

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron August 1984
[08/25/1984-08/31/1984]
Box: 5

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

Archivist: lov

File Folder: Matlock Chron August 1984 [8/25-8/31]

Date: July 29, 1999

Box 908875

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Briefing Paper	US Soviet Relations: Leadership Situation, 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #76</i>	nd	P1/F1
2. Briefing Paper	US Soviet Relations: Bilateral Issues, 2p <i>R " " #77</i>	nd	P1/F1
3. Briefing paper	Attempt on Pope's Life, 1p <i>P 11/22/00 F95-074/2 #78</i>	nd	P1/F1
4. Briefing Paper	Soviet Military Development, 4p <i>R 10/30/02 F95-074/2 #79</i>	nd	P1/F1
5. Issue Paper	Regional Issues: Soviet Union (pages 6-9), 4p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #80</i>	8/84	P1/F1
6. Briefing Paper	Former President's Briefing (pages 8-13), 6p <i>P 11/7/01 NLSF95-074/2 #81</i>	Apr-Jun 84	P1/F1
7. Briefing Paper	Former President's Briefing (pages 16-17), 2p <i>R 3/28/00 NLSF95-074/2 #82</i>	Jan-Mar 84	P1/F1
8. Briefing Paper	Former President's Briefing (pages 6-9), 4p <i>R 11/7/01 NLSF95-074/2 #83</i>	Oct-Dec 83	P1/F1
9. Memo	Robert Kimmitt to Geoffrey Kemp, et al, re candidates briefing [6320], 1p <i>R 4/27/00 NLSF95-074/2 #84</i>	8/28/84	P1/F1
10. Briefing Paper	copy of #1, 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #85</i>	nd	P1/F1
11. Briefing Paper	copy of #2, 2p <i>R " " #86</i>	nd	P1/F1
12. Memo	draft, Robert McFarlane to Charles Wick, 1p <i>R 11/30/99 NLSF95-074/2 #87</i>	nd	P1/F1
13. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re meeting, 2p	8/29/84	P1/F1 P5
14. Memo	McFarlane to Matlock, re meeting, 1p	8/29/84	P5, P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

LOJ 5/10/2007

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON AUGUST 1984 (8/25/84-8/31/84)

FOIA

F95-074/2

Box Number 5

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
-------------	----------------------	-------------	----------

4 ~~BRIEFING~~ ~~SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENT~~ ~~PAPER~~ ^{MVH 3/17/08} 4 ~~ND~~

8-27-84

6320
add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Papers for inclusion in the Mondale-Ferraro briefing package are attached, as noted:

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| a. Leadership Situation | prepared by |
| b. Bilateral Issues | Jack Matloc |
| c. Soviet Military Development | prepared by |
| | Ty Cobb |
| d. Soviet Compliance with Treaties | being prepared by Ron Lehman |

6320
add-on

To Jim Lucas
Rm 303

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074/2#77

US-SOVIET RELATIONS
Bilateral Issues

BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/6/00

In addition to our proposals in the arms control area and our efforts to engage the Soviets in a realistic dialogue on regional issues, we have made a number of proposals designed to improve the bilateral relationship. The status of the more important of these is as follows:

Agreements Concluded:

-- Hot Line Upgrade, permitting more speedy transmission and transmission of facsimiles.

-- Improvements in consular practices, including an expansion in entry-exit points and more expeditious visa issuance for some categories of travelers.

-- Fisheries: Restoration of a limited Soviet fishing quota in the US-controlled zone, in return for commitments to US fishing interests.

-- Economic: Extension of the ten-year agreement on economic, industrial and technical cooperation. We proposed further that a working group meet to plan a meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission, and the Soviets have indicated that they will be prepared for such a meeting in November or December.

-- Incidents at Sea: The agreement to prevent incidents at sea between our navies has been extended and a fruitful meeting by Naval representatives held.

Proposals under Negotiation:

-- Cultural Exchange Agreement: We have proposed negotiation of a new agreement and have submitted a draft agreement to the Soviets. Preliminary negotiations on the draft began in August and will be continued.

-- Maritime Boundary: Negotiations are continuing on an agreement to delineate the maritime boundary in the Bering Sea.

-- Cooperative Activity: We have proposed the reactivation of cooperative agreements in the areas of health, environmental protection and housing, all of which have been largely dormant since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets have accepted in principle, but have not yet set dates for meetings to plan specific activities.

-- Consulates: We have proposed negotiations to reopen consulates general in New York and Kiev. The Soviets have indicated that the building previously allocated to us in Kiev is available, but are insisting that Aeroflot service to the U.S. be restored as a precondition. We consider the Aeroflot question a separate issue.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-- Air Navigation Aids in the North Pacific: Negotiations continue in ICAO regarding Soviet participation in more effective navigation facilities for civil aircraft flying the North Pacific route, in order to prevent a recurrence of the KAL tragedy.

US Proposals Not Yet Accepted for Negotiation by Soviets

-- Joint Simulated Space Rescue Mission: Proposed by the President last spring; rejected by Soviets as inopportune.

-- High-Level Military Contacts: No reply has been received to repeated proposals to arrange for high-level consultation of our respective defense officials and senior military officers.

-- Nuclear Terrorism: The Soviets have still not responded to U.S. proposals to discuss the potential problem of dealing with nuclear terrorism.

-- Joint Military and Diplomatic Communications: The Soviets have also been unwilling up to now to negotiate agreements for direct military-to-military communications and improvements in embassy-to-capital communications.

-- Search and Rescue at Sea: We have also proposed negotiations to improve procedures for assisting those lost at sea, with no clear response from the Soviets as yet.

Soviet Human Rights Performance

-- Soviet adherence to its obligations to respect human rights has deteriorated further over the past year, and this situation places certain limits on how far we can move in some bilateral areas to improve relations.

-- Jewish emigration has been reduced to an insignificant trickle.

-- Since the release of the Pentacostalists last summer, no significant moves have been made to solve any of the outstanding high-interest cases (e.g., Shcharansky, Orlov).

-- Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner are under exceedingly heavy pressure at the moment, and it appears that Mrs. Bonner has been sentenced to five-years "internal exile" for "anti-Soviet propaganda."

-- Several laws further restricting contacts with foreigners have been passed, and police repression against dissidents and refuseniks is at an all-time high for the post-Stalin period.

We have made it clear to the Soviet authorities that this situation exacts a price in the US-Soviet relationship, and that -- conversely -- if there are improvements in the human rights situation they would facilitate progress in our bilateral relationship.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ATTEMPT ON POPE'S LIFE

We are not privy to all the findings of the Italian investigation but our examination of the evidence available to us thus far leads to the following conclusions:

- We are confident that Agca did not act alone in attempting to assassinate the Pope.
 - We are confident that Agca was involved with the Bulgarians in some types of illegal activity, including narcotics trafficking.
 - We have seen insufficient evidence to permit us to conclude with certainty that the Bulgarians (and therefore the Soviets) arranged the assassination attempt on the Pope. However, circumstantial evidence seems quite strong.
 - We understand that the trial in Italy may take place later this year or early next year. We can expect more detailed information to become available at that time.
- 

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F95-074/2 7178
By CAS, NARA, Date 11/22/00

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 195014/2 #79
BY CSS NARA, DATE 10/30/02

SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENT

Military Spending: The Soviet commitment of resources to defense has increased each year since the early 1960's and the share of GNP devoted to military programs remains more than twice that of the U.S.

- Soviet defense spending grew roughly 4-5% annually from 1966-76, fueled by the rapid expansion of Soviet conventional forces as well as the modernization of their strategic and theater nuclear forces. This growth has slowed since 1976, down to almost 2% annually, with little growth in procurement. However, the decline coincides with a commensurate drop in overall economic growth and the share of GNP devoted to defense has remained constant over the past fifteen years (about 14-16% of GNP).
- The Soviets expanded their land forces significantly more than other categories over the last decade, probably reflecting a reemphasis on conventional war doctrine and mounting concerns over the Sino-Soviet conflict.
- The leveling of procurement in certain categories probably reflects recognition of the decline in overall economic growth, technical problems, industrial bottlenecks, and possibly, conscious decisions to reallocate scarce capital into consumption and investment.

Soviet Military Power: Current Soviet spending is so large that, despite the procurement plateau noted, Soviet forces have been augmented by 2,000 ICBM and SLBM missiles, 5,000 tactical aircraft, 65 SSBN and attack submarines, and 31 major surface combatants -- just since 1975.

- Strategic Defenses: Primary focus has been on anti-ballistic missile capabilities and countering the low-altitude cruise missile and bomber attack thrust. They have upgraded and expanded the Moscow ABM defense to the 100-launcher limit. This system will soon have a two-layer defense of long-range missiles designed to engage targets outside the atmosphere, and high-acceleration missiles to engage targets within the atmosphere. Of particular concern to us, the Soviets have laid the groundwork for expanding missile defenses to other areas of the USSR if they should choose to "breakout" of the ABM treaty, and have continued work on high-energy lasers with potential application against both aircraft and space satellites. Other systems with capabilities to destroy both bombers and tactical ballistic missiles are now entering the force. Finally, the USSR has continued to expand civil defense measures designed to protect the leadership and the economy in wartime.

~~SECRET~~

- Strategic Offensive Systems: Over the past five years, the Soviets have modernized a large part of their ICBM force, have taken steps to improve the survivability of this force and its capability for reconstitution in a protracted nuclear war, and have developed a command and control system that probably gives them confidence that they would be able to launch most of their force on tactical warning of a U.S. strike. Specifically:
 - The Soviets have significantly increased the capability of their ICBM force by deploying over 750 of their latest MIRVed ICBM variants (SS-17-18-19), and now have approximately 1400 ICBM launchers. Their warhead totals have increased more than 30% to over 6,000 and two new solid-propellant ICBM's, the MIRVed SS-X-24 and the single-warhead SS-X-25 have been flight-tested and could be deployed on mobile launchers.
 - Although SSBN construction has slowed, their deliverable warhead total has soared with the deployment of MIRVed missiles. The new SSBNs have longer-ranges, making them less vulnerable to our ASW efforts. Interestingly, despite the advantages of the long-range missiles, the Soviets have chosen to move some of the new SSBNs nearer to the U.S. as a supposed response to the Western deployment of INF missiles.
 - After 15 years of virtual neglect, the Soviets are modernizing their heavy bomber force, including two new long-range bombers and a long-range, air-launched cruise missile (mentioned in the press this week).
- Theater Forces: The Soviets continue to expand their IR/MRBM forces, reorganized and modernized their theater air assets, and restructured and expanded significantly their ground forces.
 - The SS-20 force now numbers 378 launchers, approximately 2/3 of which are deployed against the West. Brezhnev's moratorium (March-1982 to December-1983) on SS-20 deployments against NATO meant that no new bases in the Western USSR were begun, although work continued on bases already under construction and deployments in the East continued.
 - Supersonic, all-weather aircraft with look down/shoot down capabilities (MIG-29 and SU-27) highlight the improved Pact capability for defensive operations. Improved flexibility and capabilities to conduct massed operations has been secured through a pervasive reorganization of the strategic, tactical and air defense

assets. The BACKFIRE bomber force has been expanded to 250 (roughly 50% are with naval forces) and theater air offensive capabilities have been further improved through the addition of the shorter-range FENCER and MIG 23/27 fighter-bombers. They are experimenting with a new ground attack aircraft (FROGFOOT) in Afghanistan, and may have begun fielding it with combat units in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

- Soviet ground forces now have a total of 195 divisions, with most of these deployed opposite NATO and along the Chinese border at full strength and a high degree of readiness. We have noticed increased emphasis on high-speed operations that include exploiting breakthrough attacks and making raids deep into the enemy's rear. The active divisions have nearly 48,000 tanks -- about 4½ times what we have -- self-propelled artillery systems with nuclear or conventional capabilities are now in the field, and three new or improved missile systems have been developed: the short-range SS-21 (replacing the FROG), the SS-22 with a range to 900 km, and the SS-23 with a range of 300-500km.

- Naval Forces: The level of major surface combatants has remained about level, but the fleet now has larger ships that carry more advanced weapons. Two new destroyer classes and two new cruiser classes are now entering service and the ASW helicopter carrier force has three ships. A large aircraft carrier is being constructed and the USSR may have four of these carriers in service by the year 2000.

- The Soviets have been building fewer ballistic missile subs and more torpedo or cruise missile units. Two new classes of nuclear-powered attack submarines have been launched and specially built subs designed to carry antiship cruise missiles have been launched. The Soviets are also developing at least two long-range sea-launched cruise missiles for attacking land targets.

Prospects for Force Modernization: Slower economic growth, the need for more investment and incentives to raise labor productivity, and the unsettled leadership picture would suggest that the Soviets should perceive an imperative to pursue little or no growth in military procurement.

- However, we are concerned with mounting evidence that the Soviets are planning a broad-based and pervasive modernization program. Expansion of floorspace at Soviet production facilities indicates that defense industrial

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

capacity appears to be sufficient to support a substantial force modernization. The expansion of R&D facilities has continued and we estimate that about 60 major new weapon systems have been deployed since 1981, and another 60 could reach IOC by 1985. Over half of them are completely new or highly modified designs.

- On the other hand, a steep upswing in military procurement would draw important resources -- skilled labor, high-quality plant and equipment, raw materials, and energy -- from other sectors of the economy. It would require lower civil investment and mean a fall in per capita consumption. There is also the question of whether or not the Soviets will be able to overcome the technical and manufacturing problems with advanced weapons experienced in the past.
- While rationality would probably dictate that a continuation of the traditional high rates of Soviet defense spending would impinge too greatly on Soviet consumption, technical, and investment capacities, we must remember that the military-industrial nexus dominates Soviet national security decision-making, and the arguments of public interest groups or economists carry little weight in the final analysis. As one observer has noted, it is not a question of whether or not the Soviet Union has a military-industrial complex, the Soviet Union is a military-industrial complex.
- Even if military procurement remained constant or grew for the next few years at somewhat less than the 4-5% rate during 1966-75, there would be a substantial upgrading of military capabilities because the Soviets are already investing so much in military hardware that slower growth or indeed merely continuing procurement at the existing level would ensure large increases in their stock of military equipment.
- Therefore, we remain confident that improvements will be made across the board in key strategic and theater nuclear forces, and probably will include new ICBM programs, new fighter and interceptor aircraft, general purpose submarines, and tank modernization programs. Further, we believe that the Soviets are likely to procure these new systems, as well as others, in large numbers.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

August 23, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR GEOFFREY T. H. KEMP
JACK F. MATLOCK, JR. ←

ROGER W. ROBINSON

TYRUS COBB

PHILIP A. DUR

RAYMOND F. BURGHARDT

FROM:

Paul B. Thompson for
(ROBERT M. KIMMITT)

SUBJECT: Candidates' Briefing

The Mondale Briefing has been confirmed, and some new issues will be included in the briefing. The updated outline is attached with the new issues in your area highlighted.

Your inputs still should be given to Jim Lucas in the CMC by noon, Monday.

Attachment

Tab I - Outline

MONDALE-FERRARO BRIEFING

I. REGIONAL

A. Europe (Matlock)

1. US-Soviet Relations
 - a. Leadership situation - same as e.
 - b. Bilateral issues: trade, grain, cultural, consular
 - c. Soviet military development
 - d. Soviet compliance with Treaties *Ron Lehman*
 - e. Status of Soviet leadership
2. NATO: Political
3. Greece-Turkey-Cyprus

(Sommer/Cobb)
(Sommer/Cobb)

B. Latin America (Burghardt) (Burghardt)

1. Central America
2. The Central American negotiations
3. Caribbean (including Mariel talks)
4. Southern Cone

(Burghardt)
(Burghardt)

C. Near East and South Asia

(Kemp)
(Kemp)
(Kemp/Dur)

1. North Africa
2. Middle East
3. Iran-Iraq war and the Red Sea Mining Operations
4. Persian Gulf (including Iran leadership and possibility for escalation of Iran-Iraq war)
5. South Asia
 - a. Afghanistan
 - b. Soviet-Pak tensions
 - c. Indo-Pak tensions

(Fortier)

(Fortier)

D. Asia (Laux) (Sigur) (Childress) (Childress)

1. China
2. Japan
3. Korea
4. ASEAN (including Kampuchea and Thai border)

E. Africa (Wettering)

II. Functional

Kraemer/Linhard
Mahley

- A. Arms Control
- B. NATO: Political-Military
(including conventional
modernization, ET,
infrastructure)

Robinson

- C. International Debt
 - 1. Economic prospect of
Argentina, Brazil and other
heavy debt ridden countries.

McMinn

- D. International Trade (including
steel case)

Fortier

- E. Non-proliferation

Douglass

- F. Defense Budget

Matlock/Cobb

- G. US assessment of responsibility
of responsibility of attempt on
Pope's life.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GEOFFREY T. H. KEMP
RAYMOND F. BURGHARDT
RICHARD T. CHILDRESS
DONALD FORTIER
JOHN W. DOUGLASS
SVEN F. KRAEMER
DAVID N. LAUX
ROBERT E. LINHARD
DONALD . MAHLEY
DOUGLAS W. MCMINN
JACK F. MATLOCK, JR. ←
ROGER W. ROBINSON
GASTON J. SIGUR, JR.
PETER R. SOMMER
FREDERICK L. WETTERING
TYRUS COBB

FROM:

Paul B. Thompson for
ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT:

Candidates' Briefing

Bud has been asked by the President to give a national security briefing to Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro. He expects to brief the candidates orally during the first week of September, using for that purpose a briefing book containing objective individual discussion papers on the full range of current national security regional and functional topics. Responsibility for assembling the briefing book has been given to the CMC, but it will need a good deal of help from you.

In view of the short fuse on completing this project, we may want to use updated excerpts from recent NSC products -- e.g., Selected National Security Issues, recent Former Presidents' Briefing books, etc. -- as the basis for the briefing. Drawing from other pertinent, readily available material is also encouraged.

Please review the attached material, which consists of a) the outline for the Candidates' Briefing book and b) excerpts from recent off-the-shelf NSC-wide products on your area of responsibility. From them, and/or using your own material as appropriate, please prepare a brief (two to three pages maximum) summary of the key developments and U.S. policy issues that now concern us on your areas of responsibility. (The topics assigned to you have been highlighted on the outline.) Individual papers should be objective, up-to-date, and no higher than the SECRET level. Lead officers indicated are responsible for coordination with staff counterparts.

Rm
368

Since time is short, we must have your responses by no later than noon of Monday, August 27. Please have someone on your staff hand carry your contributions directly to Jim Lucas of the CMC in Room 303.

Thank you.

Attachments

Tab A - Outline

Tab B - Excerpts

MONDALE-FERRARO BRIEFING

I. REGIONAL

A. Europe (Matlock)

(Sommer/Cobb)
(Sommer/Cobb)

1. US-Soviet Relations
 - a. Leadership situation
 - b. Bilateral issues: trade, grain, cultural, consular
2. NATO: Political
3. Greece-Turkey-Cyprus

B. Latin America (Burghardt) (Burghardt) (Burghardt)

1. Central America
2. Caribbean (including Mariel talks)
3. Southern Cone

C. Near East and South Asia (Kemp) (Kemp) (Fortier) (Fortier)

1. North Africa
2. Middle East
3. Persian Gulf (including Iran leadership and possibility for escalation of Iran-Iraq war)
4. South Asia
 - a. Afghanistan
 - b. Soviet-Pak tensions
 - c. Indo-Pak tensions

D. Asia (Laux) (Sigur) (Childress) (Childress)

1. China
2. Japan
3. Korea
4. ASEAN (including Kampuchea and Thai border)

E. Africa (Wettering)

II. Functional

Kraemer/Linhard
Mahley

- A. Arms Control
- B. NATO: Political-Military (including conventional modernization, ET, infrastructure)

Robinson
McMinn

- C. International Debt
- D. International Trade (including steel case)

Fortier
Douglass

- E. Non-proliferation
- F. Defense Budget

REGIONAL ISSUESSOVIET UNIONIssue:

How can the United States deter further Soviet direct and indirect aggression and reduce the risk of a U.S.-Soviet war?

Objectives:

- o Reduce, and eventually eliminate, the use and threat of force in solving international disputes;
- o Reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons, on a balanced and verifiable basis;
- o Establish a better working relationship with the Soviet Union, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding; and
- o Deter Soviet aggression and to facilitate negotiation of agreements which would reduce tension and diminish the threat of war.

In pursuing these objectives, our approach is based on three guiding principles:

- o Realism, which means that we must recognize the nature of the world we live in and the Soviet system, and must not sweep problems under the rug, but must deal with them forthrightly.
- o Strength, which is more than military power; it is an amalgam of political unity and will, economic health, and an adequate defense.
- o Dialogue, which means that we are prepared to discuss the problems that divide us and to work for practical and fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise.

Accomplishments:

- o The world is safer today than it was four years ago. Our ability to deter aggression is being restored, and the growing tide of Soviet direct and indirect aggression we saw in the 1970's has receded.
- o Not one square inch of additional territory has fallen to communist aggression since 1981.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2 #80BY LOT, NARA, DATE 11/6/00

- o The Soviet Union has also avoided actions which could cause direct conflict between us -- as opposed to what happened, for instance, in 1973, when Soviet preparations to intervene directly in the Middle East caused us to go on a world-wide strategic alert.
- o Our World alliances and traditional friendships, essential to deterring Soviet aggression, have been repaired and are sound.
- o NATO's action in backing the deployment of INF missiles in Europe to counter the threat of the Soviet SS-20's is a case in point.
- o We have created a sound basis for realistic and peaceful management of our relations with the Soviet Union.
- o We have placed far-reaching and ambitious arms reduction proposals on the table.
- o We have moved to place our working relationship on a more businesslike footing, and to increase contacts between our societies.
- o We have made it clear that our cooperation with the Soviet Union will depend importantly on Soviet compliance with existing agreements; including those on arms control, human rights, and other major issues.
- o We have established a pattern of consultation on regional issues. Despite our fundamental disagreements on many of these, consultations help us and the Soviets to avoid actions which could escalate into direct conflict.
- o We have in place a policy designed for the long term, since management of our relations with the Soviet Union must be steady and must avoid the rapid fluctuations of the past, which weakened our ability to defend our interests. It is based upon a realistic assessment of the Soviet Union, and on the recognition that we must preserve peace between us as we work toward solving problems.

Talking Points:

- o Our policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is aimed at achieving a reduction in the use of force, a reduction in nuclear and other armaments, and a better U.S.-Soviet working relationship. We also seek to deter further Soviet direct and indirect aggression in the world.
- o During the 1970's the USSR increased its military power far beyond its defensive needs and used force and the threat of force to expand its control over other countries.

- o Either directly or through surrogates the Soviets attempted to establish communist regimes in Africa (Angola, Ethiopia), in Asia (Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos), in Latin America and the Caribbean (Nicaragua, El Salvador and Grenada), and actually invaded a neutral country (Afghanistan). They turned Communist Cuba into a base for aggression in Latin America and Africa. At the same time, they attempted to undermine NATO by deploying SS-20 nuclear missiles against Western Europe.
- o This pattern of aggression not only posed a threat to many independent nations, but ultimately to American security and to the American way of life.
- o During the same period, the Soviet Union reached parity with us, and in some areas pulled ahead of us, in strategic nuclear capabilities.
- o This Administration has moved decisively to contain Soviet expansionism. No country has fallen to Soviet aggression since 1981 and, despite its frequent saber-rattling and truculence, Moscow has been more cautious in its military behavior over the past four years. This, we believe, has happened because we have repaired our deterrent capacity and strengthened our alliances.
- o At the same time, we have created a sound basis for realistic and peaceful management of our overall relationship with the Soviet Union. In the past four years, the United States has made dozens of specific proposals to the Soviet Union which, if accepted, would reduce tensions, reduce arms levels and provide for a better and more realistic working relationship.
- o We have proposed conducting a joint simulated space rescue mission.
- o We have agreed to upgrade the "hotline" for crisis communications between our capitals.
- o We are discussing again the proposal to open consulates in New York and Kiev.
- o We are discussing extending our agreements on avoiding incidents at sea and on cooperation in fishing.
- o We have renewed our agreement on ~~consular~~, economic, industrial, and technical cooperation.
- o We have proposed reviving agreements on cooperation in environmental protection, housing, health, and agriculture.

- o We are seeking to resolve differences on our maritime boundary off Alaska.
- o We are proposing to discuss potential nuclear terrorist incidents and search and rescue procedures for those lost at sea, and improving joint military and diplomatic communications.
- o Moscow has, however, refused since December 1983 to negotiate with us on reducing nuclear arms. We believe that it is in the interest of both countries to negotiate verifiable agreements for lower arms levels, and to improve our relationship in other respects. We will continue our efforts, and believe that the Soviet leadership will eventually come to understand that such negotiations are in its interest as well.
- o Until the Soviets show a readiness to negotiate realistically, it is essential for us to continue our defense modernization program. If this program is curtailed without verifiable agreements to constrain threatening Soviet programs, the Soviet leaders will have little incentive to negotiate, but will simply wait in the hope of achieving their objectives without any concessions on their part.

B. U.S.-Soviet Relations

Ever since the Soviets broke off INF and START negotiations last November, they have sought to portray U.S.-Soviet relations as being at their post-World War II nadir and to place all the blame for that situation directly on the Reagan Administration.

- o Their tactics seem based on the hope that the downturn in our relations will prove an election liability for President Reagan.
- o The virtual freeze in Soviet-American ties could also serve another purpose for Moscow: it allows the Soviets to put off tackling some potentially tough decisions on controversial matters--particularly on arms control--at a time when Chernenko is still trying to consolidate his power within the leadership.

Whatever their motivations, the Soviets clearly have been doing their best to be unresponsive to nearly all opportunities to lessen bilateral tensions and improve relations.

- o We believe the Soviet pullout from the Olympics was, in part, an attempt to dramatize to the world the decline in U.S.-Soviet relations. (The pullout decision was made hastily and at a very high level.)
- o Moscow has summarily dismissed as "election year rhetoric" the President's repeated calls for joint steps to improve relations.
- o It also responded negatively--but belatedly and obliquely, to avoid being criticized as obstructionist--to the President's June 14 endorsement of the concept of a well-prepared U.S.-Soviet summit.
- o At the same time, the Soviets' behavior in continuing to meet with us on a range of secondary issues--hotline upgrade, bilateral trade, the Bering Straits boundary, preventing incidents at sea, etc.--suggests they do not want a complete break in our dialogue.

Meanwhile, the Soviets have been seeking to discredit U.S. arms control and defense policies and to heighten public apprehension in the West about the possibility of nuclear war.

- o The Soviets continue to push the themes of the danger of nuclear war and of a first strike by NATO on the Warsaw Pact.

- o Not only has Moscow spurned all efforts to get it to return to the INF and START negotiations, but also it has publicly rejected recent U.S. arms control initiatives in other areas--chemical weapons, non-use of force, and the new Western MBFR proposal.
- o The Soviets have opted, however, to keep participating in such multilateral negotiations as MBFR, the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and CDE in Stockholm, probably because they believe these forums provide opportunities to divide the U.S. from its allies.

Although Moscow continues to float repackaged disarmament proposals of long standing such as no first use of nuclear weapons, mutual reductions of defense expenditures, and renunciation of the use of force, its main arms control preoccupation at present appears to be the issue of space militarization in general and U.S. ASAT programs in particular.

- o Chernenko has associated himself personally with the current campaign to prevent the militarization of space and has called for formal U.S.-Soviet ASAT negotiations.
- o The campaign probably reflects Soviet efforts to influence the Congressional debate on ASAT and the strategic defense initiative, as well as genuine concern about the U.S. gaining a strategic advantage in these areas. (S)

D. USSR: Domestic Developments

The Leadership

Chernenko has been trying during the past three months to project an image of active and vigorous leadership. His success in achieving real power seems to have been limited at best, however. While he quickly acquired the trappings of power and moved to strengthen his hold on the party bureaucracy, it appears clear that his actual authority is constrained by that of his powerful Politburo colleagues--particularly Ustinov and Gromyko.

- o Chernenko has yet to install a single crony or client in a key post.
- o The anti-corruption campaign that began under Andropov continues; the longer it does, the greater are chances that some of Chernenko's supporters will come under fire.
- o Gromyko and Ustinov continue to display their authority in the fields of foreign and defense policies, respectively.
- o Party Secretary Gorbachev's unusually high public profile throughout June suggests that his political stature is growing and that he is increasingly willing to be seen as an active candidate to succeed Chernenko.
- o Meanwhile there are reports that Chernenko has recently suffered episodes of sudden physical weakness--behavior suggesting that his known problems of emphysema and a heart arrhythmia are getting worse.

Severomorsk Explosion

In mid-May [REDACTED] widespread damage resulting from an accidental explosion at the main missile storage facility of the Soviet Navy's Northern Fleet headquarters at Severomorsk.

- o We still do not know what caused the accident,

- o Extensive damage resulted:

- o The accident, although spectacular, did not seriously cut into the Soviets' countrywide inventory of such weapons. Rear supply depots probably began quickly to replace the weapons that were lost.
- o This and similar accidents of lesser magnitude are strong indications that the Soviets are rather sloppy in their munitions storage and handling practices. ~~(S)~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

-16-

USSR: Chernenko Succession

Konstantin Chernenko's succession to the post of General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party represents a triumph for the status-quo forces in the Kremlin. At this stage we see little chance that this "organization man," who got to the top by personifying loyalty and conformity in a system that places great emphasis on these qualities, will do much to alter the essential goals, strategy, and structure of the Soviet system.

Chernenko's climb up the career ladder was unusually rapid.

- o After 10 years' service behind the scenes as the CPSU's top administrative officer, he was promoted three times between April 1976 and November 1978.
- o He probably owed his rapid rise to Brezhnev's reliance on him, particularly as Brezhnev's health declined.
- o But Chernenko still lacked the support he needed from key leaders like Gromyko to take over when Brezhnev died in November 1982.
- o Circumstances were different when Andropov died last February; Chernenko was one of the few left at the top who could lay claim to the Brezhnev legacy.

Vice President's Observations

Vice President Bush met with Chernenko at Andropov's funeral, at which time he presented President Reagan's letter expressing interest in constructive relations. The Vice President noted that:

- o Chernenko appeared in good health, robust, and capable of intelligent repartee.
- o The new Soviet leader echoed the sentiments of the President's letter but made no substantive proposals or suggestions, even though his general tone was positive and upbeat.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-074/2 #82
BY LOI NARA, DATE 7/18/00

- o One significant Chernenko remark was that the USSR is satisfied with the existing correlation of forces and any effort to upset it would be unacceptable.

Domestic Policies

Chernenko is likely to try to emulate some of Andropov's efforts to boost economic production, but he is less likely to follow Andropov's emphasis on labor discipline and cracking down on corruption.

- o We expect him to pay greater attention than his recent predecessors to social institutions, control mechanisms, and labor and party administration.
- o He also probably will promote a more open governmental style, but this will be done within strict ideological limits.
- o Even if he wanted to do so, we doubt he could soon push for any reordering of economic priorities disfavoring the military.

Foreign Policies

Chernenko may try to take a page from Brezhnev's book and revert to using detentist rhetoric in his public statements about the West, but we see little likelihood that he can--or even will want to--reverse recent Soviet policies toward the West.

- o He has in the past paid at least lip service to the idea of improved relations with the West (including the US), strategic arms agreements, and detente, however.

We should be able to learn more soon about the likely course of Soviet foreign policy under Chernenko.

- o He is scheduled to visit Eastern Europe shortly on his first foreign trip since becoming General Secretary.
- o Some Yugoslav and Hungarian officials reportedly expect to find that Gromyko, not Chernenko, is the leading political and intellectual force in what they now regard as a collective Soviet leadership. (S)

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

-6-

Country and Regional Developments

Soviet Interests and Activities Abroad, 1983

A recently-published DIA summary of Soviet developments and activities in 1983 shows both significant gains and losses for Moscow in its dealings with other countries during the year.

Soviet gains included:

- o A qualitative change in the depth of the Syrian-Soviet relationship, thanks largely to Moscow's sending the Syrians the advanced SA-5 antiaircraft missile system as well as some 2,400 to 3,200 Soviet troops needed to man the sites.
- o Moscow evidently secured its role as India's major military supplier by working out arrangements for the production of Soviet T-72 and T-80 tanks in India and for providing New Delhi with advanced jet fighter aircraft.
- o Headway was made in improving relations with China, albeit only on a superficial level. Trade was up between the two countries, as were promises of increased cultural, technical, and commercial contacts. Beijing is pressing for movement on more meaningful issues, but Moscow has stonewalled on these so far.
- o Greater Soviet influence in the Seychelles probably resulted from Moscow's military shows of support for the Rene regime and increasing Soviet military involvement there.
- o Argentina granted Aeroflot landing rights in Buenos Aires, a minor but potentially important gain for Moscow that probably was facilitated by the U.S. decision to back the British in the Falklands war.

On the other side of the ledger, Moscow suffered several sharp reverses and potential setbacks during the year:

- o The U.S.-Caribbean rescue operation in Grenada was a blow to Soviet as well as Cuban interests, negating Soviet-Grenadian military aid deals worth \$26 million and Soviet involvement in projects with potential military utility (e.g., a deep sea port and a satellite station).

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

NLS F95-074/2 # 83

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/2/01

- o Through the first 10 months of 1983, some 165 Soviets were expelled--or left voluntarily--from 19 countries where they were accused of espionage or other illegal activities. The total was up from 49 expulsions in 1982 and 27 in 1981. (See separate item.)
- o For the first time, a Marxist client regime, the dos Santos regime in Angola, appeared to be in deep trouble and in danger of being ousted, thanks to a stepped-up and effective guerrilla (UNITA) campaign against it. Moscow and Havana felt obliged to pour in more military aid. (Moscow's aid alone now totals \$843 million.)
- o The USSR made few if any lasting gains against the insurgency in Afghanistan, where Soviet force levels remained at about 105,000. So many Soviet weapons were lost to the resistance forces that Moscow had to stop issuing antitank and antiaircraft weapons to the Afghan army. (See separate item.)
- o Soviet-Iranian relations, cool to begin with, worsened when Moscow ended its arms embargo to Iraq and Tehran jailed leaders and members of the pro-Moscow Tudeh (Iranian communist) party. ~~(TSC)~~

Soviet Views on Relations With the U.S.

After a period of internal discussion, the Soviets appear to have rejected the option of hunkering down and freezing bilateral relations with Washington through this year's Presidential election campaign period. This, at least, is one analytical view from CIA recently.

According to this view, a period of heightened debate on prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations began in Soviet power circles in September. One side argued that there was no hope for improvement any time soon in relations with Washington.

- o Andropov expressed a view close to this on September 28, saying that recent events had dispelled "once and for all" any "illusions" about the possibility of an evolution for the better in U.S. policy.
- o Another Soviet commented that current U.S. policy was really a reflection not just of the President's wishes, but rather of those of the U.S ruling "oligarchy."

The somewhat less gloomy view of other Soviets was that Washington's policies were subject to moderating influences, such as pressures from the American public, the Congress, and West European leaders.

- o The director of Moscow's Institute for the USA and Canada, Georgiy Arbatov, was among those noting the potential influence of public concern on Administration policy, although he was less sanguine than some about its near-term effects.

A major reconsideration of Soviet policy toward the United States may have taken place around the end of November, when the U.S. Embassy in Moscow noted the simultaneous absence from public view of a number of specialists on bilateral relations. If such a reconsideration did take place, the view that apparently prevailed was a synthesis of the two views outlined above.

- o The Soviets recently have seemed to be trying to maintain a dialogue with us on secondary issues, leaving the door open for a new U.S. initiative on arms control while expressing doubt that real progress is likely.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

-9-

- o Toward the end of December the Soviets informed us they were ready to resume the interrupted talks on improving the direct Moscow-Washington communications link.
- o Bilateral talks on nonproliferation issues are continuing.

At the same time, Moscow has stuck to a hard public line about chances for any real breakthrough, particularly on arms control. Gromyko, for instance, speaking shortly before his Stockholm meeting with Secretary Shultz, characterized U.S. appeals for a resumption of arms control talks as "hypocrisy" and "propagandistic dope." He reiterated Andropov's condition of November 24 that the U.S. must show willingness to revert to the pre-INF deployment situation in order for talks to resume.

Nevertheless, Moscow has continued to indicate it does not want a deep freeze in the bilateral relationship. A Moscow television commentator said on December 25 that the Soviets are "ready to deal with any U.S. President." And a prominent political observer wrote in a well-known Soviet journal on January 4 that it would be "premature" to say that hope for an arms agreement has collapsed. (S)

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6320
Add-on

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

August 28, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR GEOFFREY T. H. KEMP
RAYMOND F. BURGHARDT
RICHARD T. CHILDRESS
DONALD FORTIER
JOHN W. DOUGLASS
SVEN F. KRAEMER
DAVID N. LAUX
ROBERT E. LINHARD
DONALD MAHLEY
DOUGLAS W. MCMINN
JACK F. MATLOCK, JR.
ROGER W. ROBINSON
GASTON J. SIGUR, JR.
PETER R. SOMMER
FREDERICK L. WETTERING
TYRUS COBB
PHILIP A. DUR
DAVID G. WIGG
PAULA J. DOBRIANSKY

FROM:

Paul B. Thompson for
ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Candidates' Briefing

To aid him in briefing candidates Mondale and Ferraro, Bud has asked for talking papers for each separate briefing item. Please prepare a one-page talking points paper, in the format of Tab F of the Staff Manual, covering your input. Talkers of less than one page are preferable. These point papers may draw on your prior submission and, where appropriate, from the earlier distributed CIA input in eight of the categories.

The final candidates' briefing book will reflect a tab for your subject containing the talking paper, your previous submission and, where relevant, the CIA input.

Please provide your talking points to Jim Lucas by noon tomorrow, August 29.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074/z #84

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 7/18/00

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F95-074/2 #85

US-SOVIET RELATIONS
Leadership Situation

BY

LDS

NARA, DATE

11/6/00

-- The transition from Andropov to Chernenko was smooth on the surface, and Chernenko rapidly was accorded the three key titles of Soviet public leadership: General Secretary of the Party, Chairman of the Defense Council and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium (chief of state). (U)

-- It would appear, however, that Chernenko in fact has not acquired the authority of his predecessors. He has yet to put a personal stamp on the Soviet leadership and most policy seems to be made by others who are preeminent in their functional fields. Gromyko, for example, seems to be making the foreign policy decisions, probably in close cooperation with Ustinov on national security matters. Our evidence for the above is circumstantial, but persuasive, and includes the following:

-- Having been passed over for the leadership when Brezhnev died, we must assume that there was opposition to Chernenko's succeeding Andropov. There are unconfirmed rumors that, in fact, a deal was struck in the leadership which limited Chernenko's authority.

-- We have noted a consistent pattern since February for many Soviet officials, often those with KGB connections, to denigrate Chernenko's ability in private. This is a virtually unprecedented phenomenon.

-- Chernenko's extensive correspondence with the President does not reflect a personal touch; his letters always seem to be written by committee in the Foreign Ministry.

-- Chernenko's health is poor. He is suffering from moderately advanced emphysema, which is progressive, and which not only limits his physical activity but makes him subject to heart disease and pulmonary infections. Some reports indicate that he can work only about six hours a day. Medical specialists in the intelligence community estimate his life expectancy at a maximum of five years, with a 20% chance each year of his dying. Perhaps more important, they expect his infirmities to be progressive so that his physical ability to be active is likely to erode steadily. (S)

-- At the moment, Gorbachev seems to be positioned as the "heir apparent," and seems to act as Chernenko's number two in the Party Secretariat. Whether he would in fact become Chernenko's successor upon the latter's death, incapacitation or removal, would depend on events in the Soviet leadership between now and then. (S)

-- Overall, our conclusion is that the Soviet Union does not at the moment have a strong, coordinated leadership which would facilitate fundamental policy changes opposed by some powerful interest group. Nevertheless, pressures on the leadership, both internal and external, are increasing. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

US-SOVIET RELATIONS
Bilateral Issues

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-074/2 #86
BY hdt, NARA, DATE 11/6/00

In addition to our proposals in the arms control area and our efforts to engage the Soviets in a realistic dialogue on regional issues, we have made a number of proposals designed to improve the bilateral relationship. The status of the more important of these is as follows:

Agreements Concluded:

- Hot Line Upgrade, permitting more speedy transmission and transmission of facsimiles.
- Improvements in consular practices, including an expansion in entry-exit points and more expeditious visa issuance for some categories of travelers.
- Fisheries: Restoration of a limited Soviet fishing quota in the US-controlled zone, in return for commitments to US fishing interests.
- Economic: Extension of the ten-year agreement on economic, industrial and technical cooperation. We proposed further that a working group meet to plan a meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission, and the Soviets have indicated that they will be prepared for such a meeting in November or December.
- Incidents at Sea: The agreement to prevent incidents at sea between our navies has been extended and a fruitful meeting by Naval representatives held.

Proposals under Negotiation:

- Cultural Exchange Agreement: We have proposed negotiation of a new agreement and have submitted a draft agreement to the Soviets. Preliminary negotiations on the draft began in August and will be continued.
- Maritime Boundary: Negotiations are continuing on an agreement to delineate the maritime boundary in the Bering Sea.
- Cooperative Activity: We have proposed the reactivation of cooperative agreements in the areas of health, environmental protection and housing, all of which have been largely dormant since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets have accepted in principle, but have not yet set dates for meetings to plan specific activities.
- Consulates: We have proposed negotiations to reopen consulates general in New York and Kiev. The Soviets have indicated that the building previously allocated to us in Kiev is available, but are insisting that Aeroflot service to the U.S. be restored as a precondition. We consider the Aeroflot question a separate issue.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-- Air Navigation Aids in the North Pacific: Negotiations continue in ICAO regarding Soviet participation in more effective navigation facilities for civil aircraft flying the North Pacific route, in order to prevent a recurrence of the KAL tragedy.

US Proposals Not Yet Accepted for Negotiation by Soviets

-- Joint Simulated Space Rescue Mission: Proposed by the President last spring; rejected by Soviets as inopportune.

-- High-Level Military Contacts: No reply has been received to repeated proposals to arrange for high-level consultation of our respective defense officials and senior military officers.

-- Nuclear Terrorism: The Soviets have still not responded to U.S. proposals to discuss the potential problem of dealing with nuclear terrorism.

-- Joint Military and Diplomatic Communications: The Soviets have also been unwilling up to now to negotiate agreements for direct military-to-military communications and improvements in embassy-to-capital communications.

-- Search and Rescue at Sea: We have also proposed negotiations to improve procedures for assisting those lost at sea, with no clear response from the Soviets as yet.

Soviet Human Rights Performance

-- Soviet adherence to its obligations to respect human rights has deteriorated further over the past year, and this situation places certain limits on how far we can move in some bilateral areas to improve relations.

-- Jewish emigration has been reduced to an insignificant trickle.

-- Since the release of the Pentacostalists last summer, no significant moves have been made to solve any of the outstanding high-interest cases (e.g., Shcharansky, Orlov).

-- Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner are under exceedingly heavy pressure at the moment, and it appears that Mrs. Bonner has been sentenced to five-years "internal exile" for "anti-Soviet propaganda."

-- Several laws further restricting contacts with foreigners have been passed, and police repression against dissidents and refuseniks is at an all-time high for the post-Stalin period.

We have made it clear to the Soviet authorities that this situation exacts a price in the US-Soviet relationship, and that -- conversely -- if there are improvements in the human rights situation they would facilitate progress in our bilateral relationship.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 30, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Letter to Rep. Dante Fascell Regarding Andrei Sakharov

I concur in the proposed letter prepared by the Department of State -- as corrected -- to Rep. Dante Fascell regarding the plight of Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner. Please forward the memorandum at TAB I to Sally Kelley with the proposed response and previous correspondence.

John Lenczowski^{JL}, Sven Kraemer^W, Walt Raymond and Chris Lehman^{not available} concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at TAB I to Ms. Kelley.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

TAB I Memo to Sally Kelley, with attachments

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Letter to Rep. Dante Fascell Regarding the Plight
of Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed letter -- as corrected -- to Rep. Dante Fascell regarding the condition of Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner.

Attachments

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

84 AUG 30 A12: 51

S/S 8422884Date August 29, 1984WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOMFor: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White HouseReference:To: President Reagan From: Dante FascellDate: July 25, 1984 Subject: Sakharov and StockholmCDEWH Referral Dated: August 16, 1984 NSC ID# 233513
(if any) The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.Action Taken:

- X A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:

for Kristie A. Kenney
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUGGESTED RESPONSE

Dear Dante,

I am writing pursuant to my August 10 letter in which I indicated I would provide further reaction to your July 25 letter to President Reagan. At that time you recommended that the issue of Andrei Sakharov be raised formally at the Stockholm CDE meeting in September and at the September meeting in Vienna on space weapons.

As you know, although film recently ^{funneled} leaked to the Western press by the Soviets indicates that Sakharov was probably alive six weeks ago, we have no reliable independent information on his current health or whereabouts. During the last several weeks, reports have been circulating which state that Sakharov was force-fed and possibly treated with psychotropic drugs. There are also reports, as yet unconfirmed, that his wife, Yelena Bonner, has been tried and sentenced to five years of internal exile. These reports give us great cause for concern and I want to assure you that the Administration is doing everything possible to help the Sakharovs, through private as well as public diplomacy.

The President has expressed his concerns about this issue on several public occasions. Privately we have raised the Sakharovs' situation with the Soviets many times and we will

The Honorable
Dante B. Fascell, Chairman
Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe,

continue to do so. We are also in close touch with friends and allies on this subject. The U.S. delegation raised the Sakharov case with our NATO allies at the CDE meeting last June and Ambassador Goodby circulated copies of House and Senate resolutions calling on all Helsinki signatories to protest Soviet treatment of the Sakharovs. He also raised the Sakharov issue with his Soviet counterpart. The strong Soviet reaction to these steps in Stockholm indicates that they had an impact on Moscow.

The Sakharov issue has also been a subject of extensive bilateral discussions. Last month Walter Stoessel travelled to France, Germany, Switzerland, and Denmark on a Presidential mission to discuss Soviet human rights abuses with European leaders and the situation of the Sakharovs figured prominently in these discussions. We will monitor closely the results of these discussions. We will continue to consider carefully your recommendation that the Sakharov issue be formally raised at the CDE, particularly if we conclude as a result of our ongoing review, that such an initiative would be helpful in eliciting information about their condition or in helping to secure permission for Mrs. Bonner to travel abroad for medical treatment. Prospects for a meeting in Vienna do not appear promising at this time; however, if that situation changes, we will take careful account of your recommendation. We are also currently exploring how we can effectively mobilize international support for the Sakharovs during the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly.

✓ As Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, we welcome your continued interest in the Sakharov issue. I can assure you that we will continue to work with our allies and through both public and private channels to press the Soviets to allow Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment and to allow Dr. Sak^harov to travel and work where he wishes, including outside the Soviet Union.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President

Draft: EUR/SOB/SOBI:SLysyshyn⁸²
8/22/84 #3874b

Cleared: EUR/SOB/SOBI:JSchumaker⁸²
EUR/RPP:JHawes⁸²
EUR/SOV:TSimons⁸²
EUR:RBurt
HA:GMatthews⁸²
H:NMorgan⁸²
PM/CDE:JGundersen⁸²
IO/HR:WHewitt⁸²

August 10, 1984

Dear Dante:

On the President's behalf, I would like to thank you for your most recent letter emphasizing your serious concern regarding the tragic situation of Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Elena Bonner.

As Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, you may be assured that we appreciate your recommendation that the Sakharov case be raised publicly at every available bilateral opportunity. I will ask our foreign policy advisers to closely review your specific suggestion that this issue be raised in Vienna in September and at the Stockholm CDE meeting. In the interim, let me assure you that we share your concern for the welfare of Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner, as well as the many other Soviets who are denied permission to emigrate.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Dante B. Fascell
Chairman
Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

MBO:KRJ:emu 8MBO

cc: w/copy of inc to W. Tapley Bennett, Legis Affrs, State
for DRAFT response

2
N
DANTE B. FASCELL
CHAIRMAN

ROBERT DOLE
CO-CHAIRMAN

COMMISSION ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

#233513
R. SPENCER OLIVER
STAFF DIRECTOR

SAMUEL G. WISE
DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR

237 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2

(202) 225-1901

July 25, 1984

8422884

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to you again, as I did on May 8, about the tragic situation of Nobel Laureate Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Elena Bonner. On June 4, 1984, I received a response to my letter on the Sakharov issue from Assistant Secretary of State Bennett.

Despite facile official Soviet assurances -- including "recent" photographs of the couple and a June 26 telegram purportedly from Elena Bonner to her children in the U.S. -- we still have no definitive information about the Sakharovs. According to appalling unconfirmed reports on July 10, Sakharov has been undergoing six weeks of intensive psychotropic drug treatments in a closed ward of the Semashko Hospital outside Gorky. The apparent aim of this brutal procedure is to force Sakharov to sign a statement renouncing his activities.

In light of this calculated Soviet policy of total isolation, I feel that the Sakharov case has become a major test of the political and moral will of the West not to rest until this tragic case is favorably resolved. Editorials in leading American newspapers and hundreds of private initiatives on behalf of the Sakharovs show the depth and breadth of continued public concern for their welfare. In your efforts to improve U.S.-Soviet relations, the Sakharov case should not be shunted aside.

Congress, in overwhelming votes in both Houses, has passed two resolutions (H.Con.Res. 304 dated May 13 and H.Con.Res. 332 dated June 20) which call on the Soviet Government to resolve the Sakharov case by granting Elena Bonner travel permission. In addition, these resolutions call on all Helsinki signatory states to protest "in the strongest possible terms and at the highest possible levels the Soviet Government's continued refusal to provide specific information as to the whereabouts, health and legal status of Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner, and its continued refusal to issue her an exit visa."

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
Page Two

July 25, 1984

In January 1984, Sakharov wrote to the Stockholm Conference for aid in convincing Soviet authorities that his wife should be permitted to go West for much-needed medical treatment. In my May 8 letter to you, I recommended that the Sakharov issue be raised publicly at the Stockholm CDE Conference. I was sorry that the Sakharov case was not formally raised by the U.S. delegation during the recent session of the Stockholm Conference which has just recessed until September. By failing to raise the Sakharov issue at the Stockholm meeting, we are falling prey to the long-term Soviet objective of decoupling the military security component from the rest of the Helsinki Final Act, thereby undermining the integrity of the entire CSCE process.

Mr. President, as Chairman of the CSCE Commission, I would respectfully submit that our delegation in Stockholm should be instructed to take a strong lead in urging our allies and others to join us in raising the Sakharov issue formally, not just on the periphery, at the next phase of the CDE meeting. Indeed, I recommend that every available bilateral opportunity, including the September meeting in Vienna on space weapons, be used to raise the Sakharov case publicly.

If our allies cannot be persuaded to join us in this endeavor, the U.S. should nevertheless be prepared to speak out publicly on the Sakharov case at the Stockholm meeting. Such an approach would not only reaffirm the integrity of the Helsinki process and maintain faith with Andrei Sakharov personally, it would add an important voice in the world-wide demand for justice in this tragic affair.

Sincerely yours,


DANTE B. FASCELL
Chairman

DBF/cc

Conference on Confidence & Security
Building Measures & Disarmament

in

Conference on Disarmament in
Europe

8422884

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

AUGUST 16, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF M. B. OGLESBY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 233513

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JULY 25, 1984

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: THE HONORABLE DANTE FASCELL
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON DC 20515

SUBJECT: WRITES AGAIN REGARDING THE TRAGIC SITUATION
OF NOBEL LAUREATE ANDREI SAKHAROV AND HIS
WIFE, ELENA BONNER. "RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS
THAT OUR DELEGATION IN STOCKHOLM SHOULD BE
INSTRUCTED TO TAKE A STRONG LEAD IN URGING
OUR ALLIES AND OTHERS TO JOIN US IN RAISING
THE SAKHAROV ISSUE FORMALLY...AT THE NEXT
PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN
EUROPE MEETING."

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

*Received in S/S-I
8/16 at 9:44 AM (CJ)*

ID# 233513

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

8422884

DATE RECEIVED: JULY 27, 1984

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE DANTE B. FASCELL

SUBJECT: WRITES AGAIN REGARDING THE SITUATION OF NOBEL
LAUREATE ANDREI SAKHAROV AND HIS WIFE, ELENA
BONNER

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
M. B. OGLESBY		ORG	84/07/27	M.D. A	84/08/20
DOS	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:	GT D	84/08/16		1/1
	REFERRAL NOTE:		1/1		1/1
	REFERRAL NOTE:		1/1		1/1
	REFERRAL NOTE:		1/1		1/1
	REFERRAL NOTE:		1/1		1/1

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230

MAIL

USER CODES: (A)

(B)

(C)

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION CODES:	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	* CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	* OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	* CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		* OUTGOING	*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *			*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE			*
*X-INTERIM REPLY			*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,OEOb) EXT. 2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

US-SOVIET RELATIONS
Leadership Situation

-- The transition from Andropov to Chernenko was smooth on the surface, and Chernenko rapidly was accorded the three key titles of Soviet public leadership: General Secretary of the Party, Chairman of the Defense Council and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium (chief of state). (U)

-- It would appear, however, that Chernenko in fact has not acquired the authority of his predecessors. He has yet to put a personal stamp on the Soviet leadership and most policy seems to be made by others who are preeminent in their functional fields. Gromyko, for example, seems to be making the foreign policy decisions, probably in close cooperation with Ustinov on national security matters. Our evidence for the above is circumstantial, but persuasive, and includes the following:

-- Having been passed over for the leadership when Brezhnev died, we must assume that there was opposition to Chernenko's succeeding Andropov. There are unconfirmed rumors that, in fact, a deal was struck in the leadership which limited Chernenko's authority.

-- We have noted a consistent pattern since February for many Soviet officials, often those with KGB connections, to denigrate Chernenko's ability in private. This is a virtually unprecedented phenomenon.

-- Chernenko's extensive correspondence with the President does not reflect a personal touch; his letters always seem to be written by committee in the Foreign Ministry.

-- Chernenko's health is poor. He is suffering from moderately advanced emphysema, which is progressive, and which not only limits his physical activity but makes him subject to heart disease and pulmonary infections. Some reports indicate that he can work only about six hours a day. Medical specialists in the intelligence community estimate his life expectancy at a maximum of five years, with a 20% chance each year of his dying. Perhaps more important, they expect his infirmities to be progressive so that his physical ability to be active is likely to erode steadily. (S)

-- At the moment, Gorbachev seems to be positioned as the "heir apparent," and seems to act as Chernenko's number two in the Party Secretariat. Whether he would in fact become Chernenko's successor upon the latter's death, incapacitation or removal, would depend on events in the Soviet leadership between now and then. (S)

-- Overall, our conclusion is that the Soviet Union does not at the moment have a strong, coordinated leadership which would facilitate fundamental policy changes opposed by some powerful interest group. Nevertheless, pressures on the leadership, both internal and external, are increasing. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/6/00

NLS F95-074/2 #76

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

8/31

JACK MATLOCK:

Would the President want
to send a personal note back
to the author?

WR

Sent 6899a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Dear Charlie:

The President asked me to call your attention to the enclosed article by Professor Nina Tumarkin of Harvard entitled "Does the Soviet Union Fear the United States?". It analyzes the contrast between the fear of ordinary people, affected by Soviet propaganda, and that of the rulers who manipulate the propaganda to serve their own ends.

I am aware that many of the themes which would undercut the Soviet propaganda image of a belligerent America are already major components of the Agency's and VOA's output. Still, it might be useful to give some further thought to whether there is more we can do along these lines, such as more material on our historical restraint in using force, the defensive nature of our military modernization, and our good will toward the Russian (and other Soviet) people(s).

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment:

"Does the Soviet Union Fear the United States?" by Nina Tumarkin.

The Honorable Charles Z. Wick
Director
United States Information Agency
400 C Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074/z #87

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 7/18/00

MEMORANDUM

6399
add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

August 31, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JS*

SUBJECT: Letter to Wick with Tumarkin Article

Attached is a letter to Charlie Wick forwarding the article by Nina Tumarkin, as you requested in your PROFs note.

Walt Raymond concurs. *WR*

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachment:

Tab I - Letter to Wick with Tumarkin article

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *R.V.H.* NARA, Date *7/28/99*

DOES THE SOVIET UNION FEAR THE UNITED STATES?

There is an old Russian peasant proverb, "Don't take your garbage out of the hut." Its meaning: when you wield power, do so in secret. This proverb remains the operating principle of the Politburo, which is shrouded in secrecy (in striking contrast to American presidents who rush to publish their memoirs as soon as they leave office). It is therefore impossible to gauge what that small coterie of septuagenarians thinks and feels about the United States. But some of the psychological components of Soviet high politics can be illuminated through a long study of Soviet history. And ordinary Russians are garrulous and animated people; they are quite ready to tell the interested visitor what they think. I am an historian, fluent in Russian, and have just returned from a two-week trip to the Ukraine. I would like to share with you my impression of the Soviet people's attitudes toward the United States, and my speculations about the views held by the men at the top.

July is a wonderful month to visit the Ukraine. The weather is balmy and the fields lush. Farmers' markets are well-stocked with produce grown on small, privately-owned plots and sold by old peasant women, babushki, whose wrinkled faces peer out of colorful flowered scarves. In the small river town of Cherkassy I came upon an outdoor market. Two babushki immediately recognized me as a foreigner and asked where I was from. "The United States," I said, smiling broadly over an enormous pile of carrots. "Why does your country want war?" one of them asked. "We only want peace, war is bad for everyone," added the other woman. I assured them that my country wants peace as well, but they shook their heads in discouraged disbelief.

I was last in the Soviet Union in 1978 for five months, and during that time was never once accused of coming from a jingoistic country. But that was

before the breakdown of detente. Since that time, and particularly in the past four years, Soviet newspapers and magazines -- and political cartoons especially -- have depicted the United States as a warmongering nation pursuing an adventuristic foreign policy and led by a fanatically anti-Soviet president who has made a "crusade" (they use that exact term repeatedly) of anti-Communism.

Without going to the U.S.S.R. there is no way of telling how this propaganda has been received by the people. Friends and colleagues returning from Moscow and Leningrad of late have in fact been reporting a generalized popular anxiety about the United States, and have been recounting stories much like the one I sketched above, of ordinary people, largely women, protesting the United States' purported militaristic stance. What struck me about the encounter I had in Cherkassy was that despite its small size and remote location, public fear of the United States was very much in evidence. It certainly does seem that the anti-American propaganda of the past several years has been enormously effective. My general impression is that the Soviet people -- particularly those without much sophistication -- do genuinely fear the United States, and that this fear has grown more intense since the deployment of missiles in Western Europe.

We may think, of course, that our past history best proves our peaceful intentions, since during the 1940's we never exploited our four-year monopoly of atomic weapons. Soviet propaganda, however, condemns our recent past behavior, arguing that we did use atomic weapons, twice, and that we have demonstrated our willingness to fight communism in Korea, Southeast Asia, and to some extent in Central America. Worse yet, the Soviet media labels our government fascistic, which is, of course, the most hateful term possible in a country that lost twenty million to the Nazis. "They kill you on the streets of Los Angeles. What's there to see in the United States? Fascism, that'- what!" said a tiny

old crone to me as we stood in a small alley in the beautiful old port city of Odessa. She drew deeply on her cigarette and leaning heavily on her cane blew out the smoke and said, "I am a veteran of the Great Patriotic War. I have seen enough of fascism."

As distressing as this kind of negative publicity is to the concerned American, it is of small import for two reasons. For one thing, ours is a confident culture; our national self-esteem is not at all affected by what the Russians say about us. Secondly, and more important, Soviet popular fear of the United States does not in any way inform that country's politics. The fear comes from a deliberate propaganda campaign designed to portray the United States as a menace to world peace and the U.S.S.R. as a peacemaker (public gardens that used to display red flowering plants in the shape of a hammer and sickle now exhibit planted flowers that spell out the Russian word for peace). What does affect us all, of course, is the Communist Party leaders' perception of the United States. Do Mr. Chernenko and his colleagues fear our government and if so, what is the content of that fear?

There is no evidence whatsoever that the Politburo believes its own propaganda about the United States. It is hard to imagine the Kremlin's shrewd old guard actually thinking that we would be crazy enough to launch a first strike against them or against anyone else. But they do appear huffy and bellicose, an attitude that has filtered down to the quite ordinary Communist Party spokesmen with whom I interacted on my recent trip. "Why did your president call us an evil empire?" asked an English-language professor from Odessa State University of the American tourists to whom we were both lecturing during their travels through the Ukraine. This indignant professor was expressing the same prickly defensiveness that I believe operates right now at the Politburo

level. When the Soviet leaders are anxious, they act in aggressive ways, both at home and abroad. And today they appear upset and angered by what they perceive to be our government's disdainful refusal to accord them respect, and at times even legitimacy. This is where it becomes necessary to understand the psychology of the Soviet leadership.

Soviet political culture is one that includes a shockingly low self-esteem. Indeed it has often been said that the Soviet Union suffers from a massive inferiority complex. Therefore the Kremlin, unlike Washington, has an enormous need for visible proofs of world respect. When they call us names it matters little to our people or government. But when we respond in kind, they are enraged, because our government's invective feeds into a national psychology that has a high level of self-contempt. The Soviet leaders can be likened to a street bully in an urban neighborhood, the mixed-up kid who wants to have friends but is sufficiently twisted to alienate everyone, and ends up adopting offensiveness as his style, while continuing to get angry at the frustrating consequences, and to hate himself.

The men who rule the Soviet Union know full well that theirs is the only major world power with no friends and no real allies. I followed my recent trip to the U.S.S.R. with a week each in Romania and Hungary. I chatted with a variety of people. Not one had anything positive to say about their mighty Eastern neighbor; about Russia I heard only complaints, often in the form of bitter jokes. I was also struck by the fact that in neither country did anyone I asked admit to knowing the Russian language, although I know that students in both countries are required to study it.

While the leadership of the U.S.S.R. sees itself as underappreciated, isolated, and maligned, it appears convinced that the United States is unable

or unwilling to understand how the Soviet Union sees the world. The fear of looking foolish, clumsy or brutish runs very deep with them. They were enraged by the political fallout from last year's downing of KAL 007. Their press dwelt obsessively on the "anti-Soviet hysteria" that was "whipped up" by the Reagan administration. I suspect that Messrs. Chernenko, Gromyko, et al are genuinely worried that some terrible humiliation might come their way at any moment because of what they perceive to be the American government's refusal to recognize their status as a superpower. To them, being a superpower means having the freedom to deepen their security, if not through expansion, then at the very least through the inevitable proliferation of anti-American regimes, such as that of the Sandinistas. The Soviets see us as impossibly rigid and unrealistic, incapable of accepting political changes that are not to our liking — particularly in Central America. Moreover, they fear our possible exploitation of their evident economic woes and the concomitant erosion of popular solidarity with the regime. For reasons both within and beyond their control, they are deeply insecure. At the very bottom of this insecurity lies a profoundly pessimistic view of human nature. Their belief that people are low and untrustworthy comes from a centuries-old Russian peasant culture and in part from the precepts of the Russian Orthodox church. It contrasts strikingly with the eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophy on which our government was founded — with its faith in progress and in the rationality and innate goodness of man.

With its vestiges of traditional culture, Soviet society today remains a far more conservative one than our own. Based on the old-fashioned virtues of patriotism, respect for authority, and loyalty to family and friends, Soviet social values are worlds away from the obsessive narcissistic quest for self-actualization that one encounters, for example, on the California coast. But time has a way of catching up, even with the U.S.S.R. Some of its

old values are eroding, enthusiasm for revolutionary legends and heroes has long since waned, and even the heroic memory of World War II is fading. In every Soviet town old men shuffle through the streets displaying rows of war medals on worn suit jackets of brown or grey -- but no one so much as glances at them. This is a most vulnerable transition period in the history of Soviet society and psychology. Communist ideology is drained of all dynamism; social and political apathy is evident to the sensitive observer; and the most coveted cultural artifacts come from the West, especially the United States.

If the mighty and powerful in the Soviet Union do fear something American, they fear not our arsenal, but our culture. The Party leadership, the wider political establishment, and even to a certain extent a possible majority of Soviet people over fifty-five, see America as corrupting their nation's spirit with a flashy and seductive culture based on materialism, self-indulgence, a cult of youth, and a shocking moral lassitude. Indeed it is ironic that the evil empire of "Godless Communists" should assail our culture on moral grounds. But it does.

As a long-time scholar of Soviet history I am convinced that the Soviet Union's greatest asset has been not its economy, nor its technology, nor even its natural resources -- but its people. I agree with the novelist, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who maintains that the U.S.S.R.'s six decades of suffering has produced a people with a greater strength and depth of spirit than the people of Western countries. The people of the Soviet Union know how to sacrifice and how to endure hardship. Without their courage the U.S.S.R. would be a very poor country indeed. The possibility that Western culture might erode that popular spirit must be truly frightening for Mr. Chernenko and his colleagues to contemplate. The Soviet people, by and large, admire American culture and fear our weapons. Their leaders, in contrast, respect our military might, but fear the power of our culture.

I believe that our government ought not to encourage any of these fears. When the Soviet people are fearful, they draw more closely around their leaders. When the leaders are frightened they become angry, and take that anger out on their own people and -- to the extent possible -- on the rest on the world.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Nina Tumarkin".

Nina Tumarkin
Russian Research Center
Harvard University

August 1984

National Security Council
The White House

System # _____

Package # _____

84 AUG 30 P 3: 35

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
J Matlock	2	_____	I/R

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Per our discussion, let's hold this for UNGA. State is working on that text, and you may want to pass this insert to Rodman or Burt, or both

**National Security Council
The White House**

System # _____

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	<u>2</u>	<u>yes</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>RCM HAS SEEN</u>	<u>I am</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Bud: Here is the Soviet insert

Jack Matlock sent to Ben Elliott.

May from Ben of Darnley

→ Bob Timmitt

From: Jack Matlock

VFW SPEECH

Draft Segment on US-Soviet Relations

No element of our foreign policy requires more careful thought and management than our relations with the Soviet Union. But no matter how complex and difficult this task may seem, our objectives are simple and clear.

First, we must preserve the peace. As I have said many times, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

Second, we must find a way to reduce the high levels of arms, particularly nuclear weapons.

And third, we would like to establish a better working relationship with the Soviet Union, if its leaders are willing to make that possible.

Keeping the peace has to come first because if we don't do that, nothing else will be possible. But we will keep the peace, because we know that the way to do it is to keep America strong. No war in my lifetime broke out because America was too strong; every one we fought happened -- at least in part -- because our strength or our will to resist was in doubt. America's ability and determination to defend its values and its friends must never again be questioned. So long as I am President, they will not be.

But we need strength for more than deterring war. We also need it to negotiate arms reduction. One clear lesson of the past is that the Soviet leaders do not curtail their armament

programs unless they get something in return. Our strength allows us to offer something in return.

Now I know some people feel that if we would just cancel or curtail this or that defense program, or start ignoring some of the ugly realities of today's world, we might induce the Soviet leaders to negotiate fair agreements. Well, I can understand our critics' desire for peace and a better relationship with the Soviet Union. These are just as much my goals as theirs. But, you know, I don't believe history provides a shred of evidence that their way of reaching these goals will work.

Just one example. Remember when President Carter suddenly cancelled development of the B-1? Shortly after his announcement, an American diplomat asked a high Soviet official what his government would do in return. And the Soviet answered with a smile, "We are not philanthropists." I think it's time our critics heeded his words and stopped pretending that we can expect the Soviet government to do something it has never done before, and that is to reduce arms without a concrete, verifiable agreement to do so.

If we are to improve relations with the Soviet Union, we have to do so in the real world, not on the basis of fantasies. This means that we must never forget that the Soviet leaders look at the world differently from the way we do, and draw conclusions in ways an American would not. Our different philosophies may require us to compete, but these differences do not predestine us to armed conflict. In fact, one goal that we share is keeping the peace between us.

Last January I described to the American people my aspirations for improved relations with the Soviet Union, and called on the Soviet leaders to meet us half way in trying to reduce regional conflicts, lower arms levels and create a better bilateral relationship. We had made proposals to the Soviet Union before then for improvements in these areas, and we have made literally dozens since then. We are absolutely serious in our desire to make progress.

Up to now, I regret to say that the Soviet leaders have not been willing to grasp the hand we offered. They walked away from the negotiating tables when we were seeking lower levels of nuclear arms. And they refused to accept "yes" for an answer when they themselves proposed talks on space weapons and we accepted. But we will not give up.

As I said in January, our policy toward the Soviet Union is a policy for the long haul. If I am reelected it will not change. The proposals we have made will still be on the table and we will continue our efforts to engage the Soviets in realistic negotiations to lower arms levels, reduce tensions and put our relations on a better footing. Whenever the Soviet leader is ready to meet, he'll find me ready and willing.

What we are asking of the Soviet Union is realistic and fair. We are not making our proposals in a take-it-or-leave-it spirit; we are prepared to negotiate. We know that if the Soviets are to reduce their arms, we must also reduce arms -- and we are ready to do so on an equitable and verifiable basis so that both sides can feel secure as arms levels come down.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Open File August
(Leave in envelope)

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 13-14 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.