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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
 OA/Box: Box 4
 File Folder: NASA Briefing

Archivist: kdb
 FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen
 Date: 08/04/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (4875)	Frank Carlucci to Chief of Staff re NASA presentation to the President, 1p	6/26/87	B1 UNK
2. memo	R 1/10/11 F97-066/6 #81 William Graham to H. Baker re NASA presentation, 1p	6/25/87	B1 S
3. schedule proposal	Carlucci to Fred Ryan re Presidential briefing, 2p	3/16/87	B1 S
	R 1/10/11 F97-066/6 #83		

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Pasadena, California 91125

Office of the Chairman
Division of Geology and Planetary Sciences

Telephone
818/356-6108

January 4, 1988

FEDERAL EXPRESS

Mr. James Glanville
The Sea View
9909 Collins Avenue
Bal Harbor
Miami Beach, FL 33154

SENATOR HOWARD BAKER -
FOR YOUR PRIVATE
INFORMATION.
J.

Dear Jim:

The following are some of my thoughts on the matter.

- 1) I agree with Mr. B's assessment. More committees are simply not needed.
- 2) The only solution can come from the President through the clear enunciation of a specific long-term objective.
- 3) The appropriate agencies and interagency committee must get clear instructions as to their charge.
- 4) There can be no substantial impact on the budget.
- 5) NASA must get committed to expendable vehicles which are now in production for the Air Force. This must be part of their normal procurement and not as an add-on to the budget.
- 6) The shuttle must be used for only those purposes which really require a manned presence.
- 7) The space station, which is still amorphous and very expensive, must be stretched out for a somewhat longer time.
- 8) A heavy lift capability usable by both NASA and the Air Force must be defined, planned and obtained and should provide the support for the space station.
- 9) If there is no definite action in the next few months, the game will be lost within this administration and very likely for the next eight years (possibly to the end of the century).

At the present time I do not consider the actions at lower levels within the White House to be of a quality and intensity to generate substantial progress. Some of the current discussions involving fly-by-night outfits and false ideas about commercialization simply fill my heart with fear. Some of these are under discussion in the Economic Policy Council and in the OSTP.

Mr. James Glanville
Page 2

January 4, 1988


I am personally convinced that the right course of action for our nation is as follows: The President announce that the U.S. is committed to the exploration of Mars as the main goal of the U.S. Space Program. The objective for this century is robotic exploration with the return of Mars samples from diverse locations. The longer term goal will be piloted missions to Mars early in the next century. The program will be an international one with the U.S. as the leader in this endeavor. International cooperation would be welcomed by the U.S. Insofar as the Soviet Union is interested in the scientific and technological endeavor, we should share our results with them and set up joint science teams to discuss objectives and coordinate activities when it was to our mutual benefit. The U.S. missions should be independent and function on a stand-alone basis. (The best course would be if both powers enunciated that the scientific exploration of Mars was a common goal with each nation independently pursuing the same common objective and sharing the scientific results with occasional exchange of small hardware packages. This may be too difficult to achieve in the present environment.)

The effect of such a commitment by the United States with appropriate and firm Presidential directives on certain issues (e.g., 3), 4), 5), 6), 7), and 8) of previous listing) would be to focus our resources on a realizable goal of historical significance. The practical effects would be to A) identify the President and the nation with a distinguished goal that will go down in the books to his credit; B) provide a basis for getting expendables and for developing a heavy lift capability that we must have in a rather short time scale (very likely within 8 years); C) permit the use of the heavy lift capability to efficiently assemble the space station and not overload and over-drive the strained and pained shuttle; D) give a realizable and significant goal to NASA that will recapture U.S. leadership on a relatively rapid time scale; E) get NASA and the Air Force together with better defined objectives of legitimate mutual interest (HELV and OTV); and F) avoid a serious budgetary impact.

These are my current thoughts, Jim, which you may use in any way you feel would be beneficial. I think we are very close to the end of the line as I indicated above. I will be glad to give it the old college try once more if you have any suggestions. I think that the true commercial issues which involve communications satellites may be resolved if the use of NASA and Air Force launch facilities can be put into responsible order with adequate management and if the production of the commercially capable ELVs is kept on schedule. This would then permit the United States to use U.S. launches and not buy foreign launches and to get our well-defined commercial objectives satisfied and functioning. Almost all of the other "commercial" objectives (e.g., space manufacturing, etc. are flim flam).

I wish you and Nancy the best for the new year and apologize for my tardiness in getting this note to you, but work load at this end has been somewhat out of sight. I hope this will do some good. Please let me know.

Very truly yours,



G. J. Wasserburg
Division Chairman and
John D. MacArthur Professor
of Geology and Geophysics

GJW:bms

JOHNE. CHAPOTON

1/11/88

TO: Lura Nell

Mr. Attwell asked that we have this
delivered to the Senator for Mr. Glanville.

Marie

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 26, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI 
SUBJECT: NASA Presentation to the President

I have noted Bill Graham's recent memos to you urging postponement of the NASA/CIA briefing to the President, now scheduled for June 30. We remain convinced the briefing should go forward as scheduled.

As you know, Jim Fletcher has had this briefing ready for the President to review since last November. When you, I and Jim Miller reviewed it on June 1, we agreed it contained information that the President would find useful. Given recent Soviet launch tests and public announcements of far-reaching space initiatives, we believe it is important to provide the President with the perspective this briefing contains. While we continue to support the SDI briefings mentioned in Bill's memo, we believe their presentation is not a matter of urgency.

Bill Graham raises important policy issues that we agree will require careful attention. However, we are currently in the early stages of working with OSTP and other agencies to update national space policy and associated programmatic implementation guidance. We suggest this interagency policy review process is a preferable forum in which to address these broader issues.

cc: James C. Miller III
William R. Graham
Nancy J. Risque

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F97-0666/6 #81
BY RW NARA DATE 11/10/11

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 24, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.

FROM: WILLIAM R. GRAHAM *WRG*

SUBJECT: NASA Presentation to the President

A NASA/CIA presentation is tentatively on the President's calendar for Tuesday, June 30th. As I understand it, the briefing deals with Soviet space achievements, capabilities and projections, as seen by the Intelligence Community, and concludes with broad recommendations by NASA on how the U.S. space posture could be strengthened.

Since you specifically asked that I review this briefing prior to its presentation, I wanted you to know that, despite my explicit requests to the NASA leadership, I have not been consulted on the policy recommendations likely to arise in this discussion. Furthermore, I have serious reservations as to the message of the briefing as I understand it through informal channels.

I fully agree that the President should be brought up to date on important new developments in the space arena. In the near term I would suggest a CIA/DIA briefing devoted exclusively to developments in the Soviet space program. Additionally, a briefing by General Abrahamson on the Delta 180/181 programs, jointly proposed in March by Frank Carlucci and me (and approved by Fred Ryan's office) remains ready for presentation (see attached Schedule Proposal).

Broader space policy issues, such as those under consideration by NSC and OSTP for the past few months, should also be brought to the President's attention, but only with the full participation of NASA, DOD, DOT and other affected agencies. I believe that appropriate review councils (EPC, SIG (Space), etc.) should also have an opportunity to make their views known.

Let me suggest that the subject briefing be postponed until a balanced, comprehensive set of views can be put forward, and that equally urgent briefings already approved be brought to the President's attention in the interim.

CC: James C. Miller III
Frank C. Carlucci
Rhett B. Dawson
Nancy J. Risque

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 97-0166 #83

BY RW NARA DATE 11/10/11

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRET

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

March 16, 1987

TO:

FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.
DIRECTOR OF APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM:

for FRANK C. CARLUCCI *CJ*
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

WILLIAM R. GRAHAM *WRG*
SCIENCE ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT

REQUEST:

Briefing to the President on the technically significant results of the first SDI space intercept experiment conducted in September 1986 (Delta 180 Project), and on the plans for the next space experiment (Delta 181) to take place in November 1987.

PURPOSE:

Information. These experiments provide the most timely and visible evidence of the potential for Space-Based Strategic Defenses. An informal presentation to the President will let him see the national commitment and capability to conduct the SDI program. Also, he will gain additional insight into these programs to aid him in his discussions with Congress, the press, our allies, and our adversaries.

BACKGROUND:

Several of the technological advances now being factored into the future of the SDI program were accomplished in the Delta 180 program. In addition, the program was carried out in a very competent and rapid manner, and the President has recently sent letters of appreciation to several of the scientists and engineers who carried out the program.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION:

The President has received several briefings from LtGen Abrahamson on the SDI. These meetings have only briefly touched on the above topics.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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2

DATE AND TIME: When schedule permits
DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: Situation Room

PATICIPANTS: President
Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chief of Staff
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
Science Advisor to the President

OUTLINE OF EVENT: Following a short introduction on
the scientific significance of the
Delta 180 and 181 experiments by
Dr. Graham, the President will receive
an explanation of the Delta 180 and
181 Programs and their significance
from LtGen Abrahamson. The medium will
be video tape, pictures, and scale
models. The President is not required
to perform any official duty.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None required.

MEDIA COVERAGE: None. (Briefing is classified.)

RECOMMENDED BY: Frank C. Carlucci and William R. Graham

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