph CARSON

Washington, D.C.
November 10, 1971

By Jerry N. Hess, Harry S. Truman Library

HESS: All right, to begin today, Mr. Carson, let's go back just a little bit and would you tell me your earliest recollections of Mr. Truman?

CARSON: Well, my earliest association with his name was when it was reported that he was going to run for the Senate from Missouri. And I had been for many years, a very good friend of Congressman Jack Cochran, who had been before that, before he became Congressman, he had been secretary to Billy Igoe, the Congressman from St. Louis, William L. Igoe. And by the way, there is something very interesting in that, I think, and that is that Igoe had two--tells us a little about the Congressional situation in those days--Igoe had two old maid sisters for whom he was responsible. They were in their late forties, fifties, and Billy Igoe was about the same age. Bill Igoe's

[2]

district was a doubtful district in St. Louis the first time he ran and that was about 1914, as I recall. Jack Cochran became his campaign manager, and in fact, induced Igoe to run. Igoe won, but not by a very pronounced, very great, margin.

But then in 1916 Igoe won again and in 1916 he voted against war. He lived with Jack Cochran and Mrs. Cochran in a very modest, nice apartment southeast of the Capital. But Jack told me that Igoe had gotten up during the night, he had a room quite a piece away from them, from his secretary and his secretary's wife, but he got a--he was getting up in the late night and was disappearing, and he'd come back along 4 or 5 o'clock every morning and Jack said he finally went out to find out--he tailed Igoe--he followed him without Igoe knowing it, and Igoe went over to the park grounds in front of the Capitol and walked through the park grounds from about 2 o'clock in the morning till 4 o'clock, night, night after night.

Jack said, "There's only one answer to it, John, Bill is sick unto death that he's going to have to not vote with the President on this, he's going to vote against war, he'd like to vote for--or be loyal to the President, what the President wants. He was very

[3]

devoted to Wilson, a very devoted Democrat, but he cannot bring himself to vote for the war, so he's just trying to walk and talk himself into, "--and this went on and on and finally Igoe voted

against war. They thought that would finish him, but in 1918 he got the nomination from the Republicans and the nomination from the Democrats without it. The campaign--he was elected unanimously without a campaign. And in 1920 he again got--no, in 1920 I think, he got the nomination again, without opposition from a Republican or Democrat, but he refused to take it, he resigned.

And when I asked him why he was going to resign, Bill said, "You know, John, it's utterly impossible for a member of Congress to make a living down here, to break even even." He said, "You know, I live with Jack and his wife, ate there, and was a member of the family, with the least of expense for me," and he said, "the only expense I have is cigars. I smoke cigars," and Bill would take a drink, but he wasn't a drinker at all, and he said, "that's all." But he said, "My constituents coming in, you've got to take them to dinner, and they're in here constantly, I take them to dinner every night and so on and something else happens, you contribute to this, and you contribute to that, and you contribute to campaign fund," and he said, "I'm broke, and he said, "I have to take care

[4]

of the two sisters and I've got to leave Congress in order to go back home, go back to the law and make enough money to protect these two sisters."

Well, I think that's the--I found that so often, the fellows that were great fellows in the Congress, and I knew lots of them, they couldn't save any money at all, they were always on the ragged ends. I know that's--they found some way--if they found some way to make money, some of them made up their speaking engagements, some of them speculated in real estate in Washington. But my gang, the fellows that I knew and loved so well, they never even engaged in any speculation in real estate. There were a lot of others that were, that were making money that way, but anyhow, that's when I--Now I was for Jack and we--I had been trying to get Jack, and Billy Igoe had been trying to get Jack to announce his candidacy for the Senate. He had been in the House for seven years and had been really started a reorganization of the Congress with a bill--he had done all of the spadework and the bill was later introduced by young Bob LaFollette, a young fellow from Oklahoma, and didn't accomplish anything. But Jack was trying to find a way to develop the fact finding resource for the Congress. He and I have talked it over many times.

[5]

One of the things that--well, let's go on with Mr. Truman.

Well, Charlie Ross and I were for Jack. Then when Truman announced, of course, Charlie Ross who loved Truman and was pals from the time they were kids in the first grade in school, Charlie had to tell Jack that he couldn't give him any support, but he wouldn't do anything to oppose him, but he would support Truman all the way, of course. And I said no I was going for Jack. I kept after Jack and after Jack to get in, get into this race. And Jack was waiting to see if he could get some leadership support from the far western side of Missouri, around Kansas City where the Kansas City organization was dominant. And he wanted some hope for a little support there, if

he could get that he could win. But he wouldn't get in the race until about, I think it was about a month, until he finally did get in about a month before the primary election, and of course, it was far too late and Truman beat him. But I don't think Truman beat him by much.

Now, I, having worked out in the Midwest on newspapers, I knew the Kansas City Star and anything the Star was for, I was against, any opportunity I could be against them, I was against them, and I had plenty of opportunities. I knew Senator Jim Reed very,

[6]

very well, from the St. Louis newspapers down here in Washington. But then I read--I heard these stories that Truman was the candidate of the--oh, what's the name?

HESS: The Pendergasts.

CARSON: The Pendergasts. And the Pendergasts--I didn't know who the Pendergasts were, but I heard stories about them. The fact that the Kansas City Star was against Truman, I was for Truman. Of course, I would have been for him anyhow, but I was very much for him then. But when he came to Washington, I didn't pay any attention to him. I had probably, oh, I'd say that there were at least, just guessing, I'd say there was at least thirty Senators that I was intimately associated with day after day, I was--progressive Republican crowd particularly, but others I knew like Bob Wagner. I always played golf with Bob Wagner right along, and Arthur Vandenberg and so on, but I was--but I didn't pay any attention to Truman until there was a Senator from Washington, who was a very, very good friend of mine, Lou Schwellenbach, and Lou when he came here I don't know who knew me in Washington, but Lou called me and told me that he had been told to get in touch with me. So Lou and I became very good friends. And Lou was in the Senate but he wasn't too

[7]

happy about the Senate because--I didn't know why at that time, but a little later that he recovered from a very severe case of tuberculosis, but he hadn't escaped from the possibility of a recurrence and he was worried--doctors were worried because Lou was working very, very hard. Well, I talked to Lou one day, talking to Lou and Lou said, "You know [John A.] Garner has given me a job," he said, "you know, we're counted on, we're asked to help to inform and educate the boy with the freshman Senators, and they've given me Truman of Missouri."

And I said, "What about Truman?"

And he said, "John, he's one of the men that is honestly and sincerely humble. You know what he wants? The only thing he is asking, he wants to know how to make a speech." He said, "He wants me to come to his office and help train him in how to make a speech." He said, "All he wants is to be able to make a speech so he can get upon the floor and talk."

Well, we laughed about it at that time, and I thought, well he--never was a bit interested in Mr. Truman when I listened to Schwellenbach. And then perhaps the best of the newspapermen that

I know, probably one of the best was Jack Cairnes of the St. Louis Post Dispatch for many years, but he was with Cordell Hull in the

[8]

Democratic National Committee at this time and--maybe that was later. But anyhow, he knew Truman, and he made--he went to see Truman occasionally for some reason, I don't know what the connection was. I think Jack had left the national committee at that time, but anyway he went in to see Truman and he came into my office one day and talked to me and said, "You know," he has been talking to Truman, he said, "You know Truman is thinking about studying law. He is getting law books over at the congressional library and says he is going to study law."

Well, that interested me in Mr. Truman, and I, whenever I got a chance in those days that I could find some place that I could help him, I'd help him, but I didn't know him well enough to go to his office and sit down and talked with him as I did with these other Senators.

And the first time that I can remember that I began to admire the guy was at--I'm trying to think what it was that happened. Something happened that Truman stood up in the Senate and did his job of standing by his convictions, talking about the issue, and it took a great deal of courage to do at that time. And I again said, "Well, that Truman is going to be one of my men," I knew it, be with Truman.

[8A]

Well, Truman was then--I finally made a connection there that was important. Truman was on the Committee on Interstate Commerce. Burt Wheeler of Montana was chairman of the committee and Couzens of Michigan, Jim Couzens of Michigan, who is my senior partner in the office there, Couzens had been chairman when the Republicans controlled the Senate and then when the Democrats came in, Burt Wheeler became chairman and Couzens was the ranking committee--the ranking member of the committee at that time, the Republican member.

One morning I got a letter from Max Lowenthal, just a typewritten letter, he wrote it on his typewriter, it was about two pages, single-spaced, in which Max recounted--or presented facts and evidence about involving banks and insurance companies and others in St. Louis, and involving him in the Missouri Pacific case, or what was known as the Missouri Pacific case or cases of that type. They were trying to get the certain judge appointed as I recall, and the judge was trying to get the brother of the judge or something, you know, to become the receiver or something for the Missouri Pacific, or he was president of the Missouri Pacific or something of that kind. It was an involvement of a couple of brothers out there. And I--it's been so long ago I can't remember, and I don't have that memorandum. I may find it, if I do I'll

[9]

send it to you. But I--it wasn't signed, Max didn't sign it at all, and I took it in and laid it on Couzens' desk and walked away and Couzens didn't say anything to me, went over to the Senate.

And when he came back from the Senate that night about 4 o'clock, down at the office he called me and asked me, he said, "Where did you get that memorandum that you laid on my desk?"

I said, "Well, if you are interested in it and are going to do something about it I'll tell you from who I got it, but I'm not--I just put it on your desk because I thought it would interest you and show you what the Interstate Commerce Commission and others are doing with Missouri Pacific cases out there."

And he said, "The reason I'm interested in that I gave it to Burt Wheeler to read and Burt Wheeler suggested that we might like to have an investigation of Missouri Pacific case, other cases." And he said, "Burt is interested. Will you go around and talk to Wheeler about it?"

And I said, "I will."

"Okay."

And I went around to Wheeler's office, I knew Burt very well. I told Burt--or I didn't tell him where I got it, but I said to Burt, "All I can say to

[10]

you is that I'm absolutely certain you can depend upon the accuracy of everything this man says. He has facts to support it, even the commas and periods, he'll have facts to support everything that's in that memorandum."

But he said, "Well, Couzens and I are talking about starting an investigation."

I said, "Well, I'll tell you, if you'll come out to the Columbia Country Club Wednesday night," this was a Monday, "Wednesday night, to me with dinner, I'll have the fellow that wrote the memorandum there."

And he said, "I'll come."

So we made a date and I called Max and Max came down and I took him out with me to the--we got a taxi--no I drove out, took Max out with me and we met Wheeler out there and we had dinner, and I introduced Max to Wheeler, that's where Max met Wheeler. And Wheeler asked him then about the--they talked about the memorandum. Oh, we talked for two hours, I think, there that night and Wheeler finally said, "Well, Mr. Lowenthal, I'm ready to introduce the resolution to investigate the financial operation of railroads and its relation to the Interstate Commerce Commission and its work, but I'll do it, I will introduce the resolution under one condition."

[11]

And Max said, "What's that?"

And Burt said, "If you will come and become the lawyer for the committee, if you will direct this investigation."

And Max said he would. Now, of course, at that time, the salary for that kind of job was \$3900 a year, a lawyer got for directing a job of that kind, and Max was--had retired from active practice, but Max's time was worth \$3900 a month, almost. And I know it cost Max.

So I'm sure that that investigation cost Max, just hiring the people on his own and buying books. He bought almost a library of books, hundreds of copies of books for the people that had--that worked for him, he got other agencies of the Government to hire and they transferred over to work for him.

Well, Truman was on that committee. Because of that and because of Max's connection, I kept in intimate touch with the committee, of course, because of Max's connection, I occasionally got to talk with Mr. Truman or see him, but we hadn't become intimate friends even up to that time, but I knew him.

Well one Sunday afternoon--we lived in Chevy Chase, Maryland, at that time I think, and one Sunday afternoon Max called me by telephone about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and he said, "Johnny," and I can almost

[12]

hear him. He said, "Johnny, I want to consult you because I want you to know everything that's going on, and what I'm doing." He said, "I'm going out to see Truman this afternoon, I have a date with him," I think at 2 o'clock he said, "I have a date with him, but," he said, "you know we have the Missouri Pacific case coming up on Monday, it's scheduled to come up on Monday," this is on a Sunday afternoon, it was scheduled to come up the next day on Monday. And he said, "Truman is the ranking Democratic member, John," and he said, Truman has actually been of more value to us in this investigation than any other member of the committee." He said, "You remember we had doubts about his appointment to this committee." When he was appointed that was true. He was considerably--let's say none--freshman almost for a couple of years. No one thought of him advancing to a place where he could be a great help in those fights, but Truman surprised us. He said, "Truman's done more for us I think than anybody, including your friend Jim Couzens and Burt Wheeler."

He said, "Well, what happened, Burt just called me, called me last night and told me he was being called out of town." And he said, "The result of that is that Truman becomes now the chairman of the committee during this, and the very day that he becomes chairman of the

[13]

committee, we're throwing the Missouri Pacific case in his hands." And he said, "You know that involves the Missouri Life Insurance Company, it will involve some of the banks out there, and it's going to involve quite a few of Mr. Truman's political friends." He said, "Now, I think it's a damn dirty trick for us to--well, let's postpone this case for a week or two, let Burt get back, and

then Truman will be the ranking member, and he will be at the committee, and then he will be free to cross-examine the witnesses if he wants to. And if he doesn't want to he won't have to, but if he's chairman he's got to organize and lead the cross-examination."

I said, "Well Max, you've got only one answer to it. You told me before how helpful Truman has been to you, you've got to protect Truman in this situation, give him--you've got to play the game fair. You go out and see Truman and we--I'll tell Couzens that it's going to be--you're going to try something else."

He said, "Well, we can bring up the B&O case, something like that up." And he said, "I'll do it, Johnny, I'll let you know."

So, that was the last I heard from Max for about two--it was about 8 o'clock that night when Max called me from Union Station. And he said, "I've got some bad news for you."

[14]

And I said, "What?"

And he said, "Well, I went out and saw Truman, and I told him and I made a very good story out of it. I told him just what this situation was, that the C&O people were pressing us very much to get this case heard and we weren't prepared as fully as we wanted to do about the Missouri Pacific case, we wanted to get this C&O case, and we'd take up the Missouri Pacific case, it'd be a week or ten days before we could get that, and so on. And he said--I thought I put on a very good story," but he said, "after about an hour Truman looked at me and said, 'Well, Mr. Lowenthal, I'm very, very grateful to you for what you're trying to do. I know what you're trying to do, but you're not going to get away with it.' He said, 'When I took a place on this committee I assumed the responsibility that goes with it. When Burt Wheeler goes out of town, I become chairman. There's a responsibility and you're going through with this thing just as if Burt Wheeler was here, and I'm going to do the cross-examination to the extent of my ability, join in the cross-examination. You're not going to get away with it, but I appreciate very much what you're trying to do.'"

[15]

And Max said, "Then I said, 'Well, we'll try to get as much as we can, only it's not going to be as good as I'd like to have it because we haven't finished the job of research that we want to do with it, but we'll do as well as you can, but you see this C&O case, we have to get that C&O case not later than Thursday. We can't take much time on the Missouri Pacific case,' it wasn't worth it."

He said, "What we'll do, we'll present the case, you can cross-examine all you want to, as you should, and I'll try to help wherever I can, Senator, but we won't have time to read all the exhibits, we'll put the exhibits in the record so they'll be there for anybody that wants to read it. We don't have time to go through them as we have in other cases and read the exhibits, and--but in that we we can get the C&O case."

So he said, "Truman looked at me and said, 'Mr. Lowenthal, I want to say that I appreciate what you're trying to do, but you're going to present the exhibits and then you're going to read them because that's where the opportunity comes for cross-examination of the witnesses, and you are now trying to help me avoid cross-examining these witnesses, but you're going

[16]

through with the same procedure that you'd have if Mr. Wheeler were here.'"

So Max said, "Johnny, I tried," but he said, "the guy was--he knew just what I was trying to do, couldn't get away with it." So he said, "We're going through with it, so he told me.

I watched the hearing on the Missouri Pacific case. Truman handled it just as Burt Wheeler would have handled it, and Couzens helped and so on and so on, but Truman did the job. And from that time on I was a thousand percent for Truman. That was--we didn't become--oh we were friends, but we didn't become close friends at all, but he knew me and knew what I knew about Max and me, But then...

HESS: Did he try to remain fair and impartial in the Missouri cases?

CARSON: Oh, yes. Oh yes, he dealt with the facts the committee researchers and lawyers had brought in. Then I watched him--then we had another experience that was very interesting. Burt Wheeler, I think, played a bit sharp on this and I can't say that he did, but after the Missouri Pacific case, and the other case were in, and that job with that committee was done, the war had come on,

[17]

and one day Max came down to the office, and came down from New York, and we always spent a couple of days together, and Max came to me about something, I don't know what it was, and I said, "Max I've got another idea." I said, "After the last world war, the First World War, we had the Harness case, as I recall, we had several cases involving aluminum, steel, and other things, oil, all related to war and committees on--trying to make an investigation on what had happened, and everything had been done. The thefts and frauds had been committed and there was no way of doing anything about it." I said, "Why wouldn't it be well to get a committee, a special committee, appointed to begin the investigation at the start of this war now, and drag in these people while the war is going on and so on?"

And Max said, "You're right. You're right," he said, "I'll talk to Burt about it right away." So he went over to Burt and Max came back and said that he--"Johnny, Burt listened to me, but then looked up at me and smiled and said, 'Max, you're just a couple of days late. Truman of Missouri has--Truman has been talking about this, and I promised to support him in becoming chairman of a committee

[18]

of that kind, and he's going to introduce a resolution to create a committee." I'm damn sure that Truman hadn't told him that at all, but Max--or Truman--Burt Wheeler--Burt was a fine guy in lots of ways--really a great guy in lots of ways, but Burt never was much of a worker. He didn't take on jobs that pinned him down for too long a time.

And Burt didn't want to do--to become chairman of that committee, didn't want to run it, but he didn't want me. Max had told him that I had suggested it, he didn't want Couzens to be doing it either. But he, I'm sure went right to Truman and told Truman the story, and Truman introduced the resolution, and Truman became chairman of the committee.

Now I didn't keep up with that committee because I had a hell of a lot of stuff to do myself then in those days, I didn't keep up with the committee. I kept up with it, but I wasn't--I didn't have my nose in it and Max didn't have his nose in it.

Frankly, I doubted that--my judgment wouldn't be worth talking about. My judgment was that it was not too good of a job. I didn't think that--it was a tremendously big job and to throw Truman into that kind of a job without any background, really, in running a

[19]

committee of this kind, an investigation, It--here were two or three things that I--I remember there was a question involving a pipeline on oil that--building a pipeline or something on oil up to Canada. I had had a lot infor--no, I had some information about oil, always, I had followed oil from the time I began newspaper work in 1918 now following oil. Oil has always been the most powerful lobby, actually the most active and powerful lobby in the Congress. It's absolutely unbelievable the control that oil has over the Congress. But there were other lobbies; the railroads were very effective in lobbies. The insurance company was very, very effective in lobbies, but oil accomplished more for oil than any--than accomplished for any other special interest down there. And I was watching oil because in the investigation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue I had turned up oil traces all through there which controlled committees, in control of the Government, and so on.

Well, I remember so well that I went down to talk to some of the fellows that were working for Truman on that committee, and I came away from it very much disappointed that they hadn't been enough interest in it to get the story, and I didn't know the whole story, but I was sure there was more than they got. There were quite a few other things...

[20]

HESS: Do you recall who you talked to at the time you went down to the committee?

CARSON: No, I don't know who it was, I just dropped down there. Max wasn't there, if Max was there, why, we'd have--but Max wasn't employed in that.

HESS: Tell me a little bit about your association with Mr. Lowenthal, when did you first meet him and what is your general assessment of Mr. Lowenthal?

CARSON: Well, Max--I had a very interesting first meeting with Lowenthal, about 19--it was about 1932 I guess, maybe a little bit before '32. '32--no it was '32 I guess. I got a call one day and I was--it must have been after '32 because my--I was the kind of a resource man for Tommy Corcoran and Ben Cohen and in those days I had a great deal of respect for both of them and I think they did a lot of good. Later on I didn't become--I lost a good deal of my esteem and admiration for Tommy, but Ben and I have been friends, were friends and have been friends all the years. And I later on learned that Ben and Max, Ben Cohen and Max Lowenthal were intimate friends, but I didn't know that when this incident happened.

But one day I got a call from a fellow named Charlie Irwin, and I don't know whether Charlie spells

[21]

his name I-r-w-i-n or E-r-w-i-n, it's--Charlie had been the editor of the old New York Call, and I didn't know him, but I knew of him and he knew of me. He later on became public relations man for Imalgamated Clothing workers and there he knew Max, because Max was the counsel for the Imalgamated. And Charlie then had become--or had been over the years, I learned later, a very close friend of old Bob LaFollette. Charlie was a Socialist, Charlie Irwin was a Socialist and active in the Socialist Party, and he and old Bob LaFollette had become very close friends and he used to say that he carried the young Bob around in his arms when young Bob was a baby and a very sick boy, young boy. And that's true, Charlie was a very good friend of old Bob and young Bob, but he lost a good deal of his esteem for young bob later on.

But Charlie was a very, very dominant fellow, big fellow, probably six foot tall, weighs probably 200 pounds, big of voice and big of demeanor when he was in the conference room. Charlie sat at the head of the table and everybody knew Charlie, and Charlie spoke.

Well, I got a call from--I didn't know Charlie Irwin and he asked me if I knew who he was and I said, "Yes, I know of you."

[22]

And he said, "Will you come down to the Mayflower, we're going to have a conference down here at 2 o'clock this day, and I want you in on it. I want your help."

So, I went down and there were probably, oh, fifteen people in there, in the room, and I don't think I knew--as I recall now I may have known some of them, but I can't recall that I didn't. But the issue was related to the banking legislation. That's--it was after '32--the issue was related to the banking legislation, which was before the Senate, in which there was a terrific fight made by the banks and others. And after they talked for awhile about this legislation, then Charlie Irwin said, "I asked John Carson to come down here, I want to ask John about the strategy of--because he knows the Congress and knows the Senate particularly, ask him about the strategy of a fight--for the fight that we'll have to make in this and so on and so on." And then he asked me a question.

Well, I answered the question, and then he asked me a couple more questions and I answered them and gave my reason for my opinions and so on. Then he asked another question, three or four questions, and then he asked another question, and a fellow stood up behind Charlie Irwin and said--he said, "Mr. Irwin," or "Charlie," he

[23]

said, "I want to talk about this."

And Charlie said, "You sit down," he said, "I'm here trying to listen to John Carson. I want John Carson's opinion about this, and I'm not going to listen to your opinion. You sit down." So the fellow sat down and after they talked for a half an hour, I had to go back to the Senate and I left.

Well, the next morning, the fellow came up to my office and introduced himself as Max Lowenthal, and told me who he was and so on. And he apologized for trying to interrupt the discussion down there and so on, and he didn't have to apologize--we immediately became friends, casual friends at first and then became absolute friends. Our friendship continued, I think, as close as any friend I have ever had. And I always remember--Max you know was charged with the--that was the day when anybody who had an idea in Washington about anything was charged with being a Communist. And I was charged with being a Communist, you know, by Fulton Lewis.

Fulton Lewis carried on about a six month radio campaign to prevent my confirmation to the Senate, but I was charged with being a Communist. I was not, never was. But I had lots of friends who I knew was Communists and there were communist cells all over Washington.

[24]

Now, they weren't trying to destroy--the ones, the fellows I knew, weren't thinking of destroying this government at all, they were convinced that the issues had developed, the conditions had developed, where an issue was being drawn between the Fascist and the communists, whether the Army was going to take over or the Congress of the United States was to be protected and so on. Most of those fellows were young fellows that got into that.

Well, Roosevelt had them for their friends for a long--many of them for friends. I always think of one thing that was very interesting. The CIO promoted the organization of a--Federal employees here. The AFL had their little bureau of--little organization of Federal employees, and then there was another little independent labor organization that had most of the Government employees in it. And the CIO started their--I don't know what they called it, but it was Government employees organization. They had a--they took over an old residence down on about 18th Street and E, right across from the State Department, run down residence. I don't--I imagine they probably rented it for a hundred dollars a month, but they were there for--I think in that place for a year and a half and they became quite a factor in the development of organized labor for Government employees. They were a stronger

[25]

they were more influential I think than the AFL organization at that time, but not as much as the independent, but anyhow, they were there.

One day I got a call from the president of that organization, the CIO organization of Government employees, and he asked me to come over to that house, he wanted to see me. I went over and we were in a room, in a subbasement room, which was his office. I was then with the Cooperative League, and that's where he and I had met one time. He took me over and he said, "John, what I want you to do, think about it because I'm going to make you an offer, how would you like to become president of this CIO organization of Government employees?"

I said, "I wouldn't like it, I'm not going to be."

He said, "Oh yes, yes, don't--this thing will pay you \$15,000 a year, that's my salary." He said, "I'm resigning now, and going into something else." He told me what it was, I didn't pay any attention to it, but he said, "We have agreed if you take it we'd like to have you take it over." He said, "You see, we're kept here by John L. Lewis, he's paying all the bills. He just--this organization is here, and our purpose is to get--John L. Lewis wants to keep his foot in every Government office, Government agency, if you'll come over and take it you can have this job."

[26]

I said, "That may be, but you're not going to get me, I'm not going to have a damn thing to do with it."

Well, that wasn't a bit of doubt but what that Government--that CIO Government employee's agency had a great many of the boys that were on the verge of being communists in it at that time, there wasn't any doubt. I knew Lee Preston very well; he was counsel for the CIO. Lee and I were acquaintances. I never liked Lee, he wasn't my type. Lee could be mean and dominant and domineering, but I never questioned the guy's integrity. I knew he was a Commie, the head of their public relations, they had an office just south, a mile from Jackson Place at that time, and the CIO had an office just three or four doors down, took over a building there. And I saw them because we passed each other day after day, but the head of the public--press, the CIO press down there was a Commie, there wasn't a bit of doubt about it at that time. And Alger Hiss came to my office a couple of times, and somebody sent him up, and I always felt terribly sorry for him. There was never a self-conscious guy with a terrible inferiority complex or something, it was Hiss. There was nothing mean about Hiss that I saw, it was just a poor--he was a very, very self-conscious guy. But

[27]

he came in for, he was anxious, somebody told him to become acquainted with me and he was working for the committee which Gerald Nye was chairman and Art Vandenburg was a member, and Hiss was working for them. They had an office room down on the fourth floor of the Senate Office Building and my office was there on the fourth floor also, passing he dropped in a couple of times to tell me about stopping into Justice Holmes that morning and Holmes was sick and

dying and so on, something of that kind, but he never came back and we never carried on--never met again. But anyhow...

HESS: What type of evidence did Fulton Lewis, Jr. try to put forward when he was accusing you of being a Communist?

CARSON: I can't recall. It went on--actually I never paid a damn bit of attention to it. Never--I was not interested. I hadn't been too anxious to get the job in the first place, as I told you, I refused it the first time that Truman sent Max and Elmer Milliman over to get me to take it and then two years later when the commissioner resigned they came again. And I said to Mr. Truman when he asked me to take the job on the commission, I said, "You're going to have one hell of a job having me confirmed, because I've been in every fight down here since 1918 against the big buys, the big interests and so on, and they're

[28]

going to all lobby, organize a lobby to beat me I'm sure, they won't want me down there."

But--so he said well--and I said, "Moreover, you've got to appoint me as an independent because I am an independent," and it was a Democratic vacancy at that time, and Jim Mead got the appointment later. Well, I said, "You can't appoint me as the Democrat because, although I grew up a Democrat, and active with the Democrats, I am independent and I've been with the progressive Republicans, I'm not a Republican, but I'm an independent. It's awfully difficult, Mr. President, as you know, to get an independent appointed, and particularly on this commission, because if anybody goes to this commission, why, "well, he said, "Oh, I think I can do it. You try it, you go out and talk to so and so from the, "--a lawyer out there, the name escapes me, know him very well, he's still around here, a lawyer. And I told them I wanted them, that they were going to have difficulty getting me through, there was going to be a fight, but if they wanted to go for the fight, I'd take it on. Well, Volty knew me or I knew Volty, he had been in the press gallery, never of any consequence, he worked for Hearst and he never rose above being a cub reporter down there, but he had, as you know, an exceptionally good radio voice, and he had some good research people and he was competent,

[29]

he was competent guy in what he was doing. And at that time the National Tax Equality League was fighting the cooperatives on the question of charging the cooperatives were tax exempt. They were not, only the farm cooperatives were tax exempt, and the consumer cooperatives, the league--all the cooperatives that I had been associated with, in the league were paying all of their taxes, paid more than they should have paid. But the National Tax Equality League began to hand in information about the cooperatives and then Carson, the head of this thing, and Carson was one of the guys who was employed with it. And then they began--the Tax Equality League began to charge that the cooperatives were Communistic, and Carson, oh, his whole background has been fighting business and legitimate profit, the profit system, and so on and so on.

Well, what had happened, Jerry Vorhees had gotten interested in the cooperatives somehow, they had sent for me and we got acquainted and Jerry wanted to make a speech or two. And one--no, what I did I wrote to Jerry a letter, in which I opposed the profit system, and Jerry put it in the Record and I--there was some rather sensational sentences in this letter--not sensational, but they were irritating to anybody who was interested in the welfare of the competitive profit

[30]

system. But Fulton found that letter, the oil--the lobby oil in the advertising clubs of New York were giving Fulton information and help, the oil crowns were giving them help, and I'm sure the railroads, and I'm sure the wool industry was giving him help, they were feeding him. Well, he found--somebody handed him that, and he read the excerpts from that letter over the radio, oh, night after night he'd go back and, "Here's this guy so on and so on."

Well, he did a good enough job that Eddie Roden, who was secretary to Senator--the Senator from Connecticut. Eddie had been with the United Press in the early days and then with Jim Farley in the Roosevelt campaign. But Eddie took the job with this McGrath; I think it was, from Connecticut. And Eddie called me one day and said, "John, aren't you interested in what this guy Fulton Lewis is doing to you?" And he said, "You had better be interested." He said, "Our mail I'd say we've got not less than five thousand letters attacking you in the Communistic Fulton Lewis, all lies here, and so on, and you can be damn sure that every other Senator up here is getting this kind of mail." And he said--I said, "Well, I'm not going to be interested."

[31]

But finally the guy--they, somebody came to me, said, "You've got to get into this fight." So I did get into it and I got a hold of Lowell Mollet, Lowell was an old Scripps-Howard guy, we had grown up in Indianapolis together, and Lowell--Lowell's about ten years old than I, but Lowell and I were good friends. And Lowell had a column, the Washington Star printed for him. So I gave Lowell the facts and showed him that all this--most of this--all these excerpts that was in this letter I wrote to Vorhees and that Fulton was using to attack me as being Communist, a lot of people believe it. I shoved him the--they came from the encyclical of Pope Pius XI, and the encyclical was called "Quadragesimo anno" and then I showed all these--a little story I remember a little story.

Once Fulton Lewis was attacking the Pope, and he pulled this stuff out.

I had another experience. There's a fellow named Bob Quirk here who was a lawyer, a very distinguished lawyer, a big railroad lawyer, independent, but Bob and I were good friends, we both belonged to Columbia Country Club. And Bob, when I was nominated, Bob immediately said, "I'm on the AM--American Bar Association committee to approve of nominees for this commission, John, among other commissions, and you can count on it you're going to get the approval of the American Bar Association."

[32]

Lo and behold, Bob didn't see me for a long while, I knew something had happened. And one night I went into the bar of the Columbia Country Club and there was Bob Quirk with his ear up to the radio. He said, "Come here, John, and sit down, sit down." And he had Fulton Lewis on, and when Fulton Lewis started to pull this stuff he said, "Did you say that John, did you say that?" To me, Bob said, "Did you say that?"

And I said, "Yeah."

He said, "Did you say that!"
And I said, "Yeah."

Well he said, "Did you say that!"

And I said, "Yeah."

Well, he finally to me said, "What the hell, where in the hell, what's the matter with you?"

And I said, "Well, I think I've got good authority for that."
And he said, "What?"

I said, "Well, that's Pope Pius XI encyclical of Quadragesimo anno, it's quoted from that."

He said, "The Pope said that?"

I said, "Why, yes, the Pope said that in the encyclical, and I got him," Lowell left said, "I know Bob supported me, but that's where..."

[33]

HESS: What was the nature of the quote that you had taken from the Pope?

CARSON: Well, I don't know. I've got the encyclical I got it out here someplace, I could read it. But I...

HESS: Were they on social justice or something to that effect?

CARSON: Oh yes, oh yes. It was mainly on just one thing. This is from America. America is the magazine of the Jesuit Order, you know, in New York. In the issue of September the 25th, 1971, just recently, there is a piece in here by James R. Jennings is the author, and Jennings, I don't know him, but he would be identified here. Jennings is Associate Director of the Division of World Justice and Peace for the United States Catholic Congress. The title of the piece is "Quadragesimo anno," of course, that means forty years after, so on. The subhead is, "Ten percent of the world's population consumes two-thirds of the world's resources with the United States taking the lion's share." Now he quote--he quotes Pope Pius XI one place, an unanswerable argument. No, he says that Pope Pius is Quadragesimo anno says, first, the system

of free competition was incapable of either curbing or controlling itself from direct economic life and in the final

[34]

analysis the system is self destructive. There are other less harsh ways of looking at the world scene, but Pope Pius XI to support his position offered what he called, "An unanswerable argument, the immense multitude of non-owning workers on one hand, and the enormous riches of certain wealthy men on the other." And then there's quotes all through this thing. I marked this up to give it to one of the correspondents up there, that...

HESS: But that was the nature of the quote that you had taken?

CARSON: Yes, resulting--yes. "The result," the Pope said, "was an economic dictatorship which regulated the flow of the entire economic system." And the Pope referred to the "very exceedingly rich and unnumbered profitus, and the giant private corporations bitterly fought each other striving to gain supremacy over the nation, generating conflicts between nations." That's of the Quadragesimo anno, is a very interesting piece, there was a lot of quotes but the Pope had denounced the competitive profit system in the big corporations.

HESS: What was the date that he issued that, do you recall?

CARSON: 19--wait a minute now--in 1931, Pope Pius XI.

[35]

HESS: Well, I can see how some of those statements would get Fulton Lewis, Jr. a little upset if he didn't know who had made them, I guess.

CARSON: Well, actually what happened--what happened, Lowell printed this thing and the final day of hearings when I would be heard by the Senate committee, they called up Fulton Lewis and he got on the stand and the minute he started--he made some statements that he had been given all of this information about Mr. Carson and so on and so on and he didn't know Mr. Carson, but this--and someone said something. And the Senator from Maine at that time, who got into trouble later, he grabbed something--Fulton Lewis' statements, or immediately latched onto them, and flung them at me and so on, where--what justification do I have in these things. That was the only time that I really got mad, lost my temper. I stood up and said, "Yes, I made them and I'll make them again, because they are on great authority, they are from Pope Pius' encyclical of such and such a date," and I went on to tell them about this encyclical, and when I got through this fellow from Maine immediately began to apologize, I didn't know why, but later on somebody said to me, someone came to me, I didn't realize it--he said, "now, John, you know about half of Maine now are French, they've moved down from Canada, and this Senator Jackson

[36]

attacking the Pope got him...

HESS: His Catholic constituents wouldn't have liked that at all.

CARSON: No. And so--but that--immediately the fight against me ended after that, the open fight, the fight to stop me ended. And I won finally in the Senate, but it was a bitter fight.

HESS: Even though we haven't discussed all that was in the Pope's encyclical, did you agree with the provisions in the encyclical?

CARSON: Oh yes. Oh yes, yes. And I had a very interesting thing about that. I was, at that time--there were three religious groups, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ and the National Catholic Welfare Conference and the American Rabbinical Conference, were organized into a little interfaith work which has been going on here, oh, from 1925 on, and the Catholic priest up in the National Catholic Welfare Conference was Father--forgot his name--Father McGowan, Ray McGowan, and Dr. John A. Ryan, Monsignor Father John A. Ryan, celebrated economist and so on, he was head of that division of NCWC and Ray, Father Ray McGowan, was his assistant.

[37]

But Ryan turned over this work to Ray and Ray ran that conference. When I was an active member of that conference we had about twenty people that worked in the work.

Well, one morning in 1921 Ray called me, Father Ray McGowan, called me down at the Federal Office Building and he said, "John, have you seen 'Quadragesimo anno'?"

And I said, "No, I haven't seen it, I've heard something about it."

He said, "Get it, get it, it's the greatest thing that's come out on the Catholic Church in our day," and it was. "Get it." And he read some of the quotes.

And I said, "Well, Ray, listen Father McGowan," I said, "nobody reads these damn encyclicals, the public doesn't read them, who's going to read them, what good is it?"

He said, "Good," he said, "I'll tell you what I'm doing, I'm carrying around in my back pocket, when I go out and make these speeches for a lot of Bishops, when they start asking me where I get authority for that I just pull this out of my back pocket and wave." Well, it was undoubtedly, and of course today it's--there's no one who will oppose what he said. You could say that I disagree with his

[38]

philosophy and so on, okay, that's fine, but no one will say that...

HESS: It was a little radical for the time.

CARSON: Oh it was, oh yes. Of course, the later ones that came out of Pope John are even more radical but this is radical enough. That's what this fellow is pointing out that there's--even in '31 here was a Pope that was far out ahead of the Catholic Church that--well, now we get back to Truman.

HESS: Before we get any further on that, let's discuss the 1944 Democratic convention, and I understand that you and Max Lowenthal attended, is that right?

CARSON: Well, Max Lowenthal, incidentally, yes, we went out together, and that was a very interesting experience, and we went out together.

HESS: Held in Chicago that year.

CARSON: Yeah, held in Chicago, and a fellow who was, I don't know whether Mac gave you this name, T. Edwin Quinsberry, did he give you that name?

HESS: Not--I don't recall.

CARSON: T. Edwin Quinsberry. Quis had been on the New

[39]

York Stock Exchange for years, and the House of David, he always said he was a speculator. And he and Max had become friends. I'll tell you where he and Max had become friends, and that will help you on Max so much.

Quis had told me where there was a firm that was on bankruptcy, or threatened with bankruptcy, and he said, "We, our house, has considerable interest in that firm, and tried to salvage what we could get out of it." And he said, "There was a lot of the big operators had their attorneys at this conference and some of the small business had." And he said, "Of course, what they were going to do--I became chairman of that conference, agree on a settlement, division up from the assets that were there, a division of the assets," and he said, "They were doing what they were always doing in those things, John, the guys that were the harpies, that are in there fore--the lawyers for the other guys were there trying to take everything they could and so on, so on, and this thing went on this morning. And finally just before noon, a young man got up in the back of the audience and he said that he would like to be heard because he had a client that was interested, the client was a small businessman who," and he named the client, and he said that he made a proposal that--for an organization of a discussion of this conference group here, so on and so on. And he said, "He impressed

[40]

me very much, I listened to it, and when he got through I said, 'Well, we're going to take an adjournment for lunch.'" And he said, "When I went out for lunch one of the lawyers for the big--the big interests, came to me and said, 'You're not going to listen to that little tyke out there

that's representing the small businessman, he's just a tyke over here trying to get his foot in the door and so on."

Quis said, "I'm not only going to listen to him, I'm very much impressed by it and I probably will do something that he's doing. If I'm going to continue to be chairman of the conference, I think that we're going to do just what that little tyke proposes."

So he said, "When I went back into the conference in the afternoon, I called on this fellow to get up and talk again and he talked, and presented." I said, "We're going to handle this conference in that way I'll assure you." He said, "The man was named Max Lowenthal," and he said, "I got acquainted with Max from that and thereafter I became Max's friend and we have been intimate friends ever since."

Well Quis was a very rich man, but a very honest guy, and a very fine guy. He was a very great friend of Adlai Stevenson, by the way, intimate friends. And Quis had gotten us a room at the Illinois Athletic Club,

[41]

which is two squares or so from where the Democratic convention was to meet, the headquarters of the convention. And we got there on Sunday afternoon. On Monday I called Lou Schwellenbach, I saw that he was in town, Monday morning early I called and asked if he would come to breakfast with me at the Athletic Club and he came down and we had breakfast, and told him what I was doing, and I said, "Actually, Max and I are out here for--to support Mr. Truman's candidacy, to see if we can get him to run."

He said, "He's not going to, he can't do it." Yet he said, "We had dinner last night out at Hatch, Senator [Carl A.] Hatch's, of New Mexico. Hatch's apartment, and there was Truman and there was Jimmy Byrnes, who came in late, and Shay [Sherman] Minton was there, and Hatch was there, one other one was there." And he said, "Truman agreed to--Byrnes came in and said that he had--before he left Washington he had talked with Roosevelt and Roosevelt had said that he wanted Byrnes for his Vice President" and he said, "Truman agreed to nominate Byrnes last night. The agreement was made; Truman is going to nominate Byrnes."

"Somebody insisted on Truman, and Truman said he wasn't going to be a candidate under any circumstances and so on. So he's going to nominate Byrnes," but he said, "he's going to have trouble tomorrow because a little late on last night, Barkley's son-in-law came

[42]

to Truman and asked--told him that Barkley was going to be candidate and wanted Truman to nominate Barkley." And he said, "Truman would have been delighted to have nominated Barkley, but he had told--to go back and tell Barkley that, "I have already agreed to nominate Byrnes, but if he and Byrnes will get together on it and I'll do whatever they want, but I'm not going to--I don't want to do anything for one and hurt the other in any way, and so on, but I want

to be fair with both of them.” But now he’s got on his hands--he’s committed to nominate Byrnes and Byrnes has insisted that he go ahead and nominate him.”

Well, Byrnes--Lou told me that Byrnes had told the conference that it was absolutely definite and final that Roosevelt had chosen him, Byrnes, to be vice-presidential candidate. Lou said he doubted it a bit but--I said to Lou, “It’s a damn shame your name is Schwellenbach, because you could have been a candidate in this thing. But the name--a ticket ‘Roosevelt and Schwellenbach’ would never get very far.”

I remember Lou said, “Some of my family changed the name when we were up in Linden Minnesota or northern Michigan changed it to Schwelling. I don’t know why they didn’t give me the Schwelling, “but Lou Schwellenbach thought he was going to be a candidate sometime. Anyhow he thought he was--you know, the

[43]

next vacancy that came over there on the Supreme Court at that time, Lou had done a very fine job for Tommy Corcoran and Roosevelt in the campaign, or Al Smith was campaigning, you know he turned to go--lost to Roosevelt. Roosevelt was nominated, and he represented the National Economic League or association that had just been organized, a big interest, a big powerful banking interest, and he made a speech attacking Roosevelt. And Tommy Corcoran came up the next day to my office and said, “John, I’ve got to get somebody up here to make a speech attacking Smith. Who would you get for that?”

And I said, “Well, on many counts I’d say Schwellenbach, he’s not a Catholic, but he’s always been a very fair guy, he’s a Democrat of course, and I am sure that he supported Smith and campaigned for Smith in the ’28 campaign.” So Tom asked me if I’d go around and see, and I went around, and he asked me--took Tom back and introduced him to Schwellenbach and Schwellenbach agreed to make that speech, and I wrote the speech and the Schwellenbach revised it, of course. Tom put a hand in it, but Schwellenbach made the speech and it was a very effective speech, and Tom expressed his gratitude and debt to Schwellenbach and the gratitude and debt that the President had.

[44]

Well, Schwellenbach had become somewhat distinguished in the Senate for many reasons, he’s a very able, very fine fellow. And when it came to the Supreme Court nomination, why, Schwellenbach was called down to the White House one morning and I went around to see him when he got back, and he told me that the President had told him that his name was on the top of the list. And the list--Shay Minton’s name was on the list, and so on, named three or four, but he didn’t name the present Justice of the Supreme Court, who had been, or at that time was chairman of the Security Commission.

Well, I remember one thing, another thing in this situation. I went around to see Norris later on about something, and I said to Norris with some little enthusiasm, emotion in my voice, I said, “You know Schwellenbach is going to be appointed, he’s been told this morning by Roosevelt

that his name is on the top of the list for appointment for the Supreme Court.” Norris immediately became a bit depressed and I said, “What’s the matter?”

And he said, “John, I have counted on it very much, I think Schwellenbach can become a really great Senator, and that’s far more important than being a member of the Supreme Court,” and Norris was very much depressed.

Well, Schwellenbach didn’t get the job, he appointed this fellow, you know who I’m talking about, Justice

[45]

Douglas. He appointed Justice Douglas.

Well, there’s quite a story about that that I couldn’t prove, but Schwellenbach and Tommy Corcoran became enemies. Schwellenbach said that Tommy double-crossed him and I think Tom did.

The story that Schwellenbach had was that Douglas had become an intimate friend of Roosevelt, and their friendship had developed because Douglas managed to get up around the White House around 4:30 in the afternoon when Roosevelt was tired and he would get in to see Roosevelt and put his feet up on Roosevelt’s desk and tell him a lot of stories, funny stories, and risqué stories and so on, and they became pals. And then Roosevelt had the story once that one day Tom Corcoran got word from Roosevelt that he wanted to appoint Douglas, but he wanted to find some way to dramatize the appointment to make it stand up. But Tom wrote--on that very day Douglas happened to be going over to the Mayflower Hotel to address the National Association of Security Dealers and so on, Douglas being, at that time, chairman of the Security Exchange Commission. The story told, I’m sure to Schwellenbach, was that Tom had gone to Douglas and told him that your name is right on the top of the list and the President wants to appoint you, but you’ve got to do something. Now go there and make

[46]

A speech, just raise hell with securities, the action of the Stock Exchange and so on and so on, and you’ll be appointed.”

And he went over and made that kind of a speech and was appointed. That’s the story that I can’t prove at all. I never asked Tom about it because Tom and I, we’re still acquaintances and we still speak and are friendly, but I don’t trust Tom’s judgment or Tom’s activities any more. But--you asked me about--oh, well, Schwellenbach came over to see me that morning, I told him that we were going to be for--well Max had Truman go--took Truman to see Sid Hillman, I didn’t know that because my job, I had friends, personal friends in the Missouri delegation, I had personal friends in the Indiana delegation, had worked out there. I had personal friends in the Michigan delegation, and I had personal friends in the Maryland delegation, or I had newspapermen, acquaintances and friends there. But I had chosen the delegate--the head of the delegation there in Michigan, because I knew him very well, and I was talking with him and he

worked with Max and me. My job was to get them to hold off the nomination until the last moment because we were determined to get Truman nominated if we could get him nominated. Max knew what little we could do and how much we could do. And the chairman of the Michigan

[47]

delegation did a fine job on it. He got delegates from these four states together and he did hold off. I saw him right--the night before the--when in the crucial night he was--after the crucial night he was--I'll come to that in a moment. But then I got Elmer Middleton to come over from Detroit from the AFL and he worked--he represented the AFL over there and we were very, very close personal friends and he was working, doing everything that he could for Truman.

Well, then the next Tuesday we were afraid on Tuesday that Wallace might break through, because Sid Hillman had agreed to support Wallace, the CIO was supporting Wallace, and he was willing--he went along with Max as a second choice he was going for Truman, but as long as Wallace was in the race he was going to stay there. And I think I had--I'm sure I--I can't recall how I got Elmer Middleton of the AFL to see Truman. I think maybe I took him in and Max got to know him very well also, and he took him in to see Truman. But Tuesday it was very tough, we didn't have much hope. The fellow--the Wallace gang and others were opposing Truman openly and it looked like Wallace was going to pull through. Byrnes' name was not--or not Byrnes, Byrnes' name was mentioned, but Douglas' name was not

[48]

Mentioned at all in those days, but I was--the White House gang, the fellows that are out there for the White House, were in a hotel, across--I think it's the Knickerbocker out there across the street from where the convention headquarters was. And I'm sure now as I recall Hopkins was out there I'm sure and the--I'm a little hazy, but I'm sure Hopkins was there, Lowell Mollet was there, Lowell was my pal, he was there, and a couple of other fellows were there. Tom Corcoran was not there, but I forget who was their contact man in the White House, but from that crowd at that time there were slates that came out. They had slates passing the word out to--certain slates that would be acceptable, approved by the President.

But the interesting thing in those slates, I only saw two of them, as I recall I knew two of them, but the interesting thing of those slates, on the face of them they were fraudulent, they would have--the first one they would have maybe some--the name of someone that wasn't--Cordell Hull for example, would be the first name. Now Hull had absolutely refused to permit his name to be used and I heard that--the Judge didn't talk to me, that's one of the few times that we didn't get together and talk. But I knew what it was, you know Hull's wife was a Jewess and he didn't want to--he had come through the Klu Klux Klan period, I had got him

[49]

to be chairman of the Democratic National Committee and he had been in a fight with the Klu Klux Klan there, he was always afraid that his wife was going to be dragged into that and so on, and so on. And he made it very positive that he wasn't going to be a candidate. And I had that word from him because I passed it out that he wasn't going to be out there. I knew that he wanted me to get the word around wherever I could, whoever I was talking to. And they had Jessie Jones on the list, I remember Jessie Jones. And then about--they'd have four names like that maybe, people that no one would even think of being a candidate, or being nominated and then there would be Justice Douglas, see. There wasn't any doubt but what that gang was working for him. Now I can't say that Roosevelt had ordered them to work hard, but they were.

HESS: Do you recall if that was the time that Roosevelt passed through Chicago on the train on the way to the west coast...

CARSON: Yes sir. Yes.

HESS: ... and he released a letter, he had given it to Robert Hannegan, and it's the so-called "Truman-Douglas" letter, where Mr. Roosevelt had said, "If I were a candidate or not," he said, "I would be pleased to run with either of these two men, Truman or Douglas."

[50]

The story goes that the letter was first given to Hannegan as "Douglas-Truman" and he took it in to Grace Tully, Roosevelt's secretary, and had her retype it as Truman-Douglas, putting Truman first.

CARSON: Well, there wasn't any doubt but that Truman was their--Roosevelt was deter--anxious to get Douglas nominated and Max and I were determined to beat him.

Now I'll tell you something else...

HESS: Now one question before we go on there: Why do you think that Roosevelt was so against the man who had been his Vice President for the first-- for those last four years, Wallace?

CARSON: I wasn't in that fight...

HESS: Even though Roosevelt did send a letter saying, "If I was a delegate I would vote for Wallace," which was very weak. You know in 1940 he sent a letter in saying, "If you don't give me Wallace I won't run." But here in 1944 he comes--it comes out a much weaker letter, "If I were a delegate I would vote for Wallace." And it has been pointed out that Mr. Roosevelt almost took a lack of interest in it, the important--the startling thing on Roosevelt's part was his lack of interest.

CARSON: Well, yes, I can't tell you why, and I know that

[51]

Roosevelt was determined that Wallace should not be nominated, in fact Sid Hillman was for Wallace, but he knew very well that they were fighting somebody else.

HESS: Do you think it was mostly Mr. Roosevelt who was opposed to him or the people at the White House, the staff?

CARSON: I would say maybe there was some of that opposition. I didn't--I wasn't down to the White House very much because Mr. Roosevelt and I were not too very good friends at that time. Well, I had no right, he had no--I wasn't well enough known to be friends or anything else, but I did keep in touch with the White House and I knew that were--the Douglas thing was on and I was--with the gang that I was working with, I told them the whole background what I was sure was going on and how the Douglas thing was being promoted and keep us supporting Wallace enough to keep the thing alive, but not too much, because probably they would find someplace else to get another candidate and if they had nominated Barkley, I would have been pleased beyond measure. I say because I was tremendously--I knew Barkley very well, much better than I knew Mr. Truman, and knew a great many years. Barkley was one of the great, great men that I have known. But on this Tuesday, Max and I worked on

[52]

that and one of my jobs was, because I knew all of the correspondents--not all of them--but I knew most of them--was to go down to the ranks and talk to the correspondents about Truman saying, "Eventually they are going to nominate Truman," all the time.

I remember I had a funny experience with that. Well, just about two or three months before the convention when it was--there was not--there was no thought about who would be the nominee unless it was Wallace, there was no talk about that.

I decided that I would go around the press gallery myself and do some lobbying, was what I'd do, or did. And I went over one day and Charlie Ross was lying on the couch of the press gallery half asleep and I pulled a chair up alongside of him and I remember so well I can quote it, I said, "Charlie," I didn't know about Charlie's connection with Truman at all at that time, and I said to Charlie--about his personal connection, I knew he was a friend of Truman's. But I said to Charlie, I said, "When you think of the Truman Committee's investigation of railroads and so on, Truman--all the publicity that Truman's got, it wouldn't take much if we'd get together," I said, "I'm for Truman, I think it would be rather easy for us to do a job to help Truman. Do you want to help Truman, Charlie?"

[53]

Well he said, "Of course, I agree, I'm for Truman, I went to school with him as a young man."

And I said, "Okay, I don't need to do any propagandizing here John, you command a big command, I'll help you."

So I went around told everybody. Out at the convention I knew all of the newspapermen in those days and they knew me and I had helped them a lot and they had helped me. So I was doing a lot of propaganda, but I can't tell you what--I know that one thing that Hull had been irritated considerably by Wallace. Wallace was constantly, during the first Roosevelt administration, Wallace was constantly going to the White--well now I don't say constantly, but I know that he went to the White House and talked with Roosevelt on this occasion I know. I know one day that he got Ickes to go with him and they went over to Mr. Roosevelt and some big plan on international relations, some big project, they worked on the thing.

HESS: Not on the Department of Agriculture at all?

CARSON: No, it was on international relations and Roosevelt called and said, "We'll have to get the Judge to come over."

Called and all of a sudden Hull came over and took off his coat and hat, overcoat and hat, and we hung it up and Roosevelt said, "Henry and Ickes, Harold, have

[54]

what they think a very fine idea of what we should be doing in international relations and so on," and said, he called on Wallace to present--wanted Wallace to present it because he said it was Wallace's idea originally and so--their project. So Wallace went into a long statement of his reasons and so on and so on. And when he finished Roosevelt turned to the Judge and said, "Well, Judge, what about it?"

And the Judge got up, walked over and put on his coat and hat, said, "Well, gentlemen, I've got quite a few things on my desk over at the State Department that I've got to be busy at," and turned and walked out.

Well, that condition continued, there wasn't any doubt but what Hull was not friendly with Wallace, he might have been personally, politically he was not friendly, and I think Hull may have been instrumental in influencing Roosevelt because Roosevelt had treated Hull so despicably, you know, that there was some good reason to win Hull's friendship at times, and Roosevelt did go out of his way at times. But I was in the situation at the Economic conference where Moley--drive down to see Hull, I was--in fact, Hull called me down, on a Sunday morning, I don't know whether I told you about that.

[55]

HESS: Raymond Moley.

CARSON: No--did I tell you about it?

HESS: Yes.

CARSON: Well now Sunday, Couzens and I had got in there late. We were in there a week later and I didn't go to see Hull, but one day I was raising--I was arguing with the State Department administrative clerk. I started down the stairs with him. I wanted a room; they had put me on the fourth floor with no bath and so on and so on. And this fellow said that didn't have any rooms and we got over there late and we'd have to take it.

I said, "Well, I won't take it, I'll take my per diem and go over to the Dorchester and live with the newspapermen."

And he said, "No, you've got to stay here, clearances, and you can't get your per diem."

And I said, "Well, I don't want the damn per diem, and I'll go to the Dorchester," and went running down the stairs, and the delegation came in, Couzens wasn't with them, but Hull and the Chief Justice and Jimmy Cox and so on, and Hull looked up and saw me and said, "Well, there's John Carson, old John Carson," and he ran up the stairs quickly and said, "John, I'm so glad

[56]

to have you over here. I need your help and my office is there and I'll tell my clerk that you're here and you're to call me at any time, I need you." And he said, "You know these fellows."

And I said to Chief Justice -- I said, "Hello, ---, and I know Governor Cox just casually from about 1920, but I don't know this man."

The other fellow's name was Morrison; Couzens hadn't gone out that day. Well, Hull--they went downstairs and this guy, McGrath, or whatever his name was, important bureaucrat that was running the show over there, he said, "You know, Mr. Carson," he said, "I've got a problem." He said, "You know, my wife is coming over here tomorrow, and I've got a room around here that's not big enough for two, but may be big enough for one. I wonder if you like to look at that room?"

And I said, "Okay," and he stepped up to go back to this room and he said, "Here's a room right next to the Judge, how would you like this one? Let's look at this room." Well, this looked like the parlor of a palace.

And I said, "No, I don't want this room, let's look at the other one."

And we went around to look at the other room and he said, "By the way, it's right across the way from the suite that Senator Couzens has."

[57]

I said, "Let's look at that one." We went around; it was on the second floor. "If this was big enough for you." Well, there was a double bed, a great big flat top desk, four chairs and a bath big as--a bath about as big as this room or bigger. He said, "Will this be big enough?"

HESS: It had a few places didn't it?

CARSON: Yeah, I was--I rated right away you know. Well, the Judge and I consulted occasionally, but on Sunday morning Moley and what's his name, Swope, had come over on a Sunday and Moley was in and out, Moley didn't--the first thing that he did was absolutely stupid. I went around to talk to the Judge's secretary, running the committee room around there, I was wanting to get some information about the hearing that day of the commission, and the fellow, the young fellow that was running the room that day said, "Mr. Carson, did you hear that Mr. Moley was here?"

And I said, "Yes, he came in last night, the newspapermen were telling me about it, he came in yesterday afternoon."

He said, "Well, he was over here this morning, he came over and left a card for the Senators telling them that if any of them wanted to confer with him he

[58]

would be in residence over at the Embassy."

I said, "My gosh, they're still after Couzens. He'll never get--he'll never hear from Couzens if he has to wait the rest of his life. But you tell him that I said, 'You just go straight to hell, you're not--Couzens is not going over there,'" and they laughed about it. And then they told me that Moley had a secretary that was--somebody had assigned to the commission for the purpose of spying on Hull and all that. Hull told me that too. But this Sunday morning, we were on the same floor, I went around. He said, "Where are you going?"

I said, "Going to mass."

He said, "What time?"

And I said, "9 o'clock." I told you that didn't I?

HESS: Yes.

CARSON: He said, "Sit down, I'll--you're going to talk," he said, "I need your help." He said, "You know Moley's over here?"

I said, "Yes"

He said, "Do you know what he's doing?"

I said, "Yes, I know what he's doing."

[59]

He said, "Well, John, he's calling in the delegates over to the Embassy from all of the other countries and he's cutting the ground out from under me completely." He said, "This is very delicate matter to get an agreement on someone solid monetary base around which we can build international relationships, and it's just a matter of talk, talk, talk until you get the boys in the boat. You can't do it any other way. And I have made some progress, but it's going to take several months to get someplace here, I think, but I've made some progress and I'm satisfied with what's being accomplished. He's going around now tell them that he's there as Mr. Roosevelt's agent and cutting the ground out." He said, "What am I going to do?"

I said, "Hell, there's no--you know what you're going to do."

He said, "Well, I'm absolutely out on a limb, now I'm asking you."

I said, "You're going to get on that phone and tell Mr. Roosevelt either Moley goes back or you go back. You can't sit here as chairman, representing the United States Government in this. You're a delegate representing the United States Government; you can't sit here and let this guy be sent over making a fool out of you."

[60]

And he said, "Well."

I said, "What are the other guys saying?"

He said he told me that--I said, "It's obvious."

He said, "Well, John, thanks very much, I just wanted your opinion," and I got up to go and I got over to the door going out the door of the room that morning, had an idea, and I came back and said, "Judge, what you want, you want Roosevelt to call Moley back."

He said, "Absolutely."

"But you don't want to get in a fight with Roosevelt."

He said, "Absolutely, I don't want the commission to be hurt if I did."

I said, "All right, I'll send Moley back."

And he said, "Well, what will you do?"

And I said, "Well, I won't tell you. You can't have any responsibility in this at all. I'll send him back."

And he said, "Well, I'll trust you, John, go ahead."

Well, I went to church and came back at noon and called Couzens over to my office, my room, and told him the whole story, and he said, "I'll send Moley back." So he called in newspapermen and Couzens gave an interview saying that unless Roosevelt called Moley back,

[61]

he, Couzens, was resigning to go back.

And on Monday morning, Moley announced that he was going back to Washington.

Well, when we were on the boat going into New York later, Moley cabled, or radioed, Couzens asking to see him in New York.

Couzens wired back and said that he was going to be at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington on Saturday, and Sunday, if you want to come down on Sunday and see him there. I didn't go out to the hotel, but Moley did come down. Monday morning Couzens came in and Foley and Burt Couzens, and he said, "Do you know what Moley told me yesterday afternoon?" He said, "When he came in I said to him, 'Well, I don't know whether I want to shake hands with you or not. I don't like to shake hands with somebody that I think has been a dirty son of a bitch in the situation as you were in London.'"

And he said, "Moley said, 'Well, you're a strange man that you won't listen to my side of the story.'"

He said, "You're right, let me hear your side of the story and I'll retract everything I said until I hear your side of the story."

He said that Moley told him that Roosevelt had chosen him and directed him to go over there and do this job. I said, "Well, I don't know, I think that's possibly true."

[62]

But I went down a week later and told Hull what Moley had said to Couzens about Mr. Roosevelt and Hull listened to me and then he said, "Well, thank you, John, very much for the information. I didn't count on that." But I'm sure that Roosevelt did--I don't think he told him to go there--he did tell him to go over there and help Hull any way he could help him, and Moley went over and did the job trying...

HESS: All right.

SIDE TWO

CARSON: I actually had--I was in on the conference where Roosevelt--which resulted in Roosevelt's nomination in March of '32. Hull called me down one morning, he was on the first floor and I was on the fourth and I went down and he said, "John, I want the campaign this year developed entirely around economic issues," and I said--he said, "I want you."

I said, "I'll go along with you."

He said, "Well if I do that, John, I've got to take the party away from who is the Democratic National Chairman, because he'll want it away from economic issues and on liquor and so on."

And I said, "Well, I'll go along with you."

[63]

And he said, "What are your Catholics going to do?"

And I said, "Ninety percent of the Catholics are poor, middle class, they are Democrats, ten percent are rich, they are Republicans, and they'll vote their economic issues. There may be exceptions but you don't need to worry about the Catholics, they'll be for what you're trying to do if that's what you want."

And he said, "Well, I can get 12 men to stand for me on the Democratic committee meeting before the convention I can put it over. We'll have control of the chair, we'll put it over. I'll let you know because I want your help."

So I said, "Okay."

And, oh, about four days later he called me to come down right away, and I went down. He said, "You know, I told you if I could get 12 I could do this."

And I said, "Yes."

He said, "I've got 22, what about it."

I said, "Well, it's done then."

He said, "Yes. What's more," he said, "I got a telephone call from Albany last night, it was Governor Roosevelt on the phone. He said he heard what we're doing and he wanted to go along with it. What do you think of that?"

[64]

I said, "I don't like it, not at all."

He said, "Why not?"

I said, "He's a New York delegation to the convention, he's one of the delegates at large, and here he is now down here playing footsies with you to cut Smith's throat, and yet he's committed to supporting Smith." I said, "I don't play in that kind of company."

And he said, "Well, the convention delegates haven't been appointed."

I said, "Judge, don't fool me, you know damn well the Democratic chairman, the Democratic state chairman, and the Governor and the two Senators will be the delegates at large, and you know they always are, and you know he knows what he's doing."

He said, "He didn't call you until this time over the phone and tell you he'd go along with you." I said, "I don't like it, moreover, he's going to be your President."

He said, "Can he be elected?"

And I said, "Sure. Anybody can beat Hoover by a million votes, and he'll put--you add the name Roosevelt on the ticket and you'll get two million votes. Sure, he can be elected, but I don't like it."

He said, "Why not?"

[65]

And I said, "Well, Judge, I saw him around here in 1918 and 1919, he was the kind of a guy that wore white flannel trousers, and a blue surge coat and a straw hat yelling Harvard or something. No sense of responsibility at all. The fact is that at one time, I know Josephus--Jonathan Daniels will differ with me because he's still--he's friendly towards Roosevelt, but Josephus Daniels, who I think is the greatest Secretary of State that I've known, one of the greatest ever, Roosevelt was his Assistant Secretary, and there were times that Josephus Daniels couldn't find where Roosevelt was. He was on his own; he was the boss of his own ship. Well, at least I was told that very, very--I was told one time that Josephus was trying to find him and he found out that he was in Europe, on the front, up near the front someplace. Well, and then other times I heard quite a few things that left me with a great deal of contempt. I know that Al Smith when he was chairman, or Democratic Floor Leader in the Senate up in New York, constantly had trouble with Roosevelt. He could depend even on Jimmy, "___oh, the singer and dancer who Al had to spank pretty hard.

HESS: Walker.

[66]

CARSON: Jimmy Walker. "He could depend on Walker going along when he got to him and kicked the hell out of him, and Bob Wagner. He had--but he didn't know where Roosevelt was going to be practically any day and any time." I said to the Judge, "Now, I just don't play that kind of a game."

He said, "Well, John," he said, "Oh, you've got him wrong. He's been a sick man since then and he's changed, he's changed." He said, "You have him right in 1918, that's what he was in 1918 and '19," he said, "but he's a sick man, a wholly different man, you're going to like him."

And I said, "Well, I hope so Judge, because I think now he's going to be your President."

He said, "I think so also." He said, "Okay."

And then I remember he said, "I'll talk to you again, John," he swung his chair around and looked out on Delaware Avenue and he said, "but I have to say to you John, there isn't one thing in his conduct of the finances of the state of New York we can boast about."

I said, "That's what I'm telling you Judge, the guy..."

Well, so I--anyhow, Wednesday came up out there and Truman was absolutely not going to be a candidate, nothing,

[67]

you couldn't do anything about it. But I was over again, over at the Morrison Hotel seeing my Michigan delegation, the fellows from it and talking to some of the newspapermen and so on, and I got back about 3 o'clock to the hotel--in the bar room of the Athletic Club and Max was lying on the bed with his hands folded on his chest, tapping his chest and looking at the ceiling. And he said, "John, we've got to get another candidate, quick," he said, "or we're going to have Douglas." He said, "Truman came in this afternoon down at--to Hannegan, and Hannegan called him in and told him that there were going to get nominations the next night and that Truman had to make up his mind, that he had to be a candidate."

And he said, "Truman went all out and said, 'nothing doing,'" and they said--they sent the chairman of the Missouri delegation over to Truman and Hannegan told the chairman to stick with him, and get a yes or no, but to get a yes, if he could. And he was in there for two hours with Truman. And he came back and said, "There isn't a damn thing you can do with this guy, he is absolutely committed he will not be a candidate, he is not going to be a candidate."

And I said, "Well, in preference to Douglas, I'll take Wallace."

[68]

And he said, "I will too."

So I said, "Well, I'll get down and see Tom Stokes the correspondent, columnist, a very fine guy, a good friend of mine and a good politician." I went down to the hotel to tell Tom the situation and get Tom to see if they could hold off with me out there before having to--why, if they couldn't get Truman, they could get Wallace.

And we went to sleep that night and the next morning I went over have breakfast with the Democratic National Chairman from Michigan, and I was in the Morrison Hotel at 7 o'clock waiting for him to come down and Truman came in. And there was nobody in the lobby. And I walked over and shook hands and said, "What are doing up here today, Senator?"

He said, "I'm going to have breakfast with the most beautiful girl in all the world."

And I said, "You're not going to do it, Senator, that's my daughter and she's back in Washington."

He said, "It's my daughter, she's upstairs with a couple of her playmates, girls, and they're coming down and we're going to have breakfast."

And I said to him, "Well, Senator, I was with Max last night, I heard what you decided last night, yesterday afternoon, but I guess you saw the Chicago Daily News, and Joe Guffey has a big piece in the News

[69]

today saying you're the candidate of the corrupt bosses and so on, so on, the whole line." And then the fellow who is now Congressman from Florida, oh he was...

HESS: Pepper.

CARSON: Pepper. "He has a shirttail on it charging you with out here trying with your gang-- and in the cities, trying to--these guys are just out here trying to drive you out of this damn race. I thought you had enough guts to go in and fight them. And I told Max that if you read that stuff in that paper, what they're doing to you, you'd change your mind."

He said, "That's just it, Mr. Carson, that's just it. You go back and tell Max that I'm in this up to my neck and there's going to be a fight all the way down the line and I'll be nominated on the second ballot tonight. Go out, go back and tell Max." I raced back to tell Max what Truman had said to me.

Well, then Max had gotten word that they had got--Hannegan and others had gone to Truman that Wednesday afternoon at 4 or 5 o'clock, and after quite a battle they induced him to become the candidate and he is going to become a candidate."

But the other thing that I think that you like is--one afternoon we were sitting down, as I told you, in the anteroom to the hotel where the convention headquarters were and--and Max and I--that was on Tuesday

[70]

night I guess, Tuesday, and Truman turned around and looked and saw us and came back, and he said, "I know what you fellow's are down here for, you might just as well get up and go back home. I'm not going to be. I told you I'm not going to be a candidate."

Well Max said, "That's true."

He said, "You know the guy that gets this vice-presidential nomination might become President and I'm not competent to be a President of the United States." He said, "I'm not competent to be a Vice President of the United States." He said, I was not competent probably to be Senator, I

was never competent to be a Senator.” He said, “the only damn thing that I’ve been a damn bit of good at was an artillery captain, I was a damn good artillery captain,” and laughed and said, “Now, go on back home.” And he went away maybe ten or fifteen feet and he came back, “One more thing, you fellows,” he said, “I know what happens in the White House to President’s children, children of Presidents in that White House and it’s not going to happen to Margaret. You go back home.”

HESS: That was before he changed his mind, huh?

CARSON: Yes. Yes--we--but that’s well, I didn’t see Mr. Truman again until--Max--when he was nominated I didn’t

[71]

see him after he was nominated. I did see him that night, but I didn’t see him at all and I didn’t...

HESS: Did you see him in the campaign?

CARSON: No, I didn’t see him in the campaign. I can’t remember of any place seeing him in the campaign. I was in the campaign, up to my neck, but that campaign that was the election I was wholly with Roosevelt, of course, because of Truman, but I didn’t support Roosevelt personally after the ’36. I did in ’36 because I thought he saved the country from revolution in the four years ’32 to ’36. Thereafter I saw too many things, the Bronson Cutting episode and other things. I couldn’t take it, so I--’42 on--’42--no, ’44. ’44 was Truman, I did everything I could, I did some campaigning, but I didn’t get out making speeches or anything, but I was dealing with newspapermen and passing--handing out propaganda stories and so on wherever I could for Truman, telling about what he’d done on the committee, and so on, that was all I could do and I did it.

HESS: You brought up an interesting subject there about Roosevelt’s health. What was your opinion of Roosevelt’s health at this time?

[72]

CARSON: Well, I thought his health was very good. I was--I saw nothing--oh, at the time of Truman’s. . . I didn’t see him at that time. I saw pictures of him and I thought there was a question about his health at that time too. But in the early days, in the ’32s he was in very good health.

HESS: Just with the polio, but outside of that he was pretty robust.

CARSON: Oh yes, and--oh, yes, he was very vigorous, and . . .

HESS: When did it seem to you that Roosevelt’s health started to fail, shall we say drastically?

CARSON: The only thing I saw--well, I had a very intimate conference with him. I told you about that the last day, when I told him what the bituminous coal commissioners were doing to violate the law over there. I stuck with him that night, that was about '37 or '38, and he was perfect health at that time. But of course, I saw him up at the Senate once. He came up to the Senate once, one night for something and. . .

HESS: About what time, what year?

CARSON: Oh that was--I think that was around '40. I've forgot the year, and I remember watching--they took

[73]

him in the side door, a wheelchair in the side door. I was right over there at the time.

HESS: This was before the war?

CARSON: Yes. He was in good shape in those days. The guy who was a--now I don't know whether this--there was a--the Bronson Cutting affair was an example.

Bronson Cutting came here from New Mexico as a Senator, appointed, a vacancy had occurred, he was appointed. He got here right at the time of the famous Newberry fight, this was the big fight that Jim Reed as chairman of the committee to investigate campaign expenditures, charged--the committee charged that more than \$300,000 had been spent up to--to elect Newberry. Newberry ran against Henry Ford, by the way, Henry was the Democratic candidate. But Bronson came up, Newberry was lying finally, they didn't beat him in the Senate, it was close, but Capper of Kansas ran out on us in that fight and...

HESS: Old Arthur Capper?

CARSON: Yes. He had promised to vote against Newberry, but Bill Kenyon was leading the fight, Senator Bill Kenyon of Iowa was leading the fight, and I ran into Bill--Kenyon, Senator Kenyon, he was Bill and I was

[74]

John--one day and I said, "How do we look?"

He said, "Have you got a poll that, "-- usually I carried a poll, sent it around, checking them off, what it was going to be. And I showed him the poll and he said--I thought we were going to win by one or two votes, and I was a newspaperman at that time, and Bill Kenyon went down and he said, "Well, I hear you're wrong." He said, "Capper is going to be against us."

I said, "Why, that guy has pledged himself."

He said, "I know. But I know that he is going to vote against us because Mrs. Capper has told Mrs. Kenyon that Arthur is going to vote for Newberry."

Well I said, "Okay." And I'll tell you this is funny. I went up to the press gallery and Earl Cletes, a newsman, we used to work together, I got my--I got a little group together and I told them the story, and got a job right away.

My job would be to go down and call Senator Capper out of the Senate to the President's--or wherever newspapermen sat, and there was one place there that there was a mahogany bench and I called Capper out and I said, "Senator Capper," I said, "Senator, how about that farm bill that you've got before the Department of Agriculture, and I have a bill to ask you about."

[75]

And he went on to tell me all about this bill and what he was doing and so on. Had a little squeaky voice. And then when he got through, I said, "Say, Senator, have you made up your mind how you are going to vote on Newberry?"

And he started to polish the floor with his trousers, the seat of his trousers. He said, "No," he said, "I haven't made up my mind." He said, "I think that--I think, he says--this Senator Newberry didn't spend the money and he didn't know a thing about it, yet they say that there was \$300,000 spent out there, and it's difficult to believe or know how he could spend \$300,000 without knowing about it," and so on.

And I said, "Well, when you make up your mind Senator, let me know."

He said, "I will. I will."

Well, then, Red Smith, with International News Service went down about five or ten minutes later and I would go in the Senate gallery and watch and you'd see the page boys go in and get Capper. He'd begin to shake--and Red Smith would greet him, "Railroad consolidation bill, how about your railroad consolidation bill?"

Capper would give him the spot, and Red would say, "Senator, have you made up your mind how you're going to vote on Newberry?"

[76]

Well, there was four of us and we just hazed hell out of Capper for about two days. And I ran into Bill Kenyon one day and he said, "What in the hell are you--what the hell did you fellows do to Capper?"

And I said, "Well, we took him over the coals."

He said, "Somebody has that fellow."

I said, "Why?"

He said, "Well, Mrs. Capper told Mrs. Kenyon that Senator Capper had changed his mind, that he would vote for Newberry if they needed his vote, but if they didn't need his vote, he wanted to vote against Newberry." He said, "If they needed votes or something. If they don't need his votes he's going to vote against Newberry."

HESS: Now that we are on to Capper, did you ever hear the story that before he would decide how to vote, that he would make two piles from the letters from his constituents, and whichever pile was the highest was the way he would vote?

CARSON: I wouldn't be surprised. One of the funniest things, I wanted to write comedies as well as other things, and one thing about a lot of these stories--and oh, it was the funniest thing. He had a Cliff somebody, one of his editors of one of his papers, he brought Cliff here as the secretary, and Cliff was...

[77]

HESS: The Topeka Daily Capital.

CARSON: Huh?

HESS: The Topeka Daily Capital?

CARSON: Yes, he wrote this...

HESS: Oh, Capper's Weekly.

CARSON: Capper's Weekly. He wrote this--Cliff wrote his speeches and so on. And Capper's voice was a very little voice you know, and soon, and he was most. . .

HESS: I heard that voice at 3:15 every Sunday afternoon for his fifteen minute show.

CARSON: Well, down here--he'd get down in the front row, and have his speech written and he'd say, "Mr. President," and then he'd read this thing with his head down and so on, and nobody knew what he'd said. And then Cliff would write the story for the papers, "Senator Capper thundered in the Senate..."

HESS: That made him sound pretty good, huh?

CARSON: I don't know whether you'd be interested in the Cutting story, but that's a story about Roosevelt. We don't need to go into unless you want to. Well, Roosevelt--nobody knew...

[78]

HESS: Your opinion--in other words, your opinion of Roosevelt took a nosedive, diminished.

CARSON: Absolutely diminished.

HESS: One other thing. . .

CARSON: Hold that off just a minute now.

He was appointed and the Newberry fight, he went all the way out with the reactionaries for Newberry and he was a very rich boy, you know, and a very rich boy, and big man, big man physically. And then by George, almost overnight he turned over and became oh, his esteem for Norris was a thousand percent. And he just couldn't do anything, Bob LaFollette--Young Bob, he had worked, very thick friends and everything we were trying to do, Cutting was one of the best. Well, along came this Roosevelt campaign and Cutting left his party in '32 and actually, Hiram Johnson was to deliver a radio, national radio hookup address from Denver, or Salt Lake City and Hyrum couldn't make it and Cutting went on and made it, and I think he paid the cost of the radio. But then he came to Washington, came back, of course, to Washington, and Cutting was supporting the bill to pay the soldier bonus, and Roosevelt had committed himself to support to pay the soldier bonus.

And Cutting--all the crippled soldiers were sent down to New Mexico, you know, the cases and

[79]

he spent a lot of time. And he was a hundred percent for payment. But the one thing that he said, that he was for Roosevelt and so on. Well, then Cutting came to me one morning--no, I was going across from the Capitol to the Senate Office Building and Cutting was walking around ahead of me, and I stepped up to walk along with him and I said, "Bronson, what's troubling you this morning?"

And he said, "Well, John, can you come into the office?"

I said, "Yes."

He said, "Why is Jim Farley attacking me, he's attacking me in my own party. He's using all the Federal Works employees down in New Mexico to beat me from the nomination in my own party." He said, "If he was just waiting until the campaign, but in the primary, why is he doing this, spending all this money trying to beat me?"

I said, "I don't think Jim Farley's doing it."

He said, "Oh yes he is, John, I know he's doing it."

And I said, "Oh no." Well I said, "I'll find out for you." So I got in my car, went down to the State Department to see Hull, and told him what Bronson had said.

[80]

He said, "John, I don't think Farley is doing this."

I said, "Well, Farley thinks he said. . ."

He said, "No, I'm sure not, you can say that he isn't doing it. Farley tells me that he has no part in this, whatever anybody is doing he hasn't anything to do with it."

Well, I went over to see Farley--no, I went to see--I called Bronson the next day and told him such and such.

And he said, "Well, I understand it's Roosevelt that's doing it himself." Well he said, "I can't understand why."

Well, I usually had a stag party about once a year, in the fall or sometime, out at Columbia. And I organized one immediately, had Norris and Jim McLain of Wisconsin, some of the others out there, and Cutting and I had Tom Corcoran come out. And I had Tom bring out his guitar and put him next to Cutting because I wanted Tom to talk to Cutting and after it was over I asked Tom what he thought about Cutting and he said, "He's a wonderful guy, John, he's so on and so on and so on."

I said, "What do you think Tom, Farley, Jim Farley," I didn't tell him that--I told it to him, "Jim Farley is

[81]

using everything in the Democratic Party to beat Cutting."

Tom said, "Well, I'll stop that, I'll be in your office tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, and I'll be ready to tell you it's stopped, and you can tell Cutting that."

The next morning, 10 o'clock, Tom came in and said, "As I promised to you, it isn't Farley, it's the Chief, and nothing can be done about it."

And then I went back to Hull and he said--Hull called me on the phone in the afternoon and said, "That's right, nothing can be done about it."

HESS: What did Roosevelt have against him?

CARSON: Well, I went around to see Cutting and I asked--I told Cutting the story and he said, "I'd hear that--I understand that Roosevelt says he questions my word, my pledges. Well, and I have said--that's the reason." And he said, "Roosevelt just decided just to beat me because he's giving all the help he can to Chavez and so on, he's going to beat me if he can get..."

Well I said, "Okay." Well, I, about oh, six weeks, maybe three or four weeks later, one morning a fellow came into the office and said, "Did you see a friend of mine," Dick Hodges or something like that came in, said, "Do you see where Cutting is out at the

[82]

White House?"

And I said, "No."

So he said, "I don't know why."

I said, "Well, I don't know either, but I think I know."

Well, about 2 o'clock that afternoon I went over to the Capitol to see Couzens and walked into the Republican cloakroom and the only one there was Cutting and he was walking up and down the floor. And I said, "What's troubling you now Mr. Cutting, you're--I see you're down at the White House, have you talked to Mr. Roosevelt and you--Mr. Roosevelt promised to support you if you'd support this war resolution that's in there, the German war thing, something about war resolution on the floor. He wanted to pass that. And then he said, "Cutting didn't speak for a minute or more and then he came over and grabbed me by the coat and he said, 'John, can you believe that that man, that any man, can do to me what that man did to me this morning?'"

And I said, "What did he do?"

He said, "Just as you said." He said, "I went in and he sat down and was very pleasant, told me about this war resolution and if I wanted him to support him he needed my help on it," and he said, 'You go back up there, vote this war resolution, I'll take care of Chavez, I'll give him a job.'"

[83]

He said, "Do you think a man can bribe me, 'I'll give him a job,' bribe me that way?" He said, "What could I do, he's a cripple, I couldn't strike him, and he's my President, I didn't want to strike him, but I don't think I've ever been so insulted in my life."

I said, "What did you do?"

He said, "I got up and put on my coat and hat and walked out. I can't--I couldn't do anything else. I couldn't strike him, I couldn't do anything. But, "he said, "he's got me in a fix now because of the reservations. I'll take this, I'll vote for this, but," he said, "the boys will know, everybody will know he's had me down to the White House and they'll think I'm bought. And I can't vote for this resolution," he said, "but I've got to go out to New Mexico tonight, I got to appear in a court case where Chavez's gang is attacking me, and I intend to get a plane and get back, but I don't know how. I may stay away," but he said, "I love it, I like very much to vote for that resolution, but I can't vote for it."

I said, "I'll tell you what you do Bob, you go ahead and go down there, get back and I'll take care of it up here. I'll tell Norris, young Bob, the rest of the fellows this story and what Roosevelt has done, just as you told me."

[84]

And he said, "Will you do that for me John?"

And I said, "I will."

He said, "All right, I'll go right down and just as soon as I get through with court I'll catch a plane and come back." And he went down and got on a plane and came back and the plane fell in Missouri and Cutting was killed.

But I never--now I never did--just couldn't quite--things like that that went on, that the--now I never talked to Couzens enough about it to influence Couzens at all. He was a Republican, of course, until he supported Roosevelt in '36, but I never talked to him about it at all. But the only time that Couzens did anything when I was around to question, that I wouldn't have done, I think I would have done it, yes.

One time during the bank closing situation--I got my story over there. They were trying to find out a way to handle this banking situation. Roosevelt--the secretary at the White House called, said Roosevelt wanted to talk to Couzens and I went into Couzens office and told him about it and started out, and Couzens said, "I want you to get on the phone in your office and make notes, take a memoranda, give me a report of what's said here."

And I said, "I don't trust this guy, Roosevelt."

[85]

That's the only time, all the other quarrels Couzens had around here, and he's had plenty of them, he never asked me to get on a phone call and listen to a phone call. This day he wanted a witness.

Well, our relationships with Roosevelt weren't very good, I didn't like him. And Hull--Hull just lived through hell. If I would go on to tell you things he--Hull one time said that Wally would go up to his office, down the hall by Hull's office and on to the White House once a day or twice a day. He never came into Hull's office to do a thing--to tell him a thing that was going on. And all the time while he was in the State Department he was cutting Hull's throat and Roosevelt knew it.

Well, that's--now you want me to talk to you more about Max Lowenthal. I don't know whether I can say anything more about him. But Hull--I don't think Max in the last thirty years of his life ever missed an opportunity that came his way to do a public service at a cost, and never asked anything at all from anybody at any time. And I, as a lawyer, I don't think--I think everybody

will agree that New York was due long--Max was as good a lawyer there was in New York. Max never sought a job, he never--you would never find the slightest evidence of any time

[86]

that Max was using anybody for his own personal good, at all. He was just a saintly guy, his father was the head of a synagogue out in Minnesota. They got in some trouble and they accused his father of something, and his father broke down over it, but they didn't prove anything. But his father got sick, not long, I don't know, and died, but Max never quite got over the suffering his father endured over this little petty quarrel attack.

His mother lived to be way up in the nineties I think, late eighties, very sweet. I never met her but she was a very--Max's wife Ellie was really great, great person. Their kids are great people, but Max is just about as fine and as able--this fellow, he knew--you know when he wrote the book on J. Edgar Hoover, it was called Hoover--FBI--he came over to see me and talked with me about that. And I said, "Max, look, I wish you wouldn't do it."

He said, "Why not?"

I said, "You and I are going to be here a few years and then we'll close out our affairs in this world, it doesn't matter what J. Edgar will do to you or me, but you've got three children and Mr. J. Edgar Hoover isn't going to be happy about the book you've done."

[87]

He called in the three children, and they all agreed that they'd stand on their own initiative, but if he wanted to write the book, go ahead, they'd take--they'd be with him.

So, Max hired a group of about eight young lawyers to see that every sentence and every comma and participle and apostrophe in that supported the facts, and that's the way he--I only tell that to tell how he worked. He worked--anything that Max was in, and we were in a lot of things, anything that he was in--particularly in the railroad investigations, that was a great investigation, it practically demonstrated what's going to happen to the railroads now, and it's happened now. And at that time if--if they could have done something to that investigation to find some way to make the Interstate Commerce Commission be concerned about the little inside wrecking of the railroads we might have saved the railroads. And Max did that, I'll bet that cost him, I wouldn't be surprised that cost him \$25,000 in pay--just to pay his clerical hire and buy books and so on, stenographers and no upkeep. He got very little money for himself.

HESS: Do you recall if the FBI was upset about his book?

CARSON: Was they? Did he tell you?

[88]

HESS: Not very much.

CARSON: Well, they were. They were. In fact, I saw some of it. It was--they were just persecuted, persecuted, persecuted. Roy Cohen prosecuted him; take him before the grand jury in New York. They judged him down here before a Senate-House Committee. And I didn't know he was in Washington until he got away and I called him in New York and I said, "Look kid, I know you've taken a grilling up there before that committee, but I've got a job in the Government, but it doesn't make a damned bit of difference, I'm going down and if anybody don't agree, I'm going to be there. And I don't want you coming down here and running down to this place and taking this thing alone." He told me, then that he'd come down and Burt Wheeler went down, came as counsel to the committee. And then the committee started in pulling J. Edgar Hoover stuff and the Cohen stuff on him. Burt Wheeler just let loose and tore the committee to pieces and--but he was--Max went through that thing constantly for years.

HESS: Did you and he think that the FBI would be vindictive toward the families?

CARSON: To the what?

[89]

HESS: To the families; to his daughter?

CARSON: Oh, I feared it, I feared it might be--I knew what the reaction was. I know that I wouldn't get in a fight if I could take it myself I wouldn't mind, but I wouldn't give the fight that might be hurting to somebody, any--not only my family, but any other friend. I don't want to drag anybody else into it.

Now that's about all I know about the Truman thing. One other incident that I always like to tell about Truman. When he called me down and asked me to take the job, or tell me he wanted me to take it, and I told him that I wasn't going to take it. And we started out the door and there was a big piece there, I don't know whether it was marble or metal or something, and he said, "What do you think of this?"

I said, "I don't know."

He said, "Well, that was sent to me by the Shah of something or so on as a gift from the Shah to me and so on and so on." And he said, "I'm told it's worth millions of dollars and so on." And he said, "But," he said, "of course, it's sent to me personally, but it's not going to be mine personally, it's sent to the United States Government and it's going to the Government," he said, "I'm just handling it." It wasn't his, he was making it clear that he wasn't taking anything from anybody at anytime.

[90]

HESS: All right, you served on the Federal Trade Commission from 1949 to 1953, what are the highlights that you recall of those years?

CARSON: Well I was--I knew that I --there was very little chance that I would be reappointed by Eisenhower. I knew that oil was determined, the motorcar industry, a lot in there were fighting me, and oil, Standard Oil particularly, was fighting me, and the insurance companies were after me.

HESS: You made a lot of powerful enemies, how did you make so many powerful enemies?

CARSON: Well, in the insurance fight you know, they got through a bill up in the Senate to regulate insurance, declaring that insurance was in interstate commerce, subject to the antitrust laws, and then Pat McCarran handled that, Senator McCarran handled that and then they wrote a provision in there that something in the provision that looked like it might provide for exemption--no they didn't. Pat McCarran made a statement.

Well, when I went on the commission I said that I was confident that our commission had authority over insurance companies that the court had held that it was interstate commerce, and that Charles Evans Hughes had exposed the insurance companies. Justice Brandeis certainly did much to expose them and thought that they were

[91]

a menace, and they were at times--they were violating the antitrust laws and that our commission was going to insist on regulation of the insurance companies, antitrust, as long as I was there. And the commission authorized me to go up to talk to the head of the New York commission up there, state commission regulating insurance. And I went up and talked to him about it, and I said,--he said, "Well, you just want to expand your job."

And I said, "Well, whatever you like, whatever you like."

He said, "Why not?"

And I said, "Well, because we've got too damn much to do now, the taking on this damn job of regulating insurance, that would keep the commission busy, or the commission's three or four times as busy, but what I want to do, I want you to make clear, and to admit to agree that the commission has this responsibility, but let's transfer that to law men in the assembly so that we will be relieved of that responsibility or we will get plenty of money to do that regulating job.

And I remember he said, "Mr. Carson, I have the biggest staff in New York, in the state of New York bigger than any other staff by far. He said, "In fact, in my division of the New York State Government there are more employees than in all the other divisions of

[92]

New York State government, and I can't begin to take care of the job of regulating the insurance companies in New York, all over the state of New York."

I said, "Well, that's the reason I don't want it, but I don't want--I'm giving my oath of office to see that this law is enforced. And I know that we've got authority and therefore, responsibility to the Federal Trade Commission. If you--if we can get an agreement, get the insurance companies to get an agreement to relieve us of the authority, or if not, give--help us get enough money." And I said, "I agree, I think that the regulations should be by a separate commission big enough to do the job."

And so that word got back and I immediately proposed to the commission that we--and we had a little bureau down there on insurance--that we appropriate no more money for that bureau, because it wasn't doing a damn thing, and so that word got out and I was fighting the insurance companies and so on. And I don't think everything was done, then the Standard Oil chiefs up there in Detroit, the retail dealers, brought that case and our attorneys said there wasn't a bit of doubt on that case, we had a case and obligated, so I fought that case through and finally got an order. But when we got up to the Supreme Court, I think it went to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court threw out

[93]

the case.

But I handled that case and again the oil companies were on my neck and so on, and then the sparkplug case. The head of the biggest of the sparkplug companies came to Washington, hired a former commissioner to come out and see me to plea--to tell me that they weren't going--guilty of what was charged. I'm sure they were as guilty as they could be. And I, of course, had to go through with that case, and the result was that we didn't--the decision, that was made after I left the commission, but we lost that case.

And when we had the big steel case down there I insisted that the head of the economic division, I asked--proposed the commission at least, to have the head of the economic division come in and argue the case along, have time to argue the case along with lawyers, let the lawyers have their say, our commission lawyers, but also I wanted the facts presented in the case. And I--well, I found the lawyers for the commission and Dick Clayton--Dick Whiteface was head of the--was handling that case, he's an old lawyer down there, and he had the same idea, he agreed with me and we did have corporate interest in the division come in and just make the argument in the steel case.

And then when that word got out that I was the rascal that was fighting these cases, then the other thing that got

[94]

along, we had an examining force, trying examiners, who handled a force of about eighteen, twenty. They went out and heard cases all over the country, and then the cases would come back, they would recommend the decisions, and then the cases would come back and they would be reargued before the commission. And we were sitting on that commission for two or three

hours every day hearing some of the most trivial damn stuff that you wouldn't have heard in a justice of police court, trivial things.

One night, one of the examiners who had been head of the Texas University Law School, I think it--one of the big law schools in Texas, D. M., I think he's still down there. He wasn't liked by the other lawyers too much because he was a very, very--oh, he thought the Supreme Court was the last--was more than the twelfth apostle and so on, distinction, great everything--the law, the law, the law. A very fine man, and I rode home with him one night and I said to him, "Judge," (he had been a Judge), I said, "Judge, what can we do to avoid hearing all of these cases and so on and so on?"

And he said, "Well, you know one of the procedural acts--procedure acts, we could--the commission could have gone two ways. They could have had the examiners make

[95]

and recommend decisions, which they do, or they could have the examiners make a preliminary decision, and that would provide that unless either side appeals the commission."

And I said, "Do you think that can be done?"

Oh he said, "Yes, yes."

And I said, "Will you draw up the resolution to get it done?"

And he said, "Yes."

And I said, "Well, Don, I'll bring it before the commission, but we won't talk about it until--because every lawyer in this place, I think every one of these examiners will be on my neck." But he drew it and I took it in and I found that there was only one lawyer, that was Dick Whiteface, in the commission, the chief lawyer Bill Kelly came in and denounced what I was trying to do, and his assistant lawyers denounced me, and so on and so on, but I finally...

HESS: What was their reasoning? Why didn't they go along?

CARSON: Oh they had--the time that their procedures had been adopted, they had been through it all and so on and so on and so on. Well, somebody told me at that time, the examiners were fighting it, not a lot of them, because they were at least--they had sent ten

[96]

or twelve of these examiners who were absolutely incompetent, through age or some other reason, were absolutely incompetent to be examiners, and if they didn't have to make the interviews to recommend their position, they didn't have any responsibility other than that, they could get their way by sitting up there reading a newspaper.

HESS: They could get by with no more responsibility than they had at the present time.

CARSON: I appealed to the commission that morning and I finally got the commission to agree with me, and we announced that it would be put into effect. You know that the lawyers never quite forgave me for it, but I--the secretary of the commission came to me about a month later and said just what the result of that decision was. I think it was eight or ten, ten examiners were resigning, we are saving more than \$80,000 in salaries this year, so they weren't against me on the Roosevelt, but...

HESS: Did the new method work out pretty well?

CARSON: Oh yes, oh yes, they have never changed it. In fact, I went down to the commission about three or four years later, the lawyers were having a little private

[97]

dinner and they asked me to come down and sit in on a little private lunch, and they got talking about what was I doing now. And they knew I was doing some fighting some place and so on, and I remember one of them said, said to the other--"You know, what Commissioner Carson did on changing our procedures on trials, I think it worked out pretty well."

And the other lawyer said, "Yes, I was sure it--it did turn out all right."

Well, it turned out so much--while I was there we didn't sit on that bench more than one day a week, one afternoon a week, and we had plenty to do not sitting. We'd sit out there on that bench everyday for three or four hours, and listen to cases. I could tell you cases that would absolutely astound you. But that was the procedures that I was moving, didn't have time enough, only had three years, but we had a lot of cases and I did support the--and got through the study of the oil cartels the world over, and that came in, why there were nations, somebody--Jim Mead who was chairman asked, "What are we going to do with this now?"

And Mason said, "Well, if Carson ever says anything, we'll hand it to him to take on." And I took it on and that was part of Ford's published box. I probably hurt my standing with a lot of the liberals or progressives because in that report they stated and Box presented

[98]

the proof that the British Government of the British explorers of oil in the British colonies and so on, that they deliberately got dry holes and dry holes in order not pay to get--they were holding oil reserve in reserve, they weren't developing it. And they'd just get enough dry holes to prove that there wasn't any oil there except for--they were still holding on to it.

And they had this oil and this report was one of the reports, and so I had to go before the commission and say I'd love to publish this thing and I think it should be published, but world war is out and Britain is one of our partners in this war. I don't think this report should be published. I think we should send it to the State Department and ask the State Department to edit

it and so on, and they did, and we wiped, washed out this report. But my friends who were against the oil gang, they worked beside me and worked beside me. So I don't think there was--there wasn't enough time in three years. If I had gone on I would have certainly made a fine test, through a lot more. I think I ...

HESS: What changes would you have made?

CARSON: I would have reorganized the whole commission. I would have taken--Jim Reed you know fought the bill when the--bill creating the commission way back in '33, he fought

[99]

saying the commission should not be both the investigators and the prosecutors, but should be--that should go to the Department of Justice and so on. Well I--when I said in '36, '37, '38 when they asked me to go on the Interstate Commerce Commission, or when I was proposed, I said no, the only job I'd take was the job on the Federal Trade Commission because I thought Mr. Brandeis was one of the greatest men I'd known, and I knew he was interested in the commission and that he was picked to be one of the prime authors of the commission act, but after I got on the commission and saw it, no, I would agree with Jim Reed 100 percent. I think the first place was just one we are not going to even begin to attack the problems of the Congress of the United States until we find some method of developing the facts, and presenting the facts or anything else is pointless to the Congressmen. Now you--the fact-finding organization is not--is poor, now it's better than it was, but it's still very poor. There is no justification of why, and not just transfer--from the Senate and the House calling on the Federal Trade Commission if we didn't have, we didn't have all this other, we were just a fact-finding agency such as Mr. Brandeis wanted, to develop facts, and recall some of these bills we'd transfer all the facts up there that we've got, and present them, and let the

[100]

Proponents of the--opponents--the parties of the case, both sides, attack the commission facts. Then you'd have a permanent record made fact-finding the facts. Now you get the record where committees will sit and they will be--I don't know what it is today, but when I was up there about an hour of your day, of every day for a committee meetings, was to try to get a quorum. And you would rarely--well, you'd get a quorum, but you'd finally get a quorum where one or two would say, "You can count me as a quorum," and they wouldn't even come. If five was a quorum you only get three maybe, the other six or seven wouldn't come. Six or seven would come in there and sit for just long enough to be counted and then run off to another committee or someplace else. And it was--the result was you got--and if you did get a hearing, unless it was a big case, and it developed a lot of publicity for it, unless you got a hearing you got the facts of A, one which was against, and B, one which was for. But you didn't get a--an impartial finding of facts whatsoever down there. Without the facts you're not going to solve this problem of Congress without the facts. And if they have it, oh, I was in one other fight that I've always--the one thing that I remember, my other problem.

[101]

My paper the Baltimore Evening Sun was very much interested in the budget act, a couple of jobs. In the old days we had a little auditing department, bureau, in every agency. Charlie Dawes was in that fight when Harding became President, Coolidge's Vice President, and I wrote column after column about those hearings and about--I wrote really propaganda for the reorganizing the budget in the old General Accounting Office.

We got it through and there was tremendous applause, commendation from everybody. They appointed a man by the name of Karl, he had been Norris' first secretary when Norris came to the House, and then left Norris to go to the Harding campaign. And he was appointed comptroller general. All he did for three or four years was, oh, I don't know how long, was to investigate whether or not somebody was stealing the fraudulent expenditures of money, or illegal expenditures of money. Well, when I went over to join with Couzens, just as soon we had the Bureau of Internal Revenue investigation, that education investigation, and another one coming on, that was to create the commission on communications, but one that I was determined to do something about was the General Accounting Office.

And I remember I went down there one day, I had a couple of hours at noon, I went down to see Karl, he

[102]

wasn't there, the General was out playing golf and the General had about four young men assistants in there. They wanted to know if I could tell them and I said, I'm going to tell you then I'm going to tell Mr. Karl, but I'm just going to raise particular hell everywhere I can raise particular hell to make sure you fellows do your duty down here." I said, "This--budget act puts upon you the responsibility of determining not only the legality--the illegality of expenditures--but determining the efficiency of expenditures, and the efficiency of expenditures is a big job, and I'm going to see you do it." Well, they laughed and said they disagreed with me. But I said, "All right let's fight."

Well, a few days later a fellow named Ollice McGuire came up my office, a great big fellow, in the afternoon and he said, "Now, I don't want--I want a commitment from you that you will not say anything about me being up here, my being up here."

I said, "Okay."

He said, "Well, I'm assistant counsel for the General Accounting Office and you're a hundred percent right." He said, "I'll get you the whole hearings on this, and you're a hundred percent right, and so on."

And I said, "I knew I was," and he got me the--our act here which was revised in 1920, the British

[103]

pattern, we took the British law that's been developed and patterned--it runs very closely, the Budget and Accounting runs very closely to the British act and he showed me that Jim Good, Congressman from Iowa in the House, Jim Good made it very positive in the one statement that he made. There was no doubt about it, the bill not only provided for the investigation and determining the illegality or legality, but the efficiency of it, and that was the important job.

Well, as you know, I started on that, the first time on that, I hate to say this, but I went to see my good friend Bob Wagner, Bob was chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee at that time as I recall, or something. I went to see Bob, asked him if he wouldn't give me a subcommittee to make an investigation. Bob was interested, but he told me he'd do it, but he was loaded, he wouldn't possibly find opportunity to do half of what he wanted to do, and it just--let this one slip through his hands. He didn't talk with me anymore about it.

And Fred Van--under Fred Van Nuys, from down here in Indiana, I knew Fred. Fred became chairman of one of the committees and I went to Fred and asked Fred to give me a subcommittee. He said he would, he was interested in this. But he went--he gave me a subcommittee

[104]

under Jim Davis, under Jim Davis of Pennsylvania, who didn't know enough about his job as a child would have known. He was chairman and I could no more explain to him what I was up to at all and I never got any place.

And then Jack Cochran--they had two committees in the House, one in the House and one in the Senate, committees on the expenditures in the executive department and Jack got the chairmanship of the executive expenses in the House. And I can't remember just the date, but I'm sure that I know--I'm positive that I talked to Jack about it. And Jack went overboard for it, and Jack immediately, in his committee, called in the General Accounting Office and demanded an investigation in some phase of the efficiency of expenditures. He went all out to find--Jack became an advocate of advocates. And Jack usually got things done and that was the--that was really the cause of the reorganization of the House--of Senate and the Congress which was--Bob La Follette and the Senator from--and the Congressman from Oklahoma, but it was Jack's workmen did that. And then there was a vacancy down in the General Accounting Office for comptroller and they got Congressman Warren from North Carolina came over, and he and I became pals in fights, and now they set up committees, you see,

[105]

in the House on Government operations. I remember I went over to see Chet Hollifield one day and Chet was on the Atomic Energy Commission, chairman, and I said to Chet, "Now if you're on the Government Operations Committee, and you can't be on both of these committees..."

Chet said, "Yes, I think I can, but if I have to make a choice, it's going to be Government Operations, I'll get off the Atomic Energy Committee, that is the biggest committee, it still is,

but not in the same that what's his name from Arkansas then, he's been in everything he's chairman.

HESS: McClellan?

CARSON: Yes. Over in the House, the chap who is running it now, they're doing this. But that's all that I know about the work down there that I did.

HESS: What's your opinion of the success or failure of the FTC in meeting its challenges during those years?

CARSON: Oh, we were--we lost practically every big case that I was interested in. I, of course, had someone, that was an emotional involvement in the case. The commission had been interested in something, and that was the monopoly of the undertaker dealers, the undertakers of the country. And I finally forced the

[106]

commission to take that case up and I picked the two lawyers to handle it and we got a fine record on that case, I think, proved it conclusively, there wasn't a bit of doubt about it. But we went up to the commission, the man that handled it for the commission, he handled it for himself, he was handling it, he had the authority. He ruled against us and he brought--we--neither side--we appealed. Our lawyers appealed for the commission proper and we insisted on a decision and went up to the appellate court, it was up to the appellate court, I guess the Supreme Court too, and they threw the case out and I never could understand that case, I think we proved that case. But we had first--the commission was--it always was known as the little commission. I think the appropriations for the commission are less than practically any other commission, and--much less.

You had this theory developed down there that it was solely--that the commission--I remember I went to one of the lawyers one day and to tell him that I was going to raise hell on the commission if they didn't vote more on the budget, the economic division, fact finding. He said, he was a good friend of mine, quite a guy, and he said, "John," he said, "I agree with you on fact finding if the fact-finding is related to a case before the commission."

[107]

I said, "I know you do John, but I'm not interested in that--I'm interested in that, but that's the smallest point of it. I'm interested in the factfinding, developing facts to educate the people and so on and so on."

Now you can't--and we have this situation, you could issue an order against patent medicine and so on and so on. A skilled lawyer could carry that case on and on and on for trying to take it up to the courts and getting it thrown out. The courts were--the courts were usually against the commission, they didn't like this theory at all.

HESS: Why?

CARSON: Because it was--the same thing that Jim Reed didn't like it, this business of trying these cases should be tried by an independent body and so on. And the Department of Justice was very much against us, so much so that I went over there one time because I knew the fellow handling oil, the lawyer handling oil, this investigator, I went over and he and--well he, what's the fellow in the Department of Justice who was the research lawyer, very able, one of the finest fellows I've ever known, a fellow named Watson Snyder. He wanted very much to get an agreement between the commission

[108]

and the Department of Justice, so that a certain field work in oil would be handled by the commission and the other--the Clayton Act he wanted us to handle and so on. He could never get it, and the Department of Justice they practically said, "Well, we'll go over and we'll announce that we're going to--some way the information would get out that we were going to win the case, let's say the Standard Oil case, which was complacent and amenable, they'd immediately put that on their trial investigation to stop us, and they practically agreed that they--it wasn't only in oil, in everything, that they just hated the commission so much, they had such contempt for the commission that they did everything to block it.

HESS: Did that come--did that go all the way up to the Attorney General?

CARSON: Oh, I'm sure it did. In fact, when McGrath, I think it was, who was Attorney General for a while, Jim Mead and I went over and talked to him one day just to tell him that we ought to find some way...

HESS: To cooperate instead of compete.

CARSON: Yes. Yes.

HESS: What did he say?

CARSON: Oh, he said that he would look into it and so on,

[109]

And he agreed with this as we talked, but nothing ever came of it, I don't know what it is now. But then you had this thing of--this situation, you get into the patent medicine cases and they'd go on for a day or years, and years, appeal, appeal, appeal. Well, once you got, say into something, Carter's Little Liver Pills, is the famous case that I got into. Well, once you get all that advertising and all the years you can establish the name Carter's Little Liver Pills, very little--after the court throws it out, they can rewrite the advertising, but they've got the--the sales...

HESS: They've had their publicity and you couldn't get it, that Carter's Little Liver Pill case, I think, when I got in there I was so outraged by it I grabbed that case and insisted on fighting it through myself, they assigned it to me. I think the lawyers for the company and for the commission I think they dragged that through--they had had it something for fifty years.

HESS: What was the basis of that, misleading advertising?

CARSON: Oh, misleading advertising, yes. There was no--there was nothing in those pills to affect the liver at all, it was just a harsh cathartic, a harsh, rough cathartic that was all it was. But we finally won, by

[110]

they struck out the "Liver," Carter's Little Pills they call them. And now that people buy them...

HESS: They still remember, yeah...

CARSON: Well, that was the--and then you went around--there are so many things I can't remember. But everyplace you turned you found that precedents had been established and made it difficult and so on.

HESS: Even yet today you hear a great deal about the movement underway, or that should be underway to make the Federal Trade Commission more consumer minded. Should it have been back in those days?

CARSON: I said it was the finest consumer agency of the government. In fact, I have, when I started that movement to determine who got the consumer's dollar, how much went to labor, how much to advertising, so and so and soon, more or less. I called in representatives of labor, small business, to--I didn't tell--I had no publicity to it, but they were friends of mine in all these places, the cooperatives, the farmers, and so on, and I remember one of the representatives of labor, there was two from the AFL and one was a young man, another an older man. I didn't know the young man very well, and after I presented what I was trying

[111]

to do, everybody agreed but this young man from labor. He said, "But I will--we should agree to this because the finding might be that labor was getting too much of the riches."

The older man said--Mr.--Johnny said--called me Johnny, said, "John, you don't need to worry, don't pay any attention to this young man. If that can be found it should be published and labor will go all the way with you on this thing." I was constantly trying to develop it as a consumer agency, it got all of the authority, but if they'd only take away this question of trial in cases, judgment--final judgment, and turn that on to the courts, or back to the courts, or set up another court if they have to. I think that then we can develop the commission as an educational, fact finding commission, and you could develop responsibility, you could be ready to adopt the

authority, the appropriations. I don't know what the purpose--if I ever remember looking at the salary, what little money they got.

HESS: Did you often meet with President Truman on the Federal Trade Commission matters.

CARSON: No. No, he was...

HESS: Did he pay much attention to what was going on down on Pennsylvania Avenue?

[112]

CARSON: Well, I don't think he had a chance because he was so busy with so many things during that time period, closing the war and all the war problems and soon, and you know they got through--the Hoover Commission got through a provision in the act that the President should appoint the chairman of the commission. Well, that should have never gone through and should never have permitted it.

HESS: Why?

CARSON: Why, the commission is an agency of the Congress and it should be an agency of the Congress, and the chairman of the Commission should be responsible to the Congress and the Congress should be made to know that that responsibility rests there. You know, Joe Eastman, who is probably the greatest commissioner of the ICC, and probably he was the greatest man on any commission here for many, many years, one time I went to see Joe and asked him to do something, and he said, "John, I don't think I can do it. I'm really in the dog house in the White House."

I said, "Why?"

And he said, "Well, Roosevelt called the representatives of all the commissions over to his office the other morning and set forth the plans for their relationship with the White House, and the executive

[113]

hereafter, and they were going to have to send all of their budgets to the Budget Committee and so on for approval of the--by the Budget Commission and so on and all this, and he asked about it and a couple of the representatives on the commission, who wanted to be good boys at the White House, applaud this thing, and turned to me and said, "How about you Mr. Eastman, your voice will be more than anybody's voice."

Joe said, "We can't do it, we won't do it. It's a violation of the law." And he said, "Roosevelt said where is it violating the law."

And Joe said, "I'll tell you Mr. President, when I go back I'll write you a memorandum, but I'll assure you it won't be done, because the law will not permit to do it, and it wouldn't permit the other agencies to do it."

And he said, "I came back and sent him two paragraphs of the law and a short memorandum on it. I got word that I was not wanted around the White House anymore."

So the end of any commission should be responsible to the Congress and only to the Congress and they shouldn't have any other judicial...

HESS: Why not to the executive?

[114]

CARSON: Huh?

HESS: Why not to the executive?

CARSON: Well...

HESS: Aren't independent agencies sort of midway between the Congress and the executive?

CARSON: No, that isn't the--they shouldn't have been. That's what they became in some respects, but they should never have been subject to the executive department. As I'm sure that Mr. Justice Brandeis said to me once, "It's utterly impossible to accomplish anything through the agencies, investigating agencies, which are subject just to the executive departments." That's true because the control of our Government and our way of life in this country is in the hands of big, powerful economic interests; oil, railroads, insurance and so on; banks and so on. They run our Government.

Now what Woodrow Wilson proposed, you know, the principal he laid down, particularly publicity of facts which are public because of their very nature, you can never possibly hope for any of that principal being adhered to and adopted by the agencies which are subject to the executive department. That's what Mr. Brandeis

[115]

said. Eventually that power, when it can be exerted in secrecy here as it will be in the executive department.

Now you find the other thing, Mr. Hess, that I found in all these Government--and not all--enough government agencies to be impressed by it. The lawyers that come into the government service have two goals, or two, if they want to succeed; they move one of two ways. If they are going to stay in the government service, they are intent upon developing their strength and powers of government services, the bureau then developed. The lawyer knows pretty well that he mustn't get out of line very far, if his chief is--and his chief is there because he's been

appointed and so on, if he doesn't want to stay in the government service he's going out to practice law. Well, he isn't going to develop a reputation in the government, so he's attacking. He's one of these guys that's going to expose, expose the railroads, expose oil and so on. He's going to find some way to establish himself in the good graces of all these prospective clients, so that he's caught between the two things. I think that--I'm sure that was absolutely true in the Bureau of Internal Revenue that I investigated, found all over the Bureau of Internal Revenue so that the commission--I would certainly, if I had my way, I would establish the commission as an agency of the Congress, fact finding,

[116]

complete authority to find facts, they've got not only complete authority, they've got an obligation now, but complete authority to find facts and plenty of money to do the job. But I'd transfer back to the courts their responsibility and to the Department of Justice its responsibility to prosecute these cases. But I make it clear it was the obligation of the commission, where it differed with the Department of Justice to become a continuing, never-ending critic of the Department of Justice, and has failed. It is using the public forum for exposing the Department of Justice and its failures.

HESS: Were there any people on Mr. Truman's White House staff that proved helpful or useful to you?

CARSON: Oh yes.

HESS: Charles Murphy, the Special Counsel?

CARSON: Yes. Yes. Oh, anything that Charlie could do for me at any time, he did, and they never asked--they never asked for anything. In other words they didn't try to influence the decisions at all, never at any time and I think that I was closer to them--personally closer to them. Jim Mead was closer to Trumann than I was of course, but Charlie Murphy was--those fellows down the ranks, I can't remember all their names, but I--they were very fine.

[117]

HESS: Yes, there was a great deal said about five percenters doing this during this time and...

CARSON: No.

HESS: Never had phone calls from the White House?

CARSON: No.

HESS: Did you ever hear of any commissioners receiving any phone calls?

CARSON: Not a thing, and that--that was one of the most venal--I think, Mr. Hess, as I recall, you might be interested in this. When they tried Matt Connelly out at St. Louis, I was told that the Judge of that case that set to the--on two occasions the jury on that case, the grand jury came in, or the jury, trial jury, came in to tell the judge they couldn't agree on a verdict and he sent them back on two occasions and told them to stay there until it got a verdict in the case. I don't know whether that is true, but I also was told is true that two weeks after that verdict was rendered, the judge--for the jury, and the judge got it, went out in his automobile and shot himself in his head and killed himself. I know that the judge out there, the judge did do that and I was told that was the judge in the Connelly case.

[118]

That thing that happened there, angered me so much. If Matt Connelly had wanted to be playing a game of that kind he could have been worth millions and millions of dollars. To think that because he took--and I'm sure Connelly if he could--if he hadn't--a fellow bought him a suit of clothes or something, that Connelly had any way of giving it back without offending this fellow he would certainly--had no more effect on Matt Connelly or on the guy down in the Internal Revenue Bureau. No, that was just part of a, well, the Sherman Adams crusade against Truman and I know there will never be no on in this day or in a future day that will justify Sherman Adams in that, in my opinion. I think any newspaperman that looked at that story would--of Sherman Adams and what he did in that case, would ridicule it.

HESS: Did you ever have anything to do with Sherman Adams during the transition?

CARSON: No. No, not a bit. I had nothing but--I had nothing but contempt for him because of what he did.

HESS: What did you see as Mr. Truman's view of business, and not just big business as opposed to small business, but in your opinion, what was Mr. Truman's view of the role of business in the national economy?

[119]

CARSON: I don't think that I ever talked to him about it. I sat and talked to him for a long time one night. I was trying to get was giving a speech and he finally gave the speech, but he told me about his whole history with the--when he became the county commissioner, or judge, out there, that's what it's called out there. All of his experiences there, and--but I doubt that--I doubt that he's had enough experience to be aware of--to become anything of an authority in that field. I have no doubt that if he had--an issue had been developed as it developed with the railroad case in that committee. He'd learn the facts pretty quickly and then he'd be all on the public side. There wasn't any doubt about that. He was a, what I would call a progressive of progressives. He was--I think Truman, probably, I have never--I never asked him. I think probably he was a great admirer of Woodrow Wilson and Wilson certainly was a progressive of progressives in those first four years, so I think Truman probably--Truman was always, of course, Democrat, and...

HESS: What are your views on business? Should we have total free enterprise or...

CARSON: No, I would...

[120]

HESS: Some of the guidelines necessary.

CARSON: I would encourage the development--I would personally encourage the development of the consumer cooperatives and credit unions, particularly credit unions now, which have become the most important financial institution we have, but I would encourage their development. And for example, there was at one time, I think a few years ago, you know how things slip back, but one time a few years ago that this government had assured the consumer cooperative oil companies of an adequate supply of oil. I don't think you'd had any trouble with any antitrust provisions thereafter. I think that the competition of the consumer cooperatives in oil would have prevented the development of any--they would have been forced, the public interest law against the oil companies by their competition.

I am sure the--we are not going to solve any of these problems, the way industry develops in the country now, we are not going to solve them--we aren't beginning to solve them, they are getting worse, and there is no answer to this situation.

You look at the other thing. Of course, this was rather new, radical stuff in the act. When a corporation gets a charter from a state the state officials, our state officials, are responsible to me as a citizen

[121]

and other citizens, to see that they fulfill that charter. Now there isn't a state, I don't know of any state that could, if it ever looks at the work of a corporation--you can go in and get the charter of a state to organize a corporation. I assume that in states now corporations may make a report once a year. I'm sure that nobody ever decides--that charter is looked on as being a grant that nobody has any interest in, but here is a consumer republic down here does have an interest in it, and he has every right to demand that his state official shall investigate and see that that corporation is serving the public interest through this grant, this charter. It's established not--it is a complete irresponsibility on the part of corporations, because it got worse with the consolidation of the corporations. And as long as you have that, Mr. Hess, I don't think you're--I don't see how you are going to begin to solve the problem.

Of course, the Federal Trade Commission Act, you know, Bob Justice--I'll think of his name in a minute--Bob Jackson. Bob Jackson--there was somebody seeking an injunction from the President's commission from investigating something. Bob Jackson rejected the petition and announced to the Federal Trade Commission Act, they could launch any fishing expeditions or

[122]

anything else they wanted to, while the act was that broad. It is that broad, if you want to give them the money to just enforce that part of the act and do the job, I think the commission would. You know the commission was the only Government agency created by President Wilson that he was enough interested that he got out of the White House to take a walk and walked over to the commission to see how it was doing in the early days of the commission. It was undoubtedly his favorite commission in government.

HESS: We're just about out of tape; I have three more pages of questions. Shall we turn it off?

CARSON: Yeah, you can go ahead and read the questions when we get through.

Index

Adams, Sherman, 118
AFL, 24
American Rabbinical Conference, 36
Atomic Energy Commission, 105

Baltimore Evening Sun, 101
Barkley, Alben, 42, 51
Brandeis, Justice, 90, 99, 114
Bureau of Internal Revenue, 19, 115
Byrnes, Jimmy, 41, 42, 47

C&O case, 14, 15
Cairnes, Jack, 7
Capper, Arthur, 73, 74, 75, 76
Capper's Weekly, 77
Carter's Little Liver Pills case, 109
Chavez, 81, 82, 83
Chicago Daily News, 68
CIO, 24, 25, 26
Clayton Act, 108
Clayton, Dick, 93
Cochran, Jack, 1, 2, 4, 5, 104
Cohen, Ben, 20,
Cohen, Roy, 88
Committee on Interstate Commerce, 8A
Connelly, Matt, case 117. 119
Cooperative League, 25
Corcoran, Tommy, 20, 43, 45, 48, 80
Couzens, Jim, 8A, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 18, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 81, 82, 84, 85, 101
Cox, Jimmy, 55, 56
Cutting, Bronson, 73, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84

Daniels - Jonathan, 65
Davis, Jim, 104
Dawes, Charlie, 101
Democratic Convention (1944), 38
Department of Justice, 99, 108, 116
Douglas, William O., 45, 47, 49, 50, 67

Eastman, Joe, 112, 113
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 90

Farley, Jim, 30, 79, 80, 81

FBI, 86, 87, 88
Federal Council of Churches of ?Christ, 36
Federal Trade Commission, 90, 92, 99, 105, 110, 111, 121
Ford, Henry, 73

Garner, John A., 7
General Accounting Office, 101, 102, 104
Good, Jim, 103
Guffey, Joe, 68

Hannegan, Robert, 49, 67, 69
Hatch, Senator Carl A., 41
Hillman, Sid, 46, 47, 51
Hiss, Alger, 26
Hodges, Dick, 81
Hollifield, Chet, 105
Holmes, Justice Oliver Wendell, 27
Hoover Commission, 112
Hoover, Herbert, 64
Hoover, J. Edgar, 86, 88
Hughes, Charles Evans, 90
Hull, Cordell, 7, 48, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, 66, 79, 81, 85

Ickes, Harold, 53
Igoe, William L., 1, 2, 3, 4,
Imalgamated Clothing Workers, 21
Insurance companies, 90, 91, 92
Interstate Commerce Commission, 9, 10, 87, 91, 99, 112
Irwin, Charlie, 20, 21, 22

Jackson, Bob, 121
Jackson, Senator, 335
Jennings, James R., 33
Johnson, Hiram, 78
Jones, Jessie, 49
"Judge" (see Cordell Hull)

Kansas City Star, 5, 6
Kelly, Bill, 95
Kenyon, Bill, 73, 74, 76

LaFollette, Bob, 4, 21, 78, 104
Lewis, Fulton, 23, 27, 30, 31, 32, 35
Lewis, John L., 25
Lowell, 35

Lowenthal, Max, 8A, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 38, 40, 46, 50, 51, 67, 68, 69,
70, 85, 86, 87, 88,
Mason, 97
McCarran, Pat, 90
McClellan, 105
McGowan, Father Ray, 36, 37
McGrath, 30, 56, 108
McGuire, Ollice, 102
McLain, Jim, 80
Mead, Jim, 28, 116
Middleton, Elmer, 47
Milliman, Max and Elmer, 27
Minton, Sherman, 41, 44
Missouri Life Insurance Company, 13
Missouri Pacific case, 8A, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
Moley, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62
Mollet, Lowell, 31, 48
Morrison, 56,

National Catholic Welfare Conference, 36
Murphy, Charles, 116
National Economic League, 43
National Tax Equality League, 29
Newberry, Truman, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78
Norris, 44, 78, 80, 83
Nye, Gerald, 27

Pendergasts, 6
Pepper, Claude, 69
Pope Pius XI, 31, 32, 33, 334
Preston, lee, 26

Quinsenberry, T. Edwin, 38, 39, 40,
Quirk, Bob, 31, 32

Railroads, 87
Reed, Senator Jim, 5, 98, 99, 107
Roden, Eddie, 30
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 24, 30, 41, 44, 45, 49, 50, 51, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 71, 72, 78,
79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 112, 113,
Ross, Charlie, 5, 52
Ryan, Monsignor Father John A., 36

Schwellenbach, Lou, 6, 7, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45
Scripps-Howard, 31
Smith, Al, 64, 65

Smith, Red, 75
Snyder, Watson, 107
Sparkplug case, 93
St. Louis Post Dispatch, 7
Standard Oil case, 108
Standard Oil, 90, 92,
State Department, 98
Steel case, 93
Stevenson, Adlai, 40
Stokes, Tom, 68
Supreme Court, 92, 94
Swope, 57

Topeka Daily Capital

Truman, Harry S, 5, 6, 7, 8A, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 27, 38, 41, 46, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53,
66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 89, 111, 118, 119
Truman-Douglas letter, 49
Tully, Grace, 50

Van Nuys, Fred, 103
Vandenberg, Arthur, 6, 27
Vorhees, Jerry, 29

Wagner, Bob, 6, 66, 103
Walker, Jimmy, 66
Wallace, Henry, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 67
Warren, Congressman, 104
Washington Star, 31
Wheeler, Burt, 8A, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 16, 17, 18, 88
Whiteface, Dick, 93, 95
Wilson, Woodrow, 3, 114, 122