

Oral History Interview
with
JUDGE MARVIN JONES

Member of U.S. House of Representatives (from Texas), 1917-40; Judge, U.S. Court of Claims, 1940-43; U.S. War Food Administrator, 1943-45 (on leave from U.S. Court of Claims); Chief Justice, U.S. Court of Claims, 1947-64; and Senior Judge, 1964 to the present.

Washington, D.C.
April 3, April 20, April 24, May 8 and May 14, 1970
by Jerry N. Hess, Harry S. Truman Library

The Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri
May, 1971

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HESS: Judge, before we get into the days of the War Food Administration and Mr. Truman's administration, tell me a little bit about yourself. Where and when were you born?

JONES: I was born in the country, on a farm, about ten miles south of Gainesville, Texas on February 26, 1884; I believe that's the date. I grew up on the farm, went to country school, one room schoolhouse, and I took an examination for a teacher's certificate when I was sixteen

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years old and passed it and was given a certificate to teach in the state; but the trustees would take one look at me and say, "You are too young to manage our school." I taught school one year when I was only about eighteen or nineteen years old.

HESS: What grades did you teach?

JONES: There were no grades. I just taught a one room country school one year at Elm Grove. I was a tenant farmer one year, growing both wheat and cotton. Father had eleven children, nine of them lived to adulthood. He wasn't able to send us to college on the farm prices of those days.

I followed a schoolteacher out to Miami, Texas, in the Panhandle of Texas, in 1901. I was very fond of the teacher and went to school out there a year in a school that was

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called Miami College. It was really a good high school. I was graduated from Southwestern University, Georgetown, Texas. That's the predecessor of Southern Methodist University. I finished a four-year college course there in three years. I worked my way through school and paid my own expenses. I won the Commencement Debate at Southwestern, which was regarded as the school event of the year.

I then entered the law school at the University of Texas. I took a three year law course there in two years, and was the second man in the class, and was appointed one of the three quizmasters. We conducted weekly quizzes and graded papers for the weekly quizzes. I won an oratorical prize -- a gold watch.

In 1908 I located in Amarillo, Texas for the practice of my chosen profession. I practiced law there seven years. I was chosen by the

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Court of Civil Appeals as Chairman of the Board of Legal Examiners for the people who wanted to practice law in the sixty-nine counties of the Court of Appeals District.

I had wanted to get into politics from the time that I can first remember. I ran for Congress in 1916. The sitting man was John H. Stephens of Vernon, Texas. There were fifty-three counties in the 13th Congressional District which was 20 percent larger than the State of Ohio and larger than any state east of the Mississippi except Georgia. Georgia had fifty-nine thousand, and Ohio had forty-three thousand square miles.

HESS: Was that all of the Texas Panhandle?

JONES: All the Texas Panhandle and went down into North Texas -- it had been gerrymandered.

HESS: How far down did they go?

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JONES: They went down within thirty-five miles of Dallas, Cook, Denton, Wise, Montague -- a shoestring district. It was more than 400 miles long.

HESS: What was the population back then? Do you recall?

JONES: There hadn't been a redistricting for twenty years and they had at that time nearly seven hundred thousand population. The Legislature had difficulties in redistricting the large state. I knew they would redistrict soon. I thought it was a good time to run. A whole group of men I knew were planning to run as soon as there was a redistricting act.

I announced in 1916, and two other men announced. One was a rich man, Reuben Ellerd. I carried all but five of the counties. I really worked at it. I bought a Model T and I drove

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it like the wind, worked day and night, wore myself out, but I was elected.

HESS: Did the other men work as hard as you did?

JONES: No, they didn't. They spent more money. One of them didn't work anything like as hard and the other one was a great big man, physically -- he was also a great talker. He spent a lot of money, a lot of money for those days, and I didn't have it to spend, so I used his lavish expenditure of money as my text. I said it's his money, he has a right to spend it in any way he wishes.

We didn't have loud speakers much in those days. There were no movies -- no radios. People came to public speaking in that era. I would say, "It's Mr. Ellerd's money. I'm not criticizing his spending, but," I said, "I want to talk to you about approving that lavish

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expenditure of money in seeking public office. If you want to close the door of opportunity to every young man in the country, this is the way to do it. In England, the men with money are in the House of Lords. They don't get any salary. The body has only rich men, and much of the legislation for the people is killed in the House of Lords because they don't understand the needs of average people. Do you want to make a House of Lords out of the .American Congress?"

I would see a boy standing by his dad, or a man with a boy in his arms. I would look at the man with the boy standing by him and I would say, "Before you scratch my name from the ticket on July 22, I want you to take that blue eyed boy (or brown eyed boy), in your arms and say, 'Son, I voted today to close the door of opportunity in your face. I love you, but

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this is what I decided I had better do.'" I believe that argument was very effective.

HESS: Do you think that swung some votes?

JONES: I think it helped. Anyhow, I saw a great many people personally. That was the most effective way in those days.

I would like to tell you one incident that happened that was published all over the state later. They had a picnic reunion at Matador, Texas. It is right out on the prairie and there wasn't any shade. They had an arbor built covered with gunny sack material -- the only shade on the grounds. There were some mesquite trees, but it was summertime and dry and those mesquite trees simply stopped the breeze and didn't stop the sun.

Everybody came into that arbor bringing

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their children. The arbor was oblong with the speaker's stand on one side. A big mechanical merry-go-round was located on the opposite side from the speaker's stand. It produced the most mechanical music I ever heard, and was pulled by two small mules. There were not many people riding on it, mostly the youngsters. Very few could hear the speaker. The women would let the children blow up the singing balloons. Dr. Samuel Brooks, President of Baylor University was running for the Senate. He was a magnificent speaker. I admired him very much. He spoke at 11 o'clock and very few could hear him.

HESS: Drowned out by the merry-go-round?

JONES: Yes, drowned out by the merry-go-round. Mr. Ellert and I spoke in the afternoon. By agreement, we would alternate in speaking

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that day -- he spoke first. Mr. Ellerd was the rich man, a great big husky fellow, and he puffed and blew and hollered and just wore his voice out. I was sitting there with the chairman whom I had known in school, Wendel Johnson; and I said, "What do you think that fellow makes on that clanking merry-go-round?"

He said, "Not very much, about eight or ten children are riding on it."

I said, "If you can hire him to break down for about three dollars when I start speaking, I think it'd be a good investment."

He says, "That's a good idea." He slipped out and went around. He came back grinning. I didn't think he had had time to get back. He said, "I got him for two."

HESS: He went cheap didn't he?

JONES: Yes. I think he wanted to rest his mules

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anyway. When I started speaking I had a magnificent hearing of country people. The folks stopped all the talk, and I had a wonderful hearing before the big crowd and a lot of handshaking followed. After it was over I met Mr. Ellerd, my adversary, out on the grounds. He said, "You're the luckiest damn man I ever saw. That machine broke down just after you started speaking."

I said, "Yes, I guess I was lucky, wasn't I?"

I have a picture of that merry-go-round. The newspaper had coincidentally take a picture of that whole contraption at that time. Years later when the story was published over the state, Douglas Meador sent me a clipping which I have in my files.

You may not want to use it and may take it out if you wish.

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HESS: It's all right.

JONES: Anyhow, I came to Congress.

HESS: One thing on that: What was your first impression of Washington when you came here?

JONES: I had never been east of the Mississippi River and they had told me when I was running, this wealthy man would say, "This is no time to send a boy to Congress. The war was over in Europe, and sparks were flying all around in 1916. He said, "Why, if you elect him, he can't find his way to Washington."

I just laughed and said, "He may be right, but," I said, "if you elect me, I'll get somebody to show me if necessary. I'll get there." It amused people.

Anyhow, when I first came to Washington I had thought everybody would be dignified. I

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went to the gallery. I didn't know I had the right as a member-elect to go on the floor. Sam Rayburn had the same experience four years before. He and Hatton Sumners stayed up in the gallery at first. We were not told until after we arrived that members-elect had the privilege of the floor. Hatton Sumners laughed in telling me later that he was afraid he would be arrested if he got in the wrong place.

Anyhow, I then went on the floor and I was shown great interest by Champ Clark who was Speaker. He helped me a great deal as he did all the youngsters. You couldn't have beaten him for a Speaker in a thousand years. He left the Speaker's stand and came down the aisle. I thought he was going to the cloakroom. Instead, he sat down by me and began talking about as follows:

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"The first few months you are here you won't have to do much, even if you may be a member of an important committee. I suggest that you sit here and take a note every time a point of order is made. Then go over that night and take the ten volumes of *House Precedents* which are furnished every new member, and read all the decisions on that point, and," he added, "in a few months, you'll know more about the rules of the House than anyone except about five or six members who make a specialty of mastering the rules."

That was good help and I did just that. Soon, with the exceptions he mentioned, I knew as much about parliamentary procedure as anyone in the House. I was able to secure a lot of amendments adopted during the twenties. I figured out several shortcuts that later became House procedure. Any rate, then when I became Chairman of

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the House Committee on Agriculture in '31, the second two years of Hoover's administration, I found that knowledge of the rules helped exceedingly during the succeeding ten years. I handled a great deal of the Roosevelt legislation. In fact, more than any other one person.

HESS: What was that legislation?

JONES: Here is a list of the major bills I handled during my period as Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture.

- (1) The Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1933 -- passed House first week of session.
- (2) The Emergency Farm Mortgage Refinancing Act -- early 1933.
- (3) The Farm Credit Administration Act, passed within the first 30 days.
- (4) The Cattle Purchase Act -- to purchase cull

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- cattle -- and distribute the meat on relief through local packing arrangement using relief labor.
- (5) The Resettlement Act -- to finance and furnish work on those out of employment.
 - (6) The Soil Conservation and Rebuilding Act -- established in the Department of Agriculture.
 - (7) The Commodity Exchange legislation -- to regulate exchanges dealing in farm commodities.
 - (8) Tenant Home Purchase Act -- to finance purchase of homes by worthy tenants.
 - (9) Temporary Farm Act -- to replace farm program invalidated by the Supreme Court June 6, 1933.
 - (10) The Jones-Costigan Sugar Act.
 - (11) The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 -- covering a wide field of activity -- in producing

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- and marketing farm products at home and abroad including research, correcting freight rate discrimination and research laboratories.
- (12) Establishing marketing agreements -- national and regional -- applying to all kinds of perishable commodities.

(I have eleven presidential pens with which these bills were signed. They are in the Panhandle Historical building on display in Canyon, Texas. This was at a time when they did not give them away by the bushel -- only one to the chairman of the House and Senate Committees which handled a bill.)

The first thing I put through was the legislation to enact a farm bill -- the AAA. President-elect Roosevelt phoned me from Warm Springs, Georgia and said that the farms were being foreclosed by the thousands, and he said, "I

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don't care who gets the credit. I'm sending Henry Morgenthau, Henry Wallace, and Rex Tugwell and others to Washington. I want you to sit down with them and write a farm bill. Put it through at this Lame Duck Session, if possible."

We took most of what I had already written. We worked all morning, and after a short lunch began again. About 3 o'clock Henry Morgenthau called me into an adjoining room and said to me, "I am compelled to leave for New York. I will see the President this afternoon. I see that you know more about this subject than all these fellows together." And he said, "And I'm going to tell the President so." He may have been flattering me.

It was an evenly divided party, and I had a terrific time, but I finally secured its passage at that evenly divided session.

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HESS: What was your earliest piece of legislation?

JONES: Away back in the early part of my service, I secured the passage of a number of amendments, starting right after the First World War. During and after World War I the military forces issued a "blue discharge" to young who had enlisted when they were less than 21 years of age, and hadn't given the right age. When the military authorities found out their age, they would discharge them and give them a blue discharge. I got an amendment through in the early 1920s that they must be restored to duty, given their regular pay and an honorable discharge.

That was about 1920, 1919 or '20, I think. It was an important amendment because with a blue discharge the boy could not get a job under Civil Service.

Then I got an amendment through to abolish

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the Council of National Defense, which was a war agency. After the war I made the motion to abolish it -- they were going to make a permanent thing out of it and it wasn't needed after the war. Well, I was trying to make a real fight. Then, Jim [James R.] Mann, the Republican floor leader, got up and said, "This young man is right and his amendment ought to be adopted." And that put it through.

Then they brought up a short but very important bill. The Republicans were in power and they said they were going to put the bill through without an amendment. The bill authorized the purchase of a large quantity of farm products to be shipped abroad. I offered an amendment to the effect that wherever it was practical they should buy these commodities from farmers or farmers' cooperatives instead of through dealers. That was the only amendment adopted

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to that bill. The others were shouted down.

I studied the bills and secured the adoption of a number of amendments. I won't go through all of them, but the first real bill that I passed was immediately after the war. A measure had been passed authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to rezone the time of the entire nation.

In rezoning they divided Texas and put West Texas and western Oklahoma in mountain time. West Texas and the Panhandle of Oklahoma were outraged. They did business back toward Dallas and Ft. Worth, Oklahoma City, San Antonio and Houston. The people rose up like receiving the benediction. I received numerous telegrams and letters. I went to see the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission and asked that the central zone include West Texas and Oklahoma. "Oh," he

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said, "we can't do that. I mean we can't -- El Paso is more than half way in the next zone." They had run the line right down through the two states.

I knew Mr. Rayburn very well. I had known him in Texas. He was in the Legislature when I was in law school, came to the university and took two or three courses in law, while he was serving in the Legislature. I told him, "There isn't anybody in that section who wants to be in mountain time. I want to introduce a bill to change this section back into central time.

It was near the end of the session. He said, "Well, you write up your bill and I'll get you a hearing before the Committee. I assured him I would not take more than ten minutes for a hearing.

I presented the bill to run the central

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time zone down the western Oklahoma and western Texas state lines so that as a matter of law all of Texas and all of Oklahoma would be placed and remain in the central time zone permanently, or until such time as might be changed by Congress. It was to the western line of the Panhandle of Oklahoma and down the western line of Texas, including everything in West Texas and in western Oklahoma in the central time zone. That is the only part of the Nation where the time is fixed by law.

I appeared before the committee and they reported it right out. But that was toward the end of the session. I placed it on the consent calendar. I had buttonholed nearly everybody in Congress. In the meantime, Jim Mann of Chicago had gotten to be a great friend of mine because he knew I was very active. Any member of the House could object and thus

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prevent its passage. Anybody could object to it. On the unanimous consent calendar one person could object and throw it off the calendar.

I saw all the regular objectors and told them what the bill was about. I didn't speak to Jim Mann as I thought he wouldn't object. But when the bill was reached and the Chair asked if there were objections, Mr. Mann got up, to my surprise, and said, "Reserving the right to object. What's the purpose of this bill?"

I explained the purpose of the bill. But he said, "El Paso is way over beyond the middle of the mountain time." He said, "What's the excuse for that?" He kept me on the floor for about several minutes asking questions. I said, "Well, it's a fact that people don't go west to do commerce, they come east. No one should object because it doesn't affect

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anybody except that area," and I had gotten the legislature -- the member from our area, to get a resolution through the legislature approving the bill.

And Mann asked a lot of questions, just kept asking them and then I said, "Well now, the legislature of Texas has unanimously passed a resolution approving this change."

"Oh," he says, "a legislature will pass anything, that doesn't mean anything."

I said, "Well, now that may be true of the Illinois legislature, but we have a pretty good legislature in Texas."

He laughed and said, "All right, I have no objection." So the bill went right through by consent.

Soon he motioned me to come over and he said, "I had no idea of objecting, but," he said, "when I don't object, most others don't." And he added, "Now if you had

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slipped that through, your people wouldn't appreciate it."

And he said, "You send the record down to your papers and they will say you had a fight and satisfy even the Republican floor leader."

HESS: Had to fight for it a little bit.

JONES: Right. And he says, "That publicity will be worth something to you." That's what they do for a young fellow if they like him.

HESS: That's a good idea.

JONES: The bill pleased everybody in western Texas and Oklahoma. At the beginning of my second term, the Congress considered a bill to establish six Veteran's Hospitals. They were going to start with at least six Veteran's Hospitals. The bill had them all located in

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Democratic areas or at least most of them. At any rate, it was before the 1920 Harding landslide. The bill had provided the location for each of the proposed hospitals.

A fight was being made on Dawson Springs, Kentucky, where one was to be located. It was a small place and there was not much evidence in the record about the location. Mann and several members were trying to strike Dawson Springs off the list. I arose and moved to strike out Dawson Springs, Kentucky and insert Amarillo, Texas. The Republicans had nearly as many members as the Democrats. I was asked a lot of questions about Amarillo. Among other things, I said, "That's the only county of twenty thousand people in the United States that doesn't even have a cemetery; it's a healthy place."

And they asked, "Well, what do they do with

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people that die?"

I said, "Very few of them die, and they carry them over into the next county." That's true. Amarillo is right on the county line. In fact, part of Amarillo has spilled over into the next county. It amused everybody and they adopted the amendment. I knew they would knock it out when it got over in the Senate, but I received a lot of favorable publicity. They eliminated it in the Senate -- saving the neck of the veteran member from Kentucky.

I really secured a hospital later on during the Roosevelt administration, when we first came into power -- after the Hoover period. I got the hospital located in Amarillo and it's there now and one of the best.

HESS: Was that during the Hoover administration?

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JONES: No. General Hines was the director and was kept in charge. It was after Roosevelt came in. I had to talk Mr. Roosevelt into an extra allotment of \$400,000 in order to have sufficient funds.

HESS: Since you came...

JONES: I hadn't intended to tell that. It just popped into my mind.

HESS: That's all right. That's oral history, that's what oral history is.

Since you came up to Washington when President Wilson was here, what kind of a man was President Wilson?

JONES: President Wilson was a very, very capable man, but he had been a schoolmaster, and he had to learn a good deal about dealing with the political -- with the practical phases and he had

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his difficulties -- he was a magnificent scholar.

HESS: Do you think he ever learned the lesson to deal with politics and politicians?

JONES: He never fully learned it. But at one time his personal popularity was so great that he could get most of what he wanted. Soon after I became a Member, several Members were going down to see him when the Women's Suffrage measure was under consideration. Chairman Hal Flood of Virginia, Alben Barkley and several members said to me, "We're going down to the White House. Don't you want to go with us to see the President?"

I said, "Sure." I went with them. I had campaigned for him in 1916 after my election, and I had a great admiration for President Wilson, but he had a way of saying,

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Members would say he would snap down that Presbyterian jaw of his, and demand his way.

He was so anxious to secure the League of Nations as a vehicle of lasting peace, that he conceded the right of Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau and Premier [Vittorio Emanuele] Orlando to levy too much reparations, that is, too heavy in the way of money in order to get them to agree to support the League.

HESS: Do you think that if he had handled that differently, that Henry Cabot Lodge would not have been able to block that?

JONES: I'll tell you about that now. The man that defeated that League was not Lodge but Jim [James A.] Reed of Missouri. The opponents were afraid of Wilson's popularity and they

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were just talking about having some reservations to Article 10. They were suggesting some reservations. None of them were talking about defeating the League prior to Reed's speech -- they hoped to, get on some reservations. But Wilson started abroad for his second trip. It was nearly 1920. It was while the Democrats were still in power.

James A. Reed was a powerful speaker. He was against nearly everything. Champ Clark told me one time laughingly (Speaker Clark had a good sense of humor), I asked him about Jim Reed and he said, "He's a natural born prosecutor. If he can't find one of his enemies to prosecute, he will prosecute one of his friends."

One day Jim Reed arose in the Senate and announced he was going to speak against the League of Nations. Woodrow Wilson was in

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Europe. Reed made a powerful speech attacking the League directly. I went over to the Senate to hear him. I sat there fascinated.

Oh, he's an eloquent speaker. He told you about how the British Empire had six votes and we had one. Numerous small countries had one, and we had one vote. Even Haiti he said was to be a member of the League.

Reed said sarcastically they would be represented by the Duke of Lemonade. It was L-I-M-O-N-A-D-E. Reed used a lot of humor and ridiculed the League. The Senate Chamber was filled, the gallery was packed. He was repeatedly cheered, and he wound up with a tribute to the American nation. He pictured the farmers in the coonskin caps at Lexington, how they hung out the lanterns in the old North Church and Paul Revere rode out into the night. It was a beautiful peroration. When

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he finished, the whole Senate stood up and cheered, as well as did the gallery. It's the only time during my stay in Washington that I saw the entire Senate stand up and cheer. The Chairman didn't try to stop them.

Members rushed over to shake hands with Reed. For several minutes there they couldn't -- the Chair just quit trying to restore order. Almost immediately thereafter, Lodge began to talk about defeating the League of Nations. But that Reed speech was the killing blow. If anyone will read the speeches before Reed's speech and those that were made afterward, a vast difference will be seen.

HESS: Jim Reed's speech is what did it.

JONES: Jim Reed's speech is what killed the League of Nations, I don't care what anybody says. I took a copy of [Gilbert N.]

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Hitchcock's speech. He was the leader on the other side. He led the fight for the League. Reed had made the principal speech against it. I took both those speeches home and M.J.R. Jackson, a leading lawyer there, asked me, "What do you think about the League of Nations?"

I said, "I would like to see some sort of an international organization. I haven't studied the League of Nations as some have, but I have the two main speeches, the leader on one side and the man who killed it on the other. I'll lend you those, I want them back."

He took the two speeches, He came back the next day and he said, "I'm against the League of Nations. Nobody can answer Reed's speech." And nobody ever did. And that was the killing blow. I unhesitatingly say that.

HESS: Very good.

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JONES: Now, Lodge took up the fight, and a lot of others then began to oppose it. That was a pretty good description that Champ Clark had of him, a clever description anyway.

A story was published later on when Hyde, Arthur Hyde was selected as Secretary of Agriculture. Hyde was head of an automobile agency in Missouri. Hyde wasn't a farmer. Reed met Mr. Hyde one day soon after his appointment when he was getting on a train in Kansas City as Hyde was getting off the train. Reed went up to Hyde, poked out his hand, and said, "As one dirt farmer to another, let me congratulate you."

But anyhow I didn't intend to get in all that story, but you say it's all right to cover that. You can cut out a lot of this cuff conversation if you wish.

HESS: No, it's very good. We're going to leave

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it in.

JONES: Anyhow, several years after I left the Congress, Leon Allen, Chairman, at the time, of the Rules Committee in the House said, "How many men have served in official capacity in all three branches of the Government?" I replied, "I don't have any idea." He said, "I'm going to ask the Congressional Library." They made up a list, and said they could only find six men who had served in all three branches. Jimmy [James F.] Byrnes and I are the living members who served in all three branches. The first one was Oliver Ellsworth and the next one was John Marshall. I didn't realize that Marshall had served in Congress. He served in Congress four years before he was appointed on the Supreme Court, from Virginia. I don't know of any others than the list furnished and nobody has raised any questions.

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I was surprised to find there weren't more than that. Now, hundreds of them have served in two capacities in the Cabinet -- on the Federal courts and in Congress, but there haven't many of them served in all three branches. I have the names of the other two in my files as shown by the letter of the Librarian.

HESS: That's very good.

JONES: I am probably making this too long, but when I became chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, I handled more important legislation than anyone else in the House. I got the Agricultural Adjustment Bill through in -- right after the New Deal, after Roosevelt was elected. (I won't go back into the other legislation.) And they said, "We want you to bring up your bill first." Had it prepared in December and passed it through the House.

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President Roosevelt wanted all the farm groups to agree on a bill and they agreed on the bill and made some changes in the bill that I had passed the House. All the farm groups agreed, but they - - [Henry A.] Wallace even wanted some changes in that, that they had made, but anyhow it came up and I had put it through the House right after Roosevelt came in and he came in in March you know, and called an immediate special session.

"The Blue Eagle" was passed early. Mine came in first and we had no trouble at that time. The House was overwhelmingly Democratic, and the bill went right through, but they held it up in the Senate. It didn't become a law until June, but it passed the House early in March, the first major big bill that was passed.

Before Roosevelt was inaugurated, about

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three days before, Henry Morgenthau walked into my office and said, "The President wants you and Bill Myers to write an Executive order, using the reorganization bill that had been passed in the Hoover administration and not used much. He wants you and Bill Myers to write an Executive order, pulling out the different agencies lending money to farmers." There were about six different agencies including the Federal Land Banks. "Write an Executive order including these different lending agencies and establishing an independent agency, and naming it." It was Senator William I. Myers of Cornell University.

I said, "Mr. Morgenthau, I not only never have written an Executive order, I've never seen one." I said, "I've glanced over some of them, but I've never paid much attention."

And he said, "Well, that's the new President's order, and you had better do it."

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Dr. William I. Myers of Cornell University and I wrote the Executive order consolidating the agricultural loan provisions, and also at the President's request had prepared the bill implementing the new agency. Dr. Myers was head of the Agriculture Department at Cornell University. He had come down with those bright boys and he was among the best of the group. We sat down and wrote a short Executive order. Bill did most of the writing as I was handling other emergency legislation. We didn't need to make it very long and called it the Farm Credit Administration, and provided for the five different wings of credit. The twelve land banks which we expanded and we reduced the interest rates. Then we broadened and provided twelve intermediate credit banks which were the discount banks; the twelve cooperative banks, and the Production Credit

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banks -- 48 banks in all. They covered the same area as the Federal Reserve Banks. We called the agency the Farm Credit Administration. The President approved it just like we had written it. Then he says, "Now, I want you to write a bill implementing this agency."

We wrote the Farm Credit Administration together, and I was so busy in the House that Bill [Dr. Myers] wrote most of it, but I sat with him at night. We wrote and I introduced and sponsored the bill through the Congress with the help of the Agricultural and Senate committees. And that has never cost the Government anything. It reduced the farm interest rates about one-third percent all over the nation. We, in investigating, found up in the central northwest farmers were paying 22 percent interest when all the trimming were included. When arguing for the program I told about the time I went with

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my father when I was a boy, to town to borrow money from the banks, as all farmers did. In those days, especially in the South, they had to borrow to make their money crops. And Mr. Head, the president of the bank, said, "Well, you are good pay, Mr. Jones. I'm going to let you have this money for three months." He added, "I usually make loans for only two months." After we left the bank, I said, "Why did you borrow for just three months? We aren't going to have any wheat out for six months (this was early in the year), and no cotton for eight months from now. You won't have the money to pay until then."

He replied, "They charge 10 percent and the interest is taken out in advance, compounded every three months, and they always charge a dollar for making out the papers." Well, you see, that ran a good deal above 10 percent. And then

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Dad said this to me, "There should be a credit system for agriculture and livestock separate and apart from the commercial credit structure of the country. The present credit system is suited for the needs of business which must remain liquid because they may make a loan on an ice plant that may be closed six months from now." Then he repeated there should be a system separate for the farmer and rancher.

In those days in Texas they were about ten to one Democratic. Each candidate wrote his own platform. When I announced for Congress that was one of the planks in my platform. I still have a copy of the leaflet written in 1916. Those words burned into my mind, and I studied the idea. One of the first bills I introduced when I came to Congress was to establish a credit system for agriculture as separate and apart from the commercial credit

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structure. I talked on it until I think they thought I was hipped on the subject. But within thirty days after the 1933 inauguration, I passed that bill through the House, after Roosevelt came in. And I told that story -- it's in the *Congressional Record* -- in March, 1933.

I prize the pen with which the President signed the measure.

I had been introducing a measure for several years. Dr. William I. Myers and I worked out a better measure -- I consulted with some of the other members -- some of the other officials in the loan department. Henry Morgenthau became the first administrator of the Farm Credit Administration. Then he later went to the Treasury and Bill Myer became administrator. But that measure reduced interest rates on the farms more than 30 percent. The Government advanced two hundred

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million dollars to get the system started. We reduced Federal Land Bank rates from about 6 or 7 percent to 4 percent. I think in some instances, three and a half. The rates on both old and new loans varied depending on the prevailing rate at the time the loan was made.

Then I passed a farm mortgage bill which immediately refinanced farm mortgages -- a necessity because there were farms by the hundreds foreclosing, banks were breaking by the thousands. Bankrupters were rife throughout the land.

HESS: Was this still in the first hundred days?

JONES: Yes, the AAA, the FCA, the emergency farm refinancing bill were all finally passed within the first hundred days. Those and other bills were passed in the first hundred days.

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When the bills went over the Senate -- they don't act fast as we sometimes did in the House. When these bills reached the Senate, they were referred to committees. The Farm Credit measure went to both the Banking and Currency Committee and the Agricultural Committee. Part of the measure was under the jurisdiction of each of those committees in the Senate. They added a third bill -- reducing the gold content of the dollar. When the AAA and the FCA bills were reported to the Senate they had three separate titles.

We had a conference and reported the three measures with some amendments. The conference report was adopted and approved in May or June.

Now there were one or two other bills became a law first, but I had three major bills that became a law within the first one hundred days. I believe I also passed the cattle purchase

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bill, but I am not sure about the date.

The cattle were not selling for enough to pay the freight except the good cattle. The better cattle were the only ones that would justify shipping to market. The cattlemen were just keeping the culls. The Agricultural Committee reported and we passed a bill authorizing an appropriation of two hundred million dollars to purchase the cull cattle and establish local packing concerns, all over the country furnishing work and distributing the meat on relief. Some packers made contracts to process the cattle for a price, but some of them didn't want to do that. So of necessity we used some of the buildings that were vacant to establish company plants so that the meat could be used and the better cattle saved. It takes years to build up quality cattle. It would have been a tragedy if

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all the good cattle had been shipped to market. That measure became a law in 1933. They only used about a hundred and five million dollars, but I secured an appropriation for two hundred million.

Oh, I could go on all day long on this thing. I think that's enough of my...

HESS: Well, before we move on, I would like to ask you your general opinion of the three Republican Presidents that we had during that period of time: Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover.

JONES: For some years I have been lecturing occasionally at the Judge Advocate General's seminar at the University of Virginia. When I finished one of the lectures, the chairman said, "We're going to have a fifteen minute recess and then we are going to have the Judge

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tell us about his estimate of the different Presidents he served with, eight I think of them." And he didn't ask me if I'd do it. Well, I just had to get up and talk. I told them my estimate of all of them.

HESS: He didn't clear this with you ahead of time?

JONES: No, he didn't clear it, they just sprang that on me, but they seemed fascinated with the stories that I told of my impressions of each one of them.

But, going back to your question, Warren Harding I don't think cared whether he was President or not, it was Mrs. Harding who was the ambitious member of the family. He wasn't interested in the details of the Presidency. I had sat with him in a joint conference between two joint committees, and he sat there and said little. He was the finest looking President we

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have ever had, a magnificent speaker if somebody would give him a good speech, which I think they did, usually. He liked to play poker, but he delegated most of the duties of the office. I think he delegated too much. He let some designing men whom he trusted run away with the ball. I think they mistreated Harding. I don't believe he had any part in the crookedness.

Without his knowledge, I think some of them decided they had better do something for Harding and they arranged a sale of a paper he owned. I believe it was the *Marion Star*. Several hundred thousand dollars for the *Marion Star*, I believe \$500,000, which I understand was really more than it was worth. They arranged for that paper to be sold. I believe he got that advantage but that's purely a surmise on my part. I don't know, the paper may have

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been worth that amount, but any rate, he sold the paper that he owned when he became President. But, then, when this scandal began to be unfolded you know what...

HESS: Teapot Dome and...

JONES: Yes, scandals were terrible and Fall, you know, taking that money.

HESS: Albert Fall?

JONES: And a hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars in a black satchel in cash. Fall was in trouble about paying the mortgage on his river ranch -- Three Rivers it was called, the Three Rivers Ranch. But Harding, I heard Harding's speeches during his campaign for the Presidency.

He would not say where he stood on the League of Nations. He didn't say much of anything. He said he favored an international

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organization, call it a "concert of Nations" or what you please, but he said, "I don't think the present proposal is what we should have." But he wouldn't say much in his campaign. He was just against "wiggle and wobble."

I heard his inaugural address. It was the first time they had a loud speaker for the inaugural address. I went to hear his address. We all wondered what he would say about the League of Nations. The first part of his speech, he had a sentence that one could just feel caused a thrill to go over the audience. He said, "In the League of Nations, world governing with its super powers, this republic can have no part." That was a good sentence and a clear statement. That's the first time he had said anything like that. I went away over towards the Senate Office

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Building, his voice would carry over the loud speaker for great distances.

When he would come before the joint session of Congress, he was a fine looking man, and he would deliver the speech magnificently. Mrs. Harding would sit up in the gallery stiff as a poker. She was the one that really wanted him to be President. Anyway, everybody thought so.

People all over the country were talking about him a good deal, and wondering. Harry Daugherty didn't keep up with anything. He just wasn't much Attorney General, but he was quite a manipulator. Effort was being made to hush things up, but Senator [David I.] Walsh refused to give up the investigation. He just stayed with it and finally uncovered the entire shameful scandal. When the Democrats came into power in 1933, Walsh was made Cabinet member and

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died of a heart attack.

I only had occasion to call on Harding in his office one time about a public matter and then he said, "I wish you would take that up with one of the Cabinet officers." He just didn't like details. Matters were getting very serious in the summer of 1923. Congress adjourned, but the scandals were ripe. Harding made a late summer trip to Alaska and died in California on the way back.

There was considerable talk about the President. I think he should have known, but I don't think he did. I don't think he kept up with the Presidency. They could just do whatever they wanted to do and they took the play away from him. Old friends took advantage of his trust. That's my analysis. I don't know whether it's true, and some people thought he was probably in on it. I don't think so.

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HESS: What were your impressions of Calvin Coolidge?

JONES: Calvin Coolidge preached economy. He said the country should be let alone for a while. Calvin Coolidge was a smart man, and he had a way of getting political advantage out of saying nothing. But he knew how to talk when he wanted to. Farm prices were rather low, but otherwise the country was relatively prosperous. Congress passed the McNary-Haugen bill, which I don't think would have worked because it levied a tax on the export of farm commodities, what they called an equalization tax and paid the proceeds directly to the farmers, but the trouble was that it didn't have any controls in it.

If you're going to raise the price of farm products above the market levels, some controls are necessary. Coolidge vetoed it with a blazing message. The proponents started in to write another farm bill.

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In fact, I had wanted an export premium bill which the National Grange had helped to prepare. L.J. Tabor, John Ketcham of Michigan who was on the other side and I had sat down and had written an export premium or debenture bill which would issue a certificate which could be sold to exporters to pay tariff charges on imported articles. The proceeds of the sale would be paid to farmers when adjusting their production.

Well, Coolidge didn't want to veto the new bill at the next session of Congress. It was a modified version of the old McNary-Haugen bill. President Coolidge sent for John Ketcham and me to come to the White House to see him. We took L.J. Tabor along. We stayed down there about forty-five minutes and Coolidge did two-thirds of the talking. He said, "Now, it wouldn't be proper for me to say whether I would veto a

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bill if passed," but he added, "I have submitted this proposed measure to Mr. Mitchell (who is Attorney General and I think one of the best lawyers in the country), and it's his opinion and I might say it's in accord with mine, that this equalization fee is unconstitutional." And he said, "I don't see how a President, any President, can approve a bill feeling the way I do of that bill. Now," he added, "as to your bill (that's Ketcham's and mine and Mr. Tabor's), I want to say again I don't think it's proper for the President to say in advance what he is going to do."

He was familiar with both bills in detail -- that's what amazed me -- he knew exactly what they were about. Then he added, "As to your bill, I'll say this, I'll go as far as any man and farther than most men in approving a bill of any kind that I think gives any promise

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of helping the farmer's plight."

And I said to him, "Mr. President, may we quote you to the members on the Hill?"

He said, "Sure." He did not hesitate.

I'd like to tell a story here that I've never told in public and I've never seen it printed.

HESS: Good.

JONES: I lived at Congress Hall where many of the members and their families lived at that time. About a hundred members lived there and the Speaker and some Senators.

HESS: Where was that?

JONES: The Congress Hall Hotel was located where the Longworth Building is now. It was a beautiful hotel and a fine place to stay. Congress never adjourned there, they would frequently

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sit in the lobby and talk shop all evening. The hotel was torn down to make way for the Longworth Building. It was a sad day for the members who lived there. But for the story.

Mrs. Coolidge was very fond of about twelve or fifteen of the women that she knew well at Congress Hall and she would have them down occasionally just for a special little tea or something, or a luncheon. A short time before the Coolidges left the White House, these women were invited to a small gathering about a week or ten days before the end of the Coolidge term. The women came back greatly amused and told me this story. As usual it went all over the hotel in one day. Somehow it was never published. Mrs. Coolidge said that at the time Mr. Coolidge was in the Massachusetts Senate, they had these two very small children. They lived in a \$35 a month

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rented house and had to save their money to get along. She added the smoothest tongued book agent she ever heard talk came by and sold her a home medical book, \$6.00. He made her think it might save the children's lives, but certainly would help them in some illness, and she signed up.

It was to be delivered in about three weeks. She said he hadn't gotten around the corner before she knew she had made a mistake, but she had committed herself. When they delivered the book she placed it on the library table. Mr. Coolidge came in just before dinner, picked up that book and started reading it. He went back after dinner and sat there for an hour or so reading the book. He did that for about three nights and then he quit paying attention to it.

When Mrs. Coolidge saw he was no longer

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interested, she placed the book on the shelf. She didn't say anything to him, he didn't mention it. Mrs. Coolidge put it up in the library and said that she never looked at it herself. She wasn't interested. When he became Governor, it went along with the other books. Neither mentioned it. He came down as Vice President to the Willard Hotel where they lived. It was taken over to the White House and all through those years it had never been mentioned. She told her guests she was going through accumulations just before leaving the White House to see what she could throw away, or give away. She picked up that book and decided she would look at it and found on the frontis page on the first blank page, in the President's own handwriting, this inscription, "I don't find in this book any cure for suckers." And she said, "I

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folded it up and put it back," and until that day (she was talking to the women), just before they left the White House, "neither of us have ever mentioned that book." She says, "I'd die before I'd tell him that I'd seen it."

Isn't that a good story?

HESS: That's very good.

JONES: And I've told it several times, but I...

HESS: He knew she had been suckered into buying that book, didn't he?

JONES: Evidently he thought so. Coolidge became known as "Silent Cal." You may remember when H.L. Mencken criticized Washington as being a very ordinary person and accused him of being a rounder and of having many human weaknesses. A group of Congressmen went down there one day.

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Coolidge always stood up when a group came in. He would rise up and greet them and remain standing. They would stay a less length of time. He apparently didn't care whether they stayed long or not. When they asked him what he thought about this criticism of George Washington, he walked over to the window, looked out and said, "Well, I see the Washington Monument is still standing." That's all he said.

He was clever in brief comments like that. The only trouble with Coolidge, he had a sort of a mystic confidence in the divine order of big business to run the country and he let them do just that. They ran pretty fast. The stock market was going up all the time and people were playing the stock market too much on small margins. People decided they could live off the stock market. It had a sort of a

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hectic flush. All the money flowed into New York. The banks encouraged it. They talked about secondary reserves; recommended South American securities, at the same time urging those countries to build things they didn't especially need. The whole thing reached a dizzy height. Then the collapse.

In the spring before that happened in November, President Coolidge made the statement, "I don't choose to run." I don't know whether he thought they would draft him anyway or whether he just wanted to quit. The meaning of the statement caused endless discussion.

If President Coolidge had done something to control the world speculation or had had regulation of the stock market enacted, it would have helped, but he was a pretty capable man otherwise and then when Hoover....

What time is it?

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HESS: It's twenty minutes till twelve.

JONES: Well, I don't know. I'm getting a lot in this discussion.

HESS: This is all -- this is good background. It's good.

JONES: Now, I want to go on to Mr. Hoover.

President Hoover came in and I think he had been out of this country most of the time for twenty years. He didn't know the mechanics of the United States Government when he came into the Presidency. Then he became President in March, 1929. The newsmen pictured him as the great engineer. For the first eight months the market went up. It was described as the Hoover Bull Market, and he seemed pleased.

For example, the Cities Service Company had been selling at 25 or 27 in early 1929. Cities Service went as high as 66 just before

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the crash. Other stocks had more than doubled during the eight months period.

John Garner talked to me about a week before the collapse came. Ogden Mills was Secretary of the Treasury. Mr. Garner advised that Ogden Mills had said it was necessary to stop or at least halt this wild increase, that prices were getting too high and too dizzy, almost a wild scramble, that stock prices were far beyond their normal value and beyond their earning power.

The administration evidently raised the re-discount rate on money and tried to stop it too fast I suppose. At any rate, the whole market collapsed like a house of cards. Prices went down in one day in many instances to less than half. People jumped out of windows. One day people thought they were rich. The next day they were poor. The great

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Hoover Bull Market had proved to be a dud. Newsmen and financiers and money experts had been bragging on Hoover all the time. But then when that happened he seemed lost. He didn't know what to do. He finally got the RFC enacted, but that took care of only banks, insurance companies, mortgage companies and railroads -- no loans to anyone else. John Garner said, "It's the only thing offered, I suppose we will have to vote for it."

I said, "I shall not. This thing should be available to every business that can meet the terms." I voted "no."

I offered an amendment on the floor of the House. The bill required adequate security, but the terms made clear that adequate security would be construed on a liberal basis. I offered an amendment there to make loans available to any individual or company that

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could furnish adequate security as was defined in the bill.

We had quite a fight on my amendment. It received a surprising vote. I was asked to make a recording of parts of my speech, and it was used on a state-wide radio in Nebraska, and in other places in the West. It was quoted a great deal. Mr. Hoover never would do anything. He seemed baffled. He still thought -- he called in the big businessmen who had practically brought this tragedy on by encouraging lavish expenditures. People in the stock market were making money, of course, on paper, everybody was, and then the collapse came in one day.

Many began urging that the currency be expanded so that more money would be available. People didn't have any money. The total production was down to 39 billion dollars. Hoover kept

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saying prosperity is just around the corner. He had in the campaign said to expect to have a chicken in every pot and two cars in every garage. Hoover was terribly unpopular. In fairness to Mr. Hoover, later he made some wonderful speeches, after he got to studying and learned something about this country. He grew as much as any public man I have ever known. But most of this came after his administration was over.

Well, I don't know, do you want to go have lunch with me across the hallway here?

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Second Oral History Interview with Judge Marvin Jones, Washington, D.C., April 20, 1970. By Jerry N. Hess, Harry S. Truman Library.

HESS: Judge, to begin this morning, let's just discuss a few of the men who served on the Texas delegation to the House of Representatives. What do you recall about Mr. Martin Dies?

JONES: I served with Martin Dies, Sr., who was one of the best Speakers in the House, but he didn't want Woodrow Wilson to go to France. And he figured that some war hero would run against him and, since he wasn't in good health anyway, he decided that he wouldn't run for re-election after World War I had ended, but peace had not been declared. He and I were very good friends and he had a tremendous amount of ability and was listened to whenever he spoke. He left the House voluntarily. Several members urged him not to retire, but

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he insisted and said, "No, I don't want to remain here any more." Martin Dies, Jr. was elected several years later.

Martin Dies, Jr. was also an interesting man. He was a good Speaker, had a good sense of humor and loved the banter in the cloakroom. He organized what he called the "Demagogue Club" just in fun, but if someone made a speech in the House a little different from opinions expressed in the cloakroom, Martin Dies would make him a member of the Demagogue Club as soon as he returned to the cloakroom. But he studied the question of silver until he became an expert on that

subject. He was the head of a special committee appointed to investigate the money question, especially the coining of silver as a joint basis of money. He probably went a little far, but he could make a powerful speech on the question of recoinage

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of silver. All at once he quit talking about silver. I asked him why. He replied that he observed that nearly everybody who kept studying the money question went "nuts."

About that time communism became the rage Martin Dies became head of the Committee on Un-American Activities. It became a very active committee. There was opposition to his listing names, but Martin was very popular in the House and he kept on with the committee. Dies, Jr. ran for the U.S. Senate in Texas but was defeated, and he had served a while on the Rules Committee in the House. Martin was a delightful man personally. Everybody liked him except the ones that wanted him to quit this investigation.

HESS: Now, we mentioned Mr. Sam Rayburn last time, but what else do you recall about Mr. Rayburn, what else comes to mind?

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JONES: I didn't think we said much about Mr. Rayburn.

HESS: Oh, a little. I think we mentioned the fact that when you were in law school in Texas and he was in the Texas legislature that he came to the school for a couple of classes. I believe that's about it.

JONES: Well, it was more than two classes. He took one or two courses there in one year -- I mean part of two years.

HESS: Is that when you first met him?

JONES: That's when I first met him. I had known of him, of course, through the newspapers.

We lived in adjoining counties, but we lived in different congressional districts. As a matter of fact, when we were younger, we both lived in the same congressional district,

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but there was a redistricting before we were grown. I was thrown in the western district and he in the district just east. In our youth we both lived in the same district and we both admired Congressman Joseph W. Bailey of Texas when Bailey was in Congress. Later when Bailey became Senator a fight against Joe Bailey was made, claiming that he had represented Waters-Pierce Oil Company and the Standard Oil Company as an attorney while serving in the Senate. I believe Sam Rayburn was in the Legislature when the fight was made on Bailey. Our fathers supported Bailey. Sam and I were ardent supporters of Bailey. We became very well acquainted and Sam and I remained close friends throughout our public careers. Sam was a member of the Texas legislature when he took his law course and was later elected Speaker of that body. He

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came to Congress four years before I did. We had long been friends, we had offices right down the hallway from each other and...

HESS: Did you work together closely during the years that you were in Congress?

JONES: Yes, we worked together closely on a lot of things. We shared an apartment at 16th & U Streets for two years. Sam Rayburn bought the furniture and the remaining two years lease of Jeff McLemore who retired from Congress.

HESS: Where was that?

JONES: What was known as the Flatiron Building, a three cornered building at 16th & U Streets. We lived together there. His three brothers visited us and we had a very pleasant week while they were there. Mr. Rayburn and I each had an Essex car. We would drive his car to the

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Hill one morning and mine the next and then alternate.

HESS: I understand that there was a period of time when Sam Rayburn was married to your sister, is that correct?

JONES: Yes, they were married about 1928, the early part of the year. They lived together about six months. They separated. No one knew exactly why. Neither of them ever talked about it. My sister married again and is the mother of two fine children and now has six grandchildren. She was a very attractive young lady in my book. I thought Sam was a great chap, but somehow they didn't get along. They parted as friends and she went by to see him in his last illness. He had asked me, oh, a year before he died, saying, "If Metze comes up here any time, I would like to see her."

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And I said, "I am sure she will come by to see you."

They never did really fall out. I never asked her and she didn't volunteer, said they just couldn't get along, and they couldn't, and she respected him. That's about all she would say and he wouldn't say anything. Sam's sisters liked Metze. They remained friends. It all seemed rather strange, but strange things happen in law and in life.

But that was merely an incident in our lives. Sam and I fished together for thirty years, all kinds of places, and I have been in his home both before and after that happened. His sisters admired my sister and they remained friends, and asked her to come to see them. One of them lived in Dallas. I have no further explanation.

HESS: How would you rate him as a political

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technician?

JONES: He was extra good. He would study his bills. He was one of the few men who took an interest in the way the programs were planned even before he became Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and I became Chairman of the Agriculture Committee. When the New Deal came in in 1931, the last two years of Hoover's administration, the Democrats gained control of the House by a very narrow margin. We were elected Chairmen and we still worked together. There were several subjects that were on the margin as to jurisdiction of our respective committees. We would simply agree on which committee would handle. One of these was rural electricity. It was in Agriculture, but Sam had such a fight on the securities exchange bill. We were both strongly in favor of rural electrification. But

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on account of his utility fight, I waived any claim, although technically I think I could have claimed it. I supported it in every possible way.

We were very close friends for many years and when he became sick I had just gotten back from Hawaii. I called his office immediately when I arrived in Washington and was informed, "He left this morning and he is not well at all, has back trouble."

Well, I immediately called him then in Dallas on the phone and I said, "Well, I was glad to hear that it is simply back trouble and not serious as some had thought."

He said, "Well, I don't know. They say I am better, but I've got an awfully sore back."

Some of the people in Washington had said that they feared he had cancer. I immediately decided that it probably was cancer, just in my mind, I didn't say it. I

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said, "Well, I hope you get along all right and get better soon." I flew down to see him after it began to get worse.

HESS: Now, he was Speaker of the House on and off. Who would you rate as the best Speaker that you knew, that you served under or that you knew?

JONES: Well, I'll tell you. I think that Will [William Brockman] Bankhead and Sam Rayburn were the two best Speakers in my time, and we were all great friends. As a matter of fact, Will Bankhead and I came to Congress the same time and he asked Mr. Rayburn and me to go down with him when Tullulah, his daughter, had her debut here at the old theater on Ninth Street. She was pretty as a picture and only 18 years of age. Will, Sam and I had dinner together and we went to the theater together. I think the two were outstanding

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as Speakers and members. There were several good Speakers, but these two knew how to handle that position as if born for the place, and I don't like to say that one was better than the other, but both were among my favorites. Then, of course, John [Nance] .Garner was only Speaker a short

time when he was elected Vice President. I don't think there has ever been a better Speaker than Sam Rayburn. He served longer than anyone else, and at the time he surpassed the record of anyone else. There was held a luncheon for him in the Speaker's Dining Room, and many members, several Senators and four Cabinet members were present. Several tables were placed in the hall. He was to be presented with a plaque. I was asked to present the plaque to him when he broke the record for his length of service as Speaker. That address is in the *Congressional Record*.

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Sam seemed very much pleased with what I said. Naturally I paid him quite a tribute. But I was always partial to him. I enjoyed other Speakers as well, but you asked the specific question. Sam was temporary Chairman of the Democratic Convention in 1944.

HESS: Was that the '44 convention?

JONES: I am getting mixed. Sam was with the delegation in 1940. Sam was Chairman of the 1944 convention. I attended the 1944 convention, too, part time.

After the 1940 convention, when Henry Wallace was nominated, Will Bankhead called me to the Speaker's stand one day in the House and said, "I can't go to Iowa to notify Wallace officially as Vice Presidential nominee." He added, "I want you to go out to Des Moines, Iowa and officially notify Wallace of his

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nomination."

I said, "Mr. Speaker, you're supposed to be the one to do that. You were the keynote speaker at the convention."

He replied, "I'm just not able, not physically able, to go. I want you to go as a personal favor to me."

I didn't know he was in as bad condition as he was. He added, "You're the man to do it and I want you to do it," and, of course, I went as a courtesy to him and made the speech of notification, on a national hookup. Bankhead went to Baltimore and made one speech and then died before the election.

Fritz Lanham was one of the most popular men in the House, and he was very effective and very entertaining and could make a marvelous speech, and then I could give you, through the years, a good many of them I served with.

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Robert C. Thomason, of El Paso, was a marvelous member. There were so many able men from Texas, as well as elsewhere -- please don't ask me to name them. The Congress of the United States has many able men. They are sometimes abused by critics, many of whom have an axe to grind. The members of the House are selected in open competition. Champ Clark chuckled one

time and said to me, "There are not a thousand men in the United States who wouldn't come to Congress if they could. They are the selected men in every state and congressional district."

HESS: What about Tom Connally?

JONES: Tom Connally and I came to Congress at the same time and we were very good friends and the first term had offices right close to each other. Connally and I worked together. He was ambitious and he came to me, before he

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announced for the Senate, and said, "Now, you have represented what is now three districts in Texas." It had been cut into three districts by that time, fifty odd counties, an area larger than Ohio, and he said, "Somebody is going to beat Mayfield," and he said, "if you run, I won't."

I said, "No, I've had my fill in campaigning in tremendous territory and I like the place I have." This was 1928. But all through those years we had worked together. He had a great ability and made a good record in both branches of the Congress. He never became chairman of a committee in the House. He was on the Foreign Affairs Committee, but we nearly always voted the same way. He was a very outstanding man. Then Claude Hudspeth was a man of unusual ability. He was a ranchman, you know, in E1 Paso district, which is also a large district.

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HESS: What about John Nance Garner, whom we have mentioned a couple of times?

JONES: Well, John Nance Gainer was head of the delegation when I entered Congress and I was a very great admirer of John Garner. He was just as effective at getting things done as anybody I ever knew, and he knew the mechanics of the House better than anybody else. He was head of the delegation, and we all respected him, and he would come by to see us. John Garner was a man of tremendous ability as an operator.

HESS: I have read that he is supposed to be given some credit for the fact that so many committees were headed by Texans. What would you say about that?

JONES: He deserves much credit. He was on the Ways and Means Committee and he picked them

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out, the ones to go on the committees. I was supposed to go on the Judiciary Committee my first term, which position I wanted, but Hatton Sumners was my senior in service. He wanted to get a large post office building in Dallas and had decided he would probably go on the Public Buildings Committee. He told both me and John Garner that he felt he should go on the committee that handled the Post Offices. Right at the last he decided he would go on the Judiciary; otherwise, I was booked for Judiciary. There were six new members from Texas in 1917, so Mr. Garner, like Mr. Anthony, had a problem. Mr. Garner said, "We don't have enough important committees to go around, we've got so many new men from Texas," but to me he said, "We will get you the first major committee you want here when there is a vacancy." So,

temporarily he assigned me to three committees: Civil Service, Roads and Insular Affairs. I was appointed to

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Agriculture as soon as a vacancy occurred. Seniority governs in the selection as between two men.

HESS: As it still does.

JONES: Yes, as it still does, and they have never found a better way. It works hardships sometimes, but you know an amazing thing in the House, once in a while you get -- a man will get to be chairman that everybody realized just happened to stay there, and they wonder if he can do the job. They get into a row if they don't use that system and it creates a lot of ill feelings. An amazing thing, a lot of people that you don't think will do a good job become outstanding. I remember one particular instance. Do you want me to tell about it?

HESS: Yes.

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JONES: James W. Good was a sort of a fire-eater from Iowa. He was on the Appropriations Committee and he would get up and make a stormy speech and offer amendments and talk, and everybody sort of felt like he was a little flighty. A vacancy occurred in the Appropriations Committee. The party officials seriously considered (the Republicans were in power), appointing someone else. Then they decided that, "Well, it will create a lot of hard feeling and ruin this man." Then they said, "We'll just go ahead and elect him and at least give him a try." He settled down and made one of the best chairmen that that committee ever had. He was a tireless worker and became so well informed and was so frank and fair in presenting the facts that the House trusted him and usually followed him. Later he was appointed Secretary of

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War and died while in that position. I attended his funeral with my mother in the White House sometime in the twenties, I don't know the exact date. But one can't tell -- I didn't intend to discuss the merits of the seniority system.

I wish there was some way that would satisfy public opinion. The Congress has talked about many changes. They have talked about having each committee elect its own chairman, but that creates a sort of division in the committee and then when it comes to electing a chairman it gets steeped in favoritism. I understand that was tried once. But, at any rate I wish there were a better way, but I don't know of a better way. You remember Speaker Reed once appointed all committees and committee chairmen. He became known as "Czar" Reed. It took a pitched battle to dislodge Uncle Joe Cannon

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who succeeded to the same powers. That fight left many scars. It was years before the body fully recovered from the ill-feeling thus engendered.

HESS: What do you recall about James Byrnes?

JONES: I was on the Court of Claims and would go up occasionally to the Texas luncheon. I went up there in '42 when Byrnes was to speak to the delegation. I had known Byrnes in the House. I listened to his speech and then he said, "I want you to ride back with me. I'll take you back to your court." And on the way down he said, "I want you to come to the White House and be my assistant." He was Director of...

HESS: Economic Stabilization.

JONES: Economic Stabilization at that time, but afterward he was made Director of Mobilization.

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HESS: Was this -- this was after he had resigned from the Court, is that right, and had been...

JONES: Yes, he had resigned from the Court. When he became Director of Mobilization. Fred Vinson later became Director of Stabilization, thus adding another step in the process. This was in May, 1943.

HESS: In October of '42.

JONES: In October of '42, Byrnes, soon after he resigned from the Supreme Court, was made practically the domestic president in most ways. He practically had his own way in domestic issues. On the way back from the luncheon he said, "I want you to come by and be my adviser on agricultural matters and I'll practically let you determine them because," he said, "you are the only man that I have ever known who could get along

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with "Cotton Ed" [Ellison DuRant] Smith and still get what you wanted to secure. I think you have the ability to get along with people and would like to have you down there, and," he added, "I've got so much to do." At that time he had both Economic Stabilization and Mobilization and all disputes of high-up officials. Of course, there are plenty of divisions in that field. I went down there and was there for -- well, I was in that office for six months except when I headed the international conference on Food and Agriculture at Hot Springs, Virginia, in 1943.

HESS: What were a few of your duties? Do you recall any of them in particular?

JONES: They had the Office of Price Administration [OPA]. In late 1942 it was decided to appoint a War Food Administrator. The President wanted

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me to take it at that time. It was to be placed under the Secretary of Agriculture. I said the man ought to be Secretary of Agriculture if he is to use the branches of that service in order to save the vast expense of an entirely new organization.

Mr. Byrnes and Marvin MacIntire said, "Well, the President always said he would like to have you for Secretary of Agriculture."

I said, "I wouldn't have the place." And I said, "I've got the place I want." I said, "I'll take leave of absence and do any kind of war job the President wants me to do because I think that's a man's duty in wartime, but..."

HESS: What was their argument against giving that position to the Secretary of Agriculture, or giving those duties to him?

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JONES: Well, I think they felt that probably [Claude] Wickard wouldn't be able to get the job done -- that is, the double job. That's what they told me. I didn't know him very well, that is, as to his work.

HESS: What did you think?

JONES: Well, I'll tell you. I knew there was a lot of maneuvering in the Department of Agriculture for position. I didn't think he was a man of outstanding ability, but I thought that if he is to be over me with the opposition already developed over personalities in the Department, it might make the difficult job almost impossible. Let the Food Administrator hire his own independent setup. But those in authority felt like this war would last longer. They felt that a much broader plan should be arranged so that all disputes between the different agencies should be

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placed under one man with appeals finally to James F. Byrnes. Later it was to Fred Vinson and then to Byrnes. I had been handling legislation for agriculture for a long time and I knew something about the conditions in the Department of Agriculture. I told Byrnes to undertake to compose differences that already existed between personalities, and especially since Wickard had been given that place when others felt like they should have been selected and would create many problems. But I still thought that he might be able to handle the place if he had complete authority over the entire setup. They would know he could shift them around. I was still a little doubtful and so stated to the President if the Food Administrator was placed under him. The President said, "Well, I'll try it for a while, but I don't think it will work." I don't know what he knew, but I hadn't

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told him anything about Wickard except as to my talk with Byrnes. I knew that with that setup it was going to be a man-killing job. In the circumstances Claude Wickard had a tough time. In late March Byrnes said, "The President wants to have an international food conference." The President told me that, talked to me and said, "We want to have forty-four nations, six hundred delegates in Hot Springs, Virginia. There will be approximately six hundred delegates. Tell Marvin I want him to head the delegation and he will be elected president of the organization." Byrnes said, "I think you ought to take it. We will get along here until you get back and it's the President's request."

I accepted and it was an interesting experience. The President gave as his

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special reason for calling the convention, "After World War I, the Allies had gotten along fine and fell apart as soon as the war was over and couldn't agree on anything." I then talked to the President personally. He told me, "I want you to go down there because I think you can handle it, and let us see if we can't agree on something while we are still working together." And he added, "It will be called the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization or Conference."

I talked with several of the delegations who arrived before the date for the meeting. The State Department handled all the details. I won't go into the details, but at first we were criticized for secrecy. The President directed us not to have the newsmen in the building, let them stay in an adjoining building and have us brief them after each day's work. "We used this plan at Yalta," he said.

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"The Big Three" (he didn't say the Big Three), Stalin and Churchill and he met together and he said, "We used that method and it worked beautifully. At the end of the day we would call the newsmen in and tell them all that happened."

I rather protested. I said, "I think we'll have difficulty because newsmen in this country have been accustomed to being present. They don't want second-hand news," and I said, "I think it would be all right if we have executive committee sessions so they would have freedom for discussion, but after the committee sessions I feel we should let them see anybody they want to see."

Then he added that we were responsible for the safety of the nations that meet there. It was advertised and the President called attention to the fact that there was

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danger of bombing in those days, not only by Japan, but even the possibility by Hitler and Hitler's organization. I said, "I believe they are going to find out where it's located, anyway, there is not any way to conceal that fact. I would prefer to have it open like we always have, but, if you wish, I will give it a try."

He said, "I want to experiment and I want to try it because I think that would be better."

We went down April 17. We spent the first day getting the committees organized. We had a big meeting the first evening. All delegations were present and scores of reporters attended. The State Department had everything dignified. I delivered the welcome address and Dr. -- from Brazil, responded -- I'll get you his name.

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HESS: That's all right, we can look it up later. We can get it later.

JONES: All right.

And then I asked Mr. Kelchner, who was with the State Department, saying, "I want you, when we get through with the speeches, to call the name of each delegation and let them stand up and let's see each other."

He said, "That's not usually done in this kind of a meeting."

Well, when we got through the speeches, I said, "I wish you would do that, anyway."

He said, "I don't think I should do it."

I said, "Well, give me the list and I will call them."

And they just loved it. That's about the only time the delegates get a chance to be seen and to see the others. I said, "I want you to see each other and get better

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acquainted. The sooner we get acquainted and get along like one big family, the better it will be."

When I called the name of Australia the delegation stood up and they were given a big hand and it happened all the way through. When I called the delegation from France (France was overrun so they had two claimants to the titular head of the absent group. One was a general who later was killed, and he and [General Charles] De Gaulle had agreed on Henry Alphan, who was later the Ambassador to America), the audience simply took the roof off. It impressed the newsmen and they had quite a write-up of the innovation. The *New York Times*, the Baltimore paper and the Washington papers, in fact papers from all over the country, gave it a big write-up. The fact is, some of the hardboiled newsmen had moistened eyes with the impressive occasion.

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Even Kelchnex said afterwards, "I'll have to admit it went over."

Anyhow, we started off with a bang and then the newsmen wanted to be admitted to the building. I couldn't do it. I had instructions otherwise and I wasn't going to disobey my instructions. I had tried to talk the President out of the restriction before I ever went down there, but he was adamant, so I said, "Well, I'll go ahead and do the best I can."

They just wouldn't give us any favorable publicity after that first meeting. We went right to work, working like bees in a hive, but they mentioned only the fact that the State Department furnished some liquors. We would brief them after each day, but they simply panned us for secrecy. After two or three days I decided to have something done about it.

I called in Dean Acheson, who was Assistant

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Secretary, and one or two others to come down. I told them something must be done about this situation. I said to Dean Acheson, "I wish you would call Sumner Welles (because he had had much to do with planning the details of the meeting), and ask him if he won't go over and talk to the President." I said, "We are doing fine work, but we don't get any favorable publicity." I told him we were in the position of the bashful boy who threw his sweetheart a kiss in the dark. He knew what he was doing, but nobody else did.

Dean Acheson called Welles and Welles said, "I have talked to him several times and I'm afraid if I went over there again I'd get thrown out of the window."

Then I called Byrnes on the telephone and I told Byrnes, "This situation is pretty bad here. We're not getting any favorable publicity although we're doing fine work and

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we're getting panned on every side. I think we should open the main building at all times to the newsmen, let them attend all meetings except the actual committee sessions."

Well, he says, "You're in charge, why don't you go ahead and do what you think should be done?" That's the way he was, with the President he had been given a free hand.

I said, "Don't you think I ought to talk to the President?"

"Oh, no," he said, "he's gone out so much on a limb it would embarrass him. You go ahead and do what you think's right."

I said, "I will make the change."

I called the newsmen in and told them I was willing for them to come in to the main building any time and they could talk to any delegate or anybody. I thought since we had a whole group of committees the committees should be executive, but, except for those

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sessions, we would have no restrictions and they could talk to anybody at any time and have their meals in the main building. That pleased them and then we didn't get any unfavorable publicity after that.

But I hadn't ever said anything to the President. I didn't know what he would say. I told Dean Acheson, "All the President can do is bring me home and," I added, "if this situation remains static I don't know what will happen." I told Acheson, "I am taking responsibility for this action so you won't be blamed." We got much favorable publicity and the President invited us, the whole six hundred, to the White House. When we adjourned we had agreed unanimously on all resolutions, agreed on the emergency efforts for the wartime, and then we recommended the drafting of a charter for a permanent organization. We appointed a committee to draw a charter to be effective

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29 of the 44, or two-thirds of the nations, had approved it, which was done in 1945, by 1945. They met (more than 29 had approved the charter), in Canada and had the present Food and Agriculture officially chartered.

They have over a hundred member nations now doing a wonderful work in agriculture and getting agreements with various people over handling of surpluses and problems of marketing of surplus commodities like wheat, which is produced in many countries. They have done very fine work. They had the meeting here in Washington on -- "Feeding the Hungry" was the title they gave. The F.A.O. sponsored a meeting in Washington in 1963. There were 1400 delegates from 101 nations, a tremendous meeting. President Kennedy and the President of India spoke in the morning at that opening session and that afternoon Mr. Settle and

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I spoke. I spoke first in the afternoon and they presented me with a plaque. It is on display at Hot Springs as a memento for the first International Conference at which the great organization was started.

But, you know, before we went down to the Hot Springs conference in 1943, the Russian delegation had flown -- they had six members or seven, I think it was six -- and four of them had flown across Siberia and Canada. In fact, most of the delegations came by to see me in the East Wing of the White House before the Hot Springs meeting. I talked to Mr. Krutokov, the head of the delegation, and said, "It has been tentatively planned to have a number of working committees and I would like to have you as chairman of one of the committees." Mr. Krutokov was Vice Commissar of Commerce in Russia.

We had to use an interpreter. They had a

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good interpreter and Mr. Krutokov said, "Well, we are pretty badly overrun by Hitler in Russia and we are not going to take any large part in the conference. We will be very much interested. I believe I should not be chairman of a committee."

I said, "Now," of course, we were working with Russia completely then, and I said, "I think you ought to take a chairmanship." I said, "Russia's one of the prime Allies and they are doing a great job. We are all working together and I think it would be better."

He said, "Well, I'll have to study over it and let you know tomorrow." He came back the next day and said, "If you will come by occasionally and see that I don't get into trouble, I'll accept the chairmanship of a committee."

I said, "I'll be glad to do that, but I don't think you will have any trouble."

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We became very good friends. They usually sat to themselves, somewhat aloof when in the lobby. The Homestead has a tremendous lobby, and I would go by to see them in their corner. Few people did, especially at first, but I soon became acquainted. I had different delegations up

to my apartment evenings for a little reception as often as practicable. I asked Dean Acheson to come and also Mike McDermott to attend the reception to the Russian delegates. Dean Acheson didn't stay down there all the time, but he would come back occasionally. I had Dean Acheson in and we had a good time. I had learned a few words of Russian, so I could say, "Good morning," "Good afternoon," "Hello," "Thank you," and other greetings. Krutokov learned a few words in our English, and so we could greet each other and thank each other. The members of the delegation would smile when I

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came by and Krutokov would usually respond in English when I greeted him.

HESS: Now, his name was...

JONES: Krutokov. Krutokov.

HESS: Was he the head of their delegation?

JONES: He was the head of the delegation. He looked to be only about thirty-five or forty years of age. Before the conference ended he came to me and said, "I want you to fly back with us to Russia."

And I said, "They have another hard job picked out for me and, since it is wartime, I suppose I shall not accept." I had gotten well acquainted with him. He had a good sense of humor. I told him, "After the war I might come."

And he said, "Fine."

Then I said, "Now if I come," I had gotten

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well enough acquainted with him that I thought I could say this, "If I come over there, are you going to let me see what I want to see, or are..." I said, "I've been told you just show people what you want them to see."

He smiled and replied, "Well, that's what we sometimes do because critics come over for the purpose of writing something against us. Naturally we avoid helping them do that, but if you will come over," he said, "when one of our friends comes over, someone we feel like won't abuse us, it will be different. If you come over there you can see anything in Russia you want to see and I'll go with you so you can ask what you want to see and you will see it."

And I said, "That's fair enough."

And I thought at the time that I'd do it, but you know right after the war was over the officials of our two countries got to fussing

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at each other, so I decided not to go, although I would still like to visit Russia.

After the conference was ended, the President invited us up to the White House. He spoke to us in the Assembly Room of the White House, complimented the conference highly and then invited us to a garden party in the area back of the White House.

HESS: The Rose Garden?

JONES: Perhaps it is called the Rose Garden. At any rate it's a beautiful garden with flowers and that's a good name for it. The President had us. I was asked to lead the delegates back there after he had delivered an address and said what a great thing he thought the conference had accomplished in setting the pattern for international cooperation. I didn't know whether he would jump on me about violating his instructions, but he shook

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hands and smiled and said, "I think you did a grand job." The subject was never mentioned again, but I had checked with Byrnes, who's very close to the President.

HESS: Did Roosevelt at this time keep pretty close tabs on domestic matters such as this?

JONES: Well, this was not a domestic matter. It was handled largely by the State Department. Byrnes first mentioned it to me, but the President then asked me to talk the details over with Cordell Hull and that they would also plan the general program and make all contacts with foreign countries. I went immediately to Mr. Hull's office. He explained the plan and purpose, and he called in Sumner Welles and told him to arrange to meet the delegates and ask them to contact me in the East Wing if they arrived in time.

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HESS: Did he turn most domestic matters over to Byrnes...

JONES: Pretty well.

HESS: Pretty well.

JONES: Of course, Byrnes knew what was going on all the time, and Byrnes would just walk through the corridor there and see him two or three times a day -- usually every day. Byrnes worked, he would get down to his office at 8 o'clock in the morning and frequently worked until 8 o'clock at night, and he would eat lunch at his desk. I don't know how he stood it.

HESS: How would you characterize James Byrnes? Just what kind of man is he?

JONES: James Byrnes was, I think, a very fine man. He loved to have his way, and that's natural, and he had great ability in settling disputes.

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He could work out things usually and, especially if it was left to him, he could make necessary concessions, and he knew how to make decisions and he would make them. I was very fond of him. Sometime before we get through we might mention the fact that I was in his office on the morning before he went to Chicago. He was busy getting ready to go, so I merely talked to Don Russell.

HESS: In 1944?

JONES: Yes.

HESS: Let's discuss that.

JONES: Do you want to jump over...

HESS: Tell me about that.

JONES: Well, sir, do you know I went over there to see Mr. Byrnes about something. When I arrived I said to Don Russell, "This isn't

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important, but I just thought I would come over and check with Byrnes."

Russell said, "You know Byrnes is packing now to go to Chicago. He's been told he will be selected to..."

HESS: To be Vice President.

JONES: To be Vice President, to be nominated for Vice President.

And I said, "Well, that's fine," and I said, "I won't bother him now because he..."

Russell said, "It's all been arranged."

Byrnes went to Chicago. I was informed that Mr. Truman had promised to introduce him. They were good friends. I was later told that those in charge had trouble in convincing Truman that the President had decided that he wanted him; and that Mr. Truman kept on working for Byrnes even when they came and told him they wanted Truman

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instead.

HESS: Byrnes kept on working, is that right?

JONES: Truman kept on working for Byrnes.

HESS: Oh.

JONES: They had a hard time convincing him that, and I think [Robert E.] Hannegan finally gave him a penciled note. And that finally Truman went to see Byrnes. All this is what was told me. This is not a matter of any personal knowledge. Well, Byrnes phoned me after he came back from Chicago.

HESS: What did he say?

JONES: Byrnes was as angry as he could be at Roosevelt. He didn't say a word against Truman. He still thought Truman was open and aboveboard on everything, and he decided that he had been -- he took several minutes, saying,

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in substance, "Roosevelt has misled me. I thought I had the assurance, it embarrasses me." And he added, "I think I'm going to resign right at once this position."

He was out of humor about it, but I knew what he had in mind, and I said, "Now listen," when he got through after he talked to me and told me the whole story, I said, "Jimmy, don't you do that. If you do that they'll accuse you of being a sorehead." I said, "You continue on here for a while, anyway, and don't let them misjudge you. You keep right on. I know the President still likes you. You have a fine record. Wait until you think this over before you do anything." I had never seen him that way before because he usually was smooth and worked out everything.

Mr. Byrnes then said, "Well, I'll study about that." He stayed in his then position

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a good long while, in which he was very wise, I think. Roosevelt had a tremendous personality, you know. He had a way, the President did, and I learned it rather early in the game. I became very close to President Roosevelt. He had me down for lunch at his desk a number of times. I was one of the four men invited to the -- four people rather -- that were invited to the fortieth wedding anniversary of President and Mrs. Roosevelt. There were only four there outside of the family.

HESS: Who were the others?

JONES: Justice [Robert H.] Jackson and Mrs. Jackson (I sat right by Mrs. Jackson) and the Ambassador to Canada, I believe it was, I don't know his name, and myself. And you know that's the first time I had decided he was near the end. I didn't say anything about it, and he

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asked -- he called me over and asked how I was getting along War Food and I said, "Fine." I said, "Working the heck out of me."

He laughed, and said, "Well, I knew they'd do that."

Anyhow, he sat on one side of that elongated table and Mrs. Roosevelt sat on the opposite side and Mrs. Jackson sat on her left and I sat next, and the Ambassador sat over by Mr. Roosevelt. The President would sparkle up for a minute and then he'd drop his head.

HESS: What was the date on this? Do you recall?

JONES: February 20th, about the middle of February. I believe it was the 20th of February, 1945, less than a month before his death. Several years later, the first time I ever mentioned...

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HESS: Just after he got back from Yalta, then?

JONES: What?

HESS: Just after he got back from Yalta.

JONES: Yes. He had sat down and delivered an address to the Congress in a wheelchair. He had apologized for that, but I didn't pay much attention to that fact. When he talked to me he would seem in good spirits.

That night at the wedding anniversary he didn't say much and he would sit and listen and Mrs. Roosevelt would carry on the conversation. Then he would want to dip in and he would brighten up and seem himself for a moment, and then I would notice his head would drop down.

I walked home that night. They asked one if I wanted a conveyance, and I said, "No, it's only four blocks up here and it's a beautiful night."

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I was bothered for the first time and I never mentioned that to anybody until, oh, just a few years ago.

I happened to be at a dinner and Mrs. Jackson was present at the dinner. Someone drove us home and on the way I said, "Mrs. Jackson, I'd like to know if you remember how Mr. Roosevelt looked on his 40th wedding anniversary?"

She said, "I certainly do." And she said, "You know on the way home from the White House Justice Jackson was driving and I said to him, 'We're not going to have Mr. Roosevelt with us very long,'" and she added, "He stopped that car and said, 'Why do you say that?'" I said, "Why, didn't you see how he looked and how he dropped his head down after he would say a few words?"

She remembered how he looked. And she had reached the same conclusion I had that he

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couldn't last long. It was too bad but, of course, I didn't mention it at the time to anybody, and she didn't either, I suppose.

HESS: When did you first notice that he was in failing health, or when he first looked bad?

JONES: When he was -- I think it was a short time before he was nominated for the fourth term, perhaps a few weeks before. I saw him and heard his address of acceptance. He did it over in the White House. I wasn't there, but I listened on the TV. Then I saw him for a moment as he was on the television as he was driving in the rain in New York City.

HESS: During the campaign?

JONES: During the campaign.

HESS: In New York.

JONES: And it was -- I just decided at that time that

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he wasn't well and shouldn't be campaigning in the rain, but he loved campaigning.

HESS: Speaking about Mr. Byrnes, of course, now he was later Secretary of State for Mr. Truman and they had a little difficulty on that. Have you ever spoken with Mr. Byrnes about that episode?

JONES: No, I never did because I just figured he had been given such a free reign by President Roosevelt that I don't know, I think he must have thought, "Well, Truman will leave it to me." But he shouldn't have made his report without first reporting to the President. I think Truman was right about that if that was done. But I never did say anything to Byrnes. I never did mention it to him because it would have been embarrassing to think that I, as close as I was to him, would bring the subject up; and I

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didn't know what the facts were, but I just gathered that that's what happened from statements in the press. I don't know whether the reports were true or not.

I'm still especially fond of both Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Truman. I admired both of them. I didn't want to comment unless I was first spoken to about the matter. I had known Byrnes since 1917.

Then I came to know Mr. Truman because of his investigation of the war activities of the various Federal agencies. As chairman of the committee he, or his assistants and employees, investigated practically every department, including War Food. One of the investigators at that time said that they told one of my assistants, "I wish every place was run as well as this one is."

At the time Truman became President, I

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was terribly tired. I had been very busy, put in long hours and had a tremendous task over there to look after.

HESS: When you were War Food Administrator?

JONES: When I was War Food Administrator, and we had contacts with fifteen hundred warehouses and I never did give out any statements at all. I said, "I don't want any publicity about this because I want to go back to my place on the Court as soon as the war in Europe is over." I was loading as many as -- now when Hoover was War Food Administrator during World War I, he received great publicity when he was loading one shipload of food going to Belgium, and it was highly advertised. You know he was a great advertising man. Anyway, I was loading twelve ships in New York at one time. They made me transport the food, buy for lend-lease, allot all the food to the Army

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and Navy and to the civilians, and it would have to be rationed by OPA. We had many problems.

As soon as Mr. Truman was sworn in I felt every man should submit his resignation to the new President. Soon after he became President I went to see Mr. Truman with my written letter of resignation and I said, "I think you ought to be able to select your own people in official capacity, so I am handing in my resignation, and if you accept it it will be fine."

He said, "No, I want you to stay on. I have perfect confidence in you."

And I said, "I really want to go back to the Court as soon as the major work is finished. However, I will abide your wishes in the matter and would like to stay until the heavy part of the task is finished." I told him I would be glad to stay until the war in Europe was ended. After the war in Europe was over, I saw Byrnes

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and I told him -- talked to Byrnes -- and he said, "Well, they have a group over there now and I know they're going to make it a little difficult for you. They are going to make some changes." He said, "If I were you I would go ahead and resign, but it's up to you."

And I said, "Well, I don't mind, but I don't want to resign under pressure."

And then he went to see -- he said, I'll see Mr. Truman." And Mr. Truman said, at that time, so Byrnes told me, "Well, why don't we just wait until the war is over."

I would have left then if I had known the others were going to resign at that particular time.

But Byrnes had told the President, "No, he's tired. Let him go." And then Byrnes came back and he said, "You write a letter."

I said, "I've already written him a

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letter." That surprised Byrnes. But I added, "Well, if you have told him that much I will write another letter." I then wrote another letter of resignation late in May, right after the conversation Byrnes had with the President. I don't know what happened to the first letter, but that isn't important. After the developments I rather wished I had gone to see the President personally.

They were going to appoint Secretary [Clinton P.] Anderson as Secretary of Agriculture, and take -- the then Secretary, I guess, at that time was still Claude Wickard. But anyhow, at any rate, Truman went ahead then and accepted the resignation that I had tendered.

Roosevelt had told me at the time I reluctantly accepted the position of War Food Administrator that if I would take that place he would give me the same place or a better

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one. I don't know whether Mr. Truman knew about it or not, but anyhow he appointed me as Chief Justice. All the circuit courts had chief justices at that time, and all state courts still have chief justices, instead of chief judges, but they have changed that name in the Federal system and there is just one Chief Justice. And I have this commission -- this certificate that President Truman signed. I have always been very partial to him. I think he had the worst, the toughest, problems that any man ever had to decide in the same length of time during his first three years.

I have read this *Year of Decisions*, but you know problems just piled in on him. There were numerous readjustments. Then he faced the Hiroshima decision, one of the gravest problems that ever met human intelligence.

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Then the meetings with Stalin, then the trial of the war criminals, involving many legal questions. He didn't seem to have any easy questions. The cold steel of final determination of these great issues was his and his alone. You know he had that sign on his desk, "The Buck Stops Here," and he never flickered. He would make a decision. He had plenty of American entrails. He could decide without wavering. The critics could kick him all over the lot and it didn't seem to bother Truman. They were not easy, but he faced them without flinching. I've admired him greatly for that because I dealt with some people that you couldn't get decisions out of until it was too late to make a correct decision. A long time ago, I believe Tacitus, in quoting some old philosopher, said, "The gods look with favor upon superior courage."

HESS: What are your earliest recollections of Mr.

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Truman? When did you first meet him or see him?

JONES: Well, I don't know whether he would remember it or not, but I met him soon after he came to Washington, and I met him in the Press Club when they had what was called Congressional Night, when they invited the members of the House and Senate to the club. I met him then. I doubt whether he would remember, and then I saw him at different times and then while I was War Food Administrator, after he became Vice President, I came back on the train

and he came in and chatted with me. I had met him and gotten pretty well acquainted from time to time, and I met him in Mr. Rayburn's office a time or two. I think I went to see him once to ask him about something after he became President, but I had gotten pretty well acquainted with him after he was Vice

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-President. He was always very gracious to me, and I was a very great admirer of his and appreciated his unusual qualities.

I would add this to what I just said about War Food. We had shortage of packaging and everything else. I was always afraid there would be some food spoilage, perishable food. It begins to deteriorate as soon as it is produced unless it is refrigerated. Ships would be torpedoed while carrying food for the Allies and some limping back to New York with broken, leaky packages. In order to reduce the expense, I hired Lynch, Donohue and Dee to repair the broken packages on the dock in New York. I paid them eighteen thousand dollars a week just to stay and mend the packages on the docks. If I sent the broken, leaky packages back to the warehouse there would be additional transportation and storage charges.

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HESS: Were they a packing company?

JONES: It's just a company that did packing. They simply repaired broken packages. They also did packing. If we had shipped these packages back to a warehouse and paid loading, transportation and re-loading, the cost would have increased many times over. Then, too, packages would sometimes come in from the interior with broken packages. When I was up there one time we were loading several ships. Five hundred barrels of salt pork were on the dock and fifty barrels were leaking. When you are buying five million dollars worth of food per day for lend-lease it is a gigantic undertaking, especially when they were also loading food to feed millions of men in our own armed services. This was no ordinary undertaking. The only practical way was to have repairs done in the dock by a

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responsible company.

HESS: A New York company?

JONES: Yes, it was a New York company and they did a wonderful job. It would cost a lot more to do it any other way. I wasn't responsible for the food after it got on the sea, but when they would bring it back to shore after attack by a U-boat, I had to do the repairing of the packaging.

We were instructed by the Congress to maintain a support price on numerous commodities, including eggs. Some of the concerns didn't like the egg price. One Friday, just before noon, a committee came to Washington and told our egg people that the support price of eggs was too high. They said, "The egg dealers are not going to buy any more eggs as of this

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time. We are out of the market all over the United States." All the big wholesalers come in a group down to War Food and the egg people in War Food were scared to death. They came in to see me (our people that had been handling the eggs). They knew we had instructions from the Congress to support the price, but it had to be done by purchasing if there wasn't any other way to dispose of them. But all the egg dealers, especially the wholesalers, were out on strike. There were no purchasers. Our egg people asked, "What are we to do?" And I replied, "We are going to buy those eggs." Our committee reported my statement to the wholesalers, and they said, "He wouldn't dare to do that."

My committee told the wholesalers, "You don't know that fellow. He'll smile, but

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he'll stick with what he says." And our people handling the problems said, "What are we going to do with them?"

I said, "Well, we'll sell what we can at the ceiling price and we'll store what we have storage space for, and then the rest we can make chicken feed, dry the eggs, and obey the law, and we may prosecute the wholesalers conspiracy if necessary." I didn't flicker at all, and only had to buy a hundred carloads of eggs. They came back into the market. But that was tough. They picked Friday afternoon, when it was hard and awkward to do that.

But we had a lot of problems, tough problems. The full scale war was on and this thing lasted -- First World War lasted only about a year, 18 months from the time Congress declared the state of war and our fighting

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only lasted a few months, April to November. This time the war lasted from December, 1941, until May, 1945, before the war was over in Europe. I am proud of the fact that we had less -- even these retail grocery stores allowed 3 percent for spoilage, because it is impossible to not have some. And we had slightly less than 1 percent. Now, that isn't a fair comparison because we bought in great quantities, but, on the other hand, we had much more to handle. I think it's a wonderful record and I've always been very proud of it.

HESS: What is the toughest problem that you had to deal with?

JONES: That's one of the toughest. And another

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one was that while I was down at the Food Conference the officials put a mandatory ceiling on a lot of commodities.

HESS: Congress did?

JONES: No, Jimmy Byrnes, under authority granted by Congress.

HESS: Jimmy Byrnes did.

JONES: And, of course, he had authority to do it. The authority of Congress to act. It was under an Executive order. But it was an Executive order pursuant to an act of Congress, or so interpreted, and when I got back from the Food Conference I was told, "Well, now listen, some of these prices were low and there is temporarily a big surplus of some of them, which has run prices down," (this was before I was over there with Jimmy Byrnes).

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We had problems with the corn and hog related prices early in the war. I said -- the prices of corn and hogs are closely related. It is called a ratio price. I said, "You should lift the price of corn so that corn will move into the market." OPA opposed the change. The corn growers simply wouldn't sell their corn. They would buy a few hogs or make a trade with their hog growing neighbors. Eighty-three percent of the corn never crosses a county line in Iowa, in those big corn states, that's an amazing statement, but it is correct. But the balance is still several hundred millions of bushels.

HESS: Is it fed to hogs in those counties?

JONES: It is fed to hogs in those counties. And a lot of them are hog growers and a lot of them are corn growers, and some of them are

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both. But they can always sell their corn, and to make it move there has to be a related price or corn would not move. If these prices were out of line they would sometimes make an agreement with a hog, growing neighbor to work together on side agreements or would simply store their corn and wait for a change in the ration price. And we had that problem all the way through. And another problem was when they simply would not sell, but just hold for a better deal. We had twelve million people in the armed services toward the end of the war and they came first in food allocation. Then the lend-lease. We had to help the Allies. The OPA rationed the domestic allotment of food. We had to feed those turkeys and chickens and all kinds of livestock in the East and unless corn moved they couldn't get the feed. Finally

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the authorities agreed to a change, lifted the price of corn ten cents a bushel and that, of course, caused some of the corn to move. But one of the worst things I had was when I was called over to the White House, I think it was in December, 1943, or January of 1944. I think it was December. [William M.] Jeffers had just announced -- I want to tell this because it's important -- that he had solved the synthetic rubber problem, that it would be made from petroleum, and that since he had the problem solved he was resigning and going back to his position as president of the Union Pacific Railroad. I was called over to the White House and told, "We've got to have two hundred million bushels of wheat, and a hundred and sixty thousand tons of sugar to make synthetic rubber." I said I thought Jeffers had solved that problem. They laughed.

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I said, "Well, I've just allotted -- made an allocation of sugar to housewives and am importing wheat. We're short on all those things."

And they said, "Well, we've got to have rubber for tires for six hundred thousand wheeled vehicles to land our army on D-Day."

These figures staggered me and I said, "Can I announce that and tell these people why I must reduce the sugar allotment?"

They said, "No, you can't say one word. That must be kept a complete secret."

I said, "Well, let me make it this way then because we're going to have a lot of trouble with this adjustment. Let me just dish it out as it is needed and used." And they agreed to that.

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HESS: As what?

JONES: They let me make the actual allocation as needed and not to allot it all at once.

HESS: I see, yes.

JONES: And we can do some...

HESS: Slip it in a little at a time.

JONES: Yes, of course, they said those, all of those, vehicles had to have rubber. Well, when they first sprang it on me I said, "I thought Jeffers said he had already solved the question."

They had a whole bunch of the high brass over there in Byrnes' office, and they said, "We know it's tough, but it must be done." I was the bluest then that I ever was during my War Food days. I said, "I don't know

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whether I can ride the storm or not, but this is a war and I'll do the best I can."

Well, we worked it out finally. It upset our plans, but we furnished the sugar and wheat as they requested.

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Third Oral History Interview with Judge Marvin Jones, Washington, D.C., April 24, 1970. By Jerry N. Hess, Harry S. Truman Library.

HESS: Judge, I understand that your name was one of those that was under consideration for the vice-presidential spot in 1940. What can you tell me about that?

JONES: Well, it was -- several of the newspapers carried me among a list of others, but I wasn't particularly interested in that position at that time and... I can tell you some things that were said to me by a high up authority, but I won't. Perhaps some would not believe it anyway.

HESS: Why weren't you interested?

JONES: Well, I don't know, I'd prefer not to say, because I wasn't very enthusiastic about breaking the two term tradition. There were a number of people that are outspoken, but I

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was going to remain a Democrat and carry through, so I just prefer not to say much.

HESS: Who else was under consideration at that time?

JONES: There were -- the list of names, five or six were mentioned in the newspapers from time to time, but these were highly speculative. As I recall, was Alben Barkley, Sam Rayburn and several others. I am sure the newspaper files would show.

HESS: Henry Wallace?

JONES: Henry Wallace was also named as being under consideration, but not many of them mentioned his name, some of them did. There was considerable speculation, but not much information. They finally narrowed it down and some of them told me, they narrowed it down to two names, but I prefer not to...

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HESS: Okay, one more question: Did you ever speak with President Roosevelt on that matter?

JONES: Yes, we had some conversation about the possibilities, and some of those under him were speaking about it, but you know people who understand each other may have meaningful discussions with calling a spade a spade. At that time, he wasn't disclosing that he was going to run. The last conversation I had with him about the whole matter was in June. He talked about how Hitler was wanting to conquer the world, had emissaries all over South America, said we must make plans. He specifically urged me to not accept the judicial position to which I had already been confirmed -- said he needed me. I finally agreed to not take the oath until toward the end of the year. He didn't talk like a man who was quitting.

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I had no doubt then that he would run. In fact, later when Wallace was nominated, the President made me promise to go with him on his barnstorming tour throughout the nation. I could tell you more, but that is enough. He didn't disclose until convention that he would run, that is, in definite terms. People were talking -- Garner announced you know, and so did Jim Farley. Both of them were campaigning his forces at the convention.

HESS: Now both of those men were against the third term weren't they?

JONES: They were outspoken against more than two terms.

HESS: Or against the third term suggestion?

JONES: Yes, against it.

HESS: Breaking the tradition.

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JONES: The two term tradition. Against any three consecutive terms. But I took no part in that because I was a Democrat and while there wasn't anything in the law to prevent a man running for more than two terms, those opposing an additional term said they wanted to be sure that any President didn't build up a following that would enable him to run indefinitely and possibly change the form of government. That was not the theory, or not the practice, but nevertheless, I figured that whoever was nominated I was going to support. For years I had had the honors of the party and I felt I had no right to quit the team after the play had started. The breaking up into splinter parties is what got France and many other countries in trouble. Coalition governments rarely last long. I intended to support President Roosevelt if he was nominated and

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I told him so definitely. And then after Wallace was chosen, the President wanted me to go with him on the campaign. And I went.

HESS: We mentioned last time that Mr. Bankhead had asked you to go to Iowa for the notification speech, is that right?

JONES: Yes. And that speech is in the *Congressional Record*.

HESS: And then did you stay and go on the part of the campaign?

JONES: Yes, when I stayed there according to the wishes of the President, he personally spoke to me about that after Wallace was nominated, but said he wanted me to go with Wallace on the barnstorming tour.

HESS: What did he say to you at the time that he asked you to go? Why did he want you to go?

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JONES: Well, I don't know. He said I was more experienced than Wallace. He mentioned the fact that I had for many years been speaking all over the country in the Democratic tradition and I had been in charge of the western headquarters in 1936 of the Democratic Committee at Chicago when for the first time we carried practically all the western farm states. I was in charge of the western headquarters and assigned all the speakers in the West and he added, "You are well-known and popular among the farmers." In 1936 I was placed in charge, and we had the Chicago headquarters -- we sent out thirty-six million pieces of literature from there in that campaign. The people wouldn't read long printed speeches.

And we'd get out a little two-leaf cartoon folder on each subject, tell how the vote of the Republicans was on that subject and how the Democrats had voted. The majority of the

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Republicans in the House that year had voted against practically everything that we had proposed including the rural electrification (I was amazed at that), and we got for each subject they had voted against. They weren't much for the farm deal, that is the farm program as we had fashioned it. Joe Martin, the new leader, was trying to build up a reputation of holding the members in line and he did a pretty good job. Martin was a good organizer.

Anyhow, we would get out on rural electrification -- on the Farm Credit Administration on marketing agreements, on corn, hogs and wheat prices, showing that farm prices were better and farm interest rates much lower than at any time in recent years. We had a good cartoonist. We had a cartoon on every leaflet. On rural electrification we had a cartoon of a woman on an old wash tub, and

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then -- another woman standing right by her electric washer smiling.

And then we just had a few sentences. I had learned the value of short, crisp sentences. And we'd say on the passage of this measure and that measure, we had about a dozen different -- major farm programs. We would show the vote on those various commodities separately. We would show the difference in the interest rate of the home tenant purchases, each on a separate leaflet citing the various acts that we had passed, but each separately and we would say, "Before they were passed the interest rates were so much, and after the passage of these acts it was so much lower." Just a half a dozen sentences, great big letters. "Do you want this repealed?" "Do you want that repealed?" "Do you wish it repealed?"

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Western Democratic state headquarters would ask for 5,000 or 10,000 at one time.

They called me out to speak so much that I would go out and make two or three speeches and come back and then assign the other speakers. And Paul Porter was out there. He helped write those just single sentences. I told him what I wanted. Paul Porter could give you that story, and he's a whizz anyway, a very able man. Anyhow he was young, but he knew how to get things done and he was an enthusiast.

I campaigned in all those Western States in 1936. I went up to Wisconsin to speak and they said, "We want five thousand copies of that leaflet on the milk, and milk products subject." Over on the side were stacks of congressional printed speeches, many packages unopened sent out from the general headquarters.

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I looked over there at the stacks of printed speeches and said, "You apparently already have plenty of campaign literature on hand."

He replied, "We don't pay attention to them. People don't read them, but they read those leaflets."

The national committee had sent the speeches and they sometimes helped if someone was particularly interested. But people told me time and time again in many places, "These people get those little leaflets and carry them around in their pockets."

I spoke in practically all those Western States except in Cliff [Clifford] Hope's district in Kansas. Farley sent word to me, wrote me a letter, that he wanted me to go down in Cliff Hope's district and speak. I believe he called me up on the phone after that. And I said, "I'll go down there if you want me to, but

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I'll brag on Cliff Hope because he is one of the few," -- he was the ranking Republican on the Agricultural Committee who supported the program in most instances.

And he said, "I guess I had better not send you down there."

Anyhow, in Minnesota, the state chairman came to see me. He came to Chicago for some purpose and came up to see me and said, "They want me to invite Cordell Hull up to speak at Minneapolis," (I think it was, or -- yes Minneapolis), "and they want him to come up and talk on the 'favored nations' agreement." The chairman said, "I told them I will invite him if they would permit me to write you to speak at the same meeting. If you come along, well, I'll go ahead and invite him." I told him that he shouldn't make that as a condition that Cordell Hull was one of the truly great men of the nation, and that he would get a crowd

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alone. But he stood his ground. I finally said I would go and make a short talk, but let him make the principal speech. Hull made a great speech, told a few western stories, and I bragged on Hull. I am sure he never knew of the attitude of the state chairman. It worked out fine.

HESS: Well, when you were traveling with Mr. Wallace, what cities did you go to?

JONES: Well, we first went -- we started out in Chicago and spoke at Springfield, and Decatur, oh, I know several little towns, on a barnstorming tour through Illinois, Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma. I could look up the...

HESS: Oh, that's all right.

JONES: The national committee would have that record. We spoke at about -- I think we spoke

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two days in Illinois and we'd speak at a lot of little towns, five or six speeches each day. And they'd have a good crowd. Whenever we were booked we'd just make short speeches, and Wallace always made the last speech.

HESS: What kind of impression was Wallace making on the voters at this time, did you feel?

JONES: Well, he -- in the farm areas he was more favorably received than in some of the other areas. Of course, there were some objections to the first part of the AAA because they had accused him of killing the little pigs.

HESS: Every third pig, and every third row of corn.

Did you hear any objections, did you hear any statements by farmers in the audience at this time about...

JONES: There wasn't so much at that time. I go

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back now since you mentioned it. When I delivered the address notifying Wallace (to go back to that), Mr. Rockefeller (I think it's the same one that is Governor in New York, but I'm not sure), he told somebody that they nominated the wrong man for Vice President. I don't know whether he'd confirm that or if he would remember it.

HESS: He liked your speech?

JONES: Well, apparently he did, I don't know. Anyhow, as we went along, Wallace improved a great deal. I mean it was a little difficult to keep him from -- you know he was so inclined to just talk along and speak somewhat off-the-cuff and sometimes he'd say some things that didn't seem to ring the bell. Cliff [Clifford V.] Gregory of the Prairie Farms would talk to him afterwards, but he improved a good deal in his

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speaking during that campaign. We would urge him to put more life into his speeches, to talk like he really meant it.

We spoke in Missouri, Illinois into Missouri, and into Iowa, which was it? Illinois joins there in the corner of Missouri doesn't it? Illinois?

HESS: Yes.

JONES: We spoke at about ten or twelve places in Illinois and across into, well we -- across into Missouri, went through Missouri and through the corner of Kansas and then through Oklahoma, spoke a number of different places. We were about three weeks on that barnstorming trip and I tell you it got to be popular because it was a little different from what had been the custom. We'd drive in cars most of the time, but if there was a big leap we'd get on the

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train. People would furnish the cars and some of them were taking along cars anyway and would drive them even when we had plenty of transportation.

HESS: A car caravan from town to town.

JONES: Yes. And then when we arrived at Woodward, Oklahoma -- we'd spoken at, oh, several different places in Oklahoma, I remember Woodward where we wound up. I had just gotten that wire that I should come back because there was going to be a close vote on the extension of the draft. So, I had to leave the caravan.

I did go on with him to Amarillo because it was a couple of days before the vote on the draft. I went on and got off the train at Amarillo about midnight of the same night we had spoken at Woodward. The next day I could get a through train to Washington. I could go from Amarillo to Chicago on that

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Santa Fe Special. As I recall they were taking the train to California with Wallace who said he hoped I could rejoin them as soon as possible.

I rejoined them in the Midwest on the way back from California, and made a few speeches with the group.

Finally the caravan ended and special speeches were made by Wallace and others under assignment. I made several speeches as did others under assignment of the Democratic Wallace Committee. The caravan had crossed the continent both ways, had been a spectacular accomplishment, but proved to be wearing on the principal and expensive to the committee.

Wallace developed a good deal in the way of speaking. I would keep insisting, I would say, "Show a little more enthusiasm."

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I would say, "You've gone over this same thing time and time again and it's not new to you." I got him pretty well along and Cliff Gregory would prod him too. I think Cliff Gregory went on with him, but he left before I joined on the way back. He needed to rejoin his farm paper. He published that paper and had been with them a long time. Then I came with him on the way from Illinois. We came back through Michigan and through those areas toward the coast.

HESS: A few years later, Wallace was regarded as being quite a liberal and quite far to the left. If you agree with that statement, why do you think that that would have developed. Why did Wallace have these inclinations to being an extreme liberal?

JONES: Well, he was, Wallace was considerably a dreamer anyway, and he had a great heart,

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and he wanted to do everything he could to help people in the world. He just gradually, I think, developed a good deal more that way when he was footloose and then finally he, well you remember, he ran for the President on an independent ticket later. He made some rather rash statements. His defeat for the renomination in 1944 was a great disappointment to him. Anyway he went far to the left. And then ran for President as an independent.

HESS: In 1948.

JONES: Wallace had a lot of fine qualities. He was very pleasant. I always got along with him very well. Time and time again he'd make some statements that would make it necessary for me to get up on the floor of the House and defend him.

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HESS: Do you recall what some of those statements were? What were the nature of them?

JONES: Well, when the Agricultural Adjustment Act was held invalid in 1936, January the 6th, 1936, the law levied processing fees, you see, on all these major commodities. As a practical matter the Department found it necessary to delay collection of the processing taxes. When the tax was paid at once, and then the commodity is shipped out, it was passed on right through the retailer to the consumer. If the manufacturer had to pay the tax at once, he had in some instances to wait two or three months to collect from the dealer or retailer. He would pass the tax on, but he wouldn't get his pay until the bill was collected. So he was given from sixty to ninety days, and in some instances a hundred and eighty days, to pay the tax, but in some

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instances the dealer paid the tax at once to get the cash discount.

When the tax was invalidated these processors had about two hundred million dollars in their pocket which they had passed on and collected, that much that they hadn't turned over to the Government yet. I knew that most of them would turn it back since they had collected and there wasn't any practical way to refund it to the individual consumers. Henry Wallace gave out a statement, it was a public statement, that these processors were guilty of highway robbery in retaining these funds, that it amounted to legalized robbery. In fact he used other similar terms.

Wallace wasn't particularly popular in the House. I was preparing some legislation at the time to require that (most of them were going to pay it back voluntarily as soon as

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they found out who to pay it to), but I was going to require them to return it to the U.S. Treasury unless it had already been paid as collected taxes. Well, Congressman Allen Towner Treadway of Massachusetts got up and said that Wallace should be impeached for making such a statement, that there was no obligation on the part of the manufacturers to do anything since the taxes were illegal.

At any rate he made the flat statement that Wallace should be impeached. I arose to question Treadway, and I said, "Who do you think ought to have this money? Should the processors have it, or should the tax be turned over to the Government even though it is an illegal tax?"

He said, "It's an illegal tax and they don't have to do anything."

I said, "It's got to -- it'll either go back into the Treasury or it'll be an

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unearned increment of some kind, or a windfall."

This is all in the *Congressional Record* -- at least in the *Daily Record*.

Well, they all sort of quieted down after that, but they had been storming around about his giving out that statement. Some of the manufacturers hadn't said what they were going to do. So, I drafted a bill to return the money to the Treasury. The balance in the hands of the processors was about two hundred million dollars. There was very little opposition to the bill for returning the money to the Treasury. Some of the processors said, "We are holding this money and we want to know who we should give it to." We passed that bill right away to require the processors to refund it unless they had already turned it in. Any part that hadn't been turned in, so it went back into the Treasury. I explained that on a theory

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that there wasn't any way to send it back to the -- all the people that had paid it, and I said, "The whole country in the using of these food products had paid it, that was the best way to try to get it back where it should be placed." That measure went through and then another problem came up.

It was toward the end of the session, and Chester Davis called me up. He was the Administrator of the AAA at that time. He said, "These farmers have complied with their contracts. You know they had agreed to adjust their acreage of certain commodities. These winter wheat and other crops are planned and planted long ago. They've kept their part of the contracts, and they ought to be paid because they acted in good faith."

And I said, "How much is it?"

He said, "It's a hundred and ninety-six

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million dollars."

And he said, "It ought to be done right away. They're getting unhappy. If we are going to tell them they aren't going to be paid after they carried out a part of an agreement in good faith we will have a storm on hand."

And he says, "Can you get it through?"

And I said, "That'll be tough at this time because it's too late to go through the budget. This is the last appropriations bill -- the deficiency bill we're going to have," but I said, "I'll do the best I can."

I went to see [Congressman James P.] Buchanan, the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and explained it to him. He had a farm district himself, and he asked -- he had

already reported the deficiency bill which is the last big appropriation bill. And I said, "Now, I want to offer an amendment to

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that bill."

And he asked me how much it would take. When I told him how much it was, he whistled. I said, "These farmers acted in good faith when they complied with these plans, planting some crops, some of them non-compensating, some of them cover crops and soil building practices." I said, "I want to offer an amendment to add \$196,000,000 to the appropriation bill which you have just reported to the House." In fact, it was scheduled to be taken up in the House that -- as soon as the House met, which was within a few minutes.

It hadn't been authorized by his committee, but I mentioned it to those I saw and I didn't know whether I could get it through. Buchanan said, "Well, I think it ought to go through. It ought to go through now." And he added, "You go across the aisle and talk to John Taber,

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he is from New York and he is the watchdog of the Treasury as you know. He carefully examines every item, but," he says, "he is fair. You go talk to him," the House was just meeting, "and tell him what you want to do."

I went over to see Taber and Buchanan had added, "If he doesn't object," he said, "probably you may get it through."

I went over and talked to Taber and told him the facts. I said, "I think the farmers ought to be paid."

He said, "I think so too. How much will it take?"

And I told him a hundred and ninety-six million. He also whistled to beat the band. "Well," I said, "that's the only way, and it's gong to be paid some time, John, and this is the only chance to get it through in time, and you might just as well keep them in good

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humor the best you can, because they're hurt anyway about the knocking out of that farm bill."

He said, "I may ask you a few questions, but I don't think I'll object. You go ahead and offer your amendment."

I offered that amendment to add a hundred and ninety-six million dollars to compensate the farmers for the part of the work that they'd already done in good faith. It was just a very simple amendment. Taber got up and asked some questions, made me explain just what it was about, and then he said, "Well, I'm not going to object, I think the farmers ought to be paid."

So, they went through by unanimous consent. Any member could have objected. A hundred and ninety-six million dollars that hadn't even been budgeted. And they hardly ever...

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HESS: That's a lot of money.

JONES: I went over and thanked John Taber. I had a great regard for him because -- he could be very stern. He was Republican, but he was a very fine Representative, and he stayed in Congress over thirty years. (Everybody believed in his integrity.) But I think that was a remarkable accomplishment.

HESS: Now, moving on to another subject, I understand that not too long after the 1940 election you were offered the job of Secretary of Agriculture. Is that right?

JONES: I was offered it more than once.

HESS: When was the first time?

JONES: The first time I was -- it was not offered by the President, but the first time was when Wallace and Flynn, who was the Democratic National Committeeman in New York...

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HESS: Ed [Edward J.] Flynn. Is that right?

JONES: Ed Flynn. And they telephoned me at about 11:30 o'clock at night after I was asleep and said, "Do you want to be Secretary of Agriculture?"

And I said, "No, I wouldn't have the job."

And they seemed surprised.

HESS: About what time was it?

JONES: It was about 11:30 at night.

HESS: No, what day, month, year...

JONES: Well, it was...

HESS: In 1940?

JONES: In 1940 after the...

HESS: Convention?

JONES: After the convention and after Wallace had

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been nominated.

HESS: After the convention, before the election?

JONES: Yes, and before the election. And -- yes it was before the election. And then I told them I didn't want it and they seemed a little surprised and said, "Would you want it from now until the end of the term?"

I said, "No, I wouldn't want it for that." I said, "I wouldn't mind being in the position temporarily, but the President has asked me to campaign. The Democratic Committee wants me." And I said, "I can be of more value in the campaign because of my experience in campaigning than if I'm handicapped by being a Cabinet officer, so I'd rather not have that."

And then when I -- in 1942, James F. Byrnes phoned me and said the President wanted me to be War Food Administrator, and I have a record of conversation. I won't go into detail. Byrnes

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asked me to have dinner with him one night. I had dinner at his home out at the Shoreham and he said, "The President and I worked out a plan to establish a War Food Administrator to be under the Secretary of Agriculture, but -- technically, he would have charge of all the active agencies of the Department of Agriculture, and the President's going to ask you to be War Food Administrator under that plan."

"Well," I said, "I don't think that I would want to go under the present Secretary of Agriculture. Besides I think the Secretary of Agriculture ought to be Food Administrator."

HESS: It was Claude Wickard at the time.

JONES: And it was Claude Wickard at the time and he said, "Well, he'll appoint you Secretary of Agriculture. The President has indicated that he'd appoint you Secretary of Agriculture any time that you wanted it, and he'd just as

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soon do it that way. He would give Wickard another job." And I said, no, I wouldn't want to take the job under Claude Wickard. I know there's a good deal of disagreement and feeling in the Department of Agriculture, and some of them felt that Wickard was preferred over some of those who have been in the Department longer. I told him I thought I might have difficulty in getting along if I were under Wickard. And I said, "I think the Secretary of Agriculture should be appointed and given full authority."

And he said, "If you'll just agree to take it, he'll appoint you Secretary of Agriculture."

I said, "No, I can't do it. I'm not going to give up the place that I have. It's what I have always wanted. I'll take leave of absence and do most anything during the war."

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The next morning, about 11 o'clock on December the 4th, Byrnes phoned and said that he had talked to the President and the President still wanted me to take the position, and Byrnes said, "There isn't any question, he'll put you Secretary of Agriculture if you want it."

Jimmy Byrnes was a court reporter as a young man, before he came to Congress. And he had a custom, in what he regarded as important conversation, of taking it down in shorthand. Byrnes surprised me with a copy of our conversation and I have a typed copy of the conversation that we carried on which showed that the President still was anxious for me to be War Food Administrator. And he said, "If you agree to accept, he will appoint you Secretary of Agriculture."

And I still said, "No." And then I said something about reasons and that I thought I'd

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have difficulty with Claude Wickard. I went ahead to say that if Chester Davis was over there, I'd be glad to accept. I could work with Chester Davis I know and I said, "I don't know whether I could work with Claude Wickard. We'd always been friendly, but I know something about his troubles." I said, "I'd work under Chester Davis because I know there wouldn't be any trouble if I were with him."

Byrnes called me up a little later and said, "The President said he would go ahead and experiment by making Claude Wickard Secretary of Agriculture, and War Food Administrator also." But he said, "I doubt whether it will work." The President wasn't very happy over the arrangement apparently. I didn't talk to him on that phase of it. But the President appointed Wickard. I think the appointment became effective in December, 1942.

And then in -- just before Christmas or

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around the first of January, I happened to be on the Hill to attend a Texas delegation luncheon. They have a luncheon every week in the Speaker's Dining Room. I went up, Byrnes was going to speak and I was very fond of Byrnes anyway. I went up to hear him speak. I went up after it was over to congratulate him and he said, "I want you to go back to the -- ride back with me. I am in the East Wing of the White House and I'll take you over by your place;" (which was Seventeenth and Pennsylvania, just diagonally across), "I want to talk to you." On the way he said, "I want you to take a leave of absence and come over and be my assistant and advise me on agricultural matters, because you are thoroughly familiar with those issues."

And I told him, "Well, I'll be glad to do that." And I said, "When do you want me?"

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"Just as soon as you can come." And I said, "I'll have to speak to the Court," and at that time, with war on, we had a lot of contract cases pending in the Court -- but we couldn't get witnesses in many of them. That was a big part of our business, the big contracts that were being made in

wartime -- but the retired Army and Navy engineers, were for the most part what were called the Contracting Officers. They would supervise the contracts for the Government. Many of them had been called back into service and were in far away places. We couldn't get the testimony in a great many of those cases and those cases had to be deferred until after the war was over so that witnesses could be present. We had a heavy docket, but the other judges could handle such cases as could be tried at that time.

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The Court willingly gave me leave of absence for the duration and I went over to Byrnes' office right away.

I could tell you some interesting experiences, but there is a limit to what should be included. One of the first assignments I received involved live cattle. War Food and OPA were having a controversy over whether to put a ceiling on live cattle. The cattlemen and packers both were very much opposed to it. That's about the only thing the cattlemen and the packers agreed on. A ceiling should be placed on meats and meat products. The OPA was anxious to put a ceiling on live cattle.

Byrnes, the second day after I was with him, called me and said certain officials of the OPA [Office of Price Administration] had requested the cattlemen of the nation to

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come to Washington to consult whether a ceiling should be placed on live cattle. Byrnes said the cattlemen were disturbed about being called in at this busy time, in fact, were a little out of humor. They were short of both help and supplies, as well as time.

I am not going to say who it was, but Byrnes added, "They are so determined that I'm afraid those cattlemen will cause trouble. They are an independent group as you know. Some of them have told me that there isn't any way to tell the quality of meat until you take the hide off." Byrnes said, "You go to the meeting and see if you can keep any trouble from developing."

They had one of the representatives of OPA (I won't call his name because he's still living, he might not remember it), but I went over there and Byrnes said, "You go over and keep them from having trouble." He said, "You

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know those cowmen." This man who was in charge called the meeting to order. It was in a packed auditorium in the basement of -- what's that hotel over there right by the White House there?

HESS: The Washington?

JONES: The Washington Hotel.

And that was right across the street, with the Treasury Building between -- only about a block away. I went over to the auditorium. Every seat was taken and they were standing up around the

three walls. The chairman arose, asked for order and said, "Gentlemen, I thank you for attending, for coming to Washington," and he said, "I'd be," -- he started off this way, "I would be less than frank with you if I didn't tell you that we have already decided to put a ceiling on live cattle."

Well, they rose up like receiving the

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benediction. They began to shout, "Why did you bring us to Washington then?"

They said, "We're busy out on the ranch. We were called to consult. Why bring us to Washington just to tell us?" And then a bunch of them started for the platform, some of them saying, "Throw him out." I got up and I didn't know what might happen. I was afraid they would manhandle him. They are men of action. Well, I got up immediately and told them, "I'd like to say a word." They quieted down. And I said, "I have just come from Mr. Byrnes' office and he told me that he hadn't yet decided the matter, and he has the last say, and it hasn't been determined, and he'd like to have your reviews and would like to have the discussions here so I can tell him how you feel about it." Then we...

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HESS: Then they calmed down a little bit.

JONES: They calmed down and went ahead and had discussion. And Joe Montague, for 20 years the general attorney, for the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association, had always been a great friend of mine, he came to me later and said, "You know, it's a good thing you got up when you did because that bunch, I don't know what they would have done. They got worked up -- they would have gone up there and they'd have done something to that fellow and they might have pitched him out into the street." He said, "I don't know what they would have done, and," -- but this particular man just listened, he didn't say a word. The meeting proceeded with an orderly discussion. He didn't even thank me. I didn't think he realized, as I did, what was likely to happen.

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HESS: How serious the situation was.

JONES: How serious it was.

He never thanked me, but he never criticized me. He went right ahead and had the conversation. I am sure he did not realize the danger he was in. He did not know these frontiersmen, and sons of frontiersmen who didn't like any sort of pressure talk. I am sure he was in real danger, but I am equally sure he didn't realize it. We had many discussions. That's just one incident. There are always somebody wanting something and I had to interview a great many people. Processors would come in and say the ceiling's too low. And I'd have to have a conversation with them and decide what I thought should be done, if anything. I was getting along pretty good, but they began to talk about Wickard, some of them, and didn't like -- but Wickard, he'd come over to the East

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Wing when they would want something, or some change. He would bring some other officials with him. He would think they had agreed on something and then one of the fellows under him would offer something different. Wickard never would jump on him, but I could tell that he was bothered about it. We would try to thrash it out and come to an understanding.

They came over a number of times, as did many groups and I had to write a number of things for Byrnes affecting agriculture because he had to make the final decision on everything, practically, in the domestic field.

Byrnes called me one day in late March or early April and told me, "The President has decided to call an international conference on food and agriculture."

HESS: That was the one down in Virginia?

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JONES: Yes, down in Virginia. Now, I don't guess you want to go into that.

HESS: Well, we covered that last time.

JONES: I believe we did.

HESS: How were you chosen for the position of War Food Administrator? How did that come about?

JONES: As a matter of fact, when they decided they were going to have Wickard leave, the Mobilization Committee and two or three others, Bernard Baruch, "Barney" they called him, a lot of people did -- they were all meeting and they usually called me in on those meetings, but this time -- they were holding a meeting to advise that they were going to change Food Administrators I didn't know about what purpose, but before they went in Byrnes told me, he said, "I think I had better warn you that they're going to select

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a new War Food Administrator and I think they are going to pick you." And he said, "I thought I'd better warn you. They will send for you in a little while I'm sure, and I think that you should know it. I ought to tell you what they're going to consider."

In about fifteen minutes they sent for me to come in and I went into that great big bunch in there, you know, including Harry Hopkins, Barney Baruch and several others, and Byrnes announced that, "We're going to -- we've decided that we're going to appoint somebody as War Food Administrator in place of Mr. -- in place of Claude Wickard. He seems to be having trouble, and we're going to appoint a new man."

I immediately spoke up and said, "I have just the man for the place."

I was ducking it. That's one job I did not want.

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HESS: You were ready for them?

JONES: I was ready for them and I gave them a good selling there for a few minutes. And I said, "Now Chester Davis is the most experienced, one of the most experienced, men in the United States and the most experienced in administering agricultural programs. He's been head for years of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration in Agriculture." They put him on the Federal Reserve Board and he left voluntarily to become president of the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis, a position he now holds. And I said, "He's the best man that you can pick and I'd like to have you consider him." The Regional Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis is an important place, and he's had a background. As a young man he was minister of agriculture in one of the big

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western states. He has a degree from an A & M college. He has come before my committee many, many times, in former days before I was chairman of that committee. We have always been good friends. He knows the subject."

They listened very carefully. I gave them a good selling. They said, "We thank you," and I got up and walked out.

In a few minutes, Jimmy Byrnes came out and came by and he said, "You're the damdest man I've ever seen. They had already agreed to appoint you -- to recommend to the President for appointment as War Food Administrator. And you talked them out of it."

"Well," I said, "I'm glad I did. I don't want the job."

I think we discussed the other day about his staying in there while I went down to the Food Conference and then I came back, I think

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I've recited how that they decided -- well, then the President called me himself after Chester Davis had sent an immediate resignation, to be effective at the end of the (that was I think sometime in early June), to be effective when the programs were laid out. It would be effective in the fall. Well, he had sent it over at night, almost after our conversation, and so the President apparently was peeved about it, so he just accepted his resignation effective immediately. I didn't know it until Byrnes called me. And the next day the President called me himself and he said, "I'm going to appoint a new War Food Administrator."

In the meantime they had changed that provision when Chester Davis came in, to make him just in active, complete charge, of all the active branches of the Department of Agriculture which left a sort of a shell.

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Harry Hopkins said at the time, "If I were Wickard, I'd resign as Secretary of Agriculture."

And I said, "Oh, I don't know, he's got a job that he likes."

But he didn't have much to do after that as Secretary of Agriculture because the authority had been taken away from him.

Anyway, the next, the next morning after that resignation, the President had sent him a letter, accepting his resignation immediately. Then the President called me up and said, "I'm going to appoint a new War Food Administrator, and the choice is between you and Mr. Hoover, Herbert Hoover." Well, he didn't like Hoover I knew.

HESS: Did he say that in a joking manner?

JONES: Oh, it was evidently spoken facetiously and he laughed when he said that. And I said,

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"Well, Mr. President, Mr. Hoover's an experienced man in that field."

He said, "You're not going to throw me off the track this time." He said, "You're the man for this place, you're the man I've always wanted for it from the beginning and I want to appoint you."

And I said, "Well, I'd like to suggest somebody else. I'd like to suggest Spike Evans," who had been AAA Administrator when Davis left over there and had as much experience, than he had when Davis left and went to St. Louis, he took Davis' place over on the -- and he was an able man. He knew a lot about agriculture. I suggested four or five.

And he said, "They are not well enough known."

And I -- he turned me down every one I

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suggested. I was trying to get out of it even then. I didn't want the place. And then I finally told him I said, "Well, I don't know, if I consider it I would like to have it just for a year because I don't know when they are going to be needing me back on the Court."

And he said, "Well, you go over and straighten that out for a year and then we'll talk about it."

And I said, "Well, if I go over, I'd like to be a member of the Mobilization Committee," which was the little war cabinet.

"Fine, I'll make you that."

And I said, "Well, I'll go over and try it for a while, try it a year."

Well, I went over there and it was a difficult place because the demand for food was something tremendous, and they had taken many boys off the farm. There was a shortage

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of labor everywhere. Many of the young men that were helping run the farms, yet we were called upon to increase production, in every way we could to induce the great production. Which we did. And we increased every year. Notwithstanding the shortage of labor, the production of the necessary food increased all the way from 10 to 40 percent each year. And then we had to buy. I bought an average of five million dollars worth of food per day for lend-lease. I had contracts with fifteen hundred warehouses. We had the responsibility of storing and transporting the food to New York, and loading on ships at New York and Seattle, and other export places, several of them. Then we had to be responsible for the packaging. There was a shortage of packaging material. Did I go over this before?

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HESS: We mentioned some of the difficulties that...

JONES: Well, I don't need to go over that again do I?

HESS: No.

JONES: I would like to show -- you know that I had a letter from Bernard Baruch on October the 4th, 1944 after I had been in War Food fifteen months. I think I'll read that into this record.

HESS: That's fine.

JONES: It's addressed to me. "You certainly have done a good job as Food Administrator with little noise, but with great effect. I do not see you," (he was a troubleshooter you know for the President), "I do not see you as much as I would like, but there is nothing to talk to you about because you undertook a job and you

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have done it. I congratulate you and want to say how deeply I appreciate your fine efforts. I wish our paths crossed oftener, but my feet only lead me where there is trouble I can help avoid. You don't need any of this because you see far ahead and act before the trouble occurs. Again my congratulations. Sincerely, Bernard M. Baruch."

HESS: What was your impression of Bernard Baruch and his general effectiveness?

JONES: He was very effective. He was a very able man. He talked to me before I went over to War Food, and after I had started the work. He invited me to dinner at the Carlton Hotel. He had a Mr. Hancock and two other experts with him. They kept him informed as to all branches of the Government, and did research for him. I had talked to him and Mr. Hancock, both of whom had a great interest in War Food,

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especially as to the difficulties and trouble that had arisen before I had gone over there.

Baruch wrote me two letters. I was surprised to receive these letters. In one he said, "I'm glad to see your position in regard to the distribution of our agricultural products. People seem to think that America is an inexhaustible source of everything. Under your direction agriculture has done a fine job and you certainly have done a good job in that distribution. It is impossible to give the whole world what they want, whether it is in arms, food, credit or material. I do not come to see you because I do not want to take up your time. And I know if you thought that I could do anything, you would let me know. I wish everything would go as smoothly as you have been running your show. But congratulations and best wishes. B.M. Baruch."

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Well, that was written me on March the 17th, 1945 and I don't mean that we didn't have some difficulties. We had many serious problems. I told you about one or two of them. I am sure you will not want me to go into some of the other serious problems that we had.

HESS: Well, we discussed a couple of them. Let me ask you just a few general questions.

What were your duties in relation to the War Production Board?

JONES: They allotted all critical materials and men. Donald Nelson was the chairman. The Board would meet regularly. Sometimes a subcommittee would meet. The Board would have regular meetings with the whole Board about once a month. As a member, I attended several of them, but they'd talk about so many

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different problems of other agencies that had no connection with my work that I was unable to attend regularly. Donald Nelson didn't usually attend but would come occasionally to the Board meetings, but he'd have somebody preside for him.

HESS: Who ran them when he didn't come?

JONES: I didn't get your question.

HESS: Who presided when he did not come?

JONES: Usually one of his assistants. It was a tremendous organization and they had -- the Secretary of War presided once when I was over there. They would change even while the meeting was going on. Different people would present their problems and then leave. I would ask to be excused when they were discussing other matters. I needed to be

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back at my work. I would always attend when they'd call me -- or when I called them and told them I would like to come over and talk with them about some War Food needs. They had a tough assignment anyway with so many allotment problems. Donald Nelson was always busy but he was a good man. As a matter of fact, the whole setup was pretty well handled. The assignment of men and materials of all kinds covered a vast field. You don't want anything about the Hot Springs conference?

HESS: No, I think we've got it.

JONES: I told you about being invited to the White House didn't I, before? You may have to rearrange some of this.

HESS: Oh, that will be quite all right.

JONES: I left the subject, because I thought you wanted to get to the subject of what I

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knew about Mr. Truman.

You had something else in mind.

HESS: Well, tell me about the visits to the White House.

Perhaps we've got that down, but it doesn't ring any bells here now.

JONES: My visit to the White House, what do you mean?

HESS: Well, you mentioned a few minutes ago something about a visit to the White House I believe.

JONES: At the end of the year, after I had been in War Food a year, a little before Bernard Baruch had written this first letter that I have quoted, I decided that I would go and see the President. I was directed by the order to report to the President if something came up that he was interested in. Anyhow I would go to

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the White House to see Byrnes every week or two. We'd have problems between War Food and OPA. And I would go over and see Byrnes because as a practical matter he had the final say. I would go to [Fred M.] Vinson's office first while I was War Food Administrator.

But after I had been over in War Food a year, I went over to see the President, because he had said that I could come to see him any time I thought it was wise. I didn't go much during that period, but I went over at the end of the first year. He was sitting at his desk writing something. He looked up, smiled and greeted me. I was standing there by his desk, and I said, "Mr. President, my year is up."

He went back to writing. He said, "You know they're shooting boys over in Europe that desert on the field of battle."

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We both laughed when he said that. He said, "You go on back and finish your job."

I felt he wouldn't relieve me, but I thought that I would just remind him. The President rather liked friendly banter.

But then -- coming back to Mr. Truman. When he was in the Senate he was head of an investigating committee which investigated the operations of the government agencies, including the independent agencies. He resigned when he was elected Vice President, but the committee continued. After they had finished with War Food, one of the committee remarked that they wished some of the other agencies were doing as good job as I did, as I had. We had a lot of other problems. I think I told you about being called to Byrnes' office, and told about this synthetic rubber. Didn't I tell you about that?

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HESS: Yes.

JONES: Well, I don't know of anything else.

HESS: This brings us up pretty close to Mr. Truman. It's about 11:30, do you think this is enough for this morning? Are you getting tired?

JONES: No. How much time are we going to take on Mr. Truman?

HESS: Well, I'm not sure. Now, just on what occasions did you see Mr. Truman?

JONES: Well, I saw Mr. Truman every once in a while. I would see him at receptions. I saw him at the National Press Club, also at Mr. Rayburn's office on the Hill and at various places. He was never a pretentious man and I would frequently see him at dinners and on special occasions. After he was

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President even, he would come in and just say a few words of greeting to the people. I saw him at the Press Club a number of times and I had a visit with him on the train while returning to Washington, and I would run across him sometimes when he was walking. I would get up early and take a walk. I wouldn't see him often, as I usually walked in a different direction. When we met he always stopped and spoke, very pleasantly. Then after he was named Vice President, I told you about the boat scene.

HESS: What about the boat scene?

JONES: There were several of us who would go over to an old millstream and lake that had been dammed up near Cambridge, Maryland and fish; Mr. Rayburn, Mr. [James M.] Barnes, who was one of the President's secretaries, Jesse Wolcott,

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of the Banking and Currency Committee, and several others. There were about eight or ten of us there on this particular weekend. It was a good fishing place. They had made a lodge out of this old millhouse that was built in revolutionary days. The old mill wheel was still there. The lodge

was reasonably priced and the lake was privately owned, so we went over as paying guests always.

Mr. Truman went over there right after he was elected Vice President. While there he said he wanted to go down the river in the boat with Jim Barnes and me and watch us fish. Jim Barnes was secretary of the President.

Barnes sat in one end and I sat in the other and the man in the middle rowed the boat, he was an expert oarsman. Mr. Truman said, "I'll sit there by," (I shouldn't say Mr. Truman, I should say the Vice President), "by

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the oarsman." It was a broad middle seat so the oarsman could row the boat without any trouble. We went down the river three or four miles. As we returned there was a big bunch of lily pads just before we got back to the lodge. It was cold weather, it was in November after the election. When we got up to the lily pads and started through, Mr. Barnes said, "Mr. Vice President, it's going to be a little tough for the oarsman going through these lily pads, I think it would be wise if you moved back and sat with me, since we can't fish in the thick lily pads anyway. Come back and sit down by me."

The Vice President, like he always does, stood up quickly to move back. The boat evidently rocked and the distinguished guest fell into the water. The back of his heels caught on the edge of the boat, and he grabbed

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the edge of the boat with his hands. He was very agile and quick. He went up to his mouth or his nose, his glasses didn't fall off. He got thoroughly soaked and Barnes, Jim Barnes and I both got up and told the boatman to get over on the other side and we pulled him back into the boat. He laughed about it. He was a good sport always. At the lodge he changed to dry clothes. I don't think the incident was published about his falling out of the boat, no one commented, because it was a private place and nobody would talk about it, except the joshing at the lodge.

Anyhow, a few days later I was invited to a judicial reception at the White House and Mr. Truman in the receiving line introduced me to Mrs. Truman and said, "Here's the man that pushed me out of the boat." She looked pretty hard at me for a minute, and then of course he

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and I both laughed and she saw it was all in fun, and she joined in the amusement.

HESS: She saw that you really didn't push him out of the boat?

JONES: Evidently. Luckily the Vice President was smart enough and quick enough to grab the sides of the boat. I don't know, you may want to strike this all out.

HESS: Well, that's all right, he was an Army officer and not a naval officer, you know, so he...

JONES: Yes, an officer in the Army during World War I, did I say Navy officer?

HESS: No. I was just making a comment. He would know more how to conduct himself on land than he would in a boat, perhaps.

JONES: I suppose so, but he usually took care of

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himself anywhere. I was getting along fine in War Food and even though it is a wearing job, I worked day and night at that thing and didn't get away often. I never gave out interviews because I wasn't running for anything and I didn't expect to. But, as soon as Mr. Truman became President, I submitted my letter of resignation personally. It was April the 12th when the President died, and Mr. Truman became President almost immediately. I wrote my resignation, took it over and submitted it personally. The President was very gracious. I said, "I think a new President ought to have the right to pick all the people that he would like to keep. I think official resignations should be customary at such a time." I said, "I am tendering my resignation as War Food Administrator so you may have freedom of choice."

He said, "I thank you. I'll just put

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it here in my desk, but I want you to stay on, I have every confidence in you." The letter was never mentioned again.

Then after the war was over in Europe, I decided -- and Jimmy Byrnes, who was out then and didn't know the setup over there well at that time, saw me -- he talked to me one night when he returned to Washington and said, "Well, I think you have said repeatedly that you want to go back as soon as the war in Europe is over, they are going to make some changes over there anyway, going to change their Secretary of Agriculture I think," and he said, "If I were you I would just send him my resignation."

Which I did on May -- I think about May the 23rd, after the war in Europe was over on May the 8th, and I sent another letter of resignation to be effective June 29th, and he accepted it. I went back after the war in

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Europe was over as I had always planned to do. Did we cover my relationship with Mr. Truman after he became President?

HESS: That's what we're up to right now.

JONES: Would you rather make it some other day?

HESS: I would. I think we're about to run down to the end of this reel of tape and so why don't we just make this for another day.

JONES: All right that suits me fine.

HESS: Good.

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Fourth Oral History Interview with Judge Marvin Jones, Washington, D.C., May 8, 1970. By Jerry N. Hess, Harry S. Truman Library.

HESS: Judge, to begin this morning, let's start with a question that I found in a book by Allen Matusow, and his book is entitled *Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman Years*. And, according to him, the War Food Administration used a "bare-shelves" policy near the end of the war as an attempt to prevent a postwar surplus of food by lowering production goals and by dropping stockpiling for relief, so that American civilians would eat up food stocks that seemed to threaten future markets. And he thinks that in the face of the worldwide food shortages following the war, that that policy was a mistake.

JONES: Well, I'll tell you. He's mistaken in the first place about our having a "bare-shelves" policy. We never at any time during World War II had any such thing as a "bare-shelves"

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policy. Let me contrast the differences between conditions in the two wars.

I was here in World War I, and when the World War ended, World War I cotton prices were about forty cents per pound, and they remained that for a very short period, and then they dropped first to twenty cents, then to ten cents, and then to six cents per pound. And then Congress was reluctant to appropriate the big sums even though they might be needed for shipments abroad, and they refused to do so. Wheat went from a dollar and a quarter a bushel down to as little as twenty cents a bushel.

HESS: Was that because of oversupply?

JONES: It was because an oversupply developed after World War I. In late 1918 when the war was over, Congress began to tighten up

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on the shipments abroad trying to get back on a pay-as-you-go basis. We had vast expenditures during the war, and we had great problems following World War I, that's when the farm problem got to be so serious, because we had these vast accumulations of various farm commodities and they had gone down in price.

In World War II the problem was different. Congress had guaranteed that farm prices would be supported at the war level for two years after the war -- so there was no danger of major farm price level falling for at least two years, so our problem was different.

We had, at the time during latter part of World War II when this policy came up -- we had some division among our folks about it, but one or two of them who had dealt with the farm problem said we have all these commodities we had in big storage, but I called their

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attention to the law guaranteeing farm prices, so we didn't have any "bare-shelf" policy at all in World War II.

In World War I we had a supply of wheat that was suited to war times. It wasn't certain that we would be able to get Congress to make the provision for sustaining farm prices after the World War I fighting was over.

We had to fight for years. Coolidge vetoed two of the bills intended by its authors to take care of the farm situation that had developed. And all through the twenties the committee was trying to get the farm program, and finally, a program was prepared during the twenties. The details of the two bills vetoed by President Coolidge will be told later.

Mr. Hoover, on advice of his Representative in the House, Franklin Fort of New Jersey,

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then took all of the teeth out of the bill's regulating features. The bill authorized a Farm Board to buy the surplus at a flooring or support price. President Hoover had pulled all of the safeguards out of the original bill, and then McNary-Haugen asked that it be passed as changed. The philosophy of the Farm Board bill was, "We will buy products at a support price above the market and hold them for a higher price."

The thing just collapsed. Mr. Hoover appointed a Board headed by Alexander Legge. It was called the Federal Farm Board. Alexander Legge, in the best of faith, left a fifty thousand dollar job because he thought he could help adjust this farm policy and render a public service.

The Board bought cotton and bought wheat above the market price. I had a talk with Mr.

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Legge afterward, and he said, "I don't understand where all this wheat came from." When we began to buy wheat, it came out from barns, granaries, elevators, and from everywhere. We had put a flooring under the price -- we would buy wheat at a dollar and sixteen cents a bushel when it was selling down to -- all the way from sixty to eighty cents, and we didn't have any storage for it. We were swamped.

As a matter of fact, when the New Deal came in we simply gave away to the American Red Cross several hundred thousand bales of cotton that had been purchased by the Farm Board. In fact, more than a million bales of cotton were held on which the Government took a loss. We gave several hundred million bushels of wheat to the American Red Cross.

None of our group in World War II argued that we wanted to have a "bare-shelves" policy. They all wanted a supply, a sufficient supply,

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to avoid a loss, and then we could go along with full production because we are equipped with the assured price to produce more food, and were producing more food than had ever been produced in this or any other country. One or two had argued that the existing law should be kept as a stand-by, but not one of them argued for anything approximating a bare-shelves or reduction policy.

Mr. Hoover's administration was buying in 1929 and 1930 without any regulation at all, just endlessly without any outlet or market. The Farm Board collapsed in 1930 and the whole country collapsed. The farmers couldn't produce at the low price. The whole economy stalled on dead center; it broke banks, it broke everything else. Millions of hungry people were shuffling in the bread lines, hopeless, helpless, and despairing.

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But the guarantee that Congress had enacted at the time authority was granted to put a ceiling on prices assured farm support prices for a period of two years following the first of January following a declaration of the end of the war. So there was no occasion to have any fear of a price collapse following World War II.

Some of these people have written who don't know about a situation, they didn't understand. I have lived through both World Wars and have seen these problems and have seen the great losses the Government took in trying to get rid of surpluses. Some of our people were talking that when I came into War Food. I immediately said, "We're just going to do away with controls and produce all the food we can as long as this war lasts." And we produced at all times all the food we could possibly produce. No production controls would

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be needed during the war.

HESS: Production control?

JONES: No production control during the war. The law was still in the books, but I had authority to and I did suspend any restrictions during the war. I said, "We are simply going to get all the food production possible until the war ends. At that time my authority will end, but that will be the rule while my authority lasts. I can't repeal a law, but the Congress has authorized suspension during the World War II."

Back in 1937, as chairman of the committee on agriculture, I was asked to handle a proposed sugar bill which proposed a reduction in the tariff on sugar and a processing fee on sugar produced in all the offshore sugar producing areas, as well as this country. The proceeds were to be paid to domestic producers if they would keep within their allotment.

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Senator Robinson called me to his office in the Capitol. Cordell Hull, Rex Tugwell, and several others were present. I knew little about sugar and I so stated. I said, "It belongs to the Ways and Means Committee; it affects the tariff. Besides, I am already busy with other legislation."

"If I handle it," I said, "in the first place, I'm going to make all these offshore areas keep a six month's supply so there never will be a shortage of sugar. We can write that in the bill as a condition to their selling their quota; that is, if we are going to establish quotas at all."

Rex Tugwell said, "Oh, we can't do that."

And I said, "It's damn sure going to be in there if I handle the deal. I'm not going to have a shortage come up when my people are interested in cheap sugar."

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I was assured, "You will be protected since we are going to reduce the tariff and we're not going to have the processing fee any higher than the reduction of the tariff." We're going to have a reduction of \$2.12 per hundred pounds on the tariff on imported sugar. Cordell Hull was there and Senator [Joseph Taylor] Robinson and several others, all trying to manhandle me into handling this legislation if it took all morning. But he said, "I am perfectly willing to handle this if the President wants me to even though I think it should be handled by someone else, because I'm already swamped with other things up here." But I said, "I'm going to write into that bill that the processing fee shall never rise above the reduction of the tariff that we're making here at this time."

Again, someone said, "Well, you can't

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write that in the bill."

And I said, "I can write it into the bill."

We adjourned before finally determining the issue. About 1:30 p.m. the President phoned me and said, "I want you to handle the sugar bill." I told him the production belonged to the Ways and Means Committee. The President said, "They're having trouble in Cuba and other places and we just can't wait -- you have a way of getting action up on the Hill, and the Ways and Means Committee will probably take three months in hearings and there may be a revolution in Cuba and other places where the situation is. I am personally asking you to handle the measure."

So, I wrote those two safeguarding provisions. I have had a lot of experience on this farm situation, and I know it can get

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out of hand and cost the Government a tremendous sum, and if you go to solving a farm problem at all you have a -- if I'm talking too much on this, I'll...

HESS: Go right ahead, it's very good.

JONES: As a matter of fact, for a hundred years, more than a hundred years, the surplus producing farmer has paid the burdens of the tariff in which he has no part. He can't get any advantage of the tariff, but he pays a tariff, a higher price behind the tariff wall on everything he buys from a knitting needle to a threshing machine.

I called attention many times on the floor of the House to the fact that Alexander Hamilton who was the patron saint of the tariff and who was the first Secretary of the Treasury, and in the first Treasury report on December 5, 1791, had advocated a tariff to protect our infant

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industries. A lot of them are no longer infants any more.

But he said it would permit them to grow and thus manufacture a lot of our own materials and keep the money in this country. In the report he made this statement: "The farmer can have no benefit of this tariff; therefore, in order to bring them back to the level of equality, the farmer should be given a bonus, or a payment, as an offset to that tariff, either on his production or upon the sales of his commodity abroad."

When those interested in a protective measure adopted the tariff, which they did, they forgot the farmer's end, and for a hundred years, the farmer suffered the burdens of the tariff and didn't have any corresponding benefits.

I didn't believe in the philosophy of

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Alexander Hamilton, but he was at least intellectually honest, and I could read to you his statement on that subject. He admitted that it would be unfair to the farmer who had no benefits from it and he should be brought back to the level of equality. I read that portion of his report many times. If you go back in the *Record* you may find that. And then I tried to get that situation corrected -- I'll give you a little history here if I may.

HESS: Very good.

JONES: I tried to get that bill through to let the cooperatives, farm cooperatives, the farm organizations ship their products abroad and have a certificate equal to the tariff on similar commodities given to them on which they could use to bring in the products used -- use that certificate in payment of the tariff, or sell the certificate to an

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importer. I had quite a vote on that in the House.

Then in 1935 I hit upon an idea and I introduced a bill. I wrote it myself, about a page, and it's still on the statute books, the only automatic appropriation in the Government today. Nobody has been able to repeal it. The measure sets aside (at that time about 30 percent of the people engaged in farming or dependent on farming directly or indirectly in the little villages, about 30

percent of them), set apart 30 percent of the tariff collections each previous calendar year automatically on the first day of July, to the credit of the Secretary of Agriculture in the Treasury of the United States (amounts to about a hundred and forty million dollars a year), and which should be used in the payment of the loss in distribution of surplus farm

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commodities at home or abroad. And they have used that money every year.

They wouldn't use it the first year. They raised Cain about it, but I was just invoking the philosophy of Alexander Hamilton on that issue, and you can find it in the statute books now. And every year a hundred and forty million, and it accumulates if not used. At the end of three years, it goes back into the Treasury if they don't use it.

But they used it to start the school lunch program, originally. And then the school lunch program outgrew it. When they would have a drought period in certain sections, it could enable them to ship feed across the country, as well as abroad, at a loss. As a matter of fact, they had at times used part of that on the food stamp program.

Eisenhower came in you remember, we had

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a drought out in the Southwest. He went out to Amarillo, my home town, and he came out -- he gave a statement that he found the area in great need in West Texas, New Mexico, and the Southwest, and that he was going to, as soon as Congress made funds available, he was going to use the funds to relieve the situation.

When I read his statement I called Lyndon Johnson who was leader in the Senate. I called him by phone and said, "Listen, the Secretary of Agriculture (that was Ezra Taft Benton), has three hundred million dollars in his pocket that can be used for this drought right now." I said, "That's an automatic appropriation and I happen to know that there is a considerable sum available in the Treasury to his credit. All he has to do is write a check."

I was just going into Court and Johnson said, "Where is that provision?"

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I said, "It's along about 1935 or '36. It's an automatic appropriation on the first of July, a sum equal to 30 percent of the tariff collections for the previous calendar year are set apart to the credit of the Secretary of Agriculture for these purposes, and," I said, "I'm going into Court right now, but I'll find it as soon as I come out at 12:30. I can get it and phone you within five minutes."

I came back and I called Johnson's office and told Arthur Perry, who was his Administrative Assistant, "I found that article known as Section 32. Mr. Johnson wanted me to look it up for him," and I said, "I'll give you the reference to it."

"Oh," he said, "Mr. Johnson didn't wait for that." He said, "He made us look the thing up and they've got three hundred and fifty million dollars down there, and Johnson's

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over on the floor of the Senate panning Eisenhower and the Secretary of Agriculture for not using their funds."

I don't think Benson knew it was there. He had just come in a little while before.

President Roosevelt didn't understand it when it was first written. [Henry] Morgenthau just raved about an appropriation not having to go through the budget year after year; an automatic appropriation. I had to get points of order waived, I succeeded in doing that to make it go through originally. I could tell you a story on that, but that's too much detail.

But anyhow, Morgenthau called me up and said, "I'm going to request the President to veto it."

And I said, "All right, see if you can get it done." I added, "It is tied up with a whole bunch of other things that the President wants."

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He won't veto the whole bill for this one item."

He was still peeved. Then he induced the President the following session, in his first message, to ask repeal of that provision. [James P.] Buchanan, who is from my state, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee said, "He's recommended a repeal of that provision."

I said, "You might just as well bay at the moon. Congress isn't going to repeal that section."

And he says, "I know that. I don't want it repealed."

I went down to see the President a short time after, and he said to me, "What is this thing you have cooked up to turn over to Secretary Wallace a hundred and forty million dollars a year to spend like he wants to?"

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And I said, "Now, wait a minute, Mr. President." And I told him the background of it.

He says, "That's not a bad idea, is it?"

And I said, "No, it's a good idea."

And he became as enthusiastic about it as I was. So, it's still on the statute books, and the money is available every year. And that's the nearest approach to an offset of the tariff that the surplus farmer has ever known.

HESS: Do you recall if Eisenhower and Benson used that money after it was pointed out to them by Senator Johnson?

JONES: Oh, they used the money. I guess they used it for the same purpose. I don't know. Congress didn't have to appropriate the funds for it, because they had them.

HESS: It was just pointed out that it was available.

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JONES: It was available. They never denied that. But I didn't intend to take all this time...

HESS: Oh, that's all right.

JONES: ...as explanation. But there are a lot of people writing on this that haven't studied the farm problem.

Now, we didn't advocate bare-shelves at all. He's just as wrong as he can be about that. We advocated the keeping of a reserve supply, as well as all-out production at all times.

HESS: Did you think there was going to be a surplus after the war?

JONES: I thought there probably would be at some time, and as a matter of fact, the surpluses did come. They were a little later in coming because we had had four years of war. I felt it would be some time before there would be a

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surplus. It was a little slower coming, and then, besides, they had a provision in the law guaranteeing the wartime prices for more than two years after the war ended. This made a different picture from previous experiences.

We had a provision in the measure anyway to induce production.

So the situation had plenty of safeguards. It was so that the Secretary of Agriculture each year after the war could adjust production upward if it was necessary to produce more. He could adjust it under the law that was already written.

After the war it would be his duty to estimate the needs, and in estimating the needs, to include what the budget had made available for furnishing food for people abroad. The Secretary of Agriculture, under the control act, at the beginning of each season, each crop, he would estimate what would

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be needed each year to see that we always had a normal reserve supply on hand before he started to cut down the production.

We had some people who wanted toward the end to be careful about oversupply. I said, "No, we won't do that. We are only responsible during the war period. The Secretary of Agriculture after the war may take such actions as he finds necessary from year to year."

I don't know anything about this man. Does he ever say anything about the danger of spoilage when the warehouses are full and no place to put additional food? I didn't know anything about the background of this man. I've never seen his -- what's his background?

HESS: He has a Ph.D. from Harvard. He's a fairly young man. He is a professor of history now. He was at Rice University in Texas for a

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while. Where he is now, I'm not sure.

JONES: Well, as a matter of fact, I was invited to lecture the Harvard School of Government. I told you about that already, didn't I?

HESS: I think so.

JONES: In 1939 I was asked to lecture at the Graduate School of Government on the processes of enacting legislation. They studied as a text the Farm Act of 1938 which covered everything. I had sponsored that legislation and had written the soil conservation, rate discrimination, and regional research features. They kept me under questions from 4 to 7 p.m. Dr. Froelich told me I had given them much valuable information, that I knew the subject thoroughly. He made me one of the trustees of the Graduate School of Government, the Littauer School, and said they would admit

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any student I recommended. I have this letter to that effect. Of course, that was while I was still in Congress and Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee.

HESS: One other point: In April and June of 1945 a special House committee chaired by Representative Clinton P. Anderson of New Mexico, traveled around the country to investigate the food shortage and to recommend remedial action. Do you feel that Anderson and his investigation was critical of you as the War Food Administrator?

JONES: Well, if he was I didn't know it. He wasn't particularly critical. He came to see me at the beginning and said it was a friendly investigation, and I said, "Well, I am perfectly willing for you to go ahead." And he may have offered some criticism from time to time, but some of them didn't understand

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it, and I don't know where he got his notion or what he found. As a matter of fact, in order to find more storage we had a contract for warehousing over in a cave in Atchison, Kansas.

All the warehousing we had was completely filled. Here is the thing that a lot of people don't understand: Perishable food begins to deteriorate the minute it's produced unless you have storage for it, and we had all the storage places full. And when I came into War Food they had ninety million dollars of butter on hand, and about forty-four million pounds of it was rancid. They didn't have the storage and I had to get rid of about forty million pounds as best we could because no one here would use it. The Russian people were glad to accept it for some use in that country. We looked for additional storage wherever we could get it. And I have told you

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about these fourteen hundred carloads of eggs that were tended to me at one time. I didn't have any place to put them, but I had an order from Congress to support that price, to buy the eggs. I had to do it.

HESS: But no place to put them.

JONES: No place to put them. And then Anderson may have found some little places where he never disclosed any of them to me.

[Chester] Bowles had recommended, in fact, he made the announcement that he was taking off rationing. The announcement had been made taking off rationing temporarily on certain of the commodities. It was this way: There was a big supply of meat and two or three other perishable commodities. We were furnishing all the Army needed, all the lend-lease needed. The storage was all full and just temporarily

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there was no outlet for these items. Bowles and I discussed the situation and he announced that he would take off rationing on commodities for the time being. The newspapers carried his statement that he was taking them off rationing.

I said, "I don't mind that action as to items that are perishable that we can't store, but they should be restored to rationing as soon as needed or as soon as proper storage is available."

Later he suggested restoring the rationing.

I said, "I agree that they should be restored as soon as a place is found for any company excess. I don't want it to perish on my hands." I said, "Give me the facts. I am sure we can agree." We may have both been criticized, as we were from time to time.

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Senator Anderson may have found some little shortages, but with the vast quantities of food we had, you know, I don't know, there might have been a shortage in someplace, but he never mentioned it to me, and I am sure it was not serious because our theme then and all along had been all-out productions. There was no shortage so far as any report that I ever saw him make. He told me it was a friendly investigation.

The great program was over; he did reorganize and appointed some people over there for what was to be practically after the war activities. But that work and the need for it was an entirely different nature.

But, anyhow, I wish I had time to go into all the details of that thing, but I don't. We never had any serious problems of shortage of food.

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HESS: What kind of Secretary of Agriculture did Clinton Anderson make? Was he a success?

JONES: I think he made a good Secretary of Agriculture because the war problems were practically over, you know. He had experience as a dairy farmer and I am sure he had studied the subject of the farm and the ranch. I had felt from the beginning that if the Department of Agriculture officials, employees, and activities were to be used, the Secretary of Agriculture should be the War Food Administrator. And he didn't have the great war problems because they disappeared largely. The problem of maintaining a flooring price was easy after the war was over. He didn't have all these problems of finding extra storage space, but there were still many problems as always, and I think he made -- did a good job as Secretary.

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As a matter of fact, he asked that my right-hand man, Wilson Cowen, who is now the Chief Judge of the Court I left, Anderson asked that he be permitted to stay. He wanted to come right on back with me. Anderson called me and asked if I had any objections to his story or of his asking President Truman to ask him to stay. I said, "Of course, I would think such a request would be a great compliment to him." Truman wrote him a gracious request, and he agreed to stay for six months with Anderson. I think he helped Anderson because he knew that business over there, the way we had handled it. And I had used him and Ashley Sellers, my two right-hand men. Wilson Cowen is an exceedingly capable man. He was a great help for me and I am sure he was of great assistance to Anderson who was taking the position, and any new man in that position

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needs all the help he can get. Chester Davis had brought in some new men. The War Food Administrator was authorized to do that. I think Anderson did a good job, but he only stayed there a few months. He wanted to run for the United States Senate, which he did, and was elected.

HESS: And then he was replaced by Charles Brannan. How successful was Charles Brannan in your view?

JONES: Who was that?

HESS: Charles Brannan.

JONES: Charles Brannan, I am sure, made a good Secretary of Agriculture, although I was busy in the Court when he was Secretary.

HESS: What's your view of the Brannan plan?

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JONES: Well, I think -- I'd rather not comment on that at this time. I think Brannan's plan had some good features, but I think it needed some revamping.

Brannan made a pretty good Secretary of Agriculture though. At that time I was no longer keeping up with the details since our Court had a heavy accumulated docket which kept me very busy. I wouldn't want to compare the two because Brannan had a new plan with which I was not familiar. I think he had a plan that had some impractical features, but in the main, what he did produced rather good results. There was controversy over it and I don't want to get into that because of my unfamiliarity with its details.

HESS: There was a good deal of controversy, wasn't there?

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JONES: There was a good deal of division of sentiment. Charles Brannan was the attorney for the Farmer's Union, and the Farmer's Union and the Farm Bureau Federation and the National Grange didn't agree in national policies. The Farmer's Union was rather liberal at the time. I was not sure how far Brannan would go in completely changing the whole plan of farm program operations. I like Brannan personally, and I have always been especially fond of the president of the Farmer's Union, James Patton. He was a very sincere and earnest man, and he had a vital interest in the farmers of America, but might make changes too rapidly.

When I was War Food Administrator, the Farmer's Union had advocated a plan to have the -- all the farmers in the United States sign written contracts to produce first the amount and kind of food that would be found to be

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essential. He is retired now, a wonderful man and a good friend of mine. He will always have an interest in the individual farmer. He took a great interest in the Bankhead-Jones tenant home purchase which accomplished a great deal with meager funds.

James Patton was the head of the Farmer's Union. He and Ed [Edward Ashley, III] O'Neal of the Farm Bureau and someone else met at the White House. The President asked all of us for suggestions about the food situation. And I think the Farmer's Union had gotten the President interested in a contract provision. He wanted to know if it was practical. The President said to me, "It has been suggested to you that we have a written contract with all the farmers in the United States for the coming year, and what do you think about it?"

And I said, "Well, Mr. President, there

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are six million farmers in the United States (there were at that time). The paper shortage would make it impractical to have an individual contract, and you would have more controversies than

you ever heard of if you tried to supervise compliance." And everybody laughed, and that was all that was ever said about it.

As a matter of fact, I was very fond of Jim Patton personally. Before that they had had a man named [John A.] Simpson who was wild as a March hare, and Patton did have more practical views and he advocated some good things, but we can't go all out on extreme views either way. I never was much of an extremist on either side of any of those controversies.

So, I don't want to criticize Charles Brannan as Secretary of Agriculture. The Brannan plan was never adopted. I wondered

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if it didn't lack some practical features, and yet, as Secretary of Agriculture, he went ahead and administered exceedingly well what he had before him in the way of legislation. And I know that Jim Patton was a lot more reasonable than the previous head of the Farmer's Union had been, and I was always glad to have his viewpoint. He was always studying the subject.

HESS: All right, at the end of our last interview we got up to some of your relationships with President Truman after he became President.

JONES: After he became President? Well, I'll tell you, like most people, I was very much interested in what he was doing. He had more problems the first year, I think, than any other President ever had the same length of time. He had that problem of the dropping

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the atomic bomb at Hiroshima. And that was a terrific responsibility.

And then he had trouble with John L. Lewis and many other domestic problems growing out of the ending and aftermath of the war, plus the responsibility of peace settlement, peace treaties, the United Nations organization, the rebuilding, the foreign aid, the conference with Stalin and Winston Churchill. I don't know how he did it all.

I want to compliment him on being able to handle these things as they came up, without fear. He had a sign on his desk that said, "The Buck Stops Here." He had to be alone in making the final decision, and that isn't an easy job, even in normal times. But the vast problems that arose out of the readjustments, all fell on his desk suddenly. He formulated a big foreign

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aid program which was a desirable program. I felt that at least a part of the funds should be allotted to help individual farmers abroad increase their production of food, and at the same time preserve their soils. I called Sam Rayburn, Dick Russell, and others and said that if the authorities will allot 15 percent of that money and turn it over to the Extension Service, with the County and Home Demonstration Agents, boys' and girls' 4-H Clubs, and let them help those people help themselves, sending them only to countries that ask for that help, that 15 percent will do as much in the long run as the other 85 percent. They all agreed that it should be done. I said to them that the Extension Service is the most efficient U.S. Government agency. It doesn't get

much publicity, but it has the County Agent, Home Demonstration Agents, and boys' and girls' 4-H Clubs. That

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agency has made over rural America. There isn't any question about that. The funds are turned over directly to the A&M colleges and the other land-grant colleges of each state, some of which are state universities. The Federal Government pays one-third, each state one-third, and each county, if it desires the service, pays one-third of the expense.

The National organization doesn't make any of the policies. It acts as a clearing house of information so that if the experiment stations or farmers discover a new method, it may be distributed over the country. A Mr. Edwards was a county agent from the Southwest, trained at Texas A&M College. He was an exceptionally capable agent.

The original Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia heard about this work or at least found out about it. He asked the Extension Service to

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send Edwards and some other agents to show them about the operation. Edwards went. He showed them how to have these experiment stations, how to organize these things. Old Ibn Saud, the original one, you know, the big man, so fell in love with Edwards and his work that he offered him two times his salary if he would take a leave of absence and come over and take charge of the work.

Edwards came to me and said, "I would like to go, but I don't want to give up my seniority here," and he added, "If you call..."

HESS: He didn't want to move to Arabia?

JONES: "I don't want to move to Arabia permanently, but I'm willing to go over there and spend three years on a leave of absence, without pay, if I can retain my rights."

I called the Under Secretary of Agriculture,

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Mr. Wilson, who had charge of the Extension Service and told him the story, and he said, "Why sure, I don't see any reason why we can't do that."

So he went over there and the old King was very partial to him. He had access to the palace and he played with the King's children -- one of them later became King. He would take them little presents when he'd come back to visit our country. The King wanted him to stay, of course. When I told Dick [Senator Richard B.] Russell of Georgia, he said, "Well, I think that's right the way as you explained it. I think it will help them help themselves." And he said, "I can't give out any interview because they'll think I'm trying to fix things."

So, I went to Paul Hoffman, who had been president of one of the motor companies,

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possibly Studebaker. He was in charge of the program. I called his secretary, but she made various excuses to put me off. I then asked to see the President. I told him about my suggestion. He seemed interested and suggested to talk to Hoffman. The President said, "Well, now that sounds interesting. I wish you would talk to Paul Hoffman about it."

Then I had no trouble seeing Hoffman, and Hoffman said, "We're already doing that."

"Well," I said, "if you're already doing it, that's fine. I didn't know that you were doing that kind of work."

And he said, "You go over and talk to Dr. Fitzgerald," who had been with me in War Food and who was working under Mr. Hoffman.

Fitzgerald said, "I'm glad you talked to Hoffman because all we're doing is exchanging a hundred men to visit those countries and the

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United States purely on an experimental basis. We are not doing any of the kind of work you suggest. I wish that could be done."

In fairness to Mr. Hoffman, I don't think he ever understood the suggestion. He was a very busy man.

At any rate, Truman, soon after that, announced the "Point 4" program which helped a great deal along a similar line. I don't think it was as good as the other would have been, but it accomplished a great deal.

Another matter. Several years earlier, I had written President Eisenhower, the papers are continually charging the Army and Navy officials of buying more of some things than they need and even some things they don't need. If one has more than is needed of an article, they won't give each other supplies they have accumulated. It is on their hands and not needed. It has been that they rarely

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turn unexpended funds back into the Treasury. I suggested that a group of experienced civilians be authorized to make purchases and let the Army and Navy requisition what they need as they need it. I'd been trying to get that idea sold, but that's hard to do. I suppose they like to have their own commissary department.

Mr. Truman, time after time, would be faced with disheartening things. Labor issues and then the Taft-Hartley bill, which wasn't what either side particularly wanted, but that was the best Taft could get and the union labor was against it. The President had to act on that. So many controversial things were presented that his popularity to a certain degree went down in the polls anyway. Perhaps we have already discussed his campaign.

HESS: '48?

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JONES: Yes, '48.

HESS: We haven't got into that yet.

JONES: Haven't we gotten into that yet?

HESS: No. That's one of the questions coming up. Tell me about the -- what do you remember about 1948?

JONES: Well, 1948 -- we've discussed the vice-presidential activity, haven't we?

HESS: Yes.

JONES: There's one correction a little later I want to make on that. But as to the campaign in 1948, did I tell you about -- I was going to tell you about what my mother said.

HESS: Yes, how that she said she thought that he came across as a real person.

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JONES: She heard him on television. And then have I already told you about what these newsmen said towards the last there about his coming up so fast?

HESS: I don't recall.

JONES: But anyhow, when my mother made the prediction right after his fighting speech in Philadelphia, I still didn't think he would be elected. I wouldn't say I thought he would be defeated. I wouldn't say that at all, but at the time, I had some doubt about his being elected. I lived at the University Club, and it was more Republican than Democratic all the time and only two of us would stand up for Truman. They just ribbed the life out of us. But we stood on our ground and told them they would be singing a different tune after the election, that is, if they were able to sing after that.

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HESS: Who was the other man?

JONES: Huh?

HESS: Who was the other man?

JONES: The other man was the fellow that had worked for the Interstate Commerce Commission, one of their examiners, and I can't recall his name -- he's a big stout fellow. He and I would just fight them like cats and dogs and have a lot of fun out of them, but they'd offer to

bet, and I said, "Well, I wouldn't bet on a cinch." We would take up for him all the way through. As a matter of fact, I would have liked to have been foot-loose to campaign for him because I had done a great deal of campaigning. I suppose I was like the old fire horse when the fire bell rang.

HESS: Did you hear any of his campaign speeches?

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JONES: Oh, I heard a number of his campaign speeches at different times. You know, they would be on radio or television, but I never was present when he made these -- what do they call it, the...

HESS: The "whistlestop" speeches?

JONES: "Whistlestop" speeches, and that is what really elected him as much as anything else. Then Barkley, of course, was helpful. But along about two weeks before the election -- I have a brother in Texas who keeps up with those things, and he wrote me a letter and said, "You know Truman is gaining in a rapid way and he may surprise you."

And then, I was over at the National Press Club, and if I haven't told you about what these newsmen said -- well, anyhow, I was over there having breakfast at what is called the round

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table. I would eat with that group of newsmen who came there. They always know what's going on. And two of them had been on each train, the President's train, and the...

HESS: And [Governor Thomas E.] Dewey's train.

JONES: Dewey's train. And one of them said (this was about ten days before the election), "You know Truman's gaining rapidly, and if this campaign lasted two weeks longer, he would be elected."

And the other one spoke up and said, "Well, he may beat him anyway."

I asked them some questions then and one of them said, "I was on Dewey's train out West through Montana or some of those places, or in the same area. Dewey didn't stop at all of the places, but at many of them, when the train stopped (Dewey's train), there wouldn't be

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anybody come out on the platform for a little while, and then finally some fellow would rather listlessly walk out and take his place. Finally, Dewey would mosey out with his hair done just right and his mustache in place, and they would present him. He would bow gracefully and say a few words to them and there would be a few polite handclaps -- I mean applause -- as they naturally would extend to any man of that prominence. It seemed rather formal and seemed to lack warmth." The newsman added, "When I came back over the same area two or three weeks later riding on Truman's train, when the Truman train stopped he would just bounce out first and

begin to talk to them. He looked over at the man with chaps on his ankles, and said, 'You look like a cowboy to me.'"

"And he would say, 'Yes, I'm a cowboy,' And then Truman would see somebody else and make

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some comment and then he would say a few words in chatty fashion and he just captivated that crowd."

And he commented, "There's a warmth about it and a folksy manner that appealed to those people." And he said, "That happened everywhere I went with him."

And the other one said, "I had a similar experience except in reverse. I went with Truman first and then followed with the other man along the same area in those states."

And the people who were studying it had a lot more confidence in the possibility of his being elected. They were still, the betting was five and six to one and four to one all the way through, even during the day of the election.

That night I went over to a dinner here where Paul Porter and several others were present. Paul had worked with me

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at the campaign headquarters in Chicago during the '36 campaign. I was in charge of the western headquarters.

HESS: Where was the dinner held?

JONES: I believe that was -- it probably was at Drew Pearson's home. They had a large group over there. But at any rate, some of them were there playing bridge, and I was in listening with Porter and Henderson.

HESS: Leon Henderson?

JONES: Leon Henderson and Paul Porter, and the news began to come in that Truman was leading in these little sparsely -- sparse reports that came in early. The reports would fluctuate a little up and down, but the net gain was always for Truman. Well, they were laughing and having a good time, all of us

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cheering the reports as they came in for Truman. Along about 11 o'clock, Paul Porter said when quite a lump of reports came in with the Truman lead increasing -- practically always a net gain, sometimes more than others, Paul Porter and Henderson both laughed and cheered, "Well, I'm going to cheer while I can. I know this can't last."

I said, "Listen, I've been watching these campaigns for a long time; Truman is elected. I'm going back to the University Club and kid some of these people that have been kidding me."

HESS: Before they go to bed?

JONES: Before they go to bed. "Oh," they said, "you've got to wait, it isn't over yet."

I said, "This campaign's over now. Truman's elected."

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As I went out, I believe it was Drew Pearson's over in Georgetown somewhere -- I thanked him and told him I was going back to the club. I went out to get a taxi. The taxis were in demand. It was there right near Pennsylvania Avenue, however, and we weren't afraid to walk across there in those days -- I knew we couldn't order one. We had to flag one.

HESS: Over on Wisconsin?

JONES: No, over on Penn Avenue or "M" Street before we got to Wisconsin. I think I walked across about a block or two.

HESS: Oh.

JONES: And then it turns into Wisconsin out in Georgetown, doesn't it? In Georgetown?

HESS: I don't remember. It's immaterial.

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JONES: It's about a block over there, and I walked over there and took twenty minutes to find an empty cab. I went straight to the club. And you know, it was the sickest group you ever saw.

They said, "Isn't it awful?"

And I said, "Isn't it wonderful?"

And they were so crestfallen...

HESS: They thought the election was over, too.

JONES: Evidently, I just didn't have the nerve to kid them as much as I wanted to. It wasn't funny to them. They had lost a lot of money. There was considerable money wagered at odds on that campaign.

HESS: Do you remember...

JONES: After that campaign, I saw President Truman several times. I saw him at Mr. Rayburn's dinner at the Capitol. I saw him down at the

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Press Club and at several gatherings here. He had the knack of mixing with people and not looking like -- not doing any strutting. He was open and aboveboard and not afraid to tell his story and stand by it. I have a great admiration for him and it grew during the period.

HESS: Do you recall in 1948 before the convention and the campaign, the problems that were caused when Congress rewrote the charter for the Commodity Credit Corporation and they left out the provision to buy and provide storage bins, and, therefore, the farmers couldn't get their wheat and corn into the storage bins?

JONES: I remember reading about that. As a matter of fact, that was a terrible oversight. It created some real problems I understand. That

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was after I had gone back to the Court about two years before. I think they probably had some losses on that, considerable losses on it.

HESS: Do you think that they played an important part in the rural areas in the Democratic victory that year?

JONES: I suspect it did.

HESS: States like Iowa, which went Democratic, and hardly ever do?

JONES: That's right. And as a matter of fact, the only other time that they had that many was in '36 when we made that thorough campaign in the West. They normally are Republicans, all that area through most of the Midwest, and even the far West. It is largely Republican among the farmers.

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HESS: Why do you think most farmers are Republicans?

JONES: That's hard to say because most of that -- that is, in that particular area -- the farmers normally in that area have fewer problems. But the main reason is that it had nearly always voted Republican. Customs are not changed easily.

HESS: Ever since the Civil War.

JONES: Ever since that war, and the only man that had ever been able to get away from them was Truman -- I mean, was Roosevelt and then Truman. I went down with Mr. Rayburn when he made a speech in North Carolina. He made a good speech in favor of Truman and...

HISS: Was that '48?

JONES: In '48, yes.

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HESS: How was it received?

JONES: It was well received. Down there, sentiment was growing by the time that we went down there at that time. I took no part in the meeting.

HESS: You say North Carolina?

JONES: North Carolina. I am sure it was North Carolina.

HESS: Did you hear anything about Strom Thurmond when you were down there at that time?

JONES: Yes, we heard a lot about Strom Thurmond. It was normally Thurmond territory, but that didn't make any difference. Rayburn had a fine hand on that speech. I don't think he made many speeches, but he made a good one there. There were many Thurmond people in South Carolina, especially the Strom Thurmond

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area. I didn't go down into South Carolina, but Strom Thurmond had a considerable following, you know. That was another location factor that looked like it might defeat Truman. That's another problem he had.

HESS: That, and Wallace, Henry Wallace.

JONES: And Henry Wallace. Well, I never did think he would be a serious factor. He would take votes from both sides. Wallace had quit the party then and was running as an independent.

HESS: He had his own party, the Progressive Party.

JONES: Yes. Well, you know, he made -- he needed somebody with him to keep him from making remarks that would react unfavorably. He was inept in some respects. He was perfectly sincere, a very wonderful man, a very fine

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character, but he had the idea that we could just go along, and he wouldn't give up on Russia. And he would make mistakes -- I heard him say this on TV, "There are some people who think there is more Democracy in Russia than there is in the United States." Now he didn't say that he thought that, but that's a strange statement for a man in a political contest to make.

I didn't think he would be a serious contender. I didn't think he would have much effect in the South. South Carolina is a sort of law unto itself. It started, you know -- it's the first one to...

HESS: It was where this first shot was fired, wasn't it?

JONES: Yes, where the first shot was fired. My mother's folks, the Gastons, came from -- her

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folks from North and South Carolina. My grandparents on my mother's side moved to Tennessee, and my mother was born in Tennessee.

I always was very fond of Justice Byrnes because he worked with me a great deal, but, you know, I wrote an opinion -- I don't know whether you'd like for me to tell this or not -- I wrote an opinion and it's in a book here of human interest opinions.

HESS: Are they all your opinions?

JONES: Yes, they're all mine.

HESS: What's the title of your book?

JONES: The title is *Should Uncle Sam Pay - When and Why?* I'm a little short on them. I just had them published for my friends, but I've got one here, and if you want to take it along I would like for you to read the one about

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a soldier who was taken prisoner at Corregidor. I told you something about that.

HESS: Off the tape, not on the tape. We haven't got this yet. We might as well get it right now.

JONES: Well, anyhow, I'll show you the book. I'll have to get you to return it because I'm just a little short on them.

HESS: That'll be fine.

JONES: I had stories in it about cats and dogs and about various human things and gambling...

HESS: Cases that would come before the Court?

JONES: That came before the Court, and my law clerks selected them and wanted them published, so I decided to have them published, and they have attracted a lot of attention. One of the

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directors of *Journal of the American Bar Association* wrote up quite a review of the book.

But, anyhow, when the Americans were in Corregidor, finally driven into Corregidor, and in that couped up place they were having fights in getting there in the first place.

In one of the companies under General [Douglas] MacArthur, every officer in that company was killed or had disappeared. They had this boy, a second lieutenant, who had already proved

himself a hero. He'd risked his life in getting a lot of wounded soldiers across the line while he was under fire.

So, a major general promoted him to captain on the field of battle; the man in charge of that division. He fought there for about three months. MacArthur had left and he surrendered with [General Jonathan] Wainwright and became a prisoner of war. He

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died as a prisoner in 1944, and the Department of -- the War Department, refused to recognize the promotion. His folks sued for the difference in the salary as a second lieutenant and a captain for the time he was in prison.

I wrote the opinion giving his parents the difference in pay. The Department of the Army claimed that the major general who promoted him on the field of battle was not competent authority to make such a promotion. We held that since the promotion was made under battle conditions, the major general in charge was competent authority, and even if he were not, since he fought there several months under the watchful eye of General MacArthur and General Wainwright, who succeeded him, if he didn't have authority, it was ratified by those men. And that if they didn't know what was going on in that coup'd up place,

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they weren't the great military chieftains that most of us thought they were.

Well, somebody sent the opinion to MacArthur. I mean my secretary may have sent it, thought he might like to see it. But he wrote me and invited me to come to see him.

And I didn't go for several months. I was scheduled to go to New York one Sunday to stay until Tuesday. I thought I would just like to go by and make a courtesy call. I had never met him, and -- oh, I had met him informally like you would at some reception.

HESS: This was when he was living at the Waldorf.

JONES: The Waldorf Astoria in the penthouse.

HESS: Roughly what year was this? Now we pinned down the other day that he died on April the 4th of '64.

JONES: It was -- and I had been thinking I would

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find out, but I got this injury and it was sometime -- it was either just before or after the year '61.

HESS: Around 1961.

JONES: It was between '59 and '62, and I'm impressed with the thought it was after '61. When I went up there, he was delighted, apparently. I wrote and told him I would like to come by and

pay my respects sometime Monday, if convenient. I wrote him Thursday night knowing he didn't have time to answer the letter. I told him the hotel where I would stay. When I arrived, he had left word to get in touch with so and so and he'd see me at 11 o'clock on Monday. I went to the Waldorf and they sent me right up to his place. He had written me in the earlier letter that he couldn't understand why the Army officials wouldn't let a gallant officer have the benefit

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of an officer promoted under battle conditions. After talking a few minutes complimenting my opinion and about several matters of interest, I started to go, and said, "I just came by to pay my respects, General, and I don't want to impose on your time."

"No," he said, "sit down, I want to talk to you." And he knew that situation in the Orient better than any man with whom I had ever talked.

HESS: The Far East?

JONES: Far East Asia. He knew that as nobody else has known it. As a matter of fact, I didn't bring the subject up, but he did. He brought it up. He seemed to want to talk about it, and I was glad to listen. He said he had gone down to see President Eisenhower and urged him to do certain things.

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And he added, "One could never tell just what he was going to do. He was very pleasant, very cordial," and he liked him, but that Eisenhower sometimes had difficulty making up his mind.

I had told him I had heard his speech when he addressed the Congress.

HESS: At the Joint Session of the Congress after he came back from the Far East in April of '51?

JONES: April of '51. He knew that I was bound to know about all of these things. So I didn't expect him to say anything about Mr. Truman, and I certainly didn't intend to ask about it, but once he talked about men that couldn't make up their minds about issues. To my surprise he said, "I'll have to admit that Mr. Truman surprised me. He has plenty of courage, and he's not afraid to make a decision and

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stand by it." I was shocked. I didn't think he would ever say that, especially after his speech in Congress. But he said, "I'll have to admit that he does, he has plenty of courage, and I like that in a man."

And I didn't say much of anything. I said, "Well, I think that is a very fine thing for you to say, and I agree that Mr. Truman has that quality to a remarkable degree and he has had many difficult problems."

And that's about all the conversation at that phase, but he made me stay there for nearly an hour, and then he said, "Any time you're back in New York, I'd like to have you come and see me."

And I said, "Well, I'll be glad to do it, General. I enjoyed talking to you."

He had some very wonderful furniture in the penthouse; Oriental furniture, the finest I

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had ever seen. It was a palatial place he had there, and he had Oriental boys waiting on him. Of course, he loved to be an important man. But as a matter of fact, I think he finally realized that he had misjudged Mr. Truman and there wasn't any question he had decided that he could just go ahead, and -- I'm going back to the time, you know, when this happened.

And, you know, a man mellows a little as he gets along in years. I'm quite sure -- I know I intended to go back to see him and I think it must have been about 1962, and that's a guess. I thought, "Well, he's so pleasant about everything; he is a distinguished man, and I'll go back to see him." But he just admitted that much, and I don't know there's ever been a record of his saying that to anyone else, but he did to me. Do you know I

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got the impression that he was lonely and wanted to talk to someone.

HESS: Do you think that he should have been replaced in 1951?

JONES: Well, I don't know enough about it to answer that question, but according to all the reports I read, his action must be classed as insubordination. I think -- you know, a man if he's commander in chief, can't have somebody flouting his commander in chief. Much as I admired MacArthur as a great military chieftain, he probably made a mistake in thinking, "Well, here's a man that isn't going to take a drastic action." But the truth finally prevails in nearly anything. I can't help thinking that MacArthur realized that he had undertaken to get away with something. And I was sorry to see it happen. I don't know what Mr. Truman

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thought about it, but he had gone to see him over there. They met over there somewhere in between...

HESS: At Wake Island.

JONES: Wake Island. And I don't know how anybody can criticize Mr. Truman for saying, "Well, I can't have a," -- I don't know the merits of it, but I just think that there is just one commander in chief. If his orders are not obeyed, he is no commander in chief and the situation becomes confused. I'm a great admirer of General MacArthur as a military officer, and I think he knew that subject. I think that it's too bad that it had to happen. But if an army doesn't have discipline, it ceases to be an army. I don't know how Mr. Truman could avoid taking some action. Now, that's the way I reason it out. I'm not familiar enough with

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all the facts to -- but that's just the impression I have.

HESS: During Mr. Truman's administration, did you ever have any dealing with any of the members of the White House staff: Clark Clifford, Charles Murphy, Sam Rosenman?

JONES: Oh, Sam Rosenman, I had dealings with Sam Rosenman during Roosevelt's administration. You know, he came over to see me about some reports they were making on -- in fact, he helped write a report and it was too long, but I didn't have time enough to revise it, but the President hesitated a long time. Mr. Rosenman said to me, "Well, he won't sign it unless you ask him to sign it." The President said I shouldn't have more than six or eight pages, rather than 100 pages.

I said, "Well, there's nothing wrong

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with the report except people won't read that long a report."

I think I finally told the President -- I said -- I think I said, "I don't have time to revise that report. It is too long." I think he had included what several had told him. I said, "Nobody is going to read it."

And the President said, "It ought to be done in six pages."

I agreed, "It ought to be done in not less than ten pages." But I said, "I just don't have time to do it, and I don't know anybody who has time to condense it. I have no objection to its being signed. I have read it. I don't find anything objectionable in it except its length." The President finally signed it. I don't think many people read it. It was just too extensive, a correct statement, but too long, but Roosevelt did a

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whale of a job in collecting information from various people. Sam Rosenman was an exceptionally good writer. He helped the President on many of his speeches.

I helped Byrnes and some of the other writers in preparing some of the executive speeches. But the President finally made them his own. He would change and make them sound like his own production, which they really were.

I never knew Clark Clifford very well. I knew Tommy [Thomas G.] Corcoran very well. He often came to the University Club. Clark Clifford has a lot of ability. I think he is one of the best men that were connected with any President since I've been here. And Rosenman, now, as a speechwriter, I think Rosenman is very wonderful, or was and still is. I think he's still living, isn't he?

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HESS: In New York City.

JONES: And now, I didn't have occasion to be very close to -- this other man -- who was it that was over there. Who was his date maker?

HESS: Matthew Connelly?

JONES: Yes, I think I talked with him on the phone and maybe met him once or twice, but I wasn't close to Truman's staff. I didn't have occasion to be. I was on the Court and couldn't do much except perhaps make some suggestions and I couldn't do that except as to something that grew out of my experience in government. I told Mr. Truman more than once that I thought he was doing an excellent job, which I think he did. He was one of our truly great Presidents and he had a tough row to hoe.

HESS: Let's turn the tape over.

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All right, Judge, do you recall anything in particular about the transition from the Truman administration to the Eisenhower administration?

JONES: Well, I...

HESS: Were you involved in that at all?

JONES: No, I wasn't involved in that at all. I don't know that there's anything I can add. I followed it and watched the inauguration. I had tickets and went up to observe the ceremonies. I was present at the dinner at which President Truman announced in 1952 that he would not be a candidate for another term. It surprised everyone at our table. I was sorry that he decided not to run again because he would have been a very popular candidate that time. He wouldn't have had the struggle he had in '48.

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HESS: Were you at the National Guard Armory that night that he announced that he was...

JONES: Yes, I was there.

HESS: What do you recall about that?

JONES: Well, I know that everybody at my table -- I was the guest of somebody that had taken me. We had two or three prominent people at our table and they were all surprised. He pulled a surprise on all of them, I think. I never did hear Mr. Rayburn say whether he was surprised. I don't suppose he was, but I was, and everybody at the table, and I thought...

HESS: Who was there? Do you recall who was seated at the table?

JONES: No, I believe I was the guest of Roy Miller, although I am not at all sure. At

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any rate, I was the guest of some Democrat. Most of them I knew. They had about eight or ten at the table. I attended many of these dinners. I expressed surprise as well as the others present. One of them remarked: "Well, he'd be a cinch if he wanted it." And then they all began to say, "Well, we don't blame him if he doesn't want to go through that agony because he's had the roughest road that a man ever had and yet has pulled through in fine shape." Nobody blamed him, and yet, they all regretted his declaration. It came in his speech. He said, "I shall not be a candidate for re-election in 1952," or words to that effect.

HESS: Who did you think, after he announced that he was not going to run, would make the best candidate for the Democrats that year?

JONES: Who all was being considered at that time?

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HESS: Well, Barkley, Sam Rayburn, maybe, a little bit, Fred Vinson and Adlai Stevenson, of course.

JONES: Yes, well, I think Adlai Stevenson would always be a good candidate, and I always think Sam Rayburn would have been. Barkley would have been, if it hadn't been for his age, Barkley would have been a shoe-in for it, I think, if it hadn't been for his age.

HESS: How about Richard Russell?

JONES: Who?

HESS: How about Richard Russell of Georgia?

JONES: Oh, Richard Russell would have been one of my favorites if I had thought he could be nominated.

HESS: And why didn't you think he could be nominated?

JONES: Well, you know, they hadn't gone south so

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much until that time.

HESS: Why?

JONES: Well, there was sort of a feeling, "Well, that's a cinch down there. We want to get a man from some state that can help us carry a doubtful state." That's one thing.

HESS: Do you think his views in segregation might have entered in?

JONES: Well, I don't think that had gotten so vital up to that time. You see that didn't get to be such a close question until after the 1954 decision by the Supreme Court, so that wasn't a serious question. But there's never been much -- up to that time, they'd rather not pick a southern man for some reason. It was a hangover, I guess, of the old feeling, but it was just -- it was just sort of a custom that,

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"Well, anybody can carry the South." I don't know, in '52 -- it seemed to me there was somebody else that was being considered too at that time. It wasn't...

HESS: There were quite a few, quite a few.

JONES: Yes, there were quite a few, but at any rate, I was very fond of Barkley.

HESS: [Estes] Kefauver, for one, was trying very hard.

JONES: I think Dick Russell or Sam Rayburn or Adlai Stevenson, or Alben Barkley or Kefauver would all have been good candidates. Either one of them would have been a good candidate.

Now, you know, there has never been quite the prejudice, or that sectional prejudice against Texas, as there has been against others, for some reason.

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HESS: Why do you think that is, that Texas seems to have an aura of both Southern and Western -- it depends on how you look at it.

JONES: Well, all of West Texas was settled up more from Illinois and Iowa and Nebraska and Tennessee. East Texas was largely settled by people from the old South at an earlier date.

For example, in my home county, when I first went out there as a schoolboy, they had homeseekers from Illinois, Ohio, great many from Iowa, Missouri, and Tennessee who were buying cheap land for homes. There was one time when every county officer in my home county of Potter -- Amarillo was the county seat -- was either from Tennessee or from some other state. There was not a native in the bunch. Not a man from the South proper except Tennessee.

A great many Republicans have always

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been in West Texas. They would always vote Democratic as to county officers, and then they would usually vote Republican in the national election. They had no voice unless they did that. They used to claim that Fort Worth was where the West begins. That's what Amon Carter used to say.

There was always a bantering controversy between Fort Worth and Dallas.

HESS: There would be a little rivalry there.

JONES: And Amon Carter was the self-chosen and acknowledged leader of the western area; that is, Fort Worth was considered western.

One time a big Chamber of Commerce or business group came down from the north and east to visit Texas. They first stopped in Dallas, and Amon Carter was over there. The Dallas people ribbed him good. The rivalry was

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largely in fun rather than any bitterness. Then they came over to Fort Worth, and, of course, a lot of Dallas men came to Fort Worth the following night. It was more a matter of having fun than it was really feeling, although there was some feeling. When they came to Fort Worth, Amon Carter presided, and he started off this way: He said, "Gentlemen, you are now in Fort Worth, Texas. That's where the West begins. Over there in Dallas is where the East peters out." He brought down the house with that statement. It amused all these people. But that whole western area of Texas has been as much western as southern. And yet, they deal with each other just the same.

HESS: Were you surprised in 1952 when Adlai Stevenson was defeated by General Eisenhower?

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JONES: No, I wasn't surprised. Even though Eisenhower didn't know which party he belonged to (he didn't have any party affiliation), he would have been overwhelmingly elected if he had run on the Democratic ticket. It is difficult to beat a great hero right after a successful war...

HESS: The war hero is going to win.

JONES: The war hero usually does. But I think Adlai Stevenson would have made a great President. His acceptance speech was a gem in both language and thought. I think Alben Barkley and all of these men we mentioned would have made good Presidents. But Adlai Stevenson was nominated again in 1956. Well, he was nominated in '56, wasn't he, and in '60, wasn't it? No, in '56, and they tried to nominate him in '60. Mrs. Roosevelt wanted

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to nominate him. I watched that convention on television.

HESS: In Los Angeles?

JONES: I believe so.

HESS: What do you recall about that convention?

JONES: I'll say this. Sam Rayburn was not well. He was Johnson's manager. They had the best organized (the Kennedy's), the best organized campaign I've ever seen. They got the names of

every delegation and when the delegates arrived in Los Angeles, they had busses to meet them with beautiful girls on them, with their tags, but they didn't campaign. They would just say, "We'll take you wherever you want to go and anywhere you want to go while you are here -- anyway you call us, we'll show you around."

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Meeting people coming into a strange place and extending courtesies is very effective.

HESS: That impresses people.

JONES: That impresses people and the fact that they didn't try to campaign. That was even more effective.

HESS: Quiet campaigning.

JONES: It was the most effective type. The delegates knew who they were working for. They were doing them this courtesy and not asking them for anything. It was one of the most effective arrangements I've ever witnessed.

That campaign had been worked on for years you know. The Kennedys began to organize right after the campaign in '56 when J.F.K. tried to be the Vice Presidential nominee

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and received a large vote. This is not a criticism -- merely a comment.

HESS: When he came so close to getting the Vice Presidential spot?

JONES: Yes, and they watched the election of delegates. They had someone interested at the county conventions and even some of the precinct conventions, somebody to look after them. Not many people attend a precinct convention. They select delegates to the county conventions. Delegates to the state convention are chosen at the county conventions.

But you know, John F. Kennedy had a tremendous personality. He came to the University Club and lived about two months when he first came to Washington as a member of the House. I got acquainted with him and he was a delightful person. He had a frank,

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easy manner with just enough breeziness about him to be able to meet people without any trouble at all.

HESS: Concerning the events in Los Angeles that year, there is always a big controversy over the question of whether the Kennedy camp really wanted Lyndon Johnson as second on the ticket or not. What is your view?

JONES: Well, it would have to be more or less secondhand. Mr. Rayburn didn't want to take it at first saying, "I don't think it will be wise." But he changed his mind and a lot of them did that.

As a matter of fact, that's one thing that hurt Lyndon Johnson in Texas. A lot of people that were strongly for him didn't want him to accept second place.

HESS: They were strong for him as first on the ticket?

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JONES: Didn't want him to take the second place. Nevertheless, I get the impression that it was John F. Kennedy's decision that he would need him and I think he did need him to carry the South. I think that Johnson helped him carry the South and Lady Bird [Mrs. Lyndon Johnson] did a beautiful job down there in campaigning. I wrote her a letter about that. She campaigned through the South. The noisy opposition didn't bother her a minute and I think her courage and skill were of great assistance. I think Kennedy probably would not have been elected if Johnson hadn't been on the ticket. And I think he realized that. I think some of the inner circle probably would have preferred if John F. Kennedy had lived, to ditch Lyndon Johnson in 1964, but John F. Kennedy just nailed that and said, publicly when asked about it, "He'll be on the ticket if he wants to be." There was some considerable talk that they might get somebody

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in his place, but he scotched that talk at once. But that's my impression. It is all secondhanded to me except in talking with people. I didn't know much about it.

HESS: Back to Mr. Truman, what in your opinion were Mr. Truman's major contributions during his career?

JONES: Well, I'd have to study a little while on that. He had so many national and international problems to meet, the natural result of essential readjustments after the war, that it is hard to pinpoint one thing. I think the Hiroshima decision and pulling that 1948 election out of the fire when few people thought it possible were major achievements. As President, he met these various problems head-on. He never tried to deceive anybody, and he carried through with quite a few good measures that were adopted, and I'd have to study a little while. I know he

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did a number of very wonderful things. He really got the foreign affairs situation well in hand, and at the same time people became happy with the legislation that he secured. And, of course, he had a Republican Congress during one two-year period.

HESS: The 80th Congress.

JONES: The 80th Congress, and he...

HESS: '47 and '48.

JONES: And he used that to get people to think.

HESS: He referred to them once or twice during the campaign.

JONES: Yes, I'll say he did! That was a very effective campaign topic. I don't have in mind the various things he did, but he grew on the people and became very popular because of the

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things that he advocated and the things he accomplished in getting out of a -- we'd been in a turmoil and he had cleared the deck on all these problems in the aftermath of the war.

And then -- I followed this a good deal. I talked to Mr. Rayburn a number of times about it. He didn't try to overwhelm the country with legislation. Hurried legislation is often worse than no legislation.

I have had fifty-two years service in the Government. I should have absorbed a little information on the mechanics of Government. If you take legislation in an abnormal time, crowd it through, frequently it just -- well, you know, it's hard to administer. It won't fit in normal times. If you crowd legislation through without thorough consideration, have it written up by somebody who isn't answerable

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to the people at all, it delays the passage of worthwhile legislation. I think several of the pieces of legislation were good, and he got this country back on the track after it was engaged four years in the greatest wars in all history. He won the hearts of people everywhere, and they began to talk of him as one of our outstanding great Presidents. He got the train back on the track. And I think he deserved the title.

HESS: What's your estimation of his place in history?

JONES: I think history will give him more credit than the current comment. Just like they probably will with Johnson as a matter of that fact. History is going to accord him a great place because of those international problems, as well as domestic problems that he had to face

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and which he handled successfully. He didn't have all this trouble of rioting and similar difficulties. None of these came up. If a man in an official position is careful in what he presents, the country will operate far more smoothly. It is better than hurried, ill-prepared legislation. After handling tremendous after the war adjustments, our country was sailing at the end with flying colors. Those things don't just happen at a time like that. Any ship needs a great captain, especially in stormy times, if the ship is to be brought safely into port. And that applies to the Ship of State, as well as to any ship.

I know Mr. Rayburn had a very high regard for him, and he told me just a little before he went away that Truman is going down in history as one of the great Presidents. And

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I share his view.

I'm not going to try to comment on the respective merits of all he accomplished, because I don't recall what they all were; I was busy along other lines. But everybody liked Truman's frank open method. He didn't try to deceive anybody. And in the long run a man's stature grows when he meets those things face to face and doesn't flinch. There are hard questions that arose in government. Some officials begin to back and fill sometimes. It's the very essence of greatness that a man when given a responsibility, a real responsibility, if he meets those responsibilities with his head up and unafraid, the people will always respect him, and history will honor him more and more as the years go by, in my judgment.

HESS: Do you have anything else to add on Mr. Truman

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or the Truman administration?

JONES: Well, no, I believe that's about all that might be of interest. Now, I may have said too much...

HESS: No, we appreciate your cooperation.

JONES: Thank you.

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Fifth Oral History Interview with Judge Marvin Jones, Washington, D.C., May 14, 1970. By Jerry N. Hess, Harry S. Truman Library.

HESS: All right Judge, when we spoke last week I left Allen Matusow's book with you, *Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman Years*. After looking over his book, what are your comments?

JONES: Well, I was amazed at his mistaken so-called knowledge of the real facts in connection with this story. The writer indicates that I was for holding down the production, controlling production of food and farm products. The truth is that from the time I went into War Food after Claude Wickard and Chester Davis had served three months apiece, it was a difficult assignment because there were some disagreements in the Department of Agriculture over whether -- what the policy should

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be about all-out production. So, when I first went in I said, "Our problem is to have all-out production, the biggest production we can get, because food is essential to the conduct of this all-out war." The first statement I made after beginning my service June the 29th, 1943, I emphasized the need for all-out production. I never changed this attitude during my entire service.

I had served under Justice Byrnes for a six months period in the East Wing of the White House. As his adviser on Agriculture from early January to June 29, 1943, just prior to becoming War Food Administrator, I said on the broadcast on the Blue Network on August the 9th, 1943, "This

goal calls for a tremendous production of food. It calls for a proper distribution and handling of that food." The entire speech emphasized the need for the determination that we are to have an all-out production.

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Then on August 18th, 1943 in spelling out the program for the following year, "This is an all-out war; it calls for all-out production."

I want to quote a sentence from different places. I have the record here. Anyone can read this record. "There will be no restriction on food production. All-out production is needed."

These quotations are from speeches and statements that I made as we went along. And there isn't a line in the record that calls for restriction of production, anywhere in the whole period of my service as U.S. War Food Administrator. And -- well, I've marked a number of places. In fact, I'd just like to send a copy of this book of speeches and statements to the Truman Library.

HESS: That would be very fine.

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JONES: I have marked in the books some statements, but anyone may read all the statements. On September 29th, 1943, I said, "I hope the Congress may be willing to increase the funds available to the Commodity Credit Corporation so that the powers of that corporation can be used to the fullest extent in increasing food production."

Along about that time, some were saying, "Well, we still have the law on the statute books that calls for adjustment of production of certain farm commodities."

And I said to our staff, "I have authority during the war period under the Executive order to suspend and control any production during the war period." Some of my staff didn't like it even "Jake" [John B.] Hutson said, "No, I don't think you ought to do that."

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"Well," I said, "I'm going to do it, and I have already issued the order. I have the authority and we're not going to have, from now until the time this war is over, any restriction on production. After that we can't keep them from restoring the control program if they decide to do so. We don't have any authority after the war is over unless we are given an extended authority, or somebody else is given it."

I've marked here several places in this book -- in March 1944 when we had already planned that year's increased production. Then too, you have my report on the food situation. Then I have in my hand -- you see I am holding conference reports in my hand. I want to give you a quote from the December 1944 statement that I made for publication. "For the coming year 1945, production goals call for about the same as have been produced in the year just ending,

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but with a slight increase in planted acreage in 1945, and 1944 has been the greatest food production in the history of the nation." With all the shortage of help and materials we are with the bulk of farmers still measuring production. That was in December of '44 when we had made the plans for '45. And then as late as 1945 I made a public statement dated February the 3rd, 1945: "Our goals for this year call for greater acreage to be planted and more livestock to be raised with particular emphasis on increased production of milk and hogs and cattle. Crop goals call for an increase of nine million acres above last year." I increased the acreage every year.

It must be understood that the original ceiling order didn't cover all foods. These controversies raised the need of adding additional items that had not been included in the original

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freeze order.

Here is what a lot of people didn't understand, and evidently Senator Anderson thought I was holding down the prices in order to control production. I had absolutely suspended any chance for that. OPA wouldn't agree to many of the needed increases in prices. I would have to go to see [Fred] Vinson and he would hold down the prices. I was trying to get increased prices on all these products needed for the war effort.

I said many times that if I had sat in on the original ceiling price legislations or the order pursuant thereto that had authorized a freezing of prices, that I would have said that I didn't think any ceiling ought to have been placed below parity if we were to get full production. During the

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1930s we had rarely been above about 80 or 85, and one time as high as 90 percent of parity on any farm commodity. I would have said if we had any ceiling on essential farm production that should never be below parity.

I was not present when the legislation was enacted and I was out of the city at the Food Conference when the freeze order was planned. The prices had been frozen and naturally some of them were too low because when there had been a big surplus on some of them prior to the war we had a fight with OPA over prices and subsidies and they had a legitimate fight. I got along with Bowles, although naturally we didn't always agree.

HESS: What did Bowles say when you told him you thought the prices should be raised on certain commodities?

JONES: Well, he just said, "We are opposed to it."

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And he -- he said, "If it's necessary there should be a subsidy." But he'd argued that it wasn't necessary. The OPA wanted to put a ceiling on hogs. We had to go to Vinson and then to Byrnes. We could appeal to Byrnes. Vinson said, "We're going to put a ceiling on hogs."

I said to Byrnes, "If there is going to be a ceiling, let's put it at fifteen cents." And Bowles wanted to put it at twelve and one-half cents. And I said, "We won't get the production at that price."

We went to Byrnes and Byrnes said, "Well, why don't you just, you fellows," [Prentis M.] Brown was there as OPA director--that was just before Bowles was appointed. And Byrnes said, "Now, we're going to have to compromise this. Why don't you guys agree on fourteen cents?" And he said, "You had better both agree or I may make it worse on one of you."

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And I said, "Well, I'll accept it. I don't like it. I think it had ought to be higher than that." But we agreed.

Later Bowles insisted on a lower price ceiling on hogs. He had [Richard V.] Gilbert over at Byrnes' office arguing that it ought to be kept lower.

The prices of corn and hogs are as mutually linked as the law of supply and demand. They are called the ratio prices. Corn won't move without those related prices. There isn't a line anywhere in my record, and I'll be glad to have anybody examine the notes that the Secretary made on our various War Food morning conferences -- we had a conference every morning for 30 minutes attended by the twenty-one or two division heads we had in War Food.

But some people don't understand that you must have an outlet or refrigeration for perishable

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foods. There was an outlet during the war. We had no trouble with the outlets. I bought five million dollars worth of food per day for lend-lease for two and a half years; six billion dollars worth of food, and loaded it on ships. We had contracts with fifteen hundred warehouses and we had seventy thousand county and community committees. It is all emphasized all through these speeches and statements in this book that I will send the Truman Library. And it even goes back by reference to the time when I was in the House and handled the New Deal legislation. We had the problem then. I said on the floor back in the 1920s, "We have mastered the machinery of production to a far greater degree than we have mastered the machinery of distribution. Let's produce all we can dispose of at home or abroad."

That has always been my policy.

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Some would say even then, "It's a scarcity program."

I said, "No it isn't." I said, "I'm in favor of producing everything in this country that we can distribute at home and abroad. And in distributing abroad we are limited by the amount that the Congress is willing to provide for. Otherwise it becomes piled up here and deteriorates." I voted against the original Farm Board for the very reason that they didn't yoke it with distribution. I said -- I made the remark on the floor of the House, "We have mastered the machinery of production to a larger degree than we have the machinery of distribution." And if you don't, if

Congress doesn't make the provision for shipment, then the thing piles up on us, and rots in the granaries of the farmers, which it did under the Farm Board.

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Hoover didn't understand these essential facts, nor did the man he designated to draft the Farm Board legislation, understand at all, the problems, the links, the problems that one must meet if he handles both production and distribution.

Bowles and I agreed to take off rationing temporarily certain of the perishable foods. You know certain food is perishable. On those particular items all military, and military and lend-lease needs were fully supplied. All the warehouses were full. That type of food begins to deteriorate the minute it's produced if you don't have an outlet. There was no place to put these items for the time being. The main problem was to get storage space for it, especially at harvest time.

And now this man and [Herbert] Lehman, and Hoover never understood that. When he was

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War Food Administrator during World War I, Hoover only had a limited number of articles in a short war. His problems were not one-tenth as much as ours. That war only lasted about eighteen months and the fighting only six months. He simply wanted to have a ceiling on certain commodities, which ceiling he would fix without having anyone else have a say. He didn't have an appeal to Vinson or Byrnes or the President. He had the final say in fixing the ceiling on the few products he controlled. After the war he distributed some food on relief, mostly to Belgium. He didn't have anything to do with production, he didn't have any authority on that at any time.

He had a great publicity staff. I had only the regular information men in the Department. I gave out only one interview, jointly, with somebody from OPA. And Mr. Hoover got a lot

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of advertising because he loaded one ship with food. I was loading twelve in New York City at one time with food for lend-lease. We had a -- we had so much bigger problems. I said to my staff repeatedly, "Let's not try to solve the production problem for the after the war years. Congress has already, in the early part of the war, guaranteed farm support prices at the wartime level for two years after the war, so I'm going to have, as long as this war lasts, we're going to have all-out production without any restriction at all."

Now evidently Mr. Hoover didn't understand. As a matter of fact, at the time I was appointed War Food Administrator, Hoover gave out a statement and he predicted there would be a collapse on this whole program in six months. And at the end of the year Justice Byrnes wanted

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me to wire him and tell him how wrong he was. And I said, "No, I won't do that. I don't want to embarrass anybody." I only want to do my job.

HESS: Why did he think that there was going to be a collapse?

JONES: Well, he just said, "It was set up all wrong, that it should be left up to one man who should have full Authority to make all the decisions without having to go to various people to end disputes." Sometimes, when we couldn't get quick decisions he may have had a point, but, of course, I had no chance to even consider that. The problem in this long, drawn out, and far ranging war was far beyond the problems he was called upon to face.

Well, he never did have to report to the Congress anything about it. There never was any

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investigation of his expenditures. And he advertised extensively. He had a lot of advertising expense.

He didn't know when he came in as President, much about this country -- the mechanics of this country. He had been in England 20 years. How he agreed, as he did in the Farm Board, to have a flooring -- I mean a minimum price at which the Government would buy without any provision for what to do with it is difficult to understand.

I had opposed on the floor of the House the Farm Board bill in 1930 because it didn't have the proper yoking of the production and distribution and assurance there would be a distribution. I said, "It won't work," and I was one of the thirty-five that voted against it. The Democrats got into power, as you know.

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And I proceeded then, we had, oh, I've forgotten how many millions of bales of cotton stored up, no place to put it. It was stacked up in broken down warehouses, in sheds even upon farms. A drag on the market. We had wheat that they had on hand and couldn't dispose of and Congress wouldn't ship it abroad and the whole thing collapsed and I had to introduce a resolution and it was passed to give to the American Red Cross this cotton to be used to clothe the people that needed to be clothed and the wheat to be used by the Red Cross in any way to dispose of it. They made contracts with the processors and distributed the products on relief. Then I also had in the bill a provision that they could take this wheat and -- I mean take the perishable products -- some people don't consider the difference between perishable products and the other that you are able to store indefinitely.

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Coming now to World War II problems, Congress generally was opposed to subsidies. They preferred raising prices, but we had orders to hold the prices and use subsidies. I don't think Senator Anderson knew this, and he -- and then Hutson -- was one of the two or three people that was usually stirring up trouble. Hutson was the main one.

HESS: How did he do that?

JONES: Well, he would go over and tell Byrnes and Vinson individually that he was being handicapped, fenced in and ignored. The truth was he attended every staff meeting and was in all major decisions. He would go over and make personal reports and contacts.

HESS: What's his first name?

JONES: Jack Hutson, J.B. Hutson. He was chairman

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of the Commodity Credit Corporation, head of it. I'd have him in, before anything came up in the way of checks to be signed by me. He would usually initial them in advance. On any measure he would initial a check because he was responsible for the money that went out from the Commodity Credit Corporation. He came to me and said he just didn't have time to initial all these checks. He told me he had too much to do and he would like to be relieved of having to initial all these checks. And I said, "Well, I don't know, I need some protection on these matters." I added, "Well, I'll be very careful. I'll call the others in, but I think it's unloading too much on them, but we'll try it, I am not sure it will work."

He then went over to Jimmy Byrnes within two days and told him that I didn't give him anything to do -- that's two days afterward. And -- well, Byrnes told me what Jack had said, I

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started to say, "Well, let's send for him. I've been wanting to find out some of his cleverness." But it was toward the end of the war and I simply said nothing to Byrnes. And I told him later I was glad that I didn't face him with it, but I wanted him to know that I knew. I never told Byrnes. That was just one illustration, but it was near the end of the war period and I fixed it up. He was ambitious and was continuously undermining anyone he apparently felt was in his way. He apparently never really criticized me, but he would get after my assistants. There were other intriguers in that big organization. That's one of the problems I had. That is the reason I had to suspend the controls of production. Hutson was one of those who didn't want to suspend the controls. He just wanted to keep them for possible use. He had sold himself somehow to Vinson. He was from

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Kentucky. Vinson listened to him and I had to watch all the time. As a matter of fact, when I went over and was originally sworn in by Chief Justice Richard Whaley, who at that time was Chief Justice of the U.S. Court of Claims, Whaley went over with me and he sat back in the audience and he told me later, "You know two of those fellows sitting together were saying, 'I wonder how long he's going to last.'" He said it was clear that those two didn't like to have an outsider come in much anyway.

HESS: That's when you were sworn in as War Food Administrator?

JONES: At War Food. Whaley told me, and that's the reason he wanted me to take Wilson Cowen, who was then a trial commissioner of the court. Whaley said, "I think he had better be over there

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to help you because two or three are going to gang on you. The rest of them seemed friendly and anxious to help. And time after time in Congress I would challenge anybody who said on the

floor we were subsidizing the farmer. I'd say, "We are restoring equality because the farmer has borne the burdens of the tariff all these years and we're simply making restitution, bringing him back to the position of equality."

Sometimes opponents would say I was really trying to have a doctrine of scarcity and I would reply, "I'll challenge that any time. I want us to have the greatest production we can have and dispose of at home or abroad."

I made this statement in Congress, "I don't think there has ever been a pound of cotton produced but that somewhere in the world, there was a child that needed the

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warmth that the clothing would furnish. And there's never been a bushel of wheat produced or meat or any other perishable commodity but that somewhere out yonder under the stars is a hungry mouth that needs to be fed." But we must link distribution and have provision because Congress holds the purse strings and if we don't emphasize distribution, we will be in trouble. I added, "The farmers are in the minority and we must keep all programs on a sound basis or we will lose out."

I drafted a bill to pay an export premium to encourage foreign marketing. Some said that is subsidies, but I said, "No, it's restitution." And you can go back to the very beginning and I advocated -- I wrote the Soil Conservation Act myself. The Department sent up a proposal that was wholly insufficient. It dealt only with water erosion, and left wind erosion

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untouched. I wrote and Congress passed a much broader soil erosion and rebuilding act that is still in effect. I said, "The greatest in the world is the area covered food basket by the Mississippi Valley River system." I said, "Really the Missouri River is the Mississippi. It's longer, but they call it the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the...

HESS: It feeds into the Mississippi.

JONES: Yes, both the Mississippi and the Missouri and the two thousand tributaries that constitutes the Mississippi River system. The Ohio and its tributaries, the Missouri and its tributaries, the Mississippi and its tributaries going up into the edge of Canada. That system stretching from the Alleghenies to the Rocky Mountains drains thirty-one states and a part of two provinces of Canada -- there isn't any other such

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breadbasket in the world." I was always fighting on the question of food production. During my career in Congress I had never let up on the subject. We had long been building levees down on the lower Mississippi treating water as a curse. We were working against nature and nature always fights back. She's building up the bed of the stream, above the level of the surrounding area. It did you know, and...

HESS: Sediment.

JONES: Sediment or rather topsoil deposit, and when it broke over I remember Herbert Hoover went down there back in the early twenties when part of eight states were flooded. He recommended relief, but he never suggested the real remedy.

[Willis Grantz] Sears of Nebraska, he was a Republican Congressman. Sears and I talked for years about that subject. I said,

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"Let's, instead of relying wholly on building these levees, let's go up to the headwaters build check-dams and utilize the water where it falls in the tributary streams, contour the land, and work with nature, and utilize the water where it falls and then we will solve most of our problem of -- except in the tremendous floods." Sears and I fought battle for years and finally got that program through. I'm explaining this to show that from the very beginning of my youth all the way I have fought for a program of truly national interest. I was placed on the Agriculture Committee and I studied all those problems. I would hear other members challenge me in the House, but I never did have any of them really answer the question about the other wing of the tariff which Alexander Hamilton was honest enough to concede but which no industrialists and

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tariff claimants ever linked together.

HESS: Which didn't get passed.

JONES: Didn't get passed. I would be glad to have anybody look over my statements right up till the time I ended my service as War Food Administrator. I had a conference with Anderson. He told me that he was making a friendly investigation, and I suppose he was. He thought, he said, "They ought to raise the price on hogs, and it's too low." I have said that since the beginning of my administration.

And I said, "I've been preaching that ever since I have been here." I said, "OPA won't let me do it, and I've had to deal with Vinson, who is sold on holding the price idea. It's his problem to keep it as low as possible."

Under orders from the President in order

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to get the all-out production we were told to arrange to get some subsidies. The farmers didn't like subsidies, and Congress didn't like to give them. They would fuss at me about subsidies and I said, "Well, now I -- as a matter of fact, I wanted the ceiling on a number of these products to be higher, but they have been frozen at a point. The President had said we must hold the line and we must use subsidies rather than break the price line. We had no choice but to abide his instructions. In the war period we used the argument that if we broke price freeze on any commodity, it would start a spiral of inflation that would make the war much more expensive. It was a pretty strong argument, that we are having a hundred billion dollars worth of war contract expenditures, that to break through the ceiling on one, they'll probably be other

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billions that will drive just as hard and say, "We have just as good a case," and there will be trouble.

It was necessary to work as a team. They often declined to make adjustments. The war was being fought. We complied with instructions. Somehow we secured increased production every year. But it was like pulling eyeteeth and Congress would say, "Well, why don't you just raise these prices?" And that's the thing Anderson -- Anderson was mistaken in that. I don't think he meant to be critical, but then he simply didn't understand the plan that was being used under the orders of President Roosevelt. There were certain foods that we had to emphasize production and urged them to do these things. At that time President Roosevelt had died and President Truman had been sworn in. The investigations were being conducted. The war in Europe was nearly

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over.

There are more than a hundred and sixty farm commodities and they are divided into about -- there are about twenty basic, really basic commodities, important commodities, and about half -- more than half of the production is perishable.

Senator Anderson had a lot of trouble because he finally became convinced that he did not have the power to raise prices without approval of Fred Vinson, as well as of Bowles, but he had such problems as we had had during the all-out war. The Senator was quick to learn. He knew about farming, but I am sure he found problems in the food field even though the war was ending.

Some, at any rate Senator Anderson knew, and I knew, now that the war was about over, that my service was about ended, that Congress would take a new slant

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since the war in Europe was ending and that when the war was over, there would be many adjustments.

I had only agreed to stay until the war in Europe was over and President Truman was very fine about all that. He said let's wait until the war is over. But Byrnes insisted on action at the end of June, 1945. He told President Truman, "I know he's tired and wants to go back to the Court and all these war contract cases are coming before the Court. They want him back."

Right after President Truman was sworn in, soon after April 12, I went to the new President and tendered my resignation in writing. I told the new President that I felt he should have the privilege of selecting his own officials and I would be pleased to have it accepted at any time he wished. That

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I felt the big wartime food production program was about finished except for finishing up odds and ends, but that I would abide his wishes. It would not be proper for me to quote the President, any President. I think he said in effect that he would like for me to stay on and that he had perfect

confidence in me. I'll be glad for you to ask him what he said. At any rate, I appreciated his attitude and I said, "I'll be glad to stay until the war in Europe is over. I really would like to go soon after that."

He replied in substance, "Well, you let me know when you feel like you have to go." I had done what I think everybody should have done in the full Cabinet: Give the new President the chance to have his own group. I didn't think Truman would have raised the question. Bowles and I agreed that we'd

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take, temporarily, the rationing off of certain of the perishables, because there was some danger always of spoilage, especially because of shortage of storage facilities. Chester Bowles announced the taking off of the rationing, temporarily. He made the announcement. Byrnes and Vinson had both agreed to the announcement. That's one of the few things that he agreed on. I told Fred Vinson that anytime he wanted them restored to the ration list I would be glad to restore them.

Then of course, when the war was -- when the Bulge fight came on and war -- we saw it was going to last a good deal longer than many had thought it would. I was in Denver on a food and storage mission when that came up. I phoned the office to tell Vinson I thought the rationing should be immediately restored

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on all food items and he issued the order. In fact, I had told him before I left on the trip that anytime he thought the items temporarily taken from the list should be restored, to simply issue the order.

HESS: The Battle of the Bulge.

JONES: But I never changed my position on all-out production right through to the end of the war.

HESS: Okay, let's pin a couple of those spots down specifically, because in Matusow's book he mentions that to prevent a postwar surplus of food one of the things that was done was the lowering of production goals in 1945.

JONES: That is simply not a fact. We increased the goals for 1945. There might have been somebody in our setup that wanted to do that.

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It was simply not done. I showed you in these few quotations I increased the planting and production goals for 1945. I'll be glad to show quotations right up to the last. I put this 1945 goal higher as shown in this February 2nd statement. And I have some quotations in the book that run up to almost the time that I quit over there. These records were made at the time. To any suggestion I said, "No sir, we're going to have full production and no restriction until the war is entirely over.

Then my authority will automatically end. I can't then make any further suspension. But as long as my authority lasts there will be no change and no lowering of production goals."

Then it will be up to Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture to make an estimate of how much they can dispose of at home and abroad. But Congress began to talk, all during

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that time, about cutting expenses. I think that's where the critics got most of this impression, from remarks by some of the members of Congress.

HESS: Who was your main opposition on the Hill?

JONES: Only a few people in Congress and others not in Congress, Lehman and some of the New York people. It didn't seem especially serious. The fact is, I had little opposition in Congress.

HESS: Herbert Lehman.

JONES: Yes. Lehman -- or at least statements were published to that effect, and I saw no denial. Prior to the war, under my authorized war powers, I said until the very last and I think in my final statement I showed we had increased production every year, and far

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above any previous time. And I brought in annually all the way from fifty thousand to eighty thousand farm workers from other countries in order to be able to produce more. I got the 4-H boys clubs to help produce more food. And I emphasized all through these speeches that food is essential as the air we breathe. It is all the more important in a great war.

I am glad Clint Anderson didn't have the problems that I had. Immediately after he came in the war in Europe was over and conditions and problems had changed -- you noticed this from some of these accounts. I didn't follow through what all he had done, but when he looked the situation over in the Department of Agriculture, he asked my chief assistant, Wilson Cowen to stay and help him. Mr. Cowen wanted to go back to the Court at once with me. He said,

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"I'm going back to the Court, back to my old position."

And then Anderson asked me if I objected to his staying with him and helping him. I replied, "It's all right with me. Whatever you talk him into."

Senator Anderson then wanted to know if it was all right if he got the President to write a letter requesting him to stay with him six months. I replied, "Sure, that would be a deserved compliment." President Truman wrote Cowen a letter and asked him to stay for at least six months. Cowen stayed the six months.

HESS: And Matusow's second point about the prevention of a postwar surplus he gives is: "By dropping stockpiling for relief."

JONES: As what?

HESS: "By dropping stockpiling for relief."

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He said this is one of the things that resulted in the shortage.

JONES: Oh no, there wasn't any dropping of stockpiling at all! We had a problem of storage space. There were some storage problems even for wheat, but those were not troublesome except at harvest time. But with the ones that require refrigeration and danger of spoiling, the problem is greater. But there never was any reduction of stockpiling at all as far as the action of the War Food Administrator was concerned. I would hear some talk about cutting down expenses, but there wasn't any reduction in stockpiling.

Even in the 1920s we often had storage facility difficulties even in peacetime. In fact, Congressman [Henderson M.] Jacoway of Arkansas in the earlier years had written and secured an act by the Congress to increase

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storage facilities. That has been a continuing problem. We have a winter wheat of the Southwest which is the finest of the wheat, high protein, clean wheat. Then we get the spring wheat in the central northwest where it grows up with the weeds, and has foreign materials and the grade is much lower. Then they had some good wheat on the Pacific Coast, as well as some macaroni wheat they call it. There are more than sixty different types of wheat grown by farmers two thousand miles apart and we must have programs that induce them to produce.

The farmers like anyone else, want to produce what is most profitable. That was my fight all along the line with all-out production to the end of the war, of the commodities that were needed during the war. That was one reason subsidies were necessary. I said

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that two or three times, "Enough people coming home so that there won't be any surplus problem for a little while anyway." We're having trouble with storage space, that is, in getting enough of it. There was not enough even in prior war-peace times. The war increased the problem. These critics never paid any attention to that. They ignored storage problems and the difficulty of building storage in wartimes.

We didn't reduce any stockpiling. No -- they can't show a line on that from anything that I said that even indicated reducing stockpiling. It didn't occur. There were earnest discussions on different branches of the Government lines and difference of opinion. Sometimes the friction of mind upon mind helps to establish truth. Even QPA had differences of opinion within their organization just like

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we did. That is not a criticism, just a comment.

I would like to tell you a story that one of the officials -- but I don't guess I should tell it here.

HESS: No, that's fine. Go right ahead.

JONES: Well anyhow, one of the officials of the OPA -- they had a great many attorneys over there, several hundred attorneys. If we would try to get an agreement, they would have to go into a huddle and ask these lawyers. So, in order to get any material from the War Production Board, we had to make a showing of the need. This official told this amusing story. A lot of funny things happen in any active organization. If you're going to pick out some little incident you can find something probably where somebody made a slight error or miscalculation on something. This official telling this

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story or incident.

He said, there was a dairy man up in Wisconsin or Minnesota somewhere up in that area, that had a stream running through his dairy farm. His house was on one side of the stream and the dairy barn and cattle and feeding area was on the other side. So he had a footbridge across the stream so he could cross to feed and tend his milk cows. Well, there came an extra flood on that stream and washed out the footbridge. It was wintertime up there and desperately cold at times. This man wanted a pair of rubber boots. He asked OPA to recommend the boots. Well, these people went into a huddle and said, "No, we can't. There's a shortage of rubber. We can't recommend that WPB issue you a pair of rubber boots."

Then the dairyman said, "I'm going to sell my dairy cattle. They will probably be used

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for beef. Dairy products are short too, but I'm not going to catch any pneumonia going across this stream without rubber boots."

And so they went into a huddle, another huddle, and they said, "I'll tell you what we'll do. You make up the list of what you need to rebuild the bridge and we'll give you a recommendation for those materials."

And he said, "Well, that's fine."

They said, "We'll approve of that."

He made up the list and they approved it and it went right through. The inspectors came back in about six months later inspecting to see if he had gone ahead with the bridge, and he still didn't have any bridge. And they said, "What's the matter, you said you"

"Well," he said, "in making up my list of what I need to build the bridge, I included a pair of rubber boots and when I got the boots,

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I didn't need the bridge."

He told that as an incident -- I doubt whether it is a made-up story, but strange things happen. In any big organization now many curious things happen, no matter how well an organization is run.

HESS: Speaking of scarcities, there were some shortages of food after the war here in the United States. What caused those shortages?

JONES: Of course there were some shortages with the unusual demand for food. In 1945 there was some shortages, some drought and bad weather. Some slight shortages were partially produced by those unusual weather conditions and they partially were produced by the need abroad. That affects the whole market situation. But I am sure it was only temporary. You realize I wasn't in charge after the war.

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The Banking and Currency wrote into the bill that for two years following the signing of the armistice, the prices for farm products should not be lowered. And that made provision for production. Sometimes there are shortages, and some of them you can't help and that's the reason I wanted special favors under legislation, to keep a reserve supply as a condition. I wrote that provision in the sugar legislation. It went far toward preventing a shortage of sugar. Prior to that legislation, sugar varied from a low of 6¢ retail to a high of 27¢ per pound which carried much dissatisfaction among consumers.

All the offshore areas were required to keep a six months supply in reserve to prevent a shortage. I wrote it into the body of the legislation.

But these critics jump onto one thing and because of any temporary taking off the ration list of a few perishables sometime

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before the bad weather conditions which came after the war was over. And after the war, Congress did enact a provision to ship a lot of food abroad to our enemies as well as our allies. No one knew in advance they would do that, but so far as the provisions for all-out production, right through to the end of the war, and then, of course, a whole picture changed.

You remember a lot of soldiers came home and we had millions of them still abroad. A lot of them came home and they were disbanded. Then this United Nations did make some provision, under the Marshall plan to ship a good deal of this stuff abroad and to feed people all over the world which I think was a good idea. One must remember that the demand for food during the war to produce food for 12 million in our armed services, the lend-lease food, and our

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civilian needs. And I don't know what the items they claim, I didn't go over that. What items did they claim were short?

HESS: Well, meat for one was a little short.

JONES: What?

HESS: Meat.

JONES: There was only a short period when in the heavy marketing season when meat came to market when there was no place to store it. Should we have let it spoil? Bowles and I consulted. Neither Byrnes nor Vinson objected. Bowles made the announcement. I believe I have explained all that.

We never had control of the prices on cattle and never had a support price on cattle. They just didn't want it. And they didn't need it during the war period. Cattle prices

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were high so that our cattlemen produced all they could.

We had twelve million people in the armed services during the war. They were on the move and consumed about twice the average per capita. Because that's a perishable and there was a great demand for meats you know, then I shipped five million dollars worth of food per day for lend-lease for our allies. They'd -- that was a thing that had to be rationed here in order to not to have too much meat consumed in this country. Even during the short period when a few perishables could not be stored, we were still shipping about five million dollars per day of lend-lease food. That policy never changed. The low price of some of these perishables had caused some meats to go into black markets. The OPA couldn't help that. They did the best they could, and so

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did we.

Remember, nearly all perishables are seasonal. The production is greater at ripening, harvesting or marketing periods. Remember, we were producing all we could and urging the cattle be fed but, the marketing period creates a storage problem. It's impossible not to have, occasionally, a shortage in perishables, and at certain times, a storage problem.

HESS: Now there was a worldwide shortage of wheat, was there not?

JONES: There was a worldwide shortage and as I told you in my original session, one of the troubles about wheat was that we were producing all we could in this country, even had all-out production. I repeat, Byrnes' office and high officials called me about six months

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before the D-Day in Europe and said the synthetic rubber program has broken down. That was just after President Jeffers of the Union Pacific, who had charge of the program, announced, "We have solved the synthetic petroleum rubber program. I am resigning and returning to my railway job." Byrnes called me over to the high brass and they said, "We're going to ask you to allot a lot of wheat or sugar -- great quantities of wheat and sugar to make synthetic rubber for the D-Day landing of thousands of soldiers." This came as a shock right after the Jeffers announcement. But that was it. I'd just made up the allocation of the wheat and also of sugar and allotted the portions to the housewives.

We had a shortage of sugar too. But

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I had no choice but to agree to use two hundred million bushels of wheat and a hundred and sixty thousand tons -- I believe it's a hundred and sixty thousand, maybe it was more than that, of sugar to make industrial alcohol.

This upset the entire plan. But they insisted that D-Day would require several hundred thousand landing vehicles that must have rubber tires. And that comes first. But you're not to mention it no matter how much it upsets your program.

We were already getting cattle production up as high as we could. We were having to use wheat for feed to supplement the corn production and there was such a demand for feed of all kinds that we didn't have as much stockpiling as we needed. We had all the -- we had all of the bins filled with wheat again at the beginning of 1945 and one can't forecast that there won't

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be a shortage of some commodity that when we have a normal production of so many millions of bushels and suddenly the drought in different parts of the world make a big world demand for wheat or any other essential commodity.

Some submarine attacks had sent some vessels carrying beef limping back just at heavy beef marketing time. There were no storage facilities. Bowles and I agreed that it would be better to temporarily remove the rationing on meat and a few other articles in supply. Bowles made the announcement as the reports will show. No one objected. I told Fred Vinson at the time that we would restore the rationing as soon as needed. A few weeks later Vinson called me and I said, "I'll put anything back on you say if OPA will agree to it." And OPA apparently wanted to do it. I was leaving for Denver

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the next day, and I told him to issue the order as soon as possible. Vinson went ahead and restored the rationing on these commodities that had been temporarily relieved to keep them from perishing, but never was there a change in the program.

I never have, from the time I first begun to study this program of production and distribution and stockpiling -- you can stockpile a lot of wheat if you have it, but that is just at harvest time. We never did have sufficient wheat, never could get enough wheat during the wartime, that is when

the need was greater, and it apparently was always that way. I brought in two hundred million bushels of wheat one year from Canada for feed in the eastern United States. And those problems were tremendous on the overall picture. And that's the reason I said, "Well, they are just going to have all-out production of everything and

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with emphasis on the articles most needed, but you can't get people to put wheat in when -- on a voluntary basis when they can grow something else they can get more money for."

There wasn't any cut in stockpiling -- why do they get the idea there was a cutting down on stockpiling. Now where did they get that information? Somebody dreamed up that, it just wasn't done. That is it wasn't done by Agriculture, or it wasn't done by War Food Administration.

HESS: All right, on another point, we've mentioned former President Hoover this morning. During the time that you were War Food Administrator did you ever speak personally with former President Hoover about the problems of food production and distribution?

JONES: Well, he gave out interviews in New York

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and Chicago, and, as a matter of fact, I had gone to see him when he was War Food Administrator during World War I. I knew him very well, but I wasn't intimate with him. He didn't offer any suggestions. I didn't ever contact him during World War II because he gave out an interview at once that this whole thing, he predicted, would collapse in six months. The whole setup, right or wrong, could be changed in the middle of the war. And at the end of the year I had these wonderful letters from "Barney" Baruch and others about what a fine job I had done and Byrnes wanted me to write Herbert Hoover about his mistaken prediction of a collapse. But I said, "No, I won't do that. I am trying to get a job done. I respect Hoover. I am sure he had problems too."

HESS: But you didn't get one from President Hoover?

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JONES: No, I didn't hear a word from President Hoover. And then towards the end he came out again with a statement about something that he never had studied. He never had studied the problems of production.

That's a much bigger problem than the problem of distribution. Distribution is just a matter of getting enough money to distribute. But we had been compelled to pay major attention to the production end, over a three year period, and then somebody dreams, "Well, these hungry people, why do we let them starve?" I agree, but there are three million employees in the United States Government service (I think I may have mentioned this before), there are just five hundred and thirty-seven of them elected by the people. And wise or otherwise, the Constitution said no money can go out of the Treasury, not even to pay the President his

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salary, except by the action of the Congress. And when they dream up and say this thing ought to be done, we have grave difficulty in getting the subsidy funds essential to get production, then you're met with the problem of production which has to be planned practically a year ahead, you're met with a danger. If Congress doesn't appropriate the money, we couldn't spend it.

You can go read the speeches in the *Record*, the *Congressional Record*, during that period and they often said, "Let's cut this thing down. We're spending too much money." I am not criticizing Congress. I had four years of service in the House. That is the greatest legislative body on earth. But, if we spent all the money the do-gooders and dreamers ask them to spend, the Government would go broke and our nation would be on the

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rocks. It's a free country and people may say what they wish. Perhaps it makes the critics feel better to allow them to blow off steam, and it doesn't hurt the Congress much. They just move along doing their jobs.

Somehow we were able to furnish the extra wheat and sugar for synthetic rubber and somehow we weathered the storm, but that didn't alter the fact that up until that war was over, we had all-out production, and until I left there was no -- there was no change in that program from the time I went in until I finished. And I'll ask anybody to look through the records and they can go through -- we have notes that were made at all our staff meetings, recording what was said during all this period.

I was urging, as shown by these speeches and statements -- well, for the first year I was over there we had 30 minute daily staff

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meetings in order to eliminate duplication in our own organization, and about once or twice thereafter. I never did know why other agencies didn't have the same procedure. The heads of the divisions met and briefly discussed the program and it was very effective. Sometimes two men would be working on the same task. We would decide which was to handle it and we would all understand the different parts of the program. It worked like a charm -- I was preaching all along that it's our job to get all-out production of the essential foods.

We all worked together -- certainly for the war period -- and we produced all we could induce the farmers and livestock people to produce. They did a heroic job with short help, but the demand was great. We were feeding the greater part of the allied world, but that order requiring all that wheat and sugar for industrial

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alcohol for the rubber program, after the plans made for the year and announced, that hit a pretty good jolt you know. But somehow it was done.

Then I had -- when I think maybe I told this the other day, I hope I'm not repeating. When Eisenhower landed in Italy, when his group landed there, I had a wire to ship immediately thirty thousand tons of flour -- flour, I think it was, or thirty thousand barrels. I'd have to check my

figures, but I had to wire all over the United States to get that flour because that -- we had a shortage of wheat, but we got it, shipped it, because they came first, and I shipped that flour. Of course they had -- on the move you know they used about twice as much food. They carried it always from location to another under battle conditions. When they moved, that perishable stuff was ditched.

HESS: And they have to feed the civilian populations

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in the area that they take over.

JONES: That's right. It was a wolfish problem. Many of us went back to the office at night and worked on the problems. It was an inspiration to see so many officials and employees worked overtime without complaining. And, of course, most people didn't find anything to complain about.

Really, I don't think Mr. Hoover ever knew the problem of production at all. He didn't have to deal with that. You see, he was only authorized to put a ceiling on commodities and never had anything to do with production. He was authorized to put a ceiling price on food, feed and fuel, but in food only a few commodities were included in the bill. That's the World War I program and the actual fighting lasted only about six months for our soldiers. The fighting in World War II lasted

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nearly four years on a two ocean basis.

I wish I had time to write up my experiences in War Food because I have the records here and I'll be glad to have anybody examine these records. If they can find anything that isn't an all-out production, I'll buy them a good dinner.

HESS: Do you have anything else to add in answer to Mr. Matusow's book?

JONES: Well, I think -- I don't know anything about him. I have no idea where he secured so much misinformation, but he simply didn't have his facts straight. I don't say he was deliberately trying to show something else, but he must have listened to someone who didn't know or didn't want to find the truth. I have no complaint as to Claude Wickard. He was present when I was sworn in. Soon thereafter I invited him

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him to attend the staff meetings, which he did.

HESS: Did he think you were trying to come in and get his job?

JONES: Well, I had heard it intimated. I just didn't want him to think I had any such idea in my mind. As a matter of fact, Brynes and Marvin McIntyre had told me that the President would appoint me as Secretary, if I would accept it. I had repeatedly made it clear that I didn't want the

place. I wanted to relieve Claude Wickard of any uneasiness. The facts are, President Roosevelt offered me the position after I became War Food Administrator.

I needed somebody for transportation. We had transportation problems. We had to transport the war food -- lend-lease to the Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf Coast from 1500 warehouses located throughout

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the country. I asked several transportation people who was the best transportation man in industry, and I was told "Mark Upson knows more about it than anybody in the United States outside of the men who run the railroads and maybe more than they do."

And I said, "Call the president of the company, call the president of Proctor & Gamble," I believe his name was Charles Dupuis. I introduced myself. I said, "I am War Food Administrator and I need an expert transportation man and I want Mark Upson."

"Oh," he said, "I couldn't let you have Mark Upson. He's one of the best men I have and the Government's already gotten about," (I think he said), "two or three hundred of my people there working for them and, I'm handicapped;" and he says, "I just can't spare Mark Upson." I am quoting this from memory,

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but I am sure it is substantially accurate.

And I said, "Now listen Mr. Dupuis, I didn't want this job I have. This war is on and Proctor & Gamble have as much at stake as anybody else and I want Mark Upson."

Mr. Dupuis studied a moment and said, "When do you want him?"

I said, "Tomorrow morning."

He replied, "He'll be in your office at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning. I'll let you have him for one year and then I must have him back."

I said, "Well, we'll take him for a year and then we'll talk about it."

At ten minutes before 9 o'clock a.m., Mark Upson walked into my office and reported for work. And Mark Upson at the end of the year wanted to stay a little while longer and did

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a marvelous job. President Dupuis agreed to a brief extension. I have always appreciated the alert action and fine patriotism of Mr. Dupuis.

And then I had Lee Marshall of the Continental Baking Company to handle some of these phases you know that had to do with processing. I secured the best men in the country on that -- on

those various things, and men that knew how to organize. And then I used all the active division heads of the Department of Agriculture.

I'm very proud of the record of the War Food Administrator. I worked day and night. I'd get down at the office at 8 o'clock and have an early -- quick lunch frequently on the desk, and I frequently went back at night, took work home with me. I can't understand why people without ever coming to me and asking

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what the facts are, who wasn't there.

I think Clint Anderson -- I never had anything against him -- I don't think he understood when he started out to hunt for some shortages that I was getting all the production I could all along the line. I think he misunderstood that. I gather from -- assuming that this is correct. I want to visit and talk to him in a friendly way sometime. I have always liked him. I believe he rather thought that I was trying to hold down production toward the last. He may have said something early about empty shelves as you call it. Well, he is entirely wrong about that if he said it. I didn't hear his statement. I intended to go see him about that because I never had anything against him.

Senator Anderson was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Jack Hutson was appointed

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as Under Secretary. Then pretty soon -- or thereafter Hutson went up to United Nations and [Norris E.] Dodd became Under Secretary. I don't know why that was changed, but Anderson kept Wilson Cowen six months and I understand wanted to keep him longer. I went back to the Court. Secretary Anderson didn't have anything like these big problems that I had because the whole thing was about over, but he had some other problems. They were pretty tough. And I think he ran for the Senate, you know, when the first opening came in New Mexico. Naturally he resigned as Secretary of Agriculture.

Anyhow I have a great admiration, I want to repeat, for President Truman. I think he is one of our truly great Presidents. He was very generous to me at all times and he had even told Byrnes when he suggested I'd like to go, he said, "Let's wait until the war is over."

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I mean in -- and Byrnes said, "No, he'd like to go now." But he was -- just suggested -- at least Byrnes told me that. Probably -- if I had known all the others were going to quit at the same time, I probably would have asked to stay even though I was pretty worn out at the time. At any rate, I wrote another letter on May 22, and asked to be relieved as of June 29.

I would like to add that while I felt farm price adjustments should have been made and the other prices adjusted to fit, nevertheless, those in authority had decided otherwise. So I went along with the subsidy plan as decided. Most of the slight criticism of me from the Hill was that I asked them to provide subsidies so that the price line would not be broken and a spiral of inflation started. I knew and he served with many of them. Most of them understood that the plan had been set from the top. They understood

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and always greeted me in friendly fashion and frequently came to see me with their problems.

A TRIBUTE

At this point I want to pay a tribute to the officials and employees of the Department of Agriculture. They had a double obligation; to carry on their regular work and do the War Food work as well. Practically all of them worked overtime without any complaint. They would work at night willingly if we asked them when there was an emergency. There were nearly 12,000 of the regular employees in Washington. Practically all of them were dedicated, loyal and anxious to help on the war effort. Only two or three were troublemakers. One of them I have mentioned would carry stories to both Byrnes and Vinson. Even this didn't prevent a very successful administration of a very

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difficult job. All of the division heads were loyal and efficient.

Then we had about 75,000 county and community committees who worked in the 3,000 farm counties in the United States. This is a broad, big country, and all these people deserve the thanks of the nation for a job well done. I am very proud of them and their work.

A SUGGESTION

Should there be another war, which heaven forbid, for it would be a worldwide tragedy which is unthinkable.

One should learn from experience. If there should be occasion for another War Food, I feel that we shouldn't have so many different people to appeal to before a final decision is made, especially when dealing with perishable foods. I was very fond of both

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Byrnes and Vinson. They were wonderful men. It was much easier when there was only one appeal to Byrnes. He could make quick decisions, but when another intervening appeal was decreed, it became far more complicated.

Fred Vinson had great ability. He was thorough. Frequently when we would go to him with troublesome questions, he could listen and then say, "I will think over this and let you know." I would urge a quick decision when the issue affected perishables. The major portion of food is perishable. I would sometimes say, "I would rather have a wrong decision in some instances than to have it delayed." He would laugh and say, "Better be careful, I might decide against you." I would say, "Please settle it as quickly as possible."

He was an exceedingly busy man with a terribly difficult job. He rarely made a wrong

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decision, but he would get busy and sometimes forget and we would have to remind him. In one instance he waited several months and in that instance never made a decision for the time had

passed when any decision was needed. This is not a complaint. He was a very thorough man and did a great overall job.

But, here is my suggestion: Food is basic. It is as essential as the air we breathe. Life cannot be sustained without it. No army can march without it. It has long been accepted that parity is the ideal purchasing power of farm products measured in terms of the price of other commodities.

1. Have a War Food Administrator, who, for the duration of the war declared by Congress, would be authorized to fix a ceiling price at parity. No more and no less on essential farm commodities, and authority to fix a support price of not less than 90 percent of parity.

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No appeal should be allowed from the ceiling or support prices established by the War Food Administrator.

2. All other prices of essential articles and services essential to the war effort should be automatically fixed at the level that existed at the time price fixing becomes effective.

3. If the cost of living increased as much as 3 percent and remained at the increased level for a definite period of, say three months, other articles and services would be increased a similar percentage.

This is very similar to the plan that Canada used throughout the war. They apparently had no difficulty in its operation.

The suggested method would avoid repeated arguments and delayed decisions that make the handling of perishable foods during the wartime

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needs.

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