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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

Archivist: lov

File Folder: Matlock Chron July 1984 [7/15-7/31]

Date: July 29, 1999

Box 90887 5

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re US-Soviet bilateral relations [90789], 1p <i>R 10/17/05 M02-011 #29</i>	7/18/84	P1/F1 P5
2. Memo	Kenneth Dam to the President, re US-Soviet bilateral relations [90789], 2p <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2 #49</i>	7/14/84	P1/F1
3. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re Soviet grain purchases [5554], 1p <i>R 11/22/00 F95-074/2 #50</i>	7/18/84	P1/F1
4. Note	from situation room, re Soviet purchase, 1p <i>P 4/27/00 NLSF95-074/2 #51; P 10/17/05 M02-011 #30</i>	7/17/84	P1/F1, F3
5. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re Robert O. Anderson's proposals [90824], 3p <i>D 10/17/05 M02-011 #31</i>	7/24/84	P1/F1 P5 <i>P6</i>
6. Memo	same text as #5 [90824], 3p <i>D 10/17/05 M02-011 #31</i>	7/24/84	P1/F1 P5 <i>P6</i>
7. PROFS note	McFarlane to Poindexter, re 90824, 1p <i>R 10/17/05 M02-011 #32</i>	7/31/84	P1/F1 P5
8. Memcon	Matlock and David Hanney, re British position, 2p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #52</i>	7/25/84	P1/F1
9. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re recent American visitors to Moscow [5728], 2p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #53</i>	7/25/84	P1/F1
10. Memo	Matlock and Ron Lehman to McFarlane, re chronology and contingency statement [90844], 1p <i>R 10/17/05 M02-011 #33</i>	7/31/84	P1/F1 P5
11. Chronology	Tab 1: Chronology of US-Soviet Diplomatic Exchanges..., 5p <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2 #54</i>	nd	P1/F1
12. Statement	draft, 1p <i>R 10/17/05 M02-011 #34</i>	nd	P1/F1 P5
13. Memo	same text as #10 (with added Ron Lehman comments) [90844], 1p <i>R 10/17/05 M02-011 #35</i>	7/31/84	P1/F1 P5
14. Chronology	same as #11, 5p <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2 #55</i>	nd	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

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File Folder: Matlock Chron July 1984 [7/15-7/31]

Date: July 29, 1999

Box 90887 5

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
15. Statement	same as #12, 1p <i>R 10/17/05 M02-011 #34</i>	nd	P1/F1 P5
16. Statement	draft, re Vienna talks, 1p <i>R 10/17/05 M02-011 #36</i>	nd	P1/F1 P5
17. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re US-Soviet bilaterals [90845], 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #56</i>	7/31/84	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer CAS

Box Number 5

FOIA M02-011

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1984 (7/15-7/31)

DATE 3/22/2007

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7 NOTE	MCFARLANE TO POINDEXTER RE PAPER (#32)	1	7/31/1984	

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90789

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

July 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Relations

State has submitted a memorandum from Ken Dam to the President (Tab I) reviewing several recent developments in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations and suggesting that there may have been a gradual change in the Soviet willingness to deal more constructively on some of these issues.

I have no problem with the memorandum, but I believe that the President is already well informed on most of these developments and I question whether we should impose on his time with a two-page memorandum. I believe it would be adequate for you to bring the President up to date on any of these items which may have missed his attention during your 9:30 meeting.

Recommendation:

That the Memorandum at Tab I not be sent to the President, but that he be briefed during one of your 9:30 meetings on any items in it that have not yet come to his attention.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachment:

Tab I - Memorandum from Kenneth Dam to the President dated July 14, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MO2-011 #29

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Bilateral Relations:
Possible Soviet Policy Decision

Although we will be focussing over the coming weeks on the issues involved in the Vienna talks, I wanted you also to be aware that we may be seeing a new pattern of developments emerge on non-arms control issues in the US-Soviet relationship.

Dobrynin told the Secretary about a month ago now that "there are no obstacles" on the Soviet side to progress on bilateral issues, and made optimistic noises about Soviet responses to our proposals on hotline upgrade, Pacific maritime boundary and the like. The general context was that the Soviets are not afraid to be seen negotiating with the Administration in this election year. That sounded fine, but at that point there was no way of telling how much importance to attach to these statements. The evidence since then is still not conclusive, but there has in fact been enough concrete follow-up on specific issues to suggest that he was reflecting policy guidance from Moscow:

-- Our hotline upgrade delegations have now reached substantive agreement, and the text could be initialled as early as Tuesday, July 17.

-- The Soviets agreed to extend the Long-Term Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation Agreement on the basis we suggested, just before it expired at the end of June, and we have now followed up by proposing a Working Group of Experts meeting in late August in Moscow.

-- The Soviets agreed to the July 23-24 dates we proposed for another round on the Pacific maritime boundary, and State Legal Advisor Davis Robinson will lead our delegation to Moscow.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-074/2 #49
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 7/18/00

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~- 2 -~~

-- Gromyko brought two deputy foreign ministers along for Art Hartman's presentation on southern Africa July 5, was notably non-combative, and undertook to get back to us about "where and when" a meeting with Assistant Secretary Crocker might take place, and "whether such a meeting would be worthwhile."

-- On July 6, the day after Art handed Gromyko our draft for a new exchanges agreement, the Soviets named the head of their negotiating team and promised to get back to us with a date for beginning talks some three weeks hence.

-- The same day, four weeks of consular review talks in Moscow resulted in agreement on the draft text of an exchange of notes resolving a number of technical problems involving diplomatic missions and personnel in the two countries. Of the four principal items on our agenda, we obtained full Soviet agreement on three, including an increase from three to five in the number of exit/entry points available to our personnel travelling to and from the USSR. These talks have gone on off and on for eight years without a mutually acceptable agreement being reached. At the last minute, the Soviets did not initial the draft notes, citing as a technical problem, the lack of the necessary higher-level authorization. Assuming this is indeed the case, the notes should be initialed this week.

We now have two pieces of evidence that this might reflect a gradual change in Soviet policy. A Soviet Embassy officer in Belgrade told us July 5 that "last month" Moscow had decided to move to "unfreeze" relations with the United States before the election. Somewhat more problematically, he added that the Soviets will send a delegation to Vienna to begin ASAT talks in September, and that it would be "unrealistic" not to expect other pressing arms control issues such as START and INF to surface in those talks. This man's record, though occasionally quite good, has been mixed, and on Vienna we will have to see. On unfreezing bilateral relations overall, however, a Hungarian Politburo member told our Ambassador in Budapest the same day that at the late-June CMEA Summit meeting Chernenko joined other leaders in stressing the need to put US-Soviet relations back on track, and said that they should improve "soon, or at least shortly after the US election."

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Proposed Press Release on U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship

I have reviewed and revised the proposed press release prepared by the Department of State (Tab I). If you have no objection, Bob Kimmitt should forward the memorandum and amended release to State (Tab II).

Karna Small, Phil Dur, Steve Sestanovich and Richard Levine concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the revised press release at Tab II.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed press release and State's memorandum, dated July 16, 1984

Tab II Revised release and memorandum to State Department

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By R. Vitt NARA, Date 7/12/99



S/S 8420025 XR8420024
United States Department of State

5497

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 16, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Proposed Press Release on U.S.-USSR Fishing
Relationship

Attached is a proposed press release on the US-USSR fishing relationship for your clearance as requested in the Kimmitt-Hill memorandum of July 3, 1984. Barring any unforeseen developments, we now plan to inform the Soviets towards the end of this month and make our public announcement a day later.

Charles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By *L. Vitt* NARA, Date 7/12/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL. OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Press Release on
US-USSR Fishing Relationship

The President has decided to grant the USSR a directed fishing allocation in the U.S. exclusive economic zone of approximately 50,000 tons and we have so informed the Soviets. This decision is taken in the framework of continuing cooperation between the two countries in the fisheries area, and will directly benefit U.S. fishermen involved in an existing joint fishing venture. It will also provide them with enhanced opportunities to benefit from Soviet technology and expertise in fishing.

This decision is consistent with the President's policy of promoting a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and facilitating non-strategic trade exchanges.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~DECL. OADR~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By A. Vitt NARA, Date 7/12/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5497

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Proposed Press Release on U.S.-USSR Fishing
Relationship
(S/S 8420025 XR8420024)

The attached press release on the U.S.-USSR fishing relationship
and plans for its release have been approved.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By R. Vitt NARA, Date 7/12/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Press Release on
US-USSR Fishing Relationship

The President has decided to grant the USSR a directed fishing allocation of approximately 50,000 tons in the U.S. exclusive economic zone, effective [date]. We have so informed the Soviet government. This decision is taken in the framework of the Governing International Fisheries Agreement and will result in the expansion of an existing joint venture, thereby directly benefiting the U.S. fishermen involved in it. It will also provide them enhanced opportunities to benefit from Soviet technology and expertise in fishing.

The President's decision reflects his policy on non-strategic trade and his long-standing interest in a dialogue with the Soviet Union. This dialogue must address the full agenda of issues that concern us, including arms control and security, regional conflicts, human rights, trade and other matters.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~DECL: OADR~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By A. V. H. NARA, Date 7/12/99

National Security Council
The White House

asking

System # I

Package # 5497

1260

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>✓</u>		
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>5</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Matlock</u>	<u>6</u>		<u>Redo</u>

I = Information	<u>A = Action</u>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

July 23, 1984

Attachment at Tab II revised as requested.

JFM

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JK*

SUBJECT: Proposed Press Release on U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship

I have reviewed and revised the proposed press release prepared by the Department of State (Tab I). If you have no objection, Bob Kimmitt should forward the memorandum and amended release to State (Tab II).

Karna ^{VS}Small, Phil ^{SD}Dur, Steve ^{SRS}Sestanovich and Richard ^{not available}Levine concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the revised press release at Tab II.

Approve RCMDisapprove State's para 2*Let's use*

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed press release and State's memorandum, dated July 16, 1984

Tab II Revised release and memorandum to State Department

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By R. V. H. NARA, Date 7/12/99



5497

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 16, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Proposed Press Release on U.S.-USSR Fishing
Relationship

Attached is a proposed press release on the US-USSR fishing relationship for your clearance as requested in the Kimmitt-Hill memorandum of July 3, 1984. Barring any unforeseen developments, we now plan to inform the Soviets towards the end of this month and make our public announcement a day later.

Ch. Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By L. Vitt NARA, Date 7/2/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~DECL: OADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Press Release on
US-USSR Fishing Relationship

The President has decided to grant the USSR a directed fishing allocation in the U.S. exclusive economic zone of approximately 50,000 tons and we have so informed the Soviets. This decision is taken in the framework of continuing cooperation between the two countries in the fisheries area, and will directly benefit U.S. fishermen involved in an existing joint fishing venture. It will also provide them with enhanced opportunities to benefit from Soviet technology and expertise in fishing.

This decision is consistent with the President's policy of promoting a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and facilitating non-strategic trade exchanges.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~DECL: OADR~~

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By L. Vot NARA, Date 7/12/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5497

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Proposed Press Release on U.S.-USSR Fishing
Relationship
(S/S 8420025 XR8420024)

The attached press release on the U.S.-USSR fishing relationship
and plans for its release have been approved.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By L. Vitt NARA, Date 7/12/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Press Release on
U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship

The President has decided to grant the USSR a directed fishing allocation of approximately 50,000 tons in the U.S. exclusive economic zone, effective [date]. We have so informed the Soviet government. This decision is taken in the framework of the Governing International Fisheries Agreement and will result in the expansion of an existing joint venture, thereby directly benefiting the U.S. fishermen involved in it. It will also provide them enhanced opportunities to benefit from Soviet technology and expertise in fishing.

This decision is consistent with the President's policy of promoting a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and facilitating non-strategic trade exchanges.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By R. V. Ott NARA, Date 7/12/99

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 18, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Grain Purchases

According to Agriculture's figures the Soviets have now purchased a total of 12,357,800 tons of grain for delivery in the crop year ending September 30, 1984. These purchases were almost equally divided between wheat and corn (6.3 and 6.05 million tons, respectively). In addition, the Soviets have purchased 416,200 tons of soybeans.

Regarding the crop year beginning October 1, 1984, the Soviets purchased 350,000 tons of corn yesterday and there are rumors that they will make substantial purchases of grain (1 to 3 million tons) within the next few days. They are obligated to buy at least 9 million tons of grain in each crop year.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLS F95-074/2 #50
BY CAS, NARA, DATE 8/11/22/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

90824
JULY 24, 1984

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 5 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMO RE: BERING STRAITS

The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. hereby agree to the following concepts as being in the long term interests of the two countries and the world community:

- 1) Both nations agree that the Bering Straits shall be open to peaceful navigation for all nations of the world in the belief that the concept of open sea lanes are a major need for world commerce.
- 2) Both nations agree to set up a joint organization to explore long range problems that are of mutual concern. Environmental problems, meteorological phenomena, mineral development in the Bering Sea, and others shall constitute the initial agenda for discussion.
- 3) A joint commission shall be constituted to put the foregoing into effect and to pursue any and all other matters of any nature whatsoever that may be of importance to the long term interests of both countries. The commission shall consist of 14 members, equally divided between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
 - (a) It shall meet not less than three times per year at a site to be designated by the Co-Chairmen.
 - (b) It shall be chaired by co-chairmen consisting of a U.S. and a Soviet member of the committee to be so designated.
 - (c) The Chairman and the committee shall report directly to their respective Chiefs of State. The U. S. membership shall be bi-partisan and advisory in nature.
- 4) The first meeting of commission shall be within 90 days of this agreement, dated _____.

11

HIRSCH/VELIKHOV DRAFT
U.S./U.S.S.R. PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE STUDY GROUP

PURPOSE: Develop a sound basis for peaceful coexistence in the nuclear age.

BACKGROUND/ASSUMPTIONS/GROUNDRULES:

- ° Nuclear war is intolerable and must be avoided.
- ° U.S./U.S.S.R. relations have deteriorated to a troubling level.
- ° Make no assumption of who is to blame.
- ° Attempt to rise above past confrontations and squarely face today's realities.
- ° Recognize each side thinks differently and sees each other in ways the other may not understand.
- ° Document and analyze past difficulties.
- ° Step back from any specific issue.
- ° Cover all aspects of relations.

EXPECTED RESULTS:

- ° A framework of understanding on which to build negotiations, trade and cooperation for the future.

D R A F T

TOWARDS A MORE SECURE PEACE

PROLOGUE

Relations between the two greatest powers in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union, are at their lowest point in recent history. Antagonisms exist that endanger world peace and detract from the abilities of the two countries to apply their energies to further the well-being of their peoples. The purpose of this communique is to attempt to squarely face up to past and present differences and lay a pragmatic foundation for upgrading future relationships.

WHY CHANGE IS NEEDED

Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. possess technologies and weaponry that are able to totally destroy the other country in a matter of minutes. Never before in human history have such capabilities existed. In the past, nations have possessed the power to conquer others but the time required to do so and the level of destruction possible are dwarfed by today's weaponry and delivery systems.

This capability for massive destruction has existed for nearly two decades. It is a credit to both sides that neither has unleashed its massive powers. On the other hand, there have been occasions of doubt and associated military alerts when the potential for miscalculation has been heightened dangerously.

Both sides strongly desire a practical, pragmatic means to reduce tensions and the threat of war. The primary motivation is the knowledge that such a war would probably totally destroy both countries and much, if not all, of the rest of the world.

D R A F T

- 2 -

The management of today's weaponry places heretofore unimagined responsibilities on the two sides. It mandates control, restraint, and cooperation that go beyond what man has ever had to exhibit in the past.

Such a threat clearly overshadows all other concerns. Nevertheless, it is also clear that a reduction in tensions and the awesome military activities associated therewith would free talent and resources that could be used for far more constructive purposes. Both countries have important internal problems whose solution would greatly benefit their peoples. Therefore, a reduction in tensions and related military expenditures could positively impact the internal wellbeing of both sides.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE PEOPLES AND THE GOVERNMENTS

The heritages and basic cultures of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. differ dramatically. This is manifested in countless ways, many of which are not always recognized.

The Soviet people have a long and harsh history that has been shaped by multiple foreign invasions, geography, weather, and repressive czarist rule. The population of the U.S.S.R. is by no means homogenous, being composed of people from very diverse cultures, languages, and backgrounds. These people have not always worked together constructively.

American history is brief by comparison. It has been influenced by a struggle for independence, a civil war, a gentlier climate and a diverse population, which originally came from virtually all countries of the world. The U.S. has had peaceful borders and has never suffered the destruction of invasion.

D R A F T

- 3 -

The Soviet system of government is basically centralized and controlled, while the American system is decentralized and less controlled. Both systems have different, difficult internal problems to solve. While the two sides have criticized each other's form of government in the past, such criticisms must be separated from issues of war and peace, which overshadow all else.

Both forms of government are devoted to promoting the well-being of their peoples. The Soviet system has full employment and universal medical care, among other things. On the other hand, all decision making must be worked through a central apparatus and freedom of individual choice is bounded.

The American system is decentralized so that individuals and organizations are relatively free to determine their own courses. Government influence on everyday life is comparatively less evident. On the other hand, the United States has problems such as unemployment and high interest rates.

The point is that both governments have strengths as well as weaknesses.

In the twentieth century, the United States has not been invaded by a foreign power. While its people have fought in foreign wars, it has not had to endure the fear, agony, destruction, and humiliations associated with invasion. This comparative security has impacted American thinking and military policy.

D R A F T

- 4 -

The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, has been invaded a number of times and incurred massive losses, in particular, during World War II. The scars of that war have created a deep resolve in the Soviet people and their government that such destruction must never be allowed to happen again. These feelings strongly impact Soviet thinking and military policy.

The U.S.S.R. has a number of borders across which potential aggressors could pass in a future invasion. By contrast, the U.S. has only two land borders both with peaceful, non-threatening neighbors. People and governments naturally think differently in these two situations.

Both sides see each other in very different ways just as individual people view each other differently. Individual people learn to live in harmony through a variety of means, usually involving friendly, conciliatory dialogue. Our countries began such dialogue in the early 1970s, but for a variety of reasons matters have recently deteriorated.

Like disputing individuals, there is every reason to believe that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. can find common bases to rebuild and strengthen their relationships. Indeed, most peoples on both sides hope and pray for such improvements.

THE CHARACTER OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP

Both sides have taken actions in recent years that have heightened tensions. Neither side is without some blame.

D R A F T

- 5 -

It is totally unrealistic to think that a problem as complex as this can be solved simply. If that were the case, a solution would have already been developed.

Improvements in the relationships will require time, effort and unusual behavior. A pragmatic road to decreased tensions must be built on the assumption that many positive steps will be required and that a number of irritations and miscalculations will continue to occur along the way. It is simply unrealistic to think that our people and our political systems are capable, or maybe even desirous, of changing rapidly.

Further, neither side can be expected to unilaterally move toward peace without reciprocal action by the other. Indeed, unilateral force reduction would leave one side in a state of comparative weakness, which could lead to overreaction on its part in a period of perceived threat.

Both the Americans and the Soviets are excellent negotiators, and naturally attempt to gain an advantage for their side whenever possible. This has been past practice.

In the early to mid 1970s a number of treaties and agreements were developed between the two countries. Some of these have been of great mutual benefit and have endured. Others were not 50-50 agreements, i.e., one side benefited to a greater extent than the other. Unequal agreements are unfair to one party and accordingly, will always be doomed to a short lifetime.

D R A F T

- 6 -

Because of the great threats that we face and because the two countries need to build an inventory of long-lived mutually beneficial agreements, future negotiations should be held in an atmosphere where both sides aim to define 50-50 arrangements. Such an approach provides the highest probability of creating lasting agreements and creating a constructive atmosphere of trust between the two parties.

There have been, and will continue to be, great differences between the interests, needs and actions of the two countries. To think otherwise is to be unrealistic. The new relationship that we must build between our countries must be durable enough to withstand future differences and cannot minimize the concerns of the past or the present. Nevertheless, our special situation requires that we build a relationship that encourages both sides to rise above those differences and forge a better future.

RESOLUTION

Recognizing these facts, the two governments hereby establish a bilateral commission to study past, current and potential future issues of interest to our two countries and to make recommendations to the two heads of state for concrete actions to alleviate strains and to provide opportunities of mutual benefit.

The commission will work in private and report directly to the U.S. President and the Soviet Chairman. It will be composed of two co-chairmen plus twelve members, with equal representation from both sides. The American side will be bipartisan and the Soviet side will have representatives of its internal factions.

D R A F T

- 7 -

This approach will help to forge recommendations that have the best chance to enduring the expected periodic changes in the two governments. From time to time public announcements on progress will be provided, with the same message going to the peoples of both countries.

The commission will have no powers other than to study issues and make recommendations, which will then be processed through each government in a normal manner.

Robert O. Anderson

7/13 III
box 1000 622-3140
Roswell, NM 88201

Jack Matlock -

I thought you might find the brief
notes of my recent trip to Russia
of interest.

R. O. Anderson

July 11, 1984

ROUGH DRAFT

Russia, June 1984

I had occasion some months ago to write a paper regarding East-West relations and the possibilities for reduced tensions between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. In that document I portrayed a Russia that was in striking contrast to the country I visited a few weeks ago.

My description of the Soviet Union was based on several trips in the early and mid-1970s, at which time I had been greatly impressed by the relative poverty of the Soviet Union compared to the rapidly rising levels of prosperity in Western Europe.

Press accounts and occasional personal contacts had given me the impression that if progress had been made, it would have been at a glacial pace. Poland's financial difficulties in 1980 plus the Soviets' gradual liquidation of their substantial gold reserves were further indications that the Soviet Union was under increasing financial pressure. The need for hard currency to finance shortfalls in food production and other imports was very evident. Weather patterns in central Russia were seen as critical to the external needs for hard currency to finance food requirements for the Soviet Block countries. The Russian ruble had never been accepted as a world currency, and I interpreted this as a great impediment to the Soviets' ability to trade freely in the world community.

In short, there was little or no evidence to support the concept that there had been much improvement or change in the Soviet Union since my first visit thirteen years ago. Yet change I found, and in such a degree that I have been forced to conclude that we have somehow overlooked very

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basic factors in Soviet development during the last decade. I emerged from a week's visit with a new perspective of Russia and one that has particular reference to the future of East-West relations.

The new airport terminal in Moscow, while far from pretentious, was clearly more in keeping with Moscow's role as a major capital city. The Customs people and the slowness with which things moved indicated that this was still very much a police state preoccupied with bureaucratic procedure. The relatively large number of taxis and the competitive and even friendly and shouting taxi drivers were a new touch. So were the occasional but unmistakable traffic jams we encountered in the city itself. It was clear that Moscow was beyond the bicycle and motorbike era that dominated much of western Europe during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Hotels and high-rise buildings had gone up at an astonishing clip, and I counted 47 large construction cranes within the distance of a mile. A pleasant and warm Sunday afternoon had thousands of people out on the streets visiting and chatting in a manner that would have been unthinkable a decade earlier. Ten years ago people not only avoided your glance or comment, but they scuttled by looking like sullen gray bundles. Today high heels, sheer hose, lipstick and make-up are everywhere. Clothing, while not yet up to western standards, shows the clear impact of western fashion, and such differences as exist are not so great that one can readily distinguish a group of tourists at a glance.

In short, I found myself looking at a Moscow that could not possibly have existed a decade ago. While it obviously remains a relatively austere economy, it has clearly outpaced both western Europe and the United States in terms of relative change. Only in far Eastern Asia does one find

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even more remarkable change. The latter can be explained by the explosive rate of industrial development and commerce. Russia has not experienced either. Yet there obviously had to be an explanation for the change. The guns and butter scenario I had dwelt on in my paper eight months earlier had not had the negative impact I had anticipated. Russia has certainly not deviated from its military posture. Yet there was a great deal more "butter" than conventional wisdom could explain.

I departed from Moscow a week later mulling over a fact well known to me for more than a dozen years, but one that I had failed to think through or see its significance. Russia is by far the world's largest producer of crude oil. At 12,000,000 bbls. per day of oil production together with the world's largest known gas reserves, I think one can safely say that OPEC and the U.S. dollar have done far more for the Soviet Union than Carl Marx ever dreamed of. Russia produces more oil per day than the current level of all of the Persian Gulf countries combined. The nominal dollar value of this production is roughly \$150 billion per year, which would have a major impact on any country in the world irrespective of its size. To appreciate the full implications of this, one has to recognize that the major impact on Russia has occurred during the last two or three years as Russia has emerged as a significant exporter of crude oil and natural gas. All of these oil, gold and tourist transactions are in U.S. dollars which on today's United States monetary policies gives them a large multiplier when they convert the dollars to the less desirable currencies in which they primarily deal. I suspect the appreciation of the dollar has added purchasing power of close to the equivalent of \$20 billion

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per year to the Soviet's external trading. This is far more than enough to cover the worst possible crop failure in the Soviet Union, and more than enough to add tons of butter to the Soviet households as well.

Based on their present level of oil exports, gold, strategic metals and tourist income plus the dollar multiplier, I would suspect that the Soviet Union enjoys something like a \$50,000,000,000 equivalent per year surplus account to cover their external needs. As I write, the Soviet grain crop teeters on the brink of disaster, yet no one seemed to be the least bit concerned as I suspect they now have adequate funds to cover any shortfall. As a matter of fact, in the last few years the Soviet Union has become a very large factor in the international dollar market. It has been described as the largest dealer in dollar markets and appears to have ample funds to buy and sell large volumes of dollars on a daily basis. This adds credibility to the theory that the Russians are in far from desperate conditions in regard to their dollar avails and holdings.

The Polish and Eastern European debt problems have certainly moderated in the last four years, the same four years that Russia's fortunes have experienced a significant improvement. Oil, gas and the overvalued dollar have not only done wonders but there is no end in sight. Russia is moving rapidly to coal and nuclear power generation to free up more oil for export. Their major gas transmission lines to Eastern and Western Europe will be the basis for increased trade and they have more than ample reserves to back up and increase deliveries. The large gas reserves of Norway will have increasing difficulty in competing with the Soviet gas at the market place—particularly

5.

in view of the extremely heavy tax burdens placed on Norwegian gas.

While I have not had the opportunity to visit the Warsaw Block countries in recent years, I would suspect that they have also seen greater economic improvement in the last four years than that experienced by western Europe. The high heel shoes, clothing, laboratory equipment, automobiles, etc. all carry Warsaw Block country labels. There must be some parallel economic activity associated with what I observed, although it would be in rubles rather than dollar-denominated transactions. I now realize that a nonconvertible ruble is a most effective way to tie the Comecon countries to the Soviet Union. In short, the nonconvertibility factor of the Soviet currency is probably as effective a tie as the pound sterling which did much to hold the British Empire together in the 19th century.

The recent elections in Poland would indicate that economic conditions have moderated. Little has been said of the recent meeting of the Comecon countries, and one can only wonder if the Soviet Union found itself for the first time in position to deal more generously with its junior trading partners than it has in the past. It may also be the reason that after 13 years of relative hardship a meeting was convened at all. Comecon itself appears to be developing as a curious variation of a conventional imperial system. In most historical scenarios, the Empire has been focused on a major power that provided the industrial and military base to its colonial possessions. The colonies in turn provided resources and raw materials to the imperial power which shipped back finished goods to find a market and pay for products. Maintaining a single currency helped insure that the trading system

6.

could not be invaded by competing nations in the marketplace. The ruble plays a similar role today among the Comecon countries although here the system is inverted.

Russia, the dominant member, is the source of the raw materials (i.e. oil, gas, gold, strategic minerals) while the colonial trading partners (the Warsaw Block), furnish finished goods in exchange for resources and energy. An inverted Empire!

The system appears to be working surprisingly well, and as long as Russia can keep up a favorable trading balance with the hard currency nations there is little incentive to seek hard currency status for the ruble. In effect, it would reduce the dependence of its trading partners who would then be freer to turn to the West for trade.

As I see Russia today, there is little reason to believe that it will not become an increasingly important economic entity. They have vast resources and have discovered how to develop and utilize them.

Communism has repeatedly failed to demonstrate that it is a viable economic system, yet external income and money in sufficient quantities can cover up the shortfalls of virtually any economic system. Russia continues to have many problems. The "new affluence" does not extend to rural areas or Asiatic Russia, and the huge bureaucracy continues to stifle productivity. Their standard of living continues to be far behind the developed world. If the Soviets would elect to modify and liberalize their social and economic postures, they are probably in position to make some remarkable economic progress. They have a vast internal market potential, mineral resources and the manpower to become the dominant economy of Europe with a comparable standard of living.

7.

It is difficult to analyze the military implications of what I have seen and described, but to see Russia as a declining economic and political power would be the height of wishful thinking. Ten years ago, I was confident that Russia would eventually collapse under its own economic and political failures. Today, it is clear to me that they have benefited enormously by external events that have given them the time to reverse their fortunes and they now have the means to become the dominant economic entity that de Tocqueville envisioned when he wrote of the United States and Russia in the early 19th century.

Hopefully it will be under a liberalized social system that will conform and coexist more comfortably with the world community than in the past.


AFFLUENCE

CONCEPTUAL ECONOMIC
OVERLAY OF RUSSIAN ECONOMY
1970-1984 AS IMPACTED BY OPEC,
RISING OIL-GAS EXPORTS PLUS
IMPACT OF DOLLAR DENOMINATED SALES

(1984-1985)
1984-1985

30th Middle
East Oil
Enhanced 66 2/3%
By Overvalued Dollar
(+ 50%
Expansion
Purchasing
Power)
Rising oil
costs impact

POVERTY



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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 607 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

Jack: Please come see me about this.

J. M. Poindexter

~~SECRET~~

July 31, 1984

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Pkg #90824 Matlock Paper on Anderson (ARCO)
Proposal for Advancing US Soviet Relations

I agree with Jack's analysis of the pitfalls in the Anderson proposal. The difficulties we would face with a group of outsiders with either vested or uninformed views on US-Soviet relations would be substantial.

I'm not sure how we received this proposal -- did we get it from Jim Baker? If so with what background of commitment by Baker, e.g. restrictions on handling? Whatever the background, my impulse is to staff it to State in the normal way and to ask that State make a recommendation. They may want to have Shultz preempt this thing taking on a life of its own by asking Anderson to a meeting at which he makes clear how we intend to proceed and why we oppose the establishment of such a body. I would basically get it out of the White House and bury it as soon as possible. Please so inform Jack and move out as above unless you feel differently.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS MD2-011 #32

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BY LJS, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 25, 1984

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: British Position on Polish Amnesty

David Hanney, the British Charge, telephoned me this morning to convey the British reaction to the Polish amnesty. (He had earlier provided the reaction to State.) He made the following points, obviously reading from instructions from London:

-- The considered reaction of the British Government is that the amnesty is a constructive development which merits a positive Western response.

-- It is a courageous move on Jaruzelski's part, since the Polish hard-liners and their friends in other Eastern countries were probably opposed.

-- The private reaction of a number of Poles in contact with the British is that this step could be a watershed in the regime's effort to establish a more effective relationship with the population at large. Although some of the interlocutors could be suspected of arguing from self interest, there is reason to believe the argument is sound.

-- Under these conditions, we could find that sanctions will be a diminishing and indeed counterproductive asset, since an inadequate Western response to the amnesty could force Jaruzelski into the clutch of his hard liners and their Soviet backers.

The British Government has made no final decisions, but is considering the following:

-- Howe will meet the Polish Foreign Minister on the margins of the UN General Assembly this fall. (This would be the first meeting on that level since martial law was declared.)

-- The British Government will support Polish membership in the IMF and would welcome an American decision to do so as well. The British will say publicly that they are in favor of IMF membership for Poland.

-- The British Government will consider lifting political restraints on new credits. It is recognized, however, that economic and financial restraints make it unlikely that new credits of significant magnitude will materialize in the short term.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLS F95-074/2 #52

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 11/6/00

-- The British Government will also consider lifting political restraints on extending small tranches of credit to ongoing projects begun before martial law.

-- Consideration will be given to a visit by Undersecretary Rifkin to Poland in the fall, and also to a visit by a ministerial level trade delegation.

-- The ban on high-level cultural exchanges will probably be lifted.

-- MFN is considered a strictly American affair, but if the US should see fit to restore MFN treatment to Poland, this would be welcomed by the British Government.


Jack F. Matlock

MATLOCK

Chen

~~SECRET~~

July 25, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *Jm*

SUBJECT:

Recent American Visitors to Moscow Report More Flexible Attitude, Unorthodox Private Comments

The last few weeks seem to have been an unusually active season for meetings between U.S. private groups and Soviet "scholars" and propaganda types in Moscow. On the margins of these meetings several knowledgeable Americans had the opportunity for private conversations with their Soviet interlocutors -- the sort often used to convey an agreed line to Westerners. I have mentioned some of these in previous memoranda, but having received six or more individual briefings now, I would like to call attention to what appears to be some threads which run through all of them.

1. All the groups said that the Soviets opened with a relatively hard-line prepared statement, but then suddenly became more businesslike in their discussion of the issues.
2. In private, the visitors found several Soviet participants willing to speculate about ways to improve the U.S.-Soviet relationship. This contrasted with the adamant refusal (in some cases by the same individuals) of the Soviets to do so when they were visiting the U.S. just a few weeks earlier.
3. All the Americans who talked to me were convinced that a Soviet policy debate is still in progress, and that their Soviet interlocutors did not have clear instructions on some of the specific issues. One could, however, infer that the instructions apparently given Soviet "unofficial" groups in the spring to avoid discussion of possible future changes in Soviet arms control positions had been altered.
4. Some of the specific comments are of possible interest, but there was such a variety (sometimes with contradictory thrusts) that it is impossible to detect any specific trial balloon -- or, for that matter, consistent effort to supply disinformation.

I attach at TAB I a summary of some of the more interesting comments by the American visitors, along with their reports of private comments by Soviets. Bill Beecher's article at TAB II was written on the basis of a conversation with Falin, the former Soviet Ambassador to West Germany, associated with Zamyatin in

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Declassify: OADR

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11/6/00

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- 2 -

the Central Committee International Information Department. It is notable since it is the first time since last December to my knowledge that a senior Soviet official would speculate about a possible resumption of START/INF.

Attachments:

- Tab I - American Visitors to Moscow: Comments by Soviet Officials
- Tab II - Beecher story in Boston Globe, July 3, 1984

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AMERICAN VISITORS TO MOSCOW, JUNE - JULY, 1984

Selected Comments by Soviet Officials

-- Strobe Talbott: During his stay in Moscow in June, Talbott spoke mainly to Institute types (he mentioned Trofimenko and Federenko specifically) and also to someone from MFA (not named, but probably Bessmertnykh). He said he was astounded that the Institute types had begun to talk as if they see the possibilities of an opening, in sharp contrast to the position they were taking just a couple of weeks before in Washington. Some even allowed that the Soviets might not continue to hold to their insistence that INF missiles be removed for talks to resume. They (apparently Trofimenko and Federenko) also conceded that the "correlation of forces" is changing, and implied that this would require changes in the Soviet position. When he discussed the Scowcroft Mission with them, all said that it was rejected because Gromyko "hit the ceiling" at what he interpreted as a blatant effort to bypass him (requesting private meeting with Chernenko). This was not surprising, but the Institute types added when they were in private that the U.S. analysis was correct: Gromyko is the problem and must be bypassed even though our earlier effort backfired because it was too obvious.

-- UNA parallel studies group: Toby Gati, Bill Beecher, Stanley Resor and Ivan Selin briefed me on their experiences in Moscow late June and early July. They had seen a lower-level group than usual (Zhurkin chaired), but most of talks were more substantive than they had experienced earlier. Also, the tone was less hostile than that experienced by the Dartmouth group here a few weeks ago.

The opening speech by Zhurkin was bad, but then things became more businesslike. The group noticed three themes as prominent in their unofficial conversation: (1) that the collapse of detente had brought out the security forces and everything is tighter; (2) that we face a long, cold summer and fall, but things could turn up afterward; and (3) they hold RR responsible for the reactivation of the goons. On the substantive side of the formal discussions, nothing really new.

-- Bill Beecher: Beecher went with the UNA group, but stayed a week longer and had more meaningful private conversations than the others. He said that he had a long conversation with Bogdanov (Arbatov's deputy, who is believed to be a senior KGB officer) the following week, and also talked to Falin, Milstein, Burlatsky and Trofimenko.

According to Beecher, Bogdanov acted as if he was passing a message, since he remarked that they had "so few contacts" that they had to "make use" of visitors like him. Re the space arms proposal, "If your side really wants to improve relations, this is the opportunity." But linkage is not acceptable. Moratorium is not a precondition, just a suggestion.

As they were walking over to the Praga Restaurant for lunch, Bogdanov said that the issue of U.S.-Soviet relations was the subject of heated debate in the Politburo. But decisions represent a consensus. Both the Politburo and the Secretariat must agree on policy. [Note: This was a curious statement, since the Secretariat formally reports to the Politburo and is not an independent body. In the light of Bogdanov's subsequent comments, it may have been meant to convey that Gorbachev has a key role in the policy-making process.] Gromyko's words count for a lot, but Gorbachev has a role, particularly by virtue of his authority in naming personnel to diplomatic and other posts. Gorbachev is a "team player." Nice to everyone; well liked; listens to specialists. Gromyko is not a one-man show but a big voice. Works closely with Ustinov. Both Gromyko and Ustinov realize that stability is required with a Party Congress coming up.

Bogdanov added that the biggest Soviet problem is the economy, including (1) technological lag; and (2) consumer goods production. But they are working on this and expect results in 4-5 years. As for Gromyko, his pride was injured by Madrid meeting and plane landing incident. He thinks we have contrived to put them in an inferior position. And he remains the most important voice in foreign affairs.

According to Bogdanov, the atmosphere must be improved. He is not sure how. Perhaps talks on space. SDI more important than ASAT. Early next year could be a time for rapprochement. Question being asked in Moscow is how RR will be during his second term.

There was also a curious exchange re Midgetman, when Bogdanov said that it was another effort to force the Soviets to restructure their missile forces, and that one new system brings others in its train, since they feel we want ASAT to deny them the possibility of going after Midgetman. He added that we could change our force structure in 5-6 years, but this would always leave them behind.

-- Foreign Policy Research Institute: (Nils Wessell, Marvin Wachman, Bill Sullivan, Bill Perry and others) were in Moscow July 1-11, and had talks with a Soviet group sponsored by IUSAC July 3-5. Said the climate was better than they had expected, and that in particular the Soviets carefully avoided any attacks on the President. The Soviets, however, made clear their preference for agreements on general principles before dealing with concrete issues. Milstein, by the way, said that the Soviets would be at Vienna in September and inquired of Bill Sullivan whom the U.S. is likely to send to head its delegation. On other hand, Velikhov told Bill Perry that the Soviets are interested in a comprehensive space treaty or nothing. On INF, one junior staffer (Alexander Vasiliev) said that the "Walk in the Woods" formula was a good one.

-- SRI Group: This was a group concentrating on economic issues, including Herb Levine (University of Pennsylvania economist), Alice Rivlin and Ed Hewett of Brookings and Mark Earle and Bill Bader of SRI. They met with a Soviet group June 11-13.

The Soviets tended in the formal sessions to parrot the official "hardline" -- that the Reagan administration is the worst monstrosity and it is impossible to imagine the reestablishment of normal Soviet-American relations (particularly offensive nuclear missile talks).

- However, in private discussions and corridor gossip, the Soviets expressed disgust with the intransigent stance taken by the Soviet leadership, which they feel is counterproductive to the USSR's best interest.
- They were very critical of the immobilism in the top echelon of the leadership, referring derogatorily to "our gang of four" (Ustinov, Tikhonov, Gromyko, and Chernomirko, the latter ironically the youngest of the four)
- Gromyko is consistently seen as the primary obstacle to an improvement in Soviet-American relations and to the enhancement of the Soviet Union's current low international image.

On economic issues, Soviet officials calculated that GNP will rise at a 4% annual rate average thru the year 2000. This is slightly higher than the Wharton estimates and significantly higher than CIA/DIA projections. Soviet economists seem mainly concerned with the availability of investment capital and the productivity of both capital and labor (which they neither know how to measure nor improve). The focus will be on reducing allocations to agriculture (currently about 28% of total investment), leveling off transportation investment (with the completion of the gas pipeline system), and increasing investment in machinery production and fuel extraction.

Soviets rouse the arms talks

By William B. Her
Globe Staff

MOSCOW — After months of inactivity on the arms control front, there are signs of stirrings within the Soviet government.

The Soviet Union last week invited the United States to come to Vienna in September to launch a new set of negotiations to ban antisatellite weapons. A series of give-and-take over the scope of any such talks with the issue still unresolved.

At about the same time, a well-placed Soviet analyst said in an interview that a debate is underway here over what position to take once nuclear arms control talks resume and that a totally new approach could emerge from this process.

"I proceed from the premise that sooner or later the talks are to be resumed," he said, "and I would prefer earlier rather than later."

One of the problems with the American response to the space weapons proposal was the attempt to link the talks with negotiations on reductions in medium range and strategic weapons. The Soviets do not want to link the two issues.

They also want formal negotiations to deal not only with antisatellite weapons but all forms of space weapons, including those which might be used against ballistic missile warheads. Sources here say if the Reagan Administration will drop all preconditions, including its attempt to link space talks with nuclear missile talks, a new set of negotiations can proceed.

The Soviet proposal for a moratorium on antisatellite tests could be discussed at the start of new negotiations, they said, rather than being a Soviet precondition to holding the talks.

The United States is planning its first test of a new weapon project in space in November and is not believed willing to drop that test in order to enter

Western diplomats here were amazed both at the way the Soviets broached the idea for space talks and about the freedom with which a well-placed Soviet analyst discussed some aspects of the internal debate over strategic missile negotiations.

The space initiative was presented in a note given Friday by Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin to Secretary of State George P. Shultz, without any advance warning to or discussion with Ambassador Arthur Hartman here. That was considered unusual.

Western diplomats here were amazed both at the way the Soviets broached the idea for space talks and about the freedom with which a well-placed Soviet analyst discussed some aspects of the internal debate over strategic missile negotiations.

And the analyst's candor in the interview was also considered highly unusual.

Stressing he was expressing a personal opinion that may not reflect the outcome of the debate, the analyst, who is particularly well-connected and who has had extensive government service, outlined an approach featuring the following elements:

- Combining medium-range missiles, which have been dealt with in a separate negotiation in Geneva, with talks aimed at reducing the number of strategic missiles and bombers. He said the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles being deployed in Western Europe, since they could hit strategic targets, could logically be treated in a comprehensive approach to all strategic weapons.

- Freezing production of new weapons and limiting tests as the two sides try to come up with a new set of agreed principles on which to limit weapons and deployment areas. By entering such talks, he said, the Soviet Union would not concede that the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles could

or should remain in Western Europe.

- Placing less weight on warhead numbers and more on the capability, and even deployment areas, of various weapons to try to work out an equitable balance. The Pershing 2, he said, could readily carry three warheads like the Soviet SS20 were it not for its heavy guidance package and special warhead designed to penetrate deep underground before exploding. The implication was that the three-warhead SS20 should count no more than a single-warhead Pershing 2.

- Taking into account or compensating for British and French nuclear forces which, he contended, will grow to 1000 warheads in 1990 and 1500 warheads by 1995. The United States has refused to consider compensation for British and French largely submarine-based missiles in the medium-range missile talks that the Soviets walked out of last November.

Diplomats here say the analyst's four points probably represent one school of opinion in the internal debate about what to do when arms talks are resumed.

Merging the two sets of talks, they said, would enable the Soviets to save face in that they have vowed never to resume medium-range talks in Geneva while the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles remain.

Several diplomats were amazed that a well-placed Soviet analyst would discuss the terms for returning to arms-control talks at a time when the government is saying talks may not resume for years, and certainly not before the US elections in November. To say otherwise might help President Ronald Reagan's reelection prospects.

They were surprised at the temerity of the analyst to express his views so freely, even though not for attribution.

The analyst said it was necessary for both sides to "start from scratch" in new negotiations, perhaps carrying over some agreed notions from the SALT II and START arms talks but beginning with agreed principles on how the superpowers intend to coexist and what precepts should govern the permissible strategic weapons on each side.

It no longer makes sense, he said, to start with detailed proposals on warhead and missile numbers without first coming to grips with governing principles. One such was the specific capability of weapons against particular types of targets, he said. The Pershing 2/SS20 was an example he offered.

Another was his assertion that a US missile submarine based in Scotland was almost three times as effective as submarines based in the United States. Since the Soviets have no forward bases, he said this should be taken into account in deciding how many missile submarines they may retain.

By the same token, though the analyst did not draw this inference, the United States could use the same logic to assert that the giant SS18 intercontinental ballistic missile, which carries much larger warheads than anything in the US arsenal, would have to be reduced more than any other system on either side.

The analyst said the Reagan Administration has abandoned the carefully built structure of SALT II in its START proposal, and it is therefore necessary to start from scratch on a new negotiating structure based on an agreed set of principles.

Some of the principles he cited, such as a weapons freeze and an agreement not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, were among six principles mentioned by President Konstantin U. Chernenko in a speech March 2. Those were the only new ideas in the arms-control area offered by Chernenko since taking office.

Some of the other ideas raised by the analyst have never before been aired by the Soviets, officially or unofficially, according to diplomatic sources. The notion of geographic weighting of weapons is one such, they said, for if both sides had to pay a higher price for forward-deployed systems, this might be intended to make the United States reconsider the value of keeping Pershing 2's in Europe and of the Soviet Union keeping large numbers of missile submarines close to US shores.

The analyst's approach also would seem to represent a policy departure, if adopted, from recent Chernenko assertions that the Soviets will not return either to medium-range or strategic missile talks unless the United States agrees first to withdraw the Pershing 2's and cruise missiles.

Virtually all Soviet public statements have stressed that the Reagan Administration must also first prove its sincerity by agreeing to a ban on weapons in space or ratifying the threshold test ban treaty before progress on other questions could be considered.

In that regard, the analyst only said the United States should "take the first step" in proposing a new approach to dealing with the Pershing 2's and cruise missiles. Presumably, he was suggesting that the Administration should suggest merging the two sets of talks, something it has been very reluctant to do.

Some diplomats say it appears that certain officials seem to be unhappy that the current Soviet hard line is counterproductive in terms of needing to make progress on arms control rather than see both sides run free and in suggesting to public opinion in Europe and the United States that Moscow is the principal stumbling block to possible progress.

The analyst's comments might be intended to suggest that constructive thinking is under way here.

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MODE

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE
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RELEASER

LVS

DTG 012242Z Aug 84

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. TOM SHULL FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE / SANTA BARBARA / SITTO # 109

2. 707:012327Z

3. _____

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INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS: ATTACHED:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

101
7/29/99

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CLASSIFICATION

JM 7/26/84 c

THE SOVIET UNION

Issue:

- During the 1970's the USSR increased its military power far beyond its defensive needs and began to use force and the threat of force to expand its control over other countries.
- Either directly or through surrogates the Soviets attempted to establish Communist regimes by force in Africa (Angola, Ethiopia), in Asia (Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos), in Central America (Nicaragua and El Salvador), and actually invaded a neutral country (Afghanistan). They turned Communist Cuba into a base for aggression in Latin America and Africa. At the same time they attempted to undermine NATO by deploying SS-20 nuclear missiles against Western Europe.
- These aggressive moves abroad were accompanied by a crack-down within the Soviet Union: Soviet authorities used police action to silence dissent and suppress freedom of religion and conscience, violating their pledge to uphold human rights which they made in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. They extended this crack-down to the countries under their control in Eastern Europe, brutally suppressing the Polish workers' demand for a free trade union.
- This pattern of aggression not only posed a threat to many independent nations, but ultimately to American security and to the American way of life.
- During the same period, the Soviet Union reached parity in strategic nuclear weapons, and forged ahead of the United States in several respects.
- Soviet aggressiveness significantly raised the risk of war, though the Soviet objective was clearly to obtain the fruits of a military victory without fighting a major war.

U.S. Objectives:

- We must act to preserve peace and freedom. The two are inseparable.
- As the President as stated repeatedly, "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."
- If peace and freedom are to be preserved, the Soviet Union must be deterred from continuing its use of military force to spread its dominance.
- The prospects for peace can also be enhanced by negotiating significantly lower levels of arms, particularly nuclear weapons. But the Soviet Union has no incentive to enter into balanced, fair agreements unless it can be convinced that its attempts to use force will be unsuccessful and that

the United States is willing to maintain an adequate defense even in the absence of agreements.

- Our objective, therefore, is to maintain our strength -- economic, political and military -- to deter aggression and to facilitate negotiation of agreements which would reduce tension and diminish the threat of war.

U.S. Policy:

- The President has outlined three broad objectives in dealing with the Soviet Union:

- (1) To reduce, and eventually to eliminate, the use and threat of force in solving international disputes;

- (2) To reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons, on a balanced and verifiable basis; and

- (3) To establish a better working relationship with the Soviet Union, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

- In pursuing these objectives, our approach is based on three guiding principles:

- (1) Realism, which means that we must recognize the nature of the world we live in and the nature of the Soviet system, and must not sweep problems under the rug but deal with them forthrightly.

- (2) Strength, which is more than military power; it is an amalgam of political unity and will, economic health and an adequate defense. Strength is necessary both to deter war and to provide a basis for negotiation.

- (3) Dialogue, which means that we are prepared to discuss the problems that divide us and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise.

- The United States has made dozens of concrete proposals to the Soviet Union which, if accepted, would reduce tensions, reduce arms levels and provide a better, more realistic working relationship.

- The Soviets have accepted some of these proposals and many others are under negotiation currently. However, since December, 1983, the Soviet Government has refused to negotiate on nuclear arms.

- We believe that it is in the interest of both countries to negotiate verifiable agreements for lower arms levels, and

to improve our relationship in other respects. We will continue our efforts, and believe that the Soviet leadership will eventually come to understand that such negotiations are in its interest as well.

- Until the Soviets show a readiness to negotiate realistically, however, it is essential for us to continue our defense modernization program. If this program is curtailed without verifiable agreements to constrain threatening Soviet programs, the Soviet leaders will have little incentive to negotiate, but will simply wait in the hope of achieving their objectives without any concessions on their part.

Accomplishments

- The world is safer than it was four years ago. Our deterrent capacity has been repaired, and the threatening pattern of Soviet direct and indirect aggression so evident in the 1970's has been stopped.

- Not a single country has fallen to Communist aggression since 1981.

- The Soviet Union has not taken action which could cause direct conflict between us -- as for example happened in 1973, when Soviet preparations to intervene directly in the Middle East caused us to go on a world-wide strategic alert.

- Our alliances, essential to deterring Soviet aggression, have been repaired and are sound.

- NATO's action in deploying U.S. missiles to counter the threat of the Soviet SS-20's is a case in point.

- We have created a sound basis for realistic and peaceful management of our relations with the Soviet Union.

- We have far-reaching and ambitious arms reduction proposals on the table.

- We have moved to place our working relationship on a more businesslike footing, and to increase contacts between our societies.

- We have made clear that the degree of our cooperation with the Soviet Union will depend importantly on Soviet compliance with past agreements, including those designed to protect human rights.

- We have established a pattern of consultation on regional issues. Despite our fundamental disagreements on many of these, consultations help us and the Soviets

to avoid actions which could escalate into direct conflict.

- We have in place a policy designed for the long term, since management of our relations with the Soviet Union must be steady and must avoid the rapid fluctuations of the past, which have weakened our ability to defend our interests. It is based upon a realistic assessment of the Soviet Union, and on the recognition that we must preserve peace between us as we work toward solution of problems.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5419 ✓

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 16, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC STAFF

FROM:

ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Boh*

SUBJECT:

Catalogue of Key National Security Policies

Bud McFarlane has asked that we pull together our key national security policies into a concise and unclassified volume. To facilitate this process, directorates are tasked to prepare short summary papers (maximum three pages) on key national security topics, by region and by function. Attached is a list of the papers, responsible drafters and a sample format. Each paper should include the specific policy issue being addressed, the policy objective, our accomplishments, and any discussion points.

Richard Beal's staff will consolidate the papers and, working with Don Fortier and Bill Martin, will produce a volume. This book will be used to assess our progress in these areas and review our priorities. Such an effort could also be useful in educating the public and Congress and in briefing senior officials on U.S. foreign policy. Please provide your papers to Richard by no later than Wednesday, July 25th.

Attachments

National Security Subjects

Sample Format

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on OADR

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *R. Vitt* NARA, Date *7/20/99*

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National Security Subjects
and Responsible Drafters

Summary

Overview

Fortier

Regions

- A. Soviet Union
- B. Western Europe
- C. Eastern Europe
- D. East Asia
- E. Middle East
- F. South Asia
- G. Latin America
- H. Africa

Matlock
Sommer/Cobb
Dobriansky
Sigur
Kemp
Kemp
Menges
Wettering

Topics

- A. International Economics
- B. Nuclear Non-proliferation
- C. Arms Control
- D. Terrorism
- E. Technology Transfer
- F. Defense Programs - Military
Balance - cooperation with Allies
- G. Energy, Resources, and
the Environment
- H. Space
- I. Human Rights

Robinson
Fortier
Lehman
North
Fortier
Lehman
Martin
Rye
No single author
-- but all regional
authors provide one
or two bullets on
key trends in their
area.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By S. Vitt NARA, Date 7/20/99

SAMPLE
POLICY PAPER FORMAT

(not to exceed three pages)

Issue:

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- o

Objectives:

- o
- o

Accomplishments:

- o
- o
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Talking Points:

- o
- o
- o
- o
- o

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

July 31, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jm* and RON LEHMAN

SUBJECT: Chronology and Contingency Statement on Vienna Talks

Attached is a chronology of US-Soviet diplomatic exchanges and public statements regarding the proposed talks in Vienna in September (TAB I), as well as a draft statement to be issued by the White House in the event the Soviet reply to our latest proposal is negative and the Soviets close the door on further attempts to work out a joint statement (Tab II). On the latter we have made some substantial changes in the State draft. We are still reviewing both and will provide follow-on packages as the situation develops.

At the moment the Soviets have not yet responded to our latest message and our proposed joint statement. This seems to indicate that it is being given serious consideration (albeit possibly only from the standpoint of public presentation). Therefore, while we may be faced soon with a door slammed by the Soviets, it seems more likely that they will continue to press us, both privately and publicly, for further changes in the joint statement.

In addition to these two items, State has prepared for Secretary Shultz a memorandum making recommendations for subsequent negotiation of the joint statement, in case this should be the course the Soviets follow. We have serious problems with the early draft we have seen, and will prepare an analysis for you of the issues.

Attachments:

Tab I - Chronology of U.S.-Soviet Diplomatic Exchanges and Public Statements on the Vienna Talks

Tab II - Draft White House Statement (Contingency)

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADRNLS MD2-011 #33BY LOI, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

CHRONOLOGY OF US-SOVIET DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES AND
PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE VIENNA TALKS

29 June Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin gives Secretary Shultz Soviet Government Statement proposing that U.S and USSR begin negotiations in Vienna in September, 1984 on preventing the militarization of outer space. Dobrynin also conveys proposal for a moratorium on testing and deployment of space weapons from the opening of the negotiations. Soviet proposals are made public almost simultaneously with publication by TASS of the Soviet Government Statement.

Later that day, Acting Secretary Armacost called in Soviet Embassy Minister-Counselor Isakov to present copy of White House statement announcing U.S. acceptance of the Soviet proposal, issued shortly after the meeting. Armacost noted that the U.S. decided to publicize its response in view of the Soviet decision to make its proposal public. White House statement said U.S was prepared to meet in Vienna (1) to discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons can be resumed; and (2) to discuss and seek agreement on feasible negotiating approaches which could lead to verifiable and effective limitations on anti-satellite weapons.

In background press briefing, National Security Advisor McFarlane explains U.S. position, stresses that U.S. is making no preconditions in agreeing to Vienna talks.

1 July TASS Statement scores the "negative response" of the U.S. to the Soviet proposal, claims that U.S. attempt to link Soviet proposal to START and INF represented an unacceptable precondition for the Vienna meeting. The Statement said TASS was authorized to state that "the American Administration's reply to the Soviet Government Statement is totally unsatisfactory, clearly intended to turn outer space into an arena for the deployment of weapons of mass annihilation."

State Department releases statement expressing regret at Soviet reaction, noting U.S. expectation that matter will continue to be discussed in diplomatic channels, and reiterating that U.S. remains ready to sit down with the Soviets at a meeting in Vienna in September, as the Soviets have proposed.

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~~DECL: OADR~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-074/2 #34
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/18/00

President Reagan reiterates U.S. acceptance of the Soviet proposal to Ambassador Dobrynin during White House social event.

2 July Gromyko, in speech for British Foreign Minister Howe, expresses "regret" at the U.S. "negative reply."

3 July Secretary Shultz gives Dobrynin ^{a U.S. message} ~~July 2 letter from President to Gromyko~~ expressing view that Soviet-proposed meeting on the "militarization of outer space" is an "excellent idea," and setting forth U.S. views regarding how the Vienna talks might be organized. Letter also notes close relationship between offensive nuclear arms and other space weapons emphasized by the Soviets, expresses optimism that ways can be found to limit anti-satellite weapons. Secretary emphasizes U.S. readiness to meet without preconditions, explains that U.S. has its own view of what "militarization of outer space" means, notes U.S. flexibility regarding date for beginning discussions, urges that further discussions be confined to diplomatic channels.

5 July Assistant Secretary of State Burt, in conversation with Soviet Charge d'Affaires Isakov, reiterates U.S. readiness to discuss modalities of Vienna talks.

6 July An authoritative TASS Statement repeats charge that U.S. is unwilling ~~now~~ to accept Soviet proposal. Statement asserts that "before the delegations of both sides get together, agreement must be reached on the subject of the talks," and states: "TASS is authorized to declare that the Soviet Government confirms its offer to the Government of the United States to open formal talks on preventing the militarization of outer space. It is these, and not some other talks, that it is urging the U.S. Government to start, and it is awaiting a positive response from the latter."

Department of State press spokesman welcomes TASS indication that Soviet June 29 proposal remains in force, states: "We accepted their proposal for talks a week ago ... Our position has not changed. We accepted and have placed no preconditions on acceptance of the offer of the talks ..." Spokesman emphasizes importance of keeping discussions in diplomatic channels.

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- 3 -

- 7 July Soviet Charge Isakov hands Assistant Secretary Burt the text of a Soviet message responding to the President's July 2 letter. Message echoes July 6 TASS Statement regarding need for agreement on subject matter for the talks, accuses U.S. of seeking a "conference" without a definite agenda. Assistant Secretary Burt reiterates that U.S. will have specific proposals on outer space to put on table at Vienna, and suggests sides talk about defining the agenda.
- 13 July Pravda article says that "Washington's loud assurances of its readiness to come to the talks in Vienna and to conduct them 'without any preconditions' are worth but little."
- 17 July A Pravda commentary calls the U.S. intention to discuss nuclear arms questions "a precondition, and a deliberately unacceptable condition at that."
- 18 July Leonid Zamyatin, head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Information Department, writes that "linking" a prohibition on space weapons with nuclear arms reduction talks "would mean blocking the negotiations on space as well."
- 19 July Ambassador Hartman gives Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko U.S. message responding to Soviet message of July 7. U.S. message expresses support for idea of reaching agreement on content and objective of the Vienna talks, suggests that U.S. and Soviet diplomats work this out. U.S. message stresses that neither side can assert the right to define for the other the issues relevant to the talks; message also emphasizes U.S. desire not merely to "study something," but to find mutually acceptable negotiating approaches which hold promise for concrete results, and reiterates U.S. view that the militarization of space is but one factor in the overall US-Soviet strategic equation.
- 21 July Soviet Charge Isakov gives Assistant Secretary Burt text of Soviet proposal for US-Soviet joint announcement of agreement "to open talks in order to draw up and conclude an agreement on the prevention of the militarization of outer space, including the complete mutual renunciation of anti-satellite systems." The proposed statement would also announce agreement on a "mutual moratorium on the testing and deployment of outer space weapons commencing on the day of the start of the talks." Isakov suggests U.S. should be able to accept Soviet draft, since President accepted Soviet proposal "without preconditions."

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- 4 -

- 23 July TASS Statement publicizes Soviet proposal for a Soviet-American joint announcement; in Press Conference at Soviet Foreign Ministry, spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko parrots thrust of TASS Statement, denies that the moratorium represents a Soviet precondition, but asks "... if there is no such moratorium, what sense is there to conduct talks on the prevention of the militarization of outer space?"
- White House issues statement that U.S. is pleased Soviets have responded to U.S. suggestion to work out a joint announcement, noting that U.S. will respond in diplomatic channels. Statement notes that, historically, serious interest in reaching agreement has led both sides to deal in established diplomatic channels rather than through press releases. Statement reaffirms that U.S. accepts Soviet proposal without preconditions, and looks forward to talks on assumption the Soviet Union will also avoid preconditions.
- 24 July State Department spokesman states that U.S. is responding to Soviet statement privately, in diplomatic channels, as best means of ensuring success for Vienna talks.
- Assistant Secretary Burt gives Soviet Charge Isakov proposed U.S. draft of joint announcement. Burt also restates U.S. readiness to discuss outer space issues in Vienna, says U.S. continues to believe it is also important to address offensive nuclear arms, which are related to the outer space question.
- 25 July Moscow television refers to White House statement of July 24, states that "the White House is continuing its verbal maneuvering ..."
- 26 July Soviet Charge Sokolov gives Deputy Secretary Dam Soviet message responding to U.S. message delivered in Moscow on July 19. Message states that U.S. response to their proposed joint announcement does not square with U.S. acceptance of Soviet proposal for talks, and leaves no doubt that the U.S. is not prepared to conduct negotiations aimed at preventing the militarization of outer space. Message expresses regret that the U.S. position makes it impossible to conduct the negotiations, but says USSR is prepared to reconsider if the U.S. alters its position.

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27 July

Soviets release TASS Statement calling U.S. draft joint announcement evidence that U.S. does not plan to enter into talks. Statement charges that U.S. draft did not even mention "outer space" or Soviet-proposed ASAT moratorium, and calls not for negotiations, but for general discussion on everything and about nothing specifically.

In press conference at Soviet Foreign Ministry, Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov reiterates thrust of TASS Statement, declares that Vienna talks impossible unless U.S. changes its position and agrees to talks on preventing the militarization of outer space.

White House Spokesman Speakes states that TASS Statement misrepresents U.S. position, reiterates U.S. acceptance of Soviet proposal without preconditions, declares that U.S. will respond constructively to Soviet proposals on anti-satellite weapons. Speakes rejects TASS charges regarding responsibility for breakdown of nuclear arms talks, says that if Soviets do not choose to listen to U.S. views on nuclear arms they need not, but that world expects U.S. and USSR to maintain discussions on this subject.

28 July

U.S. Embassy in Moscow delivers U.S. message responding to Soviet message of July 26. Message objects to misrepresentation of U.S. position in Soviet message, and recalls President's earlier statement that negotiations on the "militarization of outer space" are an "excellent idea." Embassy also presents a new U.S. proposal for a possible joint Soviet-American announcement on the content and objective of the Vienna talks, that would state that the aim of the talks should be to work out and conclude agreements concerning the militarization of outer space, including anti-satellite systems and other aspects of this issue. In presenting the draft statement, the Embassy pointed out that if questioned about the meaning of the phrase "militarization of outer space," the U.S. would make clear that it refers to proposals which either side may make which are relevant to this matter. In addition, taking into account the Soviet proposal for establishing a moratorium on anti-satellite tests from the outset of the talks, the Embassy informed the Soviets that the U.S. would consider language in the joint announcement stating that the sides' negotiators at Vienna would consider what possible mutual restraints might be appropriate during the course of the negotiations.

State Department spokesman reaffirms U.S. willingness to go to Vienna without preconditions, to engage in substantive talks there on outer space, including anti-satellite weapons.

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DRAFT WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

[Contingent upon Soviet public rejection of latest U.S. proposal.]

The United States has made clear to the Soviet Government in a series of high-level messages that it accepts the Soviet Union's June 29 proposal, and is prepared for serious talks in Vienna on outer space, including anti-satellite weapons. We have expressed our view that the problem of weapons in space cannot be considered in isolation from the overall strategic relationship, but that we have no preconditions for the Vienna agenda.

Despite this clearly-stated, positive stand on our part, the Soviet Union has alleged that the United States has somehow rejected the Soviet proposal. The latest TASS statement repeats these charges, despite the clear statement of the United States position in a series of high-level messages conveyed to the Soviet Government in diplomatic channels.

In our communications with the Soviets, we have stated our view that the proposal for a conference is an "excellent idea," and that we are prepared to have a delegation in Vienna September 18.

We recently presented a proposal for a possible joint Soviet-American announcement on the content and objective of the Vienna talks. This proposal states explicitly that the aim of the talks should be to work out and conclude agreements concerning the militarization of outer space, including anti-satellite systems and other aspects of this issue.

Taking into account the Soviet proposal to establish a moratorium on anti-satellite tests from the outset of the talks, The United States rejected any precondition but expressed a readiness to consider language in the joint announcement stating that the negotiators would consider what mutual restraints would be appropriate during the course of the negotiations.

The United States regrets the repeated misrepresentations by the Soviet Union of the U.S. position regarding the opening of arms control talks between our two countries in Vienna on what the Soviets have called "the militarization of outer space." As we have indicated, we have accepted their proposal, we are prepared to begin such talks next month in Vienna, and we are prepared in the intervening weeks to work out an agreed formulation on the content and objective of this meeting.

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NLS M02-011 #34

~~SECRET~~

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

July 31, 1984

INFORMATIONMEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *Rm*FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jm* and RON LEHMAN *Rm*

SUBJECT: Chronology and Contingency Statement on Vienna Talks

*attached at
Tab 3 is an alternative
draft statement.*

Attached is a chronology of US-Soviet diplomatic exchanges and public statements regarding the proposed talks in Vienna in September (TAB I), as well as a draft statement to be issued by the White House in the event the Soviet reply to our latest proposal is negative and the Soviets close the door on further attempts to work out a joint statement (Tab II). On the latter we have made some substantial changes in the State draft. We are still reviewing both and will provide follow-on packages as the situation develops.

At the moment the Soviets have not yet responded to our latest message and our proposed joint statement. This seems to indicate that it is being given serious consideration (albeit possibly only from the standpoint of public presentation). Therefore, while we may be faced soon with a door slammed by the Soviets, it seems more likely that they will continue to press us, both privately and publicly, for further changes in the joint statement.

In addition to these two items, State has prepared for Secretary Shultz a memorandum making recommendations for subsequent negotiation of the joint statement, in case this should be the course the Soviets follow. We have serious problems with the early draft we have seen, and will prepare an analysis for you of the issues.

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Tab II - Draft White House Statement (Contingency)

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADRNLS MO2-011 #35BY LOI, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

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29 June Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin gives Secretary Shultz Soviet Government Statement proposing that U.S and USSR begin negotiations in Vienna in September, 1984 on preventing the militarization of outer space. Dobrynin also conveys proposal for a moratorium on testing and deployment of space weapons from the opening of the negotiations. Soviet proposals are made public almost simultaneously with publication by TASS of the Soviet Government Statement.

Later that day, Acting Secretary Armacost called in Soviet Embassy Minister-Counselor Isakov to present copy of White House statement announcing U.S. acceptance of the Soviet proposal, issued shortly after the meeting. Armacost noted that the U.S. decided to publicize its response in view of the Soviet decision to make its proposal public. White House statement said U.S was prepared to meet in Vienna (1) to discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons can be resumed; and (2) to discuss and seek agreement on feasible negotiating approaches which could lead to verifiable and effective limitations on anti-satellite weapons.

In background press briefing, National Security Advisor McFarlane explains U.S. position, stresses that U.S. is making no preconditions in agreeing to Vienna talks.

1 July TASS Statement scores the "negative response" of the U.S. to the Soviet proposal, claims that U.S. attempt to link Soviet proposal to START and INF represented an unacceptable precondition for the Vienna meeting. The Statement said TASS was authorized to state that "the American Administration's reply to the Soviet Government Statement is totally unsatisfactory, clearly intended to turn outer space into an arena for the deployment of weapons of mass annihilation."

State Department releases statement expressing regret at Soviet reaction, noting U.S. expectation that matter will continue to be discussed in diplomatic channels, and reiterating that U.S. remains ready to sit down with the Soviets at a meeting in Vienna in September, as the Soviets have proposed.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~DECL: OADR~~

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NLS F95-074/2 #35
BY LOT NARA, DATE 7/8/00

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

President Reagan reiterates U.S. acceptance of the Soviet proposal to Ambassador Dobrynin during White House social event.

2 July Gromyko, in speech for British Foreign Minister Howe, expresses "regret" at the U.S. "negative reply."

3 July Secretary Shultz gives Dobrynin ^{a U.S. message} ~~July 2 letter from President to Chernenko~~ expressing view that Soviet-proposed meeting on the "militarization of outer space" is an "excellent idea," and setting forth U.S. views regarding how the Vienna talks might be organized. Letter also notes close relationship between offensive nuclear arms and other space weapons emphasized by the Soviets, expresses optimism that ways can be found to limit anti-satellite weapons. Secretary emphasizes U.S. readiness to meet without preconditions, explains that U.S. has its own view of what "militarization of outer space" means, notes U.S. flexibility regarding date for beginning discussions, urges that further discussions be confined to diplomatic channels.

5 July Assistant Secretary of State Burt, in conversation with Soviet Charge d'Affaires Isakov, reiterates U.S. readiness to discuss modalities of Vienna talks.

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Department of State press spokesman welcomes TASS indication that Soviet June 29 proposal remains in force, states: "We accepted their proposal for talks a week ago ... Our position has not changed. We accepted and have placed no preconditions on acceptance of the offer of the talks ..." Spokesman emphasizes importance of keeping discussions in diplomatic channels.

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- 3 -

- 7 July Soviet Charge Isakov hands Assistant Secretary Burt the text of a Soviet message responding to the President's July 2 letter. Message echoes July 6 TASS Statement regarding need for agreement on subject matter for the talks, accuses U.S. of seeking a "conference" without a definite agenda. Assistant Secretary Burt reiterates that U.S. will have specific proposals on outer space to put on table at Vienna, and suggests sides talk about defining the agenda.
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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 23 July TASS Statement publicizes Soviet proposal for a Soviet-American joint announcement; in Press Conference at Soviet Foreign Ministry, spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko parrots thrust of TASS Statement, denies that the moratorium represents a Soviet precondition, but asks "... if there is no such moratorium, what sense is there to conduct talks on the prevention of the militarization of outer space?"
- White House issues statement that U.S. is pleased Soviets have responded to U.S. suggestion to work out a joint announcement, noting that U.S. will respond in diplomatic channels. Statement notes that, historically, serious interest in reaching agreement has led both sides to deal in established diplomatic channels rather than through press releases. Statement reaffirms that U.S. accepts Soviet proposal without preconditions, and looks forward to talks on assumption the Soviet Union will also avoid preconditions.
- 24 July State Department spokesman states that U.S. is responding to Soviet statement privately, in diplomatic channels, as best means of ensuring success for Vienna talks.
- Assistant Secretary Burt gives Soviet Charge Isakov proposed U.S. draft of joint announcement. Burt also restates U.S. readiness to discuss outer space issues in Vienna, says U.S. continues to believe it is also important to address offensive nuclear arms, which are related to the outer space question.
- 25 July Moscow television refers to White House statement of July 24, states that "the White House is continuing its verbal maneuvering ..."
- 26 July Soviet Charge Sokolov gives Deputy Secretary Dam Soviet message responding to U.S. message delivered in Moscow on July 19. Message states that U.S. response to their proposed joint announcement does not square with U.S. acceptance of Soviet proposal for talks, and leaves no doubt that the U.S. is not prepared to conduct negotiations aimed at preventing the militarization of outer space. Message expresses regret that the U.S. position makes it impossible to conduct the negotiations, but says USSR is prepared to reconsider if the U.S. alters its position.

27 July

Soviets release TASS Statement calling U.S. draft joint announcement evidence that U.S. does not plan to enter into talks. Statement charges that U.S. draft did not even mention "outer space" or Soviet-proposed ASAT moratorium, and calls not for negotiations, but for general discussion on everything and about nothing specifically.

In press conference at Soviet Foreign Ministry, Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov reiterates thrust of TASS Statement, declares that Vienna talks impossible unless U.S. changes its position and agrees to talks on preventing the militarization of outer space.

White House Spokesman Speakes states that TASS Statement misrepresents U.S. position, reiterates U.S. acceptance of Soviet proposal without preconditions, declares that U.S. will respond constructively to Soviet proposals on anti-satellite weapons. Speakes rejects TASS charges regarding responsibility for breakdown of nuclear arms talks, says that if Soviets do not choose to listen to U.S. views on nuclear arms they need not, but that world expects U.S. and USSR to maintain discussions on this subject.

28 July

U.S. Embassy in Moscow delivers U.S. message responding to Soviet message of July 26. Message objects to misrepresentation of U.S. position in Soviet message, and recalls President's earlier statement that negotiations on the "militarization of outer space" are an "excellent idea." Embassy also presents a new U.S. proposal for a possible joint Soviet-American announcement on the content and objective of the Vienna talks, that would state that the aim of the talks should be to work out and conclude agreements concerning the militarization of outer space, including anti-satellite systems and other aspects of this issue. In presenting the draft statement, the Embassy pointed out that if questioned about the meaning of the phrase "militarization of outer space," the U.S. would make clear that it refers to proposals which either side may make which are relevant to this matter. In addition, taking into account the Soviet proposal for establishing a moratorium on anti-satellite tests from the outset of the talks, the Embassy informed the Soviets that the U.S. would consider language in the joint announcement stating that the sides' negotiators at Vienna would consider what possible mutual restraints might be appropriate during the course of the negotiations.

State Department spokesman reaffirms U.S. willingness to go to Vienna without preconditions, to engage in substantive talks there on outer space, including anti-satellite weapons.

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

[Contingent upon Soviet public rejection of latest U.S. proposal.]

The United States has made clear to the Soviet Government in a series of high-level messages that it accepts the Soviet Union's June 29 proposal, and is prepared for serious talks in Vienna on outer space, including anti-satellite weapons. We have expressed our view that the problem of weapons in space cannot be considered in isolation from the overall strategic relationship, but that we have no preconditions for the Vienna agenda.

Despite this clearly-stated, positive stand on our part, the Soviet Union has alleged that the United States has somehow rejected the Soviet proposal. The latest TASS statement repeats these charges, despite the clear statement of the United States position in a series of high-level messages conveyed to the Soviet Government in diplomatic channels.

In our communications with the Soviets, we have stated our view that the proposal for a conference is an "excellent idea," and that we are prepared to have a delegation in Vienna September 18.

We recently presented a proposal for a possible joint Soviet-American announcement on the content and objective of the Vienna talks. This proposal states explicitly that the aim of the talks should be to work out and conclude agreements concerning the militarization of outer space, including anti-satellite systems and other aspects of this issue.

Taking into account the Soviet proposal to establish a moratorium on anti-satellite tests from the outset of the talks, The United States rejected any precondition but expressed a readiness to consider language in the joint announcement stating that the negotiators would consider what mutual restraints would be appropriate during the course of the negotiations.

The United States regrets the repeated misrepresentations by the Soviet Union of the U.S. position regarding the opening of arms control talks between our two countries in Vienna on what the Soviets have called "the militarization of outer space." As we have indicated, we have accepted their proposal, we are prepared to begin such talks next month in Vienna, and we are prepared in the intervening weeks to work out an agreed formulation on the content and objective of this meeting.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M02-011 #34

~~SECRET~~

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

DRAFT WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

[Contingent upon Soviet public rejection of the latest US proposal.]

The United States has made it clear to the Soviet Government in a series of high-level messages that it accepts the Soviet Union's June proposal to meet in Vienna on September 18, 1984, that we view that the proposal for a conference is an "excellent idea," and that we are prepared to send a US delegation. In those messages, the US made it equally clear that we are prepared for serious talks in Vienna on a number of important issues to include what the Soviet Union terms the "militarization of space." We have expressed the US view that the problem of weapons in space cannot be considered in isolation from the overall strategic relationship, but that we have no preconditions for the Vienna agenda.

Despite this clearly stated, positive stand on our part, the Soviet Union has alleged that the United States has somehow rejected the Soviet proposal. The latest TASS statement repeats these charges, despite the clear statement of the United States position in a series of high-level messages conveyed to the Soviet Government in diplomatic channels.

Let us set the record straight. We recently presented a proposal for a possible, joint Soviet-American announcement on the content and objective of the Vienna talks. This proposal states explicitly that the US, in the interest of meeting Soviet concerns, would be willing to agree that the principal aim of the talks should be to work out and conclude agreements concerning what the Soviets have termed "the militarization of space," including anti-satellite systems and other aspects of this issue.

Taking into account the proposal of the Soviet Union, the only nation that now has a deployed ASAT capability, to establish a moratorium on anti-satellite tests from the outset of the talks, the United States rejected any precondition, but, once again responding to Soviet concerns, expressed a readiness to consider language in the joint announcement stating that both sides would consider what mutual restraints would be appropriate during the course of the talks.

The United States regrets the repeated misrepresentations by the Soviet Union of the US position regarding the opening of arms control talks between the two countries in Vienna. We regret even more that after expending considerable effort and showing great flexibility in trying to meet Soviet concerns, the Soviets are now backing out of their own proposal.

For our part, the United States stands ready to meet with the Soviets to discuss any item of concern to both sides at any time and at any place. We would welcome the opportunity to explore approaches which could lead to the negotiation of verifiable and effective limitations on anti-satellite weapons. We would also like to discuss the resumption of negotiations on reducing existing offensive nuclear arms. And, we remain prepared to discuss what the Soviets term the "militarization of space" and other areas of concern. We offer now to meet with the Soviet Union on these terms and without preconditions on September 18 as they themselves proposed on June 29. We hope the Soviet Union will decide to join us in these critical discussions.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M02-011 #36

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Chron
~~MATLOCK~~~~SECRET~~

July 31, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

RCM HAS SEEN

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Bilaterals: Consular Review Talks,
Fishing and Other

In response to your note, you should know that conclusion of the consular review talks has been postponed once again, until tomorrow, August 1. The Embassy, however, feels that the cause of the delay is not political but was the result of the fact that the Soviet official who was to sign (Bessmertnykh) was out of town.

The Soviets have continued to address some of the comparatively minor bilateral measures. Sokolov came in this morning at his request to see Mark Palmer, at which time he delivered a note which makes final the arrangements for a limited fishing quota for the Soviets (that is, they accepted the obligation to buy an equivalent amount of fish from American fishermen). Dobrynin told Hartman in Moscow that the Soviets were working seriously on the navigation aids proposal before ICAO. Also, Sokolov conveyed Soviet agreement to a proposal we had made to hold bilateral talks on the protection of seals. Regarding the cultural exchanges agreement, Sokolov said the problem was that several of their key people are on vacation in August, and asked unofficially whether early September would be acceptable to us for the start of negotiations.

During Sokolov's call, Palmer took the occasion to tell him that he hoped his government understood the seriousness of our approach to Vienna and would respond in an equally serious vein. Sokolov said he had no instructions on the matter but that personally he thought there were "significant new elements" in our position.

In sum, it would appear that the Soviets have decided to proceed in reasonably businesslike fashion on some of the bilateral issues. At the moment, it would seem that a decision has not yet been made to write off the Vienna proposal totally, but I believe that we will see, at a minimum, further efforts to move our position on the talks closer to theirs.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074/2#56BY h05, NARA, DATE 11/6/00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7/31

TO: JACK MATLOCK

Wilma received the attached letter today which I read to her over the phone (she is in Calif). She asked that I make a copy and send to you for appropriate action. Also, that RCM has not seen this letter, but that he signed the reply to Green/Pearce's last letter yesterday and it was mailed from California today.

Dona

Atch

7/27/84

Wilma,

We greatly appreciate the way you work and know that if there was anything to communicate from Bud we would have spoken with you last week.

Our second purpose in calling was to let you know that the initiative continues to be very active. Since we have limited experience in these areas, (what an understatement!), we assume that further reference to the initiative could be made by the Soviets or the Chinese through any number of channels, and wish to assure you are completely informed, should a response be made through an unexpected one.

Since our last letter of July 18, we have spoken with Ji Chaozhen of the PRC Embassy again. We have suggested a written Clarification of the response from Chairman Deng and have continued our discussion of the possible role Deng might

play in encouraging a Soviet response.
Mr. Ji confirmed that Ambassador
Menjin has forwarded the request
and question, and was positive
about both. (We have since narrowed
the question about Soviet response, and
are considering what "heart" connections
might be available to Gromyko) any
thoughts?

This is a traditional time for vacation
and reflection, and we will be
spending the next few weeks with
our families. We hope to hear Bud
in San Francisco at the Commonwealth
Club and would be honored to
provide any assistance to you or
him or your families in California.
It would be a special privilege

God bless you both.
Tom and Jerry