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09 JUL 1981



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

July 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN W. THOMAS
ASSISTANT COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Assassination Report

When Ed Meese and Secretary Regan met a couple of days ago, the Secretary gave him an initial copy of the Department's assassination report. At the time, the Secretary indicated that a subsequent version of the report would be available in early July. I am attaching a copy of the latest version for Ed Meese. Again, we consider this to be very confidential and have limited distribution in Treasury to less than a half-dozen individuals.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "DL" or "DL Chew".

David L. Chew
Executive Assistant
to the Secretary

Attachment



CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

June 26, 1981

Dear Ed:

I thought you might like to see the most recent draft of the report I requested from the General Counsel of the Treasury on the performance of Treasury Department agencies in connection with the attempted assassination of the President on March 30, 1981.

In general, the report concludes that the Secret Service and other Treasury agencies performed very well indeed, but as in all such reports a scrutiny of events and responses illuminated certain deficiencies. These are noted in the Conclusions section of the report and are followed up with specific recommendations for change.

I should note that the report has great praise for the performance of four individual agents -- Jerry Parr, Tim McCarthy, Dennis V. McCarthy, the agent who was first to reach and subdue the President's assailant, and Ray Shaddick, the agent who pushed Parr and the President into the car and ran the security at the hospital. Appropriate awards are recommended for these men.

The Department's General Counsel is now working on a version of this report which, without classified information, can be made public and submitted to appropriate Congressional committees.

Sincerely,

Donald T. Regan

The Honorable
Edwin Meese III
Counsellor to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE

D R A F T

Dated: July 2, 1981

Report on the Performance of the
United States Department of the Treasury
In Connection With the
March 30, 1981, Assassination Attempt
On President Ronald Reagan

Prepared by the
General Counsel,
United States Department
of the Treasury
June , 1981

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I. INTRODUCTION

On March 30, 1981, the President of the United States was fired upon and wounded while leaving a meeting of the Building and Construction Trades Union at the Washington Hilton Hotel. This was the first apparent attempt on the life of a President since 1975, and the first time that a President had been injured in such an attempt since the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, nearly eighteen years ago.

Perhaps more troubling than the incident were its implications. As one more act of violence in a continuing pattern of physical attacks on Presidents and other prominent figures, it raised again the question of how free institutions can defend themselves and still remain free.

Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan, who oversees the Presidential protection activities of the United States Secret Service, responded to the incident by directing the General Counsel of the Department to investigate "all aspects of the incident, including the adequacy of procedures, facilities and personnel for (i) ascertaining the existence and assessing the seriousness of threats to the President, (ii) protecting the President in his public activities, and (iii) responding promptly and effectively to this and similar incidents." He observed that "[o]n March 30, 1981, this nation narrowly avoided a tragedy; your report should focus not only on the event itself, but also on its lessons for the future."

In response to this instruction, the General Counsel of the Treasury established a working group of attorneys, drawn primarily from the law enforcement area, but with support in international affairs and domestic finance. Those attorneys were given full access to the personnel and papers of the Department and its bureaus, including the U.S. Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the U.S. Customs Service. In addition, Secretary Regan requested, and the working group received, the cooperation of the Attorney General, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Finally, on a less formal level, the working group was assisted by personnel in the White House, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Federal Reserve System.

As Secretary Regan suggested, the inquiry went beyond the

question of whether Treasury agencies responded well to the incident of March 30. In many ways, that transfixing encounter with fate was an easy case: the gunman acted alone; on a week-day; with a low-caliber weapon; in Washington, D.C.; while the President was at the door of his limousine; within a mile or two of a fully equipped and staffed metropolitan hospital; above all, the President's wound was not mortal. Anyone can imagine less favorable circumstances, and it is for these that Treasury and other agencies must be prepared.

For this reason, the report focused on the procedures or plans which each Treasury agency involved had in place on March 30 for dealing with an assassination attempt or similar crisis, and compared the agency's performance with the standard established by its plans. Where plans or procedures did not exist, the agency's performance was assessed in light of what professional judgment or common sense would suggest. The report's conclusions evaluate performance in relation to procedures, evaluate procedures for their efficacy, and, in some cases, recommend the establishment of procedures or plans where none existed on March 30.

But the report also had significant limits:

* First, the report does not attempt to suggest an appropriate level of protection for the President. This is fundamentally a political and policy question, suitable ultimately for resolution by the President alone. The means exist fully to protect the President; unfortunately, he must decide whether in availing himself of these means he will reduce his ability to lead and his effectiveness in the office.

* Second, the inquiry was made necessary by a criminal act for which an accused person has not yet come to trial. Accordingly, the inquiry was conducted and the report drafted in such a way as to minimize any possible threat to the procedural rights of the accused. To this end, no interviews of persons who had been at the Washington Hilton on March 30 were conducted without the approval of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, and no such person was interviewed about his observations of the crime itself.

* Third, in conformity with the Secretary's direction, the report is about the Treasury Department and its constituent agencies. The inquiry did not attempt to review or evaluate security plans or procedures of the White House or of the intelligence agencies, or indeed to determine whether such plans exist or were implemented on March 30.

* Fourth, the inquiry was concerned solely with institutional preparedness for, and response to, an attempted assassination of the President. The performance of individuals in conditions of crisis was not relevant to these purposes. Although questions arose concerning the performance of a few individuals during the inquiry, the details of these matters are known to officials who can act appropriately upon them and do not appear in the report.

* Finally, certain agencies may already have evaluated their performance on March 30, 1981, and plan to implement changes based on that evaluation. The inquiry did not attempt to review, and the report does not assess the efficacy, of these changes.

Even with these limitations, however, the report was compelled in some cases to deal with major issues of national policy, issues which require the balancing of competing values or objectives. The report does not presume to strike this balance, but seeks only to make somewhat more clear the implicit choices which underlie current policies. What is already clear is that a democratic system which values an orderly transfer of authority through free elections cannot allow the results of these processes to be redirected or reversed by violence.

II. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS OF MARCH 30, 1981,
PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO HILTON HOTEL

President Ronald Reagan was scheduled to visit the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981, to speak to representatives of the Building and Construction Trades Union, AFL-CIO. The President was to arrive by motorcade from the White House, reaching the hotel at approximately 1:50 p.m. After entering the hotel, the President would have his picture taken with fifteen union leaders, and then go into the main ballroom to speak briefly to approximately 4,000 members of the union. Following the speech, the President would return to his motorcade, parked on the "T" Street side of the hotel, and depart for the White House, where he was to arrive at about 2:30 p.m. The visit was expected to be routine.

Since the President had been making similar trips to the Hilton approximately once every other week, the White House staff and the Secret Service had developed a standard drill for Hilton visits. In accordance with that procedure, the White House designated a staff advance man, in this case Rick Ahearn, and provided him with the President's itinerary. The staff then informed the Secret Service's Presidential Protective Division (the "PPD") of the scheduled visit. On Wednesday, March 25, the PPD notified Special Agent William Green that he would be the lead advance Special Agent for the March 30 visit. Ahearn was responsible for arranging the President's schedule during the Hilton visit, while Green was responsible for coordinating all security preparations.

On the morning of Friday, March 27, Ahearn, Green, and members of their respective advance teams met with Hilton representatives and with union officials to make arrangements for the visit scheduled for the following Monday. By Friday evening, the entire Secret Service advance team had been notified of their assignments. Over the weekend, Green and Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon, who was in charge of transportation, arranged for the participation of other Secret Service Special Agents and police officers in providing security for the President for the entire time he would be outside the White House.

On Monday, the day of the visit, Gordon drove through the routes to be taken to and from the Hilton with a representative of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. Later that morning, Green and an agent from the Service's Washington field

office went through the hotel looking for security problems. The Special Agents assigned to guard particular posts in the hotel, a counter-sniper team, and an intelligence team were then briefed and placed at their stations. Personnel from the Service's Technical Security Division conducted searches inside the hotel and around the arrival area, looking for explosive devices or any similar threat to the security of the President. Remaining security preparations for the President's arrival were completed.

The President's motorcade left the White House at 1:45 p.m., and arrived at the Hilton at 1:50 p.m., as scheduled. The limousine pulled into a driveway parallel to "T" Street and stopped directly outside the VIP entrance; the President waited for his Secret Service escort to surround the limousine, and then got out of the car and went inside the hotel. There were no unusual incidents during the trip from the White House to the Hilton.

Rick Ahearn met the President at the entrance to the hotel and conducted him inside. President Reagan had his picture taken with several union leaders in a "holding room," and then was escorted to the main ballroom for his speech. The speech began at approximately 2:00 p.m.

In accordance with usual procedure, the motorcade cars were backed up, after the President had gone into the hotel, so that the Presidential limousine was parked at an angle to the curb, with the front of the limousine facing onto "T" Street. A follow-up car was parked a few feet behind the limousine; the rest of the motorcade was parked either behind that follow-up car, or out on "T" Street itself.

At approximately 2:20 p.m., Green informed the agents that the President was concluding his speech and would be out momentarily. The motorcade drivers returned to their vehicles, and the Metropolitan Police Department officers resumed their assigned posts. The President concluded his speech shortly thereafter, and left the main ballroom. He was accompanied to the holding room, and from there to the VIP entrance, by Secret Service Special Agents and members of his staff.

As the President prepared to depart from the Hilton through the VIP entrance, members of the press pool who had covered the speech left the hotel through the terrace entrance on "T" Street, and began to make their way alongside the motorcade and up the hill toward the VIP entrance. Their way was blocked by the other press and bystanders restrained by the

rope line, so the press pool began to move around that group and filter between the cars of the motorcade. When the Presidential party came through the VIP entrance, there were more than 200 people on hand. Most of these spectators were across "T" Street, blocked off by James Brady, Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, Military Aide Jose Muratti, and advance Special Agent Green. Special Agent Tim McCarthy opened the right rear door of the limousine. The President responded to calls of "Mr. President" from the crowd, and waved first with one hand, then the other.

The Secret Service protective detail exited, and went to take up positions around the limousine. The President exited accompanied by Special Agents Parr and Shaddick, Press Secretary James Brady, Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, Military Aide Jose Muratti, and advance Special Agent Green. Special Agent Tim McCarthy opened the right rear door of the limousine. The President responded to calls of "Mr. President" from the crowd, and waved first with one hand, then the other.

At that moment, John Warnock Hinckley is alleged to have stepped from the second row of the crowd behind the rope barrier, held a .22 caliber handgun in front of him with both hands, and fired six shots at the President.

At the sound of the shots, Special Agent Parr immediately pushed the President toward the back seat of the limousine. As he fell toward the seat of the limousine with Parr on top of him, the President was apparently struck beneath the left arm by one bullet which ricocheted off the side of the limousine and passed through the small space between the door and the limousine's body. Shaddick pushed Parr and the President into the limousine, and closed the door behind them. The limousine moved off in less than ten seconds, dodged a stalled Metropolitan Police Department car, drove up "T" Street and turned left onto Connecticut Avenue. Most of the rest of the motorcade was blocked for several seconds by spectators, so only one motorcade car (now carrying Special Agent Gordon) and one motorcycle policeman accompanied the limousine as it turned onto Connecticut Avenue.

The six shots had been fired by the assailant in a period of less than two seconds. One shot struck Press Secretary Brady in the head, and he fell to the ground immediately. Another struck Officer Delahanty in the neck; a third struck Special Agent Tim McCarthy in the upper torso as he turned, screening the President with raised arms, toward the sound of the shots. Two more shots ricocheted off the armored lim-

ousine, one of which struck the President. A sixth shot traveled across the street and passed through a window.

The first individual to reach the assailant was Alfred Antenucci, a civilian who jumped on him from behind as the last shot was fired. Reacting to the shots, Special Agent D.V. McCarthy moved along the rope line in front of the crowd and was the first law enforcement officer to reach Hinckley, diving on him as he continued to pull the trigger on an empty gun. McCarthy was followed immediately by Sergeant Granger and Officer Swain of the Metropolitan Police Department. The assailant had his weapon quickly shaken from him; this weapon was eventually retrieved by Special Agent Thomas Lightsey. After some seconds, D.V. McCarthy was able to handcuff Hinckley, as other Secret Service Special Agents and police officers moved to surround them. Although several Secret Service Special Agents drew their weapons, no shots were fired, and only the persons struck by the assailant's bullets were injured. As the Secret Service and the police began to clear the scene of bystanders, the rest of the motorcade was able to leave, several seconds behind the limousine.

One of the U.S. Park Police motorcycle officers left his motorcycle and ran to assist the agents struggling with Hinckley. As he arrived at the crowd of Special Agents, he lost his .38 caliber revolver, which fell alongside the prostrate Brady. For some minutes, this revolver was mistaken for the weapon used by the assailant, causing considerable confusion. The officer subsequently retrieved his revolver, and assisted in moving Hinckley toward the Metropolitan Police Department cruiser brought to the scene by Sergeant Granger. When the rear door of Granger's vehicle would not open, the crowd of Special Agents and policemen moved to a second Metropolitan Police Department cruiser. Hinckley was pushed into this vehicle, and was taken to the Metropolitan Police Department Central Cell Block.

The wounded were given some limited medical assistance at the hotel by two paramedics who identified themselves to Secret Service agents on the scene. McCarthy, Brady, and Delahanty were removed, in that order, by ambulances. McCarthy and Brady were taken to George Washington University Hospital, while Delahanty was taken to the Washington Hospital Center.

This activity was taking place as the Presidential motorcade traveled along Connecticut Avenue. Once the Presidential limousine had cleared the area of the Hilton, the President asked Parr to get off him, and complained of pain in his ribs.

Parr radioed, "[The President] is OK," and instructed the motorcade to proceed to the White House. Parr continued to examine the President and found no evidence of external injury, but noticed that the President was bleeding from his mouth. The President suggested that he might have broken a rib; Parr was unsure of the precise nature of the President's injury, but he decided nonetheless to divert the motorcade to George Washington University Hospital (the hospital designated for emergency use on the Hilton trip).

Special Agent Unrue, driving the President's limousine, informed the motorcade by radio and Secret Service agents monitoring the broadcast notified the hospital of the change in plan. Hospital personnel were not told that the President was injured, however, since no one in the motorcade had said that the President had been hurt (Parr radioed a request for a stretcher, but not until after the hospital had been notified). When the President reached the hospital, the emergency trauma staff inside was assembling, but no stretcher was brought outside for his use.

Special Agents Parr and Shaddick escorted the President through the doors of the emergency entrance. After the President got inside, his knees buckled; Parr and Shaddick assisted him inside the emergency room, where he was placed on a cart and moved to the trauma area. A team of seven or eight emergency personnel, headed by Dr. Joseph Giordano, removed the President's clothing. It was only after the President's shirt had been removed that the medical personnel attending the President realized that he had been shot.

The President spent approximately forty minutes in the trauma area being prepared for surgery. He remained conscious throughout this preliminary treatment, and was able to speak with Mrs. Reagan and emergency personnel. The President was moved to an operating room at some time between 3:15 p.m. and 3:30 p.m.

Dr. Benjamin Aaron assumed command of the President's operating team. Dr. Giordano conducted the initial procedure, known as a "peritoneal lavage," which involved an incision into the abdomen and the insertion of a small tube to determine whether any of the major internal organs had been damaged. No damage was found. Dr. Aaron then performed the surgery to remove the bullet. He encountered a great deal of bleeding from the President's chest; later estimates indicated that the President lost almost one-half of the volume of blood in his body before going into surgery. Initially, Dr. Aaron was

unable to trace the path of the bullet; although he reportedly decided at least once to terminate the surgery without locating the bullet, he continued and was able to locate the bullet shortly before 6:00 p.m. The bullet had been flattened, and upon removal appeared to be roughly the shape of a dime. Following surgery, the President was moved to a recovery room after 6:30 p.m.

Chief of Staff James Baker and Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese were informed of the shooting within minutes of its occurrence. Baker and Meese went to the hospital, while Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, National Security Adviser Richard Allen, CIA Director William Casey, and Attorney General William French Smith met in the White House Situation Room.

Vice President Bush was notified that shots had been fired as his Air Force plane left Fort Worth, Texas, destined for Austin. Bush decided to allow the plane to be refueled in Austin, and then to return to Washington. The return to the White House occurred without incident. He landed at Andrews Air Force Base at approximately 6:30 p.m. From there, he was taken by helicopter to his official residence at the Naval Observatory, and then by motorcade to the White House. Bush went directly to the Situation Room, and was briefed by the officials there. The Vice President made a brief statement to the press at approximately 8:00 p.m., and then returned to the Situation Room, where he remained until 9:45 p.m.

While the President was being treated for his injuries and senior government officials were taking steps in response to the shooting, law enforcement agencies, headed by the BRI, initiated an investigation of the incident. The man apprehended at the Hilton was interviewed by representatives of the FBI, the Metropolitan Police Department, and the Secret Service; his wallet and personal belongings were searched for investigative leads. Shortly after 3:00 p.m. he was identified as Hinckley, and Federal Agencies began cross-checking records for any information on the suspect. When his identity was announced by the national news services, field offices in geographic areas Hinckley had been known to frequent did the same. By 4:30 p.m., the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had successfully traced the handgun used in the assault to a pawnshop in Dallas, and had learned that Hinckley had purchased other weapons and ammunition at that shop and at other locations.

The Washington field office of the FBI took custody of Hinckley shortly before 5:00 p.m., after having begun efforts to obtain a warrant to search Hinckley's room at the Park Central Hotel. At 9:45 p.m., a warrant was obtained from U.S. Magistrate Arthur L. Burnett, authorizing a search of Hinckley's hotel room; this search began at 9:55 p.m. and continued until 4:15 a.m. the following morning. At 11:00 p.m., criminal complaints were sworn against Hinckley for assaulting the President and assaulting Federal officers. After a preliminary hearing, Hinckley was moved to a Marine Corps brig at Quantico, Virginia.

III. TREASURY DEPARTMENT PERFORMANCE:
PROCEDURES AND EXECUTION

Although the Treasury Department's interest in the safety of the President begins with one of its bureaus, the United States Secret Service, it extends beyond that single jurisdictional nexus. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, a Treasury agency, has jurisdiction over Federal regulation of many of the weapons which may be used in an attempt on the President's life, and the U.S. Customs Service has intelligence resources and authority to interdict movements of persons and things which could give it a role in preventing or limiting the damage caused by such an incident.

Moreover, as the lead agency of the United States Government on economic matters, Treasury has a legitimate concern for protecting and fostering the stability of domestic and international financial markets, and maintaining a capacity to discharge numerous other Federal responsibilities. Finally, the Secretary of the Treasury both has the responsibility for directing the exercise of these varied authorities and stands fifth in line of succession to the Presidency. Thus, the procedures for keeping him advised of events assume great importance.

Each agency or unit of the Treasury Department which had a role in the incident of March 30 will be examined in this report for the purpose of evaluating both its preparations for dealing with an assassination attempt and its responses to the attempt on President Reagan that occurred on March 30, 1981. The report will assess agency procedures in effect on that date, the adequacy of those procedures, and the performance of these agencies as measured against whatever procedures were in place.

The conclusions arising out of these evaluations, and our recommendations based thereon, are set forth at the end of each section of this report.

A. United States Secret Service

BASIC AUTHORITY

The United States Secret Service is an agency of approximately 3,500 employees, organized into a Washington, D.C., headquarters and 61 domestic (and two foreign) field offices. While the Service is charged with protection of the President of the United States under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3056, it must also perform a number of other protective responsibilities ^{1/} and investigate violations of the laws against counterfeiting of coin, currency, and stamps, and forgery and fraudulent negotiation of Government checks, bonds and other securities.

The performance of the Secret Service on March 30, 1981, must be reviewed against a background of budget constraints. Secret Service officials point out that over the past four years their force of Special Agents has declined by 72 (to 1,544) and the force of Uniformed Division officers has declined by 97 (to 800). Concurrently, Service officials estimate that protective responsibilities assigned to the Service during the same period would require 217 additional positions. While all government agencies claim to be understaffed, certain of

^{1/} The responsibilities include protection of: the President's immediate family; the Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the Office of the President; the President- and Vice President-elect; the members of their immediate families, unless the members decline such protection; the visiting head of a foreign state or foreign government and, at the direction of the President, other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States performing special missions abroad; persons who are classified as major Presidential or Vice Presidential candidates unless such protection is declined; former Presidents and their spouses; the Executive Residence and grounds and any building in which the White House offices are located; the temporary official residence of the Vice President and grounds in the District of Columbia; foreign diplomatic missions in the Washington metropolitan area and such areas in the United States, its territories and possessions, as the President may direct on a case-by-case basis; protection of foreign diplomatic missions located in metropolitan areas in the United States where there are located twenty or more such missions headed by full-time officers (only under certain enumerated circumstances); and the Main Treasury Building and its Annex in Washington, D.C.

the responses of the Service on March 30 suggest that continual shortages of manpower may have created a reflexive response against commitment of excessive personnel to any incident, even a crisis.

ORGANIZATION

An understanding of the methods used by the Secret Service to provide protection for the President requires some working knowledge of its organizational structure, and the ways in which it divides responsibility.

Functioning under a Director, H. Stuart Knight, and a Deputy Director, Myron J. Weinstein, the Secret Service has five Assistant Directors whose responsibilities generally reflect the structure of the organization: Investigations, Protective Operations, Protective Research, Administration, and Inspection. The last two are support functions, with no direct management role in a crisis situation. Only the roles of the first three, and their subordinate offices and units, will be covered in this report.

* The Office of Investigations, under Acting Assistant Director Robert R. Burke, has line authority over the 63 field offices of the Secret Service located throughout the United States and abroad. Those offices are staffed with most of the 1,544 Special Agents of the Secret Service, who investigate incidents of counterfeiting and forgery when they are not performing intelligence investigations or direct protective duties. Of these 63 field offices, the one with the largest protective mission by far, and the one on which this report will focus, is the Washington, D.C., field office.

* The Office of Protective Operations, under Assistant Director John R. Simpson, supervises the Uniformed Division and the protective details -- those units of Special Agents assigned full-time to the protection of specific persons, traveling with them and drawing on the field offices for support and supplementation as necessary. The Uniformed Division, composed of 800 officers, is trained as a police force and assigned to guard the White House and foreign missions within the metropolitan area of the District of Columbia.

* The Office of Protective Research, under Acting Assistant Director Robert R. Snow, is responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of protective intelligence information for the entire Secret Service; it

provides policies and procedures relating to data systems and communications; and it develops and conducts scientific and technical programs in support of the protective and investigative responsibilities of the Secret Service. Located only at the Service's Washington, D.C., headquarters, the Office of Protective Research consists of six divisions, and is staffed with approximately 66 Special Agents and a number of technicians and specialists.

In addition, the Director has Assistants for Public Affairs and Training, and a Legal Counsel, who provides advice to him but reports directly to Treasury's General Counsel. Of these, only the Public Affairs Assistant has a role in a crisis involving the President of the United States. Therefore, although Public Affairs is not a part of the Service's protective staff, it will also be covered in this report.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

This report's analysis of the performance of the Secret Service follows, as closely as possible within the constraints of the Service's structure, the sequence in which the Service's various constituent organizations had their most intense involvement in the process of protecting the President on March 30 --

* The Office of Protective Intelligence, which has its greatest impact on the President's safety in the work that it does long before any particular trip;

* The "advance" group -- the Special Agents and specialists drawn from a cross section of the Service's protective organizations who prepared the way for the President at the Washington Hilton;

* The "protective detail" of specially trained Special Agents who accompanied the President throughout the day, covered him with their bodies, and evacuated him to George Washington University Hospital;

* The Special Agents who went to George Washington University Hospital to aid in establishing security for the President after the evacuation from the Hilton;

* The Special Agents who remained at the Hilton Hotel to coordinate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and gather intelligence for the prosecution of the suspect and for evalu-

ation in connection with the Service's protective functions;
and

* The protection that the Service maintained for the Vice President as the possibility arose that he might have to assume the Presidency.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Within the Secret Service crisis management scheme there are three principal assigned areas of responsibility, roughly corresponding to the three line Assistant Directors. As is set forth below in more detail, within the Intelligence Division of the Office of Protective Research, an intelligence Command/Control Center is established for coordination of all intelligence and alert notifications. Within the Office of Investigations, the Assistant Director, operating primarily through his subordinate field office in the geographical locale of the crisis, is responsible for preserving the security of the crime or incident scene until the arrival of the FBI, and for working with the FBI on the subsequent criminal investigation. Within the Office of Protective Operations, the head of the protective detail involved in the crisis is responsible for continuing emergency coordination of protection. On March 30, 1981, all three of these emergency procedures went into operation.

Intelligence Division's Command/Control Center

Procedures

In a May 20, 1980, memorandum, titled "Headquarters Emergency Situation Response", Deputy Director Weinstein set out procedures for the establishment of a "top level command and/or control facility where emergency situations can be coordinated" at headquarters and in the Service's Washington field office. Within the Secret Service this procedure is understood to cover emergency "incoming and outgoing information/communications" together with initial emergency personnel notification. Actual command responsibility for the discharge of the protective and criminal missions of the Service is covered in another memorandum, discussed below.

Under the procedures set out in the Headquarters Emergency Situation Response memorandum, the Operations Desk Supervisor of the Intelligence Division is responsible for notifying all affected offices, working from a published list contained in the memorandum. Personnel in each office are in turn responsible for ensuring that the head of the office and all others with a need to know are promptly notified.

Any Assistant Director may activate the headquarters Command/Control Center. If more than one Assistant Director is directly involved, the Director or Deputy Director is required to designate which Assistant Director will be in charge at the Center. That Assistant Director is then responsible for insuring that all incoming and outgoing information and communications concerning the emergency situation are channeled through the Center. A representative from the office of each Assistant Director which has a role in the emergency and a representative of the Office of Public Affairs (depending on the nature of the emergency) are expected to report to the Center and to serve as contact points for communication of information in either direction.

Beyond the establishment of the Center and the requirement for accomplishing appropriate notifications, the May 20, 1980, memorandum does not contain procedures to govern the conduct of the Center. The personnel available to staff the Center, however, are experienced Special Agents who staff the duty desk as a routine matter. There is a substantial similarity between their daily responsibilities and the intelligence and communications functions that they are likely to be required to perform during a crisis.

Execution of Center Procedures

With written instructions in place for establishing a headquarters Command/Control Center, the Secret Service responded quickly in setting up a Center on March 30. Acting Deputy Assistant Director Richard E. Keiser took charge of the Center, but left the principal command to the Intelligence Division's Special Agent in Charge, Edward Walsh.

Walsh assumed overall supervision of the Command Center within a minute or two of the receipt of the initial radio reports that there had been an attack on the President. Personnel from the Office of Protective Operations, the Office of Investigations, and the Public Affairs Office quickly assembled at peripheral desks around the duty desk operation and Walsh installed senior Special Agents in the key positions at the desk. Communications were immediately established with the Hilton Hotel Security Room and with the Intelligence Squad at the Washington field office. In addition, telephone arrangements were established between the duty desk and the Protective Operations and Investigations Offices.

The Command/Control Center was not intended to handle the deployment of physical protection. Its demands on field offices are for the development of intelligence -- and to the extent this requires additional manpower the Office of Investigations transfers personnel among field offices as needed.

Operational Crisis-Management

Operational Crisis-Management Procedures

The Secret Service also has written procedures governing crisis response by operational personnel. These are set out in an April 23, 1979, memorandum issued by Deputy Director Weinstein. Among other things, that memorandum directs that the first Intelligence Team present at the attack site is to establish an "interim federal presence" and maintain that presence until relieved by the FBI or the Special Agent in Charge of the local field office.

The Assistant Director (Office of Protective Research) is assigned responsibility for determining the nature of the attack and the potential for additional threats to protected persons; the protective detail leader "[h]as the ultimate responsibility to evacuate and provide necessary security for the protectee"; and the Special Agent in Charge of the field office (which was the Washington, D.C., field office in the March 30 crisis) is responsible for assisting the protective detail leader in insuring the safety and evacuation of the protected person. The memorandum contains no provisions requiring an automatic increase in the level of protection around the President.

Except for Special Agents assigned to the protective details for specific protected persons, in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area there are approximately 280 Special Agents (of whom 110 are assigned to the Washington Field Office) and 800 Officers of the Uniformed Division. As a practical matter, on any given day these Agents and Officers handle regular protective and other assignments, or may be in leave status, effectively reducing the number available to protect the President.

Execution of Operational Crisis-Management Procedures

No Secret Service Special Agent or Uniformed Division Officer had been posted at George Washington Hospital on March 30, 1981. Immediately upon learning that the President had been taken to this hospital, Acting Special Agent in Charge Andrew Berger of the Washington field office sent one supervisor (Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Pat Miller) and a small group of Special Agents to the hospital. When it arrived at the hospital, the Presidential motorcade radioed a request for more manpower, within a few minutes, Berger sent another Special Agent followed at approximately 3:00 p.m. by a small group of additional Special Agents.

Information prepared later by the Washington field office suggests that some other agents may have gone on their own or been sent over during this period, but between 3:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., no additional agents were requested by Pat Miller, and none were sent spontaneously by Berger. Throughout these hours, Berger recalls receiving no communications from the Presidential detail concerning the situation at the hospital, and recalls no significant communications from headquarters concerning manpower needs. A reserve of Special Agents was gathered in the Washington field office conference room, and was parcelled out on other assignments during the course of the afternoon.

Most of the attention of supervisory Washington field office personnel was directed to the arrangements concerning the custody of Hinckley; the transmittal of information derived from Hinckley's personal effects (the first significant intelligence accumulated to help determine the nature and extent of the crisis) to the Command/Control Center at headquarters and to the appropriate field offices; and coordination with other protective details in the Washington, D.C., area.

In the meantime, Gerald Bechtle, acting as Assistant Director of Protective Operations, sent instructions to the Washington Hilton to hold the original security contingent at the hotel in order to execute his understanding of the "interim federal presence" requirements of the April 23, 1979 memorandum. That memorandum actually assigned the responsibility for maintaining that presence to the first intelligence team on the scene and did not, at least in its express terms, require that the intelligence team keep other Special Agents there.

Just after 4:00 p.m., Bechtle directed the Uniformed Division to send as many officers as possible to the hospital.

Then, a little after 5:00 p.m., Bechtle received a call from Miller at the hospital asking for a substantial number of Special Agents. This call had been diverted from the Washington field office because Miller could not get through on the telephone lines. Miller was anticipating the President's removal from surgery, and he expected to need additional manpower to station in a couple of additional areas of the hospital. In response, Bechtle had the Office of Training at headquarters queried to see if Special Agents could be located in the in-service training classes that were being conducted in downtown Washington.

During the first hour and a half the Office of Investigations received no requests for help from the Presidential detail at the hospital, or from Bechtle in Protective Operations, from whom they would have expected any requests to come. Assistant Director Burke recalls calling Berger at the Washington field office around 6:00 p.m. to ask whether Inspection should provide manpower to the hospital, and Berger said no.

While additional numbers of Special Agents were mustered to the hospital site by accumulating them from parts of the Presidential Protective Division, as will appear in the discussion of the situation at the hospital below, it does not appear that supervisory Secret Service agents away from the hospital had any specific information concerning the number of Secret Service personnel at the site. With the exception of the limited numbers of Special Agents sent by Washington field office personnel, largely on their own initiative, and the Uniformed Division officers who arrived around 5:00 p.m., it does not appear that those off-site supervisors attempted to increase manpower on the site during the first two hours or so.

In effect, headquarters crisis managers followed the implications of existing procedures, and assumed that the Presidential detail personnel on site, and the Washington field office personnel sent there shortly afterward, would request whatever assistance was necessary. The requests they received from the hospital site were few, and took some period of time to fulfill; as a consequence, the number of Service personnel at the hospital did not reach a level substantially greater than the security that had been established at the Hilton prior to the shooting until late in the afternoon of March 30.

Office of Public Affairs: Crisis Response

Procedures

The Office of Public Affairs at Secret Service has no written procedures which prescribe how office functions are to be performed under either routine or emergency conditions. However, the Assistant to the Director (Public Affairs), Jack Warner, has held that position for a number of years and has developed a routine for office operations when an event occurs which attracts substantial media interest. In addition, he is required to provide a representative to the Command/Control Center that is set up in the Intelligence Division whenever a crisis arises.

Personnel assigned to the Office of Public Affairs are instructed that only Warner will handle wire service calls and audiotaping for radio and television. Determinations of what information will be released are also made by Warner. The general policy is that information not injurious to the mission of Secret Service will be released.

Action of Public Affairs Personnel on March 30

The Office of Public Affairs received notification of the assassination attempt from the Command/Control Center in the Intelligence Division offices almost immediately. The Center remained the primary source of information for Public Affairs throughout the afternoon.

Public Affairs immediately took steps to inform the Director and Deputy Director, and assigned staff to the Command/Control Center. The assumption was made that the Center would not be able to reach Public Affairs by telephone, so a messenger system was arranged to deliver information to the Public Affairs office.

The major activity that took place in Public Affairs was responding to an overwhelming number of inquiries from the press. Wire service calls and taping for radio and television were handled personally by Warner. There was an initial effort to have him respond to all the network inquiries as well, but there were too many.

There was little, if any, contact between Secret Service Public Affairs and the public affairs offices of the Treasury Department or its other bureaus. There were some calls between

Secret Service Public Affairs and the White House press office to coordinate their information, primarily through Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes. Although the hospital and the White House had established a press room in a hospital auditorium, the Secret Service Public Affairs operation had no contact with it.

During the afternoon, a large number of media personnel congregated in the eighth floor lobby area at Secret Service headquarters. Warner periodically went out and spoke to them as information became available. Although his responsibility is to answer questions related to Secret Service, he was routinely asked other questions as well, but he did not respond.

Conclusions

1. The Secret Service system for establishing a Command/Control Center at the duty desk of the Intelligence Division is a sound and effective method of ensuring that emergency notification is provided to the appropriate personnel, and that intelligence is collected and disseminated throughout the Service. This system was implemented in an effective and timely manner on March 30, 1981.

2. While the Secret Service has regular procedures for maintaining security around the President, in a crisis situation such as the aftermath of an attempted assassination the procedures do not contemplate an increase in security unless the head of the President's protective detail makes a decision to request additional assistance. This may not be the most reasonable allocation of responsibility. The principal agent on the scene may not know the dimensions of the threat that produced the attempt; his attention is likely to be focused on the immediate physical welfare of the President, and he may hesitate to call for increased security simply because he is not aware that the threat which places the President in jeopardy extends beyond a single assassin.

The key question appears to be whether the Service should act first and risk over-manning or await a more comprehensive view of the circumstances before increasing security around the President. On the facts of March 30, viewed with hindsight, there was no need for special precautions. But in the first hour at the hospital the Service could not have known this.

The prudent course would appear to be the establishment of

procedures which will rapidly increase security in the immediate aftermath of an assassination attempt. These procedures should contain special provisions to accommodate the special situations that arise in the Washington, D.C., area.

3. Despite the absence of written procedures on March 30, the Office of Public Affairs at Secret Service functioned satisfactorily.

The Office has followed a policy of attempting to confine its press contacts to matters peculiarly within the knowledge of, and related specifically to, the Secret Service. Based on a review of press clippings and an interview with the Assistant to the Director (Public Affairs), there is no indication that the office went beyond its mandate in providing information to the public.

Recommendation

The Secret Service should consider whether to establish procedures for substantially and rapidly increasing security around the President in any crisis situation -- such as that at the hospital on March 30, 1981 -- in which the degree of continuing danger to the President is largely unknown. These procedures should take account of variations in the level of manpower available to the Secret Service due to such factors as the time of day, and the location of the President.

PROTECTIVE INTELLIGENCE

Procedures

The Secret Service responsibility for developing intelligence for protective purposes is assigned to the Office of Protective Research. Within that office are six divisions. The primary intelligence collection and analysis functions are assigned to the Intelligence Division and the Liaison Division. In the Washington, D.C. area, these two divisions are substantially augmented by personnel of the Washington field office intelligence squad.

Intelligence Received Via The White House

White House personnel turn over to the Secret Service letters and telephone calls that appear threatening to the President or another official. If the matter requires further investigation a field investigation is authorized. Individuals who come to the White House complex are interviewed, and then referred to the protective intelligence squad of the Washington field office for possible investigation.

Intelligence Received From the Field

Intelligence in the field is collected through field office investigations, from state and local agencies, and from the field offices of other Federal agencies. Intelligence from state and local agencies will include information elicited from or volunteered by law enforcement groups, local mental hospitals, and state and local government offices.

The degree to which the field is successful at generating intelligence is solely attributable to informal field liaison efforts aimed at either requesting information and assistance, or educating local agencies to the Service's intelligence needs. These efforts are informally monitored and encouraged by the Intelligence Division at headquarters.

Secret Service Director Stuart Knight has stated on several occasions that the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act have contributed to a decrease over the last several years in intelligence information received from various sources, including other law enforcement agencies and foreign

countries. For example, in testimony before committees of both the House and Senate following the March 30 assassination attempt, Knight testified that foreign law enforcement organizations as well as state and local police are reluctant to pass on information to the Secret Service and other federal agencies. They believe that, because of the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act, United States government agencies do not have the ability to maintain the confidentiality of the information they receive.

The Secret Service's view is almost universally shared by other law enforcement officials. In a report entitled "Impact of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts on Law Enforcement Agencies," dated November 15, 1978, the Comptroller General stated that "law enforcement officials at all levels of government have stated in congressional testimony that the proliferation of access and privacy laws has been instrumental in creating a restrictive climate which affects their ability to obtain information from the public and institutions, to recruit and maintain informants, and to exchange information with other law enforcement agencies."

Law enforcement officials reported, according to the GAO Report, that the Privacy Act has had some of its most severe effects on their ability to obtain information from institutions such as hospitals, banks and telephone companies. While law enforcement agencies could previously obtain records from these institutions on an informal basis, an increasing number require the agencies to get a subpoena before providing the information. Secret Service officials told the GAO that since most of the threats against the President come from mentally unstable individuals, timely access to records maintained by mental institutions is critical when the President or other dignitaries travel around the country.

Intelligence Received from other Federal Agencies

The Service has entered into memoranda of understanding or agreements with other Federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. These agreements describe in broad, general terms the intelligence sought by the Service, and an examination of various editions of these agreements used over the past ten years shows little substantive evolution in the description of information the agencies are to furnish.^{2/}

^{2/} [Footnote on next page]

Neither the Liaison Division nor the Intelligence Division has any procedures for monitoring whether Federal agencies have internal guidelines implementing the agreements and educating their personnel as to Service intelligence needs, although the Intelligence Division itself tries to use its limited staff to perform these functions informally with respect to some

2/ [Footnote from previous page] Agreements commonly specify seven "types" of information to be referred to the Service:

1. Information concerning attempts, threats, or conspiracies to injure, kill, or kidnap persons protected by the USSS or other U.S. or foreign officials in the U.S. or abroad.
2. Information concerning attempts or threats to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means, or attempts personally to contact such officials for that purpose.
3. Information concerning threatening, irrational, or abusive written or oral statements about U.S. Government or foreign officials.
4. Information concerning civil disturbances, anti-U.S. demonstrations or incidents or demonstrations against foreign diplomatic establishments.
5. Information concerning illegal bombings or bomb-making; concealment of caches of firearms, explosives, or other implements of war; or other terrorist activity.
6. Information concerning persons who defect or indicate a desire to defect from the United States and who demonstrate one or more of the following characteristics:
 - a. irrational or suicidal behavior or other emotional instability.
 - b. strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiment.
 - c. a propensity toward violence.
7. Information concerning persons who may be considered potentially dangerous to individuals protected by the USSS because of their background or activities, including evidence of emotional instability or participation in groups engaging in activities inimical to the United States.

agencies. Infrequently, Liaison arranges meetings with representatives of other Federal agencies in which Intelligence Division personnel can describe their intelligence requirements.

Liaison Division agents maintain informal relations with the rest of the Federal community, and will serve as a conduit for Intelligence Division requests to these agencies for specific information. Some agencies provide formal liaison contacts while others do not, forcing Liaison Division agents to establish their own contacts on an informal basis. Liaison Division agents also distribute to their Federal agency contacts boilerplate descriptions, similar to those in the formal agreements, of Service intelligence needs. How these handouts are utilized by the Federal agencies is not monitored.

Federal agencies provide the Service with intelligence in response to a direct request for specific information from the Intelligence Division, or in response to a request from the Liaison Division. Federal agencies, especially the FBI and the CIA, unilaterally provide intelligence they judge to be of interest to the Service. Intelligence suppliers have not been assessed or evaluated with a view to improving their performance.

Information collected and disseminated by the FBI is the most important source of Secret Service intelligence on potential domestic threats to the President, and has a significant impact on the ability of the Service to fulfill its mission. As a general matter, intelligence received from the FBI will be of two types: information about the intentions and objectives of individuals and groups, and information about what individuals and groups have actually done.

Since the Service is interested in predictive information -- that is, intelligence which will enable it to assess possible threats to the President -- information about intentions is a good deal more valuable to the Service than information about completed acts, from which future intentions may only be inferred.

This distinction has led the Service to become increasingly concerned in recent years about a decline in the FBI's domestic intelligence activities, and the almost exclusive emphasis which the FBI has begun to place on its role as an agency engaged in investigation for purposes of assisting prosecutorial authorities. Generally speaking, much domestic intelligence investigation may be usefully characterized as the

stronger suggestion on the face of the data that an investigation should be undertaken, the most the Service could reasonably do with raw arrest information would be store it for later correlation with other facts. If, for example, the same person were arrested in another city the President is visiting, the coincidence might suggest that he is "stalking" the President and justify a more thorough investigation. Today, the Service's resources do not permit such data correlation.

The data processing and intelligence resources required just for that, quite limited, correlative system would be massive, and even then there could be no assurance that the linking of circumstantial data to support an inference of danger would be more than mere chance. Normally, follow-up investigation would still be needed.

Limitations on resources -- and indeed effective use of resources by the Service -- compel the Service to concentrate its efforts on collecting, analyzing and investigating information which more directly indicates a threat to the President. This is information about the overtly or covertly expressed intentions of individuals or groups.

From the protection-oriented perspective of the Service, therefore, the decline in FBI domestic intelligence activities has caused a critical overall decline in the useful information the Service receives from the FBI. In November 1979, Secret Service Director Stuart Knight testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that the Service was, at that time, receiving only about 40 percent of what it had previously received from the FBI, and that this reduced intelligence product had deteriorated in quality. Explaining what he meant by quality, he referred to the loss of information concerning motives and plans.

Knight repeated these statements in the aftermath of the March 30 assassination attempt, in testimony before other committees of the House and Senate, specifically attributing this loss of useful intelligence to the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines.

On March 10, 1976, then Attorney General Edward Levi issued Domestic Security Guidelines which, in effect, prevented the FBI from engaging in domestic intelligence gathering unless it was in possession of "specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual or a group is or may be engaged in activities which (1) involve the use of force or violence and which (2) involve or will involve the violation of

federal law for one or more of [certain] purposes [related to the overthrow of the government or abridgement of civil rights]." 3/

The Domestic Security Guidelines define three stages of investigation: preliminary, limited and full. Preliminary and limited investigations are confined to determining whether a full investigation is warranted. They may be undertaken only on the reasonable belief that a violation of federal law, by way of force or violence, is involved, and they may only be carried on for short periods of time. A limited investigation allows a somewhat greater range of investigative techniques than is available in a preliminary investigation, but it must be authorized in writing by a Special Agent in Charge or FBI Headquarters. Full investigations must be authorized by FBI Headquarters based on specific and articulable facts concerning the use of force or violence in committing certain crimes.

The Guidelines limit the period during which a full investigation may be conducted to one year, extendable only if the Department of Justice gives written authority. 4/

3/ Attorney General's Guidelines for domestic security investigations, issued by Attorney General Edward Levi, April 5, 1976, Subparagraph II.I.

4/ [Id., II.E. Preliminary investigations are limited to:]

- (1) examination of FBI indices and files;
- (2) examination of public records and other public sources of information; [Footnote continued on next page]
- (3) examination of federal, state, and local records;
- (4) inquiry of existing sources of information and use of previously established informants; and
- (5) physical surveillance and interviews or [sic] persons not mentioned in E(1)-E(4) for the limited purpose of identifying the subject of an investigation.

[II.F. Investigative techniques for limited investigations may also include:]

- (1) physical surveillance for purposes other than identifying the subject of the investigation;
- (2) interviews of persons not mentioned in E(1)-E(4) for purposes other than identifying the subject of the investigation, but only when authorized by the Special Agent in Charge

[Footnote continued on next page]

The Service's criticism of these guidelines raises serious questions which cannot be ignored in any study of the Service's performance. As the March 30 incident reveals, physically surrounding the President is not sufficient protection. The President's ultimate shield must be the ability of the Secret Service to keep him out of dangerous environments. This the Service cannot do without adequate intelligence resources -- information about the intentions and plans of potentially dangerous people.

Despite its significance to the Service's performance, the Service has done little to document or analyze the decline in FBI intelligence dissemination which it attributes to the Domestic Security Guidelines. Circumstantial data, however, appears to confirm the Service's view that the decline has been very substantial.

In interviews conducted for this report, FBI officials have estimated that more than 20,000 so-called domestic security cases were open shortly prior to the promulgation of the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines. While some of those cases were converted into standard criminal investigations when the necessary information was developed, very few of the remainder produced criminal prosecutions. Some officials at the Bureau state that all but about 7,000 of those cases were terminated by the FBI for reasons other than the restrictions imposed by the Domestic Security Guidelines, but they nonetheless appear to accept the estimates of the number of domestic security cases which the FBI was handling before 1976.

Whatever the reason for termination of these cases, the decline in their number since publication of the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines has been precipitous. According to a 1976 report by the General Accounting Office, the ten FBI field offices studied by the Comptroller General during 1974 actively investigated 19,659 domestic intelligence cases, which the report asserted to represent 35 percent of a total of 55,500 cases on "subversives and extremists" opened or reopened by the FBI during 1974.

4/ [Footnote continued]

[II.I. Investigative techniques for full investigations may also include:]

- (1) use of informants . . . subject to review [after] 180 days;
- (2) 'mail covers' . . .;
- (3) electronic surveillance"

In a 1977 follow-up investigation, the GAO again counted cases and reported:

[W]e believe that the FBI's domestic intelligence effort has declined substantially. Although it is impossible to attribute the decline to any one reason, a major factor, particularly since April 1976, would be the interpretation given to the Attorney General's domestic security guidelines.

As of June 30, 1977, a total of 642 domestic intelligence investigative matters were pending, compared to 9,814 at the same date in 1975. Similarly, the number of domestic intelligence matters initiated declined from 1,454 in June 1975 to 95 in June 1977.

As of early October 1977, 17 organizations and approximately 130 individuals were under domestic intelligence investigation. 5/

Interviews for this report with FBI and Secret Service personnel indicated that the total number of preliminary, intermediate, and full domestic security investigations involving both individuals and groups which were open at the time of our inquiry was far less than at any time covered by the GAO report. Ultimately, the question is whether the Secret Service can adequately perform its mission without a regular flow of information about the intentions of individuals or groups who may be a threat to the President. An answer to this question is beyond the scope of this report, but one of the lessons of March 30 is that physical protection of the President cannot be considered a substitute for an adequate warning of danger.

Intelligence Storage

All nonclassified intelligence kept by the Intelligence Division is accessed by computer; the computer contains only case file abstracts and serves as an index to more detailed information located elsewhere in paper files.

5/ FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations: An Uncertain Future (November 9, 1977), at 15.

Although reworked to fit a new computer acquired in 1978, the Service's current computer software does not make full use of the new computer's capacity. Both the Data Systems Division and the Intelligence Division Programming and Planning Branch agree that the software should undergo major upgrading in order to be able to make optimal utilization of the data bank, but cost and personnel limitations have constrained their efforts.

The system incorporates data files on about 20,000 persons investigated in the past by the Service, on events, incidents, organizations and groups, and a name index. These data are accessed through two limited data retrieval search systems. One system searches through all information coded into each of about 100 fields in the data bank; the other searches every word in each case abstract looking for key words suggested by the operator. The coded search requires about 45 minutes and 20 such searches can be run simultaneously. The time taken by the key word search is negligible, but the key-word indexing system is expensive to set up and maintain.

Intelligence Analysis

Intelligence Analysis is primarily directed toward identifying dangerous individuals. As already noted, the field agent, along with his supervisor and the field Special Agent in Charge, evaluate the information on a subject provided by the Intelligence Division and generated by the field investigation. No "dangerous person" indicia have been generated from the Intelligence Division data pool, and no statistical analysis is used to identify patterns or correlations in the data. Consequently, the entire dangerousness determination is based wholly on agent judgment. Consistency is sought through Intelligence Division review of each determination.

An individual who has been determined to be dangerous to a protected person is interviewed at regular intervals, and his whereabouts are periodically monitored. This periodic review status continues until the field office determines, and the Intelligence Division agrees, that the subject no longer presents a danger. Approximately 400 persons are listed in this category, and most of them are incarcerated in either mental or penal institutions.

Intelligence data is also utilized to identify dangerous groups. The Analysis and Control Branch has a desk devoted to domestic groups, while the Foreign Intelligence Branch deals almost exclusively with international terrorist groups that may

present a threat to a protected person. Files are kept only on those groups which, in the view of the Service, may pose a threat to a protected person at some future time. Certain groups considered the most dangerous are constantly monitored; others are only occasionally reviewed. As with individuals, there are no "dangerous group" indicia; all assessments are based on agent judgment, supported by and analysis done by intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

A third major use of intelligence data is to identify dangerous environments. For any trip by a protected person, the Intelligence Division advance agent will attempt to obtain all available information in the computer with which to assess the general "dangerousness" of the environment into which the protected person is going. The advance agent's assessment and conclusions are communicated to Protective Operations.

While the files described above have not been analyzed in order to identify indicia of "dangerousness", the Service has made a number of efforts to develop a model that might support such analysis. During the 1960's and 1970's, a number of outside studies were commissioned to develop a "profile" of the type of individual likely to be dangerous to a protected person. These efforts produced little useful information. The Service now seems interested in pursuing broader concepts of statistical significance. Perhaps most promising to date is a symposium that the Service conducted under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences in March 1981. The results of that symposium are expected in July.

Efforts to develop statistical tools for using the information now contained in the protective intelligence files have suffered from the Service's failure to follow advice, provided as early as 1969 in a study by the Bioengineering Corporation, to bring the effort in-house. Studies made in the past under contract with outside groups have not been based upon a complete or accurate understanding of how proposals would actually be used by agents in the field, nor has there been sufficient follow-up to permit evaluation and assessment of proposals actually put into use.

Conclusions

Intelligence Division

1. Since the Secret Service has no formal authority to direct other agencies as to the gathering or dissemination of intelligence to the Service, its intelligence collection activities have relied on the voluntary furnishing of information by Federal and state agencies, police departments, and mental hospitals. This voluntary process has been affected by recent legislation on privacy and information access, such as the Right to Financial Privacy Act, amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, and state medical privacy laws. Information required by the Service is no longer volunteered by sources now concerned about transgressing privacy protections or about being revealed as a source.

2. The Secret Service's protective capabilities have been impaired by the decline in the quantity and quality of intelligence collected by the FBI, which is the primary source of the Service's domestic intelligence. This decline is attributable primarily to the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines and their effect in cutting off non-criminal domestic intelligence investigations.

3. The Intelligence Division has a fairly efficient system for storing, retrieving, and disseminating to Secret Service users the intelligence information it receives. The Division is failing, however, to make use of advances in statistical methods and data processing to improve its analytic abilities. In view of the fact that a similar criticism was made of the Intelligence Division in a 1969 outside study prepared by the Bioengineering Corporation, this failure may reflect an institutional problem within the Office of Protective Research.

There appears to be an improved receptivity to such an enterprise in the Intelligence Division under current management. The results of the Service's most recent outside study, a symposium conducted under the auspices of the National Academy of Science, may provide the theoretical base on which to begin in-house efforts at testing and verifying hypotheses.

Such an effort would require at a minimum additional personnel with data-processing-related skills, and additional personnel with professional training in statistical methods and

behavioral psychology or psychiatry. The Service has no professionals in the latter two areas at this time, other than outside consultants, who are available for very limited amounts of time.

4. While the Intelligence Division does a good job of identifying and monitoring would-be assassins who make their intentions known, it is not able to do enough toward identifying dangerous groups.

Liaison Division

1. The Liaison Division was formed pursuant to a Warren Commission recommendation, ostensibly to generate intelligence and intelligence sources. However, the Division spends most of its resources on protective operations assignments or activities other than intelligence support. This resource allocation does not carry out the Warren Commission recommendation and was criticized earlier in the 1969 Bioengineering Corporation Criteria Study.

2. Insofar as the Liaison Division is involved in intelligence support, the process is largely ad hoc. Liaison agents operate in an informal manner and, by and large, take their intelligence support roles to be passive ones, responding to Intelligence Division requests rather than generating more and better intelligence and sources.

3. The Service's agreements with other agencies as to the furnishing of intelligence were proposed by the Warren Commission as an aid to the Service's intelligence collection. The agreements are very general and appear to have become largely pro-forma documents.

4. While the Secret Service conscientiously attempts to encourage other agencies to provide it with intelligence, neither the Liaison Division nor the Intelligence Division has a formal procedure that adequately monitors the quality and quantity of intelligence received from other Federal agencies, and the current informal monitoring is not a sufficient substitute.

Recommendations

1. Because of the apparent effect of privacy and government information disclosure laws on the ability of the Secret Service to collect useful intelligence on a voluntary basis,

consideration should be given to narrowing the scope of these laws as they relate to the release of information furnished to the Secret Service, and to protecting the right of the Secret Service to have access to information in the hands of private organizations and state and local governmental authorities.

2. The Secret Service should be given an executive mandate, perhaps in the form of an Executive Order or proclamation, to require greater assistance from other Federal agencies in the collection of intelligence.

3. Consideration should be given to permitting the FBI to pursue domestic security investigations where no criminal predicate is available; this may be done through appropriate modifications of the Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines for the FBI.

4. The Secret Service has not developed indicators to help identify "dangerous" individuals, either by associating and correlating intelligence that might reveal the intentions of individuals and groups from their prior activities or by using so-called "profiles". Using data in the files of its Intelligence Division, the Service should attempt to develop useful indicators to assist it in identifying "dangerous" individuals, groups, and personality types. The Service should create within the Intelligence Division a more sophisticated planning and research operation, including five to ten non-agent employees with professional training in statistical methods and behavioral sciences. This group should be responsible, on an ongoing basis, for analyzing the intelligence data base in order to identify what types of information the Intelligence Division should be looking for, and what it should be doing with it.

5. The problems with maintaining Liaison Division as an intelligence-gathering group are compounded by its location outside the Intelligence Division. Liaison Division should be restructured and placed within the Intelligence Division. The resulting Liaison Branch should become aggressively involved in soliciting intelligence from other agencies and monitoring the amount and quality of intelligence generated. This Liaison Branch should take the lead in redrafting the agreements with other agencies so that they are more useful guides to the Service's intelligence needs that draw on the information developed by the recommended planning and research operation. If a liaison unit is needed to conduct work that facilitates advances and trips, it should be staffed through a separate liaison unit that does not compete for resources directly with

the intelligence liaison function.

6. The Intelligence Division planning and research operation should also work closely with Data Systems Division to better define the data systems needs of the Intelligence Division, to insure that adequate computer programming and data processing support is provided to this enterprise, and to insure that the computer is being optimally applied to routine Intelligence Division needs.