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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

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Date: July 29, 1999

Box 90887-5

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Matlock to Admiral Poindexter, re analysis of US-Soviet relationship [6130], 2p	8/24/84	P1/F1 P5
2. Memo	same text as #1 (with notations), 2p	8/24/84	P1/F1 P5
3. Memo	Matlock to Poindexter, re VOA programming to USSR [6375], 1p → R 11/22/00 F95-074/2 #67	8/23/84	P1/F1
4. Note	from Situation Room, re VOA programming [6375], 1p P 11/22/00 F95-074/2 #68	8/16/84	P1/F1
5. Memo	Matlock to Poindexter, re Soviet coverage of Afghanistan [6376], 2p → R 11/22/00 F95-074/2 #69	8/24/84	P1/F1
6. Report	USSR International Affairs: South Asia, 5p R 4/27/00 NLSF95-074/2 #70	8/9/84	P1/F1 P3/F3
7. Report	USSR International Affairs: South Asia (D9-D12), 4p R 4/27/00 NLSF95-074/2 #71	8/3/84	P1/F1 P3/F3
8. Memo	same text as #5 (different notations, no sign) [6376], 2p	8/24/84	P1/F1
9. Report	copy of #6, 5p R 4/27/00 NLSF95-074/2 #73	8/9/84	P1/F1 P3/F3
10. Report	copy of #7, 4p R 4/27/00 NLSF95-074/2 #74	8/3/84	P1/F1 P3/F3
11. Memo	Matlock, Walt Raymond, and Steve Sestanovich to McFarlane, re request for interview with Grani Magazine [6412], 2p R 4/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #75	8/24/84	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

August 23, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Invitation to Speak at Conference in Vermont

I have been invited by the Institute of East-West Security Studies to speak at a meeting of the Institute's Board of Directors at Middlebury College on October 11. The subject of my talk, which would be off the record, would be "Prospects for Improving U.S.-Soviet and East-West Relations."

Since I believe that it is important to express our views on this subject to opinion makers, I recommend that I accept the invitation. The Institute will defray all expenses and there will be no cost to the NSC.

Recommendation:

That I accept the invitation to speak to the Institute of East-West Security Studies in Middlebury, Vermont, on October 11.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachment:

Tab I - Letter of August 16 from John Edwin Mroz and program of conference

cc: Patricia Blauth,
Administration Office

Institute for East-West Security Studies

TELEX: 499-0809
CABLE: EWSECUR

304 East 45th Street
New York, N.Y. 10017
(212) 557-2570

August 16, 1984

The Honorable and Mrs. Jack F. Matlock
2913 P Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

Dear Jack and Rebecca:

I am pleased to reiterate in writing my invitation extended on behalf of the Board of Directors of the Institute to you and Rebecca to participate in the Institute's forthcoming substantive meetings on "The Dynamics of East-West Relations" to be held at Middlebury College in Vermont October 11 to 14. You would join some sixty to seventy officials, media personalities, specialists and businessmen from East and West.

As we discussed in your office, we would like you to give an informal talk of some 30-40 minutes on Thursday evening on "Prospects for Improving U.S.-Soviet and East-West Relations". We have indicated your role on the attached provisional agenda. We would expect a lively, informal discussion to ensue. You and Rebecca would have a quiet day to relax on Friday morning and afternoon when our Board meets. Olin Robison will help take care of meeting your wishes for the day. We thought you might enjoy some quiet hours together. The College, for example, could arrange for you to have a car on Friday to enjoy the foliage.

You will be housed with all the participants at the rustic mountainside Bread Loaf Inn facilities of Middlebury College. You will find the accommodations to be comfortable and perfectly suited for enjoyment of Vermont's autumn countryside. There are jet flights from Washington to Burlington Airport where you will be met and transported to the College. There will be no expense for you or Rebecca. The Institute's travel agent, Direct Travel, will send your tickets once your office has indicated your preferred flights. You both will be the Institute's guests at Middlebury.

We believe that you will find the meetings highly informative and stimulating. We are honored to have you as a speaker and participant and would be delighted if Rebecca would join you. Would you complete the enclosed registration form as soon as possible and return it to our conference coordinator, Philippe Brialy.

With best regards,



John Edwin Mroz
President

JEM/jhm
Enclosures

cc: Dr. Olin Robison

Institute for East-West Security Studies

TELEX: 499-0809
CABLE: EWSECUR

304 East 45th Street
New York, N.Y. 10017
(212) 557-2570

Fall Meeting of the Board of Directors

and Academic Advisory Committee

Middlebury College, Vermont

October 11-14, 1984

PROVISIONAL SCHEDULE

Thursday, October 11

Afternoon

Board Members arrive at Burlington Airport and are transported to the Bread Loaf Campus at Middlebury College (Those who drive should plan to arrive at Middlebury before 6:00 p.m.)

6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m. Cocktails

7:00 p.m. - 8:30 p.m. Dinner

8:30 p.m. Informal Discussion with the Honorable Jack Matlock, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs

Friday, October 12

7:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m. Breakfast

9:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. First Session of the Board Meeting convenes under the Chairmanship of Ira Wallach, Chairman of the Executive Committee.

12:30 p.m. - 2:00 p.m. Cocktails and Luncheon

2:00 p.m. - 5:45 p.m. Second Session of the Board Meeting

5:45 p.m. - 6:30 p.m. Free Time (Arrival of Academic Advisory Committee Members and Resident Fellows)

6:30 p.m. - 7:30 p.m. Cocktails

7:30 p.m. - 9:30 p.m. Dinner

9:30 p.m. Entertainment

Saturday, October 13

7:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m. Breakfast for Board and Academic Advisory Committee Members

9:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. Panel Discussions: "The Dynamics of East-West Relations"

Panel 1: "U.S.-Soviet Relations"

Panel 2: "European Security"

12:30 p.m. - 2:00 p.m. Luncheon (Guest speaker: Mr. Sander Vanocur, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent for ABC News)

Topic: "The Impact of the U.S. Elections on U.S.-Soviet Relations"

2:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m. Free Time: Optional tour of the Shelburne Museum

5:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m. Academic Advisory Committee Meeting under the Chairmanship of Karl Kaiser, Chairman of the Academic Advisory Committee

7:30 p.m. - 8:00 p.m. Cocktails

8:00 p.m. - 10:15 p.m. Dinner (Guest speaker to be announced)

Sunday, October 14

8:00 a.m. - 9:15 a.m. Breakfast

9:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. Panel Discussions: "The Dynamics of East-West Relations"

Panel 3: "Economic Relations"

Panel 4: "Regional Instability and East-West Relations"

12:15 p.m. - 1:30 p.m. Concluding Luncheon

Note: A bus to Montreal, Canada for the Confidence-Building Measures Conference, which the Institute is co-sponsoring with York University, will be leaving at 5:00 p.m.

Those who wish to remain at Middlebury until Monday morning are welcome to do so at their own expense. Transportation will be provided to the Burlington Airport on Sunday and Monday.

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: 8-24-84

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: JACK F. MATLOCK
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): Speak at Board Meeting of
Institute for East-West Security Studies at Middlebury
College, Oct. 11, 1984.
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):
DC - Burlington - DC

DEPARTURE DATE Oct. 11RETURN DATE Oct. 13TIME noonTIME noon

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOV AIR _____ COMMERCIAL AIR ☒ POV _____ RAIL _____ OTHER _____
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION _____ PER DIEM _____ OTHER _____ TOTAL TRIP COST _____
6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC _____ OTHER ☒
7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: Institute for
East-West Security Studies
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES ☒ NO _____
(as participant in own right)
9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler,
Describe Source and Arrangements): Institute (since her participation
also desired)
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ n/a
11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would
Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____
12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Jack F. Matlock
13. APPROVALS: _____

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1-2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM:

for R. Hinckley
RICHARD S. BEALY

SUBJECT:

Analysis of the U.S.-Soviet Relationship

At Tab I is a paper prepared by Dr. Frederick A. Rothe titled "U.S.-Soviet Relations from 1966 to 1983: Reviewing the Past and Evaluating the Present." The paper was requested by and has been sent to David McManis, NIO for Warning. McManis requested the paper because it uses data and quantitative methods to analyze this important relationship. Further explication of the information and techniques used in the analysis can be found at the Tab in the paper titled "Data and Methods." The final two paragraphs of the "Conclusion" section are not in the copy sent to McManis. The significant points of the paper are:

- o A major change in the U.S.-Soviet relationship occurred in 1980; the relationship changed from being predominantly cooperative to being predominantly conflictual.
- o Of the years used in this analysis, 1983 was the most unusual and is the acute indication of the new era in the superpower relationship.
- o Historically, the superpowers have worked together in the management of regional or client-state conflict.
- o Management of salient bi-lateral issues tends to be dominated by acrimony, unlike the regional conflict management.
- o Projections indicate that the relationship in 1984 will maintain the trend established in 1980.

If you have any questions or comments please direct them to Dr. Rothe (395-6919).

Attachment

TAB I - U.S.-Soviet Relations from 1966 to 1983

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS FROM 1966 TO 1983: REVIEWING THE PAST AND EVALUATING THE PRESENT

INTRODUCTION

Recent U.S.-Soviet relations have been characterized as the "worst in recent memory" and as being responsible for "the most peace we've had in ages." Opinions abound on this controversial and vital relationship (e.g., Brian Crozier, "Learning to Love Chernenko" and John McLaughlin, "Fortress Russia," in the 29 June 1984 National Review, "Fusillade of nyets," in the 16 June 1984 Economist, the Debate between Kenneth Adelman and Gerard C. Smith in the 17 June 1984 Washington Post, and others). This brief paper seeks to evaluate through quantitative analysis of the last 18 years of U.S.-Soviet relations the present state of the superpower relationship. Figures and tables appear after the "Conclusion" and a discussion of data and methods is at the end of the paper.

A major finding is that 1983 was an extremely unusual year; it was the peak of a relatively new trend. In 1980, the U.S.-Soviet relationship became dominated by conflictual, as opposed to cooperative, activity and the level of conflictual interaction rose to an all time high in 1983. This reversed nearly ten (10) years in fairly cooperative superpower relations.

ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP

Figure 1, displays the general context of the U.S.-Soviet relationship from 1966 to 1983. It is important to note that the values indicate the complete (i.e. reciprocal) nature of the relationship and not just U.S. actions toward the USSR (or just USSR actions to the U.S.). The more specific details of these actions will be discussed shortly.

The best indicator of the overall state of the U.S.-Soviet relationship is the total volume of events between the two nations. Research over the last eighteen years has demonstrated that the total volume of events is a reliable indicator of the amount of confrontation in an international political relationship. Peaks in the data are typically associated with periods of heightened tension between countries. That is, the higher the total number of all events between countries, the more antagonistic is the relationship.

The line in Figure 1 depicts the total volume of events between the U.S. and Soviet Union from 1966 to 1983. The total volume of activity exhibits a number of peaks, all of which are associated with periods of heightened tension between the U.S. and Soviet Union. The most important peaks are in 1970, 1973, 1977, 1980-81 and 1983. These peaks are associated with years in which significant episodes in the superpower relationship took place.

The peak in 1977-78 probably reflects the competitive manner in which the Ogaden War was being treated by the two superpowers (covert support to the belligerents) and again, possibly the Soviet brigade in Cuba incident in 1978. During times of heightened tension, cooperative as well as conflictual activity increase. The peak beginning in 1980 is a direct result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In Table 3, the most unique year is 1973 (with a score of 2.63, very unusual), followed by 1977 (with a score of 1.50).

An interesting finding is that 1983's volume of cooperative events ranks third (behind 1973 and 1977), in addition to being the top year for conflictual events. Research has shown that when hostilities increase, both the conflict and cooperation event totals increase because of conflict management efforts. Conflict management involves meeting, offering proposals, and making agreements as well as making demands, rejecting proposals and criticizing the other nation. This full range of actions contains both cooperative and conflictual events. Therefore, during times of crisis and confrontation, both the cooperative and conflictual, and obviously the total, number of events increase.

From 1982 to 1983, all three categories of behavior---total, cooperative, and conflictual---increased dramatically. The reasons for this can be attributed largely to the Soviet shootdown of Korean Air Lines flight 007, the heightened rhetoric leading up to Moscow's failure to forestall deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe, and the consequent breakdown of the INF and START negotiations. These events brought U.S.-Soviet relations to unprecedented levels of total and conflict activity.

Finally, Figure 2 clearly shows that the volume of conflict activity relative to cooperative activity reversed in 1979-80. As indicated in the Introduction, a major finding was that until 1979 there was typically more cooperative than conflictual activity in the superpower relationship. The period from 1979 to the present has, on the other hand, consistently exhibited more conflict than cooperation, a reversal of the pattern evident for most of the period, 1966-1978.

ASSESSMENT OF EACH NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY

To understand more fully the relationship and to get a better idea of the characteristics of each nation's foreign policy toward the other, the data have been arranged for each nation acting toward the other. The same variables (cooperation, conflict, total) are used in this analysis.

Figure 3, depicting U.S. activity to the Soviet Union, indicates that in 1980 the conflictual behavior (dashed red line) of the U.S. toward the Soviet Union for the first time exceeded cooperative behavior (solid blue line). In 1983, conflict

behavior again exceeded cooperative behavior. Z-scores for U.S. conflict activity toward the Soviet Union showed unusually high levels of activity in only one year -- 1983. The z-score of 3.27 is extremely unusual, suggesting that U.S. policy actions and statements increased dramatically, particularly when compared with previous years of U.S. policy statements and actions. With a conflict activity z-score of 1.36, 1980 was unusual as well, but not to the extent of 1983.

Figure 4, describing Soviet events to the U.S. from 1966 to 1968, shows a preponderance of conflict activity (dashed red line) relative to cooperative activity (solid blue line). In 1969, however, perhaps reflecting Soviet concerns that the U.S. would try to capitalize on the Sino-Soviet border conflict, the level of Soviet cooperative activity toward the U.S. exceeded Soviet conflict activity. The period 1970-71 saw Soviet conflictual behavior (in red) again overshadow cooperative behavior, perhaps reflecting Soviet interest in "Black September" and the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition. The period of detente is perhaps best represented by the high level of cooperation and low level of conflict in 1973, and is anomalous insofar as it produced the highest volume of cooperative events in the series. The z-score associated with 1973 Soviet cooperative events, at 3.19, is very unusual. Since approximately 1976, (the year of the Angola conflict) Soviet conflict behavior has consistently exceeded its cooperative behavior. Further, the gap between conflictual and cooperative behavior has grown dramatically since approximately 1979, with the trend accelerating in 1982-83.

Figure 5 compares U.S. conflict activity (solid blue line) with that of the Soviet Union (dashed red line) during the period 1966-1983. As can be seen from the graph, Soviet conflict behavior typically exceeds that of the U.S. However, U.S. conflictual actions actually exceeded those of the Soviet Union in two years---in 1976 and 1980. The peaks for Soviet conflict behavior are 1970, 1977, 1981 and 1983. The peaks for the U.S. are in 1970, 1973, 1978, 1980 and 1983, with the highest peak in 1983. The figure clearly shows that conflict activity for both the U.S. and Soviet Union actually reached their highest levels in 1983. Further, both the 1983 U.S. conflict activity level (at 197) and the Soviet conflict activity level (at 238) appear to be nearly three times their normal levels.

Examination of U.S. and Soviet conflict activity in Figure 5 makes apparent the high degree of reciprocity in conflict events. Using z-scores to evaluate the unusualness of the conflictual component of foreign policy activity, the Soviet Union, with an unusually high 1983 z-score of 3.29, is comparable to the U.S. z-score of 3.27. This confirms that in 1983 both the U.S. and Soviet Union reached unprecedented levels of conflict activity toward one another.

Figure 6, U.S. (solid blue line) and Soviet (dashed red line) cooperative behavior, also shows a fairly strong positive relationship between the superpowers' cooperative activity. An intriguing finding is that U.S. cooperative behavior consistently exceeds Soviet cooperative behavior; of all U.S. events toward the USSR, 64.45% were cooperative, while 45.28% of the total of Soviet actions were cooperative. Peaks of this behavior are in 1970, 1973, 1977-78, and 1983, with the highest peak in 1977. There are two interesting aspects of this plot. The first is the very close alignment of the cooperative activity of the two superpowers in the peak year of 1973, the year of the October War---the U.S. and Soviet Union evidently were quite committed to avoiding the ultimate confrontation. The second aspect of interest is the tremendous gap between U.S. and Soviet cooperative activity in 1976 and 1983.

1984: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

Table 4 contains the preliminary monthly figures for 1984 events in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Based upon these preliminary data, and when compared with other years, 1984 is likely to be the ranked second, after 1983, in terms of total volume. That is, the total volume of events, while not likely to be as high as 1983, is likely to be at a higher level than any other year, including 1973.

Our evaluation of these preliminary data yield another finding. The current average level of conflictual events for 1984 is second only to the levels in 1983. This means that if present trends continue, 1984 is likely to be a very conflictual year, perhaps similar in character to 1983. In fact, if present trends continue, 1984 will contain more conflictual activity than 1980 (the year following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), 1981, or 1982.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

A number of additional findings from our research bear on the U.S.-Soviet relationship. These will be treated briefly.

- o The Soviets had twice as many weeks as the U.S. which exhibited a higher frequency of conflictual than cooperative behavior toward the other superpower.
- o There is a higher probability that the USSR will be conflictual when the U.S. is cooperative (.33) than the U.S. being conflictual when the USSR is cooperative (.08);
- o There is a higher probability that the U.S. will be cooperative when the USSR is conflictual (.40) than the USSR being cooperative when the U.S. is conflictual (.12);

CONCLUSION

This paper has outlined the major patterns in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The study has demonstrated that the two nations work well with one another when managing regional conflicts. But the two nations do not work well in direct "face-to-face" competition or confrontation. According to these data, therefore, 1983 was the "worst in recent memory," due possibly to the fact that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were confronting directly one another over significant bilateral issues and not over conflicts involving client states.

More significant, however, is that a significant change in the pattern of superpower relations changed between 1979 and 1980. Almost 10 years of predominantly cooperative behavior between the two nations was replaced in 1980 with a new, more antagonistic relationship. In this regard, 1983 was an acute indication of this new trend. As outlined in Table 4, 1984 is expected to maintain this trend. Whether this major realignment of the U.S.-Soviet relations is due to leadership changes in both nations or other factors is impossible to determine from this broad overview. Whatever the case, it now appears (based on these data) that after 10 years, the U.S.-Soviet relationship has undergone dramatic change. Although 1983 was an unusual year, it was chiefly a continuation of a pattern that began three years earlier.

It is still too early to determine the strength of this trend. Because 1984 is an election year a decline in the event indicators is expected; unless of course an incident of the magnitude of the KAL shootdown or an Afghanistan invasion takes place. However, current projections for 1984 indicate that the event total may nearly equal the total for 1973 (year of the October War). This may simply demonstrate that the new era of U.S.-Soviet relations is marked by a high level of activity and that in a few years this new level will become the norm. But experience has shown that high levels of international activity are harbingers of danger and trouble.

Critical in this new era of U.S.-Soviet relations is that a miscalculation by either nation could lead to a dangerous confrontation. Although the superpowers have a history of managing regional conflicts, the new level of tension between the nations may affect their conflict management abilities, particularly in those areas of the world (Persian Gulf, Middle East, India-Pakistan and Central America) that have a high potential for superpower involvement. The U.S. must try to deflect Soviet efforts at provocation; efforts which may be designed to force a U.S. miscalculation. The Soviet Union, with a greater proportion of conflictual activity in its dealings with the U.S., has increased its political warfare efforts and may attempt to exploit potential crisis areas in an effort to undermine the U.S. position in those areas.

The chances of confrontation due to miscalculation are probably small. More important is that because of the condition of the overall relationship, significant U.S.-Soviet issues (primarily arms control) will not be seriously discussed, much less resolved. Nothing in the available data suggests that an amelioration in the relationship will soon occur. Recognizing this, the U.S. may wish to adopt a new position that seeks to arrest the deterioration of the relationship. By attempting to change the overall tenor of the relationship, discussions on significant issues may be fruitful. Getting the Soviet Union to respond to this initiative (to change the tenor of the relationship) is the most difficult task, perhaps requiring years.

Figure 1

Total U.S. and Soviet Activity, 1966–1983




Table 1

Z-scores for U.S.-Soviet Total Activity

Year	Events	Z-Score
1966	213	-0.79
1967	188	-0.99
1968	209	-0.83
1969	245	-0.55
1970	331	0.11
1971	254	-0.48
1972	303	-0.10
1973	511	1.49
1974	295	-0.17
1975	170	-1.12
1976	214	-0.79
1977	449	1.02
1978	386	0.53
1979	255	-0.47
1980	319	0.02
1981	364	0.36
1982	298	-0.14
1983	693	2.89

Figure 2

Total U.S. and Soviet Cooperative and Conflict Activity, 1966–1983




Table 2

Z-scores for U.S.-Soviet Conflict Activity

Year	Events	Z-score
1966	119	-0.30
1967	94	-0.59
1968	114	-0.36
1969	82	-0.73
1970	152	0.08
1971	146	0.01
1972	107	-0.44
1973	121	-0.28
1974	60	-0.98
1975	52	-1.08
1976	104	-0.47
1977	153	0.09
1978	151	0.07
1979	103	-0.49
1980	227	0.95
1981	222	0.89
1982	168	0.27
1983	435	3.36

Table 3

Z-scores for U.S.-Soviet Cooperative Activity

Year	Events	Z-score
1966	94	-0.93
1967	94	-0.93
1968	95	-0.92
1969	163	-0.10
1970	179	0.09
1971	108	-0.76
1972	196	0.30
1973	390	2.63
1974	235	0.76
1975	118	-0.64
1976	110	-0.74
1977	296	1.50
1978	235	0.76
1979	152	-0.24
1980	92	-0.96
1981	142	-0.36
1982	130	-0.50
1983	258	1.04

Figure 3

U.S. Activity to the Soviet Union, 1966–1983




Figure 4

Soviet Activity to the United States, 1966–1983




Figure 5

U.S. and Soviet Conflict Activity, 1966–1983




Figure 6

U.S. and Soviet Cooperative Activity, 1966–1983




Table 4

Total U.S.-Soviet Activity, 1984

Month	Coop	Conf	Tot
January	22	27	49
February	18	10	28
March	7	27	34
April	21	35	56
May	19	27	43
--	--	--	
Total	87	126	213
Average	17.4	25.2	42.6
Projected Annual Total	209	302	511

Projected Annual Total = Average x 12

DATA AND METHODS

The methods and information used in this analysis are embodied in the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS); a set of data collection and analysis procedures that have been ongoing since 1 January 1966. Briefly, the information is extracted from the daily New York Times according to a rigorous and well-tested content analytic methodology. The information has been and is collected daily and captures the official, high-level actions (both words and deeds) originating in one national government and directed toward another. The WEIS process is designed to analyze relations between nations and not to analyze the intricate maneuvers taking place within nations.

These official, high-level governmental actions are known as "events." The WEIS data collection is organized around 22 discrete event types arranged in a simple categorical scheme. Each category is designed to capture the "nuts and bolts" of official international political activity; meetings, accusations, warnings, attacks, proposals, comments, demands, agreements, grants and accolades are the diplomatic actions that are made into event data. These events are collected for every nation in the world.

For the purpose of this analysis, the 22 event types are collapsed into two (2) major categories of international political behavior. One category is labelled "cooperative" because it includes the more-or-less cooperative actions such as comment, agree, propose, request, grant. The other category is titled "conflictual" because it includes the more-or-less conflictual actions of demand, accuse, warn, reject, seize and use of force. "Cooperative" and "conflictual" are primarily titles of convenience but enjoy wide acceptance in the quantitative foreign affairs research community. All events from the U.S. to the USSR and the reverse (USSR to U.S.) were retrieved on an annual basis from the full WEIS data collection and placed into the cooperative/conflictual scheme.

A common criticism of the WEIS process is the use of the New York Times as a data source. For the various demands of the data making, data managing and data analyzing effort, the New York Times is the best possible source: the Times of London (probably the best data source) cannot be maintained in real-time and is often on strike; Le Monde does not have the global coverage but does have more on Africa; Pravda and Izvestia do not report "events" as defined here; the Los Angeles Times is improving but emphasizes Asia and Latin America and tends not to cover well the rest of the world; and other regional papers (the Straits Times, the Arab News and the Nairobi Evening Standard for example) do not have the necessary global coverage.

Another criticism of the New York Times is that it has a distinct liberal bias making unfair or not objective its reporting of a conservative government or national leader. The coding scheme used in the data making excludes all editorial comment or opinion; only the reported actions (both words and deeds) between nations are included in the data, not analysis or opinion on those actions. If it appears that the data in this paper are biased, it is due probably to the increased attention the New York Times has given to the U.S.-Soviet relationship and not to a distinct bias for one nation.

Z-Scores

A z-score is a standardized measure of the "unusualness" of a raw value with respect to the distribution of all the raw values. As mentioned in the main text, a z-score above 2.0 or below -2.0 indicates an extreme departure from the normal or routine. In statistical terms, a z-score of plus or minus 2.0 is two standard deviations above or below the mean or equal to 95th or 5th percentile of the distribution. In this analysis, a z-score above 2.0 (rather than minus 2.0) is the main concern because this represents an unusual number of events above the average.

Since a z-score is a standardized measure, it can be used to compare "apples and oranges;" the z-scores for one variable (cooperation) have the same meaning as the z-scores for another variable (conflict). Although the raw values of the variable may not suggest the possibility of comparison, the z-scores of the raw values permit comparative analysis.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 24 AUG 84 19

TO POINDEXTER

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 23 AUG 84

8/29/89

KEYWORDS: VOA

USSR

MATLOCK

SUBJECT: VOA PROGRAMMING TO USSR

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 23, 1984

NOTED

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jm*
SUBJECT: VOA Programming to USSR

In response to your attached note, I am unable to judge directly the criticism that VOA devotes too much attention to U.S. developments of little interest to Soviet citizens, since I have not been able to listen to the Russian Service regularly for over two years.

In the past (up through 1981), there has been substance to this charge. News items, in particular, seemed to be selected by journalists who were oriented much more on what interests Americans than what interests foreigners. I have often pointed this out to VOA, and my impression is that a concerted effort has been made over the last couple of years to correct it. How successful this has been, I cannot judge. I suspect VOA still needs some nudging to permit the individual services more latitude in selecting those news items which are of particular interest to listeners in its area, rather than being bound by the selections made by a central news service.

Attachment:

Tab I - Situation Room Note with question

cc: Walt Raymond

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NLS F95-072/2 #47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR-

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 11/22/00

~~SECRET~~

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SITUATION ROOM NOTE

August 16, 1984

SECRET

~~REDACTED~~

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~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~ACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

RF

Turning to a discussion of VOA programming, [REDACTED] there is a general feeling that it should be changed to make it more relevant [REDACTED]. The most commonly held criticism was that VOA attempts to be too much like "ABC news," broadcasting an inordinate amount of U.S. domestic information of little interest to the target audience. What is needed is more political commentary on Western perceptions of world events [REDACTED] (S)

Jack Matlock,
What do you make
of this?

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CLASSIFIED BY CIA
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS #95-074/2 #68
By CAS, NARA, Date 11/27/00

~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8406376

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 24 AUG 84 19

TO POINDEXTER

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 24 AUG 84

matlock

KEYWORDS: USSR

AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: SOVIET NEWS COVERAGE OF AFGHANISTAN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

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	<i>C 8/25</i>	<i>POINDEXTER NOTED</i>		<i>JM</i>

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8/14

Jack Holtz,

I find these stories
in Soviet papers
on Afghanistan quite
interesting. Is this
kind of human interest
reporting typical?

J

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NOTED

CONFIDENTIAL

August 24, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Soviet Coverage of Afghanistan

My impression is that the stories you noted in Soviet newspapers exhibit a tendency by the Soviet media to provide more feature material on the war in Afghanistan than has been normal. Such articles have occurred before, but they have been comparatively rare in the past, which contrasts with the spate which has appeared recently.

I would speculate that the increased public attention to the war (and defense of it as a selfless effort to help the Afghanis) is the result of increased Soviet casualties produced by the summer offensives and the attention foreign radios have given to the battles this summer -- and to the reports of Soviet defectors. The Soviet authorities would like to conduct the war in secret, as much as possible. But when the attention of the Soviet public is attracted by rumors of casualties (which spread on the gossip circuit and are often magnified) and by foreign broadcasts, the authorities are forced to talk about the war more to combat the negative image gossip and information from abroad creates.

I am reminded of a comment a Soviet journalist made to me a few years back when the Soviet press reported fairly promptly on the Soviet pilot flying a MIG to Japan (the Soviet stories did not admit that he defected, but said he lost his way, ran short of fuel, and the Japanese held him against his will). I remarked to the Soviet journalist that I was struck by how promptly they put the story out: ten years earlier they would have simply ignored it. He replied, "Yes, that's true. But we can't do that any more. Everybody here knows immediately when something like this happens -- from VOA and BBC -- so we've learned we have to get our version out fast."

In sum, I believe the recent stories are clearly designed to try to drum up support for an increasingly unpopular war. This

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BY GIS, NARA, DATE 11/22/00

suggests to me that we should redouble efforts to arrange for better news coverage of events there. VOA gives considerable time to these stories on its Russian service, and this definitely puts Soviet propagandists behind the eight-ball.

Attachment:

Tab I - FBIS translations of Soviet media stories on Afghanistan.

CC: Don Fortier
Walt Raymond

agree

III. 9 Aug 84

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
SOUTH ASIA

6314
D1

DRA DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER MANGAL IN MOSCOW

Meets With Voronin

PM081117 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Aug 84 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the "Official Reports" rubric: "Strengthening Cooperation"]

[Text] On 6 August L.A. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan, met S. Mangal, deputy chairman of the Afghan Council of Ministers and DRA State Planning Committee chairman who is in Moscow as a guest of the Soviet Government.

During thier converstation, which was held in a friendly atmosphere, questions of developing the DRA's national economy and further strengthening USSR-DRA economic cooperation were discussed.

Discusses Ties With Nuriyev

LD081932 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1530 GMT 8 Aug 84

[Text] Sarwar Mangal, vice chairman of the DRA Council of Ministers, and head of the State Planning Committee and the Afghanistan-USSR Economic and Technical Cooperation Commission, this morning met in the Kremlin Palace with Nuriyev, vice chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and head of the state permanent joint commission on Afghanistan-USSR economic and technical cooperation.

At this meeting, which took place in a very friendly, comradely, and cordial atmosphere, views were exchanged on subjects of mutual interest, issues relevant to the economic and technical cooperation particularly regarding the country's future 5-year plan.

According to another report 2 days ago, Sarwar Mangal met (?L.A. Voronin), first deputy head of the state technical committee between the two countries, and exchanged views with him.

During his visit to the USSR, Sarwar Mangal carried out a series of meetings with officials of enterprises relevant to the USSR economic and technical cooperation with foreign countries.

ROLE OF HELICOPTER CREWS IN PANJSHER OPERATION

PM081428 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Aug 84 Morning Edition p 5

[Second part of article by own correspondent G. Ustinov under the rubric "Afghanistan Reportage From the Panjsher": "The Blue Coveralls" -- for first part see pages D 9-12 of the 3 August Soviet Union DAILY REPORT]

[Text] Panjsher-Kabul -- Helicopters in Afghanistan fly in pairs. If you notice a softly clattering spot high in the sky, be sure to look for a second one. If your yard is momentarily overshadowed by the huge, angrily screaming shadow of the low-flying machine, the fleeting eclipse of the sun will immediately be repeated. The helicopter cannot manage on its own here. It is the most terrible enemy and the dushmans' most desired trophy. It is hunted at the first available opportunity, and if the rotor-winged bird has to make a forced -- at times, its last -- landing, the second crew always hastens to the rescue.

The people flying these machines wear blue coveralls regardless of their rank or duty. There is nothing fancy about the cut of the coveralls. They are roomy, even baggy, so as not to restrict movement in flight and to allow the overheated body to breathe. I have flown with our helicopter pilots in Afghanistan on countless occasions, but I have never seen these coveralls brand new or spotless. For some reason they are all faded, well worn, and the color of bleached denim.

BY

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NARA

DATE

7/8/80

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Be it the helicopter captain, or the pilot-navigator, or the third crew member -- the engineer -- they are all called the same here -- the blue coveralls.

The captain, Major Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Gertsev, is 30 years old, and 10 of them have been spent "in the air." Gertsev comes from Aktyubinsk and like his younger comrades, he is constantly flying.

The pilots of the rotor-winged machines are jacks-of-all-trades. They escort truck convoys along the long-distance highways, transport food and military supplies, or evacuate the wounded. But they carry mostly air freight..." The Mi-8, although not a combat machine, is fully equipped with everything needed for defense.

"Have you been in Afghanistan long?", I asked Gertsev.

"Ten-and-a-half months," he replied, and fell to musing. His eyes were on their garrison's landing strip, where the inevitable afternoon "Afghan" [reference to local wind] was furiously blowing in an attempt to bring down a helicopter that found itself at the center of the turbulence, bending and blowing about the sparse trees on the horizon, and hurling handfuls of sand and dust against the staff hut windows.

"You ask me if I have logged many flights. I don't know...At home I was keeping count, and I continued the habit here, but gave up later after I lost count. The demand on us here is vast. It was especially so in the spring, when the Panjsher was liberated. Whole Afghan Army subdivisions had to be transported by air. And how big is a helicopter? Nor do the soldiers fly empty-handed. Weight, bulk... At times the older Afghans carry not only blankets but even mattresses. Just try to live without warm clothing at an altitude of 4 or 5 km, among glaciers and eternal snow! Every other one of them flies with his own samovar. Or at least a teapot. Honestly! The real Afghan will drink tea at every available opportunity.

"We, of course, do not grumble, and treat all this with understanding. Furthermore, we try to be as attentive as possible to the Afghan comrades. Here is a typical example. You carry provisions for them and for our lads. Different supplies, the same transportation. And so the senior man comes up and says" 'Give the Afghan guys the extra bag of stewing meat and two boxes of condensed milk, their rations are more modest.'

"What is it? Am I telling you things that are not too heroic? But this is what our routine is made up of. In a word -- carriers..."

"We have smelled enough gunpowder. On one occasion a weapons caravan was making its way from Pakistan to the Panjsher. It was spotted by Afghan scouts and they informed their command. We were asked to airlift Afghan paratroops there but were almost too late: the weapons had reached their destination and were already being stored in the hideout. During the landing operation the dushmans wanted to down the helicopters and opened fire with everything they had. We went into a deep turn, flew out of firing range, and landed so quickly that the enemy lost his head. The Afghan soldiers' attack was brief. The paratroops destroyed the gang and blew up the weapons dump. The mission was very successful. No serious losses, apart from several scratches among the Afghan comrades and two bullet holes in my belly..."

"What do you mean?" I did not immediately understand. "My machine, of course," Gertsev laughed. "It is easier to patch up."

Last fall, during a brilliant operation near Kabul, the Afghan Army captured a mountain from the dushmans -- there is no other word to describe it -- of all types of weapons: 42 heavy machineguns, 13 antiaircraft guns, large stocks of Italian mines and other ammunition, heaps of firearms.

All this was carefully lifted by the helicopter pilots to one place and picturesquely displayed according to weapon type, caliber, and the "made in..." stamp. Afterward, the government invited the public from Kabul and its environs, representatives of the Afghan and foreign press, and diplomats to visit this impressive exhibition, which Prime Minister Keshtmand and Defense Minister Qader opened. Let them see who is using what to fight against revolutionary Afghanistan: the captured weapons were made in the West and in eastern countries ruled by reactionary regimes...

The helicopter pilots have improved their skills in the difficult conditions of the mountainous terrain. Last March the command recommended Gertsev for the Order of the Red Star. He was decorated with this high award for organizing the airlifting of freight to an altitude of 3,000 meters. "We rise through the air and it is well known that the higher you climb the more rarefied the air. Maneuverability deteriorates, and we had 16 machines, all of them heavily laden. Intricate work was needed. Nevertheless, we managed..."

Gertsev thought that in Afghanistan he had experienced everything a helicopter pilot must experience, but that was before the Afghan Army's Panjsher operation. It transpired that everything in the past had been only a preparation for real military life [rastoyashchaya voinskaya zhizn] and arduous military labor [tyazhkiy ratnyy trud]. During the operation they awakened with the muezzin's first guttural calls just as dawn was breaking (and this is at 0400 in springtime) and at once flew off to the Panjsher, flying the entire day. They spent 10-12 hours in the air, landing up to 15 times in the course of the most complex unloading and loading operations.

"Just imagine, we receive a radio message: Such-and-such an Afghan company at such-and-such coordinates has a wounded serviceman. Only we can pick him up because the company is fighting up there, in the mountains. If we were to take the wounded man to the command post, down in the valley, it would mean abandoning the height to the enemy and wasting the 3 or 4 days spent fighting to reach the height. This means that it is up to us. No landing strip there, just an opening, a spot in the mountain, somewhere at an altitude of 4,000 meters. So, there you are, hanging in the rarefied air about a meter above the ground, and at any moment you can be knocked down or fall. The wounded man is brought close to the cabin, and our lads are there to pick him up -- the pilot-navigator and engineer. You need absolutely accurate calculations, it is not hard to imagine what would happen if you make an error in such a situation..."

The airborne carriers shifted everything imaginable in that time. Inward: Afghan soldiers; sheepdogs trained in mine-sniffing "excellent passengers, very quiet, and everyone loves them; one such dog can save the lives of dozens if not hundreds of people"; the latest newspapers "anything about the Panjsher, by any chance?"; firewood for the Afghan soldiers ("many of them cannot bear the mountain cold -- southerners!"); and water in special canisters ("thanks to us the infantry holding the mountain peaks was able not only to drink tea but even to shave")...

Outward: wounded ("thanks, pal, you came just in time!"); captured dushmans ("they are well behaved inside the helicopters, hoping that it will militate in their favor in court"); captured food ("the ammunition dumps are often destroyed, but how can you waste a bang on a peasant's wheat?"); soldiers' letters ("no matter how many days the operation lasts, you must send word home")...

And endless local work there, the Panjsher. You are a "taxi" for both passengers and freight... Once the subunit has cleared the mines from the mountain track, the soldiers must be lifted to a new work site. A convoy has been ambushed -- you must hurry to lend a hand.

They also had to airlift their own people, helicopter pilots. The West has stepped up deliveries of antiaircraft weapons to the dushmans. Helicopters are shot at from anti-aircraft guns, machineguns, automatic weapons. The counterrevolutionary organizations promise the bandits 1 million afghanis for each helicopter they shoot down, and 200,000 afghanis for each "blue coverall."

On one occasion two of our helicopters were shot down at high altitude -- 3,750 meters -- in the Panjsher. The pilots managed to land the machines, but were no longer able to take off; both helicopters were damaged during the landing. They radioed their coordinates. The area was thick with dushmans; the infantry had not managed to get through. And the request: lift us off quickly for we have been spotted and they are running in our direction; in 20 minutes' time it will be too late. Captain Aleksandr Kozub and his crew were the first to reach them. They took their fellow helicopter pilots on board the MI-8 -- and up in the air. The dushmans who had run all the way there could only shake their fists in impotent fury after them.

On another occasion they had to give assistance under completely unusual circumstances, in what was possibly a unique case. During an Afghan convey's progress, a truck struck a landmine (it was later identified as Pakistani). One of our escort helicopters was flying above at that very moment. The explosion's shockwave "shook" it slightly, and it lost stability. Only the pilot's skill saved the crew's lives, one of the wheels having caught on a rock. But this heavy landing caused serious damage to the tail section.

"Yes, it was very hot weather," Captain Leonid Belitskiy, deputy commander for political affairs, added to what his commander had said. "We were, of course, terribly tired. We have an excellent bath-house in the town. We spent the night at home. You may wonder why we did not take a hot bath after a day like this. Believe me, we just did not have the strength. A light shower, and sleep." //

Such enormous labor... How has it been rewarded? Has anyone been recommended for an award, I asked Gertsev and Belitskiy.

"The operation only recently ended," the commander answered. "The results have not been analyzed yet, but we have been repeatedly rewarded. Do you know with what joy we have been greeted by Afghan peasants and our own sappers at the mountain summits and in the deep canyons? How many smiles, greetings, handshakes! And the inevitable question; Are you hungry? Can we give you something to eat? But you must at least have a cup of tea!... The soldiers' grub is the same -- the infantry's pot contains goulash, just like our own, and the concentrated milk has the same label everywhere. But do you know what warmth floods your heart..."

Today the Panjsher Valley is healing the wounds inflicted upon it by the undeclared war imposed on revolutionary Afghanistan by world reaction. The peasants driven out by the dushmans are returning to their native villages. Flying over the region in a helicopter, you can clearly see the yellow squares of the wheat fields and the timid flocks of sheep. There are not too many of them yet, but the Afghan Government is doing everything to restore meaningful life in the region. Not a single day passes without the arrival there of civilian freight -- bread, sugar, tea, and other products, clothing and footwear, seeds for the spring sowing, mineral fertilizers, medicines, and school textbooks.

Organs of people's power are being established in the Panjsher's population centers. Their constructive efforts are expected to consolidate the gains secured in the fighting.

It is up to them to establish peasant cooperatives, build new schools, hospitals, roads, and houses, and lead the people into the future. Not a day passes without one of the Republic's leaders flying here so that the population may gain faith in the future and better understand the meaning of the PDPA's concern and the goals of the revolution. Frank conversations about the friends and enemies of the Republic and the country's future take place at heated meetings or over a cup of tea with a peasant family.

They cannot manage in these peaceful activities without the help of the Soviet servicemen executing their international duty in the DRA. Work on clearing mines from fields and mountain slopes is continuing. The Soviet sappers are helping the Afghans repair bridges and roads and restore houses and public buildings. At the first call, our military doctors give medical assistance to the valley's inhabitants. The helicopter pilots also have quite a few concerns -- a substantial part of the peaceful freight is airlifted.

The Panjsher is turning from the lair of the five lions into the valley of life.

MORE REACTION TO USSR-INDIA TREATY ANNIVERSARY

Arkhipov on Ties, Cooperation

PM081435 [Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian on 7 August in its Morning Edition publishes on page 5 a 1,500-word interview by an unnamed correspondent with I.V. Arkhipov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and cochairman of the Soviet-Indian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation, under the heading "Our Well-Tried Friend." The interview is pegged to the 13th anniversary of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation between the USSR and India, which is being marked by a Soviet-Indian friendship month.

Arkhipov answers a question about the significance of the treaty by describing various Soviet-Indian economic cooperation projects and the development of bilateral trade. He then replies to a question about India's influence on the world situation by praising its foreign policy, pointing out that "the positions of the USSR and India on many very important questions of world politics are close or coincide." The interviewee concludes by sharing some impressions from a visit to India, noting that Prime Minister I. Gandhi "shows great concern for the development of Soviet-Indian friendship."

Pasko on Treaty Significance

LD082116 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 8 Aug 84

[Excerpts] Tomorrow is the 13th anniversary of the Soviet-Indian treaty on peace, friendship and cooperation. At the microphone is our commentator Vladimir Pasko:

[Begin recording] The signing of the treaty on peace, friendship and cooperation in 1971 has become an event of great international significance. The Soviet and Indian peoples have many common tasks: the construction of a new life, the creation of flourishing economies, and raising the peoples' material well-being.

Economic, scientific, and technological ties developing on the basis of the treaty have facilitated the creation of India's national economy and strengthened her independence. Enterprises built with the Soviet Union's assistance have played a major role since the Republic is included today among the ten most developed states.

Religious and nationalist feelings were worked up both in the gangs and among the population. Foreign advisers were constantly coming there, and weapons arrived from Pakistan.

"People still do not dare believe that the dushmans' time is past," Ur-Rakhmun said. "But they need time to straighten their backs, still half-bent according to the old custom, and look freely around them."

The Afghan Army is continuing to strengthen its positions in Panjsher. There is information that some of the bandits who have escaped retribution are taking refuge in the surrounding mountains and reckon on returning to the valley if the government troops are withdrawn. But these are empty hopes. On the contrary, major new operations to liquidate the dushmans lie ahead.

Mount Sheykh-sang rises up on the outskirts of Kabul. Its slopes have been planted with young pine trees, and a cemetery lies on the summit. Here those who have given their lives to defend the revolution are buried.

According to the local custom, a pole with a flag is set up on a hero's grave. Red, black, and green flags flap noisily in the wind. Previously a grave was marked just by a stone slab, but recently relatives have more and more frequently been placing a photograph on the stone of the serviceman who fell in battle. How young they are, these courageous sons of the Afghan people!

All of Kabul is clearly visible from here, from the mountain summit. Below is the Maiwand, as straight as an arrow. The river glimmers. Mosque minarets and the silhouettes of new apartment blocks are blurred by the gray haze. The people who have found eternal rest here struggled for the peace and prosperity of this city and their entire homeland.

A new generation of patriots has risen to defend the revolution. It will complete the cause of its dead fathers and elder brothers.

G. USTINOV ON CAMPAIGN TO CLEAR PANJSHER VALLEY

PM030955 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jul 84 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent G. Ustinov dispatch under the rubric "Afghanistan: Reportages from Panjsher": "In the Den of the Five Lions"]

[Text] Panjsher, Kabul -- It was over. They were at the prescribed altitude of 4,800 meters. The ascent to the top of Parandeh was over. Another peak scaled -- and there are many of them here in Panjsher, in the mountains of the Five Lions. Every kilometer is like climbing a staircase to the 330th floor with no steps. And you climb it heavily-laden, carrying a submachinegun, a cartridge pouch, grenades, a pack, and ammunition... some 20-30 kg of soldier's kit. Sharp rocks, treacherous glaciers, and even more treacherous footpaths trodden by caravans of merchants and smugglers in decades and centuries gone by. They are easier to climb than going through virgin mountain. But watch out: there could be a mine under very rock, every muddy track, or harmless moss-covered hummock.

Panjsher is crammed with mines. The retreating dushmans have left them everywhere. On the main highway running through the 100 km-long Panjsher Valley, on mountain sides, in deserted caves and gorges, and at abandoned weapons and food dumps. The dushmans have turned peasants' grain fields into minefields. Mines made in Pakistan, the United States, China, Italy, Britain, and West Germany, antitank mines, antipersonnel mines disguised as part of the road surface or hidden in rusty cans, and plastic mines which are difficult to detect with conventional minesweepers. This is why the subunit was climbing Parandeh so slowly. The sappers who had gone on ahead were preventing any haste.

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BY LOT
NARA DATE 7/18/80

"Halt!" the long-awaited command was heard. The commander designated some sentries and the rest, with relief, removed the heavy loads from their tired shoulders, took off their sweat-soaked tunics and undershirts, and carefully removed their leaden boots. This state of complete peace and happy relaxation lasted for 15 minutes, and then it was back to work again. Dry grass had to be found for a camp fire to prepare supper. This would not be easy here, at such an altitude. However, there were still some surplus signal flares in stock. One set burns long enough to heat up a can of stew and brew some tea. You have to find water for this tea. You have to know how to look after clothing and footwear -- they wear out in the mountains in next to no time. The helicopters will come tomorrow and you can send a request for everything you need: you cannot cross the rocks barefoot...

Faster, faster! The camp fires have to be out before dusk. By no means have all the dushmans had time to get away. Some are hiding, singly or in small groups, in mountain caves and shelters. A face lit by the glow of a fire is an easy target.

Night time. A deep, dead silence. The air from the eternal glaciers gets colder. Sergeant Petr Zinchenko, wrapped in a cloak, was fast asleep. He was dreaming of his native Kiev, the banks of the Dnieper with their golden sand, and the warm caressing water. Lieutenant Sadyk Khadzhimatov, aged 23, from Ashkhabad was sleeping peacefully next to him. Captain Petr Voropay, the subunit's deputy commander, political affairs, who previously served in the Crimea, settled down nearby... The next day it would be back to work again, combing in depth the countless caves, paths, and crevasses of Parandeh. At the regiment's command center in the valley they would have to be able to report with a clear conscience that they had done everything possible to render the dushmans' mines harmless in their particular area.

On the map the Panjsher Valley looks like a saber slash cutting through the DRA's main highway from the northern border to Kabul. There are no railroads in Afghanistan and virtually all freight, be it state or private, is transported by truck. Normal economic life in the Republic is greatly determined by uninterrupted movement along the highway linking the Afghan ports on the Amu Darya with the country's capital... The valley itself is of considerable value. The land along the banks of the Panjsher River is fertile. The vegetables, fruit, and greenery grown by local peasants are traditionally supplied to the Kabul bazaars.

Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, the uncrowned princeling and "general" of the counterrevolution, had been committing crimes in the Valley of the Five Lions for a number of years. Taking advantage of the remoteness of these locations high in the mountains, he turned Panjsher into a veritable bandit's lair, terrorized the populations of several northern provinces, and mercilessly plundered the main highway to Kabul. Using the generous military, financial, and political support from the United States, Pakistan, and other enemies of the Afghan revolution, he formed a large bandit army in the valley that was well armed, properly trained, and recognized no rules of humanity or moral prohibitions. Mas'ud himself dreamed of being dictator in Kabul and of a "strong" and "new" Afghanistan under his control.

This spring the DRA Government decided to give a fitting reply to Mas'ud's pretension. In mid-April, Afghan military units began a major operation to rid the strategically important Panjsher region of dushman gangs so as to ensure fuller success there. This large-scale operation lasted over 2 months. It was not enough just to defeat the bandits and oust them from the valley; tremendous work had to be done to clear Panjsher's soil of its lethal contents so that the peasants could return to the fields and the herdsman to the rich meadows.

For that reason the Afghans appealed to their Soviet brothers for help from mine clearing specialists who are fulfilling their international duty in our limited contingent of troops in the DRA. These specialists included servicemen from the subunit that you met at the beginning of this report.

They went along with the Afghan motorized rifle battalion commanded by Captain Gulam Rabbani. The work of this battalion's soldiers was repetitive and monotonous. Those fighting in the valley below had penetrated 60-70 km by 25 April into the heart of the Panjsher in their heavy armored trucks. Under strong pressure from them, some of the bandits fled their lair, some were routed, and many were captured with their weapons. But who knows how many of them escaped into the mountains and hid in caves at different levels. Until they were smoked out the Panjsher could not be considered free. Day after day, one rock at a time, the Afghan infantry have methodically and thoroughly scoured the mountains towering darkly on both sides of the valley. And meter by meter, our boys are persistently and patiently returning the long-suffering Panjsher to its peaceful purpose by removing the various explosives buried there.

Peaks. Passes. Mountain villages. Gorges. These men might have been called mountaineers had they simply been combating nature. But there was still an enemy there, cruel, experienced, long familiar with these mountains, who knew the paths and crevasses here by touch. For 2 months the Afghan battalion was forced to fight dozens of large and small battles. Replying to ambushes and to surprise attacks from mountain tops and cunningly concealed caves, they captured tons of weapons -- no one thought in terms of individual items -- and several radio stations and captured more than 100 dushmans, including some of the ringleaders, who prefer not to be taken alive.

Mines... They were their main enemy -- despite the sappers' experience and caution. They would find themselves facing a minefield upon completing an ascent. Two sappers with probes would go ahead of the battalion. The remainder would follow in their tracks. A dozen mines were disarmed, then another dozen. Men became tired, their attention slackened. But you have to be phenomenally attentive. One sapper "sounded out" a rock in front of him. All seemed in order. He stepped on it, his foot slipped, and there next to the rock was a mine.

Everyone knew that he could be next. But they were calm and courageous. From the first few days in the Panjsher they observed the rule that nothing could happen which had not already happened. Do not panic. Stop, concentrate, always rely on the sappers, help the medical officer and helicopter crews who fly in to help the wounded. Only then can more surprises and more explosions be avoided... That is how they conducted the operation with minimal losses.

Their most successful day came in late May. Our boys had just returned to the mountains following a 2-day furlough in the valley: a bath, a change of clothing, hot food, even a movie house. In the mountains around Kaltar village, the Afghan battalion and some Soviet soldiers headed by Capt Petr Voropay, the subunit's deputy commander for political affairs, and Captain Vladimir Yesipenko, chief of staff, discovered six people in a long cave with an underground river. They gave up without a struggle, swearing that the dushmans had forcibly taken them there. They had neither weapons nor bandit documents on them. Two of them -- a father and his little boy who cried all the time -- were immediately released, but the other four were detained in case they were dushmans.

A chain reaction thus began. A few minutes later a courier arrived and reported that the Afghan battalion's fifth company had stumbled across another cave full of people.

This time they were clearly dushmans, eight well-armed men. They also gave up without a struggle although one admitted: "Had you gone past without spotting us, we would have shot you in the back..."

When questioned, they said that their group consisted of 13 people including those captured in the first cave but leaving the boy aside. We learned from them that there was a large and well-equipped hiding place nearby where doctor Abdul Vahed, nicknamed "One-Leg" -- one of Ahmad Sheykh Mas'ud's advisers -- was hiding.

We went there. Since no one knew how many bandits there were or how they would react, our men had to prepare in the following way. Capt Voropay and some men lowered themselves like true mountaineers down a virtually sheer slope to a ledge overhanging the hideout. The others checked that there was no other way out and established that the bandits had no escape from the cave.

The Afghan battalion thus resolved one task: They ensured that the dushmans were in a secure trap. But it was important to take them alive. A prisoner as valuable as "One-Leg" might know a great deal about Ahmad Sheykh's plans and his links with emigres and his "Western friends."

A dushman captured earlier was sent down into the cave to parley. He shouted for a long time to the concealed bandits that they should give themselves up and that he was coming unarmed to discuss surrender terms. There was no response. The Afghan soldiers decided to check to see whether there was anyone there at all. Emerging from the cave, one "truce negotiator" said that he had been deep inside and that there really were people there. They had refused to talk with him or to come out into the "open air." What is more, a machinegun began to rattle from the cave...

What was to be done? They decided to enter the cave. It would have been no trouble to wipe out the bandits by direct fire, but they had to be taken alive and unharmed. Captain Voropay set off together with the Afghans. The cave was large. They examined one level, then another, but found no one. Suddenly the barrel of a machinegun appeared from behind a large rock. The soldiers took cover by the cave wall.

The dushmans again began to direct heavy, random fire. Obviously they had lost their nerve. The Afghan soldiers did not open fire. When the firing stopped, the dushmans were again asked to surrender: Opposition was completely useless. As the result of negotiations, six dushmans emerged from cover. "One-Leg" and his adjutant refused to surrender. His men said: "He is afraid that he will be immediately shot." Negotiations continued for another 2 hours before Abdul Vahed and his aide ended their stubbornness.

On seeing that Ahmad Sheykh's formidable adviser was in Afghan soldiers' hands, the dushmans became bolder and pointed out two cunningly concealed antiaircraft gun emplacements from which they had fired at helicopters. "One-Leg" did not react at all to their talkativeness and looked quite impassively, first at his former subordinates and then at the young guys who had captured him. Meanwhile, Afghan Hadovtsky (security servicemen) were dragging out of the cave documents, literature, and sacks of weapons discovered there.

For the assistance given to the Afghan soldiers in clearing mines during the capture of the Abdul Vahed group and its "archive" and weapons store, the Soviet commander recommended Capt Voropay, Lieutenant Khadzhimatov, and several other servicemen for medals. A subunit party meeting was held that evening, where the young lieutenant from Ashkhabad was adopted as a party member. And after the meeting they were guests of Gulam Rabbani and celebrated their mutual success with green tea prepared by the Afghans and drunk with Soviet evaporated milk. The ascent to the summit of Parandeh awaited them the following day.

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DRA DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER MANGAL IN MOSCOW

Meets With Voronin

PM081117 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Aug 84 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the "Official Reports" rubric: "Strengthening Cooperation"]

[Text] On 6 August L.A. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan, met S. Mangal, deputy chairman of the Afghan Council of Ministers and DRA State Planning Committee chairman who is in Moscow as a guest of the Soviet Government.

During thier converstation, which was held in a friendly atmosphere, questions of developing the DRA's national economy and further strengthening USSR-DRA economic cooperation were discussed.

Discusses Ties With Nuriyev

LD081932 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1530 GMT 8 Aug 84

[Text] Sarwar Mangal, vice chairman of the DRA Council of Ministers, and head of the State Planning Committee and the Afghanistan-USSR Economic and Technical Cooperation Commission, this morning met in the Kremlin Palace with Nuriyev, vice chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and head of the state permanent joint commission on Afghanistan-USSR economic and technical cooperation.

At this meeting, which took place in a very friendly, comradely, and cordial atmosphere, views were exchanged on subjects of mutual interest, issues relevant to the economic and technical cooperation particularly regarding the country's future 5-year plan.

According to another report 2 days ago, Sarwar Mangal met (?L.A. Voronin), first deputy head of the state technical committee between the two countries, and exchanged views with him.

During his visit to the USSR, Sarwar Mangal carried out a series of meetings with officials of enterprises relevant to the USSR economic and technical cooperation with foreign countries.

ROLE OF HELICOPTER CREWS IN PANJSHER OPERATION

PM081428 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Aug 84 Morning Edition p 5

[Second part of article by own correspondent G. Ustinov under the rubric "Afghanistan Reportage From the Panjsher": "The Blue Coveralls" -- for first part see pages D 9-12 of the 3 August Soviet Union DAILY REPORT]

[Text] Panjsher-Kabul -- Helicopters in Afghanistan fly in pairs. If you notice a softly clattering spot high in the sky, be sure to look for a second one. If your yard is momentarily overshadowed by the huge, angrily screaming shadow of the low-flying machine, the fleeting eclipse of the sun will immediately be repeated. The helicopter cannot manage on its own here. It is the most terrible enemy and the dushmans' most desired trophy. It is hunted at the first available opportunity, and if the rotor-winged bird has to make a forced -- at times, its last -- landing, the second crew always hastens to the rescue.

The people flying these machines wear blue coveralls regardless of their rank or duty. There is nothing fancy about the cut of the coveralls. They are roomy, even baggy, so as not to restrict movement in flight and to allow the overheated body to breathe. I have flown with our helicopter pilots in Afghanistan on countless occasions, but I have never seen these coveralls brand new or spotless. For some reason they are all faded, well worn, and the color of bleached denim.

BY 605 NARA, DATE 7/8/00

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Be it the helicopter captain, or the pilot-navigator, or the third crew member -- the engineer -- they are all called the same here -- the blue coveralls.

The captain, Major Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Gertsev, is 30 years old, and 10 of them have been spent "in the air." Gertsev comes from Aktyubinsk and like his younger comrades, he is constantly flying.

The pilots of the rotor-winged machines are jacks-of-all-trades. They escort truck convoys along the long-distance highways, transport food and military supplies, or evacuate the wounded. But they carry mostly air freight..." The Mi-8, although not a combat machine, is fully equipped with everything needed for defense.

"Have you been in Afghanistan long?", I asked Gertsev.

"Ten-and-a-half months," he replied, and fell to musing. His eyes were on their garrison's landing strip, where the inevitable afternoon "Afghan" [reference to local wind] was furiously blowing in an attempt to bring down a helicopter that found itself at the center of the turbulence, bending and blowing about the sparse trees on the horizon, and hurling handfuls of sand and dust against the staff hut windows.

"You ask me if I have logged many flights. I don't know...At home I was keeping count, and I continued the habit here, but gave up later after I lost count. The demand on us here is vast. It was especially so in the spring, when the Panjsher was liberated. Whole Afghan Army subdivisions had to be transported by air. And how big is a helicopter? Nor do the soldiers fly empty-handed. Weight, bulk... At times the older Afghans carry not only blankets but even mattresses. Just try to live without warm clothing at an altitude of 4 or 5 km, among glaciers and eternal snow! Every other one of them flies with his own samovar. Or at least a teapot. Honestly! The real Afghan will drink tea at every available opportunity.

"We, of course, do not grumble, and treat all this with understanding. Furthermore, we try to be as attentive as possible to the Afghan comrades. Here is a typical example. You carry provisions for them and for our lads. Different supplies, the same transportation. And so the senior man comes up and says" 'Give the Afghan guys the extra bag of stewing meat and two boxes of condensed milk, their rations are more modest.'

"What is it? Am I telling you things that are not too heroic? But this is what our routine is made up of. In a word -- carriers..."

"We have smelled enough gunpowder. On one occasion a weapons caravan was making its way from Pakistan to the Panjsher. It was spotted by Afghan scouts and they informed their command. We were asked to airlift Afghan paratroops there but were almost too late: the weapons had reached their destination and were already being stored in the hideout. During the landing operation the dushmans wanted to down the helicopters and opened fire with everything they had. We went into a deep turn, flew out of firing range, and landed so quickly that the enemy lost his head. The Afghan soldiers' attack was brief. The paratroops destroyed the gang and blew up the weapons dump. The mission was very successful. No serious losses, apart from several scratches among the Afghan comrades and two bullet holes in my belly..."

"What do you mean?" I did not immediately understand. "My machine, of course," Gertsev laughed. "It is easier to patch up."

Last fall, during a brilliant operation near Kabul, the Afghan Army captured a mountain from the dushmans -- there is no other word to describe it -- of all types of weapons: 42 heavy machineguns, 13 antiaircraft guns, large stocks of Italian mines and other ammunition, heaps of firearms.

All this was carefully lifted by the helicopter pilots to one place and picturesquely displayed according to weapon type, caliber, and the "made in..." stamp. Afterward, the government invited the public from Kabul and its environs, representatives of the Afghan and foreign press, and diplomats to visit this impressive exhibition, which Prime Minister Keshtmand and Defense Minister Qader opened. Let them see who is using what to fight against revolutionary Afghanistan: the captured weapons were made in the West and in eastern countries ruled by reactionary regimes...

The helicopter pilots have improved their skills in the difficult conditions of the mountainous terrain. Last March the command recommended Gertsev for the Order of the Red Star. He was decorated with this high award for organizing the airlifting of freight to an altitude of 3,000 meters. "We rise through the air and it is well known that the higher you climb the more rarefied the air. Maneuverability deteriorates, and we had 16 machines, all of them heavily laden. Intricate work was needed. Never mind, we managed..."

Gertsev thought that in Afghanistan he had experienced everything a helicopter pilot may experience, but that was before the Afghan Army's Panjsher operation. It transpired that everything in the past had been only a preparation for real military life [nastoyashchaya voinskaya zhizn] and arduous military labor [tyazhkiy ratnyy trud]. During the operation they awakened with the muezzin's first guttural calls just as dawn was breaking (and this is at 0400 in springtime) and at once flew off to the Panjsher, flying the entire day. They spent 10-12 hours in the air, landing up to 15 times in the course of the most complex unloading and loading operations.

"Just imagine, we receive a radio message: Such-and-such an Afghan company at such-and-such coordinates has a wounded serviceman. Only we can pick him up because the company is fighting up there, in the mountains. If we were to take the wounded man to the command post, down in the valley, it would mean abandoning the height to the enemy and wasting the 3 or 4 days spent fighting to reach the height. This means that it is up to us. No landing strip there, just an opening, a spot in the mountain, somewhere at an altitude of 4,000 meters. So, there you are, hanging in the rarefied air about a meter above the ground, and at any moment you can be knocked down or fall. The wounded man is brought close to the cabin, and our lads are there to pick him up -- the pilot-navigator and engineer. You need absolutely accurate calculations, it is not hard to imagine what would happen if you make an error in such a situation..."

The airborne carriers shifted everything imaginable in that time. Inward: Afghan soldiers; sheepdogs trained in mine-sniffing "excellent passengers, very quiet, and everyone loves them; one such dog can save the lives of dozens if not hundreds of people"; the latest newspapers "anything about the Panjsher, by any chance?"; firewood for the Afghan soldiers ("many of them cannot bear the mountain cold -- southerners!"); and water in special canisters ("thanks to us the infantry holding the mountain peaks was able not only to drink tea but even to shave")...

Outward: wounded ("thanks, pal, you came just in time!"); captured dushmans ("they are well behaved inside the helicopters, hoping that it will militate in their favor in court"); captured food ("the ammunition dumps are often destroyed, but how can you waste a bang on a peasant's wheat?"); soldiers' letters ("no matter how many days the operation lasts, you must send word home")...

And endless local work there, the Panjsher. You are a "taxi" for both passengers and freight... Once the subunit has cleared the mines from the mountain track, the soldiers must be lifted to a new work site. A convoy has been ambushed -- you must hurry to lend a hand.

They also had to airlift their own people, helicopter pilots. The West has stepped up deliveries of antiaircraft weapons to the dushmans. Helicopters are shot at from anti-aircraft guns, machineguns, automatic weapons. The counterrevolutionary organizations promise the bandits 1 million afghanis for each helicopter they shoot down, and 200,000 afghanis for each "blue coverall."

On one occasion two of our helicopters were shot down at high altitude -- 3,750 meters -- in the Panjsher. The pilots managed to land the machines, but were no longer able to take off; both helicopters were damaged during the landing. They radioed their coordinates. The area was thick with dushmans; the infantry had not managed to get through. And the request: lift us off quickly for we have been spotted and they are running in our direction; in 20 minutes' time it will be too late. Captain Aleksandr Kozub and his crew were the first to reach them. They took their fellow helicopter pilots on board the MI-8 -- and up in the air. The dushmans who had run all the way there could only shake their fists in impotent fury after them.

On another occasion they had to give assistance under completely unusual circumstances, in what was possibly a unique case. During an Afghan convey's progress, a truck struck a landmine (it was later identified as Pakistani). One of our escort helicopters was flying above at that very moment. The explosion's shockwave "shook" it slightly, and it lost stability. Only the pilot's skill saved the crew's lives, one of the wheels having caught on a rock. But this heavy landing caused serious damage to the tail section.

"Yes, it was very hot weather," Captain Leonid Belitskiy, deputy commander for political affairs, added to what his commander had said. "We were, of course, terribly tired. We have an excellent bath-house in the town. We spent the night at home. You may wonder why we did not take a hot bath after a day like this. Believe me, we just did not have the strength. A light shower, and sleep." //

Such enormous labor... How has it been rewarded? Has anyone been recommended for an award, I asked Gertsev and Belitskiy.

"The operation only recently ended," the commander answered. "The results have not been analyzed yet, but we have been repeatedly rewarded. Do you know with what joy we have been greeted by Afghan peasants and our own sappers at the mountain summits and in the deep canyons? How many smiles, greetings, handshakes! And the inevitable question; Are you hungry? Can we give you something to eat? But you must at least have a cup of tea!... The soldiers' grub is the same -- the infantry's pot contains goulash, just like our own, and the concentrated milk has the same label everywhere. But do you know what warmth floods your heart..."

Today the Panjsher Valley is healing the wounds inflicted upon it by the undeclared war imposed on revolutionary Afghanistan by world reaction. The peasants driven out by the dushmans are returning to their native villages. Flying over the region in a helicopter, you can clearly see the yellow squares of the wheat fields and the timid flocks of sheep. There are not too many of them yet, but the Afghan Government is doing everything to restore meaningful life in the region. Not a single day passes without the arrival there of civilian freight -- bread, sugar, tea, and other products, clothing and footwear, seeds for the spring sowing, mineral fertilizers, medicines, and school textbooks.

Organs of people's power are being established in the Panjsher's population centers. Their constructive efforts are expected to consolidate the gains secured in the fighting.

It is up to them to establish peasant cooperatives, build new schools, hospitals, roads, and houses, and lead the people into the future. Not a day passes without one of the Republic's leaders flying here so that the population may gain faith in the future and better understand the meaning of the PDPA's concern and the goals of the revolution. Frank conversations about the friends and enemies of the Republic and the country's future take place at heated meetings or over a cup of tea with a peasant family.

They cannot manage in these peaceful activities without the help of the Soviet servicemen executing their international duty in the DRA. Work on clearing mines from fields and mountain slopes is continuing. The Soviet sappers are helping the Afghans repair bridges and roads and restore houses and public buildings. At the first call, our military doctors give medical assistance to the valley's inhabitants. The helicopter pilots also have quite a few concerns -- a substantial part of the peaceful freight is airlifted.

The Panjsher is turning from the lair of the five lions into the valley of life.

MORE REACTION TO USSR-INDIA TREATY ANNIVERSARY

Arkhipov on Ties, Cooperation

PM081435 [Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian on 7 August in its Morning Edition publishes on page 5 a 1,500-word interview by an unnamed correspondent with I.V. Arkhipov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and cochairman of the Soviet-Indian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation, under the heading "Our Well-Tried Friend." The interview is pegged to the 13th anniversary of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation between the USSR and India, which is being marked by a Soviet-Indian friendship month.

Arkhipov answers a question about the significance of the treaty by describing various Soviet-Indian economic cooperation projects and the development of bilateral trade. He then replies to a question about India's influence on the world situation by praising its foreign policy, pointing out that "the positions of the USSR and India on many very important questions of world politics are close or coincide." The interviewee concludes by sharing some impressions from a visit to India, noting that Prime Minister I. Gandhi "shows great concern for the development of Soviet-Indian friendship."

Pasko on Treaty Significance

LD082116 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 8 Aug 84

[Excerpts] Tomorrow is the 13th anniversary of the Soviet-Indian treaty on peace, friendship and cooperation. At the microphone is our commentator Vladimir Pasko:

[Begin recording] The signing of the treaty on peace, friendship and cooperation in 1971 has become an event of great international significance. The Soviet and Indian peoples have many common tasks: the construction of a new life, the creation of flourishing economies, and raising the peoples' material well-being.

Economic, scientific, and technological ties developing on the basis of the treaty have facilitated the creation of India's national economy and strengthened her independence. Enterprises built with the Soviet Union's assistance have played a major role since the Republic is included today among the ten most developed states.

Religious and nationalist feelings were worked up both in the gangs and among the population. Foreign advisers were constantly coming there, and weapons arrived from Pakistan.

"People still do not dare believe that the dushmans' time is past," Ur-Rakhmun said. "But they need time to straighten their backs, still half-bent according to the old custom, and look freely around them."

The Afghan Army is continuing to strengthen its positions in Panjsher. There is information that some of the bandits who have escaped retribution are taking refuge in the surrounding mountains and reckon on returning to the valley if the government troops are withdrawn. But these are empty hopes. On the contrary, major new operations to liquidate the dushmans lie ahead.

Mount Sheykh-sang rises up on the outskirts of Kabul. Its slopes have been planted with young pine trees, and a cemetery lies on the summit. Here those who have given their lives to defend the revolution are buried.

According to the local custom, a pole with a flag is set up on a hero's grave. Red, black, and green flags flap noisily in the wind. Previously a grave was marked just by a stone slab, but recently relatives have more and more frequently been placing a photograph on the stone of the serviceman who fell in battle. How young they are, these courageous sons of the Afghan people!

All of Kabul is clearly visible from here, from the mountain summit. Below is the Maiwand, as straight as an arrow. The river glimmers. Mosque minarets and the silhouettes of new apartment blocks are blurred by the gray haze. The people who have found eternal rest here struggled for the peace and prosperity of this city and their entire homeland.

A new generation of patriots has risen to defend the revolution. It will complete the cause of its dead fathers and elder brothers.

G. USTINOV ON CAMPAIGN TO CLEAR PANJSHER VALLEY

PM030955 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jul 84 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent G. Ustinov dispatch under the rubric "Afghanistan: Reportages from Panjsher": "In the Den of the Five Lions"]

[Text] Panjsher, Kabul -- It was over. They were at the prescribed altitude of 4,800 meters. The ascent to the top of Parandeh was over. Another peak scaled -- and there are many of them here in Panjsher, in the mountains of the Five Lions. Every kilometer is like climbing a staircase to the 330th floor with no steps. And you climb it heavily-laden, carrying a submachinegun, a cartridge pouch, grenades, a pack, and ammunition... some 20-30 kg of soldier's kit. Sharp rocks, treacherous glaciers, and even more treacherous footpaths trodden by caravans of merchants and smugglers in decades and centuries gone by. They are easier to climb than going through virgin mountain. But watch out: there could be a mine under very rock, every muddy track, or harmless moss-covered hummock.

Panjsher is crammed with mines. The retreating dushmans have left them everywhere. On the main highway running through the 100 km-long Panjsher Valley, on mountain sides, in deserted caves and gorges, and at abandoned weapons and food dumps. The dushmans have turned peasants' grain fields into minefields. Mines made in Pakistan, the United States, China, Italy, Britain, and West Germany, antitank mines, antipersonnel mines disguised as part of the road surface or hidden in rusty cans, and plastic mines which are difficult to detect with conventional minesweepers. This is why the subunit was climbing Parandeh so slowly. The sappers who had gone on ahead were preventing any haste.

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BY LDI NARA DATE 7-18-00

"Halt!" the long-awaited command was heard. The commander designated some sentries and the rest, with relief, removed the heavy loads from their tired shoulders, took off their sweat-soaked tunics and undershirts, and carefully removed their leaden boots. This state of complete peace and happy relaxation lasted for 15 minutes, and then it was back to work again. Dry grass had to be found for a camp fire to prepare supper. This would not be easy here, at such an altitude. However, there were still some surplus signal flares in stock. One set burns long enough to heat up a can of stew and brew some tea. You have to find water for this tea. You have to know how to look after clothing and footwear -- they wear out in the mountains in next to no time. The helicopters will come tomorrow and you can send a request for everything you need: you cannot cross the rocks barefoot...

Faster, faster! The camp fires have to be out before dusk. By no means have all the dushmans had time to get away. Some are hiding, singly or in small groups, in mountain caves and shelters. A face lit by the glow of a fire is an easy target.

Night time. A deep, dead silence. The air from the eternal glaciers gets colder. Sergeant Petr Zinchenko, wrapped in a cloak, was fast asleep. He was dreaming of his native Kiev, the banks of the Dnieper with their golden sand, and the warm caressing water. Lieutenant Sadyk Khadzhimatov, aged 23, from Ashkhabad was sleeping peacefully next to him. Captain Petr Voropay, the subunit's deputy commander, political affairs, who previously served in the Crimea, settled down nearby... The next day it would be back to work again, combing in depth the countless caves, paths, and crevasses of Parandeh. At the regiment's command center in the valley they would have to be able to report with a clear conscience that they had done everything possible to render the dushmans' mines harmless in their particular area.

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This spring the DRA Government decided to give a fitting reply to Mas'ud's pretension. In mid-April, Afghan military units began a major operation to rid the strategically important Panjsher region of dushman gangs so as to ensure fuller success there. This large-scale operation lasted over 2 months. It was not enough just to defeat the bandits and oust them from the valley; tremendous work had to be done to clear Panjsher's soil of its lethal contents so that the peasants could return to the fields and the herdsman to the rich meadows.

For that reason the Afghans appealed to their Soviet brothers for help from mine clearing specialists who are fulfilling their international duty in our limited contingent of troops in the DRA. These specialists included servicemen from the subunit that you met at the beginning of this report.

They went along with the Afghan motorized rifle battalion commanded by Captain Gulam Rabbani. The work of this battalion's soldiers was repetitive and monotonous. Those fighting in the valley below had penetrated 60-70 km by 25 April into the heart of the Panjsher in their heavy armored trucks. Under strong pressure from them, some of the bandits fled their lair, some were routed, and many were captured with their weapons. But who knows how many of them escaped into the mountains and hid in caves at different levels. Until they were smoked out the Panjsher could not be considered free. Day after day, one rock at a time, the Afghan infantry have methodically and thoroughly scoured the mountains towering darkly on both sides of the valley. And meter by meter, our boys are persistently and patiently returning the long-suffering Panjsher to its peaceful purpose by removing the various explosives buried there.

Peaks. Passes. Mountain villages. Gorges. These men might have been called mountaineers had they simply been combating nature. But there was still an enemy there, cruel, experienced, long familiar with these mountains, who knew the paths and crevasses here by touch. For 2 months the Afghan battalion was forced to fight dozens of large and small battles. Replying to ambushes and to surprise attacks from mountain tops and cunningly concealed caves, they captured tons of weapons -- no one thought in terms of individual items -- and several radio stations and captured more than 100 dushmans, including some of the ringleaders, who prefer not to be taken alive.

Mines... They were their main enemy -- despite the sappers' experience and caution. They would find themselves facing a minefield upon completing an ascent. Two sappers with probes would go ahead of the battalion. The remainder would follow in their tracks. A dozen mines were disarmed, then another dozen. Men became tired, their attention slackened. But you have to be phenomenally attentive. One sapper "sounded out" a rock in front of him. All seemed in order. He stepped on it, his foot slipped, and there next to the rock was a mine.

Everyone knew that he could be next. But they were calm and courageous. From the first few days in the Panjsher they observed the rule that nothing could happen which had not already happened. Do not panic. Stop, concentrate, always rely on the sappers, help the medical officer and helicopter crews who fly in to help the wounded. Only then can more surprises and more explosions be avoided... That is how they conducted the operation with minimal losses.

Their most successful day came in late May. Our boys had just returned to the mountains following a 2-day furlough in the valley: a bath, a change of clothing, hot food, even a movie house. In the mountains around Kaltar village, the Afghan battalion and some Soviet soldiers headed by Capt Petr Voropay, the subunit's deputy commander for political affairs, and Captain Vladimir Yesipenko, chief of staff, discovered six people in a long cave with an underground river. They gave up without a struggle, swearing that the dushmans had forcibly taken them there. They had neither weapons nor bandit documents on them. Two of them -- a father and his little boy who cried all the time -- were immediately released, but the other four were detained in case they were dushmans.

A chain reaction thus began. A few minutes later a courier arrived and reported that the Afghan battalion's fifth company had stumbled across another cave full of people.

This time they were clearly dushmans, eight well-armed men. They also gave up without a struggle although one admitted: "Had you gone past without spotting us, we would have shot you in the back..."

When questioned, they said that their group consisted of 13 people including those captured in the first cave but leaving the boy aside. We learned from them that there was a large and well-equipped hiding place nearby where doctor Abdul Vahed, nicknamed "One-Leg" -- one of Ahmad Sheykh Mas'ud's advisers -- was hiding.

We went there. Since no one knew how many bandits there were or how they would react, our men had to prepare in the following way. Capt Voropay and some men lowered themselves like true mountaineers down a virtually sheer slope to a ledge overhanging the hideout. The others checked that there was no other way out and established that the bandits had no escape from the cave.

The Afghan battalion thus resolved one task: They ensured that the dushmans were in a secure trap. But it was important to take them alive. A prisoner as valuable as "One-Leg" might know a great deal about Ahmad Sheykh's plans and his links with emigres and his "Western friends."

A dushman captured earlier was sent down into the cave to parley. He shouted for a long time to the concealed bandits that they should give themselves up and that he was coming unarmed to discuss surrender terms. There was no response. The Afghan soldiers decided to check to see whether there was anyone there at all. Emerging from the cave, one "truce negotiator" said that he had been deep inside and that there really were people there. They had refused to talk with him or to come out into the "open air." What is more, a machinegun began to rattle from the cave...

What was to be done? They decided to enter the cave. It would have been no trouble to wipe out the bandits by direct fire, but they had to be taken alive and unharmed. Captain Voropay set off together with the Afghans. The cave was large. They examined one level, then another, but found no one. Suddenly the barrel of a machinegun appeared from behind a large rock. The soldiers took cover by the cave wall.

The dushmans again began to direct heavy, random fire. Obviously they had lost their nerve. The Afghan soldiers did not open fire. When the firing stopped, the dushmans were again asked to surrender: Opposition was completely useless. As the result of negotiations, six dushmans emerged from cover. "One-Leg" and his adjutant refused to surrender. His men said: "He is afraid that he will be immediately shot." Negotiations continued for another 2 hours before Abdul Vahed and his aide ended their stubbornness.

On seeing that Ahmad Sheykh's formidable adviser was in Afghan soldiers' hands, the dushmans became bolder and pointed out two cunningly concealed antiaircraft gun emplacements from which they had fired at helicopters. "One-Leg" did not react at all to their talkativeness and looked quite impassively, first at his former subordinates and then at the young guys who had captured him. Meanwhile, Afghan Hadovtsky (security servicemen) were dragging out of the cave documents, literature, and sacks of weapons discovered there.

For the assistance given to the Afghan soldiers in clearing mines during the capture of the Abdul Vahed group and its "archive" and weapons store, the Soviet commander recommended Capt Voropay, Lieutenant Khadzhimatov, and several other servicemen for medals. A subunit party meeting was held that evening, where the young lieutenant from Ashkhabad was adopted as a party member. And after the meeting they were guests of Gulam Rabbani and celebrated their mutual success with green tea prepared by the Afghans and drunk with Soviet evaporated milk. The ascent to the summit of Parandeh awaited them the following day.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 24, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK, *John* WALT RAYMOND and STEVE SESTANOVICH *Steve Sestanovich*SUBJECT: Request for Interview with Grani Magazine

Georgi Vladimov, the editor of the Russian emigre quarterly Grani (published in Frankfurt), has requested a written interview from you. The purpose of the interview would be to combat Soviet propaganda that current U.S. policy is anti-Russian and poses a threat to the Russian people.

We believe that Vladimov has put his finger on a real problem and that it would be useful to do what we can to undermine this particular strain of Soviet propaganda. Therefore, Steve Sestanovich has drafted a set of replies to questions which Vladimov submitted to us. We believe that they provide persuasive answers to the key questions and are particularly helpful in making clear to a Soviet audience that our defense modernization is in response to a massive Soviet military build-up (about which Soviet citizens hear little in their own media).

Although Grani has some readers in the Soviet Union, who see issues smuggled in, its readership is anything but wide. Therefore, if you authorize us to provide the interview we would recommend that, upon publication, it be broadcast by VOA and Radio Liberty as a news item. This would provide the widespread attention in the Soviet Union which the subject deserves.

Since the interview is neither provocative nor threatening, we do not believe its publication could become a factor in the election

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campaign. If there is any anxiety on this score, however, we could ask Grani to publish it in its first issue after November 6.

[Handwritten initials]
Karna Small and Bob *[Handwritten initials]* Sims concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the text at TAB I for publication in Grani and coverage on VOA and RL.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Timing: Next issue ____

First issue after Nov. 6 ____

Attachment:

Tab I - Draft text of interview

August 1984

Interview with Robert C. McFarlane

1. It is often argued in the American media and special publications that the aggressive and repressive policies of the Soviet Union are the continuation of former Russian attitudes and are inherent to Russian history, traditions, culture and psychology. President Reagan has called the Soviet Union an "evil empire." Does this mean that Russia and Russians are seen in the US as THE enemy?

Not at all. Our democratic political philosophy, as you know, distinguishes between state and society, or between the government and the people. This distinction carries over to our view of the Russian people. We Americans have deep feelings of friendship for the Russian people, and great respect for their cultural traditions and achievements.

There is an important point here that goes beyond expressions of friendship. Americans are by nature suspicious of the view that any dictatorship can be justified by "tradition." I know that there are endless and complicated scholarly arguments about the degree of continuity in Russian history. Certainly the Tsarist regime was not democratic, and in this respect the Bolshevik regime may superficially seem an example of continuity. But these are the controversies of scholars and specialists. For our part, while we have no intention of imposing our will on others, we believe in democracy as a universal possibility.

This is not a naive belief. In Russia, for example, didn't the February Revolution show that there are always pressures for change in any national tradition? These pressures were in fact rather great in the generation prior to 1917: they had already produced major changes in Russian politics and society. It seems likely to me that, given a chance to develop, they would have had far-reaching positive effects. In fact, had they been allowed to unfold fully, they would have become part of what we mean today by "the Russian tradition."

The Soviet regime cut your democratic development short. To my mind what that shows is not the true character of Russian tradition. It proves (which hardly needed proving!) that a state with all power in its hands can thwart pressures for democratic change.

We believe, in short, that Russians have as much right to govern themselves, and as much ability to do so, as any other people.

Finally, your term "THE enemy" leads me to remind you that, whatever difficulties may exist today in US-Soviet relations, Americans don't aspire to a relationship of confrontation. To the contrary, as the world's two greatest powers, our first (and shared) responsibility is to keep the peace. This was the message of President Reagan's speech on January 16 of this year.

2. The US is spending enormous sums to acquire more missiles, more warheads, more weapons of every kind. Why? Does the US feel threatened, and if yes, by whom? Does the US really intend to use all those missiles against our cities, our homes and families?

President Reagan has expressed himself on this matter in a single sentence that he has spoken again and again. "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." I don't think any words could be clearer than these: "must never be fought."

We do not desire war, and we do not desire an arms race either. Take a look at the past decade or more of arms control negotiations. It was almost always the United States that made the ambitious proposals for bringing the arms race under control. And almost always the Soviet government that rejected them.

For much of the 1970's in fact the United States was actually reducing its defense budget. To our regret, Soviet military spending continued to increase steadily. We cannot know precisely what the amounts are because the Soviet Union keeps its budget a secret, but our estimates are that approximately 14 or 15% of the Soviet GNP is drained away on military expenditure. The percentage for the United States is less than half that.

A few additional statistics may make clear why Americans grew so concerned during the 1970's at the pace of the Soviet military

buildup. In 1975, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had approximately the same number of warheads on their intercontinental ballistic missiles. Since then the U.S. figure has not increased at all. For some reason, however, the Soviet leadership chose to keep building, and today the number of weapons on their missiles has tripled.

Or take another example: although the Warsaw Pact has more than three times as many tanks as NATO, the Soviet Union keeps increasing its production of tanks -- in 1983, for example, by over 10%. As everyone knows, this was a very difficult year for the Soviet economy, and yet the leadership decided that they had to build 2700 tanks, over 60% more than were built that year by all the countries of the entire Western alliance put together.

Seeing continuing increases on the Soviet side, we Americans have to ask ourselves, how can we best reduce the danger that these weapons might someday be used? The decision about how much to spend for defense is vigorously debated every year in the United States: not just in the military but in each chamber of the Congress, in the newspapers and on television, in the universities, by civic organizations, among the Cabinet departments, with our allies, and so on. This debate is understandable, for we -- like the peoples of the Soviet Union -- have many things on which we would rather spend what we earn by our work. But over the past several years the conclusion of our national debate has been that the Soviet buildup does not allow us to spend less.

I might add one more point: many Americans including President Reagan are very unhappy with the levels that both the Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals have reached. We are therefore also looking into the possibility of defending ourselves in a way that is less threatening to others. The President has asked for more research to see whether technology can be developed so that if a nuclear attack were ever launched against our territory we would be able to destroy the incoming weapons themselves, not innocent people on the other side. The concept is simple. The technology obviously is terribly complicated. For now, our program is merely one of enhanced research, to explore what might be possible in the future.

This matter is one among many that we would like to discuss with the Soviet government. You may be interested to know that some Americans who have thought about these issues have publicly suggested that if we are able to develop such technology there would be no reason not to make it available to the Soviet Union also. Yet we have recently had great difficulty trying to engage Soviet representatives in negotiations, or even discussions, of any nuclear issues. Last year, they walked out of negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems. And this summer, when the Soviet government proposed talks on the militarization of space, President Reagan accepted; yet Soviet spokesmen are distorting our position and saying that we rejected the offer. The fact is we are still ready to meet, and without

any preconditions. For some reason, it seems that they don't want to talk. We can't be sure why.

13. Is it true that only the introduction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan prevented an American take-over? Why do the Americans support the Afghan mudjaheddeen, who kill Soviet soldiers, but are so excited when the USSR arms the Salvadoran guerrillas, who do not -- or not specifically -- shoot at Americans?

This charge is utterly absurd, as ordinary Soviet soldiers found out when they got to Afghanistan. As you may know, some Soviet soldiers who have come out of Afghanistan have said that the biggest surprise for them in that country was to discover that there were no Americans or Chinese fighting there, as Soviet propaganda organs had alleged. I doubt that very many people in the Soviet Union believe the official Moscow version of the invasion of Afghanistan. After all, if the Soviet leadership's real fear was an "American takeover", why was it necessary to kill the Afghan President as soon as the Soviet troops arrived?

As for the comparison you make between events in Afghanistan and Latin America, let me tell you how we see it. In both cases Soviet policy is making life harder for the people who live there, who desire only to live in peace and freedom. The Soviet Union works with Cuba and Nicaragua to support an insurgency in El Salvador despite the fact that El Salvador has a democratically-elected President, Jose Napoleon Duarte, who

represents the people. Why should the Soviet government act in this way? Simply because it aims to expand its "influence?" I can't believe that the peoples of the Soviet Union have the

slightest desire to gain "influence" in Latin America, which cannot improve their life in any way. The same is true in Afghanistan: the Soviet war of conquest there has resulted in great loss of life for both the soldiers of the Soviet occupation forces and for local population. And what have Soviet peoples gained from this?

For our part, we reject the idea that large nations need to control their small neighbors. We believe in national independence for all countries, whether they are close to our borders (like El Salvador) or not (like Afghanistan). This belief in no way threatens the security of the Soviet Union.

4. Is there a possibility of friendship between US and Russia?
If yes, under what circumstances?

I believe friendship is certainly possible, and highly desirable. In the past, as you know, some writers have thought that rivalry between America and Russia was inevitable, perhaps because they are two large countries blessed with such talented peoples and rich territories. Frankly, I can't understand why this has to produce rivalry instead of cooperation. And even if there is

rivalry, it hardly has to be military. It hardly has to increase the danger of war.

Developing the potential friendship between our peoples is my hope and President Reagan's. But let us talk of practical

expectations too. The obstacles to friendship between our peoples have to do with one thing and one thing only -- the policies of the Soviet leaders, such as their extraordinary military buildup, the use of Cuban proxy forces to promote instability in distant regions, and so forth. Is there any chance that these policies will change? We can't know, for the Soviet leaders operate within a system in which there is no open debate and virtually no pressures on them to change those unfortunate policies, and in which secrecy is the rule. That makes it hard to predict what course they will take.

For this reason, our approach is two-fold. First, to be strong enough that no adversary ever miscalculates our resolve. Second, to be clear enough about our own goals that no would-be friend or partner ever fails to understand our desire for cooperation.

5. Assuming that solid friendship and cooperation are established between the US and Russia: what would that mean for our respective countries, for the rest of the world?

It's no exaggeration to say it would be one of the most important turning points in modern history. It's hard even to assess all of the benefits that would follow from this, for both our nations and for others. But let me mention two that concern the Russian people.

First, the economic and technological benefits. The Soviet Union, for a modern economy, has participated very little in international trade. And its peoples have tended to lag in the enjoyment of modern technology, particularly in the consumer sector. I would expect this to change in conditions of East-West friendship. And not just because the Soviet Union would be freer to draw on some of the advances that have been made in the West. If the Soviet defense establishment did not have a virtual monopoly on top specialists, we'd see more Russian talent at work on techniques with civilian applications. We in the West would benefit from this too. There would be more that the outside world would want to buy from Russia -- not just natural resources, the primary Soviet export today. To my mind, the fact that the Soviet Union manufactures so little that the West wants to buy is a sign that the creative energy of your peoples is being stifled.

Second, I believe that an atmosphere of open exchange with the West would bring enormous vitality to the Soviet Union. Again, not because our own ideas are always correct in every particular.

But the ferment of open exchanges would enliven arts and letters, would enliven public debate, and so on. We would begin to learn more from you. Many Russians historically have made a great impact on Western society and culture. And Russians would be free to learn more from each other. Think what a liberation it would be if the Soviet media could leave behind their obsessive propaganda attacks on the West, and could argue honestly about things that have real meaning for the lives of their peoples.

Think what a liberation it would be if no one could ever again use the tired old argument that this or that internal restriction was required by the need for "vigilance."

At that point I suspect the writers and scholars would begin to explain that friendship between our nations had been inevitable all along!