

Oral History Interview

with

H. GRAHAM MORISON

Assistant to the General Counsel of the War Production Board, 1941-43; Captain, United States Marine Corps, 1943-45; Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, 1945; Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, 1945-48; Assistant Attorney General and head of the Civil Division, 1948-50; Assigned to establish the Office of Economic Stabilization, 1950; Acting Deputy Attorney General, 1950; Assistant Attorney General and head of the Anti-Trust Division, 1950-52; and private law practice in Washington, D.C., 1952-76.

Washington, D. C.

August 1, August 4, August 10, & August 16, 1972

by Jerry N. Hess, Harry S. Truman Library

The Harry S. Truman Library

Independence, Missouri

February 1978

NOTICE

This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written, word.

RESTRICTIONS

This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Oral History Interview

with

H. GRAHAM MORISON

Washington, D.C.

August 1, 1972

by Jerry N. Hess, Harry S. Truman Library

[1]

HESS: To begin, Mr. Morison, would you tell me a little about your personal background: where you were born, where you were educated and what positions you have held?

MORISON: I was born in Briston, Virginia-Tennessee.

HESS: Were you born on the Virginia side?

MORISON: No. I was born on the Tennessee side. It's hard for a Tennessee mountaineer to just tell "a little," but I'll try.

I am the only living child of Judge Hugh G. Morison and Lucile Barker Morison. My mother was the oldest child of Colonel J. M. Barker, a Confederate veteran who had served with Mosby in the War Between the States, and Margaret Kane Barker. My father

[2]

was the oldest child of Judge H.S.K. Morison and Annis Kyle Morison of Scott County, Virginia. My father graduated from Virginia Military Institute in the Class of 1899, and one of his roommates was General George C. Marshall. After admission to the Virginia Bar he joined the legal staff of what was to become the Carolina, Clinchfield and Ohio Railroad. In time, he became its General Counsel and briefly served as president until he was appointed Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1923.

As a teenager, the unexpected and premature death of my father from a heart attack in 1926, was a deeply traumatic experience for, as an only child, the relationship with him was close

[3]

and he was the center of my life. Because there was a depression at the time, I worked my way through the academic school at Washington & Lee University in Lexington, Virginia and its law school, graduating in the law class of 1932. I then joined my uncle, A. Kyle Morison, in the practice of law in Bristol, Virginia. Remember now, this was in the depths of the depression and I took any case that came along. In most cases, my fees were paid in produce since "cash was scarce."

I argued my first appellate case in a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 1935, and won by a unanimous court. A partner of a New York law firm was there to hear argument in the case that followed mine and asked me to become an associate in the New York law firm of Miller, Owen, Otis & Bailey. After some deliberation, I went to New York and joined

[4]

the firm as an associate. (The firm name is now Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher.)

I introduced myself to the senior partner, Governor Nathan L. Miller, and in time we became friends despite my lowly position in the firm. From Governor Miller's beginnings as a country lawyer in upstate New York, he was employed by Andrew Carnegie to effect the mergers that created U.S. Steel Corporation and was vice President and General Counsel of U.S. Steel

continuously except during the term he served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York and later when he was Governor of New York State. Governor Miller and I, despite the disparity of our ages, shared the same belief about the role of the lawyer and he took a personal interest in me, which contributed much to my maturity as a lawyer.

[5]

Governor Miller was called back to U.S. Steel to devote full time as their General Counsel in 1941 as the war clouds in Europe deepened. It was at this time that the Governor introduced me to John Lord O'Brian whom he had come to know as an able lawyer and as "Governor Hughes' man" in the State Legislature.

Mr. O'Brian had been appointed General Counsel of the War Production Board which had been created to regulate the nation's resources and production in order to provide armaments for our Western Allies and to fulfill the massive needs for our Army, Navy, and Air Force. Mr. O'Brian had asked Governor Miller to recommend capable young lawyers who might want to join his staff. Governor Miller had measured my feelings rightly and knew that I would welcome the experience and challenging opportunity

[6]

that this undertaking offered. So, I was named Assistant General Counsel to the War Production Board in 1941, and served under Mr. O'Brian.

I met President Truman for the first time while he was a member of the Senate and had been appointed Chairman of the so-called Truman Committee whose task was to hold hearings on complaints of violations of the act establishing the War Production Board, etc. This was prior to the declaration of war in December by President Roosevelt and Attorney General Robert Jackson had insisted that unless and until there was a declaration of a state of war, the War Production Board had no authority to impose limitations on material, etc. and that the industry committees which had been appointed were suspect because of the probable agreements made by competitors

[7]

in such capacities. Mr. O'Brian took the position that although war had not at that time been declared, its imminence was so probable and the need for war production to supply our Allies with armaments so imperative that the Justice Department should not set aside this structure and its operation, agreeing to confer with the Attorney General at any time.

Senator Truman was aware of the position of the Department of Justice and felt strongly that some area of accommodation should be provided by the Department of Justice. At that time point, Mr. O'Brian suggested to Don Nelson, the Chairman, that a meeting be held with Senator Truman and Senator Truman invited Nelson, Mr. O'Brian and any others on the staff they wished to bring to meet with him. I was asked to go with them and met President Truman at that meeting and for the first time discovered his

[8]

breadth of understanding of the problem of production and the function his committee would perform in aiding the war effort. After stating briefly his intentions as to holding hearings not alone in Washington but throughout the United States on complaints of violations of the limitation orders, the alleged theft and misappropriation of critical materials and all other matters related to the needs of those times, he said something along this line:

I have spent most of my adult life in studying ancient and modern history and from this you find that from the decline of the Roman Empire until the present, the venality and greed of man has occurred over and over in times of great stress of the nations of the world. This is occurring in our country today and I believe that my task with the Committee is to unearth the truth and if there is found to be theft, misappropriation of critical materials, particularly in industries that have been subsidized by the taxpayers' money or if hurriedly made and defective weapons have been delivered for our Allies abroad and this was occasioned by theft or mismanagement, it

[9]

should be exposed as a lesson to all others that our Government will not condone such venality.

Indeed, despite Bob Jackson's proper position as to the lack of a state of war, I must take into account that in truth the United States will be impelled to go to the defense of our Allies against Hitler and I am sure that he can be persuaded to understand this.

I confess that I was overwhelmed for I did not know President Truman and in what he said so pointedly, I had the first glimpse of the breadth and earthiness of his understanding of the function of the Government of our nation facing a state of war.

Senator Truman was a quiet-spoken and modest man. I knew that he had been associated with Tom Pendergast of the Democratic organization in Kansas City who had elevated him to be judge of the County Court, but this seemed to me a thing of the past in view of his understanding of this critical problem. He ended our conference by asking our group to give

[10]

him guidance in the areas of violations suspected or known and where the orders we had issued appeared to have not been followed. Mr. O'Brian agreed that we would do so and thanked him although Donald Nelson had little to say. On our way back to our offices, I talked with Mr. O'Brian and the others and expressed my view that in Senator Truman we had a powerful ally who completely understood the necessities of our function in the interim and until a declaration of war should come.

I remained in that position until, by agreement with Mr. O'Brian and with Donald Nelson's delayed approval, I secured my release and enlisted as a private in the U.S. Marine Corps.

After "bootcamp" training at Parris Island, South Carolina, I attended Officer's Candidate School at Quantico, Virginia and was appointed

[11]

a second lieutenant and joined in the formation of the Fourth Division of the Marine Corps in Hawaii, under the command of General Clifford Cates. The Division participated in several assaults in the Pacific -- Kwajalein-Roi-Namur, Saipan, and Tinian. When I enlisted I gave my occupation as "steamfitter" to avoid being commissioned and assigned to serve in some legal capacity in Washington. Through a "fluke," however, my legal background was discovered after the Division had "secured" at Saipan and I was ordered back to Washington as an Intelligence Officer on the staff of the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The "spit and polish" life required of me as a member of the Commandant's staff in Washington was just too much for me to bear. I tried every way I could to be transferred back to the Pacific or -- if the war really came to an

[12]

end -- to be released from service. Finally, I went to the only friend I had in Government who I thought might help me; Tom C. Clark of Texas, who was then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and who is now a retired justice of the Supreme Court. Tom said he would do his best, but thought all Marines "wanted out" and it was not going to be easy.

Thereafter, President Roosevelt died and Vice President Truman became President; "the bomb" was dropped on Hiroshima and the war in the Pacific was ended. President Truman terminated Francis Biddle as Attorney General and named Tom Clark Attorney General. Out of the blue, I received my discharge from the Marine Corps!

When I went to Tom Clark to thank him, he told me there was a "trick" to my discharge. He had requested my discharge on the basis that the Department of Justice urgently needed

[13]

my services. He felt the "Biddle men" in the Department were bitter about Attorney General Biddle's dismissal and were out "to do him in." He wanted me to join the Department for about six months and, since I had no close relationships with attorneys in the Department, to serve as his Special Assistant and as a roving emissary to meet, come to know, and talk with attorneys in the Department and advise him of what I learned about the workings of the Department so that he could effect a sound reorganization. He said he felt that in six months I could return to my law firm in New York. During that six months period, however, I found that the challenge to me as a lawyer of public service in the Department was most satisfying and I served in the Department for over six years, resigning in 1952.

During my six years at Justice, I was,

[14]

successively, Special Assistant and Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, Head of the Japanese Claims Program, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division, during which time I was selected by Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, to head the American delegation to the Economic and Social Council at Geneva in 1948. Upon my return and at President Truman's request, I took on the special assignment of organizing and preparing for the establishment of the Office of Economic Stabilization at the start of the Korean war. When I accomplished this the President requested and the Attorney General appointed me Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division. After my retirement from Justice in 1952, I established my own law firm here in Washington and still maintained an active practice here.

[15]

Let me go back a little. Before permitting my name to be sent to the Senate for confirmation as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division, I requested Attorney General Clark to arrange for an appointment with President Truman. I met with him and explained that, although I had been a life-long Democrat, I had organized and campaigned vigorously as the head of the National Lawyers Committee Against the Third Term when Roosevelt announced as a candidate for a third term. President Truman replied that this was proper for me to have done and that history would in time reveal that it was a tragedy that Roosevelt was persuaded to seek a third term. He also said that he had introduced a resolution in the Senate for a constitutional amendment to limit the Presidency to two four-year terms. Shortly thereafter, my nomination was confirmed by the Senate

[16]

Judiciary Committee and the Senate.

My new post was a challenging one. The Civil Division is the largest civil "law office" in the world, responsible for every type of civil action involving the U. S. Government.

As head of the Division, I personally tried two lengthy and difficult trials against the United Mine Workers and its president, John L. Lewis, involving the national emergency created by strikes of the United Mine Workers. Following the last United Mine Workers trial in 1948, my devoted friend, the late Dean Acheson, suggested to Tom Clark that he needed a proper official to head the American delegation to the Economic and Social Council at Geneva and since I seemed a bit "weary," he thought I should be the one to go and that the sea voyage would give me a good rest and I

[17]

could take my wife with me. He said the staff that would accompany me would do all the work and permit me to have a good rest.

My wife, my mother, and I went. We had ten days in Paris and then went to Geneva. I found the work of the Committee at the League of Nations Building a demanding but stimulating challenge. The task of the Committee of the Economic and Social Council was to recommend to the Economic and Social Council a means to resolve the tragic problems of the multitude of displaced persons made "stateless" as a result of World War II.

At our first meeting, Ambassador Malik of Lebanon was elected Chairman. The Russian Ambassador to Switzerland (seated next to me) then insisted that we depart from accepted diplomatic precedent and that all remarks be translated into French, English, and Russian!

[18]

On the second day the Russian Ambassador pre-empted the entire session by vilifying the United States. I knew then that the Committee had in the Russian Ambassador -- to say the least -- a mean problem! I worked in my office at the League of Nations until 2 a.m. outlining a reply to this slander and delivered it -- taking the entire session, with the three translations, to complete it. I made a caustic historical review of the brutal history of Russia under the Tsars to Stalin and the suppression of freedom of its people. This quieted the Ambassador in later sessions.

The Russians opposed the grant of any humanitarian assistance for these destitute, uprooted and stateless persons and thousands of orphaned children. Following my response to the Russian Ambassador virtually all of the delegates agreed to and worked with me night

[19]

after night to lead the attack against the position of the Russian Ambassador which they felt they could not do. Finally, we were able to offer and pass a plenary resolution providing the international machinery to rescue the hapless displaced persons and children, with Russia and Poland opposing. This set in motion the first international effort to ameliorate the human tragedy and suffering of thousands of displaced persons and orphans.

Upon my return to the United States, President Truman asked me to establish the Office of Economic Stabilization -- this was at the start of the Korean war. He knew of my service with the War Production Board and believed I was best qualified to undertake this difficult task. I took two members of my staff at the Civil Division and we spent at least three months preparing the basic

[20]

regulations, assisting President Truman's staff people in selecting and appointing a knowledgeable man to be Chairman, and appointing a General Counsel and staffing, particularly, the Division of Price Administration.

Now, I thought, I can finally get back to the Civil Division. That was not to be. President Truman soon called me to his office and asked that I accept appointment as head of the Antitrust Division. He advised that Congress had enacted legislation requiring the Antitrust Division to review the anti-trust aspects of all bids made to buy the multitude of plants and production facilities built by and owned by the Government during World War II and to determine if any bidder, by acquiring these plants, might achieve a diminution of competition in their industries. Again, because of my War Production Board

[21]

experience, he thought I was the one best qualified to accomplish this important task.

HESS: What were your first impressions of the Department of Justice?

MORISON: Well, except for a few discerning and able career lawyers who Attorney General Biddle had attracted and who were brilliant lawyers -- the majority I shall describe as sycophants who considered themselves as the elite. They regarded Tom Clark as lacking scholarship in the law and considered him a politician rather than a great lawyer. This dissidence was most harmful to the esprit of the Department of Justice. I gathered this from conversations I had with attorneys at lunch in the cafeteria. I established friendly relationships with most of these men and found the hard core of the dissidents. It was reasonably evident to me that the honorable ones who disliked Tom Clark would

[22]

resign, but that the bitter ones who were constantly in touch with the former Attorney General, Biddle, intended to try to demean the leadership of Tom Clark.

At that point I couldn't argue as I felt inside my guts because I had learned Tom Clark's capacities as a lawyer, his experience with his brother in starting a law practice in poverty in Texas, his interest in politics, which he believed to be a responsibility and which he thoroughly enjoyed, and his measured ambition, which was coupled with a rare degree of humility. He had come to the attention of President Truman because he, Tom Clark, had been the moving leader in the convention to nominate Truman as Vice President and he therefore had a strong affinity for President Truman, as did President Truman for him, because they were both blessed in being "political

[23]

animals" which term I use to mean a breadth of understanding of the "human equation."

HESS: Did you ever discuss with Mr. Clark why he thought Mr. Truman would make a good Vice President, or why he forwarded his cause at that time?

MORISON: I never did. I thought it would have been a little bit impetuous for me to ask, but Tom did say that he was truly and measurably surprised, but that he was greatly rewarded by what the President has done in this expression of confidence in him and that...

HESS: By appointing him as Attorney General?

MORISON: Attorney General, yes. And that President Truman realized, he thought, that if he was to be no longer a shadow of the dead Franklin

[24]

Roosevelt that he had to have members of his Cabinet -- and the Department of Justice is a very important and significant Cabinet post -- whose capacities he had measured carefully.

HESS: Would Francis Biddle have liked to have remained as Attorney General?

MORISON: Oh, indeed! Indeed! When he left, he was an embittered man. Later President Truman made him a member of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in

Philadelphia. I got to know him later when I left the Department and became counsel for Drew Pearson in difficult libel cases, in one of which he had agreed to be a witness for Pearson -- a case brought against Pearson by Norman Littel who had served under Biddle and had caused Attorney General Biddle considerable trouble to the extent that Biddle fired him.

[25]

But, in any event, the six months were up, a lot of resignations had been accepted. Tom Clark asked me to help him screen applicants for various positions that were there, either by promotion of subordinates in the various divisions to fill vacancies for those who left, or new applicants, and I worked on that for a while until we got the place fairly well staffed and under able leadership, I felt, on the whole.

HESS: Do you recall who you advised to be brought "on board" at that time?

MORISON: I recommended the promotion of several men. One was Victor Kramer, who then was down the line in the Antitrust Division. I recommended about five, but I'd have to go back to my papers to recall their exact names. These five were really the stellar performers.

[26]

Well, in any event, the six months were up and he said, "Now you're free to go back to your law firm if you want to."

And I said, "Well, Tom, I might as well stay around and see this thing through," because by that time I had developed a real appetite for public service for it was most rewarding.

From that first assignment in which I was engaged in civil fraud actions, in time Tom called me to his office and said, "Graham, somebody prepared this two-page letter for me. They want to build a new court building here in Washington and this letter to the Congress doesn't say what I want to say. You take a hand in it, will you? And have it all on one page."

Well, in about forty minutes I had drafted the letter and took it to him. He read it and said to his secretary, Grace Stewart, "Write

[27]

that up just like it is and I will sign it." He thanked me and said, "That was a fine piece of work and the letter says exactly what I want to say."

He then said, "Alexander Holtzoff is leaving for I have nominated him to be a U.S. District Judge and I want you to come up here and sit right with me." So I did. I took over Holtzoff's office. Among other tasks, my job was to talk with all the people Tom Clark couldn't see and to handle whatever problems they had. I also had a kind of unspecified and general supervision of the operations of the Department. I found out who was doing what. I also consulted with a Department lawyer named Ennis who was involved with the Board of Immigration officials and from him learned the full story of the plight of the American Japanese and citizens of

[28]

Japanese descent...

HESS: Did you feel it was necessary at the time, in 1941 and 1942, to remove the Japanese from the West Coast?

MORISON: I didn't even know anything about it. You see by that time I was in training and went on to the Pacific.

HESS: That's right.

MORISON: And I didn't know about the agony of this thing until after I got back. I then learned through Ennis what General DeWitt had done, and that Tom Clark had been involved as the legal aide to DeWitt and that Tom protested DeWitt's actions which he thought was a denial of the rights of these American citizens. In looking back on this event, Tom Clark said, "everybody was scared and common sense went

[29]

out the window." I learned that unscrupulous American citizens just stole the property of these Japanese-Americans who were bussed to camps for they had to sell their businesses for fear they would be looted and destroyed. It was an atrocious thing. The same thing happened to German-American citizens. I had a classmate at Washington and Lee who came from New Braunfels, Texas -- a little German community. Hell, his family had the biggest general store in that little town and they put them all in these camps -- it was atrocious!

But, in any event, from there as Special Assistant, I had to pass upon every important letter addressed to the Attorney General that was forwarded to me for preparation of an answer for the Attorney General's signature. I prepared a host of them and most of them he would sign without even reading. Occasionally, however,

[30]

he would want to talk one over with me.

Later, when I was named Executive Assistant, one of my most difficult tasks was those little slips -- about just like this, not much larger than that -- which would come in from J. Edgar Hoover for authority to wiretap.

HESS: Requests from J. Edgar Hoover for wiretapping?

MORISON: Yes. I accumulated those damn things in my desk drawer until I had about fifty and then Edgar called the Attorney General and said, "I want to know why some fifty requests for wiretap, were not acted upon."

He said, "Well, I guess Graham Morison has them. It is his job to first review them."

So, he called and asked about them. I said, "Tom, you revere our Constitution; I know you do, I've talked to you about it. There is no

[31]

authority in law and it is in contradiction of the civil rights of a free people to permit this invasion of their privacy and to say that you're going after gangsters and say that you're going after the remnants of Nazi influences and all these things. To hell with it. If we're going to have criminal prosecution against people, we don't have to make this invasion of privacy in secret and in the name of the United States of America."

And he said, "Well, Edgar's coming up. You have to carry the ball."

I said, "I'll be delighted to."

So he came up and the Attorney General asked me to state my position to Hoover who had Ed [Edward A.] Tamm with him. I said, "Mr. Hoover, I know a little bit about your background. You had an aunt who lived down in Wytheville, Virginia, didn't you?"

[32]

He said, "Yes, as a boy I used to visit her in her home there in the summer."

And I got him diverted. I said, "Well, do you remember the famous 'Hillsboro massacre' and the trial of Floyd Allen of Hillsboro in the Circuit Court of Wytheville, Virginia?"

He said, "You know, I haven't thought of that in years. As an eight year old kid, my aunt took me to hear that case at the court at Wytheville."

I said, "It was a famous case where there were two mountain family 'clans' at Hillsboro in Carrol County, Virginia. The beginnings of a feud involved a hog killing. The Allens were a sound, honest and prudent mountain family. They thought that what the members of another family clan had done in making charges to the Commonwealth attorney, which resulted in a criminal action against them, was a stratagem

[33]

for an entrapment and that they were going to get them into the courtroom in Hillsboro and then they were going to shoot and kill them all at the trial. So, two of the Allen brothers "jumped the gun" in the Court just as the case was called for trial. Two of them drew pistols and killed the judge, the clerk, and wounded the deputy sheriff and one juror, and then fled. Two of the Allen brothers were killed by a posse. Floyd Allen, however, escaped and the Baldwin-Phelps Railroad detectives found him about two years after the killing. He was working in a grocery store in Des Moines, Iowa. They brought him back to trial in Wytheville and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

And then he said, "it now comes back to me."

Then I said, "Mr. Hoover, about the requested

[34]

wiretaps. You studied law, as I did. I have a great reverence for our Constitution, and as a lawyer, I am persuaded that you know and I know that we have absolutely no authority -- however you may feel about it and despite your desire to know about the actions of citizens -- to invade their privacy in peacetime. It makes a mockery out of our Constitution and as far as I'm concerned, I will not let you do it."

And he said, "Well, Mr. Attorney General, what about you?"

Tom Clark replied, "Well, whatever he says, Edgar, I will follow."

So, a strange thing happened. As a result of the fact that I opposed him and although he previously had been riding roughshod over Attorneys General for years, he recommended me to be the Commissioner of Baseball when Happy Chandler stepped down. But I had no

[35]
interest in baseball.

After I left the Department he used to invite me to lunch, every two weeks with him and Clyde Tolson, his deputy, at the old Harvey's restaurant in Washington. Apparently I was the only one invited by his family, and Ed Tamm, to attend his funeral."

You know that's a funny thing, I've got a picture around here he sent me. It's a strange thing, but after this incident Tom said, "My God, I thought I would never see the day when somebody would 'buck' Edgar! He has walked over every Attorney General since Attorney General Stone. You know he has a political line to the Congress."

And I said, "Well, blame it on me."

He said, "That's what I intend to do." We never had any repercussions, but it ended the matter while I was there.

[36]
HESS: Did you block those wiretaps?

MORISON: Every one of them.

HESS: Were there no wiretaps by the FBI during the Truman administration?

MORISON: None that required the approval of the Attorney General were authorized while I was Executive Assistant in '46 or '47. There may have been some after I left that post.

HESS: And you became Assistant Attorney General in...

MORISON: In '48.

HESS: Were you Executive Assistant during that entire length of time?

MORISON: I was Executive Assistant for that stint. For about eight months I was in the Civil

[38]

Division, in the section set up to handle these war fraud cases -- civil fraud.

HESS: But there were no wiretaps?

MORISON: I do not know what my successors did.

HESS: Do you think he was that type?

MORISON: Yep.

HESS: Do you think that he would try to do that?

MORISON: I think he would. I think he would. I never will forget one time Tom said, after I was made an Assistant Attorney General (and I'll tell you about that), he called me up and said, "Graham, Mary and I have got this trip lined up to go to Germany and I want you to be Acting Attorney General while I'm gone."

I said, "Tom, that's something you should not do."

[38]

He said, "Why? It would be in safe hands."

And I said, "No, but it would cause you too much trouble."

"Why?"

I said, "Because the first thing as Acting Attorney General that I would do, would be to move the FBI out of the Justice Building onto the grounds across the street. The public tours of the FBI building lead the tourists to believe that this whole building is the "FBI" building. They're taking more and more of our space down in the Civil Division. They're constantly encroaching upon our space and this is true on other floors."

Now he said, "Well, you're right. I better not do it. You're really serious?"

I said, "Yes, sir."

He said, "Well, remembering the way you handled that wiretap discussion, you just

[39]

might do it! I'll name one of the other Assistants."

Well, the next thing that came up while I was Executive Assistant is this: The Kansas City vote fraud case "broke" and, of course, he's dead now -- what is the name of the former editor of the Kansas City *Star*, I can see him now.

HESS: Roy Roberts?

MORISON: Roy Roberts. Roy Roberts, of course, had a really hidden and begrudging respect for Harry Truman, but he was a Republican. They had bought out the other newspaper in Kansas City and they had a complete monopoly. The Antitrust Division brought an action against the Kansas City *Star* and Roy Roberts for monopolization in violation of the antitrust law. But the vote fraud was all played up. The *Star*

[40]

published a report after an election in Jefferson County (Kansas City is in the County) the remainder of the Pendergast organization had stolen the ballots from the Jefferson County courthouse in Kansas City to prevent the discovery of evidence of vote fraud in the election.

HESS: Jackson County.

MORISON: Yes, you are correct. Jackson County, and that...

HESS: Broke in the middle of the night.

MORISON: In the depths of night, and this was considered to be the work of the remnants of the Pendergast machine which President Truman had fully supported in Missouri. Despite criticism, the President attended Tom Pendergast's funeral and so forth and so on.

[41]

So, the President called Tom Clark about it and Tom said he'd get right on it. He called Edgar Hoover to the office to invite a full and complete investigation of the charges. In any critical conversation with Hoover, I had to be present so Edgar Hoover came with Ed Tamm at Attorney General Clark's request and not Clyde Tolson, his first deputy.

HESS: You say you "had to be present."

MORISON: Attorney General Clark wanted to be sure I was present, as his Executive Assistant.

HESS: Did he use you as a sort of buffer between himself and Hoover?

MORISON: Not so much as a buffer. He knew that I was not afraid to express opinions which he invited me to make, for I had discussed this problem with him many times.

{42}

HESS: Do you think that Mr. Clark was a little reluctant to express some of the opinions that Mr. Hoover might have found unfavorable?

MORISON: It's hard to say. One, he knew that this situation had to be "buffered" and that the Bureau did not proceed on "assumed authority." He had to get along with the Congress in obtaining appropriations for all aspects of the Department's needs in the funding of the Department of Justice. He was being pushed and pulled politically in every way as most Attorneys General are. And I think he found that in my brash forthrightness and ability to meet such touchy issues "head on," I was a good "buffer." If he agreed with me, he wouldn't duck it and would say, "Look, I agree with what Graham Morison is saying. If I addressed the issue first and spoke in

[43]

depth, it was, properly, only my view.

Well, in any event, he called Hoover in and, as I say, Ed Tamm was with him and he said, "Edgar, you've seen the news reports about the stuffing of the ballot boxes in Kansas City and the theft of the ballots?"

He said, "Yes, we have a report on it. We have our regional office there in Kansas City," and he said, "Mr. Attorney General, what do you want us to do?"

He said, "I want a full field investigation."

Well, five days later there was a further blast from the Kansas City *Star* which stated that only a minimal investigation by the FBI was underway and that the Attorney General had only ordered a "limited" (quoting Edgar Hoover) investigation.

[44]

So, I said, "Tom, we've got to meet this head-on." I said, "Do you want me to call Hoover?" He requested me to do so and to set the meeting as soon as possible. I called Edgar and said, "Edgar, will you come and meet with the Attorney General about this Kansas City matter?"

And he said yes he'd be there. So, he came in and had Edward Tamm with him and Clyde Tolson, his senior deputy. The Attorney General asked me to open the conference and I said, "Mr. Hoover, in a report from the Kansas City *Star*, which appears in the Washington *Star* and the Washington *Post*, you are quoted as saying that the Attorney General directed you to make only a limited investigation." And I said, "That's not true, I was there."

"Oh, no," he said, "you're wrong, the Attorney General said only to conduct a

[45]

'limited investigation.'"

Clyde Tolson remained silent, but Ed Tamm spoke up and said, "Mr. Hoover, I hate to disagree with you, but I was at the previous meeting with the Attorney General and he directed that we conduct a full field investigation." Well, Hoover turned white.

"Well," he said, "I may have misunderstood this, but I will certainly see that it's a full field investigation."

As soon as he left I said to the Attorney General, "Tom, knowing Edgar Hoover, Ed Tamm is ready for the 'axe' right now."

He said, "Well, what the hell can we do to avoid that?"

I said, "Well, as you know, there's a vacancy on the U.S. District Court here, and if you'll call the President and get his approval about appointing Tamm, I'll go up and

[46]

talk to our friends on the Senate Judiciary Committee and get clearance by the Committee all the way ahead. This fellow has an able background in law." I was able, with the Attorney General's help, to have his nomination approved and Ed Tamm was confirmed as U.S. District Judge. He now is on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Every time I see Ed we laugh about this event; however, because we saved Ed Tamm from dismissal, Ed's brother Quinn Tamm, was forced to resign from the Bureau. He is now head of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and is highly regarded by the police officials.

Well, then, he said, "Now, we've got to figure out how the hell we're going to try these cases. We've got to obtain indictments as soon as possible." He said, "There is a lawyer

[47]

out there who served under the U.S. Attorney who indicted and convicted Tom Pendergast for fraud but who never made a record after that.

HESS: Maurice Milligan.

MORISON: Milligan. That's the only thing he ever did. He was a very poor lawyer; he had the tide riding with him. And they found the young lawyer who had worked with him as an assistant was then practicing in Springfield, Missouri, named Dick Phelps. Phelps also had law offices in Kansas City. Because he'd been with Milligan, Attorney General Clark got him to head this investigation by the Grand Jury. The Attorney General said, "From all our accounts Phelps is not very much of an activist. We've got to get somebody to go out there who has really got a prosecutive zeal and will see that the Regional office of the FBI makes a

[48]

thorough investigation and provides witnesses for the Grand Jury.

Well I said, "Tom, the best thing for me to do, is for you to accept my resignation as Executive Assistant, make me a Special Assistant and let me pick the two best trial men in the Criminal Division to go with me to Kansas City." He agreed and we picked Eric Broome and William Paisley. [Both of these men were superb criminal trial lawyers who were highly respected as Government prosecutors.] I also suggested to the Attorney General that I should go over and

talk to the President, and he arranged for me to go over and talk to the President. I talked first to Matt Connelly and told him what I was going to do. And I said, "Do you have any recommendations, Matt?" I also said, "That's the President's territory and I don't know too much about Kansas City, but I'm going to fight this with everything I've got."

He gave me the name of a man who was the manager of the President Hotel stating that he

[49]

was a close personal friend of his. He said he had a wealth of information and added, "If you need extra cash, because I know you're on a Government salary, ask him for any amount you want and I'll see that you're taken care of by the Department." And then he gave me the names of other close friends of the President who would be helpful to me."

Well, I went out there and met Dick Phelps. He would come into our offices at the Federal Building about 11 o'clock in the morning, and he wouldn't do very much work. He had not conducted any Grand Jury hearing and no indictments had been issued. The Grand Jury panels were being worked up and I said, "Well, show me where the files are," and he took me into a room and there was only one secretary in the office and the damn file cabinets filled all the walls. And I said, "That's fine!" So, I

[50]

got Eric Broome and Bill Paisley, senior trial attorneys, from the Criminal Division and we spent five days and nights reading every damn thing in those FBI files and making notes. We then reviewed and discussed what we had found and went to the FBI, and held numerous discussions with the head of the regional office and their agents, to be sure we understood the reports accumulated in the files. But we still couldn't get a prosecutive grip on it. So, I went to this friend of the President's at the hotel there and I said, "If you had a job of finding out what the hell did go on in the theft of the ballots here, and you didn't have the FBI or anything else, how would you go about finding out the facts?"

He said, "I'd get me about fifty or sixty dollars in one dollar bills and I'd start at the cattle pens on Fourth Street at

[51]

just about 5 o'clock, and working from one end to the other of that long street I would freely buy drinks for the bums and ask about the theft of the ballots. If you do this," he said, "I believe that's the way you'll get the facts quickly."

I said, "Well, can I draw the money needed from you?"

He said, "Here it is."

I started on this program at 4:30 p.m. and I covered 104 such bars. By 11 o'clock that night I had the whole story of exactly what had happened and how it was set up. The business manager of the Kansas City *Star*, through an emissary, had employed a safecracker from out of town to get into the Jackson County Courthouse and steal those ballots from a flimsy safe.

Well, we finally got one other thing in

[52]

Grand Jury examination. I got one fellow, an electrician, who was a drunk, and asked if he had voted more than once. He said, "No, he hadn't voted twice." Finally, his wife was outside and I worked on her. And I finally got them in my office to confess that they had been directed to go to five different precincts and use different names given to them and vote and they had done it. And so I knew that I had an "important" drunk on my hands. I knew the defense lawyers -- they were a man and wife, who were smart and able criminal lawyers -- would go after these witnesses and get them out of the state. So, I got an agreement out of the electrician's wife, and the husband, and arranged with the FBI to take the husband far outside of Kansas City to an ancient "drunk tank" or private hospital for drunks. And we got him voluntarily to commit

[53]

himself out there. The defense lawyers couldn't find him. Eventually I tried a couple of cases and got convictions and then pretty well got the Grand Jury and trial schedules on the way, but before I left I damn near broke the case.

I had an anonymous long distance call from a man who said he was a fugitive and had skipped his bail bond and was hiding out and that a lawyer for the bonding company that issued his bond had detectives looking for him. He said he knew all the details of who had burglarized the courthouse and removed the ballots and who hired them to do this. He said he would meet with me and give depositions under oath about this, if the Department of Justice would get the bonding company "off his back," and provide him with immunity from prosecution. I cleared this with the Department of Justice

[54]

some five days later and then tried to call this informer back about this, but the man had "skipped."

Four days later an item appeared in the press that there had been a serious automobile crash and a "shoot-out" in rural Indiana and this guy who had called me had been killed. I also learned that the first news person on the scene from outside the state was the Business Manager of the Kansas City *Star* who took a private plane to the site to make sure he was dead and could not talk!

So, that's what happened.

Well, I came back from that stint -- a long period of vicissitudes -- and I related to Matt Connelly that one of the President's friends who was the U.S. Attorney in Kansas City, named Sam Wear, who was a great character. I told this, at Matt's urging, to the President later.

[55]

Sam would get on drunks and his secretaries would all protect him. Eric Broome and this other senior lawyer from the Criminal Division who were with me would go to church every Sunday. We went to a different church each Sunday. And one Sunday we went to a downtown church

near the small hotel where we were staying. It was a Methodist church and that Sunday was the "Temperance Sunday." They ushered us right down to the front row. And then they passed out checks and pencils for all to make donations to the Temperance Union, and provided all of their literature.

Well, I stuck that in my pocket and I conspired with Sam Wear's secretaries and I hand-pecked a letter myself on an old typewriter, one that was kind of "banged up." It was addressed to Sam Wear, U.S. Attorney and it went about like this: "Dear Mr. Wear

[56]

(spelled W-e-a-r-i-e), I have been for twenty years an evangelist proclaiming against the evils of drink. My longtime friend and right-hand man, Tom, has always sat on the platform with me and has been an example of the evils of drink because his physical deterioration was evident. Tom has just died and your name has been recommended to take his place." And then I put all of this other Temperance literature with it in an envelope, and got a stamp on it and it finally was delivered to Sam. When he read it, the secretaries called me to come down to his office. They said, "Oh, he's on the rampage." They said he told them, "The goddamn politicians are after me." Finally he called me in my office in the building and said, "You're behind this."

I said, "Sam, you know I wouldn't do a thing like that." But when I went to see him,

[57]

I admitted that I had sent the letter. I told the President about that and he said, "That's the funniest thing I've ever heard, you really had him scared didn't you?"

HESS: Were there any times when Attorney General Clark would take Mr. Hoover's position in opposition to yours?

MORISON: I never remember any. Not one. We discussed Hoover's position, however, many times.

HESS: Early in the Truman administration there was a call for investigation of employee loyalty in the Federal Government. I recall there was a commission that was set up, the President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty. And Clark's name has been mentioned by historians as one of the early proponents of setting up some mechanism for looking into the question of

[58]

Communists in Government. Some historians say that in his actions Tom Clark was acting at the instigation of J. Edgar Hoover, that it was really Hoover who was pushing for an investigation of Communists in Government. Do you recall anything on that nature?

MORISON: I don't, certainly if it occurred and I had been privy to it, it would have been when I was the Executive Assistant. In the other tasks that he assigned to me, you know, I was up to my ears. Now Tom would consult me about all kinds of things outside of my areas of direct

responsibility because we had a very close working relationship, one of absolute honesty in the "give and take" of discussions.

HESS: The head of the Commission was A. Devitt Vanech.

[59]

MORISON: He was the head of the -- he was kind of a "hanger-on"...

HESS: Wasn't he in charge of the Lands Division for awhile?

MORISON: He was put in charge of the Lands Division, and I vaguely recollect, but I'm not sure, that this may have come as a result of the Alger Hiss case, and I don't know in time sequence when this occurred.

HESS: A11 right, the commission was set up late in November of 1946. As you will recall, in the November elections of 1946, both houses of Congress went Republican. One of the Republican issues in the campaign was the possibility of disloyal employees being in the Government.

MORISON: I have so little recollection of this at all that it must not have been very important

[60]

or I would have heard about it. It might have been a pro forma program, but it would be important to know if, when set up, this was a sequence following the Hiss case, in which Nixon was a stellar performer. I just don't have any recollection about that.

HESS: I can't recall just now when the Hiss case came up.

MORISON: Yes, well I think that frame of reference would be important.

HESS: I think about that time, but I'm not sure.

MORISON: It might have been as a result of that, but these things, these waves of events, came and went and I don't have any recollection of them.

HESS: Well, nevertheless, were there times when

[61]

Director Hoover influenced Mr. Clark on decisions that he had to make? Just how much of an influence was Hoover?

MORISON: Well I think this: Tom had a thorough knowledge, having been a subordinate in the Department of Justice, of the areas of domination that Hoover had achieved in some areas and with past Attorneys General. Every Congressman was convinced that Hoover had a dossier on him which he was ready to spring on him anytime. And I think that Tom, who was a political animal, knew he should not be intransigent in all matters involving Edgar and he may have made

some practical accommodations with Edgar. But in the measure of the whole of Tom Clark's service as Attorney General he measured up a greater degree of responsibility than many of his predecessors. He saw to it that that department was run well, and worked

[62]

hard to see that that department was adequately funded. I don't think that Hoover ever sought to tell Tom Clark what to do and what not to do because this would be beyond his jurisdiction and function. He might try to do so only with a weak Attorney General. He might suggest to Tom Clark that he do certain things. Tom used to have luncheons up there in his offices that I used to attend with Hoover and our Assistant Attorney General. We would just talk about various things confronting the Department. But I just don't have any recollections of any confrontation between Edgar Hoover and Tom Clark.

HESS: At what time was that?

MORISON: That was in the forties, it was after the Kansas City case. I came back and resumed my office as Executive Assistant and in early

[63]

'48 I was named Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division.

HESS: That's right.

MORISON: I don't know what went on there when Donald Cook became Executive Assistant because Cook was an outstanding "accommodator" and he would not "buck" Hoover or anybody of importance in the administration. Lyndon Johnson was his mentor and got him the job. But when Lyndon became President and asked Don to be Secretary of the Treasury, he turned it down.

HESS: One question on those dossiers that Mr. Hoover was supposed to have had on people of importance. Do you think that he had information like that squirreled away ready to pull out if somebody crossed him?

MORISON: I have no opinion one way or another, except

[64]

as later on, more supine Attorneys General maintained no oversight of the Bureau. But while I was Executive Assistant I maintained oversight as the Attorney General directed. Thus, it could be so. I have no information one way or other.

[65]

Second Oral History Interview with H. Graham Morison, Washington, D.C., August 4, 1972. By Jerry N. Hess, Harry S. Truman Library.

HESS: All right, to begin this afternoon, Mr. Morison, would you tell me some involvement that you may have had with John L. Lewis and his coal strikes?

MORISON: Yes. I think it important to here state that what I have said and what I will relate are not based on documentation, but upon my memory and recollection -- aided by the modest number of notations made at various times and which I found in my files. I felt it improper when I resigned from the Department of Justice to take any official papers with me, and all that I have to refresh my recollection is sketchy -- as to date and time. The dates may be out of order, but the events are reasonably clear in my mind.

[66]

Concerning John L. Lewis and the first national emergency coal strike which occurred, if I recall correctly, in 1946 -- this strike of the United Mine Workers Union was prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act. Thus, the Government's legal action was by injunction to end the strike because of its devastating impact upon the economy created by the lack of coal. It was based upon the broadest principals of constitutional law as to the duty and authority of the Chief Executive to take appropriate action to end any threat to the welfare and security of the Nation and its citizens.

John Sonnett was then the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division of the Department of Justice and responsible for such legal actions. I was the Executive Assistant of the Attorney General,

[67]

Tom Clark. He asked me to participate with Sonnett in the framing of the pleadings and brief in support of this legal position for injunctive relief. I worked with him very closely. We had some disagreements, but they were not basic ones. I attended the argument of the case, but did not participate in the argument. The injunction was eventually sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court.

After my nomination and the Senate confirmation as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division, in 1948, the so-called "Taft-Hartley Act" was enacted by reason of the prior strike by the United Mine Workers. Thus the second "national emergency" coal strike by the Mine Workers Union required that I apply and enforce this new act.

The difficulties we faced were as grave as those involved in the Department's first

[68]

injunction action, for we had to interpret and apply this new law with a "scanty" legislative history, since the act was passed by the Congress with great speed. Thus we had to construct, pursuant to the terms of this law, a sound legal and factual approach that we deemed to conform with the terms of the law, including the provision for a temporary injunction for ninety days to permit mediation by a board established by President Truman -- seeking an agreement to end the strike, and if no agreement was reached -- as was the case -- to then seek a permanent injunction from the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., at which time we were required to introduce evidence to establish that a continuation of the strike endangered the public health, safety, and welfare of the Nation.

[69]

This responsibility was a grave one. I slept many nights on the couch in my office. I was blessed in having a group of very able lawyers in the Division who worked with me "around the clock" in drafting pleadings, affidavits for execution by members of the Cabinet and others, the drafting of outlines for the presentation and examination of Government witnesses, as well as outlines of expected objections in and cross-examination of witnesses.

The matter was heard by the late U.S. District Judge Allan Goldsborough, who was a wise and able Federal Judge -- who had been an outstanding trial lawyer in Maryland before he was made a Judge.

Again I quietly sought mediation through Welly Hopkins, the General Counsel of the United Mine Workers, but my efforts were fruitless.

[70]

In order to avoid the press, I asked Hopkins to meet me at an agreed place in Rock Creek Park. We met and took a walk in the woods to discuss the matter. I said to him, "I have no authority to do this, but I think anybody who has any responsibility on your side or the Government's side should think about our country, not as adversaries, but as men of principal. I think there should be a reasonable basis on which this strike and the Government's suit can be properly ended without the turmoil and damage to the Nation, its people, and the economy."

Hopkins, in general vein, said that he felt the same way, but he didn't know how Mr. Lewis felt for he was a fighter. I have thought many times that if John Lewis had not been a descendant of a Welsh immigrant, born and raised in poverty and following his father,

[71]

became a miner in Montana and then by his leadership qualities become interested in union affairs and ended up as head of the United Mine Workers, but had been recommended by a Senator to attend the Military Academy at West Point, that he would have made Napoleon really look like a corporal! John Lewis was the greatest strategist that I have every known, and to try to "out-guess" his strategy was just an impossibility. So, in time, Hopkins advised that John Lewis wanted the action to be decided by the Court.

I recall most vividly that the case was heard in the old U.S. District Court building here in Washington. The courtroom was packed. When I came in with two of my assistants, a man handed me a telegram which I didn't read until I got up to the counsel table. The telegram was sent from Canada, was unsigned

[72]

and said about as follows (I may have it somewhere in my files): "You should be advised that if you appear in court against John Lewis today you will be shot." I just stuffed it in my pocket and no one knew about the telegram until later. Then I advised the principal members of my trial staff, but bound them not to reveal this to anyone because I was convinced it was sent in the belief that I would give it to the press.

In any event, the proceedings began and Welly Hopkins, who was trying to please his boss, John Lewis, who sat with him in the bar of the court and in front of Judge Goldsborough, made a "Texas-style" emotional appeal to the court to uphold this great man who had courageously carried the standard of labor with such fortitude. He spoke of the plight of the dirty and lung-infected coal miners and their

[73]

right to organize and to demand of the coal operators the wages and terms and conditions of their dangerous work. Hopkins ended his argument against the issuance of an injunction with about a ten-minute eulogy of John L. Lewis. As Welly sat down, John Lewis stood up and turned to him and said, "Mr. Hopkins, I wish you to know that I associate myself completely with all that you have said." There was some laughter and even Judge Goldsborough smiled.

HESS: He liked to hear all that praise!

MORISON: I then made my opening address to the court, formally referring to all of the documents filed and steps taken by the Government in keeping with the provisions of the Taft-Hartley law, and stated that I was prepared to introduce the evidence of the serious effect of this coal strike upon the industry

[74]

and commerce of the Nation and the unemployment it had created in other sectors of our economy. I then offered the Government's several exhibits, including affidavits of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Commerce and others and they were admitted and marked for identification. My argument was very brief and to the point. I stated that each and every requirement of the Taft-Hartley Act under which the Government sought injunctive relief enacted after plenary hearings and which was designed to prevent such damaging economic consequences occasioned by labor strikes of any kind which would place the Nation's economy in peril, etc. had been carefully followed by the Government and that the Government was prepared to present evidence in keeping with the terms of the act establishing the serious effect to the

[75]

Nation if the miners did not return to work.

In summation, I moved that the temporary injunction that had been previously granted be made permanent and that a civil penalty, as provided by the act, be imposed both upon the president of the union as well as the union itself.

Welly Hopkins then replied, saying that such an injunction would be monstrous and that it would have the effect of denying poor miners just compensation and compelling them to work for the coal operators under the terms of an unjust contract. He stated that the Government did not have the constitutional right to so deny the rights of working men to use the only weapon they

possessed to obtain a fair contract and that this Act of Congress was unconstitutional on its face and should

[76]

be dismissed forthwith.

Judge Goldsborough interrupted Hopkins' "speech" and said: "I would say Mr. Hopkins from what I've heard as to your defense of the action of the United Mine Workers and its president, Mr. Lewis, that from the time of Hammurabi until this date, no one has asserted such an absurdity as you have made here in defense of the Union's action. So, I now need nothing more to determine the issue: the unchallenged evidence of the peril this strike poses to the Nation if continued is clear and unequivocal, and I hereby grant the permanent injunction requested by the Government."

Well, this early disposition of the proceedings was more than we had expected, but it posed the question whether John L. Lewis and the Miner's Union would appeal. We worked "around the clock" in preparation

[77]

of the Government's position if the Union and John Lewis filed their appeal, and were prepared. However, no appeal was made and the District Court levied a modest fine against Lewis and levied a fine against the Union, of about a million two hundred thousand dollars. These fines were paid to the District of Columbia Treasury. The Government of the District of Columbia hoped they'd have one of these national emergency strikes every year because it substantially enhanced the District's treasury.

The next and the last national emergency strike by the United Mine Workers occurred in early '49 (I believe that's right). This strike presented a great number of difficulties, for the Union had learned its lesson from the prior action. When the strike was imminent, President Truman invited John Lewis to meet with him and John Steelman, his economic advisor, for

[78]

a discussion of the Union's grievance. Lewis went to the White House, and as a part of his strategy, when he came out of the White House and met the press, he mumbled something to the effect that "That insensitive man doesn't deserve to be President. He doesn't understand the grueling plight of labor, and the brutality of this law that is being used against the United Mine Workers. I will not be 'wheedled' into making compromises."

With this pronouncement the strike was "on," and I worked with Cyrus Ching, chief of the Mediation Service, who was a great and magnificent man. He was named as the head of the commission appointed by the President to seek to mediate this "dispute" and obtain an agreement from the Union and the major coal companies to end the strike during the 90 day "cooling off" period as provided by the act. We kept in constant touch with each other

[79]

about the matter, but Ching and I agreed that what had occurred was a part of Lewis' strategy and that Lewis would lose face if he did not go through with the strike. In this case, having learned a lesson from the errors the Union had made in the first case, which was that in the prior case the Government had evidence that communications by telegram and personal communications by telephone, made by Union officials to district and local offices of the Union, most of which the Government obtained by subpoena, had gone out from the United Mine Workers Headquarters in Washington to the various union districts and from the districts to the locals, which in effect instructed the members what to do in defiance of the "cooling off period;" and this resulted in coal mine tipples being burned and coal bunker cars being damaged at the mines -- a

[80]

a considerable amount of violence at many coal mines in the Nation.

So, in the second case, when the temporary injunction was issued, Lewis, who had as before ordered every member of the union through the district officials to the members of the locals, to convene the members of the locals and advise all members of the terms of the court order. (Lewis had failed to do this in the previous case.) Thus, Lewis sent out telegrams reciting verbatim the provisions of the temporary injunction to each and every district with an order that they convey this to all members of every local at meetings to be called immediately and send back to him affidavits stating that each local had seen to it that the members of each local had read the injunction or that it was read by the president of each local and understood by the members.

[81]

This was tried before an old friend of mine, Judge Richmond Keech, a Washington lawyer, who was a very close friend of my wife's brother, Warrick Keegin, now deceased.

HESS: Judge Keech was a former counsel and administrative assistant to Mr. Truman.

MORISON: Yes, Keech had been made administrative assistant to President Truman, and from that position he was nominated and confirmed as a U.S. District Judge in the District of Columbia. We tried the case before Keech and he determined that the Government had not made its case and that the strike was the independent act of each union member and not the act of the Union. This was, of course, the result of the Union's strategum.

During the course of this trial. and the presentation of the evidence as to the

[82]

concerted action of union members, the Union's lawyers were saying, "This is just the act of outraged coal miners. The Union had nothing to do with the independent action of the members of each local. We didn't order this." Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, whom I had never met, but who introduced the Taft-Hartley bill on the Senate side, had in his state many constituents who were coal operators. He called me on the telephone and just "blew his top!" He said, "I have a group of coal mining company officials from Ohio who are meeting with me and they have sent you affidavits stating what the members of the Union's locals have done to destroy their companies'

mine tipples, overturn and damage railroad coal cars, and in setting fires to tipples and buildings at the mines. They say that you have stated you would not introduce their

[83]

affidavits in the proceedings. And I tell you that I'm going to raise this matter with the Attorney General and the White House, for you are refusing to use evidence that should be presented to the court."

At that time, I was "up to my ears" and working until 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning on the case. I asked him if he would give me time to come up and meet with him, and he said he would. I went to the Senator's office and sat down with him to discuss the matter. I said, "Senator, your standing as an able lawyer is well-known, but I'm sure you haven't thought through the objections you made to me in our telephone conversation about the strike. If I were to introduce these affidavits, it would give John Lewis' lawyers the evidence they need to win. The Union's lawyers will state, 'Well, this proves the assertion we have made that the

[84]

United Mine Workers Union and its president and officers at the national and district levels have had nothing to do with the separate and independent acts of outraged individual miners. These acts were done by individual members of the locals, who have in outrage taken matters into their own hands. We've never sanctioned violence."

I further reminded the Senator that the evidence of Union action was the error that Lewis made in the previous injunction case because he had not conveyed the court's order to the districts and the locals and ordered members to obey the court's order, as required. In addition the Government had evidence that similar acts of violence which had occurred then, had been suggested by officials from Lewis' office. "But this time, Senator, Lewis ordered every district

[85]

local and every member of the locals to obey exactly what the court's injunction says they shall do."

Senator Taft listened carefully and did not interrupt me. He finally said, "You know, you're right and I'm sorry," which I thought was quite generous. And he got in touch with the coal operators who had complained to him and set them straight.

In any event, Judge Richmond Keech held against the Government. I was tired and to say the least, this order made me as "mad as a wet hen." The usual time required to take an appeal from the U.S. District Court to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit would have required 60 days. I consulted the Chief Justice, Justice Harold Stevens, however, and asked to be granted an emergency appeal. He agreed, but felt we could not perfect it in less than

[86]

twenty days and prior to the Court's adjournment.

I was determined to get the appeal docketed and set for argument as quickly as possible. We worked day and night. We certified the record, prepared the brief and other papers required for the appeal, in four and a half days by working day and night. The appeal was before the Court en banc upon the Government's request, under the rules, for the Court to set an emergency hearing after the Union's response. Although the members of my staff and I were "dog tired," I was able to argue the appeal on the seventh day.

Welly Hopkins argued the case for the United Mine Workers. The argument lasted two and a half hours. At the end of that time, five members of the Court came down into the well of the Court, led by Chief Judge Stephens

[87]

who said, "We have not heard an argument like this since we were young lawyers. The oral argument was -- as in earlier days -- in the old style of 'no quarter given.' Both of you have an ability to counter every assertion advanced by the other and 'hammer home' the points and authorities in support of your positions. This is the greatest interplay of appellate argument we've heard in many a day and we enjoyed it." He congratulated us both.

We hoped to have the Court's opinion on the appeal within ten days because of the national emergency, but it was not forthcoming. The Court, I am persuaded, held up any decision in order to give John L. Lewis a motive to end the strike, and within two weeks the coal operators and the United Mine Workers negotiated a new contract and the strike was ended!

[88]

I talked to Stephens after that and he said, "Yes, that's exactly what we had in mind. We wanted to 'sit' on the appeal to give sufficient time to Lewis to decide that he might lose the case and that he should end the strike.

After the first case, and particularly after the second case, President Truman, through, I guess, Charlie Murphy or Matt Connelly, asked me to come to the White House to discuss the case. When I met the President, he said, "Well, how'd you and old John get along?" I replied that we had no trouble and that Lewis did not attend the trial. He said, "This is an unusually fine piece of work. The country has suffered from the strike and I just want to congratulate you on what you've done and I know how long and hard you have worked on this important case."

[89]

I replied, "Mr. President, I would love to accept all that, but," I said, "you don't understand that an Assistant Attorney General is often the figurehead. His staff lawyers are the people who are really doing the hard work. But, I will confess that I was working side by side with them, my shirtsleeves up, because this is the only way a trial lawyer can prepare himself and feel confident to take on a trial as grave as this one. I confess that I was shaken up by the responsibility it imposed on me."

"Well," he said, "that's the reason Tom Clark wanted you to be head of this thing." This was a great moment for me. He said, "You know, old John is the greatest actor since Edwin Booth. He is something!" He said, "He tries to make me mad, you know, I really really enjoy that old fellow. I know he's

[90]

posing. If it wasn't for the fact that he was head of the United Mine Workers and I was the President of the United States, we'd get along just fine!"

And I said, "Well, I kind of feel that way myself." I told him of the relationship of my late uncle, A. Kyle Morison, Esq. with him.

HESS: One point I would like to clear up, if we could, deals with the comment that you made last time, about having knowledge of the dropping of the bomb at Hiroshima. Would you tell me about that? You were in the Marine Corps as an intelligence officer, but at what period were you out of the United States and how did you hear about the bomb?

MORISON: I shipped out in 1943 from San Francisco. I believe that's right.

[91]

HESS: And how long did you stay in the Pacific?

MORISON: I was there until 1944 or '45. I'll have to get my Marine Corps file. Through a fluke, the Marine Corps found out that I was a lawyer and had been at the W.P.B. and when this occurred I was ordered back to Washington as an intelligence officer on the staff of the Commandant.

HESS: The war was over in '45 and I have it down from the *Who's Who* article that you were discharged from the Marine Corps during '45.

MORISON: Well, then it must have been then that I was shipped back, in early '45.

HESS: President Roosevelt died on April the 12th of 1945. Were you in the country when Roosevelt died?

[92]

MORISON: Yes. I remember seeing the caissons go down Pennsylvania Avenue. I was at the offices of the Commandant near the Pentagon.

HESS: Was that where you were when you heard the news?

MORISON: Of his death?

HESS: Of his death.

MORISON: Yes. I don't need to elaborate. I've never, of course, said anything about this to anybody else, but as an intelligence officer I knew that a bomb of great destructive power was to be dropped in the Pacific, but I did not know when.

HESS: I believe the bomb was first tested down in the desert in July of 1945. Then Mr. Truman went to Potsdam that month and the

[93]

first bomb was dropped on August the 6th of '45.

MORISON: '45.

HESS: That was Hiroshima, and then Nagasaki was three days later on August the 9th.

MORISON: Yes, that sounds right.

HESS: Just about how long before August the 6th did you hear about the bomb, do you recall?

MORISON: Oh, at least ten days before, and this was top, top secret. It was something that the intelligence people knew and which imposed on us the greatest secrecy. We had to handle it quite gingerly; there was a meeting of all of the various divisions of the Commandant's office. Some men, commanding generals, were called back I'm sure, either from Hawaii and other posts, wherein there

[94]

had to be some -- this I had nothing to do with, but I was privy to the fact, I believe, that General [William Luke] McKittrick was sent to relay this information to certain commanding generals like "Howling Mad" [Holland M.] Smith and some of the others. But in any event...

HESS: Looking back on that event from this point in time, do you think those bombs should have been used? What's your opinion on the use of the atomic bomb at the end of the Second World War?

MORISON: Well, at the time we didn't know anything about the atomic bomb and its radiation effects. We knew that the Japanese were getting to the end of their rope on manpower, particularly their fleet and air power, which had been very effective in the early days, but that anything that would precipitate in a decisive way the

[95]

necessity for Japan to "call quits," seemed to me to be worthwhile. Later on when I learned of the maiming and the absolute cruelty of that destruction, I -- really my stomach "crawled."

It unquestionably saved thousands of lives of our sailors and Marines and Army personnel, for if they had had to make that final assault, our losses would have been tremendous. I just felt that anything that would bring about an end of the war in the Pacific was worthwhile because prior to this the assault was made on Iwo Jima and I had been there, I would have taken part in that --

and, near half of my brother officers were killed at Iwo. You can understand my feelings, without having knowledge about atomic consequences of such a bomb. And, of course, the present generation just doesn't understand how we could have caused such

[96]

destruction and the death and maiming of many human beings. It was a hard decision that had to be made and despite the consequences. It brought the war to an end and saved thousands of Japanese and American lives -- for the Japanese military fanatics might otherwise have continued the war indefinitely.

HESS: One other point. The President had a sign on his desk, "The Buck Stops Here." What do you recall about that sign?

MORISON: Well, I remember on the several occasions that I had an opportunity either at my initiative to call on the President with permission of the Attorney General, on various matters, or when he asked me to come over to discuss some case, that he said as to some matter that was very critical in another area, "You know, the unfortunate thing about

[97]

this job is that I had to learn to make decisions the hard way. It's a lonely job. If the man is to measure up to being what the Constitution expects of a Chief Executive, he's got to be lonely and he's got to make up his own mind. He can seek counsel of others, but in the end 'the buck stops here.'"

I mentioned this to Charlie Murphy and I mentioned it to Don Dawson and Marty [Martin] Friedman, and they all said, "Yes, sir, that's a favorite phrase of his and it really describes his attitude as to what is required of him." I don't think I was the initiator of it, but everybody that worked in the White House with President Truman had such a deep devotion for him; but anyway, his staff did their best to try to break up the heavy burdens of his responsibilities which made him work endlessly at the most difficult job

[98]

in the world. They planned many things to get him away from these burdens and to give him a laugh.

The President read endlessly with his "flat eyes." He didn't rely on others to tell him what some document said, he would read it himself. He worked incessantly, but he had a discipline of going to bed early and getting up early, taking a brisk walk in the early morning to keep constitutionally fit. But he did this work himself. So, someone -- and it wasn't me, because I hadn't thought of it -- said, "Let's get a good sign and just slip it in there and put it on the desk."

HESS: Do you recall where they got the sign?

MORISON: No, I don't, but I think here in town. It was made of a piece of wood beveled into

[99]

a triangle. The side containing the inscription was faced up and the inscription was a white inset on black plastic. "The Buck Stops Here."

HESS: Do you recall who bought the sign?

MORISON: No, I don't know, but I know that we all chipped in to get it.

HESS: One other point on that, do you recall just about when the sign was given to the President? Was it '46, '47, '48, '49?

MORISON: I think in '48. That is my best recollection. It was about that year. Then we had another present we gave him.

My affection for the President, which was almost as if he were a kinsman, was so profound that nothing he ever did I ever felt was wrong after I came to know him and to understand him.

[100]

He did not know that I had served in the Marine Corps in the Pacific and that I was a devoted Marine and felt after having served this period of time that it was an "elite corps." Its traditions were never forgotten. It made ordinary men into men of courage and pride, and we, during the campaigns in the Pacific, comparing the Corps in times when the Army was in on an operation, with our own discipline, we were proud of how we, as a Marine company, or a division, or a brigade operated in contradiction to the "Chinese fire drill" of some Army Reserve units or others!

HESS: As it says on the memorial on top of Suribachi at Iwo Jima, "Uncommon valor was a common virtue."

MORISON: Well, that's right, and it took ordinary men and inspired them to achieve mental and physical courage to a degree that cannot be

[101]

explained, except that the "mystique" of the tradition affects the performance of any man who has served in the Corps.

So, in 1950, and it probably was at the time the President had asked me to organize for the Korean war, the Office of Economic Stabilization, because he said I was the only one in "his family" that he knew who had the qualifications to do this since I had served as assistant to the General Counsel of the War Production Board, and knew what had to be done to help to stabilize the economy so that we could arm for the Korean conflict and at the same time not let the economy "go to pot." It had to be regulated.

In any event, sometime in 1950 a member of Congress, who was an ex-Marine, had, on the floor of the House, stated that he intended to introduce a bill requiring that the commandant

[102]

of the Marine Corps be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And a letter, I believe, was sent to President Truman by this Congressman concerning this, pointing out the reasons that he believed this recognition should be given in the development of military strategy, that the Marines should not be left out. The president had replied to that, and it became public, that the Marine Corps had the best public relations machinery of any outfit that he knew!

Well, this enraged every Marine and, of course, the commandant of the Marine Corps, and all of the command of the Marine Corps here, could say nothing about it. But it was a matter which aroused all the Marines because it hadn't been long since World War II and the Marine Corps Reserve organizations were well-organized.

[103]

At that point in order to try to leaven this "public issue," because I knew the President had not anticipated that this would be such a "hurrah," I called Don Dawson because Charlie Murphy was tied up, and I told him that I had made some arrangements.

I got in touch by telephone with the president of the Zippo cigarette lighter company in Pennsylvania, and told him that I needed his help to produce a rush order for a solid silver "Zippo" lighter because a "Zippo" lighter was what I and most other Marines carried all through the landings in the Pacific and they would always work. I asked that he put the Marine Corps emblem on the front of it in gold and inscribe below it; "To HST for bravery under fire, USMC." We assembled outside of the office, with Matt

[104]

Connelly, Don Dawson, myself and maybe one other, and I led the procession in military order into the Oval Office. The President looked surprised for we all stood at attention and we saluted. I asked permission of the Commander-in-Chief to address him. He then stood up and said, "Why, I haven't been called that in a long time."

And I said, "We make this presentation to you, Mr. Truman," and I read it to him and handed it to him.

He smiled and laughed and said, "You know I don't smoke, but my brother does and I can give it to him:"

It alleviated the tension and he asked me to stay after the rest went out. He said, "I never intended this to happen. I popped off." He said, "As you know, I was an artillery officer in the Army. I didn't even know you

[105]

were a Marine."

I said, "Yes sir, I was."

And he said, "Well, I've got to find some way to head this off. I was wrong. I 'popped off' when I should have said nothing." And I left with that.

He devised a strategem. I made no suggestions about it. The Marine Corps Reserve Officer's Association was having a national meeting of ex-Marines from all over the country here in Washington and I found out through Don Dawson what had happened. He showed up at the convention unannounced and uninvited. Apparently he had let the Commandant know that he was going to come in, but quietly, and he got up and made an apology, and that Marine Corps Association was ready to roast him. He just defused them because he praised the Marine Corps for their morale, for their

[106]

spirit, and this to me is an index of that great man. Others, if they were possessed with false pride would have stood their ground as commander-in-chief and said, "Take it or leave it," but not President Truman. He was a human being, and a great human being.

HESS: Have we covered everything that we want to cover before you became Assistant Attorney General?

MORISON: You asked me whether when I came to the Department as a Special Assistant to the Attorney General and later when I became the Attorney General's Executive Assistant whether there was any office or assignment of responsibility to attorneys in the Department for the oversight of violation of civil rights of the citizens of the country. There was a section established by Attorney General Clark for this

[107]

in the Criminal Division.

The man who headed this section at the request of the Attorney General was Turner L. Smith and Mrs. Eleanor Bontecou, a distinguished lady in her sixties, who I believe had been a professor of law at Georgetown University Law School. She had dedicated her career to the cause of civil rights. In addition, Fred G. Folsom, Richard Rodman, Abe Rosen and others served in this section.

Turner Smith, who recently died, was an able lawyer and a most remarkable man. He was born in Georgia, went to college and law school there and began his practice in Albany, his hometown, which was the center of a rural county. In time he was elected to the State Legislature and was the first legislator in the state to take a stand against the denial of the civil rights of Negro citizens.

[108]

Before his election to the legislature and as a practicing attorney in Albany, when violations of the civil rights of Negroes occurred, he asked those responsible to meet with him. In most instances they were poor white men who were marginal farmers or sharecroppers. He talked to them without anger, described what they had done and made them ashamed of their actions, but this process was effective in most instances because Turner Smith with simplicity pointed out that such action by .them would lead to the denial of their rights.

Attorney General Clark had a strong feeling about the depredation of civil rights but he, as did Turner Smith, knew that the only Federal law concerning civil rights was the Voting Rights Acts enacted by the Congress after the Civil War in 1866, 1870, 1871 and 1875. They were enacted to make certain that

[109]

the Negroes in the South, having been freed of slavery by Abraham Lincoln, be protected in the exercise of their right to vote in Federal elections. So, at that time, these acts provided a very modest basis for the United States to intervene in acts involving violations of a broad spectrum of other civil rights which legally were protected by the U.S. Constitution and that of most states, but not by statutes.

Turner Smith and his staff agreed that when they had a complaint made to the Attorney General or when they read newspaper accounts of violations of all types of civil rights, timely beginning action should be taken after obtaining full information. If such a violation was serious enough, he would go to the cities where these acts were done and ask the aid of the nearest U.S. Attorney in calling in those

[110]

who had been alleged to have violated the civil rights of Negro citizens for a meeting with him at the U.S. Attorney's office. No threat of prosecution was made but he spoke to the issue in terms these people could understand. He also would have a frank talk with the county prosecutor and the state attorney general, pointing out that the Federal Government might have grounds to prosecute but pointing out that for all concerned, state action was preferred in keeping with the letter and spirit of their constitutions. He urged that they write letters to offenders and advise them of the laws of their states, which were copied after the Constitution of the United States and to see that these provisions be made effective.

I confess that the number of these violations at that time were minor in comparison with the deluge of violations that followed in

[111]

the intervening years and resulted in the enactment in 1957 of the comprehensive Civil Rights Act.

This section of the Criminal Division had many meetings with the NAACP headed then by Justice Thurgood Marshall and other organizations such as the Civil Liberties Union, and Urban League and the National Conference of Christians and Jews.

From these beginnings and the reports made by this section, Attorney General Tom Clark recommended to President Truman that he appoint a representative group of knowledgeable citizens to hold hearings and inquire into all violations of the civil rights of citizens and to submit a full report with recommendations to the President. The President established this commission and the report made by the commission was the first definitive investigation and report

[112]

in this area. It was submitted to President Truman in 1947 and is entitled "To Secure These Rights." I recall that Bob Carr of Dartmouth College was the Executive Secretary of the commission.

Looking back, it seems incredible that this small cadre of dedicated people in the Department were able to accomplish as much as they did.

So, in response to your question, Attorney General Clark did have a very strong feeling about the civil rights of the citizens of the Nation regardless of their race, creed or color. He initiated this beginning and took a special interest in the progress of that office.

I think that Attorney General Clark was shocked by his experience when he came to the Department just as the war was beginning

[113]

and when he was sent by Attorney General Biddle to California to confer with General DeWitt. General DeWitt had accepted the assertion made by the owners of large tracts of agricultural land that the Japanese-American owners of farm lands, orchards and commercial flower tracts were "spies" sent there many years prior to the war to report to the Japanese military the status of troops of the U.S. military, the ships of the Navy and other military secrets. Thus, General DeWitt had exercised his military authority to intern thousands of Japanese-Americans without any evidence that they had done anything. It was a grievous violation of the rights of American citizens. Attorney General Clark, as a special assistant of necessity, could only make recommendations to the General as to the procedures which would provide a degree of due process as to such internments --

[114]

even though exercised under the plenary powers of the War Powers Act. He strongly urged that General DeWitt provide a group of competent civilians to maintain a careful oversight and protection of the property and possessions of those who were to be interned and to protect all from bodily harm at the hands of hysterical citizens. Unfortunately, General DeWitt disregarded most of Tom Clark's advice and with a heavy hand interned thousands of these innocent citizens in desert camps all over the West. These internees' personal and real properties were bought out at about ten cents on a dollar by native Americans on the West Coast, for these internees feared the destruction of their homes, farm and garden lands and offices if they did not sell them.

This experience outraged Tom Clark although I am certain that he never voiced his feelings

[115]

at the time. After the war ended, however, there was a group of American citizens of Japanese ancestry -- many of them being decorated for numerous acts of bravery as soldiers in the war -- who organized a very strong and proper campaign to convince Congress that restitution should be made for the incredible property losses suffered by these Japanese-American citizens. This resulted in the enactment of the Japanese Claims Act. Attorney General Clark supported this legislation fully and when it was enacted, he charged me with the responsibility for setting up an office to administer this act, which I did when I became head of the Civil Division. As I have

related, the section in the Criminal Division concerned with civil rights accomplished more than the public was aware in aid of rectifying violations of civil rights. The real turn-about came, however, when by

[116]

unanimous opinion the Supreme Court decided the *Brown* case. I was in the bar of the Court and heard Chief Justice Warren read the unanimous opinion of the Court.

HESS: The case of *Brown versus the Topeka Board of Education*?

MORISON: Yes. Yes, the Topeka Board of Education. And I never will forget it. I was thinking of Turner, and I called him that day after I got back from court because I was waiting for a decision in a case I had argued. I said, "Turner, the long hope that you've had back in your beginning days in the Department, that something effective be done about the neglected areas of the violation of the civil rights of citizens has finally occurred. It's a shame that you couldn't have been in the Supreme Court to hear the Chief Justice read

[117]

the Court's unanimous opinion."

Well he said, "I had been waiting for the Court's opinion, but I didn't know that it was going to be announced that day."

HESS: But during the Truman administration, here in Washington, D.C., there were segregated high schools...

MORISON: That's right.

HESS: ...there were segregated swimming pools...

MORISON: That's right.

HESS: ...colored people were not welcome in the restaurants.

MORISON: No.

HESS: What could the Truman administration have done to have forwarded the rights of the colored people more than it did?

[118]

MORISON: This situation was one thing which never occurred to Turner Smith. I think if the President had been reminded about the situation in the Nations' capital, he would have called in the commission chairman and asked him to rectify the situation.

HESS: That was back during the days when Washington, D.C. had commissioners.

MORISON: Yes, commissioners. Jiggs [F. Joseph] Donohue in time became chairman. He was a local Democratic politician who was practicing law with [Milton S., Jr.] Kronheim. Judge Kronheim and he would have carried out such reforms if the President requested him to do so.

HESS: Well, two of the men at this time were named Young. One of the commissioners was always an Army engineer, and his name was Gordon Young,

[119]

and John Russell Young was also a commissioner.

MORISON: That's right, but they would not have "bucked" the White House. Looking back at the beginnings of protest as to the violations of civil rights, there are so many things you realize that you could have done. The greatest terror, the greatest deprivations were being made public by Whitney Young and the Negro leader who was head of the National Association of Colored People.

HESS: Walter White.

MORISON: Walter White, yes.

HESS: Did they come in to see you often?

MORISON: They came in to see Turner Smith. I kept in touch with Turner wherever I was because I too was interested in doing more to end the growing violations, although I had no responsibility

[120]

in this area.

Attorney General Clark also knew about what had happened in Texas. I told you about the events in New Braunsfel, where the German population was interned -- American citizens -- some who had been there for five generations. They had a German newspaper and the Army shut it down. It was bought out by another fellow who made a fortune on it.

HESS: The Justice Department entered -- or intervened in -- several cases in the role of amicus curiae. That action has been pointed out as being one of the things that the Justice Department did do affirmatively for civil rights during that time. Do you recall that?

MORISON: Yes, I do. This was inspired first by Turner Smith and this wonderful lady Miss Eleanor Bontecou that worked with him and by

[121]

George Washington, who was Deputy Solicitor General. And he was most persuasive about taking action. This action was taken but it was at best a modest beginning. They were doing what they could with the limited power that the Federal Government had, which was only that one act of Congress which gave the Department of Justice authority to prosecute for a denial of a

citizen's right to vote in Federal elections. They recognized that until the Congress accepted the fact that there existed wide-spread suppression of civil rights under the Constitution and this became a major issue, the Congress would not have enacted remedial legislation, for the major committees of Congress were dominated by southerners. It took a Martin Luther King to dramatize the suppression of these constitutional rights of Negro citizens.

HESS: Mr. Truman did ask for civil rights legislation

[122]
at several times.

MORISON: Yes.

HESS: On February the 2nd of 1948, he sent his ten point message to Congress on what he would have liked to have done in the civil rights field, FEPC was one. I think fair housing was another, but there was a total of ten points. Just what was the difficulty in getting that legislation passed? Was it the Southern bloc?

MORISON: Yes, I recall that message. The Southern bloc dominated every committee of the Congress. My Lord, the House Rules Committee was presided over by old Judge Howard Smith, and you just couldn't get such legislation out of the key committees.

HESS: Did you ever discuss with President Truman his

[123]
views on civil rights?

MORISON: I never did. I never did because I felt I should limit any conference with the President to matters I deemed urgent in my areas of responsibility in the Department or to respond to his request for me to talk with him about specific matters in which he had an interest and which were in my area of responsibility. I always felt I couldn't encroach on his time.

I never had a philosophical discussion with him about this, but you know as I think about it, I wish I had because I never forget when I went to New York, Governor Nathan Miller, who became my great friend, and who was the head of the firm I joined, thought he was going to have a joke on me. He knew I came from the South. He didn't know I was a mountaineer. So he invited me to a very elegant

[124]
banquet which the association of the bar of the City of New York held annually. This was a great and impressive banquet. It cost about \$50 a plate even in those days, and, of course, I couldn't buy a ticket. So he said, "I want you to attend the dinner and here's your ticket." Well, each ticket had a number, and he'd done this as a big joke on me for I was seated next to a municipal judge named page who was as black as the ace of spades. We became devoted friends as a result of that dinner. We talked about civil rights and about his experience in New York as a Negro lawyer.

HESS: Was he a native New Yorker?

MORISON: Yes, and had grown up in the ghettos in Harlem, but had made his way and had been elected as a municipal judge. Governor Miller was crestfallen to observe that Judge Page

[125]

and I got along so well. Later he told me, "You know, as I look back on it, I should have known better. I should have known that your breadth of understanding, regardless of whether you came from south of the Mason-Dixon line, you're not conventional, you don't have any conventional "southernisms," and the old Confederacy feeling that all Negroes are to be kept in their place. That was a lesson to me. I thought I was going to have some fun with your discomfort, but it increased my respect for you."

HESS: To what extent did increasing Negro political power, particularly in the cities of the North -- Detroit and Chicago -- have on focusing the Nation's attention on civil rights matters?

MORISON: Jerry, I just can't comment about this. First, because I would be guessing and I don't

[126]

know. I've given you all of the people that were involved in this. I do know one thing that I did. Detroit was a great area of difficulty.

HESS: There was a race riot there during the war.

MORISON: Yes. My great-grandfather bought slaves and brought them to Scott County, Virginia. As soon as they were purchased, however, he gave them a document declaring each of them to be free men and women and filed these in the clerk's office of Scott County. All of them were provided for by employment by the family. They requested and it was agreed that they take our name. They're all buried in the Morison plot in the Estilville Cemetery in Gate City, Virginia.

HESS: How many slaves did he have over the years?

[127]

MORISON: I really don't know but I'd say about ten or twelve.

HESS: This was over a long period of time?

MORISON: Yes, this goes back into 1800 and their progeny after that. They were all freed. My great-great-grandfather, who resided in Tazewell, Tennessee, had 300 slaves and he also gave them their freedom immediately after purchasing them prior to 1800.

HESS: Now, wait a minute, you say he would buy them and free them, all in the same action?

MORISON: The same day.

HESS: Why?

MORISON: Because he (my great-great-grandfather Hugh Graham) did not believe in slavery. He

[128]

thought it was -- he was a Scotsman and to him for people to be considered as slaves was just something that he couldn't tolerate. He built individual log homes for every one of the Negro families on this great tract of land that he had, solid log houses, installed chuck floors and fireplaces, outhouses and barns...

HESS: They stayed and worked the land after they had been freed, is that right?

MORISON: Absolutely, but they would do it for wages. He had the greatest library south of Philadelphia. People would come to Tazewell because they knew that they were welcome and could read his books and even newspapers he obtained from Philadelphia. They would stop off and visit. They'd come on the old postillion -- four and six-horse coaches. I

[129]

now have a few of the volumes from his vast library. It included practical medicine, horticulture, science, etc. Hugh Graham's wife administered to the birth of every baby of their freed slaves if asked to do so. On Sunday they were all provided -- each family -- with a wagon and a mule to go to church, and he built a church for them -- no, he built three churches and often preached sermons in their churches.

I'm coming back to the last one I knew well. I remember some of them: H. Ransom Morison, his daughter "Aunt Charl" and Willie and Henry Morison and Warrick Morison. Warrick was encouraged by my grandfather, Judge H.S.K. Morison and after my grandfather's death by my father, to get an education and the family provided for him to get a full college education so he could achieve his goals to be a teacher

[130]

and in time he was the superintendent of the Negro schools in the area of Scott County, Virginia. Later there was a kind of a boom time during World War II and he was invited to be a vice president of a Negro life insurance company because he was recognized by Negro businessmen as an educated man and well respected as an educator since he became the Superintendent of Negro schools in Scott County, Virginia.

Well, he invested what little money he had saved in the company and he borrowed some additional funds promised from friends -- including my father's family, but a depression came in the twenties and just wiped the company out. With a great deal of courage and after consulting with all the members of the family -- my father, my uncles and others -- he went to Detroit and obtained employment, first as a day laborer and later as a superintendent

[131]

of the City's Water Department. In time he began to realize that there was a great need for a Negro real estate company to serve the growing Negro population and to build new homes for

Negro families because Henry Ford had brought both Negroes and mountaineers from the South to work in the Ford plants there and provided good wages for that time. Thus, he established a real estate firm and began to prosper. Later he ran for Sheriff of Wayne County, Michigan as a Republican -- which "shook the family up" but he said, "Well, you've got to be on t'other side up there." He was elected and had an outstanding record.

HESS: About what time was this?

MORISON: This was in 1929 or '30, just about the time I was graduating from academic school at college. He then organized the Fort Lincoln

[132]

Association, which in effect was the first strong Negro organization of intelligent Negroes who were small businessmen that had a constituency all the way down to the uneducated Negroes. The Association was, at that time, respected and it was able to confront the "power structure" in the Detroit area about discrimination grievances of Negro citizens. The power structure responded and worked with the Association because this was the first time that they had something tangible to deal with. This civic relationship accomplished much to resolve issues but the Association's effectiveness later deteriorated when Warrick resigned.

Well, this is a diversion. Let us go on now. What's the next question, Jerry.

HESS: Have we covered everything before you were nominated as Assistant Attorney General?

[133]

I believe you went in to talk to Mr. Truman about that, is that right?

MORISON: Oh, yes...

HESS: Also, why were you selected for that position as Assistant Attorney General?

MORISON: Tom Clark had an unwarranted belief that I could do damn near anything, but it wasn't justified, but he did know that if I was given a task to do that I would work hard and long to get it done.

Wendell Berge, who was the successor of Thurman Arnold as head of the Antitrust Division had resigned as Assistant Attorney General. He was considered to be more in the "Biddle crowd." Yet Tom was always pleasant with him as he was with everybody. But, Tom in those days didn't have much real affinity for Wendell,

[134]

so John Sonnett, who was an Irishman from New York and who was sponsored by John Cahill, the former U.S. Attorney in New York who headed a very large law firm in New York, "Cahill, Gordon, etc."

He was being pushed politically by Cahill to be made head of the Antitrust Division since John Sonnett was considered by Cahill to be a "comer" and he wished to have him in his firm after a term as head of the Antitrust Division in the Department of Justice. John had been made Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division as I have said before, and then when Berge resigned, his mentor Cahill asked that Tom make him Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division. Looking back upon it, there was method in Cahill's move to accomplish this, because his firm represented RCA, and the Department for a long period of

[135]

time had been trying to get an antitrust suit "off the ground" for RCA's violation of the antitrust laws. He had successfully blocked such antitrust action in the past and while Biddle was Attorney General.

So, John was made head of the Antitrust Division leaving a vacancy in the office of Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division. Tom Clark thus advised that he would request the President to nominate me for that vacancy.

I had never asked the Attorney General for anything because I had enough freedom and rapport with the Attorney General to enjoy what I was doing. I mean, I had a pittance of a salary when I got married in '48 and we lived on "grits and gravy," but that was all right, I truly didn't care. I was enjoying what I was doing. As I say, I went

[136]

there to stay six months and stayed six years, and that was because of Tom Clark and Harry Truman. So this appointment was an unprecedented thing and I was kind of "shook up!"

In any event, the Attorney General said he was sending my name over to the President for approval and for forwarding to the Senate Judiciary Committee for confirmation of the appointment. I then asked the Attorney General that before forwarding, he arrange for me to go and see the President.

The Attorney General asked me why I wanted to see the President before the nomination was acted upon and I told him that when I was in New York with Governor Miller's law firm that I had become quite disturbed by the bid of Roosevelt for the third term. I had a great admiration for Franklin Roosevelt. As a matter of fact, you will see on the wall there,

[137]

a letter from President Roosevelt, then Governor of New York State, to me in 1932 in which he had written me because of my interest in his candidacy.

Subsequently, at the request of Governor Max Gardner of North Carolina, who had conceived the idea of establishing "The Young Democrats," I came to Washington while I was still in law school and met with a group of contemporaries at the Mayflower Hotel. Ross Malone, a classmate, accompanied me. He is now General Counsel of General Motors. On the second day so many young Democrats were absent for the scheduled meetings that Congressman Wright Patman and I were left to write the first draft of the constitution of this organization!

In any event, I felt that a third term for any president -- and despite Roosevelt's great capacities for leadership, was a bad

[138]

precedent. His "Fireside Chats" were the vehicle that helped to give confidence to this country from the agonies of the depression which I lived through. He offered hope to a Nation in despair. He had great capacities of leadership, but I felt that regardless of his past leadership, in my understanding of the Constitution, which requires that you read not only the proceedings at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, but also all of the thoughts expressed by members of the Convention and their writing about the issues concerning the Articles of Confederation, which was the predecessor of the Constitutional Convention, and Jefferson's view about the inclusion of the first ten amendments in the Constitution, etc., that under the concept of a tri-party system of government, separate and independent, as it related to individual

[139]

liberties, I felt that a third term would deteriorate the office and the leadership of that office.

I knew that Roosevelt was sick. I knew that from Marvin McIntire (who was a friend of my father) when I asked him about getting out of the War Production Board and getting into the Marine Corps. So I wrote President Roosevelt a letter. I never got an answer. I don't think he could identify me. I stated that I felt that a "third term" in the office was wrong. I then organized "The Lawyers' Committee Against the Third Term," and I made speeches all over the country, as a young lawyer, stating my reasons as a lawyer why I felt the third term to be wrong. I made it clear, however, that I was a Democrat.

Arthur Vanderbilt, who later became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey,

[140]

was a great friend of mine and he too was quit interested in and concerned about this issue and worked in other areas on unwritten principles involved. This did not mean that I had given up my loyalty to the Democratic Party, my belief in it, but I felt that President Truman, because he had been reared in his political career, in the tradition of regularity of loyalty to the Democratic Party that he ought to know what I had done, and if he had any objections, I'd understand. I felt I should not let my nominations go to him "blind."

Tom said, "Well, if you want to see him I'll arrange it," and he did.

And I went over and I sat down and stated just about what I've said before here, but I felt that he should know this and that in view of this he might not want to send my name up.

[141]

But he said, "Well, I don't know why you say that. When I was in the Senate I voted three times for a bill to amend the Constitution, to limit the term of the President to two terms." And he said, "You're absolutely right," and he said, "I have even a greater respect for you for coming to me and telling me. You and I think alike."

I relate this as I look back on the question we discussed before we started recording, "Why did he not run in 1952 since he had only a part of a term after Roosevelt's death and served only one term after that," and this is the reason I'm quite certain.

HESS: That's why his decision in 1952 was not to run again.

MORISON: Not to run again. It was not because he was afraid of being defeated, it was not for

[142]

any reason, because he was a man who never backed away from a difficult situation. Even if things were tough for him to be elected, if he were urged to run, if he were the only candidate, he felt it was wrong.

HESS: All right, let's move on to February of 1948, which is getting into a very interesting period of time, the political events of 1948. As you will recall there were several moves afoot about this same time by certain elements of the Democratic Party to see that someone other than Mr. Truman was the Party's standard bearer that year. The ADA was trying to get General Eisenhower, various elements were trying to get Justice Douglas, but in your opinion, how difficult would it have been for the Party to have refused to give the nomination to Mr. Truman after he made it clear he wanted

[143]

the nomination?

MORISON: I never discussed this with President Truman, but I've always felt that being a man of pride and courage and having been a man who came into that office with the most abject humility and shock, that he had grown in stature and responsibility, that he faced into the problem, we've referred to before as "The Buck Stops Here." He was in truth and in fact, the Chief Executive of the United States. He made decisions, sometimes in an early morning walk, after having thought, read everything pertaining to a particular issue of importance.

I don't think that would deter him, because that kind of indirect repudiation of his integrity, his filling to the "nth degree," the responsibilities that go with the office of Chief

[144]

Executive. Above all things President Truman had plenty of sand and grit, and adversity was something he had lived with all of his life and he was not afraid of it.

I know a little bit about that, a little more about that for another reason. I, as executive assistant, had to deal with all other departments of the Executive Department. I had found that this was in many respects a kind of a "Chinese fire drill," because you would talk in the name of the Attorney General to this subofficial in Treasury, or in Commerce, or Labor or other departments of the Government, and you never were sure that you were getting a sense of cooperative working where two or more departments had a common problem and had to join together to efficiently accomplish necessary goals.

[145]

HESS: Did you find any particular department that gave you more difficulty or seemed to be less cooperative than others?

MORISON: The Department of Commerce by far.

HESS: It didn't take you long to come up with that answer did it?

MORISON: No sir!

HESS: What seemed to be their attitude?

MORISON: Until we finally got Averell Harriman we didn't know what was going on. The subalterns underneath him said, "You know, we really run the Government. Don't be telling us what to do."

Well then I came up with an idea. When Bob Hannegan was Postmaster General, I came to know him quite well and he had a brilliant

[146]

assistant, name was Gael Sullivan. Gael Sullivan had a master's degree in political science from the University of Chicago. He had been an innovator in the machine-ridden Democratic Party in Chicago (now presided over by [Mayor Richard J.] Daley), in saying, "you've got to reform," and he had accomplished reform, by learning and practical applications of good government. And Hannegan had found out about him and brought him down as special assistant. Well, he and I became very close friends, and I'd meet with him, I said, "In the old days we used to talk about the 'Kitchen Cabinet.' We ought to have the 'Little Cabinet.'" I said, "This thing of the common interests of one, two or three departments in a problem that must be executed in the executive department is damn important, because if it bogs down because some bureaucrat just

[147]

will not take ahold of it, then you've wasted time, you've frustrated what the executive department ought to have done promptly." So I said, "How about you and I getting Bob to set up a dinner and let's invite the number two men of every department of Government."

He said, "That's a hell of an idea," and he said, "will you write up your concept of the first meeting as to what it's for?" And I did.

Well, as a result of that we met once a month, in rotation, one department and then another, all the way around. We got to know each other personally.

To give you an idea of how effective this was, when the question came up as when I was executive assistant, of how in hell we could grab the remaining German scientists that the Russians were systematically recruiting. How were we going to get them out of Germany.

[148]

They wanted to come. You've got immigration, you've got all the bureaucratic things to do to do it promptly," and I said, "let me just handle it, Tom," I said, "I'll handle it."

So I called four members of the Little Cabinet. It was called "Operation Paperclip." I got the Air Force to get the planes. The Immigration Service is part of the Department of Justice, so I called the Commissioner of Immigration, over whom I exercised an oversight to come over and told him what to do. We were going to bring these people into a place certain, where we had housing for them, we didn't want any "hurrah" after we got them here. The main thing was to get them here promptly and before the Russians got them. This was done within 24 hours, that's how we got [Dr. Wernher] von Braun.

[149]

HESS: Who were the Assistant Secretaries you called?

MORISON: There was Ed Foley...

HESS: From Treasury.

MORISON: ...from Treasury; there was Gael Sullivan, who was a good activist who joined with me to act as the whip; there was the Department of Defense, who of course wanted them...

HESS: Who did you call in the Department of Defense?

MORISON: Damn it. I'm trying to think, trying to think, trying to think. Damn, I can't think of the man's name because, you know, those -- ah damn it. He was the Assistant Secretary.

HESS: At that time it was the War Department.

[150]

MORISON: Yes, War Department.

HESS: Patterson probably was the head of the Department at that time.

MORISON: Yes, well I knew Bob Patterson because he had been on the War Production Board. I called Bob Patterson, who knew who I was, and he told the man to call, plus he wanted these scientists, he knew we had to have them.

HESS: How many scientists did you get in that manner? Do you recall?

MORISON: I believe we got about twenty-seven.

HESS: Were there scientists whom you did not get, and the Russians took away from you?

MORISON: There were some that we lost because this thing had not come to a head quick enough for us to take action. And looking back on it,

[151]

so many of the Secretaries didn't realize that this Little Cabinet with its monthly dinners, was not just a social group, but it was a method of getting things done promptly. Now later on, boy, they made great use of it, because things could be cleared just like that.

HESS: Can you think of any other illustrations that might show how the Little Cabinet set-up was used and how it functioned?

MORISON: Yes. A classmate of mine, with the authority of the Secretary of State, who was then head of the Latin-American desk, called me in desperation one day and said -- he didn't know about this set-up -- he said, "You're the last man I've called. I've called the FBI. I've called the Army. I've called everybody to help," He said, "We were dependent all during the war upon Venezuelan oil."

[152]

[Romulo] Betancourt, who was then considered a wild Marxist radical, was the head of the government down there, and had been ousted by a military junta and the radicals in response were determined to blow up all of the pipelines and the oil wells in Maracaibo, the great oil center, and their intelligence people had picked this up and they made an appeal to the United States for help. And he said, "How in God's name can we get somebody down there to help these people out? I think it's important for our national defense."

We didn't know whether we were going to get another whop from the Russians or what in those days.

And I said, "Well, give me about an hour, Jim, and I'll see what I can do." I said, . "I'm not going to Edgar Hoover, because he .won't do anything. I know that he's got FBI agents

[153]

down there, but -- I know him. I could go to the Attorney General and suggest that he order him to do it, but I'd have to do it in the end. Let me see what I can do."

So, I called the commandant of the Marine Corps, who was then General Cliff Cates, who had been my commanding general in the Pacific, and I said, "General, here is the situation," one, two, three, four. "Can you get together highly qualified retired Regulars who have had Latin-American experience and can speak Spanish?" You know the Marine Corps was there back in the Coolidge days.

HESS: The banana wars.

MORISON: Yes. They had some banana diplomacy, which was a blot on our "escutcheon."

I told him the situation. I said, "We will provide planes, somewhere in Texas,

[154]

wherever you want it to be. But can you get me some top NCO's? I don't need any general officers, but they've got to speak Spanish and can you get them together, let them have their gear and we'll take it from there." I also told him the Venezuelan government would provide top pay for all of them.

He said, "Why, hell yes, I can get it."

By the next morning he had 116 men. The Air Force had provided unmarked planes down there. I called my counterpart in National Defense there, I can't recall his name, I'd have to look it up. I then asked Jim to let me talk to the Secretary of State and that...

HESS: What year was that? Who was Secretary of State at that time?

MORISON: Acheson I think.

HESS: That would have been Mr. Truman's second term.

[155]

MORISON: Right. And I knew Dean (I'll tell you why), and I called him and told him what I was doing, and told him that my friend Jim Espy had brought this to my attention, and I felt that I didn't want to embarrass Jim, that he'd done the right thing as I saw it.

He said, "He sure did." He said, "I know about it, but I didn't know that he knew you or had enough gumption to keep on inquiring about it." So, this was accomplished and hell, that damn thing was nipped in the bud.

And oh, there are any number...

HESS: What was the main thing that force accomplished in the Venezuelan matter?

MORISON: What they did was they policed that whole pipeline area. All spoke Spanish and many made friends of the natives who quietly advised them as to the movement of the radicals in the

[156]

area.

HESS: They policed the pipelines.

MORISON: They spoke Spanish, they didn't wear uniforms, they just wore greens, you know, jungle greens. They were armed and they were made a part of the civil police of Venezuela.

HESS: Did Mr. Truman know that force had been sent down there?

MORISON: I finally told Matt -- I mean not Matt, I think I told Charlie...

HESS: Charles Murphy.

MORISON: Yes. I told him what had been accomplished. He said, "Well, that's the way to do, don't wait, asking somebody what ought to be done, do it. So, this went well. I'm leading to a point. From that association with Gael

[157]

Sullivan, which I'm going to -- somebody, oh, Douglas McGregor, who was Deputy Attorney General for awhile, head of the tax division, lawyer, now retired down in Texas, sent me the other day a clipping from the *Washington Star* about the Little Cabinet, and maybe I can get my secretary Eleanor to give it to you.

But in any event, Bob Hannegan died after that. President Truman, through Don Dawson, asked Gael Sullivan and I to constitute a two-headed interim chairmanship of the Democratic National Committee. As you know, Hannegan had been head of the Democratic National Committee. In those days you could still be a Cabinet officer and head of the national committee, and nobody said anything about it. And so we did, we occupied the office for about seven months.

[158]

HESS: This was after the death of Bob Hannegan.

MORISON: And any day Sullivan was tied up, I would stay over there as long as I could and Tom Clark would let me take that time, and we did our best to keep the party line nourished by telephone and otherwise.

We were doing a lot of things that ought to have been done after that. We tried to initiate what Charlie Murphy later did in establishing the Democratic study commission. We tried our best to revitalize our party. We knew we were going to be blocked by the Democrats in office on the Hill. They're saying, "You're trying to tell us what to do." But ideas have a way, if they're valid, of boiling up and being seized upon, in whole or in part. And that, in the interim, was what was needed to make the party cohesive and get ideas out for consideration about our

[159]

legislative program.

We started that and Charlie Murphy decided to do the job later and was most successful from 1952 on. After Eisenhower was elected, Charlie Murphy came and worked with the Democratic Committee and got this study group established.

HESS: That's right, that was started right after the 1956 loss by Stevenson -- as the Democratic Advisory Council.

MORISON: That's right. He picked that up and he did one hell of a job.

HESS: How long did you and Mr. Sullivan run the committee there before J. Howard McGrath was appointed?

MORISON: No, it was Boyle.

HESS: Oh, this was after the '48 campaign?

[160]

MORISON: Yes.

HESS: This was after '48.

MORISON: You see Boyle came in and he was a just -- he was the world's worst.

HESS: Yes, but this was after J. Howard McGrath?

MORISON: Right.

HESS: And before Boyle?

MORISON: Yes.

HESS: Why was Boyle appointed?'

MORISON: I don't have the slightest idea in the world, I've always wondered and Charlie doesn't know. I just don't know. He was the wrong man at the wrong time.

HESS: Was he appointed as more or less an interim Democratic National Chairman?

[161]

MORISON: As I think back, that that was the intention of it. Whatever he did it was a grave era of passiveness when we should have been active and working hard.

HESS: Is that the major fault that you find with him?

MORISON: Oh hell, yes. For instance, I know Virginia like the palm of my hand, I know West Virginia, I know Tennessee, I know a good deal about New York, and I would try and come and tell Bill Boyle, "Bill, you've got to do this, this, this, and this. In Virginia if you try to rub elbows with the Byrd machine you're going to get skunked."

I helped form the Independent Democrats in Virginia while I was Assistant Attorney General of the civil division. Francis Pickens Miller came to me and said, "You're a Virginian, and

[162]

I need your help and I'm going to run for Governor and buck this Byrd machine." He'd been in the House of Delegates, and he was a patrician. That was his great defect, he was an intellectual. He had been one of the group who had convinced Roosevelt to have the lend-lease of the destroyers to Britain.

HESS: The destroyer base deal?

MORISON: Right. He had been in intelligence in World War II and came out a colonel. And I helped form that with the late Bob Whitehead, one of the greatest leaders in the House of Delegates before the recent reform that we've ever had. He came from Lovettsville, Virginia.

HESS: What were the faults you found with the Byrd machine?

MORISON: Well, the Byrd machine was about like the

[163]

southern loony bird. He flies backwards, doesn't care where he's going, he wants to see where he's been!

You know, it was one of complete conformity, and all of the social needs of the state, all of the economic needs of the state and its people were neglected. Virginia was the lowest on the "totem pole" in industrial productivity, in employment, in rates of pay for its workers, in manufacture of goods, in the social services to citizens, as to the adequacy of its prisons, state hospitals, and mental health and everything else. Out of the thirteen southern states there was only one that was lower than Virginia in modern public services to citizens and in economic growth.

HESS: I'll take a guess, was that Mississippi?

MORISON: Yes. That's it. And I made a speech down

[164]

at Washington and Lee University on this thing which started, they say, this revolution, but which cost me the election as a trustee of my university, which I didn't give a damn about. But I think this is -- this was a great fault of the Byrd people. They wouldn't listen to the needs for change. But I also encountered this when John Kennedy ran. I had been floor leader for Adlai Stevenson, I'd been his floor manager, and took Adlai over to "make his manners to Kennedy." And Kennedy had asked the Governor, "I want you to have any position in my Cabinet that you want," I had met Kennedy because he had gone to Choate, and he said, "I hope that you'd come back into the Government, name what you want."

But I didn't want anything. But the disarray in Kennedy's campaign occasioned in this period of time was pretty marked.

HESS: When Boyle was chairman.

[165]

MORISON: Yes.

HESS: One question about Gael Sullivan...

MORISON: He's dead you know.

HESS: Yes, that's right, but he worked for the Democratic National Committee before the 1948 campaign, and there was a period of time when he was under consideration for chairman of the Democratic committee.

MORISON: It could have been.

HESS: Did you ever hear why he did not get that job when McGrath was appointed?

MORISON: He was overruled by the Southern Democratic group, and it was a great disappointment in his life. Right after that you know, after I resigned, he was quite angry and he opened the office here in Washington for Estes Kefauver for Vice President

[166]

and he asked me to come and help him. I was then practicing law. And I said, "Of course I will." So I went to the convention and became Estes' floor manager. He lost that time, and I'll tell you who else helped him; Paul Douglas was -- the two of us worked together, worked the floor. And the next time, why, we got him nominated as Vice President.

HESS: Yes, he was nominated in '56, but you worked for him in '52.

MORISON: In '52.

HESS: A few moments ago we mentioned the Department of Commerce and you mentioned that they were somewhat less cooperative than some of the other departments. What seemed to be the nature of the relationship between the Department of Commerce and the business community?

[167]

MORISON: Well, a very tight relationship, because the Department of Commerce is a vast complex of bureaucracy. When Harriman was there, he made many wise and basic decisions. He is a man of considerable wisdom and liberal in his outlook on things, and believed that there must be a balance between what business wants and what is good for the people of the United States.

HESS: Harriman was there from October of '46 until April of '48 and then Charles Sawyer was there...

MORISON: Sawyer came and...

HESS: ...from May of '48 until the end of his administration.

MORISON: ...that's when the trouble came, that's where we locked horns.

HESS: Did you find him to be a rather conservative business-minded man?

[168]

MORISON: Not only a conservative business-minded man, but an irascible one and I bucked him tooth and nail. He had joined with a very ambitious member of the Federal Trade Commission, his name was, oh, Lowell...

HESS: B. Mason.

MORISON: Lowell Mason was a very jocular guy, but aspired for power. Jim Mead was the chairman of the Commission and he was really a figurehead. We'd meet with Mead and staff people of the FTC at the Antitrust Division. They were dismayed because really the cases that got attention were those filed and tried by the Antitrust Division. In the record it appeared to us that they wanted to "toady up" to business, and were complaining about the Antitrust Division's vigorous prosecution of significant cases. The old saying -- among private antitrust lawyers -- was that if you've got

[169]

an antitrust action by the Government against a client, a company, in the field of antitrust violation, go immediately to the Federal Trade Commission and ask it to take jurisdiction, because the investigation will bog down and nothing will ever happen.

HESS: And keep it out of the Department of Justice?

MORISON: Don't go to the Department of Justice because they will go after it, and they'll take time, but they'll finally get you in court and you'll get your answer.

So they -- Lowell Mason and Sawyer -- conceived the idea and they sat down with Tom Clark and explained it all to him. And of course, Tom was very polite and he said, "Well, you really," - he passed the buck -- "you really should talk to my assistant Graham Morison about this." So they asked me over to have lunch with them.

[170]

Their idea was that we ought to set up by interdepartmental agreement -- by law if necessary -- a committee composed of officials of Commerce, the Federal Trade Commission and public members. It was to be a kind of council so that any antitrust complaint in the field of antitrust and the Federal Trade areas, should first be considered by this "committee" for decision as to whether action should be taken at all, or if it was to be taken, whether it should be taken by the Federal Trade Commission, or by the Antitrust Division.

HESS: That was an idea being pushed by FTC.

MORISON: This was being pushed by Sawyer and Mason...

HESS: Oh. Commerce.

MORISON: ...in conjunction with Lowell Mason, he wanted to get this idea over. He was trying to

[171]

sell it to President Truman. And I just refused to have the Antitrust Division participate. I later went to see President Truman about the plan and I said, "Mr. President, you know what such a provision would do, what they're trying to do is to take the teeth out of the Antitrust Division. Now the Antitrust Division has never been adequately staffed. It doesn't have enough attorneys, but the landmark cases that keep monopoly reasonably under control and permit free competition both in quality and price of goods and services for the American people is accomplished by the Antitrust Division." I said, "These slaps on the wrist by the Federal Trade Commission are meaningless." I said, "The Federal Trade Commission, as you know, sir, was a concept of Woodrow Wilson, which when World War I came on he had to abate."

But this concept was not to establish an

[172]

administrative bureaucracy that Congress later enacted, but some intermediate and worthy basis by which you could call the business community together in areas outside of absolute violation of the Sherman Act, and the Clayton Act, and effect a governmental relationship of saying, "Now, under our auspices you may agree, that you will not do this, this and this, and once adopted such agreements could be enforced."

Well, that was never implemented as Wilson intended it to be, it became a great sprawling bureaucracy. So, thereafter [Philip L.] Graham, the head of the *Washington Post*, in the last year of my office, called me one day and said, "I've got an idea. There's a lot of complaint about the enforcement of the antitrust laws. It's too rigid, the business community believes it is being punished and are long in the courts and all the rest. So, don't you think it would

[173]

be a wonderful stroke for you to suggest a convening of retired judges, able antitrust lawyers, and other lawyers of general competency in antitrust law, and make a full review of the antitrust laws and devise 'guide lines' by which the business community and the Antitrust Division can talk and achieve a sense of agreement?"

And I said, "Phil, you and I are friends, but I'm in antitrust and you're a lawyer yourself." I said, "The moment you give to inmates who are murderers, keys to the jail, the ball game's over, and I'll be darned if I'll do it." And I went right up to Tom Clark -- no I guess it was Howard McGrath who was Attorney General then, and told him. I said, "Look, this is what Philip Graham wants and I'm not going to do it."

He said, "I think you're right."

And Phil never forgave me for that. Later when Brownell came in as Attorney General, oh,

[174]

the Department embraced this idea right away. And the results were "sound and fury meaning nothing."

Now, what's next?

HESS: Let's mention a couple of other people who were on the Federal Trade Commission. How about William A. Ayers?

MORISON: Bill Ayers, a man of reasonable ability. He never made many waves. In a couple of actions in which he did not carry the Commission, he was a kind of a forerunner in some of his opinions for subsequent Commission action.

The worst we ever had was an old friend, Paul Rand Dixon, who was Kefauver's counsel for the Senate Anti-monopoly Subcommittee, he was the worst, followed by the Congressman, what was his name, that became head of the Federal Trade Commission in the Republican administration? Oh, after Ed Howrey's short term, Congressman

[175]

John W. Gwynne became chairman.

HESS: John J. Carson was there for a while, do you recall anything in particular about him?

MORISON: No, I never had any dealings with him.

HESS: All right. And then Stephen Spingarn was there.

MORISON: Oh, Steve I knew quite well. Steve was an activist, he was out of place on there, you know, they thought, "By God, somebody let a skunk in," because he wanted to make this damn bureaucracy work. That big burly bear of a man, he is a "pistol!" And the President had a great affection for Steve. He is a very earthy guy.

HESS: Yes. Did you ever hear why he was moved to the FTC from the White House staff?

MORISON: I haven't the slightest idea, but I was delighted and he at least put them through a

[176]

mental exercise while he was there.

HESS: He shook them up a little bit did he?

Did you say that you did not think that an informal committee should be set up to review the antitrust laws?

MORISON: How can you do that with the Sherman Act dating back to its enactment in the 1890's, with all of the interpretive "landmark" cases, and through the era following the

Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) in which there was an expose of the interlock of the major companies in price fixing, which was part and parcel of how our economy fell apart in the depression of '32, and agreements made by trade associations not to lower prices even though member companies had to dismiss their employees. And after the TNEC report was issued Judge Thurman Arnold was made head of the Antitrust Division and he didn't

[177]

have to prosecute cases. They had been exposed by the TNEC. I came down here for U.S. Steel. Roger Blough and I represented U.S. Steel. He put on the case for U.S. Steel before the TNEC so I know that committee. But after that the businessmen. would line up outside of -- Judge Arnold told me this -- his office. He said, "They come in and said 'Show us a consent decree and we'll sign it.'" But after that you had to fight.

If I can follow up on the subject of anti-trust -- shall I?

HESS: All right.

MORISON: I'll tell you some interesting things in my relationship with the President about it. First, before getting into that, did I relate my unhappy experience with Joe Kennedy?

HESS: No.

[178]

MORISON: In the Civil Division, when I was the head of the Civil Division as Assistant Attorney General, we had the Dollar Steamship case.

President Roosevelt, because of the unwavering political support of Joe Kennedy, first rewarded him by making him one of the early chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in which he did a credible job. Then he made him head of the Maritime Commission.

While he was head of the Maritime Commission, before World War II, the Dollar Steamship Company, which had obtained all the subsidies from the Maritime Commission the law would allow, came to the Commission seeking further funds for the Company was in a considerable financial situation. They had an appointment with Chairman Kennedy who they believed would help them. And here is what the records show. Alben Barkley's son-in-law, now dead, Mack [Max O.] Truitt was a partner

[179]

in Homer Cummings' law firm in Washington and I discussed this matter with him. In any event, he was general counsel of the Maritime Commission before joining Cummings' firm. So, the Dollar Steamship officials said to Joe Kennedy, "Since we can't get any more subsidy funds for the Dollar Steamship Line, it's going to go into bankruptcy, and this would be a great loss to the Nation's commerce. If we ever have a war, our ships will be needed, and the organization that we have will be needed. And here is what we will do. If you will loan us (I don't know the exact amount, let's say \$10 or \$20 million) 10 million dollars, we will give you a chattel mortgage on every ship, every bit of the repair equipment, docks and our stock of steel plate and all the

supplies, everything we have. And if you give us a term of years (I think five years, it may have been longer), at the end of

[180]

that term if we have not been able to pay it off, then under the terms of the mortgage, you can redeem all of the property of the Dollar Steamship Line, the stock of which is to be given as collateral for this loan along with the chattel mortgages."

Well, there was no specific provision of law under which that could be done, but Kennedy agreed to it. And he told Mack Truitt -- who then was general counsel of the Commission, to draw up the papers. Mack told me that he was shocked that Kennedy had made such an agreement for the Commission. Truitt said he was at a loss as to how to draft such an agreement under the act establishing the Commission. Finally, he said he drew up a straight chattel mortgage since Kennedy didn't ask if the Maritime Commission had the authority to accept such a deal (which Truitt thought it did not possess). Well, in any event, just prior to World War II, the mortgage became due and had not been paid. The successor in the chairmanship of the Maritime Commission then was -- I believe -- Admiral [Emory S.] Land, I believe that's who it was. Thus,

[181]

the Commission foreclosed on the mortgage and took the Dollar Steamship Line over. And all of a sudden that steamship line was just a "bonanza!" I mean it was just making money "hand over fist" to a point that it had to turn shipping business away. So after the end of World War II, the "Dollar" people went to Senator Pat McCarran because they had been assured that he could help them get the company back for its coffers were full. I don't know the details, but I found out that they made a deal with McCarran that if he would press for this and have the stock returned to them, they'd pay off the mortgage and get the property back. Well, McCarran was heavily involved in this and as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee had great power and he used it for the former Dollar stockholders.

In any event, they filed a suit against the United States for return of the stock. This suit was filed before a U.S. District Judge named

[182]

Goodman on the West Coast, who McCarran had cleared in the Judiciary Committee despite the stout objections of the legal community in that district. He could do this as chairman of the Judiciary Committee. Thus, we had this case to defend in the Civil Division. Well, the most imperative thing I had to do first in defending was to get depositions from Joe Kennedy about what had happened when he granted the loan.

So, I wrote him a very polite letter and told him the situation and stated that from the records I was sure that he would recall and probably kept copies of the papers on this Dollar Steamship deal. I asked if he would please advise me when one of my deputies could come and get a full statement of this and then after we had gone over it and discussed it with him, we'd take his depositions. I waited two weeks and didn't get any answer. I called his office in Boston, and they'd say, "He's not here," and that they

[183]

didn't know where he was. Well, I got mad and I called Edgar Hoover and said, "Edgar, find Joe Kennedy, and it's imperative." I told him he hadn't answered my letter. And I will say for Edgar, he did all right.

Hoover called back later and said, "He's gone to his home in Palm Beach."

So, with that -- oh, no, prior to that. I did call him, and got him once in Boston and I said, "Mr. Kennedy, you have a letter from me."

He said, "Yes."

Well, I said, "I haven't heard from you, and this is a matter of very considerable urgency and you are the key to this. I will send my men at your convenience to meet wherever you like, at your office or wherever, so that we can get the facts down, and then look to taking your depositions." I said, "I don't understand why you haven't answered my letter."

[184]

He said, "Oh now, son, just don't get excited, now I've been busy."

Well, that made me mad and I said, "Well, Mr. Kennedy, I don't mean to be "uppity," but I've been busy too, and this is some business that you should remember and which is of concern to the Government of the United States. This is why I'm seeking the facts for you approved this mortgage."

And he said, "Well, don't lecture me."

And I said, "No, I had no intention of doing so, will you give me a date?"

He said, "I'll give you a call and let you know."

Well, I figured I'd let it go and I waited two days and he didn't call me and when I called him in Boston, they said they did not know where he was, etc. So then I called Edgar again, "Where is he?" He then advised me that Kennedy

[185]

had jumped and gone down to his home in Palm Beach. By that time I was thoroughly mad. So, I called and got him on the phone. He said, "How did you find me?"

I said, "This makes no difference Mr. Kennedy. I'm in a hell of a hurry and I want to get your deposition very promptly. I'm putting two of my best men on the plane right now. They're going to be in Palm Beach in the morning at the Post Office Building there where I have their offices set up. They're going to take your deposition at 10 a.m. and I request most respectfully that you attend."

Well he said, "I -- uh -- ah," and he hummed you know, "well, do you have to go to all this trouble?"

I said, "Yes sir, it's got to be done." Then he hung up.

I sent my boys there and they called back

[186]

the next day and said he wasn't there."

"Wasn't he at his home?"

"Nobody would tell us where he was."

So, I called Edgar again, I said, "Find Joe Kennedy."

Well, it took them about half a day and I didn't hear until the next morning. When I got in I called Edgar and he said, "We found him, he's at the docks in New York to board the *Queen Mary* and he's going to England."

I said, "Thank you very much."

So then without consulting anybody about it since I had been for a time acting head of Immigration I called Ed [Edward J.] Shaughnessy, who was head of the Immigration Division in New York. I said, "Ed, Joe Kennedy's on the docks getting ready to get on the *Queen Mary*. I'm instructing you and the FBI, through Edgar Hoover, to 'sequester' him, put him in one of your examination rooms and hold him, on my

[187]

authority." And I said, "Blame me. It's on my authority."

He said, "Good God, Graham, you really want him to be locked up?"

I said, "Yes, sir, you fail and I'll have your hide." I called Edgar and told him the same thing.

He said, "You're really kind of worked up."

I said, "Edgar, I haven't got time to chat, now please do it."

So, they put him in there. By 10 o'clock I had a call from Joe Kennedy. He said, "Young man, I'm going to have your hide nailed on the wall."

I said, "That's most interesting, Mr. Kennedy, I have in mind hanging yours on the wall."

He said, "I'm calling the President of the United States right now and you'll be fired."

[188]

I said, "That's just fine, you do that!"

And as soon as I hung up, I called Matt Connelly and I said, "I've got a matter of some little urgency I'd like to see the President about. Can you work me in?"

He said, "Yes, you come over in the next 30 minutes and I'll get you in."

So I went over to the White House. I was quite worked up but felt the President should know the facts. I told this entire story to the President and he started laughing! He said, "This is the thing that Joe Kennedy has needed all of his life and you're the first hard-rock that ever had the guts to do it." He said, "I'm on your side, I hope to hell he does call." He never called.

HESS: He didn't call.

MORISON: No sir. And we took Kennedy's statement

[189]

which, at best, was vague. Then that went all the way through the courts, but after I left the Civil Division, I always felt "left out" because the Dollar lawyers put the Solicitor General, who was Phil Perlman, as Acting Attorney General, the acting head of the Civil Division who succeeded me (my deputy Newell Clapp) in contempt of court here for refusing to turn the stock over to the Dollar group. It was just the most outrageous damn thing that ever occurred. I just can't think of a man who had been given every accolade and high office in the Federal Government, for him to do this. And this is not generally known. Now where are we?

HESS: Well, we might sum up what happened to the Dollar Steamship Line.

MORISON: What happened to the daggone thing was that through McCarran, the subsequent administration,

[190]

the Eisenhower administration, made the Department of Justice effect a withdrawal of the action, and by that it was a "giveaway." And I found out later after I left the Department when I went out and I was asked to come out to see the editor of the Las Vegas *Times*, [H.M.J Greenspun, who Senator McCarran had sued for libel -- that the way that he had found out that Pat McCarran was paid off, he would not go to Las Vegas, he would go to Reno. There would be on this occasion -- one table cleared, and he would play roulette, and would win maybe a hundred thousand dollars, and even though the Internal Revenue people were right there, that's how he got paid off.

HESS: All prearranged.

MORISON: Yes, and you know that libel suit finally caved in on him. But subsequently, I had my run-in with McCarran just before I resigned, and I'll

[191]

tell you that in the end of this thing.

HESS: All right, we will keep matters in chronological order.

MORISON: Right.

HESS: One thing we might discuss for a few moments is what would you see as the landmark cases in antitrust during the years that you were head of the Division?

MORISON: The suit that had been long-pending, because John Cahill the head of the firm which prior to World War II was Cotton & Franklin, Cahill had been U.S. Attorney and later became a junior partner of that firm. Young Cotton, who was then head of the firm, had become a staff officer under General Patton in the war. When he got back and went to go in his office, here was this guy Cahill sitting on his desk. He'd just taken

[192]

over, and he, Cotton, left the firm and all the old members of the firm joined him and formed a new firm. I mean it was that kind of a, you know, unscrupulous guy.

Now I told you about his walking the corridors of the Antitrust Division and was reported to say, "Well, what are you fellows doing about RCA," and of course, they, you know, smiled at him and laughed at him. They said, "Well, you know you're wasting your time. I suppose you're earning your pay, you'll never get it off of the ground, boy," because he'd been the man that put John Sonnett in as head of the Antitrust Division. And when Sonnett was there everything was quiet as to filing an antitrust suit against RCA. Nothing was done, and I found all of this out because as the head of the Civil Division I had a case where a brigadier general in the Signal Corps had resigned and he had secured

[193]

patents which belonged to the Government for he had done this work on Government time. He was made a vice president of a division of RCA to bring those patents with him for transfer to RCA. They had to do with radar and high frequency modulation and the various other things involving electronics. And I tried to find some tool to bring a civil fraud suit against him and RCA, but there wasn't any way that such a suit could be entertained. So when I got to Antitrust, I called my staff together, and we got to know each other. I brought with me my partner Sam Abrams and Newell Clapp, who had been my deputy in the Civil Division. I said, "There's one job that's number one. I want that RCA case filed right now. I want the Economic Division and I want the two trial divisions in here by Monday to discuss the case in depth," -- this was on Tuesday - "with everything they have in their files

[194]

on it, and I'll want a draft complaint drawn and filed as promptly as possible but I want it to be started with a Grand Jury investigation of all of the files of RCA."

Well, I initiated the Grand Jury and it caused quite a commotion, but it stuck. It stuck! They tried to have the Grand Jury dismissed and to be relieved from producing their files, but lost. I went up

and was right on hand on every major move in the case, and they were penalized criminally. Thereafter, they consented to a civil decree to remedy their wrongs. After all their documents were finally delivered to the Grand Jury, we found all the evidence and they were enjoined in a separate civil action and compelled to withdraw their patent claims on many patents and were enjoined from continuing the many illegal practices established. For instance, they had cut off Commander MacDonald,

[195]

the president of Zenith, who had patents on radio, high frequency and television which they had preempted. So, I had that RCA case, that was one of real importance.

Second, was the so-called International Oil Cartel case, everybody else was afraid to file it but I filed it.

The third was the suit against International Business Machines Corporation; and finally the case against AT&T, which the Republicans, under Brownell, settled out of court when Brownell was Attorney General.

HESS: How interested was Tom Clark in antitrust matters?

MORISON: He was quite interested in them, he never once "bucked me." The same is true of Howard McGrath. He said, "When I brought both civil and criminal actions for his approval and signature --

[196]

if you say to sign this, I'll sign it, because I trust you." Tom Clark was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division when he was named Attorney General.

HESS: How about James McGranery?

MORISON: Oh, that's a different story.

HESS: He was not as interested in what was going on?

MORISON: Oh, listen that story is just terrible. And the President told me on this trip I made with him to Washington & Lee University...

HESS: ...in 1950.

MORISON: He said, "That was the greatest mistake of my life." Meaning his selection of Jim McGranery to succeed Howard McGrath as Attorney General.

HESS: How did he get that appointment?

MORISON: I'll tell you why, he was Deputy Attorney

[197]

General when I came into the Department. Tom Clark had to keep him on. He'd been a Congressman from Pennsylvania. Roosevelt had promised him, so he said, that he would appoint him to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the -- that embraces Pennsylvania.

HESS: The Third Circuit.

MORISON: The Third Circuit. Jim was not doing his work, he was drinking a lot and he was a thorn in Tom Clark's flesh because McGranery went to President Truman and said, "I want to know if you will honor what Roosevelt promised."

And Truman said, "If you say he did, why, of course, we will."

We went to the Pennsylvania delegation and they said, "We will absolutely not permit him to do that, we will not do it." So he was blocked and Tom Clark offered him a position on the

[198]

United States Court of Appeals here for the District of Columbia and he wouldn't take it. Now he was dominated by his wife Rowena, who was a lawyer. When the President fired Howard McGrath, and I -- boy, I worked with Howard for months saying, "Howard, you've got to move," and this investigation by Newbold Morris was in progress, and I said, "This guy Morris I knew in New York." I said, "He is a pip-squeak and all he wants is headlines."

HESS: Howard McGrath brought him in didn't he?

MORISON: No, he was suggested to the White House and then the White House suggested him to McGrath who had to accept him. Somebody who -- he was an independent. I tried to get Howard to move, I said, "Howard, you've just got to move," and I laid five different plans of action for him to consider and "get on the ball." He was just demoralized and could not move. He had been

[199]

Solicitor General and a good one. He had been chairman of the Democratic National Committee, he had been Senator from Rhode Island and was liked all over, but his idea was to "keep your tail down" and not do much, because he wanted -- expected to be nominated as the Catholic member when the next vacancy occurred on the Supreme Court. But he was being crowded by this and didn't realize it was time to strike. Well, he was fired, and I had a dinner out at my home for him, and all Department officials and it was more like a wake.

But, I found out from Matt Connelly, who was a great friend of Howard McGrath's, they are both Irishers and liked to drink together you know, and this, that, and the other. But, coming back to McGranery before he was nominated, Tom Clark insisted, "Graham, you've got to get him off my back."

[200]

I went down to his office one day and I said, "Jim, I've been thinking about this 'hangup' on this promise given you by President Roosevelt about the Court of Appeals." I said, "You know, I've never wanted judicial office," but I said, "have you ever thought about what kind of life you'd lead?" I said, "It may be an honor, but don't you realize that as a Circuit Court judge on the Court of Appeals, you will be with a bunch of old men, you will not hear the witnesses, you will not hear the argument of counsel on both sides as you would in a District Court, which are the things that to me would be exciting. You would sit there and read transcripts until your eyes give out," and I said, "who can you socialize with? Nobody but these judges," and I said, "For Christ sake Jim, you don't want a life like that, it'll kill you."

HESS: What did he say?

[201]

MORISON: He said, "Well, I hadn't even thought about that."

I said, "Jim, the reason I say that is this, I can get the Attorney General to appoint you to the vacancy on the Federal District Court up there in Philadelphia, and hell, there you'd be in the forum you like."

He said, "Good God, can you do it?"

I said, "Jim, I'll promise you if you'll let me do it, because I don't want you hung up, I know you're hung up."

He said, "Well, boy, go to it," he said, "will the Attorney General do this?"

I said, "Yes sir, I'll go right now." I said, "I hadn't talked to him," I had to lie. I reported this to Tom and we got him confirmed. I got him through the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Well, out of the 28 decisions he rendered, I think, only four were sustained on appeal, those

[202]

that were appealed.

But, Matt said every weekend McGranery and his wife, Rowena, would come to Washington and he'd go over and sit outside of President Truman's office with Matt for a chance to get in and say "hello" to the President and keep this thing going.

When the President got mad, he failed to counsel with others whose judgment he trusted; he often made mistakes, for he lost his sense of values. I think he did the same thing about Lamar Caudle, because he didn't take enough time to seek out all the facts.

HESS: So when he fired McGrath...

MORISON: Why, he called Matt Connelly in and he said, "I've just called Howard McGrath and fired him. Matt, who in hell will I appoint?"

And Matt said, "Well, I should have said to

[203]

the President, 'Why don't you call Graham Morison or let me ask him for his opinion?'" but, "I said, 'Well, Mr. Truman, our old friend is right outside the door here, Jim McGranery.'"

"Well, bring him in."

And McGranery -- it was a Republican dominated Congress then, if you'll remember -- he went to Senator McCarran for help and McCarran said, "I will see you through the Judiciary Committee and get you confirmed as Attorney General, but you've got to do the following: You shall dismiss the Dollar Steamship case, you will get four pending antitrust cases dismissed -- the RCA case, the IBM case, and the International Oil Cartel case. If you promise to do this, I'll get you through," and McGranery without hesitation said he would comply to McCarran's demands.

And I found out about this through two friends who were Senior Staff Aides to the Judiciary

[204]

Committee of the Senate.

HESS: Did he try to dismiss those cases when he became Attorney General?

MORISON: Oh, he kept calling me up to his office. "Do this, do that."

And I said, "I won't, Mr. Attorney General, and here's why." I wrote him detailed memorandas explaining that the cases involved were clear cut violations of the law fully supported by facts carefully gathered by a lengthy investigation which were obtained before these actions were filed. It took years of hard work in the Antitrust Division to get these cases filed and they involved monopolization which was brutal and justified criminal action. And then McGranery began to send word around, "Well, I'll get his hide." And who was sitting right next to him? Rowena, telling him who he had to get rid of!

[205]

HESS: Was your name high on that list?

MORISON: Oh yes, because...

HESS: You were not one of Rowena's favorites?

MORISON: Oh, no! I never made up to Jim or his wife, or to anyone else. Back when I filed these criminal suits that he talked about, I had a call from Senator McCarran's "paramour," who was his secretary and a "good Catholic." He, I learned, wanted the Attorney General to appoint her as a municipal judge here in the District. It never got off the ground!

HESS: Wanted his girl friend appointed as judge?

MORISON: Yes. Yes, she was his head secretary. She called me and said, "The Senator wishes me to tell you that he wishes you to dismiss all these cases."

[206]

And I said, "Well, I thank you for your call, but in my official position as head of the Antitrust Division, I cannot talk to an intermediary. If the Senator wants to talk to me about it on the phone have him call me," and hung up.

And then he called back and roared, "Why in the hell didn't you listen to what my secretary told you?"

I said, "Senator, because I wanted to hear it from you. I couldn't believe it:"

"Now," he said, "I tell you. You get these cases dismissed or I'll 'have your hide'."

And I said, "Well, Senator," -- I tried to keep my temper -- "I very much appreciate the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's suggestions and ideas about important antitrust matters. But I must tell you, sir, that I am a constitutional officer sworn to uphold the obligations and duties of my office and these

[207]

cases were filed after approval of the Attorney General of the United States, and only he can take the action you demand. You can't impose it upon me."

He said, "I'll have your hide."

I said, "All right. I am ready."

So then I went over to see the President and I told him about this, and he said, "Great heavens above, boy, you've got sand," he said, "You're the first one that ever told that 's.o.b.' off I can remember." He said, "He's the cruddiest old guy in the Congress that's fawned upon by the big boys and he ain't worth a damn." He said, "Just stick to your guns!"

So, after this thing came about, I waited until I knew the President was out of town, because I knew what he would say to me, "I'm not going to let McGranery do anything to you." I didn't want him to do that, I didn't

[208]

want to embarrass him a bit. I waited until he was out of town and I went over to the White House on a Saturday. The only people there were Don Dawson and Marty Friedman, and I told him, "I'm going to resign."

They said, "You can't do this."

I said, "Yes, I can."

Well they said, "You've got to see the President."

I said, "I understand he's out of town."

"Well, can't you wait until he gets back home?"

I said, "No, sir."

And they said, "Well, we will put you on the Court of Appeals."

I said, "I don't want to be a judge, I never have wanted to be one. I like to be in the 'pit,' in the fight, I don't want to be a judge." We spent an hour discussing this. Finally, I said, "Look, if you don't accept this, I'm

[209]

going right down to the press room and put it on the wire."

So, they "hemmed and hawed" and I said, "I'm gone!" I went down to the press room and gave my statement, which I had carefully written out and I left my letter to the President with them...

HESS: Your resignation.

MORISON: Yes, addressed to the President, telling him that it was with regret that I felt that as he had long known I wished to resign after I'd established the Office of Economic Stabilization, but at his request I had accepted appointment as head of the Antitrust Division, because Congress has just enacted a law requiring examination by the Antitrust Division of all sales of plants constructed by the Government in World War II as to its antitrust implications as to those who should bid to buy those plants as

[210]

it related to monopoly of potential purchasers." He said, "You're the only man that's got the competence to handle this."

Well, I couldn't say "no" to him, I couldn't say "no" when he said Economic Stabilization. So...

HESS: Your resignation came in June of '52. McGranery was appointed Attorney General in May of '52, one month before.

MORISON: That's right.

HESS: How much of a bearing on your resignation in June was McGranery's appointment in May?

MORISON: Direct!

HESS: You had all you could take from McGranexy.

MORISON: I knew him too well. I knew he was dominated by his wife. As I previously stated, through my friends on the staff of the Judiciary Committee,

[211]

I was aware of what was going on.

HESS: Did you feel like you were getting pushed out?

MORISON: Well, it wasn't a question of being pushed out. I knew that I would not put the burden on the President to "un-do" actions by McGranery as I have detailed. Happily, after my resignation only the *Dollar Steamship* case was dismissed -- but not by McGranery. It was accomplished by Senator McCarran!"

What else?

HESS: Oh, we've got a few other subjects to cover. We have for another session. Do you want to cut it off?

MORISON: Well, why don't you cut it off?

HESS: All right, let's cut it off.

[212]

Third Oral History Interview with H. Graham Morison, Washington, D.C., August 10, 1972. By Jerry N. Hess, Harry S. Truman Library.

HESS: To begin this afternoon, sir, you were just recounting a story before we turned the machine on, would you tell me about that?

MORISON: Yes, Mr. Hess. After I had completed the trial proceedings of the second "John Lewis case," the United Mine Workers case, I was physically and emotionally tired. And shortly after that, Attorney General Clark invited me to attend, with my wife, a small dinner of various members of the Cabinet -- not a Cabinet meeting or dinner -- that Dean Acheson was having. And apparently at his request I was invited. During the course of the dinner, Dean Acheson spoke to Attorney General Clark and said about as follows:

"Tom, I don't understand it, your assistant looks kind of 'peaked,' what's the matter, is he

[213]

off his feed?"

And this was deadpan.

And Attorney General Clark said, "I don't really know. I've noticed it too, Dean, but I just don't know what's wrong, maybe he is off his feed. I don't whether," he called my wife Miss Bea, "whether Miss Bea's feeding him right, or what," and she was about to speak up and I shushed her.

And he said, "Well, you know, this is a good time to get him back on his feet. I just happened to think of it. The Department of State has got to select a chairman of the American delegation to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland," and he said, "Why don't I just appoint him as chairman, for if he can easily take on John Lewis he can take that on." And he further said, "He can take his wife. It will be at the expense

[214]

of the Government, and he will have a staff. He can go there when the meeting convenes and appear the first day for the amenities and the last day, and in between that time his staff can take over, and he and his wife can have a little vacation."

Well, I didn't open my mouth, but Attorney General Clark said, "That's a good idea and I will try to convince him to do it."

Well, it was arranged and I took my mother, who was then about 70, who had never been to Europe. We went on the *George Washington*, a Government ship, and were given the only stateroom on the ship, it was a transport ship. And we were met in France by the head of the FBI and an officer at the Embassy in Paris, Horton Telford, who remains as a very close and devoted friend of mine from that meeting and to the present.

[215]

I had about two weeks for me to show my wife and my mother around Paris. At the end of the fifth day, however, my wife wanted to go up and visit a childhood friend from Washington who was on the staff of the Embassy in Norway, and Mother and I were left there. And being Scotch in my proclivities, as head of the Civil Division of the Department of Justice, I had just gone through a thorough review of an admiralty case pending in the Civil Division, which was a most amazing case. Admiralty law has always been an area of law in which I'm not well-versed. However, the head of the Admiralty Section had recommended settlement of the case. This didn't make common sense to me on the facts.

The facts were these: The Isbrandtsen Steamship Line had leased, under the program established, a brand new Liberty ship from the United States Government tied up in Europe. To

[216]

add "frosting" on that deal, they exacted and got the contract to pick up at Essen in Germany, the port of Essen, the excess railroad rails of the Army, and spikes, railroad equipment, and new steam and diesel engines, as well as some freight cars, and the Line was to take all of this to Korea. The Isbrandtsen Line on this trip was also engaged in a tramp steamer operation.

I found out in going over the matter with the head of the Admiralty Division, that the facts were that the captain who was sent by the Isbrandtsen Line to command the ship, after loading the

railroad cargo at Essen, sailed to the Port of Antwerp in Belgium and there on the second day, and when the ship was tied up and during a blinding rain storm that evening, he told his officers and crew that he was leaving the ship and that they were to notify the officers of the Isbrandtsen Line in New York by cable of his action -- without explanation. The Isbrandtsen

[217]

Line then flew in from New York, another skipper.

The loading then was completed after the third or fourth day, and the ship proceeded on "tramp operations" to ports of France and Spain and then into the Mediterranean. The ship finally reached the port of Genoa in Italy. And there it was tied up for three days at the quay; one ship was on the other side of the quay from it. And on the third day that ship exploded. It killed about five people, wiped out that quay and damaged the ship in the other berth. Whereupon, the Isbrandtsen Line, although it was insured by Lloyds, brought suit against the United States for the full payment of the cargo that was not property of the United States, and the full charge for transporting the destroyed rail equipment, and for the loss of their anticipated operation of the ship to Korea. This was to me a brazen travesty. So I asked the head of the Admiralty

[218]

Section and said, "What happened on the ship at the Port of Antwerp?" and "Have you had any FBI investigation of it?"

He said, "No, we got the U.S. Embassy, we couldn't get the FBI, they said they didn't have any people there." This of course was not true, Mr. Hoover just didn't want to do this sort of work apparently.

So, I said, "Well, who went?"

"Well, we got the Embassy to send some of their people down."

I blew up and said, "You mean the striped pants boys were going down to the wharfs there, to try to ask questions?"

And they said, "Well, that's all we could do, and we've got to settle."

I said, "Don't. I'm going to Europe, don't make any move. I'm going to find out about this."

[219]

So, I had some friends in Paris who agreed to take care of my mother while I'd look into this matter. My wife flew to Norway at that time for a visit, and I went to Horton Telford at the U.S. Embassy who was head of the FBI there and said, "How can I find out about this?"

And he said that the one way, if I wanted to try it, was to go up to Brussels, Belgium and have a conference with the head of the Belgian National Police, M. Anton Louage, who was a "Flem," who'd come up from a cop on the beat, and was then and still is considered to be the greatest

policeman in Europe. He was an honest and highly intelligent man. Subsequently, after his retirement, he was the only man who ever was elected head of INTERPOL for three terms.

I then got a Navy commander stationed at Trieste, who had been the investigative naval officer of the explosion, obtained an Army limousine, and I took my mother, and Mr. Telford,

[220]

and the commander, and we drove to Brussels, to the Palace de Justiste, and by arrangement met with M. Louage. And when I walked in and was introduced to him, I noticed he had a beautiful office. I noticed most particularly the many beautiful color etchings on the walls. They were exquisite. And in all honesty, and not trying to patronize him, I asked who was the artist that had done those beautiful etchings and he laughed and said, "I did them."

And I said, "Well, this is a strange thing for a policeman who's come up through the ranks to have such artistic talents."

"Well," he said, "it's a strange thing how this came about, and an important chapter in my life. In World War I, I was an intelligence officer in the Belgian Army. My subaltern was the greatest etcher in Belgium at that time. We were captured and interned by the Germans and they provided us with materials and he

[221]

taught me to etch in prison. And people say that every line I make is a duplication of the line that he made," but he said, "I have enjoyed it very much."

Well, this gave us a degree of rapport and I put my problem to him. Mr. Telford wasn't sure that he would do it, but he finally said, "Belgium owes the United States and its people the greatest debt that it owes any other people in the world. The United States has saved Belgium twice, and anything the Belgian Government can do to help the United States, it will do."

Well, I was elated. After that, M. Louage called his wife and his daughter, who had been an army nurse with the French Army, and he took me, my mother and Mr. Telford and his family to lunch at a famous restaurant of his choice, a very small one, which served the food he enjoyed. Following that I found out through Mr.

[222]

Telford that he put together not only the national police who were under his direct jurisdiction, but also a great number of city and provincial police over which he also had jurisdiction. He got the best detectives who were familiar with this major port city of Belgium, and they were in all about three hundred men. They started at 2 o'clock in the morning, in a cordon about three, three and a half miles in circumference, and moved slowly into the dock center of Antwerp and interviewed every person, whether they were in bed or not. And by the time they got to the docks, they had the answer.

What had happened was, the Isbrandtsen Line had given secret instructions to the first "Skipper" of the Liberty ship (which he would not follow), to load metal containers of sulfuric acid and agricultural nitrate, which in a vessel

[223]

of this type is considered a dangerous cargo and which as such entitles the crew to a higher "hazard" pay. And clearly what had happened, when the tramp operations began from Antwerp to Genoa, the seas were rough at some places, and there was an acid erosion of the metal drums which were mislabeled, and when it settled, the nitrate and sulfuric acid met and it was like a "time bomb" and blew the ship up. So, that case was promptly settled. I kept in touch with Mr. Louage for many, many years.

When I came back I went to the White House and talked to President Truman and told him this story and I said, "Mr. President, I would like for the United States to do something special for this great man." I said, "He's considered the greatest policeman in all of Europe and the only honest one." I said, "One mark of his validity is that Edgar Hoover is so

[224]

jealous of him that he will not allow the FBI to join INTERPOL because he thinks he overshadows him."

And he said, "What did you have in mind?"

And I said, "Well, I think we had ought to have him over here. There's bound to be some fund we can use to get foreign dignitaries over here and encourage goodwill. And he told me if he ever got to America he wanted to go see Hollywood, and he also wanted to go to New Orleans because they spoke French there," and I said, "I would like to have him come as the guest of our Government."

He said, "You just call Dean Acheson and tell him I said to do it."

And M. Louage came. He stayed at our home and then he went on the grand tour. We had a State Department emissary to go with him, and he had the time of his life. I asked him if I could get him

[225]

anything special, and found he was interested in the new Land camera, you know the one that is now -- what's the one that you take...

HESS: Polaroid Land camera?

MORISON: Yes, Polaroid. I got him one of the first.

After this Admiralty case was successfully concluded in Belgium, which delighted me, my mother and my wife and I then went by the "Blue Train" to Geneva, and my staff were already there.

We got together and went to see the offices at the old League of Nations. And the program that Dean Acheson had suggested was fine, but, I sat next to the Russian Ambassador to Switzerland there was one other Communist bloc representative, a Count from Poland who privately told me he was 'under the gun,' that they'd assassinate him if he didn't stay with them, and after I left the Department of Justice, I helped to obtain

[226]

for him political asylum in the United States and he died here.

But in any event, the first order of business was to elect a chairman. Among the delegates, I met and made a lifetime friend of the Danish representative, Baron Heinrich Zetphew-Adler, who guided me as to the expected amenities. We elected [Yakov] Malik as chairman. And then the Russian Ambassador, who sat next to me, insisted that the accepted order of international conferences be changed, and that translations not be limited to English and French, but English, French and Russian. Chairman Malik, in order to avoid a controversy I assume, ruled that that would be accepted. The meetings lasted from 10 in the morning until noon, when we went to lunch.

After the preliminaries, then the amenities, the Russian Ambassador asked to be recognized.

[227]

For an hour and fifteen minutes, or more, he engaged in a vilification of the United States. He stated that it was the most corrupt nation in the world; that it talks about liberty but are ever the aggressors, that they had stolen much of the territory which the Russians really had won by the blood of their soldiers; that they were immoral; that they had blocked freedom throughout the world; that capitalism was its dominant interest, and was the facade of freedom, while capital ruled the masses.

I became madder and madder and madder. He finally concluded ten minutes late, after the 12 noon hour.

I had nothing to say and sat for awhile and stewed. I had planned to follow the program as Secretary Acheson had suggested, to let my staff take over, because I had arranged for my wife, who is a Catholic, to have a private audience with

[228]

the Pope, and my mother agreed that she would like to go to Rome with her, and I was also going with them. But I then called my wife at the hotel and told her that I was going to work late and that I could not go to Rome.

I had a Scotch lady, about forty or forty-five, as a secretary, who was very able, and I was at the League of Nations office until about 12:30 that night. I drew what a country lawyer would call "a demand for a bill of particulars," and having carefully timed the translation in all three languages that interrupts when you speak, say, two minutes or three minutes, I timed it properly. And I took on Russia from the Mongol hordes, Ivan the Terrible, Katherine the so-called "great," all of the

brutality of the czars, the effect of [Aleksandr Feodorovich] Kerensky's short term, followed by Lenin, the various members of the Politburo that followed

[229]

until Stalin, who was then in power. And I spoke of the depravity of that government in the suppression of every morsel of freedom of the people in Russia and its satellite countries; their suppression, their lack of food, their lack of any ability to exercise initiative, their world-wide espionage and their commercial espionage. I covered every aspect of Russia's policies and its depraved government that I could think of. And before the adjournment time of 12 noon came, the Russian Ambassador just couldn't take it, he got up and left!

Following this, and at the adjournment of the meeting, all of the members except the chairman, Malik, trooped up to my office and they said, "This is the finest thing that has ever happened. If the United States in these conferences, in the United Nations and elsewhere, would hit Russia right on the nose and not take any sass from them, they'll retreat. But

[230]

they said, "We can't do it because we live right next door to them, and they can take attrition against us, military or otherwise." So they said, "The program that all of us here have agreed upon (which I had discussed with them), you've got to lead the fight if we are to succeed."

Well, I battled it out and we did win it, and we as a majority got everything that we sought to meet the tragic problems of displaced persons. Thus, it was that our recommendations were adopted by the Economic and Social Council and sent to the United Nations where they were ratified.

During the course of this, however, there was some publicity that came out of Geneva, which got into the *Herald-Tribune* and *New York Times* and other papers, about the American representative "taking off" on the Russian Ambassador, and I had a call from Jim Webb, who

[231]

was then Deputy-Under Secretary of State, I guess, saying that I should "ease off."

So I said, "Jim, I'm here and you're not. Now, the President and Dean Acheson sent me here, and you and I are old friends," (he was attached to the Aviation Division of the Marine Corps, I had known him slightly before that) but I said, "I appreciate your calling me. I'll think about it, but I'm not going to make any retractions, let that be clear, if you want to replace me, go see Dean Acheson."

"Oh," he said, "I don't want to do that, but," he said, "you'll hear from me."

Well I then put in a call for Charlie Murphy and related very quickly to him that I just could not take this vilification of my country and that I had this call from Jim Webb and what should I do about it.

He said, "Well, I'll go see the Boss if you

[232]

want me to," meaning President Truman, "but," he said, "I don't think I need to, I know what he's going to say. If you're over there hammering those Russians, you've got the guts to do what most of our striped-pants boys don't have."

And I said, "Well, would you at least mention it to him and if you get any kick-back and he wants anything else done, let me know, but I'm not going to retreat, but he or Dean Acheson can replace me."

He said, "No, you're not going to be replaced, you go ahead." So that ended that.

HESS: Do you think our dealings with the Russians would have been more successful if more people in the State Department had exhibited a sterner attitude as you had done?

MORISON: I'm not enough versed in diplomacy to know. I did this without any regard to diplomatic policy. I was just outraged as an American

[233]

citizen.

This had been my first experience in anything involving American diplomacy, or representing the United States in an international organization, but I couldn't sit still and have this vilification of our country. I don't know, this is a very intricate thing. I do know this, that that Russian Ambassador was replaced right after this thing was over, and the Swiss government moved in and cut down the size of their staff to about one-third...

HESS: Of what it had been.

MORISON: ...of what it had been before, because it was clear that it was engaged in espionage.

It was an interesting assignment in any event, and the accomplishments were rewarding, and I was extremely grateful to have this experience.

[234]

I also saw President Truman at a Democratic rally, with members of the Cabinet and others, and the officers of the Democratic committee, at the Mayflower Hotel. He came over to me and said that he had heard from Charlie Murphy and from Dean Acheson that I let that Russian "have it" over there. He said it pleased him mightily but he hadn't gotten around to telling me and wanted me to know. That was a great experience and I am deeply grateful to Dean Acheson.

I had a great affection for Dean Acheson and a high regard for his capacities. I think this was because of the fact that he was a profound lawyer, and he was quite interested in the manner in which I handled these difficult cases, against John Lewis, and in time I came to know him and we found our common bond in our affection and deep admiration for President

[235]

Truman. We remained close and devoted friends until he died, and I admire him above most men I've ever known.

HESS: On the subject of the political events of 1948, did you go to the convention in Philadelphia that year?

MORISON: Yes, I did. I was on the platform committee for antitrust, I did not go that time as a delegate, because a delegate's position is too confining and I wanted to have "floor room."

There was a lot of speculation in the press and elsewhere that there was a "dump Truman" movement, but that was like a soap bubble that burst in the first wind, because the hard core of the Democratic Party had recognized, in President Truman, his quality of forthrightness, how he had grown in office, and removed himself from the shadow of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and became

[236]

his own man and accepted the awesome responsibility of the Presidency -- as he put it, "The Buck Stops Here."

He also understood politics, he understood the needs and necessities of political parties and that what was needed for the Democratic Party was to find a manner of bringing what some of the sophisticates would call the "social compact," meaning regardless of race, religion, or otherwise, you seek to find those common denominators of need which will bind people together in common. They may not agree on all things, but the basic things, if they are a part of the party's thrust of accomplishments this silent agreement is the absolutely essential quality for a political party to succeed.

I remember most -- he of course, appeared after his nomination, there were others nominated as the record will show. Alben Barkley made the keynote address and Barkley was at his very best

[237]

that night. The thing I shall recall the most was that after this keynote address, and his subsequent introduction of the nominee, the President of the United States, they released doves that were flying all over the place, and all of the rock-bottom Trumanites that I knew would say that, "We hope Alben didn't have anything to do with that, and that those birds hadn't been fed." But that was...

HESS: Those birds were released from a big flower "Liberty Bell."

MORISON: From the platform, and these were doves flying all over the place. It was quite an event:

HESS: I'll bet. Do you remember anything particular of the writing of that particular plank, the antitrust plank for the platform, was there any difficulty?

[238]

MORISON: No, there wasn't because I soon found out that President Truman, when being consulted about the platform had said, "Well now, Morison's been in that office and he has really burnt the woods up, and he has a good feeling for the absolutely essential importance of antitrust. It's got to be strengthened. It's got to have vigorous enforcement." That was reported to me by the chairman of the committee.

He said that President Truman had said, "You know if you read Claude Bowers and his biography of Jefferson, the first place it's found that I've ever read, Claude Bowers speaks of Jefferson's talk with his friends Madison and Mason in which he said, 'You know, the Constitution, and now the bill of rights, guarantee individual freedom, but coextensive with that,' Jefferson reminded them, 'unless it is accompanied by the protection of individual freedom of one's

[239]

person or property, or economic freedom, you're denying the other half of the meaning of freedom.'" That observation by President Truman was a great statement of the meaning of individual freedom. I used that statement many, many times in speeches I made about the purpose of the antitrust laws and its enforcement: that is that it, economic freedom, is immutably related to personal liberty and freedom. The campaign after that, of course, is well-known to history.

HESS: Well, there's one further thing I wanted to mention. There was a plank over which some difficulty arose over, the civil rights plank.

MORISON: Yes.

HESS: The Andrew Biemiller-Hubert Humphrey civil rights plank.

MORISON: Right.

[240]

HESS: Were you there at the time that some Southern delegates walked out?

MORISON: Yes. Yes, but I -- one of them was the state of Virginia and I knew a lot of those delegates, they were all "quasi-Democrats," they were more Republican than they were Democrats. The Governor then was I believe John Battle, I'm not sure, I think it was, and he was against any "walkout." Now he did walk out in '60 on the platform issues. That was when Lindsay Almond was Governor, but there was this -- yes, I was there. I had never thought of it in the terms of bitterness that would affect people who as delegates should have possessed a broader spectrum of political understanding from the various communities in which they resided in the states.

This was an inevitable gap in our constitutional promise, long been deferred. The only

[241]

leverage as to the denial of the Negro's civil rights the Government then had were the bills enacted after the end of the War Between the States, providing voting rights to Negroes. At the end of the War Between the States, and during "reconstruction," the Congress enacted bills to prevent the southern states from denying the Negroes, as citizens, from voting and holding public office. It was a better time for the economic and political control of these states remaining with the white citizens. The Negro, however, was denied the right to vote or to hold land and he had no social status. The very few states that provided access to public school to Negroes were conducted by underpaid teachers and designated dilapidated cabins or frame buildings as Negro schools. All of these things were brought out at the hearings on the civil rights bills. I began then to

[242]

understand that this was the last stand of the "red-necks" -- the "red-necks" are the impoverished whites in the South. They were in the same boat, literally, as the Negro, except that they were accepted on a little better social level, but economically they were no better off than the Negroes. They were under the same "yoke," but failing to understand this, they took their anger out on the Negro citizens.

The proposals of the Humphrey plank were modest in their scope, but it was a beginning, and that beginning was important.

HESS: Many of the delegates from the southern states that walked out at that time later met and founded the States Rights Party. Senator J. Strom Thurmond ran as the Party's nominee.

MORISON: Right.

HESS: What effect did you think that Thurmond's candidacy, and the States Rights Party issue, would have on the outcome of the campaign?

[243]

MORISON: I had no way of measuring it, but I was afraid of its effect. You know the history from "Pitchfork" Ben Tillman and Tom Watson and the rest of that type of "windmill" orators, who preyed on the passion and prejudice. Tom Heflin was the last of that "breed" but he used Catholicism as the whip. I was measurably disturbed and I made several trips to...

HESS: During the campaign?

MORISON: ...on occasion, to go down to Birmingham to talk to friends; I went to Atlanta; I went to Memphis; to Charlotte and I went to Charleston, and...

HESS: What seemed to be the general attitude of the people in that area?

MORISON: Their general attitude was that it was going to at least split the vote very badly.

HESS: Were there any efforts that you or anyone else could have taken at the time to try to soften

[244]

the blow, to try to cut down the number of votes that eventually went to the States Rights Party?

MORISON: There was only one man that could do it, and that was the President. He would not seek any compromise with the devil." This States Rights Party came into being because of the insanity of people who seek office by stirring up latent prejudice. It's happened in our history before. I counseled against any idea that some accommodations should be made with Thurmond because I believe that such efforts would compromise the integrity of Harry Truman as a person. He did not believe in trying to compromise on basic issues.

I'm sure that some efforts were made quietly, but they were rejected, but I certainly was not privy to them, I was just trying to find out. I really didn't know, but I had in the kind of a bone marrow feeling that if the

[245]

President got thoroughly aroused by the Republican candidate, that he would be at his best, because he would not use prepared speeches, he'd talk right from his mind and heart. And when he did that, although he lacked oratorical style, he conveyed his convictions more distinctly and with greater impact than anybody I have ever heard.

HESS: Were you present at any time that he spoke during the campaign?

MORISON: I never was. I was working in various other places with state and local committees, particularly in Virginia and Tennessee and elsewhere.

HESS: There was also another party, Henry Wallace and his Progressive Party. What effect did you think they would have on the campaign?

MORISON: I really thought that it would have no

[246]

impact at all.

HESS: I think Mr. Wallace's appeal was mainly in the big cities, was it not; in the North and West?

MORISON: Well, to a degree. He was trying to zero in on his agricultural background and thought that he might get what was called the "farm bloc," but he had become too radical for farmers. He no longer could equate himself with his beginnings, plus the fact that there was -- he found out after the fact that there was a begrudging admiration for President Truman for his stand that if Wallace got out of line as a member of the Cabinet and failed to carry out the program of the President of the United States that he deserved to be dismissed from the Cabinet." So, I pretty well counted out Wallace and his candidacy as of no consequence. I felt Wallace

[247]

would probably hurt the Republican candidate more than he would President Truman.

HESS: Where were you on election night and what comes to mind when you look back on that time?

MORISON: I was so upset and worried because I knew it was going to be close, that I just wasn't fit to live with. I sent my wife up to visit friends in New York and told her that I just had to be alone. I went down to the White House, because they had all the up-to-date returns, other than you, got over radio, and stayed there for awhile and there was a lot of gloom. I then went back to my apartment near the Shoreham Hotel and had my little old radio on. Finally the vote tally came and he had won. The first thing I did, I knew where he was, I called -- there's a springs outside of...

[248]

HESS: Excelsior Springs.

MORISON: Excelsior Springs. I called Excelsior Springs, I had the number, and I got Matt Connelly, and I said, "Matt, great God, I wish I was out there, I'd like to pour a little bourbon with the Boss."

And he said, "Well, that's what we're doing!"

And I said, "Any chance I can speak with him?"

And he said, "Why, of course, you can speak with him." And he got on the phone.

I said, "Mr. President, I don't know what to say, I'm so full of myself!"

"Well," he said, "don't worry about that."

I said, "This is the greatest event that ever happened in my life. I've been straining with this thing despite Les Biffle's accurate predictions; and to think that the country might lose one of our greatest Presidents would

[249]

just be the most crushing blow of my life. From here on out it's all downhill!"

And he laughed and said, "Well, we did skunk 'em, didn't we?"

And I said, "We didn't, you did!"

HESS: He came back from Excelsior Springs fairly early that morning to the Muehlebach Hotel in Kansas City.

MORISON: That's right. Yes, that's right. And then I called my wife, it was late at night, and shared the joy with her, and I said, "You can come on home now!" I met her the next evening as

the "Congressional" came into Union Station. When she got off she said, "Your 'old adversary' in the litigation against the mine workers, John Lewis, is on the train." And she said, "He supported Dewey and on our trip down from New York, people made snide remarks to him." And

[250]

she said, "Nevertheless he was the soul of courtesy to every person who stopped him and he never lost his temper." And she said, "I felt so sorry for him, he seemed so alone."

Of course his wife was dead, so when he got off I went up and said, "Mr. Lewis, I'm Graham Morison and," I said, "I'm here to meet my wife. If you haven't made arrangements, I've got my car here, I'll be glad to drive you to your home in Alexandria."

He said, "Well, that's very, very thoughtful of you, but I have a car that's meeting me. But it's mighty generous of you to offer to take me home."

And I think I related to you that when I resigned that I had this call on the private line in my office? On a Saturday?

HESS: I don't recall.

[251]

MORISON: And this voice said, "Mr. Morison?"

I said, "Yes."

He said, "This is John Lewis."

Well, I thought somebody was pulling my leg, but I had enough sense to keep quiet, because I didn't know how anybody got my Government private number, I thought it might be some of the jokers in the White House or something. But he said, "I have just seen on the ticker tape here in my office that you have resigned as an official of the Department of Justice, and I want you to know that I feel that you've been an honest, forthright, and a very able Government lawyer, and I wish you well."

And I just said, "Thank you, sir." And I immediately called Welly Hopkins at the Mine Workers offices, and I said, "Did the boss call me?"

He said, "He sure did."

[252]

HESS: That was nice of him after all the disputes you had over the years wasn't it?

MORISON: I was really shook up. But this event reveals much about the man.

HESS: J. Howard McGrath was chairman of the Democratic National Committee in 1948, did you have any dealings with him or the Democratic National Committee staff during that campaign?

MORISON: He was still in the Senate and I, of course, knew Howard McGrath, but I had few dealings with him, because he was only at the committee offices off and on, maybe an hour, hour and a half at a time. There were a number of things that I discussed with the staff over there. Two of the issues that I had a particular area of political knowledge, was the question of Virginia, the question of Tennessee, North Carolina, and

[253]

West Virginia.

I discussed those with him about certain ways in which I felt we had ought to go. One of them was that I had scouted Harley Staggers who was running for Congress for the first term, and that I thought we ought to get a good speaker for him. So, about a week or so later he called back and said, "Harley wants you." And I made his opening address out there at the ball park in his hometown. I know it was a bitter cold night. Bea and I nearly froze. They had these big oil drums with holes in them and they put wood in and had some heat, but there was a very small crowd. I met all the people there and then came back twice on weekends and campaigned for him because the mountain vernacular is something I'm very well acquainted with. Staggers was elected and has been re-elected ever since.

HESS: There's a very interesting point about Virginia

[254]

in 1948. Virginia went for Mr. Truman.

MORISON: Yes sir.

HESS: And that is the last time that Virginia has voted in the Democratic column in a presidential election.

MORISON: I will tell you why. Francis Pickens Miller, who had been in the House of Delegates briefly from Fairfax, who was born in Lexington, Virginia, where I went to college, came in and introduced himself at the Department of Justice. We had a lot of friends in common. He said that he could see the trend and that he wanted to run for Governor, but that we needed to have an independent Democratic organization, because the Byrd hand in the Democratic Party machinery in Virginia was such that they could turn the vote "on" or turn it "off" through the State Compensation Board. In the workings of the

[255]

system if you are a commonwealth attorney of a county and getting \$6,000 a year, if you didn't stay in line, it would be promptly reduced to \$1,200 a year. I agreed that we should organize and we had a meeting with the most famous man in modern times in the Virginia House of

Delegates, now deceased, Robert Whitehead, from Lovington, who was the recognized master of the House of Delegates.

Nobody ever challenged Bob Whitehead. He knew more about budgets, he knew more about every bill that came before them in the House than anybody, and he was a debater par excellence. Nobody ever tangled with him.

He and Francis Pickens Miller and I formed the -- for that year, the "Democrats for Truman." And this was the beginning of the independent organization. I later became chairman of this after I left the Department.

[256]

We raised enough money to put out a series of pamphlets, all over the state, through various people who had signed up with us to distribute them by hand, and the rest by mail, to the proper people who were just "John Q. Citizens," and who were not under the interdiction of the courthouse arm of the Byrd organization. We made speeches all over the state, particularly in southside Virginia, you know, where it was always rough, and we just "skunked them," we just skunked them, because we got to the polls the hard core of average working men who could not be hurt by the Byrd organization. Theretofore, you know, most ordinary people didn't go to the polls. Why? Because they felt the Byrd organization would win anyway. And that's how it came about. President Truman was their kind of man and they turned out in great numbers to vote for him.

[257]

I participated in the presidential campaigns thereafter all the way through. Even when I tried to -- later on when Jack Kennedy was nominated and defeated the candidate I had been floor manager for, Adlai Stevenson, I came and talked with Larry O'Brien and his deputy (I can't think of his name), and told them both, "If you're going to let Bill Battle, the son of Governor Battle, be the Virginia campaign manager, just because Bobby went to law school with him, you're going to lose. If you will give us the funds we need and let us tell the average citizen in Virginia the story of the '48 campaign and how President Truman carried Virginia, we will see that the people that should be sought out, the common people, are approached and we will see to his election in Virginia.

Well, they wouldn't do it, so we organized our own campaign out of our own pockets. They

[258]

wouldn't even ask the Governor of the state, Lindsay Almond, to speak for the ticket, because Blackie Moore, who was the Dean of the House, he just had an iron hand on the politics of Virginia, and he would not let Bill Battle do anything that he didn't approve of, and he was giving out press statements up at his home near Winchester.

The only thing I can say, I finally got Governor Lindsay Almond to agree to speak for the ticket and I held for the first time a torchlight parade in Stanton, Virginia, and we had over 600 people who turned out for that to hear the Governor speak for the ticket. I knew that Pat Jennings, now the clerk of the House, would take care of the Ninth District, but the greatest victory of all, for

me, because I did the campaigning personally, was Clark County, Virginia, which is the residence of Harry Byrd. I carried it for Kennedy, but

[259]

he lost the state because they wouldn't listen to our independent Democratic group.

HESS: That was 1960?

MORISON: Yes, the Jack Kennedy campaign.

HESS: Okay, now that's 1960. Why did Virginia go for the Republican party in '52, '56, '64 and '68?

MORISON: Because it was not a Democratic Party, it never has been as long as the Byrdites have been in power there. They're put to the test now with the election of a Republican Governor who is a disappointment because he's not carrying on the Byrd tradition. Linwood Holton is more of a Democrat today, than...

HESS: They just changed roles.

MORISON: That's right, and he's an old friend, he's a mountaineer from Big Stone Gap, Virginia, I

[260]

know him very well and I am very proud of what he has done. That's the reason why.

HESS: All right, I have one more question dealing with the Justice Department in 1948 and about the election. On July the 20th of 1948, just shortly after the Democratic National Convention, the Government initiated proceedings before a New York Federal Grand Jury to indict the leaders of the American Communist Party for having violated the Smith Act. Some historians say that the Justice Department acted as it did because the administration had advance information about the imminent appearance of Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and was seeking a way to change its image from being soft on Communism. Do you recall anything about that episode?

[261]

MORISON: I don't, because at that time I was working as hard as I could, and I was not privy to this. It came through the Criminal Division. Of course, I knew who the head of the Criminal Division was at that time. If I had been executive assistant at that time I would have known about it, but I didn't. I mean I was just up to my hips in my own area of work and litigation.

HESS: Now let's move on to the year 1950, and at that time you were assigned to establish the Office of Economic Stabilization. Would you tell me about why you were selected for that particular assignment and what problems you were faced with?

MORISON: Yes, I remember it came as a great surprise, the Korean war was coming on and I was called over to the White House, and I forget whether Charlie was then Counsel, I guess he was.

[262]

HESS: Yes, he was.

MORISON: Charlie talked to me about it and then took me in to see the Boss, and Charlie had outlined what he wanted. He wanted me to take a leave as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division, leaving my first assistant as "acting," to establish an agency to be set up to control prices and wages and to schedule productions and to have limitations on certain strategic items in order to avoid a price spiral, a "run away" inflation that could hit us and to keep the economy on an even keel. President Truman knew more about me than I thought he did. He probably was advised, I don't know, maybe by Tom Clark, but anyway he said he wanted me to do it and he put it this way, "You're the only man in my official family who, because of the fact that you were assistant general counsel of the War Production Board, that knows how this

[263]

ought to be set up, and it's got to be done in a hurry. And I hope you'll accept it."

I said, "Well, Mr. President, I'll be glad to undertake this task." By action of Congress, the President was authorized in a national emergency to establish an agency to control prices and wages. In view of the Korean conflict the President had to stabilize prices and wages. It was named the Office of Economic Stabilization.

So, I took three members of my staff from the Civil Division and we went over to the old building where I first started as Assistant General Counsel of the War Production Board, old "Tempo E," now destroyed, which was built when Barney Baruch headed an agency to accomplish such controls in World War I -- but in a much more limited scale.

HESS: Who were the three men you took with you?

[264]

MORISON: I took my partner Sam Abrams, a very bright and able lawyer; Samuel D. Slade who was in the appellate section of the Civil Division, and Dick Guggenheim and my secretary Rose Dennis. I also had several other men from the Department for a limited time but it was a very small staff to undertake this urgent and complex task.

I had fortunately saved a lot of my files from my term at the War Production Board. I had stored them when I went into the Marine Corps. I dug those out and carefully reviewed them and then went to see Mr. John Lord O'Brian, the former General Counsel of the War Production Board, and he advised me where specific records were stored with reference to the establishment of the regulatory machinery in the beginnings of the War Production Board, and provided an index that he had retained. I also found other material in the National Archives. I had one of my men prepare a "problem" list. At the top of

[265]

the list was steel; second, coal; third, wages on the labor front; profits in critical industries because they all had to be drafted and published before specific regulations could be framed. Then I began drafting the basic regulations for price control and projected both aspects of regulation under one agency and not to be divided as in World War II, where the War Production Board was to a degree separate from the Office of Price Administration. So we put it under one tent, and we expanded this to be a comprehensive list of all anticipated needs. I then began to deal with the first "bugaboo," which was labor. We had meetings of all the top labor leaders. They were intransigent at first about regulations and were clearly suspicious of any regulation of wages, although they were enthusiastic about price regulations for consumer items!

[266]

HESS: Who did you talk to at first, who did you call in? The union leaders?

MORISON: Yes, the craft union leaders -- but not [George] Meany or Philip Murray who succeeded John Lewis as head of the CIO. We had [Jacob S.] Potofsky, the successor of Sidney Hillman, president of the Garment Workers Union of the CIO. The head of the telephone workers union (now Communication Workers Union) and many of the second in command in other major unions. The head of the Steelworkers Union, whose name I cannot recall, also attended.

I opened the meeting by giving them an outline. I pointed out what the hazards were because I had been through it at the WPB and all of them were aware of the problems during World War II. I recognized that labor could not stand by and see industry, the employees of union members, be granted a great increase

[267]

in price which in time would result in price increases at the grocery stores, and to the clothing stores, and all of the other consumer goods that the average union worker had to buy -- unless wages were increased commensurately. I recognized that equation. But I said, "Our purpose is to work in "harness" with labor. I don't want to have the divisiveness that I witnessed in the early days of World War II. We've got to work in "harness." This Korean war is an unknown, it could lead us into a hell of a mess in Asia. Our economy could just overnight go into a flat spin and that would seriously hurt labor, as well as all the ordinary citizens."

HESS: What would you say was the general attitude of the labor leaders?

MORISON: Well, they kind of grumbled, but they said,

[268]

"Well, we've got to see what you propose." We finally made some basic progress on principles, and then I said, "Well now, I've got to have your help." I said, "You name someone of this group to help us and work with my deputy, Sam Abrams," who was with me, "and let's work it out." I knew the format of the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration and the record of how the proper regulatory power was applied and which provided a right of

administrative appeal and all the provisions for due process by administrative hearings on just these basic principles. Well, they started and then they got "hung up." But they still accepted these basic principles as to wages and prices and it was a fair beginning.

Later I got hold of Joe Freehill, who was an able Government lawyer in the Corporation Counsel's Office of the District of Columbia.

[269]

I brought him over there to be responsible for price regulations because he had been one of the best men in the Office of Price Administration during World War II and he was a stellar performer. He began to put these principles in order and he knew how to mediate.

But we made the beginnings. I was able, with the help of our small staff, to get all of the regulatory processes set up and I also prepared a history of the experience I had at the WPB in the issuance of what we called "L" orders, i.e. Limitation Orders to serve as a guideline for similar orders and also "Price" orders. I stressed the necessity for the right of administrative appeal, although the law doesn't require it in time of war or a national emergency because this process I learned at the War Production Board served to get the pressure off of the regulators and the objectors to such orders.

[270]

I found out at the WPB that if you invite those who object to such orders to be fully heard in person in an administrative hearing -- where a record is made of their oral objects and their written protests were made a part of the record, that this type of hearing abated the objectors' anger and paved the way for just and proper charges where justified. Whenever the objectors could not substantiate their grievance, however, that ended the matter and their protest ended without anger. This process also provided a just and proper answer to the objections made, on behalf of constituents, by members of Congress.

Well, by the time I established these fundamental elements I had selected and obtained an able staff of lawyers -- although many that I wanted wouldn't come! But I had enough that agreed to join my staff and would stay with the job. At that point, I felt that the machinery

[271]

for emergency regulation had been established.

I then called Charlie Murphy and advised him "I'm all set and ready to go, but I need to know who is going to be the head of this agency, because that's of fundamental importance; and second, who's going to be its general counsel."

"Well," he said, "I can tell you who is going to be general counsel, it will be a fellow named Francis Whitehair, who is a lawyer down in Florida, and..."

HESS: Were your recommendations asked on the staffing of the top positions?

MORISON: No, they took care of the top positions. In any event, Francis Whitehair said he would come up. In time he did come to Washington and I educated him as to what we had done and then asked him, "Now look, when are you going to come and take over?"

[272]

He would say, time after time, "Well, now I've got to go home and attend to several pressing matters, but I'll be back up next weekend." But the next weekend he would have to go home again! Finally I just said, "Francis, you're not going home this weekend, because Sam Abrams and I and all of the staff from the Department of Justice are leaving! It's now your job, and you've got all the basic documents establishing the agency and I have recruited an able staff of lawyers to support you. You've got the blueprints. I'm available at any time to talk with you on the telephone, or I will meet with you. But I am responsible for a mass of cases in the Department of Justice and I must return there. This is now your job." Well, that "did the trick" and he finally took over the responsibility for the Legal Staff as General Counsel.

[273]

But, the worst thing was, word came from Charlie that the President was going to appoint a man named [Alan] Valentine, who had been the president of Rochester University.

I had known Valentine in New York. He was a great supporter of Wendell Wilkie's in the election year Wilkie ran against President Roosevelt, but he was an overeducated sycophant and had never taken a job outside of the "Ivy Halls" or in Government before. He aspired to do what was "right," but he didn't have the understanding, the leadership or the toughness that that job required. He was, by nature, an academician and not a "fighter."

Well, he arrived. At his request I spent days with that man, telling him of the bloody experiences that we went through at the WPB that would be repeated in this agency and that he must be prepared to face them. I advised

[274]

him where the pressures on him would come from. I reminded him that every friend that he ever had would be importuning him on this, and that, and the other, and I said, "Unless you are able to take an absolutely firm stand, and not flinch, and unless you agree for Francis Whitehair to take on the legal battles and you are willing to "ride herd" over every division of this agency, you can't win." I coached him, and coached him, and coached him as best I could to educate him about his tasks.

When it was clear that the first crisis he would face was the demand by U.S. Steel to increase prices, I advised him "This agency is going to be 'made' or 'broken' because of the fundamental issue that has just been raised and which challenges its authority." I learned that U.S. Steel would announce an increase in the price of steel and it was clear that

[275]

the other steel companies would do the same. I said, "If U.S. Steel is not prevented from that price increase that's going to be followed by labor's demands for wage increases." I said, "If you

don't immediately get out an order to prevent this price increase and show that this agency has "the guts" to carry out its mandate, you've lost the war!"

"Oh," he said, "it couldn't be that bad."

I said, "I've been through it all, and I promise you I'm not overstating anything. If I was in your position I would be on the phone right now making it clear to steel that they must withdraw the price increase and tell them, 'if you don't we're going to enjoin you.'"

Well, he listened. I thought he understood my position. Later he came into my office and said, "Oh, boy, I've really got it worked out." He said, "I've got some substantial help for the steel crisis."

[276]

I said, "That's great, what is it?"

He said, "I've got an appointment with Barney Baruch. I am going to meet him in Lafayette Park on 'his bench' at noon."

"Oh," I said, "that's fine, what's the meeting for?"

He said, "Oh, I'm going to ask him for his advice about the price increase of steel. He's a great financier and I know he will help us for he established the first one of these operations in World War I."

I said, "Well, that's fine. I'd like to know what he has to say after you meet with him. Would you point up the issue I have discussed with you and state that unless the authority in this period of the national emergency is sustained as to this price rise it will result in 'runaway inflation' across the board?"

When Valentine had his meeting with Baruch, he came back to my office and I said, "What did

[277]

Baruch say?"

He said, "Well, Mr. Baruch, after I had presented the problem, said a strange thing. He said, 'If I were you Dr. Valentine, I'd get in high grass and keep my tail down!'"

I knew exactly what Baruch was saying, he had measured the man. If you haven't got the guts to take the "fire," don't get near the stove. And he surmised that Valentine didn't have the toughness that the job required. I called Charlie Murphy and said, "Charlie, this fellow can't last two weeks."

"Oh," he said, "you're out of your mind. This fellow is well thought of."

I said, "Charlie, I know this man. When you first told me he was going to be appointed I told you that it was a mistake."

Well, in ten days the White House had to let him go, because the letters coming into the White House from all points, including the Congress,

[278]

were uniform in saying, "This office that is responsible for Price Administration has failed. Prices of all items are going up everywhere. What's this agency doing?" Valentine, on the steel issue, lost the fight and the floodgates of price hikes were made in all sectors of the economy.

Later, Charlie Murphy called me and asked, "Do you know Governor Mike DiSalle of Ohio?"

I said, "Yes."

"What do you think about him?"

"Well," I said, "I have come to know him at conventions. I have friends in Ohio and even those who oppose him politically agree that he has the toughness to stand by his decisions. He also has another quality. He has the rare quality of being able to control his temper when groups assail him for action taken. He'd say, 'Look, we've got to do this. I'm going to do it,' but he won't get them 'riled up,' he's not

[279]

a dictator, and I think he would be a good man for the job."

So DiSalle was first named head of Price Administration, and with Joe Freehill as his counsel on the price side of the regulatory authority. Later it began to work, but they'd lost so much ground by failing to act promptly as I had recommended. "

HESS: Valentine was replaced by Eric Johnston was he not?

MORISON: Well, for just a very brief time.

HESS: Just a brief time.

MORISON: This was a makeshift. Eric Johnston had no capacity to act firmly in this tough regulatory job.

HESS: And a Mr. DiSalle was director of the Office of Price Stabilization for quite some time until

[280]

he took over as director of the Office of Economic Stabilization in '52.

MORISON: That's right, that's right. You see, the guts of the whole thing that had to be done was to "put a lid" on prices. The scheduling of production was not a problem.

HESS: Okay, anything more on that subject?

MORISON: No, I think that's about it.

HESS: When you came back from that assignment you were Acting Deputy Attorney General, is that right?

MORISON: For about three months, I guess.

HESS: What were your duties during that period of time, what comes to mind?

MORISON: Well, the office of deputy, of course, entails, one, you act if the Attorney General's away, as Attorney General, but more than anything

[281]

else, it is the office that deals with the Congress on all matters of confirmation of officers of the Department of Justice and legislation in which the Department of Justice has interest. It is the office in which legislation sought by the Department of Justice and legislation in which the Department of Justice has interest. It is the office in which legislation sought by the Department is carried forward.

HESS: Just how is that done? That's a very interesting subject in which many historians are interested. Can you cite a particular piece of legislation that the Department was interested in and show how that was carried through, to illustrate just how that phase of the job was accomplished?

MORISON: Well, one of them was an amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. I worked with Senator Kefauver in drafting that amendment. But Estes Kefauver was an old friend of mine

[282]

and when I was head of Antitrust we conferred about antitrust legislation quite regularly. But, this emanated as a departmental -- really approval comes from the Department showing its approval, by my helping Estes in his draft of legislation to amend the Section and having the Department go over it, and to defend his position as to why "Section 7" should be amended at the hearings of the Judiciary.

Since then the damn amendment has been chopped with holes by a series of decisions, and you know what's happened in the Republican Administration, and by inaction in some of the later ones of the Democratic administration. But we then took that amendment to the Judiciary Committee, because, and since Kefauver was the -- of course, a member of the Judiciary Committee and his subcommittee was the Antimonopoly Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, and we first went to the staff so that they thoroughly

[283]

understood the amendment, and we knew that the proponent on the Judiciary Committee would be Kefauver. I, in the meantime, had also gotten in touch with the Federal Trade Commission to be sure that they didn't get in the way (and I mean just that!).

HESS: You looked upon them more or less as an obstacle rather than someone that could help you?

MORISON: Well, certainly not any help. There were certainly some good men there but they were not the commissioners.

We then let Estes be the proponent and carry all of the bills emanating from the Department of Justice, we let him carry the ball; and when we testified we would support the individual sentences of the amendment by explaining why this had to be done, we cited cases to demonstrate that there was a "vacuum" in this law. It was, in fact, just like leaving the barn door

[284]

open only to "shut the door when the horses had escaped."

HESS: Did you have any particular help from the White House staff

MORISON: If we needed it we could get it. I mean I could call Marty Friedman, or any number of people over there if I needed help on a particular matter.

HESS: In 1949 two men were added to the White House staff with the title of Legislative Assistant to the President.

MORISON: One of them became a U.S. District Judge. I assume you're talking about Richmond Keech?

HESS: No, I'm talking about Charles Maylon, and Joseph Feeney.

MORISON: Oh, Joe Feeney, yes. Yes, well, Joe of

[285]

course was Navy, and he was easygoing. He would go out and take a Senator across the street and give him a drink and, you know, he was very good at that and aided the passage of needed legislation, etc.

In areas of special legislation of specific interest to the Department, which emanated from the Department were the kind of things that we pretty well had to do ourselves. We'd get the help of the White House staff as to particular members of Congress. Usually we'd call upon individual Senators first on the Judiciary Committee, and then we would do whatever was necessary in contacting the Senators at large when it came up for a vote in either House of Congress. If there

was strong opposition we'd "scout it" and join forces with the White House staff. We kept in touch with the White House at all times.

[286]

HESS: Were there ever times when a personal call from President Truman to someone on the Hill may have been requested? He had been in the Senate, he knew many of the Senators.

MORISON: I don't recall any. Charlie [Murphy] can tell you more about that than I can, he may have done it. But for instance -- well, I've related about Pat McCarran, he said to me, "I ought to call that old so and so, but you know, I haven't been in the Senate for some time and I don't like to call these fellows up there unless I feel it's something where the White House through the President must do so; then I don't call them, but invite them down here to eat with me in the staff dining room every now and then, and mention the legislation the President wishes enacted."

HESS: The President met with what was known as "the big four," the Vice President, the Speaker of the

[287]

House, and other congressional leaders every Monday.

MORISON: That's right.

HESS: A11 right, and then a little later in 1950 you were Assistant Attorney General...

MORISON: Antitrust.

HESS: ...and head of the Antitrust Division. Why were you selected for that division? Because of your knowledge of antitrust matters?

MORISON: No, again Charlie Murphy gave me the news on this and he said, "Graham, the Boss wants you to be head of the Antitrust Division, and I'll tell you why. He said he's concerned about the fact that the new act of Congress provides for the sale on bid of all the Government-built factories and facilities that were set up for production in World War II," and he said, "The

[288]

act requires a review by the Antitrust Division as to the impact of sale of any of those who are known bidders."

As I was saying, although the Attorney General had said that this appointment was in the wind, Charlie Murphy called me and said that because I had at that time, considered very strenuously, because of my wife and the rough time she was having while I was so completely occupied, I wanted to resign, I went there to stay six months and there I was getting into my fourth year.

HESS: That sounds like a Government job, doesn't it?

MORISON: I didn't want to leave anything in the lurch, and I had a great, of course, devotion to President Truman. I could never really turn him down on anything that he really wanted me to do.

[289]

Charlie explained that the reason he wanted me above all others that had been considered to take this position as head of the Antitrust Division, was that he had found out that in the interregnum, after the resignation of Wendell Beige and when I was executive assistant, I, in effect, without title, acted at Tom Clark's request to run the Antitrust Division, so that I was acquainted with the Division and its work. But second, he said, the importance that I be the one to head the Antitrust Division was occasioned by reason of the fact that Congress had passed a law for the sale at auction or otherwise or by negotiation, of Government-built factories and facilities of all kinds, paid for by the taxpayers, to corporations who wanted to buy them. And the antitrust implications were in the act, they had to be reviewed by the Antitrust Division.

[290]

If there was any opposition to sale of a particular facility to a particular company, meaning a company we'll say like Firestone, who had set up for them by the Government a butane rubber plant right near it, and this would give it an advantage which would tend to give a position of dominance to Firestone over other rubber companies, then the opinion of the Antitrust Division was required.

And he said, "The Boss feels that you are the only fellow that can take that on, because, one, you had the War Production Board experience; you've had the setting up of this Korean office of Economic Stabilization, and you are versed enough in antitrust, because you served there, without title, to be able to do a good job," and he said he can find nobody that he things that he can depend upon, because it's going to be important that this be carefully reviewed.

[291]

I just couldn't say no.

HESS: In the year before that, in 1949, Howard McGrath had replaced Tom Clark as Attorney General.

MORISON: Right.

HESS: Why in your opinion was Mr. McGrath selected to fill that position?

MORISON: Well, for a variety of reasons. One, he had been an able Senator from Rhode Island, had a great and good relationship with all the members of the Senate, both sides of the aisle, he had been one of the first Democratic Governors in Rhode Island for almost fifty years; he had served as chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and he had been, was then, Solicitor General, which is the number two job in the Department of Justice. John W. Davis was Solicitor General in the Wilson administration

[292]

there, so it was a logical transition.

HESS: How interested was he in antitrust matters?

MORISON: I can only say this, that I would bring matters, particular matters calling for a grand jury for criminal suits, and for the filing of any antitrust suits, to him with my notes for a full discussion of the investigative facts, at some course the complaint made, and the economic background, the whole thing. I did that in the early days when he was Attorney General, and he said, "Graham, I know the quality and care with which you work on these matters. From here on out there's no necessity of your going into all of the facts and details, if you say I should sign it, just show me where to sign."

HESS: How interested was Mr. Truman in antitrust matters?

MORISON: Very much, very much.

[293]

HESS: Did you have very many conversations with him on that particular subject?

MORISON: No, I didn't, but it would come back through Charlie, "The Boss was pleased with your victory in this case, and that case, and the other, and it's been long coming." And he said to me later when I took him down to my university, in our drive together, that not until he got to the White House did he recognize, although he applauded the idea behind the Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, and the oppressiveness that would have followed with the Rockefeller and the Hill tycoons and all the great trusts, but that not till he became President did he see the impact by letters, by economic reports made, of the fact that lacking a vigorous antitrust policy, the country is left at the mercy of economic domination and that you always will have people with avarice and that this is absolutely essential for the stability

[294]

of the economy and for the good of the people to prevent economic domination by corporate monopolies.

HESS: You had known Charles Murphy for quite some time, but were there other people on the White House staff who you also knew and worked with?

MORISON: Oh, Clark Clifford, I worked with him on a lot of speeches for President Truman.

HESS: He left, I think, in January of 1950 but he was there for quite some time.

MORISON: Yes, I worked with Clark on a lot of speeches he was preparing for the President.

HESS: They were the Special Counsels for Mr. Truman?

MORISON: That's right.

HESS: Did you work with any other staff members, perhaps E1sey?

[295]

MORISON: Oh, yes, of course, I knew George. I worked with George on a great variety of things. There was not too many things within George's area of responsibility that were matters of concern that I had in Justice. Yet many economic problems he worked on had a close tie to antitrust and also to the problems of the Civil Division.

HESS: When you were working with matters pertaining to John L. Lewis, and to strikes and things like that, did you work with Dr. John Steelman?

MORISON: Oh, yes, very, very closely, all the national emergency strikes and also his deputy David Stowe who I first knew in college.

HESS: What would be your evaluation of his handling of matters in his office?

MORISON: He was a master. First, he's a keenly intelligent man. His grasp of economics was

[296]

really quite remarkable, plus the fact that he was a large, statuesque man, bubbling with good humor. He could mediate the captains of industry in any great crisis about as good as any person I've ever known. Now Dave Stowe, you know, kind of was a back-up for him. Of course, Dave...

HESS: He was his assistant for some time.

MORISON: We've always given him office space in my firm. He is now with the National Mediation Board. He wouldn't take the top job. If named, they would get him for one day and then he would resign and let someone else have it. Dave was in college with me down at Washington University, I first met him there. He's an able guy.

There were a disparity of personalities and disparities of qualifications on that White House staff, they all melled, and the common denominator (when I look at the "Chinese fire drill"

[297]

we have in the White House today measured against a very smaller, a much smaller staff), the common denominator was a devotion to the Chief Executive, as a person. Those guys would work all night long for President Truman.

HESS: And often did.

MORISON: And would do it with joy in getting it done for the President. And if I would get called at 11 o'clock at night to come to the White House, I'd go there, help out as long as I was needed.

HESS: One of the better known cases at that time was the Pan-American-Trans World Airlines route case that took place in 1950.

MORISON: Right.

HESS: Did you become involved in that action?

MORISON: Yes, the Department did.

[298]

The Civil Aeronautics Act provided that as to the award of an international air carrier route where challenged is determined by the President. This was an acquisitions case in which American Airlines, who had an overseas route, had to give it up and the route was up for grabs. TWA and Pan-American were both applicants. The board made a decision and that has to be reviewed, by that act, by the President of the United States. My recollection is a little bit vague, I'd have to go back to my own files on that. My recollection is that the board had found in favor of TWA; the President reversed that and said it should go to Pan-American on the economic facts of competition in these overseas routes and in recognition that Pan-American had pioneered overseas air transport. This then was contested by a suit filed by TWA in United States Circuit Court of Appeals here in the District of Columbia.

[299]

I was then head of the Civil Division and I had my staff people prepare the briefs, pleadings, and so forth, which I went over and changed in various aspects.

I didn't even talk to the White House. Nobody opportuned me from either TWA or Pan-American because by that time I think the word had gotten around the community, that, you know, you're just hurting yourself if you go in and try to talk to Morison, unless you want to bring out facts that he may not have or something of that kind, and just leave it at that.

HESS: But there was nothing that could be called pressure that was brought to bear on you?

MORISON: No, that's right. I mean, they just quit, because Pryor of Pan-American and TWA's head was persuaded not to go to me. I hate the opportunists and a lot of them tried to do it in antitrust, and I literally threw one guy from out in Missouri,

[300]

right out the door of my office for trying to pressure me or "buy me."

HESS: Did he say he was a friend of the President's?

MORISON: Oh, he said all of these things which were not true, but I threw him out, I was so mad. But also old friends like [Frederick M. Eaton], the head of Shearman & Sterling, a large law firm in New York, who was also an assistant general counsel in the War Production Board, he came down on the suit I filed against the Stock Exchange. I can see it now, Fred's a jocular

fellow, he told the finance community, "I know this fellow, he's my friend, he and I were both assistant general counsels. I know I can go get this thing settled."

Well, he was a friend, but I just said, "Fred, you know, I don't want our friendship to be broken, this is not the problem. Now if you have a proposition about a consent that you're authorized to

[301]

offer me, I'll entertain it, but lacking that, Fred, let's don't breach our friendship."

And I had this same problem with old [Thomas J., Sr.] Watson, the head of IBM, when he came down and cried, he had a hundred and sixteen people, everybody I had known since childhood, to call me at night and say, "Don't bring this suit against IBM. Mr. Watson is an aged man, it will kill him and so forth." And, of course, he had been a robber baron, he had been violating the antitrust laws and getting away with it for years, and I was as gentle with him as possible because of his age. But he had his son with him, and I remember after they had a presentation they put up on my desk, all prepared by, I guess a public relations outfit, the words hand painted, they'd turn the page, we've done this, and done that, and this and that, and I kept my mouth shut and listened to it all very politely until they were finished and I finally said,

[302]

"Well, Mr. Watson, let me go back now and review what we have here, and as a public servant what I must say. The record shows and you cannot deny, I use a bad word to shorten a long discussion--you stole the French Bull patent. It was an illegal act, you have suppressed competition, you have control of all of your paper stock of cards, no other cards can be profitably made that will fit the IBM machines, so they have to buy the essential cards from you. You will only rent your machines, you won't sell, you have taken aggressive action against the beginnings of potential competitors who had other like machines." And I said, "On the facts, IBM really deserves a criminal suit, but I've only filed a civil suit against your company, but I believe, Mr. Watson, that in time, if you would go in right now and accept the decree, don't litigate, this will save your company," but I said, "the technology

[303]

of electronics, which is fast emerging, from all I can gather from the Bureau of Standards, and it is going to pass you by and you will be an antiquated company in the major business of your company."

"Oh," he said, "this can't happen."

I said, "It will be the healthiest thing that will happen, but Mr. Watson, I've got to say no. I will not dismiss the suit or accept a consent decree as offered by your lawyers."

And he wept and finally went out.

I met his son after his death at a "Roper Conference," down at Hot Springs, and he came to me, "This is the first time I've seen you since we met in the Department of Justice," he said, "my father's passed on."

I said, "Yes, sir, I was sorry to hear that."

He said, "I've never forgotten what you told my father. I know you did it gently, and he, of

[304]

course, was emotionally upset, but you are absolutely right. And as his son, I couldn't say it, but we were going to be passed by and just the pressure of this decree, because he dominated the company, was the only thing that saved us."

HESS: All right, on July the 14th, 1952, President Truman signed the Fair Trade Laws bill. What do you recall about the pressure brought to bear by small businessmen who were in favor of that bill? If I recall correctly many small drugstores were in favor of fair trade laws.

MORISON: Yes. Well, no pressure was ever brought on me. I mean I...

HESS: Did you get any letters?

MORISON: No. I guess by that time that from my career in the community of both the civil side, executive assistant and as head of Antitrust

[305]

Division, those who were advised didn't try to see me, and if there were letters to me that didn't require an answer, they'd say, simply, "We want to get it passed."

HESS: That particular bill, the Fair Trade Laws bill, brought a flood of letters into the White House many of them from small druggists.

MORISON: Right. This was thought to be doing them in, and...

HESS: How would you evaluate the success or failure of antitrust actions, the overall view, in the Truman administration?

MORISON: Good. One of the best. And there's many treatises on this that say that. Now mind you, I picked up cases that had been hanging around the Antitrust Division for four or five years, and nobody had the guts to bring, and with Harry Truman

[306]

I got them out. I cannot claim that I did all of the work-up of all these cases. The devoted civil servants in the Division spent years putting the facts together.

HESS: Were there one or two that you can think of that didn't end your way?

MORISON: The only one that we lost was one that had been started before I became Assistant Attorney General, was the suit against the Stock Exchange, which in effect, charges that there

was price fixing between major stock brokerage houses on commissions that affected those that did underwriting and brokerage. That was tried before U.S. District Judge Harold Medina. We have a branch office of Antitrust in New York. It had been poorly handled and I had to go up and clean that damn office out.

The difficulty of it was that the man who had been the long proponent of it had become

[307]

ill and had resigned, and I had to get Dick Cramer, who is the head of one of the litigations sections, to give up his duties and go up to try it, but it was just impossible to get Medina to comprehend the case. He had been a U.S. Attorney, and he was a very eloquent speaker, and this, that, and another, and did a lot of shenanigans during the course of the trial. After I left the Division I left word, "Take this case to the Court of Appeals," but my predecessor didn't do it. Medina being a downtown New York lawyer instinctively -- without revealing it -- sides with the big financial and brokerage houses.

Now, all of the turbulence that is involved in the market, really relates to what we tried to do then. As you know the whole structure of the Stock Exchange machinery and its financial interrelations is now a matter of great concern to the financial community as well as to the public, because the public is in the market.

[308]

Meaning the small investors. That's one I hated to lose.

HESS: All right, in November of 1951, T. Lamar Caudle, Assistant Attorney General was head of the Tax Division, and he resigned from the position with the Department of Justice. As you know, he was accused of wrongdoing. In your opinion, was he unjustly accused?

MORISON: Unquestionably he was. I testified at a Grand Jury in his behalf held at Kansas City. The story of that I found out because I have many of the civil servants who were friends in the old Department of Justice and still remained there after I left. Those that are still there are still my friends, because I fought their battles and recognized the good ones. Lamar was born and raised in Wadesboro, North Carolina, his father had been the judge there. He was made U.S. Attorney with offices at Charlotte, and had the

[309]

greatest record of the criminal convictions of any U.S. district in the United States. He was highly recommended by the Senators from that state and that Tom Clark appointed him. But one of his great charms was also a defect -- he had a naiveness about him, a perfect and utter frankness, he would not hold any enmity against anyone, he was the most kindly disposed man I've ever known.

And I remember a cousin of mine had bought a racehorse down in Tennessee, they brought it up -- it had shown up remarkably in other races and had brought it to have it up in -- where do they have the races in Maryland?

HESS: Pimlico.

MORISON: Pimlico, I guess. And he came up with his wife and took Bea and I, and had a limousine, we went up and sat in the owner's box. His horse

[310]

did do pretty good, came in second. But when I was there I ran into Lamar, and he was with two very flashily dressed, pretty ugly looking guys, and so the next week I went down to see Lamar in his office. He always called me "Professor." And I said, "Lamar, who are those two fellows you were with?"

And he gave me the names. Well, they were a quasi-fringe of the criminal element either in money racketeering or something, I forget now, or alleged to be.

I said, "Lamar, as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Tax Division, don't you know you shouldn't be going out to public places with people like that? You've got other good and honest friends." I said, "It just doesn't look right, for an official of the United States Government's executive department, particularly as head of the Tax Division." I said, "I

[311]

don't know their records, but I can pretty well 'smell what I can't see.'"

He said, "Professor, I know you don't mean any harm to me. The thought never occurred to me. You know my daddy raised me to never think evil of any man. It would abase you too if you let it control you." And he said, "These people have always been nice to my children when they were all kids, bringing them presents. They have been nice to my wife as well."

I said, "Lamar, God damn it, this is the way they work into your confidences and you shouldn't do it. Even though you wouldn't do anything wrong, the appearance of wrong, unfortunately, is on our shoulders." I said, "I don't let people take me to dinner, or my wife to dinner, who might be the subject of litigation either in the Civil Division or other areas of the Department. I just won't do it. We just don't accept invitations." And it took me a long time to explain to my wife

[312]

why, "We're not in that bracket, we can't invite them out to dinner. And such people might and usually do have something in mind, and I don't want to have any feeling of social obligation enter into my thinking as a Government official. These people seek to make friends with people in positions like yours and mine."

"Well," he said, "professor, I had never thought of it that way."

And said, "That's the way I feel," so I let it drop.

This may sound to a sophisticated ear to be hog-wash, but it was bone marrow. Any bum off the street could come in to Lamar and talk with him. I remember one fellow came in, waited at his

office for an hour. He said, "professor, this fellow has been waiting out there, I've got to see him. I think he's a little bit off his rocker, but I'm going to see him. Will you

[313]
stay?"

I said, "Yes."

This fellow came in, had a derby hat on, and had a striped vest and had a cane, and he said, "Well, sir, what can I do for you?"

He said, "Sir," he said, "you've got to get them Jap radios off my head," he said, "they're penetrating my mind all the time," and he said, "it's just driving me crazy, those Japs."

And Lamar never cracked a smile, he said, "Why that must be real painful." He said, "Professor, what do you think we ought to do about that?"

I said, "Lamar, why don't you have him go out to the Bureau of Standards," I said, "they know all about radio waves and all that sort of thing, maybe they can get some sort of a platinum helmet to put under that derby to tune it out."

He said, "Professor, that's the thing to do." He said, "Sir, this is my friend here, why

[314]
don't you do just that?"

Well, this is the kind of a guy he was. He was unjustly accused. The circumstances are as follows: When he was U.S. Attorney in Charlotte, he had a man up for a second degree murder charge. The doctor, a very competent doctor, had filed affidavits that if he were put to the strain of a criminal trial that because of his heart, -- and they had a complete diagnostic report on his heart condition -- it could kill him right on the stand.. And the lawyers had asked that he accept the sentence by the Judge and not be tried. And Lamar wouldn't do it and went ahead and tried him and the guy died right on the stand. And he never got over that.

Now, the case involved was one, I think the man's name was [Irving] Sachs, or something like that, who was a shoe manufacturer out in St. Louis. When Lamar was the head of the Tax

[315]
Division, there was a lawyer from Kansas City who came to see Matt Connelly and Matt Connelly asked Caudle to see him, and he had talked to him about the case. Lamar said he had not gotten that far into the case enough to make any judgment and just let him go.

In any event, subsequently, a very able lawyer who represented Sachs, presented to Lamar affidavits by top physicians in St. Louis; and I think from the Mayo Clinic; and one other hospital, saying he had advanced stages of grand mal epilepsy, and if he were put to this strain of

a trial at his age, that it could, as it had done in other cases, create such a stress so as to bring on a seizure that would kill him.

Well, Lamar remembered what had happened to him as U.S. Attorney, but he did the right thing. He sent all of these affidavits to the Public Health Service and asked them to review

[316]

it, and to advise him about it. Well, I think there was one dissenting doctor who was not sure that this would happen, but the majority of those Public Health doctors, who reviewed all of the records, and one I think who actually made a physical examination of the man (one who is based in St. Louis), came back and agreed with this diagnosis. Then Lamar got in touch with the judge out in St. Louis, his name is on the tip of my tongue, and also the U.S. Attorney. He told each of them about this, and said that in view of this medical opinion that he was inclined, if this fellow would accept a plea and a fine, and if the Internal Revenue people would agree in view of these circumstances, that he would let him enter a plea to avoid the trial. And the judge said, "This is what ought to be done." So it was done.

Now after that, just after the lawyer from St. Louis first called on Lamar, Lamar

[317]

didn't even know what it was, he received in the mail, certificates for oil royalties. You know you can buy oil royalty certificates in Texas or Oklahoma, and he wrote back to the return address on the envelope and said, "I have never bought these oil royalty shares that you sent me and I am enclosing them herewith. I'd like to know how they came to be sent to me." He never got a reply, but the certificates went back. Matt Connelly received a camel hair coat from this same lawyer.

So they had this Grand Jury, it went on for two months, in St. Louis. I testified in this case. And I knew the guy who was the prosecuting lawyer, I knew him in New York. Herb Brownell had picked him to go down there.

You see, they tried to get John Snyder, they wanted to get some scandal, some criminal scandal on the Truman administration and they couldn't get it on John so they got it on Lamar.

[318]

That lasted so long that they had a revolt in the Grand Jury, and the members advised the Government lawyer, "You're going to release us, we're not going to stay here. We don't give a damn if you put us in prison, we have had nothing in here except your oratory about this man Caudle and why he should be indicted." And he finally modified his tactics to a degree, and finally in desperation, after near two months, the Grand Jury issued the indictment I think to be able to go home.

Well, after that the trial went on, I contributed funds (I was then in private practice), to help him; John Hooker, an able lawyer in Nashville, who was a great friend of his, contributed funds for his defense. I helped on the briefs, donated funds for his appeals. The Government put in its case, objections were made, but the judge who presided would not rule on any

[319]

motion when it was made. He said, "I will let it ride with the case," this is the old way of doing it that is to rule on motions at the end. They got just into Caudles' defense, the presentation, their motions had been made to dismiss for lack of any substantial evidence, but the court had not ruled on the basic motions. And then the judge died -- he committed suicide, and he had grand mal epilepsy.

HESS: The judge did?

MORISON: That's what he died from, that's what caused him to kill himself. They brought a Federal judge, a Republican, appointee from out in Nebraska to come in and read a cold record and rule on all the motives. Now how in the hell, not seeing the demeanor of the witnesses, not hearing the arguments of counsel or anything else, all of these motions had been reserved, and he, on the basis of that, sustained a conviction, and the jury

[320]

was called in and the conviction was, in effect, ordered. It went on to the Court of Appeals and on to the Supreme Court and I have never yet understood how that conviction could be sustained.

After his appeal to the Supreme Court was denied, he was incarcerated down in the Federal penal facility at Tallahassee, and I went down to visit him. He was keeping up his spirits, for me I'm sure, but it was a terrible blow to him. He said that he was in charge of a men's Bible class and he had two-thirds of all the inmates there that attended his class. He said, "Of course, we can't vote down here, but I've organized everybody in this place, to vote for the Democratic nominee by writing to their relatives."

And I said, "Well, I'm sure that may have some profound effect, and his spirits were up.

Well, after he was finally released, his wife, Clara, as a result of this, died. Tommy

[321]

his youngest son, who had become a vice president of one of the major corporations located in Atlanta, Georgia, became a psychiatric case and was hospitalized for six or seven months, he's now back on his feet. His oldest son who graduated with honors from Yale Law School, and was doing well with one of the largest law firms in Dallas resigned and went with a classmate of his in developing Hilton Head Beach to be near his father. Subsequently, Lamar came home, and Lamar later married the nurse who attended his wife, while he was in Tallahassee.

But this grief and sense of injustice was so profound he took up law practice, of course, they had not taken away his admission to practice in North Carolina, although if anybody wanted to raise it they could have, and he was doing counseling to do something to keep :busy, and this tragedy was just eating on him constantly.

[322]

Turner Smith who just recently died, and myself, and John Hooker, prosecuted his application for a pardon. I had an agreement with Matt Connelly, who was also convicted, that he would not make an application for pardon until he notified us, that they'd both do it together. He slipped the gun however and he was pardoned. Bobby Kennedy was Attorney General and had held up the pardon of Lamar. I prosecuted it here; and I shall never forget the bias of Kennedy.

I came in to confer with Kennedy with John Hooker, who is now dead, an older man, a top lawyer in Nashville whose son was a great friend of Bobby's to find out why the pardon, which had been recommended by the pardon attorney was not granted. And I was shocked. I went into the Attorney General's outer office, instead of being in the back office, where the Attorneys General when I was there worked, the room Kennedy occupied

[323]

was the reception room and saw that he had moved this big desk out and had his feet upon the desk, an ancient desk that came from one of the first Attorney Generals, the last Attorney General when the Department was in the Treasury Building. He had on no coat and a half sleeved shirt on, cut off to here. He listened for awhile and he said, "Ah well, this is a bunch of nonsense," he says, "he's tied up hand and glove with the crooks and he's a Hoffa man." Which related to the fact that while in his desperation, Lamar had no income whatsoever and was flat broke, he had to sell part of his farm his father had left him, and put a lien on his home, his father's home.

At that time Hoffa had asked when they brought the suit here to unseat him and put a conservatorship over the Teamsters, to get from Lamar an opinion about that ruling and to recommend how the ruling could be now attacked again and

[324]

set aside. And Lamar called on me in my office, when he came here, he worked day and night for about three months, went to the law library in Charlotte, and the U.S. District Court library, and the library of the Court of Appeals. He had done a magnificent job of careful research and in his opinion reviewing the whole record and concluding that action could be brought to set the injunction aside which was done on the basis of that review by Caudle. And he paid him, \$5,300, I think, for that opinion, based on his time account.

Later, still desperate for money, he was importuned by a mortgage investment company in Charlotte to seek to get funding on proper basis for real estate development they had in mind. And he went to Miami to try to see Hoffa. He didn't get to see him but talked to one of his deputies. They have a pension fund, the Teamsters, that loans money, and he wanted it only on the papers.

[325]

And although he'd sent all this to Hoffa, he knew that Hoffa was a guy who would never read anything, and he just wanted to make certain that it was so. He was being followed by the FBI when he went.

Now this was the basis of Kennedy's denial of Caudle's pardon. I got so mad that I went right across the desk and collared him, and I was going to let him have it, but John Hooker grabbed me, like this, and then Kennedy got the hell out of the office and went back to the other office.

As soon as Ramsey Clark came in, who I kind of handraised when he was a child and when he would come to see his father almost everyday. I got him into the Marine Corps, because I had been in the Marine Corps. And he was a quiet youngster, but a very studious one, devoted to his father, and he evolved when he became Attorney General as really a remarkable guy,

[326]

showing the imprimatur of his father and his mother as well as his instincts.

And I just said, "Ramsey, you remember Lamar Caudle from when you were a youngster, and you know as well as I do, although he had weaknesses, they were human weaknesses of kindness, but this man is no more capable of committing a crime than you are..." This was a political backlash that Brownell wanted to get for political purposes, and the record of Brownell's man before that Grand Jury, if you know anything about it, is full of the evidence of how terribly wrong this thing is, and how unjust, and how there can be a miscarriage of justice under our system of laws. There's a loophole that I never knew existed, that a judge that never presided at a trial or heard the witnesses, can convict a man on a dead judge's notes and the transcripts. And I want to get that pardon.

[327]

And he said, "That's right. I know the story."

And I got it in a week, before he died, and thank God I did.

[328]

Fourth Oral History Interview with H. Graham Morison, Washington, D.C., August 16, 1972. By Jerry N. Hess, Harry S. Truman Library.

HESS: To begin today, Mr. Morison, do we have anything more on antitrust that we want to put down?

MORISON: Yes, Mr. Hess, there's one matter that I recall which was a unique experience for me. When I was head of the Antitrust Division in '50 or -- in '51.

HESS: August of '50 I believe according to my list.

MORISON: Sometime during that period, when J. Howard McGrath was the Attorney General, he requested me rather than the Deputy Attorney General (who I think at that time was Peyton Ford), to attend a Cabinet meeting called by President Truman since it would relate to the issue of limitation of foreign oil imports. I did attend. And there was Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, lined by numerous

[329]

officers of the services; the Secretary of Commerce, a man from Ohio, what was his name?

HESS: Charles Sawyer.

MORISON: Sawyer, who I had tangled with before; Oscar Chapman, who I had known and been on fairly friendly terms with, and...

HESS: John Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury?

MORISON: I'm sure John Snyder and the other Cabinet members.

HESS: Was Dean Acheson there that day?

MORISON: I do not believe Dean Acheson was there, but an Under Secretary was. As to most of the issues that came up, I felt in view of my role that I should not comment or engage in discussions about such issue until it had been presented by Oscar Chapman and the other members. Secretary

[330]

Chapman urged that the President authorize the Secretary of the Interior to limit the amount of crude oil imported from foreign sources. He had inherited from World War II the remainder of the Oil Policy Board set up to see to the supply of oil for the war. The oil industry had worked hard to maintain this advisory agency after the war because the oil industry had its men well entrenched there. Secretary Chapman urged that because of the distress that domestic oil companies were facing from foreign imports, that he should be authorized to establish quotas and limitations upon the import of foreign crude oil.

And I am sure by agreement this issue was then picked up by the military representatives there who stated what their requirements were and that authority was needed to establish import

[331]

quotas to assist in the stabilization of American oil and its availability for the military. When all of this had concluded, Secretary Sawyer said he also thought this delegation of executive authority was a good idea. The President then turned to me and said, "Mr. Morison, as the head of the Antitrust Division, and speaking for the Attorney General, I'd like your views about this."

I thanked him and stated about as follows: "Well, Mr. President, to put it bluntly, I think this suggested program is not only wrong, but an outrage to our citizens. This oil policy setup that was authorized by Congress and established in World War II might have been a necessary instrumentality to see that we had enough domestic oil reserves to sustain our naval vessels, our planes, tanks and all the rest, and also to supply oil to Hawaii and oil to Europe, and to retain enough oil reserves in the United States

[332]

for the domestic needs of the country. But," I said, "now that the war is over, there is no justification for quota limits on all imports. Oil, like any other commodity, should be free of any

restraint in seeking its level of price based upon the worldwide supply available for import. The proposals for you to authorize such quotas would mean the end of any competition in the price of oil and oil products." I further said, "Mr. President, it's often forgotten, but after the Harding administration and the Elk Hills oil deals of Secretary [Albert] Fall, a quiet arrangement and agreement was made, sparked by the major U.S. oil companies, for the oil producing states using as the example the establishment of the Navy's Elk Hill oil reserve, that each of these states enact laws to provide that an official appointment by their Governors be responsible for oil and oil production in such states and be

[333]

empowered to limit production of oil. Subsequently these states joined in establishing an interstate oil compact to limit the amount of oil extracted by each state. That plan was the creation of the major oil companies and has persisted ever since except during the war. Annually these State Commissioners meet and fix quotas as to how much oil should be extracted in each state on the theory that such limitations are necessary in order to be sure that the Nation will have enough oil in reserve to defend the United States in time of war, etc." I pointed out that during the war, if that arrangement had operated properly, then there would have been unlimited production for the defense of the United States. But there was not full production in our oil states. Thus, had it not been for the oil wells at Maricaibo in Venezuela, we would have never been able to support our war efforts in western Europe and in

[334]

the Pacific. I stated that "The interstate oil compact, in my opinion, was established to keep the price of oil up and to avoid price competition that the free importation of foreign oil would make possible and that the taxpayers then and now who are consumers of oil and oil products have been paying through the nose." As head of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, I concluded that these proposals, if authorized, would be in direct violation of the antitrust laws. I have no doubt that if the Department of Justice made a Grand Jury investigation, we will find that the major American oil companies, the British Petroleum Corporation, which is a Government-owned facility, the Shell group in Holland and the other major oil companies, all of which are international in scope and which include all of the major oil companies in America, that there is a combination and conspiracy to limit

[335]

production and maintain a non-competitive price, and this proposal you are asked to approve would support the high dividends of all those companies at the expense of the consumer. We are supporting them in the limitation of availability of oil which is the prime factor as to a competitive price. In truth there is no competition in oil and oil products. I concluded by stating, "Mr. President, for the reasons stated, I oppose .this program. I think it is contrary to law and the public interest."

Well, Chapman interrupted to say, "Oh, this is not so," and so forth.

But, the President quickly ended further debate when he said, "Now, Oscar, just wait a minute." Then he said, "Morison, I fully agree with your position and such authority will not be granted." This really amazed and pleased me -- that the

[336]

President would be so blunt. It took seven months of hard work by the oil lobby using every pressure available to turn the President away from this position so as to at least get some limitation on oil imports. But for the President of the United States -- his stand called for the greatest amount of fortitude to "buck" the most powerful lobby that exists in our country.

HESS: How did they turn him around?

MORISON: I do not know the details after that because I was so deeply involved in getting antitrust suits filed that had been lying "fallow" in the Antitrust Division "off the ground," including the suit that I filed against the international oil cartel in the Federal Court in New York City. After years of litigation that case was lost because the British petroleum interests plead "sovereign immunity" and would not reveal or turn over to the Court, its records, which the

[337]

Court by law was compelled to sustain. The records of the British Petroleum Company was the sanctuary where these international agreements were kept. The British Petroleum Company, being an entity of the British Government, we could not compel the production of these agreements and had to try to prove the illegal agreements between all the companies by inference and not by the actual written agreements we knew were there.

HESS: Why, in your opinion, did Oscar Chapman, as Secretary of Interior, take the view that he did?

MORISON: I think that, as a political animal, he realized that he had to "go along" with such a powerful commercial combine or he would jeopardize his relationship with these giant companies. I think that he was fearful of that and felt

[338]

compelled to take the position he did. He was not a Harold Ickes. Ickes made mistakes but he was never afraid to "buck" any business combine. Oscar was -- as are most Interior Department Secretaries -- a politician.

HESS: Were the political parties tied closely to political contributions from the oil interest industry?

MORISON: This I don't know. Logic would impel me to have a lot of suspicions as to this factor, but I have no facts about that.

HESS: What did Secretary Sawyer say at that Cabinet meeting?

MORISON: He just said he approved. His taciturnity might well have had a relationship to my profound disagreement with him and Federal Trade Commissioner Lowell Mason and their inspired idea to "sell" to

[339]

the President the establishment of a review board on all antitrust complaints. This, lacking an act of Congress, would not be legal and also it would have purported to override the judgment of the Attorney General (and his Assistant in charge of the Antitrust Division), as to whether the department would bring an antitrust suit or whether the Federal Trade Commission would handle the complaint, etc. When complaints came in, so I was advised, it was proposed that no action be taken until a conference was held by the Secretary of Commerce, the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and the Attorney General.

HESS: Do you recall if John Snyder had anything to say at that Cabinet meeting?

MORISON: No, as far as I recall, he said nothing but stated that he approved the oil quota.

HESS: In your opinion, do you think that some of Mr. Truman's Cabinet members were perhaps too

[340]

closely tied to the business community?

MORISON: I then had no opinion one way or another about them, I just don't know. The only thing I did know, I think was that, for the first time (possibly for the first time), except through memorandas maybe, that's being sent to the staff at the White House, I verbally laid out the guts of the problem, and put it pretty bluntly, and I was not the favorite man at that meeting I must say.

HESS: Did anyone there speak up, besides the President, who said he agreed with what you had to say?

MORISON: When he said that, everybody shut up.

HESS: They may have had other views, but no one spoke out after that.

MORISON: No one took exception. No one took exception to what I said. Apparently I wrecked the plan

[341]

at least for awhile. And there was a degree of coolness after the meeting broke up and we left, which I could expect, you understand, on the part of some of them.

HESS: Okay, ready to move on?

MORISON: All right.

HESS: We are on page seven of the list I have prepared and our next subject deals with Mr. Newbold Morris. He was brought in to head a probe of the Government in 1952. What do you

recall of the Newbold Morris episode? Perhaps we should first say a few words as to why it was felt necessary to have an investigation of the Government at that time.

MORISON: We were approaching a presidential election year, and this always generates, usually in the Congress, attacks on the incumbent administration,

[342]

trying to find some way of achieving newspaper notoriety to discredit the executive department. And the most useful one, of course, is to make a charge that there has been fraud, favoritism, breach of official duty and so forth.

For the life of me I can't remember all the details, but I think at about that time was when the President fired Lamar Caudle, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Tax Division.

HESS: That's right.

MORISON: And I think this was seized upon as the center of a controversy in which there was a demand for a clean sweep and there should be a full investigation not only of the Department of Justice, but other departments of the executive department, other agencies of the executive department as to alleged improprieties. I am not privy to why, or who selected Newbold Morris,

[343]

but I'm sure others in the White House will know. This idea I'm sure was brought to the attention of Attorney General McGrath, and that he may have had conversations about it.

HESS: How did Morris and McGrath seem to get along in the first few days of Morris' investigation?

MORISON: Well, I had briefed McGrath on Newbold Morris, because I had known him in New York. He was a socialite, with money, and had been a member of the City Council. He very much wanted to be mayor, and he was looking for some opportunity (he was classified as an independent), some opportunity to get enough notoriety somewhere that would give him the basis for running for mayor.

HESS: Hadn't he at one time ran a similar investigation in New York City or in New York State?

[344]

MORISON: I recall that he had headed an investigation of Tammany Hall and its members and the relationship of its chief [Carmine G.] DeSapio to city paving and other public works.

In any event, through a number of friends that I had in New York, one who was a very wealthy man, who had been a member of the City Council under LaGuardia and whose daughter married a classmate of mine, he had expressed a very low regard for Newbold Morris as a man, and considered him to be a man who had no real dedication to the public interest but sought publicity

for political purposes. Newbold Morris had no great following. He had made a lot of noise, but had not been a stellar performer in the city government of New York.

HESS: Had you met him in New York?

MORISON Oh, yes, I had met him, but we had never

[345]

been close enough to be friends, I had just met him. In any event I tried to brief McGrath something about his background, and suggested to him that he do a lot of listening and to welcome his advice, and then after giving him full access to the Department I suggested that one of the staff members in the Attorney General's office accompany Morris, to assist him and so forth and to keep tabs on his interviews and press conferences.

HESS: Who was that, do you recall?

MORISON: For the life of me I cannot recall now who it was.

HESS: Do you recall why the decision was made to place this operation in the Department of Justice? He was made Special Assistant to the Attorney General and he was given office space there.

[346]

MORISON: I think the idea was that it had to be an operation, a legal operation of investigation and that Morris should have a free hand, without the need of subpoena to investigate, and to question and so forth, and to make any recommendations to the President that he thought ought to be done, this was the initial thing.

During this period, prior to Morris' coming, and because I had an affection for McGrath, I had prepared as many as five memoranda stating to him the internal problems that I saw developing, which in a presidential year, were things that might cause difficulty and how I thought he should rectify it.

HESS: Do you recall what those problems were?

MORISON: No, I do not. But I remember working at home, late at night, trying to prepare these things and submitting them to him, but he never took any action on them nor did he call me.

[347]

On one occasion I came up the elevator and just went into his office and he said, "I thank you for what you are doing," and that was it. He didn't want to discuss it for some reason.

In any event, I was desperately busy at that time with some very mean antitrust cases, and I had little or no time to really get into the middle of this, and he didn't assign me any job. He said, "You're busy enough with your antitrust, and," he said, "it's important." But it finally got to a

point that, at least in an oral conference with the Attorney General, Morris in the style that I had anticipated told McGrath that he would, made extensive demands which were just nonsensical.

HESS: What were his demands?

MORISON: Oh, he wanted every person, whether civil servant or appointment under presidential authority, in the executive department, to file with the

[348]

Internal Revenue Service, the Attorney General of the United States, and in a public register to be maintained for the inspection of the public, all of their sources of income, other than their Government pay.

HESS: That had to do with his questionnaire. Did you ever see Newbold Morris' questionnaire?

MORISON: I saw it. I saw it, and of course, it was...

HESS: We have a copy here.

MORISON: It was outrageous. Let's assume that there were four or five rotten apples in a barrel, if you think of the barrel as a whole total of all civil servants and appointed officials in the various agencies and departments of the executive department, which were embraced, depending upon what they were earning, this would have been an

[349]

outrageous invasion of privacy, this would have made everyone per se suspect. And it was just administratively impossible, it was under any reasonable conclusion, an impossible burden to impose for what they were attempting to do. On truth, it was sound and fury meaning nothing.

HESS: One of the people that Mr. Morris brought with him was Mr. Harold Seidman. Did you ever meet him?

MORISON: I had met Seidman, but didn't know him.

HESS: You met him at this time?

MORISON: Yes. This is the document that I recall.

HESS: That's right, fifteen pages...

MORISON: This goes to the present day proposition of snooping into the privacy of the individual, which is now being raised by the knowledge that banks are turning over to the FBI and agencies

[350]

of the Government the checks and records of deposits of bank accounts of citizens. This is the kind of nonsense that was involved.

HESS: On February the 4th Morris announced that the Justice Department would be the first agency probed. Do you recall that?

MORISON: Yes. We gave him a full and free hand. He never came to the Antitrust Division.

I might say that he never talked to anybody in the Division because I sent out word that I wanted to know (because I knew that this man wouldn't come to me) if Morris, or his agents, came in to interview anybody in the Antitrust Division, I wanted to be notified immediately to be on hand, because these were my people and I felt an obligation to be present.

This was a great administrative mistake. Morris was not a man seeking to do a dispassionate

[351]

job of investigation and recommendation, he was there to make Newbold Morris a household name. It resulted in his being fired, he had to be fired.

HESS: How did that come about, how was that decision arrived at to fire him?

MORISON: This I do not know,. except that I think from all departments and department heads, the same problem that I have mentioned as to my reaction to this, that this was a surrender of the executive department to a non-governmental investigation of the operations of the executive department of the United States, which would be publicized and made use of to the detriment and damage of a multitude of faceless civil servants in the higher brackets. And the whole panoply of career people who were objecting, saying, "Damned if I will sign this thing. I'm not going to make this out,

[352]

it's none of his business. It's nobody's business but my own."

HESS: Did McGrath fire Morris?

MORISON: No. Now this I'm not certain, whether the direction for it to be done came from the White House. I'm reasonably confident that's so. That they had come to realize not only from Justice, but from all of the other departments of the executive department, you see, that there was a genuine sense of outrage.

HESS: You say White House; do you think that President Truman thought he should be fired?

MORISON: I have no actual knowledge one way or another. I'm sure that if it was done, it was done with his approval.

HESS: In his press conference on April the 3rd. (that was the day that Attorney General McGrath

[353]

resigned), the President was asked if Morris was fired with his knowledge, with the President's knowledge, and Mr. Truman's answer was, "I saw it in the paper. It was under discussion, but I wasn't consulted when it was done."

MORISON: Well, the details of this I don't know. I'm sure that Charlie Murphy will be able to tell you precisely what it is. Mind you now, I didn't have the closeness of relationship with McGrath -- if I had been his executive assistant I would have been in on all of this. I only came in as a friend. I mean I was up to my ears going forward with antitrust. This was a nonsensical thing in my view.

HESS: All right. How was the handling of the Morris matter tied up with the resignation of Howard McGrath?

MORISON: Well, I think it was the start for there

[354]

was unfavorable publicity and editorials about the dismissal.

It was a very unusual thing. McGrath with such a magnificent record, so well-regarded and respected by all, he just had an inertia about taking any drastic steps, except the one -- as I said, if I came up with an antitrust request for a Grand Jury, seeking to indict criminally under the antitrust laws, or a civil action, laid it out, he just said, "Show me where to sign." He never questioned my judgment, and he would defend it when it was filed.

But he was not an activist as an Attorney General. He had fewer conferences than was usual in the past. Attorney General Clark was one that maintained these, and during the interim, the Acting Attorney General, Phil Perlman, who was Solicitor General. We would all convene and discuss the problems of every department so that the acting, or the Attorney General, would be aware

[355]

of what was going on. We tried to keep it briefly only to mention important, significant things, but McGrath did not have those conferences. On one occasion or a couple of occasions he had a dinner for all of the assistants and their wives, but that was social.

HESS: Would you rate his administrative ability somewhat lower than Tom Clark's?

MORISON: He had the administrative ability, but he didn't have the zeal to do it for some reason, because I had seen him when he operated under two hats, as chairman of the Democratic National Committee and as Senator from Rhode Island. And I know that even though he was not a scholar the lawyers on the staff of the Solicitor General -- and you've got an elite corps in the staff of the Solicitor General's office, when he occupied that position, they had a high regard for him,

[356]

because he had a quick mind, and the view often expressed was, he wanted to keep things quiet in anticipation that before Truman -- before the end of the year, he felt that Truman would not run, that...

HESS: He did not think President Truman would run in '52?

MORISON: He didn't think so because he was privy to the fact that Truman opposed any third term and he considered even though he only had part of the first year of...

HESS: He had almost all of Roosevelt's fourth term.

MORISON: That's right, but this was his thinking, but the principle was still there, it deteriorated, the party had deteriorated, the executive department needed new blood. But he expected that a Supreme Court justice (now I've forgot which member) would resign from the Supreme Court and

[357]

that he would be appointed to the vacancy. Oh, I know who it was, Murphy, that he would be appointed as the Catholic member of the Court, that was the kind of, you know, they made a division and this was what he was hoping for and waiting for and therefore he kept a low profile, but it worked against him. Now, whatever may have happened, I am quite certain that Charlie Murphy or some of the others can fill in the details. I just can't believe but that the Attorney General at least had said, if not to the President, at least to the staff people in the White House, "Look, however well-intentioned this may be, this is a 'Wrong way Corrigan,' and if I was requested and did ask Mr. Morris to come down there, then presumably I've got a right if I don't like what he's doing to get rid of him, and I propose to do it." Now if that was conveyed to the President or not I

[358]

don't know. But knowing Howard McGrath...

HESS: But was Morris brought in by someone else?

MORISON: Well, he was suggested, and the suggestion evidently emanated from the White House to McGrath, and McGrath said, "I'll take anybody you want." He didn't know anything about Newbold Morris, and then I boned him up on Morris. But now I'm speculating on this, Jerry.

HESS: Okay, on April the 2nd, that was the day before the resignation...

MORISON: Yes.

HESS: ...the President was at the National Airport to welcome Queen Juliana of the Netherlands, and it was reported in the press. There were photographers there, they were not

close enough to the official welcoming party to hear what was said, but it seemed like there was an argument

[359]

going on between President Truman and J. Howard McGrath. This was the day before the resignation. Have you ever heard what was being discussed at National Airport, was it Newbold Morris?

MORISON: No. No, I do not. I know nothing of the details and I never felt that I should intrude upon Howard McGrath to ask him. I was the first one there, and then Perlman, to commiserate with him, and shortly after that I arranged a dinner at my home for him and invited all of the assistants.

HESS: Just after his resignation?

MORISON: Within ten days after that. I invited J. Edgar Hoover and he said he would come. And he sent out, for three days, FBI men going all over that back country roads to see the route, the timing and everything, and scared my wife to death, but he didn't show up.

[360]

HESS: What seemed to be Mr. McGrath's attitude the night of your party?

MORISON: One of fortitude and jocularly and, you know, saying that this is the best antidote for a pretty heavy blow that I could have that I have the confidence of you people who are my assistants, who really carry the burden of the Department. And I have no animus about the President's action, he's President of the United States, and I think it's unfortunate, but that's neither here nor there, that's his prerogative. Let's be clear, I have no bitterness about it and you must not have any bitterness about it, and you must carry on that department, and he spoke to Phil, and said, "Phil, you have these actions, and you can do it. You've got all of the qualities of a good Attorney General acting until, the President appoints one. I want all of you to, get a tight grip."

[361]

HESS: The President had already appointed McGrath's replacement.

MORISON: Why?

HESS: McGranery.

MORISON: No, no, no, no. No, there was an interlude there. There was an interlude in that time, before he came in...

HESS: There may have been an interlude in the time between when he was appointed and when he came to town, but in the same press conference, in the same paragraph practically, when Mr. Truman announced the resignation he also announced McGranery's appointment.

MORISON: Well, you see, what had happened was, if my recollection serves me right, in the first week of April this had been conveyed to McGrath, probably by the President, McGrath went to the

[362]

White House and when he came back and told us. But it was not announced until a day or so after that. In the interim and the moment he left, got his papers and left, Phil Perlman moved over there as "Acting Attorney General" and I had my dinner. Now by that time I think that the announcement may have been made. But McGranery's nomination was not confirmed for several weeks -- and he was not confirmed until late in May.

HESS: I have heard that Charles Murphy, your law partner, early in the morning of April the 3rd, the same day as the press conference, was assigned to go from the White House to the Justice Department and relay the message to Mr. McGrath that his resignation was requested.

MORISON: That may be so, that may be so.

HESS: Have you ever heard Mr. Murphy make any comments on that?

[363]

MORISON: No, I've never discussed it with Charlie, but if he says it is so, you can be sure it's right.

In any event, these are the sequence of events that I recall.

HESS: All right.

MORISON: I remember most particularly that dinner, and -- of course, this blow was one, although he, Howard McGrath, maintained his outward Irish pleasantries and outgoing character. It did him in, and it eventually killed him, he just couldn't take it. He started the practice of law here.

HESS: That was the last major office that he held here in town, wasn't it, before he moved back to Rhode Island?

MORISON: Well, he stayed here quite awhile, had a law office. Peyton Ford was with him for awhile, and a couple of others. I would see him as often

[364]

as I could, but after I resigned there were far and few occasions when I could arrange to see him. He no longer attended the dinners they used to have at the Armory for the Democratic National Committee, or took any part in things, it was a great tragedy.

HESS: Previously we have discussed Mr. McGranery. He came in in April of '52, and I believe you left in June of '52.

MORISON: That's right. I have explained that his wife sat on his right hand, and she was the determined hatchet woman and last word.

I had been trying to resign, you understand, from the Department after the second John Lewis case, and as long as President Truman would get on my blind side, I could never say no to him. I would have been happy to resign, but I wasn't going to give up, because I knew of the McCarran

[365]

incident, which I have related to you, in which he said to McGranery, "I'm the only guy that can get you confirmed."

HESS: To McGranery.

MORISON: Right, because the Pennsylvania delegation was just bitterly opposed to McGranery. I had obtained for him this judgeship to get him off their back, and out of twenty-seven opinions that he wrote, that went up, three-fourths of them were reversed, and every Saturday he was down here at the White House, and I knew that

HESS: That was during the time that he was U.S. District judge for the eastern district of Pennsylvania.

MORISON: Yes. I knew that he came down here and sat outside the President's office every weekend

[366]

and Rowena came with him, and how it occurred (Matt Connelly told me that), and that he was determined that he had to pay back McCarran by doing what he said, which was dismiss the RCA case and many other cases. Well, it had gone to a point where it couldn't be dismissed. As to the Dollar Steamship case I no longer had anything to do with; for it was in the Civil Division the international oil cartel case, and there were a couple of others. And he would call me to his office with Mrs. McGranery there and say, "What about this case?" And say to me, "I don't think you've got a case."

I said, "Well, Mr. Attorney General, I of course appreciate your view, you've just come here, I'm sure you haven't gone over the records," but in spite all the toughness that his wife was trying to instill in him he didn't quite have the guts to direct me to dismiss these

[367]

antitrust cases.

HESS: Was she present most of the time?

MORISON: Most of the time. She would get up and leave, but she was there when I came in, and maybe she'd say, "Excuse me for a minute."

HESS: Sort of in and out?

MORISON: So I pretty well began to see what was happening, and one of the assistants came to me and said that he was persuaded that McGranery was going to fire me. I was too much of an activist (I didn't tell him about the other thing, about what I knew, that there were others he was going to fire). And so before I got ready on that Saturday to go over and turn my resignation in, I submitted plenary documentation on every one of these cases, with underlinings to the citations of law of the facts known, and said, "Mr. Attorney General, it is your

[368]

conscience that will be bothered in trying to see that justice is done in the United States as required by law. I hope your successor will equate to this and take the action that properly should be taken."

HESS: How did you know about the conditions that Pat McCarran had told McGranery that he would have to make to receive his support?

MORISON: A man who was one of the chief staff members of the Senate Judiciary Committee became a good friend of mine. He had been in the Marine Corps, as I was, and I'd ran through the Judiciary Committee many nominees -- like getting Ed Tamm, who set the record straight for Edgar Hoover as to Tom Clark's orders as to that Kansas City thing, on the bench and many others. This senior staff man had been most helpful and useful to me in the past. We were friends. He called

[369]

me and asked me to come up and have lunch with him, and I went out with him, didn't go to the dining room there in the Senate building, we went outside and he told me what he knew.

HESS: So that's how you found out?

MORISON: That's it.

HESS: All right, now moving on, although you had left the Government by the time the political events of '52 got underway, the convention and the campaign, let's just say a few words about them anyway. Now you have mentioned that Mr. Truman did not want to run for a third term because he felt it would be violating the spirit of the Constitution if not the letter.

MORISON: That discussion came up when I wouldn't let Tom Clark send up the first request for nomination as Assistant Attorney General of the

[370]

Civil Division, until I could tell the President about my participation, my feeling for the third term, that is. This issue had stuck in my craw, and by my studies and wide reading of constitutional law I felt that this was a very basic thing overlooked by the framers of the Constitution.

HESS: One thing we overlooked on that pertains to the 1940 election. You had been a law partner of Wendell Willkie before that time, had you not?

MORISON: That's right.

HESS: Did you support Willkie?

MORISON: No, I did not, and I told him. I said, "I'm a registered Democrat, now I'm not going to vote in the presidential election for the first time in my life. I will not vote against you, even though I know you, Wendell, are at heart a Democrat." Because he was a registered Democrat.

[371]

HESS: He had been for quite some time, hadn't he?

MORISON: Yes.

HESS: When did he join the Republican Party? That's well-known but I can't recall it just now.

MORISON: Well, I would guess in the later thirties. He just came up at the last minute, he adopted the Republican Party when he got a head of steam. He had been making a lot of speeches and he -- it caught. Nobody ever thought he could do it.

HESS: This wasn't too long before 1940 was it?

MORISON: No.

HESS: That's what I was thinking.

When did you first know that President Truman was not going to run in 1952? Do you recall? His public announcement was at the National Guard Armory, at the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner,

[372]

on March the 29th of 1952. Did you know anything solid and concrete before then, or was that the first time that you ever heard him really say that those were his intentions?

MORISON: That's the first time I ever heard him say, but I had told a few of my confidants that if they wanted to make a bet, President Truman would not permit his name to go up for another term, because he considered it a third term.

HESS: Were you at the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner?

MORISON: Yes. Yes, and it was no surprise to me. Now this was on principle, because President Truman, if ever there was a scrapper who would face any odds for principle he was it. This was not because he thought that there was a deterioration and he would have an uphill fight. It was not that. It was on principle that he felt that new blood of leadership in the party

[373]

is needed and "I must not." And he was probably influenced by Miss Bess, his wife.

HESS: She wanted to return to Independence.

MORISON: Right.

HESS: After he removed himself from the race, who did you see as the most promising standard-bearer for the Democratic Party in 1952?

MORISON: Oh, I had some mixed feelings about it. But based on my long friendship and high regard for Adlai Stevenson -- he epitomized to me the man who had a scope of mind and feeling and understanding of a changing world. I thought highly of him. He was sensitive to the injustices in a democracy. And I think my feeling was that this would be the man to be President of the United States. I didn't measure his candidacy as to whether he could be elected.

HESS: What were your feelings about Alben Barkley? Mr. Barkley would have liked to have had the nomination.

MORISON: Well, I had a strong affection for Alben Barkley and knew him well. But I felt for the times, we needed a man like Stevenson (and this goes in later to the two times that Stevenson ran), and I took into account the difficulty he had of being able -- like Harry Truman -- to just speak right straight from the heart and not worry about whether a speechwriter had written his speech or not. He had this quality of polishing a speech to literary quality, instead of realizing that it is the punch on issues that are gut issues that are heard and understood.

Idealism is suspect, because after World War II and after World War I, our people were soured on principles that had been considered

[375]

inviolate, and this was an erosive process that was going on. But I still felt as to the character of a man that if he occupied the Presidency, if he should be elected, we should have a man who would give his heart, mind, body and soul to the principles I felt were right.

HESS: Did you go out to the convention in Chicago that year?

MORISON: Yes, that was '52. Yes I did. I went out there and my old friend Gael Sullivan, who opened an office here for Estes Kefauver for Vice President. He called me and I went down and tried to help him here and get some money, and when I got out there Estes asked me to be his floor manager, which I did. Paul Douglas also was a major advocate there for Estes but we got along.

Paul Douglas was a great guy. He was a great admirer of Kefauver, but he picked a fellow

[376]

named Flowers, and I don't know whether Flowers was from Tennessee, Georgia, or Alabama, as the nominal floor leader, and it was, in the beginning like a "Chinese fire drill" I could never get a line of command and Flowers could never be found. And Estes was very difficult to pin down, to say, "Look, I can't be your floor manager unless I've got my representatives on the floor who will take orders from me, because I know what's going on, and I know the whos and whats of managing." But in any event, by reason of that kind of a "Chinese fire drill," he was narrowly defeated, although Paul Douglas made one of the greatest pleas to the platform on a parliamentary issue that I ever heard. He was a powerful man and he damn near carried it.

HESS: What was the issue?

MORISON: My recollection of the issue is that it involved the unit rule. In one state, although

[377]

a majority of the delegation were for Kefauver under the unit rule, the chairman of that state delegation voted for someone else, I've forgotten who -- and cast the vote for the entire delegation.

HESS: Even though there was a unit rule?

MORISON: Right. So that aborted our effort. But the next time in Chicago, I got him over the hump.

HESS: In '56. Were you his floor manager again that year?

MORISON: Yes, and then we had things in straight line. I established offices out at the Cow Palace, and got it wired to the floor, and I picked my own men. Gael Sullivan helped mightily being a Chicagoan, and either one of us was there for any questions from any delegate or our floor people. So we had a little better organization.

[378]

HESS: In '56 was the time that Mr. Stevenson left it up to the convention to pick the presidential nominee and it came down between Kefauver and Kennedy, is that right?

MORISON: Right.

HESS: Did the Kennedy forces give you a tough time?

MORISON: No, they were not ready for an all out fight. Estes clearly had the advantage over Kennedy because of his Kefauver hearings, the crime hearings he had that had given a great deal of notoriety. This made him the first kind of a "racketbuster," then he moved into the anti-monopoly subcommittee of the judiciary and he was quite a guy.

He had a flare for publicity. He had a beautiful, red-headed Scotch lady for a wife.

My great trouble with him was that Estes had a proclivity under the pressures to get

[379]

out with the boys and the gals and be gone for say 14 hours, and I couldn't get with him.

I remember in '52, Walter Reuther, of the United Auto Workers, had given him a report, they called a meeting at 2 o'clock in the morning at the Palmer House and I went and Reuther was announcing that the United Auto Workers were pulling out, they were not going to support him. And we got into the most unmerciful verbal fight you ever saw in your life. I peeled the hide off of him.

HESS: Why did he want to pull out?

MORISON: Because he had determined, "Kefauver can't win." You know, just that realistic, and I said, "Oh, ye of little faith."

HESS: Who did he want to support?

MORISON: He wasn't sure. He didn't commit himself then, but he just wasn't going to support Kefauver

[380]

because he had determined from his men that Kefauver couldn't get it.

HESS: In 1952 John Sparkman was nominated as the vice presidential nominee. Who were the main ruling forces behind putting Sparkman on the ticket?

MORISON: He was noncontroversial. And the thinking was and you know, "Why not just get him." Like that famous musical play *Of Thee I Sing*, he was considered kind of a "Throttlebottom."

HESS: Maybe to balance the ticket a little bit, since he was from the South.

MORISON: He was from the South, and he had been a good friend of Lister Hill.

HESS: All right, during the campaign of 1952 what in your opinion seemed to be the relationship between President Truman and Governor Stevenson?

MORISON: They didn't have -- and I can understand it --

[381]

on ultimate issues, they would agree. Truman would say it very tersely and Stevenson would rationalize very carefully and beautifully, and draw upon history, draw upon all human experiences, and postulate the situation.

Truman was a direct man. He didn't want that stuff, he wanted to go right to the issues. And he wanted to go to an issue that politically -- and this comes from his beginnings in politics -- to

determine what are the "gut" issues that'll count; where are the American people hurting and where must the Government help them, etc.

Well, Stevenson had a feeling for that, but he also had an idealism that -- Truman had it, but hid it. But this was a thing that filled Stevenson's mind. And it's a great quality in one respect, but not for a politician. He had self-doubt. Truman never had any self-doubt. So they were just at opposite poles in personality, background and understanding. Their relationships

[382]

were not the kind of warm little sessions of "branchwater and bourbon" where they could talk things over man to man very succinctly, and it was hard for President Truman to communicate with Governor Stevenson. But don't forget that despite the fact that Adlai Stevenson didn't have any strong personal appeal to him, President Truman recognized that he was an honest man, he recognized that he was an intelligent man and he did his best in that campaign, don't you fool yourself.

HESS: Starting back early in the year, in January and February, Mr. Truman had tried hard to get Stevenson to say that he would run and would be the party's candidate.

MORISON: That's right, and this was one of the kind of alienating factors, because this was self doubt on Stevenson's part, and the President

[383]

was a straight line thinker you know, "Get out in front now. You've got this fine record as Governor. You have given fine government to the people of the State of Illinois, which before has been corrupt in its political management of the state, you've given it the first clean broom it's had in many a year. Your grandfather was a vice-presidential candidate, and you've got to get out front now."

But I remember going to a reception here, and I saw Adlai. I had seen him off and on but hadn't seen him for some time.

HESS: Was that during the campaign?

MORISON: Oh no, before. Mrs. Merriwether Post gave a big "hoodoo" for him here, and he had his striped pants on and I went with a dark suit and it was pretty "posh" for me. He had a "clawhammer coat" as the President would say, and striped

[384]

pants, and he held up the line in talking to me and to bring things up to date that I'd missed in not hearing from him. He said something to the effect, "I've kept in touch with your record when you were in the Department of Justice." And I said, "Governor, get out now and let's keep going."

"Well, it's a hard struggle."

You see, he was having the trouble then of this wife, who was psychotic, and he was an emotional individual, a sensitive man, and I think all of these things had their part in this.

HESS: Did you play any particular role in the campaign?

MORISON: Yes sir, I sure did. I was Stevenson's campaign manager, first for all of northern Virginia, and then I delegated that to somebody else and took on the state without being asked,

[385]

because I knew that the Byrd machine was not going to do a damn thing. And so I got my Independent Democrats together and we had...

HESS: So you were the campaign manager for the State of Virginia?

MORISON: Without title. I mean I left some of my subalterns here to run northern Virginia. Henry Fowler said he'd take over most of that.

HESS: I believe we mentioned the other day that in 1948 was the last time Virginia had gone Democratic in a presidential election.

MORISON: Right.

HESS: What happened in 1952?

MORISON: What happened in 1952 was the -- you remember what the Virginia delegation did at the convention, on platform issues? They threatened to walk out again.

[386]

HESS: In '52.

MORISON: Yes. John Battle made another impassioned speech for solidarity but the Byrd organization was solidly against Stevenson, they had nominated Harry Byrd as a ritual. So the handwriting was on the wall, and what you had to do was to go down to get the vote out, the vote that couldn't be controlled through the State Compensation Board. This has always been the trick in beating the Byrd organization as we did in '48. You see, "Look, this fellow is for you for the first time, for God's sake get your daggone poll tax paid, get there and get all your kinfolks there and vote."

Well, with the massiveness of the Byrd sympathizers staying away, with the Richmond *Times-Dispatch*, the Lynchburg newspaper, all opposed to Stevenson, with no accommodation or offer of funds made to him by the Democratic

[387]

committee for the state where he could come and make a major address, he just had to ignore the state. So we just did the best we could and did better than anybody thought we could. We didn't win, but if we had done nothing you would have had only a scattering of Stevenson votes.

HESS: Of course, in '52 and again in 1956, he ran against a war hero.

MORISON: Right.

HESS: Was there anything that the Democrats and Governor Stevenson could have done to turn either of those elections around, '52 or '56?

MORISON: When he ran against Eisenhower the first time, if he had been like a Harry Truman, he would have said the interest of the average citizen in the United States, the poor impoverished employees who haven't got jobs, this man who may have been a great general, he was picked

[388]

by General Marshall (who was my father's roommate), and he wanted more than anything else to be the commander in chief in the battlefield, but he picked him in self-abnegation, by saying, he was only quality, he can get along with people. He can get all those poppin' jays and the Joint Chiefs that are in the operational command, that is Mountbatten, and what's the other British general, wore the...

HESS: Montgomery.

MORISON: Montgomery, who was a poppin' jay, DeGaulle on the flank, Patton and all the rest, he can get them to work together. He is not a strategist, he never has been, he doesn't understand it. His idea is that the way a command runs is, you have a good staff and they come up with the ideas, and as long as the staff says this is what to do, then you just accept it. You don't take any part in it. Now,

[389]

that's the way he ran the White House.

HESS: With Sherman Adams as the man calling the shots, who had literally, the rug pulled out from under him, that rug he...

HESS: Maybe the "coat" pulled out from under him, the vicuna coat.

MORISON: The vicuna coat. But you know, if he had the guts to say, "Let's look at this, you can't deify a man whose record is as follows..." And biographies were out then that were, you know, saying this, and as a matter of fact, I employed, through some of Stevenson's friends here, through Ball who had been in the Department of State...

HESS: George Ball.

MORISON: George Ball, and another member of Ball's lawfirm -- a very brilliant writer who had resigned

[390]

as the chief writer for -- he had to take the job which Admiral Strauss, when he was in trouble at the Atomic Energy Commission and resigned, and he made the proposal that he would leave the AEC and write a biography and get it out in time.

HESS: Who was that?

MORISON: His name was Jim Aswe11. And at my request he was hired. He was writing a biography making a comparison of Eisenhower's administration and Ulysses S. Grant's to show the parallel.

A military man just does not have the capacity to run the Government of the United States as its chief executive, because it's not like an Army command in which nobody questions the superior orders.

HESS: Did he complete the book?

MORISON: He damn near got it completed and then they

[391]

junked it, they thought that it would backfire. I think they were wrong, but that was the issue. I wanted it put out, but I couldn't get it over, because essentially Adlai Stevenson was a very gentle man, he was incapable of brutality.

He suffered under Johnson, which I was privy to, and under Kennedy. After Kennedy was nominated I took Adlai Stevenson from his farewell to our workers at the Paramount Building around the square after he made a farewell talk to thousands and I said, "Now you've got to go Governor and make our manners to the nominee." And I took him to see Kennedy at his hotel across the square.

HESS: That was in 1960 in Los Angeles.

MORISON: Yes. I took him up to see Kennedy, and Kennedy was very generous to him and said, "Adlai, if there is any position that you want, it's yours." And he then turned to me and he said,

[392]

"Graham I know you, and I know your role in this, and anything that you want in my administration is fine."

And the Governor just said, "This is very generous of you," and I said, "Well, Jack, there's nothing I want," I said, "I'm practicing law now, and I've had a long run in Government. As you know, I'm interested in seeing democracy work in the way it is supposed to."

And he said, "Governor, you have the brilliance, the understanding, the articulateness that is rare," and I was trying to say, "You ought to make him Secretary of State," but he was not named. And you know everybody at Kennedy's suite was saying you ought to stay out of there,

but who should come but Adlai's law partner, Willard Wirtz, who was named Secretary of Labor, he's now a trustee of the Penn Central. He pushed in behind us even though it was understood that just the two of us were going in to pay our

[393]

respects to the nominee. And he'd made his "pitch" for a Cabinet post and was named Secretary of Labor.

HESS: I understand that Mr. Stevenson at that time would have liked to have been offered the position as...

MORISON: Secretary of State.

HESS: ...the Secretary of State, and didn't get it. He was offered the Ambassadorship to the United Nations, but thought that that was sort of second choice, is that right?

MORISON: I think that he felt that it was. That it put him in a secondary roll in a sense as the representative of the United States at the United Nations, heading its delegation. He had no independence as our representative. He was hampered in this forum for he could not take a position he believed proper and in the best interests of

[394]

the world community and the United States.

HESS: Did you get any opinions as to why he did not get the Secretary of State job, and Dean Rusk did?

MORISON: It was a hatchet job of anti-Stevenson people. They said that he didn't campaign as hard for Kennedy as he should. They said that he was a visionary and a philosopher, he's too high and mighty for the task of Secretary of State that you've got to inject into the government of the United States. It was just pure political pressure on Kennedy by the hatchet men.

HESS: Is that everything we want to cover on '52 and '56?

MORISON: I think so.

HESS: Let's move on to 1960. What do you recall about President Truman's activities that summer?

[395]

Here is a list of speeches that Mr. Truman gave in 1960 and one of them that hits my eye in May the 2nd, of 1960, and mock Democratic convention at Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Virginia, your old alma mater.

MORISON: Right. I was president of the student government at Washington Lee. It was the first university in the United States to conceive and stage as an educational experience for students, a

mock presidential convention. If the incumbent administration was Democratic, it would hold a Republican convention, if the Republican was the incumbent, it would be a Democratic one, and this had been established oh, back in about 1920, when the student body was much smaller.

Well, as president of the student government and knowing my participation in the party and the fact that I, with Wright Patman, had written the constitution of the Young Democrats, I was asked by

[396]

the student council, of which I was chairman, and by the president of the university, to run this while I was in college.

HESS: What year was it that you ran that? Do you recall?

MORISON: 1932, we nominated Roosevelt. They only missed naming the nominee three times since 1920.

HESS: Is that right?

MORISON: And then neither candidate, either Republican or Democrat was nominated, because in my time I divided the student body up and put them into delegations by states. And the chairman that they selected had to get in touch with the national committee, the state committee of their state, and find out exactly what the sentiment was, what the trend was, how it was shaping up, the ones that were favored in their minds for nomination

[397]

and so forth.

So, the president of the university in 1960 asked me if I could possibly get President Truman to be the keynote speaker at the mock Democratic convention. And I said that I would certainly try and that I thought he would enjoy it. Well, I called him, I talked to Rose, his secretary, and told her to tell him that I thought he would have a good time. He agreed to come because he was going to combine this with some electioneering. Dave Stowe had been asked by the President to set up the tour for him to campaign for Luther Hodges down in North Carolina.

I had asked him to campaign in my old district, the ninth district of Virginia, a mountain district, for Pat Jennings who is now clerk of the House after having served eight terms, and now that I have the President's speaking schedule in 1960 and the presidential year, I see that I am in error

[398]

in stating that his acceptance to be the keynote speaker at the Democratic mock convention held at my university at Washington Lee in Lexington, Virginia, occurred in May of -- May 2nd of 1960, and that this was a single event and after that the President presumably went back to Missouri, to Independence, and from there the next engagement he had was a press conference on May the 13th in Chicago concerning Stuart Symington.

In any event, the President, through his Secretary Rose, advised me that he would attend and I decided I would try to make it as happy an occasion for him as I could. And after consulting Dean Acheson and others, we agreed that the best thing to do would be to drive down, at the proper time of day. It was in May, and we drove near the Skyline Drive to Charlottesville, Virginia and I had got in touch with Stanley Woodward his former chief of protocol and Ambassador to Canada and

[399]

they invited President Truman and me to stay overnight there and said that they would have in some friends of his in the Charlottesville area that he would love to see and felt that the President would have a good time.

Well, we had a beautiful day. The spring flush was just about at its height, and we had a nice leisurely drive down with an escort of the state police and we got to the ancient colonial home that Stanley and his wife owned up on a hill above Charlottesville, at about, oh, I'd say 4:30 or 5, and since I was -- Dave was not there, I insisted the Boss -- and spoke to Stanley and his wife -- that he go in and shuck off his coat and pants and have a little rest before dinner. And he was served a good cup of bourbon with a little bit of ice and some mint in it, which he promptly took out, and he went in and had a nap. He was a catnapper,

[400]

and in about 45 minutes he was up and outside and I never saw such a gathering of beleaguered newspapermen waiting to see him.

So, he went out and had a brief talk with them, they were asking him about the campaign and who is going to be elected and this, that, and the other, and he engaged in his usual repartee, and they dearly loved it. And he said, "I'll see you all in the morning now if you get up early enough."

And they all said, "Oh, Mr. President, we'll be here, we'll be here. We heard about those walks you go on in Washington."

And well, that evening we had a delightful dinner that Mrs. Woodward provided and he'd invited Missy [Marguerite] LeHand, Roosevelt's secretary; Admiral McIntire who was the White House physician for Roosevelt, and one or two others who had retired and gone to Charlottesville, who came from that area and who had known the

[401]

President while he was in office. And it was kind of a nippy night and there was light rain but the Woodward's had a nice fire in the fireplace. After a wonderful dinner, and it was one of the most joyous evenings you ever heard of, because with telling stories, and I've related before Stanley Woodward's...

HESS: Not on tape.

MORISON: Oh, Stanley Woodward, among other stories that were told there, said he felt impelled to tell this little coterie of devoted friends, the story about the Russian Ambassador. And the President said, "Oh, Stanley, now you can leave that out."

And he said, "No, Mr. President," he said, "they'll enjoy this, and I know you won't mind."

And he said, "Well, go ahead. You'll probably tell it wrong."

[402]

Well, Stanley said as follows; that as chief of protocol after World War II he suggested to the President, although he knew the President hated social occasions, stiff collar things, that in order to aid in nourishing the amenities with the representatives of governments from all over the world, that the White House dinners for the diplomatic corps, which had been suspended during the war, be reestablished.

And he said, "Stanley, that's a great idea and as much as I and Mrs. Truman hate it, I think this is one of the jobs I've got to do." And he said, "Well, you let me know about what you think of a date and so forth, and I'll talk to Bess and get her views on it, and so forth." And finally Stanley said, "I went back to my office to look over, this great idea, and I suddenly realized that in World War II the missions and the representatives from emerging countries that were in Washington had doubled the size of the

[403]

diplomatic corps." And he said, "I found that you could only put at best, chair to chair, 90 at the White House dining table, and there were something like 200 that were classified to be of diplomatic status, who couldn't be slighted." And he said, "I wrestled with how we were going to do it. We finally came up with an idea. I went over to see the President and said, 'Mr. President, this is our problem.'"

The President said, "Oh, my Lord, what are we going to do?"

He said, "Well, I thought we'd do this. We will start off alphabetically so nobody can be offended, and we'll take the first group and we will have the invitations all prepared for date one, we will take the second group and have them printed for a second date and they'll all be mailed at the same time, and in that way, nobody should be offended, because it's the

[404]

same announcement, but just for different dates."

And the President said, "Well, that sounds like a workable idea, I'm sure that they'll understand what the situation is."

He said, "Well, I'm sure it will," but he said that the first batch of invitations went out, and the Russian Ambassador and his wife fell in the second group. He received the announcement, but he must have found out through the intelligence agency that the first one was being held on

another date, prior to that. The first dinner went off fine, and we then went to the second dinner and Hopkins, who was on duty, about, oh, 7:30 or 8 o'clock was still around the White House."

HESS: Bill Hopkins.

MORISON: Bill Hopkins, he'd answered a call from some "flunky" at the Russian Embassy, saying that the Ambassador wished the White House to

[405]

know that his wife was indisposed and that they could not come, with regrets, and he said, "As soon as the President got that message he called me and he found out that the Secret Service who are always at the station, Union Station, had reported that they saw this Russian Ambassador -- whom the President insisted on calling Mr. Novocain -- whose name was Novikov, and said, Mr. Novocain is a damn liar and that he had scheduled this thing as a slight on the White House and on the President. Well, he said as soon as I got this call from the President -- who just "blew his top" -- and he said, "This just can't go by the boards, I'm not going to forget this." And he said, "I want to see you first thing in the morning."

And he said, "I immediately called Dean Acheson and said, 'Dean, come to the office early because we are going to be called to the White House.'" And I told him what the situation

[406]

was. We got there at 8:15 and he said, "The President had his teeth set and his face was white." He said, "Dean, I want you to fire that fellow Novocain right now. Send him home."

And he said that Dean, in his quiet and pleasant way, said, "Well, Mr. President, I understand how disturbing this thing is to you, but I want to remind you that we have probably one of the top men who is really an expert on Russia, that is doing a splendid job in Russia and keeping us well-informed, if you ask for the recall of their Ambassador, they will promptly respond to that by calling for the recall of our Ambassador, I think it was Chip Bohlen, and there we'll be, and we will lose a good man in Russia at a critical time."

He said, "I know it, that may be so, but," he said, "you don't understand, Dean, you can't hurt Harry Truman from Independence, who comes from a farm family. I've got a pretty tough hide,

[407]

but this thing went out in the name of the President and Mrs. Truman, my wife Bess, and this is a slight on her that I will not tolerate it," and so he said, "we were just trembling as to what to do." And he said, "Just at that critical moment, when I know that both Dean and I were trying to think how we could get him away from this adamant position, because we had learned when he set his teeth like a Missouri mule you couldn't move him." And he said, "Just at that moment the white telephone on his desk, his private line, rang, and he picked it up and it was Mrs. Truman, who had gone to Independence to be with the President's mother who was quite ill. She wanted to let the President know how she was, and he picked it up and the course of the conversation we heard was; "Well, Bess, I certainly am delighted to hear from you, and how's mother? Well, that sounds much better, I'm sure that your being there

[408]

lifted her spirits and will you give her my love and tell her I'll get there as soon as I can, and that I wish that I could have accompanied you, but I just could not." And evidently, Stanley said, "She asked him, 'Well, what are you doing, Harry?' and he said, 'Well, I've got some good friends of yours here, Dean Acheson and Stanley Woodward. I'm just getting ready, Bess, to fire that fellow 'Novocain,' that Russian Ambassador, that we found out from the Secret Service, although he'd lied to Willie Hopkins saying his wife was sick and they couldn't come to our diplomatic dinner, they saw him and his wife get on a train going to New York." Then he said, "Yes, but Bess, now wait a minute, honey you don't understand, this invitation went out in my name and your name. Now I don't mind anybody slighting Harry Truman, but I do resent slighting the office of the Presidency, but more than anything else, any slight upon you as my wife,

[409]

I won't tolerate. Well, Bess. Well now honey, you don't understand. Well...well...yes...well, I guess you're right Bess, all right." And it was all over!

HESS: She talked him out of it?

MORISON: She talked him out of it, and Stanley Woodward said, "Dean and I both had sweated down through our shoes. When she got back we called on her and thanked her for saving us!"

HESS: She got them out of a mess didn't she?

MORISON: Yes, she did. And then there are many other stories that Missy LeHand told about the White House days with Roosevelt, counterparts of this, which they all enjoyed and, it was a delightful evening because it was a comfortable one in which he was with people that liked him and admired him and part of the Roosevelt tradition,

[410]

and he had a great feeling for Franklin Roosevelt, you know.

HESS: Did he drive on to Lexington the next day?

MORISON: Well, the next morning, I got up early, I asked one of the maids there to awaken me, because otherwise I would have slept through it. He got up at 6 o'clock and it was foggy and rainy and he had his cane, and he had put on a raincoat and he started with that press corps, "at a clip," a fast "clip," and I'm telling you those fellow who were overweight, they were puffing it, when they got back after puffing and blowing they were ready for the steambaths, they were just done in, but they had a good time with him!

We then at about 9:30 or 10, we had a good breakfast after he came back, we had a fine country breakfast with cereal, Virginia country ham and grits, fruits, pancakes, everything you could think

[411]

of, including a pitcher of buttermilk for they had heard that he might want buttermilk in the morning. And we had a good breakfast and got packed and got a police escort and by that time it had cleared and we drove from Charlottesville across the mountains through Waynesboro down to Lexington where Washington and Lee University is, and I took him to the president's house, and they were all there en masse, the state police had alerted them. The president and his wife were there to greet him. And they let him go up and have a rest and then -- I was put up at the president's house too.

So I heard him stirring and he had awakened, I took him on a little tour around the campus. I took him down to the famous tomb of Robert E. Lee where the -- one of -- supposed to be one of the two greatest reclining pieces of statuary in the world. One's in Germany. The one at the Lee Chapel was done by Valentine the great sculptor

[412]

from Richmond. I had -- the lady who ran the chapel and museum, Mrs. Pournoy, and the mother of one of my professors when I was in college and she was the custodian, and a great admirer of Harry Truman. And she went to great lengths in opening up glass cases to let him see George Washington's various items that had been given the university like these surveyor's instruments, the sword that Lafayette brought from France to give him after the Revolutionary War, a lot of Lee's papers and documents, and he of course, being an avid history buff, was quite interested and enjoyed it immensely.

And then the next morning we were up promptly and the students had arranged, first, a parade through Lexington, the county seat of Rockbridge County, with the President leading the parade in a rebuilt and refurbished Duesenberg open top automobile, and that's a picture of the President and the automobile.

[413]

HESS: This is the picture hanging here on the wall?

MORISON: That's the picture. And I -- the crowds, country people from all over Rockbridge County were there to see Harry Truman, and it was like he was the President again, because they yelled and screamed and you'd never seen such an out-pouring in your life as the country people from that area and their admiration and affection for him.

Then from the Doremus Gymnasium, which had been set up like the Democratic convention in miniature, with student stand-ins for delegates, and he made a true off-the-cuff Truman platform address, and they roared and interrupted him, the students just went wild. And it was my task, with the help -- we had one Secret Service agent, and the state police, was to keep the youngsters from rushing him, but he would say, "Now, if you'll divide up a bit I want to shake your

[414]

hand and find out where you're from," and said that, "any boys here from Missouri" he wanted to see them, and so he had a thoroughly good time, in every respect.

And then after the convention was over which was on the 4th I guess, his part of it was, he then - we both went to Roanoke, he -- to the airport, he took a plane there and I took a plane back to Washington. I even forget who provided us the car that brought us down, but I didn't go back with it, and my next contact with the President in that year...

HESS: Now just a couple of questions before we move on, this was before the convention...

MORISON: Yes.

HESS: At this time, Mr. Truman was supporting Stuart Symington.

MORISON: Right.

[415]

HESS: Did he say anything about Symington's candidacy on this subject?

MORISON: He was a keynoter, he talked about the great issues of the day.

HESS: Did he say anything in informal conversations about his views on John Kennedy?

MORISON: He had nothing to say about that at all, he kept exclusively away from expressing any opinion.

HESS: Who did the mock convention pick?

MORISON: The convention picked the candidate, that was subsequently nominated, Kennedy. Jack Kennedy.

HESS: All right, the one reason I mention that was not long after that, in fact it was on July the 2nd, he held a press conference at the Truman Library in which he said, concerning Kennedy, "Are you certain you're ready for the country, or the country ready for you?" At this time,

[416]

two months before he had been supporting Symington, I just wondered if he said anything about that?

MORISON: No, he felt, and we discussed it when we were riding together, he said, "You know, the task of the keynoter is to speak to the issues, to recall the past, to recall all of the contributions that the Democratic Party, from its formative years in Jefferson and Jackson to Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

HESS: The Jefferson-Jackson days?

MORISON: And all the way through the Woodrow Wilson, Grover Cleveland, how each Democratic administration has come to pull the country together and to get a sense of cohesion

and to get a sense of direction away from the wrongs and evils of Republican rule. And he said, "This is what I must do here."

HESS: Now that was his official duty, more or less, at Washington and Lee. I was wondering if he, in informal conversation, while you were riding along said anything about the upcoming convention.

MORISON: I didn't ask him, I didn't think I should. I might have mentioned it, but certainly nothing that impresses me, it was a time of talking about his administration and a lot of the things that I have related here and I told him that I had been seeking, and that Luce Publications had never provided me with it, a picture that appeared in *Life* magazine of the President by himself near a piece of statuary or something, whether on the White House grounds or not, in deep thought with his hand like this, looking down, at the time of the Korean war, to exemplify the agony and the problems of the chief executive, which I thought was a great picture. I never have gotten that picture, it's one of the great ones.

[418]

HESS: That's one that was run in *Life* magazine about that time?

MORISON: Yes. During his incumbency.

And he said, "Well, Bess didn't like that."

"But I do, Mr. President," I said. Well, we talked about many things, he asked a lot about my beginnings in the mountain country. We knew then that I was going to meet him down in my mountain country later and I had told him a lot about the area of east Tennessee and southwest Virginia, I mean this schedule of his that came later to campaign...

HESS: He had made arrangements for that speaking trip?

MORISON: He had committed himself to Luther Hodges that he'd come down to North Carolina and help him campaign, and while he was there that any of the others that needed support, he would try to

[419]

lend them a hand.

HESS: All right, now let's move on to the days of the campaign, and after Kennedy was the nominee, what do you recall about the days of the campaign and helping Mr. Truman?

MORISON: Dave Stowe got in touch with me and said, "I need you and the President has asked that you come and join us. We will finish up down in North Carolina for Luther Hodges and then, at your request, we have agreed to speak for Pat Jennings (who was running for Congress and heavy Republican opposition for re-election from the ninth district of Virginia), and will you set things up?"

And I told him that I would. I had the inn there at Abingdon, Virginia, which used to be a "female academy" -- a girl's school, which now is a fine old hotel serving good food. I got the best suite of rooms there and I had had

[420]

my kinfolk and friends all around the area of east Tennessee, southwest Virginia, and western North Carolina and even parts of Kentucky, to get the word out to be on hand when his plane came in at the Tri-City Airport near Bristol. And I prepared an address for him when he was greeted at the airport. I knew these people would want something and he would want to say something to them. And I reminded him of the great political romance of past years in politics in Tennessee which was called the "war of the roses."

A very famous and brilliant theologian by the name of Taylor, a graduate of Princeton, came to east Tennessee as a minister and helped to found a college near Johnson City. His farm was called Happy Valley and it was on a river, a branch of the Watauga River and he had two sons. The oldest one was named Alfred Taylor,

[421]

the younger one was named Robert Love Taylor.

Alfred, following his father, was a brilliant student, he was sent to Princeton. Bob was jocular, full of fun, everything else, but also had a penchant for oratory but was not a scholar. So, in Tennessee for the first time, they had an open invitation for all candidates of either party to address a great rally of both parties. You see, it wasn't long after the War Between the States. And after that there would be the proper conventions of both political parties.

Well, Alf was a favorite son of his father, and being a very erudite man, he wrote a speech for Alf to be delivered as the *Republican* nominee.

So, Alf asked his brother, Bob, to go out on the river, under a sycamore and having memorized the speech to recite it back and forth to his brother and let him correct him on this speech. Well, they spent several days doing that. Bob

[422]

had never even made any indication that he had any interest in Nashville convention, but on the day and the occasion of the event in Nashville, Bob showed up as one of the candidates for the Democratic nomination and spoke before his brother Alf, and gave Alf's speech!

Well, this...

HESS: And stole his speech.

MORISON: Yes. And it followed that thereafter they turned out to be the nominees of the two parties, and they traveled together in a buggy; they slept together in the same hotel and oftentimes the same bed, and Bob won! And this was called the "war of the roses." It was a great romance.

And so I put that in the speech. I have it somewhere. So President Truman said in his talk -- remembering those early days in east Tennessee, and remembering that this affected not

[423]

only Tennessee but other adjacent states who knew of it, "I'm glad to be back on the ground where the famous war of the roses of the famous Taylor brothers occurred."

Well, that just set them afire, that he would remember that, you see, and my God, the speech went over big;

We then drove to Abingdon to spend the night, and the next morning at "milking time," two old nieces of Bob and Alf Taylor way up in years, had got their best Sunday dresses, had gotten somebody to drive them to Abingdon, Virginia to be there at the Inn and they had to see the President to thank him.

And I said, "Mr. President," I said, "these are the relatives of the Taylor boys," and I said, "They've come all the way up here, they are up in years, I think you ought to see them."

[424]

He said, "Of course I will." So he brought them right into his suite and sat with them. I had boned him up on every detail and he recalled, from memory, the story of how Bob Taylor pardoned from the Brush Mountain Penitentiary this Negro farm worker for a crime, because he'd stolen a hog. And ended up by saying, "And I will let you off for Christmas, and I know you're going to have good ham hocks for Christmas dinner."

Well, he recounted that, and these old ladies were just in seventh heaven. And it was in every editorial page of every newspaper in the area, that here, Truman, the great historian who forgot nothing, had remembered something that the younger generation didn't know -- about the "war of the roses," and then they began to republish this. So he was a great hit.

And then from there I took him the next day -- Pat Jennings the Congressman (now clerk of

[425]

the House) was there, Sidney Kellum, the national committeeman from Virginia came down from Norfolk, and the usual presidential press corps from Washington. He went to bed early that night, he took a couple of drinks and went to bed, but we then drove the next morning up to what had been Washington County's poorhouse in the 1700s, and Pat Jennings had had it refurbished to make it into a place for the AAA you know, meetings -- the young people's agricultural thing, what is it?

HESS: 4-H.

MORISON: 4-H Club, and there in the field he made a rip-roaring speech that I had written for him about the fighting ninth district, the heavy hand of [Campbell] Bascom Slemph, who had ruled by corruption the party in the ninth district of good Scotch-Irish people, and who was a

handmaiden of Calvin Coolidge and that the mountain district had been emancipated by able and bold men including

[426]

George Perry, who became Governor of the state, by John Flannigan the fiery orator who had won it, again from the Republicans, and by this young man who came out of World War II with decorations who was the sheriff of Smyth County, Virginia, whose record in Congress was already being noted. And Hell's bells, they just elected Pat Jennings hand over fist, it turned the tide, and it was a great speech. The President concluded by stating that the old poorhouse was a product of Republican rule but under Democratic Congressmen it was now a flourishing AAA center for young farmers.

HESS: Were you with him in Trenton, Tennessee?

MORISON: No, I was not.

HESS: That was five days later.

MORISON: No, I wasn't.

HESS: That was his next speech. Was Dave Stowe with

[427]

you when he was in Abingdon?

MORISON: Yes. Right. Right. Dave was with us all the way.

HESS: I think Dave Stowe was with Mr. Truman on each of the trips that year, is that right?

MORISON: Right. Right, he went on them all.

HESS: I thought he did.

MORISON: And he said later, "I wish I had your help, because," he said, "literally in this campaign for Luther Hodges in North Carolina, Luther Hodges was ready for the hospital, couldn't keep up with Harry Truman. He'd pull into these towns and make a rip-roaring speech and before you know it he was gone to another one." Dave said he covered more than he was supposed to, and that Luther Hodges was just "done in." He said, "The image of that man just shakes you up."

[428]

HESS: That was after the convention. Did Mr. Truman say anything in favor of the national ticket, John Kennedy, either during his speech or informally, or was it oriented mainly to the local situation?

MORISON: It was local and directed to the particular candidates.

HESS: All right. In informal conversation did he say anything about Kennedy?

MORISON: Not that I recall.

HESS: All right, is that everything in 1960?

MORISON: That did it.

HESS: In your opinion, what were Mr. Truman's major accomplishments during his administration?

MORISON: I think, knowing his character and the allegiances that he had in the Senate, his

[429]

realization that he had made a mistake in making Byrnes Secretary of State, the accommodation he made for Byrnes by nominating him to the Supreme Court, but from...

HESS: Byrnes was on the Supreme Court before then. You see, Byrnes was on the Supreme Court and left at President Roosevelt's request. He served as Truman's Secretary of State.

MORISON: That is correct but he was fired as Secretary of State.

HESS: Well, more or less, yes.

MORISON: He was fired. This was hard for the President to do, but he was doing it because he realized it was necessary. They went to Potsdam together...

HESS: You see Byrnes went back to South Carolina and later served as Governor, but I don't believe he had any national jobs after that.

[430]

MORISON: Yes, and became virtually a Republican.

But the real contribution of Truman was an understanding and a great deal of this relates to his close friendships, which was mutual, with men of character -- with Dean Acheson; with George C. Marshall, whom he admired, along with Omar Bradley; these were people that he equated with.

His determination that the Marshall Plan to restore the devastation of the agriculture and industry of Europe had to be done in the interest of not only world peace, but in the interest of the United States. This was a great concept. It's in keeping in part with some of the things that Woodrow Wilson, in his memoirs projected, and which were written about him as to his concept of the League of Nations as an international forum to avoid the devastation of war, and also the help which was never -- the Congress changed, and our membership in the League was never provided. It killed Wilson. The concept of

[431]

international aid to the nations devastated by World War I. Although the inceptions of the idea are still attributed to President Roosevelt, but Harry Truman brought the concept to fruition under great difficulty by never giving up the establishment of the United Nations. This was carrying forward in his mind the idea of Woodrow Wilson that there must be an organization of world governments to provide a forum for discussion and understanding and this could only be done through some sort of an agency of this type. President Truman worked ceaselessly and with detailed attention to the establishment of the United Nations as a major project that must succeed.

HESS: On that point of our foreign aid, there's a school of thought that's coming to the fore now that when we assisted the countries of Europe we were doing it for selfish reasons, we were

[432]

merely trying to restore out prewar markets and that if Europe went under our market would fail and therefore unemployment would result at home.

MORISON: Well, this could be the rationale of the bankers and so forth, but I promise you that as far as -- and President Truman discussed this one time in my presence after he had left office, with Dean Acheson, not as in detail as I am saying it, but it verified my own conclusions about it. This was never in my mind as far as I could see.

Let's assume the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, the representatives of the American Banker's Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, had come to him and said, "Do it for this reason," I think he would have thrown them out of his office.

[433]

He had seen and knew from detailed reports as to massive devastation, the poverty, the displaced persons problem which I dealt with when I went to the Economic and Social Council, and he felt that a world could not survive that didn't have as a victor, what all of history had shown had happened, Genghis Khan and all the rest, did not have the compassion to help restore the devastation and reestablish life and to give hope to people who were hopeless.

People can rationalize in looking back a thousand times, but I'm sure this was the thing that was uppermost in his mind and uppermost in George Marshall's mind, and Dean Acheson's, who was, I believe, the author of the Marshall Plan. Well, these stand out as two major achievements.

In many of the lesser important achievements, however, his basic humanitarian understanding of what has been a misused word, the "common man" and his significant place in our Nation, was as sensitive

[434]

as a very delicate musical instrument. He could feel and understand and see, because he had been a poor man. And these were his great qualities and they were reflected in so many of the things

that were needed and were done because of his intuitive feelings about our people and the clarity of his leadership.

HESS: If you were going to list a shortcoming or two of Mr. Truman or of the Truman administration, what would come to mind?

MORISON: Well, this is a two-faced answer. One, I understand and am drawn to the man as a person, because he was a magnificent human being as well as a man struggling to meet the duties of President of the United States. The things that would arouse his "hair-trigger" anger, which was leavened only by Mrs. Truman, was a human fault -- but the average man loved him for this. I understand

[435]

that and it makes me feel closer to him. This was a failing and he understood that he ought to think twice and be careful -- and he tried.

I wrote him a letter when I saw that article by [Paul] Hume criticizing Margaret's first try at being a singer, and he wrote him a letter and said he'd do -- he'd come down and "horsewhip" him. And I wrote him a letter and said, "Don't forget that when the rotten press (and there were hundreds of newspapers in Washington and Jackson's day), made aspersions about Andrew Jackson's wife Rachel, he did go down with a horsewhip and whip that editor. So, you've got a precedent, Mr. President, don't worry about it."

I think probably these are the most important things. I did relate to you about the [Harold H.] Velde thing didn't I, about the alcoholic number two man on the House Un-American Activities Committee

[436]

who succeeded to the chairmanship, that subpoenaed him to appear before that committee?

HESS: Yes, that was after the administration, but we didn't put it on tape.

MORISON: Oh! Well, after the President had left office, and his daughter Margaret had married [Clifton] Daniel of the New York *Times*, his first grandchild was born and he and Miss Bess came from Independence to New York to see their grandchild. And while he was there, the chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee was a man named Velde, who was a well-known alcoholic. For publicity he had a subpoena of his House Committee served on the President, in New York, to appear and testify with reference to the Dexter White case, the Bretton Woods Conference, Morgenthau et al, and the effect of the Communist conspiracy that resulted from that.

[437]

Judge [Samuel I.] Rosenman of New York who had been -- had acted from time to time as counsel and an advisor for Roosevelt seized the opportunity and said, "I'll take over Mr. President." Rosenman issued a statement to the press which was no more "Harry Truman" than a quotation from Disraeli. It was stilted and terrible. Following that, Governor Dewey, who

Truman has trounced, saw his opportunity and demanded and got radio time and television time - I guess radio, maybe both, and made a scathing attack on the President with reference to his failure to comply with this subpoena.

Well, Charlie Murphy was a partner of mine, we were then down in the Pennsylvania Building and the call first came in for him, but Charlie was away. So he asked for me and he said, "I want you. And when will Charlie come back?"

I said, "Tomorrow."

[438]

He said, "Well, I want you to immediately get in touch with Dean Acheson, and you, and Charlie and Dean, get together and write me a speech about five or six minutes long, no more than six, because I'm going to demand equal time, and I'm going to go on radio and TV and answer that s.o.b."

And I said, "Mr. President, it will be done."

And so when Charlie came back the next day we went over to Dean Acheson's office and were joined by Clark Clifford and we labored over each word and each phrase. We drafted and redrafted and were getting it down in some shape and the secretaries were coming in and out doing new drafts and finally Dean said, "Let's take a break, get out of here and go across the street and have a cup of coffee," which we did. And we were sitting there and he got to reminiscing about President Truman for whom he had deep

[439]

affection. He said, "You know, I never will forget the President." He said, "He didn't ask anybody's advice including the Cabinet. He didn't call me," but he said, "you know about it Charlie, you were privy to it," (talking to Charlie Murphy) "when the Korean war came on General MacArthur was making a grandstand play with his corn cob pipe just like his filmed landing in the Philippines in World War II and he had had magnificent offices in Japan, but he was pushing in Inchon and various landings like this, that, and the other. And he was pushing further and further to the boundaries of North Korea, and he had been told by Bradley and the Joint Chiefs that he must limit his operations to the defense of South Korea and not go beyond the 30th parallel. But knowing MacArthur's proclivity, he wanted to get star billing. He didn't care about the fact that this might draw the Russians right into the war, and we'd have a

[440]

major war on our hands." So he said, "The President was mad as hell," and shared his concern only with General Omar Bradley." He said, "Charlie, you remember you and Reston of the *Times* and several others after the President invited General MacArthur to meet him half way and you went with him to Wake Island where they met."

And Charlie said, "I sure do remember it. The great man came in and he fawned on the President with that eloquence of his, "You are the Commander in Chief, sir, and I'm delighted to have you here, and to give me advice and direction."

And he said, "Well, General, I appreciate that, I know that you have your hands full, this thing is a very great threat and menace to us and to the world. But I want you not to make any military incursions beyond the 30th parallel, and the reason for this is plain. If we do that we invite at a critical time the Russians to come

[441]

to the defense of North Korea in their interest in that part of Asia. They will say they are coming to the aid of their oppressed North Korean friends. Thus we would have a major war on our hands and we just must not have that."

MacArthur replied, "Mr. President, your word as Commander in Chief is my order, and I shall obey it to the letter," and he thanked him and went away. And he said, "Then upon the President's return to Washington MacArthur had committed both Marines and the Army to go right into North Korea and they were getting the hell clobbered out of them. The President got all of the dispatches from Bradley at the Pentagon, who was chief of staff, and he waited until 11 o'clock that night and he only called one man, so I understand, and that was Omar Bradley. Some say he also called George Marshall. And said, "Omar, I'm going to fire

[442]

MacArthur. Now, I figured I'd better first, though, touch base with you. What do you think?"

He said, "Harry, you're right," he said, "he's been a thorn in the whole military establishment because he will not accept the discipline of a military line of command, his orders have been specific all along by the chief of staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of our defense mechanism is geared to those orders, and he has violated them time, and time, and time again, without prior notification or approval." And he said, "You know, Harry," he said, "Franklin Roosevelt wanted to fire him many times, but he didn't have the guts to, he was afraid of him." He said, "His eloquence, his wealthy friends has made him disregard orders. I think you're right," and the President promptly sent the cable to General MacArthur: "You are relieved of your command and you shall report back to me as Commander in

[443]

Chief, Harry S. Truman."

And then he said, the next day word went out about "milking time" to all of the members of the Cabinet to be at the White House. The President called the meeting. He said, "We all got there, and the President figured he should see what the Cabinet had to say about it." He said, "Well, it was like an 'Irish wake.' I'd never seen such a pall of gloom." But, he said, "Finally Alben Barkley -- who could not stand a vacuum in conversation -- started speaking in his inimitable style. He reviewed the whole globe and all of the problems of the world. He came back to this situation and said he, on measured understanding of the relationship of all world problems, thought this action to be the right and necessary thing to do." Well, he said, "With all that eloquence nobody thereafter said a word. It was just a pall of

[444]

gloom." And he said, "I just couldn't stand it, it was just terrible for the President. I felt that some of us should say to the President, 'Mr. President, we're with you,' and I decided the best thing to do was to break it up with a little humor." I said, "You know, Mr. President, this reminds me of my classmate at Yale. He's a banker in New York, and he told me this not long ago." He said, "He lives out on Long Island and he has a daughter who is about 19 or 20. She is a very beautiful young girl and he told me he went home and dressed for dinner, and his wife and daughter had dinner with him. He noticed that his daughter was very quiet during dinner, for she usually was full of chatter. Well, he didn't think anything about it, but at the end of dinner, she came by his chair and said, 'Father, I'd like to have a private conversation with you if you could after dinner.'"

He said, "Well certainly, daughter, I'm sure

[445]

your mother would excuse you. We'll go into my library and have coffee together."

Well he said, "My friend went into the library and got a cigar and the coffee tray was brought in and his daughter came in and said -- her spine was as erect as a steel rod, and she shut the sliding doors and locked them. And he could see that she was getting her courage up. She walked right up to him and said, "Father, I'm going to have a baby!"

Her father said, "Whew, well, I sure am glad that's over." Well, he said, "That kind of eased the tensions." But with that speech, which you may remember, which he made over radio and television, the man that was hurt the most was Thomas E. Dewey, and Congressman Velde. The members of Congress were just peppered with telegrams for permitting Velde to do such a thing and it was all over. Dewey was put in

[446]

his place and considered a "bad loser."

HESS: If I recall correctly there was some consideration at that time, as to whether or not the President should accept the subpoena.

MORISON: Oh, there was a lot of controversy as to the legality of the service of it and if an ex-President was compelled to respond. But the President didn't want to fool with technicalities, if you know the President. He wanted to meet it head on, which he did, and he destroyed this whole issue and very quickly. The subpoena was withdrawn.

HESS: Okay. What is your estimation of Mr. Truman's place in history?

MORISON: I think one of the very great men in American history. We're coming into a different age and a different breed of people, but he stands out in

[447]

clarity as to what I call the "water table" of the high mountains as the best of our Nation's traditions in leadership, from the long line of the great men who were chief executives of our country, from our earliest days of independence following the Revolutionary War and up to

modern times. He was the right successor to the Roosevelt era (that nobody felt he was) to pick up the tradition Franklin Roosevelt left and to carry it on in a realistic way without fear. He was a man unafraid and he faced into the awesome problems of that office with only the kind of internal fortitude which a man of his upbringing possesses. My worry today is, do we have counterparts somewhere for the leadership of the future of that kind, because there is no office in any government in the whole world as awesome in its responsibility as the office of President of the United States. And this is accentuated in times of crisis, of

[448]

national crisis, so I put him with Jefferson, with Jackson, I put him with Cleveland, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt.

HESS: Do you have anything else to add concerning your service in the Truman administration or regarding Mr. Truman?

MORISON: No, except that I can think of no experience in my life which came to me only by happenstance that has been so much a remembered joy -- in living life to its fullest in a commitment to the public interest. I look back upon it, as probably the peak of a hoped for career, because it gave me more reward, which is a reward of spirit, of feeling that you are participating fruitfully in public events, and that you are serving the public interest -- the needs of all our citizens.

HESS: Thank you very much.

[450]

1960 POLITICAL SPEECHES

GIVEN BY FORMER PRESIDENT HARRY S TRUMAN

1-9-60	Democratic Dinner, Phoenix, Arizona
1-23-60	Kick-off Dinner 1960 Presidential Campaign, Sheraton-Plaza Hotel, Washington, DC
2-27-60	Democratic Jefferson-Jackson Presidential Kick-off Dinner, Miami Beach, Florida
3-19-60	Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner, Louisville, Kentucky
4-30-60	Democratic Congressional Campaign Dinner, Washington, DC
5-2-60	Democratic Mock Convention, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia
5-13-60	Press Conference, Chicago, Illinois, re: Symington
6-23-60	Stuart Symington Dinner, Muchlebach Hotel, Kansas City, Missouri
7-2-60	Press Conference, Auditorium Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri
9-5-60	Labor Day Speech, Marion, Indiana
10-8-60	Spencer, Iowa
10-10-60	Luncheon, Texarkana, Texas
10-10-60	San Antonio, Texas
10-11-60	Waco, Texas

10-13-60	Raleigh, North Carolina
10-14-60	Nashville, North Carolina
10-14-60	Wilson, North Carolina
10-15-60	Abingdon, Virginia
10-20-60	Trenton, Tennessee
10-20-60	Sikeston, Missouri
10-21-60	Decatur, Alabama
10-22-60	Abbeyville, Louisiana
10-21-60	Tupelo, Mississippi
10-27-6-	University of Washington, Seattle, Washington
10-27-60	Tacoma, Washington
10-28-60	Reno, Nevada
10-28-60	Oakland, California
11-1-60	Hunter College, New York, New York
11-2-60	Fishkill, New York
11-2-60	Haverstraw, New York
11-3-60	New York, New York (West Side)
11-3-60	Brooklyn, New York – Street corner rally at 13 th Ave. and 47 th street
11-3-60	New York, New York (East side) – Public School #12, Madison and Jackson Streets
11-4-60	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
11-4-60	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

[452]

INDEX

Abraham, Samuel, 193, 264, 268, 272
 Acheson, Dean, 14, 16, 154-155, 212, 234, 405-409, 438-440
 Allen, Floyd, 32, 33
 Almond, Lindsay, 240, 258
 Antitrust suits, 20-21, 39, 134-135, 168-177, 191-195, 203-206, 339
 Arnold, Thurman, 176-177
 Aswell, James, 390
 Atomic bomb, Hiroshima, 90, 92-96
 Ayers, William A., 174

Ball, George, 389
 Barker, J.M., 2
 Barker, Margaret K., 2
 Barkley, Alben W., 236-237, 374, 443
 Baruch, Bernard, 276-277
 Battle, John, 240
 Battle, William, 257, 258
 Berge, Wendell, 133, 134
 Betancourt, Romulo, 152
 Biddle, Francis, 12, 13, 21, 22, 24, 113

"Big Four," 286-287
 Blough, Roger, 177
 Bontecou, Eleanor, 106, 120
 Bowers, Claude G., 238
 Boyle, William M., Jr., 160-161
 Bradley, Omar N., 440, 441-442
 Broome, Eric, 48, 50, 55
Brown vs. Topeka Board of Education, 116
 Byrd machine, Virginia, 161-164, 254-256, 259, 386
 Byrnes, James F., 429

Cahill, John, 134, 191
 Carnegie, Andrew, 4
 Carolina, Clinchfield and Ohio Railroad, 2
 Carr, Robert, 112
 Cates, Clifford B., 11, 153-154
 Caudle, T. Lamar, 308-326
 Chandler, Albert, 34
 Chapman, Oscar L., 329-330, 335, 337-338
 Ching, Cyrus, 78-79
 Civil rights, 27-29, 106-125, 239-242
 Clapp, Newell, 189, 193
 Clark, Ramsey, 325, 326
 Clark, Tom C., 12-13, 15, 16, 21-22, 25-31, 34-35, 37, 41-48, 57-58, 61-62, 67, 108, 111, 112-115, 120, 133, 135, 169, 195, 197, 199, 212-213
 Clayton Act, amendment, to, 281-282
 Clifford, Clark M., 294
 Coal strikes, 66-90
 Commerce, U.S. Department of, 145, 166-168
 Connelly, Matthew J., 48-49, 54, 103-104, 188, 189, 202, 248, 315, 322
 Cook, Donald, 63
 Cotton and Franklin, Inc., 191

Daniel, Margaret Truman, 435, 436
 Dawson, Donald S., 103, 104, 105, 208
 Democratic National Committee, 157-161, 165
 Democratic National Convention, 1948, 235-240
 Democratic National Convention, 1952, 375-377, 379-380, 385-386
 Democratic National Convention, 1956, 377-378
 Dennis, Rose, 264
 Dewey, Thomas E., 437, 445
 DeWitt, John L., 28, 113-114
 DiSalle, Michael V., 278-279
 Displaced persons, World War II refugees, 17, 18, 19
 Dixon, Paul R., 174
 Dollar Steamship case, 178-179

Donohue, F. Joseph, 118
Douglas, Paul H., 375-376

Eaton, Frederick M., 300
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 387-389
Elsey, George M., 294-295
Ennis, Edward, 27, 28
Espy, James, 151-152, 155

Fair Trade Laws Act, 1952, 304-305
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 30-31, 36, 38, 42-43, 47, 50, 52, 152
Federal employees, loyalty, probes of, 57-59
Federal Trade Commission, 168-176, 339
Feeney, Joseph G., 284-285
Folsom, Frederick G., 107
Fort Lincoln Association, 131-132
Freehill, Joseph, 268-269, 279
Friedman, Martin L., 208

Gardner, Max, 137
Goldsborough, Allan, 69, 72-73, 76
Graham, Hugh, 126-128
Graham, Philip L., 172-173
Greenspun, H.M., 190
Guggenheim, Richard, 264

Hannegan, Robert E., 145-147
Harriman, Averell, 145, 167
"Hillsboro massacre," 32-33
Hiss, Alger, 59, 60
Hodges, Luther, 419, 427
Hoffa, Jimmy, 323, 324
Holton, Linwood, 259
Holtzoff, Alexander, 27
Hooker, John, 318, 322, 325
Hoover, J. Edgar, 30-31, 33-35, 41-45, 57, 58, 61-63, 152-153, 183, 184, 186-187, 223-224, 359
Hopkins, Welly, 69-71, 72-73, 75-76, 86, 251
Hopkins, William J., 404
Hume, Paul, 435

IBM, antitrust suit against, 301-304
Independent Democrats of Virginia, 161-162
Isbrandtsen Steamship Line, 215-223

Jackson, Robert H., 6, 9
Japan, atomic bombing of, 90, 92-96

Japanese-Americans, relocation of, World War II, 27-29, 113-115
Japanese Claims Act, 115
Jennings, Pat, 424-426
Johnson, Lyndon B., 63
Johnston, Eric A., 279
Justice Department, U.S.:
 Antitrust Division, 20-21, 39, 134-135, 168-177, 191-211, 287-293, 297-307, 339
 Civil Division, 16, 38, 66, 67, 178, 189, 215-223
 Civil Rights Section, 106-111, 115, 120-121
 legislation sponsored by, 281-284
 Morris, Newbold, as special investigator in, 341-353
 Tax Division, scandals in 1951, 308-317
 White House, legislative liaison with the, 284-286

Kansas City, Missouri vote frauds, 1946, 39-54
Kansas City Star, 39, 43, 44, 51, 54
Keech, Richmond B., 81, 85
Kefauver, Estes, 165-166, 281-283, 375-379
Kennedy, John F., 164, 378, 391-392
Kennedy, Joseph, 177-180, 182-188
Kennedy, Robert F., 322-323, 325
King, Martin Luther, 121
Korean War, 14, 19, 101, 261, 263, 267, 439, 441
Kramer, Victor, 25
Kronheim, Milton S., Jr., 118

Labor unions, wage stabilization, 265-268
Las Vegas Times, 190
LeHand, Marguerite, 400, 409
Lewis, John L., 16, 66, 70-73, 76-80, 83, 84-90, 249-251
Littel, Norman, 24
"Little Cabinet," 146-157
Louage, M. Anton, 219-224

MacArthur, Douglas, 439-443
McCarran, Pat, 181, 189, 190, 203, 205-207, 211, 368
McDonough, Gordon, 101-102
McGranery, James P., 196-204, 210-211, 361-362, 364-368
McGrath, J. Howard, 173, 195, 198-199, 202, 252-253, 291-292, 328, 343, 346-347, 353-364
McGregor, Douglas, 157
McIntire, Marvin, 139
McKittrick, William L., 94
Malik, Charles H., 17, 226
Malone, Ross, 137
Marine Corps, U.S.:
 covert operations in Venezuela, 153-156

4th Division, World War II, 11, 91
tradition of, 100-101
Truman, Harry S., clash with, 102-105
Maritime Commission, U.S., 178-180
Marshall, George C., 2
Marshall Plan, 432-433
Marshall, Thurgood, 111
Mason, Lowell B., 168, 169-170
Mead, James M., 168
Medina, Harold, 306, 307
Miller, Francis Pickens, 161-162, 254-255
Miller, Nathan L., 4-5, 123-125
Miller, Owen, Otis and Bailey, 3-4
Milligan, Maurice, 47
Morison, A. Kyle, 3, 90
Morison, Charl, 129
Morison, Henry, 129
Morison, H. Graham, background, 1-12
Morison, H.S.K., 2, 129
Morison, Hugh G., 1-2, 129
Morison, Lucille Baker, 1-2
Morison, H. Ransom, 129
Morison, Warrick, 129-132
Morison, Willie, 129
Morison, Newbold, 198, 341-353, 357-358
Morris, Annis Kyle, 2
Murphy, Charles S., 103, 156, 158-159, 231-22, 271, 277, 278, 287, 288, 289, 290, 362, 363, 437-440

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 111, 119
National Lawyers Committee against the Third Term, 15, 139
Negroes, civil rights, 106-111, 116-125, 241
Nelson, Donald M., 7, 10
New York Stock Exchange, antitrust suit against, 306-307
Novikov, Kirill V., 404-406

O'Brian, John L., 5, 6, 7, 10, 264
Office of Economic Stabilization, 14, 19-20, 101, 261-280
Oil imports, limitation on, 328-340
Operation Paperclip, 147-148

Paisley, William, 48, 50
Pan American-TWA Airlines case, 1950, 297-299
Patman, Wright, 137
Patterson, Robert P., 150
Pearson, Drew, 24

Pendergast machine, 9, 40
Pendergast, Tom, 9, 40, 47
Perlman, Philip B., 189
Phelps, Richard, 47, 48
Potofsky, Jacob S., 266
Presidential campaign, 1948, 142, 235-240, 242-249, 252-256
Presidential campaign, 1952, 369, 371-377, 379-390
Presidential campaign, 1956, 377-378
Presidential campaign, 1960, 395-400, 414-428
President's Committee on Civil Rights, 111-112
President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 57-59
Progressive Party, 1948, 245-247

Queen Mary, RMS, 186

Refugees: See displaced persons

Reuther, Walter P., 379
Roberts, Roy, 39
Rodman, Richard, 107
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 6, 12, 15, 91-92, 136-139, 178, 197, 442
Rosen, Abe, 107
Rosenman, Samuel I., 437

Sachs, Irving, 314-315
Saipan, World War II, 11
Sawyer, Charles, 167-168, 169-170, 329, 331, 338
Shaughnessy, Edward J., 186-187
Slade, Samuel D., 264
Smith, Holland M., 94
Smith, Howard, 122
Smith, Turner L., 107-109, 116-117, 118, 119, 120
Snyder, John W., 317
Sonnett, John F., 66-67, 134-135, 191
Soviet Union, UN Economic/Social Council re refugees, 17-19
Sparkman, John J., 380
Spingarn, Stephen J., 175-176
Staggers, Harley, 253
States Rights Party (Dixiecrats), 1948, 242-244
Steelman, John R., 77, 295-296
Stevens, Harold, 85, 86-87, 88
Stevenson, Adlai E., 164, 373, 380-384, 386-389, 391-394
Stewart, Grace, 26
Stone, Harlan F., 35
Stowe, David H., 295, 296, 419, 427
Sullivan, Gael, 146-147, 149, 157-159, 165-166, 375, 377
Supreme Court of New York, 4

Supreme Court of Tennessee, 2

Taft-Hartley Act, 66, 67-68, 73, 74, 78, 82

Taft, Robert A., 82-85

Tamm, Edward A., 31, 35, 41, 43, 44, 45-46

Tamm, Quinn, 46

Taylor, Alfred, 420-422 T

Taylor, Robert L., 421-422, 427

Teamsters Union, 323-324

Telford, Horton, 214, 219, 221-222

Temporary National Economic Committee, 176-177

"The Buck Stops Here," 96-97

Thurmond, J. Strom, 242, 244

Tolson, Clyde, 35, 41, 44, 45

Truitt, Max O., 178-180

Truman, Bess Wallace, 373, 407-409

Truman Committee, 6-8

Truman, Harry S.:

- antitrust policy, 292-294, 298

- character and stature, 143-144, 446-448

- civil rights legislation, support of, 122

- Clark, Tom C., relationship with, 22-23

- coal strike of 1949, and, 77-78, 88-90

- Congressional liaison, and, 286-287

- contributions as President, 428-434

- fires J. Howard McGrath as Attorney General, 202-203

- MacArthur, Douglas, dismissal of, 439-443

- McCarran, Pat, dislike of, 207

- Marine Corps, clash with, 102-105

- Morison, H.G., appoints head of Justice Department Antitrust Division, 287-290

- Morison, H.G., congratulates on 1948 election victory, 248-249

- Morison, H.G., first acquaintance with, 6-7

- Morison, H.G., meeting with re Joseph Kennedy, 188

- Morison, H.G., requested to establish office of Economic stabilization, 14, 19-20, 101, 261-262

- oil imports, policy re, 331-336

- Presidential campaign, 1960, speeches for John F. Kennedy, 418-428

- Presidential nomination, 1948, opposition to, 142-143, 235

- President's Committee on Civil Rights, appoints, 111

- Russian Ambassador to U.S., threatens to recall, 401-409

- Sign on White House desk, "The Buck Stops Here," explains, 96-97

- Stevenson, Adlai, relationship with, 1952 campaign, 380-383

- subpoenaed by Velde Committee, 1952, 436-438, 445-446

- temper of, 434-435

- third term, decision not to seek, 369, 371-372

- Truman Committee, as chairman of, 6-10

Washington and Lee University, 1960 address, 395, 397-400, 411-417

United Auto Workers, 379

United Mine Workers, 16, 66-67, 69, 71, 75-87, 90

United Nations Economic and Social Council, 14, 16-19, 213, 225-233

United Nations, U.S. Ambassador to, 393

U.S. Steel Corporation, 4-5, 177, 274-278

Valentine, Alan, 273-278

Vanderbilt, Arthur, 139-140

Vanech, A. Devitt, 58-59

Velde, Harold A., 435-436, 445

Venezuela, oil and politics, 151-156

Virginia Military Institute, 2

Virginia:

 Presidential campaign, 1948, 254-256

 Presidential campaign, 1952, 385-387

 Presidential campaign, 1960, 257-259

Wake Island Conference, 1950, 440

Wallace, Henry A., 245-247

War Production Board, U.S., 5-7, 268-270

Warren, Earl, 116

Washington and Lee University, 3, 29, 395, 397-398, 411-417

Washington Post, 44

Washington Star, 44

Watson, Thomas J., Jr., 303-304

Watson, Thomas J., Sr., 301-303

Wear, Sam, 54-56

Webb, James E., 230-231

White, Walter, 119

Whitehair, Francis, 271-272, 274

Whitehead, Robert, 162, 255

White House staff, 294-297

Wilkie, Wendell, 370-371

Wilson, Woodrow, 171, 172

Wiretapping, FBI requests for, 30-31, 33-34, 36, 37

Wirtz, W. Willard, 392-393

Woodward, Stanley, 398-399, 401-409

World government, 430-431

World War II, Pacific campaigns of U.S. Marine Corps, 11

Young Democrats, 137

Young, Gordon, 118

Young, John F., 119

Young, Whitney, 119

Zetphew-Adler, Baron Heinrich, 226