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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files

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File Folder: Matlock Chron April 1984 (1) ~~Box 70857~~
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Date: 5/30/97

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (90307)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Talks (3 pp.) R 1/7/11 MO2-DID #11	4/17/84	P1/P5
2. memo (90307)	Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re Talks (1 p.) A 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #23	n.d.	P1
3. memo (90307)	Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re Talks (1 p.) P 7/7/00 NLSF95-074 #24; Part. 7/15/10 MO2-DID #12	3/19/84	P1
4. paper	re US-Soviet Talks (2 pp.) Part. 9/27/10 MO2-DID #13	n.d.	P1/P5
5. paper	re Soviet position (1 p.) Part. 7/15/10 MO2-DID #14	n.d.	P1/P5
6. paper	re Talks (3 pp.) P 7/7/00 NLSF95-074 #25	n.d.	P1
7. memo (90307)	Diane Dornan to Robert McFarlane re Talks and Agreements (2 pp.) R 1/7/11 MO2-DID #16	4/13/84	P1/P5
8. memo	Edward O'Malley to Ken deGraffenreid re Talks (2 pp.) P 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #26 D 10/17/05 MO2-DID #17	4/3/84	P1
9. paper	re Talks (3 pp.) D 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #27	n.d.	P1
10. memo (90307)	to Ken Degraffenreid re USSR (2 pp.) D 7/10/01 F95-074 #28	n.d.	P1
11. memo (90307)	John Poindexter to Ken Degraffenreid/Diane Dornan re Review (1 p.) P 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #29; R 1/7/11 MO2-DID #19	4/6/84	P1
12. memo (90307)	Diane Dornan and Ken Degraffenreid to Robert McFarlane re Talks (4 pp.) Part. 7/15/10 MO2-DID #20	4/3/84	P1/P5

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files

Archivist: smf

File Folder: Matlock Chron April 1984 (1)

Date: 5/30/97

Box 4

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
13. memo (90448)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Response to Chernenko Letter (1 p.)	4/12/84	P1/P5
14. memo (90448)	Robert McFarlane to the President re Response to Chernenko's letter (2 pp.)	n.d.	P1/P5
15. letter	President Reagan to Chairman Chernenko (7 pp.)	n.d.	P1
16. memo (90448)	George Shultz to the President re Response to Chernenko's letter (3 pp.)	4/6/84	P1/P5
17. letter	draft reply to Chernenko's letter (7 pp.)	n.d.	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer CAS

Box Number 4

FOIA M02-010

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1984 (1)

DATE 3/22/2007

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
16	MEMO	SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE RESPONSE (#23)	3	4/6/1984	

MWH 3/17/08

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 17, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Consular Review Talks with the USSR

State has submitted, in the memorandum at Tab II, a report with recommendations for next steps in the Consular Review Talks with the USSR. The one point in dispute is the refusal of the FBI to agree to an offer to expand entry/exit points allowed on visas for our respective officials to include Baltimore and San Francisco in return for Brest and Nakhodka. State considers such expansion in the U.S. interest, and the provision for reciprocal expansion of entry/exit points integral to our negotiating package. Without this provision, State sees no merit in continuing the Consular Review Talks.

Discussion

The Consular Review Talks under discussion actually began in 1976 and have been carried on sporadically over the years without conclusion. From the outset, one principal U.S. objective was to secure an expansion of entry/exit points available to U.S. diplomats and officials in the Soviet Union. This is important to us both to facilitate travel relevant to intelligence gathering, and also to provide more efficient access by highway and rail to Western Europe and by ship to the Far East. The Soviets have been in a position, by denying a visa amendment to enter or exit the Soviet Union at points such as Brest and Nakhodka, to prevent important travel without risking retaliation for a travel denial as such. (In 1981, for example, the Soviets routinely refused the Brest entry/exit point to our military attaches, at a time when observation of possible Soviet mobilization on the Polish border was a high-priority objective.) The Soviets hardly ever apply for an additional entry/exit point for their personnel, since they routinely use New York as the port of entry, even for their personnel in San Francisco. Therefore, we have had no means of forcing a more forthcoming policy in this area by retaliation in kind.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M02-010 #11
BY RW NARA DATE 1/7/11

During past negotiations, the Soviets showed no interest in expanding the number of entry/exit points, but were eager to obtain diplomatic visas for members of the Supreme Soviet and certain other senior Soviet officials not normally eligible for such visas. Since this is a purely symbolic issue (diplomatic visas not conferring diplomatic immunities under U.S. law), it was decided to use Soviet interest in this issue to obtain their agreement on the expansion of entry/exit points. Prior to April, 1983, the FBI had approved this arrangement, but withdrew its approval at that time, and its position on the matter is unchanged now.

The FBI rests its objection primarily on the problem of handling Soviet ship visits to Baltimore. This, however, is not relevant to the entry/exit visa question, since issuing visas valid for entry and exit in Baltimore does not constitute permission for Soviet ships to use the port. The latter is an entirely separate issue, and permission for each visit is decided on its own merits, without regard to the visa question. When consulted on the issue, DIA expressed doubts about the intelligence collection value of the Brest/Nakhodka entry exit points and suggested a thorough study of the intelligence trade-offs relating to this question. These views, and Diane Dornan's covering memorandum, are at TAB IV.

In my opinion, the FBI has not made a strong case that the inclusion of Baltimore and San Francisco as entry/exit points will add importantly to their burdens. As regards the need to give further study to the intelligence trade-offs, I do not believe the relatively trivial magnitude of the changes proposed justify a formal study. The arguments on both sides are readily apparent to those familiar with the issues and procedures, and intelligence trade-offs are only one consideration relevant to the package. There is no question that service attaches in Moscow favor additional entry/exit points, since it does in fact facilitate their ability to perform travel. The additional entry/exit points are also important to staff morale and the Embassy's operational needs.

Inasmuch as the Consular Review Talks represent one of the very few areas where it appears that a quick agreement might be possible, and the addition of Brest and Nakhodka would be of substantial benefit to U.S. installations in the Soviet Union, I believe that State should be authorized to renew negotiations on the basis it proposes. However, I believe that we should be cognizant of the counterintelligence community's concerns by making it clear that approval to proceed with the consular review talks does not imply approval of Soviet ship calls, that any arrangements must meet the test of reciprocity, and that implementation should be conducted in close coordination with the FBI and other appropriate counterintelligence organizations.

Diane Dornan does not concur, and recommends a further study of the intelligence implications.

Recommendation:

That you approve transmission of the Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum at Tab I, which authorizes State to proceed with the Consular Review Talks on the basis it recommends, but with the caveats noted above.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

- Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum
- Tab II - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of March 19, 1984
- Tab III - "Consular Review Talks": Background paper from State
- Tab IV - Dornan Memo of April 13 with comments by FBI and DIA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Consular Review Talks with the USSR (S)

The report transmitted with your memorandum to Mr. McFarlane of March 19, 1984, containing recommendations for next steps on the Consular Review Talks with the Soviet Union, has been reviewed.

(S)
The Department is authorized to renew the Consular Review Talks with the USSR on the basis it recommends. It should be noted, however, that this does not constitute approval for Soviet ship visits to the Ports of Baltimore or San Francisco, which should be treated as a separate issue. Any future recommendations in regard to such requests should be submitted following coordination with the FBI and other interested U.S. agencies. (S)

If the Soviets should accept the expansion of entry/exit points as a part of the package of U.S. proposals, the Department should insure that any arrangements made pursuant to the agreement meet the test of strict reciprocity, and that close coordination be maintained with the FBI and other counterintelligence agencies so that appropriate measures can be taken to minimize any potential intelligence benefits to the Soviet Union. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #23

BY smf NARA, DATE 11/16/99



8408365 SYSTEM 11
90307 add-on
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

March 19, 1984

84 MAR 20 A 7: 28

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Consular Review Talks with the USSR

In response to your March 12 request, we are attaching a report with recommendations for next steps on the Consular Review Talks with the Soviet Union. The Department would like to proceed with the Consular Review Talks using the agenda to which the FBI agreed prior to the April, 1983 meeting with the Soviets. The FBI subsequently withdrew its concurrence to one item of the package -- an increase of entry/exit points -- an item which we feel is central to a balanced package. The entry/exit issue was placed on the agenda to counterbalance the Soviet request for diplomatic visas for high-level Soviet officials and to address Embassy Moscow's request for improved travel [REDACTED] a/ long-standing goal of the U.S. Government.

Bmckindley
for Charles Hall
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:
As stated.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M02-010#12
BY RW NARA DATE 7/15/10

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 (b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

U.S.-Soviet Consular Review Talks

The Consular Review Talks (CRT) are part of our effort to find areas in the bilateral relationship in which we can make progress in solving specific problems. We are having particular problems now on a series of consular and visa matters that the talks could help resolve. Successful talks could also provide a demonstration that realistic negotiations can produce agreements that serve the interests of both countries. A round of talks in Washington last spring came close to producing an agreement that we thought was attractive, but the FBI withdrew its consent on one important element. As a result, we had to stall and the Soviets eventually went home. The shootdown of the KAL aircraft delayed a resumption of the talks.

We believe now is the time to resume the talks. The USG must decide, however, whether or not we can agree to a reciprocal increase in the number of entry/exit points in each country from three to five. This is the issue that caused us the problem last spring, when the FBI withdrew its concurrence. Increasing the number of Soviet exit/entry points has long been a U.S. goal. It would greatly increase our ability to enter and depart the country, particularly by the overland routes

[REDACTED]

We would obtain entry/exit at Brest, on the Polish border, and Nakhodka, on the Soviet Pacific coast near Vladivostok. The Soviets would obtain entry/exit at San Francisco, where they have a consulate, and at Baltimore (by sea only, to parallel our entry/exit possibilities at Nakhodka).

The FBI opposes this expansion of entry/exit points. The attached statement of its position (Tab A) lists the following objections: "The agreed upon proposals approved by the SIG-I addressing limiting the presence and travel of hostile foreign officials and nonofficials in the U.S., proposed in part '...limiting Soviet officials and tourists to specific entry/exit points; ...' had as its thrust the reduction of entry/exit points available for utilization by Soviet officials"; and, "The presence of Soviet passenger ships for extended periods of time in this port facility (of Baltimore) would afford the Soviets a prolonged period of time to accomplish disembarkment...."

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR MD2-010 #13

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4 (D)

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

The Department does not share the FBI's view that the SIG-I agreed to reduce the number of entry/exit points; rather, it merely agreed to add exit controls to the previously existing entry controls. Earlier, the Soviets had been restricted to specific entry points, but could exit from any open city. The SIG/I decision restricted the Soviets to the same exit points as entry points.

[REDACTED] The Soviets cannot bring any more ships into Baltimore than we authorize. Making Baltimore an exit/entry point will not change that. In some past years, they already have been permitted to have one ship visit. In 1983 and again this year the Department turned down their yearly ship-visit request because the Soviets were not sufficiently forthcoming on our needs in Moscow.

[REDACTED] Given the convenience of Brest as an entry point (particularly if we open a consulate in Kiev) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the United States will get considerably more out of this expansion of exit/entry points than the Soviets and our interests are served by going ahead with it on its own merits. In addition, this was a key element in the draft "package" that we worked on with the Soviets last spring. To withdraw it would unbalance the package in the Soviets' favor, leaving us several unpalatable alternatives: 1) reach an agreement in which we will give more than we get; 2) withdraw a bargaining item of major interest to the Soviets, i.e. diplomatic visas for high-level U.S. and Soviet officials, leaving a package of rather minor visa concessions which they would probably reject; or, 3) decline to resume the talks, thus giving up the opportunity for progress that they represent and possibly stimulating a worsened tit-for-tat situation on these irritating visa and consular issues.

The State Department recommends that the entry/exit points be included in the next round of talks and we will then inform the Soviets that the U.S. proposes to reconvene the talks in May.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/WNINTEL

RE: SOVIET SECTION INTD'S POSITION ON BALTIMORE
AS THE ENTRY/EXIT POINT FOR SOVIET OFFICIALS

The agreed upon proposals approved by the SIG-I addressing limiting the presence and travel of hostile foreign officials and nonofficials in the U.S., proposed in part "... limiting Soviet officials and tourists to specific entry/exit points; ..." had as its thrust the reduction of entry/exit points available for utilization by Soviet officials.

Therefore, the FBI opposes the Port of Baltimore being designated as an entry/exit point for the convenience of Soviet travelers. The presence of Soviet passenger ships for extended periods of time in this port facility would afford the Soviets a prolonged period of time to accomplish disembarkment and boarding of passengers and large cargo items. In addition, members of the crew would also be afforded the opportunity to disembark.



While opposing opening the Port of Baltimore, the FBI would not oppose the resumption of weekly Aeroflot flights into JFK Airport, New York, if such an offer would afford adequate negotiating leverage to gain the additional entry/exit points desired by State in the USSR. Such resumption of flights would be permitted and contingent upon simultaneous access to the desired entry/exit points in the USSR and their continued availability to U.S. officials and tourists.

~~SECRET~~/WNINTEL

Classified by: 4193
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR MD2-DID #14
BY RW NARA DATE 7/15/10

E.O. 12958
As Amended
3.3.76
(U)

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 671 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 9410 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Re: 90307
Add on~~SECRET~~


April 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR KEN DeGRAFFENREID/DIANE DORNAN

FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Consular Review

I have reviewed this package and discussed it with Bud. This has to be considered from two aspects. First the President has already authorized Secretary Shultz to proceed ahead with the CRT's and secondly the CI community should have an opportunity to review and have their comments taken into account.



We need to insist on reciprocity and insure we do not take unnecessary risks that can not be adequately covered.

cc: Jack Matlock (as discussed)
Bob Kimmitt

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F95-074 #29By smf, NARA, Date 11/16/99

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 3, 1984

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: DIANE DORNAN *DD*
KENNETH E. deGRAFFENREID *deGraffenreid*

SUBJECT: Nonconcurrence on Authorization for Consular
Review Talks with the USSR

Basis of Nonconcurrence

We are unable to concur on this package because, despite requests by us and the FBI, the full negotiating terms of reference are not revealed, and because FBI has pointed out counterintelligence concerns which merit further study. Lack of information on the negotiating package reflects the deeper problem of failure to consider carefully whether the proposed terms would in fact secure net benefits for the US or at least avoid overall harm. We recommend that the package be remanded without prejudice for more careful study and that the precedent be established for orderly review of intelligence collection and counterintelligence issues in preparing negotiating packages. The process should include full participation of the FBI and OFM. OFM has been excluded from these discussions although it is authorized and required by the Foreign Missions Act to ensure reciprocity of benefits with the USSR. For your convenience we have summarized below the pros and cons expressed regarding the known negotiating terms of reference.

Summary of Issues Under Contention:

Those who advocate the wisdom of negotiating such terms contend that an agreement will demonstrate that we can negotiate successfully with the Soviets and that the addition of two entry/exit points will make the entire package more favorable to the US than to the Soviets; without these additional entry/exit points, the terms of reference would favor the USSR. You are asked to authorize State to negotiate "on the basis it recommends." This basis, and the arguments pro and con, are presented as follows:

- Diplomatic visas would be given to high-level US and Soviet government officials not normally eligible for them. This is said to be the primary Soviet incentive to accept the package, although it is said that these persons still will have to go through the normal visa authorization process and their primary gain will be one of prestige

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M02-D10 #20
BY *RU* NARA DATE 7/15/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

and, to a minor extent, of convenience. FBI was not informed of this proposal or asked to comment on it.

- "A package of rather minor visa concessions" to the Soviets which have not been specified would be negotiated. FBI was told these were irrelevant to the Bureau's concerns and its comments were not desired.

- Entry/Exit points would be expanded from three to five. Arguments that this would be more advantageous to the US than to the USSR include the following:

-- The Soviets do not need or want additional such sites.

-- Opening of Brest on the Polish border would be a major convenience for diplomats and their families traveling to and from Europe, since it is a shorter and less expensive trip than through Finland and since it would facilitate access to the proposed consulate in Kiev.

-- Overland access through Brest and Nahodka (on the Pacific coast near Vladivostok) would provide an "opportunity to penetrate Soviet society" and to "spread our ideas." [REDACTED]

-- FBI claims regarding CI problems and burdens are exaggerated and center primarily on the issue of Soviet ship visitation rights, which will be unaffected.

-- FBI arguments in other areas misunderstand actual practices and exaggerate the meaning of entry/exist points authorization.

-- By removing the need to obtain special permission to enter and exit from these two additional cities and making it a normal right, we will restrict Soviet ability, against which we have no strictly reciprocal retaliation options, to deny travel requests by US personnel, especially military attaches who have wished to use Brest.

- The FBI, however, argues that additional entry/exit points may benefit the Soviets more than us in that:

-- This would run counter to recent policy initiatives ameliorating the CI problem, including the drastic reduction in allowable Soviet exit points which recently was imposed.

E.O. 12958

As Amended

Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- Already strained CI resources would be spread thinner. Prolonged boarding procedures would make surveillance difficult in the ports of Baltimore and San Francisco; these port problems would be exacerbated if visa holders came on Soviet-owned ships, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Although we have denied Soviet ship visits to Baltimore in 1983 and 1984 to retaliate for problems in the USSR, this is the preferred Soviet method for rotating Washington embassy staff; the Soviets may accuse the US or reneging on the spirit, if not the letter, of the agreement if we deny such ship visitations and require that they book vessels from other countries, and may deny US travel rights through Brest or Nahodka in retaliation. We can anticipate internal and external pressure to allow Soviet ship visitation and in practice we are likely to lose the ability to deny these rights, thus sacrificing current retaliatory leverage over the USSR and incurring additional CI problems. In addition, access to San Francisco by air would provide easy contact with the large Soviet intelligence organization at their embassy in Mexico City, which conducts intelligence operations against the US.

- [REDACTED] benefits accruing to the US from adding two more entry/exit points may be overstated since:

- o The extent to which we have been able to [REDACTED] influence opinions by digressing into the countryside from access routes is questionable.
- o Travel from Nahodka would be by train only, which eases Soviet surveillance tasks and does not facilitate digression from the approved route.
- o Allies [REDACTED] already have access to these cities.

-- Since we do not know whether we can negotiate acceptable terms for opening a Kiev consulate, it is premature to arrange easier access to such a site.

-- The merits of convenience should be weighed against expected CI problems.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
4

RECOMMENDATION

That you return the package to agencies for further and fuller consideration of its net benefits, without prejudice to judgments regarding its overall desirability.

Approve J

see my note
Disapprove _____

That FBI and OFM be included in such deliberations and that counterintelligence and intelligence collection issues be more carefully weighed.

Approve J

Disapprove _____

*Need to also involve DIA to get
better assessment on intelligence gains.
Again we need to proceed with dispatch
and prepare an options memo.*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 13, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK SUBJECT: Letter to the President from the
Bielarussian Coordinating Committee

I recommend that you sign the attached memorandum to
Sally Kelley.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to Sally Kelley

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from the
Bielarussian Coordinating Committee

We have reviewed and concur, with slight change as noted,
with the Department of State's proposed response to the
Bielarussian Coordinating Committee.

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

3055
S/S 8409990

Date April 11, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Mrs. Vera Romuk

Date: March 26, 1984 Subject: Concern for the
Biellarussian/Byelorussian people in occupied Bielarus

WH Referral Dated: -- 4/4/84 - NSC ID# 205116
(if any)

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

XX A draft reply is attached.

_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.

_____ A translation is attached.

_____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

_____ We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.

_____ The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.

_____ Other.

Remarks:

for Kristie A. Kenney
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

Department of State
Suggested Response

Dear Mrs. Romuk:

Thank you for your letter of March 26 to President Reagan concerning the people of Bielarusa/Bylorussia.

The position of the U.S. Government and the Department of State has been and remains that the United States fully supports the principle of national self-determination for all people, including the Bielarussian people. We also strongly support the struggle of all peoples to establish freedom and democracy in their own lands.

In taking these positions, however, it is necessary to point out that the United States equally strongly subscribes to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign states, and does not as a matter of policy advocate the dissolution of sovereign states recognized as such by the United States. As Vice President Bush noted in his September 21, 1983 address in Vienna: "Let me stress here that the United States does not seek to destabilize or undermine any

Mrs. Vera Romuk, Secretary,
Bielarusian Coordinating Committee
of Chicago, Illinois,
3348 North Oleander Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois.

government, but our attitude toward the (Eastern and Central European) region is informed by a sense of history -- of European history. For this reason, we support and will encourage all movement toward the social, humanitarian, and democratic ideals which have characterized the historical development of Europe."

We understand the concern of Bielarussian-Americans for their compatriots in the Soviet Union and will continue to speak out for the right of all nations to self-determination.

Sincerely,

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

APRIL 4, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 205116

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MARCH 26, 1984

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MRS. VERA ROMUK
SECRETARY
BIELARUSIAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
3348 NORTH OLEANDER AVENUE
CHICAGO IL 60634

SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THE
BIELARUSIAN/BYELORUSSIAN PEOPLE IN THE
SOVIET RUSSIAN OCCUPIED BIELARUS

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
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UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

Received in 5/57
111-11-25 AM 11

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MARCH 29, 1984

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MRS. VERA ROMUK

SUBJECT WRITES REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THE
BIELARUSIAN/BYELORUSSIAN PEOPLE IN THE
SOVIET RUSSIAN OCCUPIED BIELARUS

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
LINAS KOJELIS		ORG	84/03/29		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:					/ /
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COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES _____

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION CODES:	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	* CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	* OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	* CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		* OUTGOING	*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *			*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE			*
*X-INTERIM REPLY			*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
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LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.



Bielarussian Coordinating Committee of Chicago, Illinois

MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS:

Byelorussian American National
Council of Chicago

Whiteruthenian (Byelorussian)
American Ass'n in Illinois

Bielarussian American Youth
Organization in Illinois

March 26, 1984

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Yesterday, March 25, marked the 66th Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence of Bielarus/Byelorussia. Bielarussian-American Communities in the United States, including Chicago, solemnly observed this jubilee with appropriate commemorative programs.

On this occasion, I am writing to you, Mr. President, to bring to your attention the destiny of the Bielarussian/Byelorussian people in the Soviet-Russian occupied Bielarus and to ask your support in their quest for freedom and independence. I plead with you to remember the Bielarussian people and their needs in your talks with the leaders of the Soviet Union.

The Bielarusians today are the group most deprived of their rights within their own territory--the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. Bielarus has become a colony of Moscow. The Bielarussian language and Bielarussian culture have been replaced with the Russian language and the Russian culture. Moscow has isolated the Bielarussian land and the Bielarussian people from the rest of the world. Moscow exploits the Bielarussian natural resources, the Bielarussian labor and talents and the Bielarussian products to her own advantage. Moscow replaced the Bielarussian native name BIELARUS with Byelorussia and is making all-out efforts to assimilate the Bielarusians into the Russian culture.

The Bielarussian Americans are greatly concerned about the destiny of our compatriots in Soviet Bielarus and ask you, Mr. President, to speak on their behalf and their freedoms, demanding from Moscow to end their colonial rule over Bielarus and other Captive Nations in the Soviet Union.

Thank you and God bless you, Mr. President.


Respectfully yours,

Vera Romuk

Mrs. Vera Romuk, Secretary
Bielarussian Coordinating Committee
of Chicago, Illinois
3348 North Oleander Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60634

Enclosures

37
Jonas Kojelis



THE NAME: BIELARUS* is the original, true and correct name of the country. Bielarus is known to the outside world today as Byelorussia. This name comes from the Russian language--Belorooseya. It was imposed by Moscow without the approval of the Bielarussian people and the Bielarussian government. The Bielarusians feel that the name of their country should be presented to the outside world from their native language. If translated, Bielarus means Whiteruchenia. Bielarusians are not Russians but a Slav people.

LOCATION: BIELARUS is not in Russia but in the western part of the Soviet Union, bordering with Poland in the west, Ukraine in the south, Russia in the east and north and the Baltic States in the northwest. Its present-day territory extends for 560 kilometers from north to south and 650 kilometers from west to east and covers a total area of 207,600 square kilometers. Its ethnographic territory extends to 380,000 square kilometers. It is larger than such European countries as Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece and Portugal, and exceeds the combined area of Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Luxembourg.

POLITICAL STATUS: BIELARUS is a republic of the Soviet Union and Communist controlled from Moscow. Bielarus is also a founding member of the United Nations. Bielarus regained independence from Russia on March 25, 1918 but was forcibly incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the U.S.S.R.) in 1922. The Bielarussian people have since struggled for freedom and independence of their country, hoping that someday their dream will come true.

MAJOR CITIES: MIENSK (Minsk) is the capital of Bielarus, population 1,300,000. Other cities are: Hrodna (Grodno), Viciebsk (Vitebsk), Polacak (Polock), Pinsk, Bieraście (Brest), Homiel (Gomel), Mahilou (Mogilev) and Babrujsk (Bobruysk).

POPULATION: Present Bielarussian population numbers 10,200,000. There are 2,000,000 Bielarusians living within the boundaries of other Soviet Republics and another 8,000,000 are dispersed throughout the entire world.

* BIELARUS is pronounced Bye-la -roos.
 Bielarussian is pronounced Bye-lah-roo-see-yan.

PREPARED BY: THE BIELARUSIAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
 P. O. BOX 30079
 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60630



Bielarussian Coordinating Committee of Chicago, Illinois

MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS:

Byelorussian American National
Council of Chicago

Whiteruthenian (Byelorussian)
American Ass'n in Illinois

Bielarussian American Youth
Organization in Illinois

March 8, 1984

PRESS RELEASE

Sunday, March 25, is the 66th Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence of Bielararus. It will be observed by Bielarussian Americans throughout the United States and those living in other parts of the Free World.

The solemn observance in Chicago will take place at 12:30 p.m. at Robert and Allen's Regency Inn, 5319 West Diversey Avenue. The observance is being sponsored by the Bielarussian Coordinating Committee of Chicago, Illinois and will feature a luncheon and commemorative program with speakers and musical and singing renditions. Proclamations from Governor James Thompson and Mayor Harold Washington will also be read as well as the remarks made by members of the U. S. Congress.

The Bielarussian Coordinating Committee of Chicago, Illinois is also sponsoring an exhibit at the Richard J. Daley Center from March 19th through 31st in conjunction with the 66th Anniversary of the Bielarussian Independence. There will be various memorabilia, craft and art items, a collection of stamps, objects made of clay, straw inlaid plaques and boxes, cross-stitch embroidery, dolls and Easter eggs on display as well as pictures portraying the Bielarussian folk and land. The exhibit can be viewed daily from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. except Saturday and Sunday. It will be in the southwest corner of the center, facing the plaza.

By observing the Bielarussian independence day, the Bielarussian Americans will focus their attention on their compatriots in the Soviet-Russian controlled Bielararus, which is known to the outside world under the Russian-imposed name of Byelorussia. We want the whole world to know that Moscow has subjected the Bielarussian people to harsh slavery and the lowest kind of indignity. The Bielarussian people are forbidden by Moscow in their homeland the use of their Bielarussian language in their national government and their schools. Moscow gives no permission to print Bielarussian-foreign language dictionaries and has even banned the appearance of greeting cards with the Bielarussian texts and motifs. The Russianization is at its highest level today.

We cannot remain indifferent to these and other abuses and to the harsh treatment that is carried out by Moscow against the Bielarussian people in their Russian-occupied homeland. We want the world to remember their sufferings and speak on their behalf. We want the Bielarussian dissidents and prisoners of conscience to be freed from Soviet prisons, psychiatric asylums, and concentration camps.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, PLEASE CONTACT MRS. VERA ROMUK, 3348 North Oleander Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60634; telephone: 745-8216

AND, SAY, WHO GOES THERE?

And, say, who goes there? And, say, who goes there?
In such a mighty throng assembled, o declare?
Byelorussians!

And what do those lean shoulders bear as load,
Those hands stained dark with blood, those feet bast-sandal shod?
All their grievance!

And to what place do they this grievance bear,
And whither do they take it to declare?
To the whole world!

And who schooled them thus, many million strong,
Bear their grievance forth, roused them from slumbers long?
Want and suffering!

And what is it, then, for which so long they pined,
Scorned throughout the years, they, the deaf, the blind?
To be called human!

[1905—1907]

This poem was written by Janka Kupala, bard of Bielarussian literature, and translated into English by English poetess Vera Rich. To date the poem was translated into 85 languages of the world. It portrays the Bielarussian struggle for freedom and human dignity. The Bielarussians are still marching on to bring their grievance to the world against their subjugators--the red czars of Moscow, who rule BIELARUS today.

BIELARUSIAN
COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Member Organizations

Byelorussian-American National Council
of Chicago, Illinois

Whiteruthenian (Byelorussian) American
Association in Illinois

Belarusian-American Youth Organization
in Illinois



XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX



66 th ANNIVERSARY
OF THE
Declaration of
Independence
OF
BIELARUS

March 25

1918 — 1984

Sunday, March 25, 1984

REGENCY INN
5319 WEST DIVERSEY AVENUE CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

COMMEMORATIVE PROGRAM

1. The American Anthem Miss Avis Pramshafer
Acc. Miss Susie Skeppsdron
2. InvocationThe Most Rev. Vladimir Tarasevitch
3. A Minute of Silence
4. Welcome Address Mr. Leo Sidorewicz, Chairman
5. Dinner
6. Introduction of Guests M.C.
7. Reading of Proclamations and Greetings
8. Commemorative Address in English... Miss Irena Romuk
9. Poem Mr. Michael Bujlau
10. Solo Renditions Mrs. Pola Breschnev
Acc. Mr. Henry Janczewski
11. Greetings from Guests
12. Duets Mrs. Pola Breschnev
Mrs. Ola Shukin
Acc. Mr. Henry Janczewski
13. Poem Mr. George Bujlau
14. Commemorative Address in Bielarussian... Dr. W. Romuk
15. Piano Solo Mr. Henry Janczewski
16. Benediction Rev. Oleksa Harbuziuk
17. The Bielarussian Anthem All Present
18. A Thank-You Word from the Chairman ...L. Sidorewicz
M.C. - Nick Zyznieuski

The Star Spangled Banner

Oh! - say, can you see, by the dawn's early light,
What so proudly we hailed at the twilight's last gleaming?
Whose broad stripes and bright stars, thro' the perilous fight,
Over the ramparts we watched where so gallantly streaming?
And the rockets red glare, the bombs bursting in air,
Gave proof thro' the night that our flag was still there.
Oh! - say, does that Star Spangled Banner yet wave,
O'er the land of the free, and the home of the brave.

The Bielarussian Anthem

My vyjdzim ščylnymi radami
Na volny rodny svoj prastor;
Chaj vola viečna budzie z nami
A hvaŭtu my damo adpor!

Niachaj żyvie mahutny, śmieły
Naš biełaruski volny duch;
Štandar naš bieł-čyrvona-bieły
Pakryć saboj narodny ruch.

Na boj! za Źdaŭcie i za volu
Narodu s'adnaha swajho!
Braty, ciarpieli my da voli...
Na boj! - usie da adnaho!

Imia i si/ŭ bie/arus
Niachaj pa/duje i ba/duć toj,
Chto śmieje nam nia/ści prymusy
I pier/ŭ vyklic/a na boj.

Braty, da Źdaŭcia my padchodzim;
Chaj hrom hrymie jaŭŭe macniej!
U kryvavych mukach my narodzim
Żyćcio Respubliki svajej!

[illegible]


MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 13, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK 

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with European Democratic Students
April 13, 1984; 3:15 P.M.; Ward Room

You have agreed to meet with representatives of the European Democratic Student Group for not more than 15 minutes this afternoon. This group is strong supportive of our policies in Europe and the primary purpose of the meeting is to indicate our interest and support. Their comments on the attitudes of European youth will also be of interest.

Suggested talking points and a list of visitors are at Tabs I and II. I will attend the meeting and will be prepared to stay with them after your departure to continue the dialogue.

Attachments:

Tab I - Talking points
Tab II - List of Participants

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

1. Describe in general terms the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations, including:

a. Our desire to negotiate real issues;

b. Soviet intransigence, stimulated by hope that they can split the Alliance by influencing Western public opinion;

c. Pressures on Soviet regime to change policies;

d. Difficulties they face in making basic decisions while in a transition period; and

e. The need for the West to follow a steady, concerted policy and not to allow Soviet intimidation to work.

2. Solicit the views of the group regarding attitudes among young people in Europe.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT McFARLANE
JACK MATLOCK

FROM: Frank J. Donatelli

SUBJECT: European Democratic Students Delegation

DATE AND TIME: Friday, April 13, 1984 - 3:15 p.m.

LOCATION: The Ward Room - West Wing

PARTICIPANTS:

National Security Council
Robert McFarlane
Jack Matlock
Peter Sommer

Office of Public Liaison
Frank Lavin

European Democratic Students

Joelle Labbez	France
Member, Executive Committee, Union Nationale Universitaire	
Deborah Anne Artingstall	United Kingdom
Leader, Federation of Conservative Students	
Hubertus Hoffman	FRG
Member, CDU Federal Defense Commission	
Brian Monteith	United Kingdom
Vice Chairman, EDS	
Stephen Morrison	United Kingdom
Executive Director, EDS	
Cecilia Stego	Sweden
Member Board, Democratic Students International	

Americans

Michael Boos (Rhymes with hose)
Program Director, Young America's Foundation
Ron Robinson
President, Young America's Foundation
James Taylor
Executive Director, Young America's Foundation

SCHEDULE:

- 3:15 - 3:30 p.m. Presentation of Ambassador McFarlane
- 3:30 - 4:00 p.m. Presentation and discussion with
Jack Matlock and Peter Sommer

~~SECRET~~

J. MATLOCK

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 13, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: DIANE DORNAN *DD*

SUBJECT: Counterintelligence Implications of Proposals for (a) Consular Review Talks, (b) Cultural Exchange Agreement and (c) Review of Agreement on Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation

In accordance with John Poindexter's instructions, IG(CI) members were asked Tuesday to comment on the CI implications of proposed negotiating terms for the above agreements by COB Thursday. They and the COMEX Staff were given previous State and FBI comments for reference, and some of them later received a State summary (Tab I) of the complete terms of reference for the Consular Review Talks (CRT). Due to the shortage of time, agencies responded individually and mostly by telephone. As instructed, DIA also submitted a written assessment of potential collection opportunities under the CRT.

My summary of previous views regarding the merits and liabilities of the CRT and the official State and FBI papers presenting their respective positions, and Jack Matlock's evaluation are at Tab II. Most agencies agreed with the FBI assessment of CI concerns regarding the CRT and highlighted the need for a net assessment of collection benefits vs probable CI difficulties. They focused on the entry/exit issue, endorsing all FBI views previously expressed, including the expectation that this would further strain CI resources. NSA elaborated on the problems which might be caused if this agreement effectively undercut our ability to deny entry at San Francisco and Baltimore to either ships or planes of Soviet or Soviet Bloc nationality. These could be fitted with ELINT collection gear and planes could also carry PHOTINT equipment. The problem would be particularly acute in Baltimore, where a ship would have a very extensive radio horizon and a perfect spot to intercept high-volume intergovernmental and defense contractor communications. Should Bloc ships be allowed to dock there, it would be necessary to establish a protected communications zone between the current two encompassing New York and Washington, an extremely expensive and complicated undertaking. The exception was OFM, which foresaw no significant CI problems with the proposed terms.

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2

Agencies responsible for collection, on the other hand, disputed the belief that the expansion of entry/exit points would provide the US with a net benefit because of its advantages for intelligence collection. The DIA analysis at Tab III discusses in detail why it would be doubtful that essential data would be collected -- partly because the Soviets would continue to minimize collection opportunities and partly because we already have normal access to the nonessential information we might secure. CIA also said regularization of access to Brest and Nakhodka would not affect its collection program.

Regarding the Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation (Cultural Exchanges), FBI has submitted a memorandum (Tab IV) advocating that technology transfer losses be minimized by requiring that the ratio of exchange personnel and groups in scientific/technical programs be the same for both countries and that there be direct reciprocity in number of groups and participants, types of groups and relative geographical access. DIA (Tab V) has suggested that "young" scholars, and visitors be defined in the treaty as those under 28 years of age, in order to limit access to those who are prime intelligence collectors. Two agencies also insisted that the agreement must drop one sentence (p. 27, para. 8) allowing Soviet scholars to change their course of study after the beginning of the year (when their programs normally are reviewed for technology transfer concerns), since this provides an effective loophole which they may exploit to target programs most desirable from a collection standpoint. CIA indicated that such exchange agreements have not been useful to the US from an intelligence collection standpoint.

Most agencies had no comment on the desirability of renewing Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation. They were largely unfamiliar with its terms and past operation (lack of familiarity was also a problem on the Cultural Exchanges issue, especially given time constraints), but most said they did not see obvious and major CI problems. DIA (Tab III, p. 2) objected, as has DOD generally, that the agreement as written offers opportunities for technology acquisition in the US; CIA said it does not affect our collection program in the USSR. DOD's general position is that it should be allowed to lapse but that if eventually revived it should be rewritten more carefully and specifically that it should give priority to Export Administration Act controls. FBI did not comment on this issue.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONRe: 90307
Add on~~SECRET~~

April 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR KEN DeGRAFFENREID/DIANE DORNAN

FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: Consular Review

I have reviewed this package and discussed it with Bud. This has to be considered from two aspects. First the President has already authorized Secretary Shultz to proceed ahead with the CRT's and secondly the CI community should have an opportunity to review and have their comments taken into account. I would like for you to go back to FBI with a copy of our proposed approval memo to assure the FBI that we are not approving ship visits and it would perfectly understandable if they caveated their position now that they would be opposed to approving ship visits to these ports. I also want you to go to DIA and get their assessment of the intelligence value of the two entry/exit points that we would get. I would like to have the package returned by the end of next week. Clearly the CI effort would be simpler if we did not have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union but we do and the President wants to improve them. We need to insist on reciprocity and insure we do not take unnecessary risks that can not be adequately covered.

cc: Jack Matlock (as discussed)
Bob Kimmitt

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NLRR M02-DID #19

BY RW NARA DATE 1/7/11

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 19, together with the views expressed by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin in recent discussions with Ambassador Hartman and Secretary Shultz. I welcome the fact that you too recognize the value of direct exchanges of views on the important issues in U.S.-Soviet relations.

First of all, I would like to reiterate my congratulations upon your assumption of the new and responsible position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. I look forward to productive working relations with you in your new capacity, to the mutual benefit of our peoples.

In looking at the present state of affairs between our two countries, I believe it will be useful to reflect upon our differing perceptions of one another. You have expressed concern about U.S. actions and military programs which you see as threatening to the Soviet Union. I fully appreciate the priority you attach to the security of the Soviet state, particularly in light of the enormous costs shouldered by your people in helping to defeat Nazi Germany, but I cannot understand why our programs can be considered threatening. On the contrary, in our view there are many Soviet actions and military programs which we and our Allies consider to be threatening to our own vital security interests.

For example, the Soviet Union continues to ship massive quantities of arms to sensitive areas near our borders, and appears bent on promoting instability rather than peaceful change in many areas of the developing world. Your country's large-scale and sustained use of force in Afghanistan,

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in close proximity to one of our closest friends, Pakistan, makes less reassuring your government's frequent avowals of peaceful intent.

Perhaps of greatest concern to us is the enormous increase in recent years in Soviet nuclear forces targeted against the United States and our Allies. This build-up may initially have been designed to attain parity with the United States, yet at some point in the last decade that goal was achieved; we have good reason to question, therefore, why the growth in Soviet nuclear forces has nonetheless continued unabated.

Take strategic offensive forces as an example. Since 1970, the Soviet Union has deployed three new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles, five new types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and at least thirteen modernized versions of existing missiles. As you well know, the USSR is now flight-testing two new ICBMs, plus another new type of SLBM. As we see it, you claim to be responding to U.S. programs, yet your new missiles have been deployed years ahead of their U.S. counterparts, not to mention in greater numbers.

In the area of ballistic missile defense, your country has been engaged for many years in a research effort similar to that recently initiated in the United States and, indeed, is the only nation to deploy an active anti-ballistic missile system; moreover, your deployment of a network of advanced radars gives us legitimate grounds to question whether the USSR is laying the basis for a nationwide ABM defense of the USSR. And there are, of course, other aspects of existing arms control agreements where the concerns we have raised with you have not been alleviated.

As you know, your country's deployment of the SS-20 has been of especially grave concern both to the United States and our Allies. Since NATO's December 1979 decision, when your country asserted that a "balance" existed in intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Soviet Union has deployed 238 additional SS-20's with over 700 additional warheads. These missiles constitute a far greater threat to the security of the western alliance --

both in quantitative and qualitative terms -- than previous Soviet missiles, which had fewer warheads and lower accuracy.

These are some of the realities of the international situation as we see it. I recognize that neither of us will be able to persuade the other as to who is to blame for the present poor state of our relations. Nor would it be productive for the two of us to engage in a lengthy debate on this subject. I doubt, however, that we can make progress in reducing the tensions between our countries, or in reducing the high levels of armaments, if either of us is unwilling to take into account the concerns of the other.

As for myself, I am prepared to consider your concerns seriously, even when I have difficulty understanding why they are held. I am willing to explore possible ways to alleviate them. But solutions will elude us if you are unable to approach our discussions in the same spirit, or if you demand concessions as an entry fee for the discussions themselves.

As for the negotiations now underway, I believe the Stockholm conference provides an opportunity for both our countries to take steps to reduce some of the apprehensions about each other's military activities. I was encouraged by your expression of hope for positive results at Stockholm and your support for measures aimed at building confidence between East and West. As you know, we and our Allies have presented a package of specific measures which, if implemented, could substantially reduce the dangers of misunderstanding and miscalculation in Europe.

If the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate seriously on such concrete confidence-building measures, the United States will be prepared to discuss the question of reciprocal assurances against the use of force and the context in which such an agreement can be reached. You have asked for a "concrete signal" in the area of arms control, and your representatives have specified that U.S. willingness to agree on non-use of force would be considered such a signal. In this connection let me add that I am pleased that our

Ambassadors to the Stockholm conference have agreed to get together soon. This will provide an opportunity to discuss an arrangement that would meet both countries' concerns.

There are many other arms control topics where we hope to move forward in the weeks and months ahead. As I said in my previous letter, the Western countries plan to present new proposals at the Vienna negotiations which will provide a solid basis for progress on the related issues of data and verification. In the Conference on Disarmament, the Vice President will table a draft treaty to ban chemical weapons on April 18. In addition to this step in the multilateral forum, perhaps the time has come when bilateral consultations on the issue could advance the prospects for an effective and verifiable ban.

While the foregoing issues are important, and while there may be other arms control areas -- including those raised in your letter -- where steps forward could be made, we have always considered the central element of our dialogue on arms control to be the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. The United States has advanced proposals that would substantially reduce the most threatening nuclear weapons systems on both sides. We have demonstrated considerable flexibility in an effort to respond to the concerns your negotiators have expressed. I must state frankly that I am disappointed that the Soviet Union has not yet shown such flexibility, or taken advantage of the opportunity for private discussions on ways to make progress in the START and INF negotiations.

I am well aware of your views regarding the impasse in these negotiations. You are, I am sure, equally aware of the fact that we and our Allies do not agree with your analysis of the balance in intermediate-range missiles or your assessment of the "obstacles" that supposedly stand in the way of further negotiations. For our part, we are prepared to consider any equitable outcome, and to halt, reverse or eliminate entirely our deployments of Pershing and cruise missiles in the context of an agreement between the two sides.

Experience has shown that neither side can hope to impose its view of the situation on the other as a precondition for negotiations. Rather, what is needed is for our representatives to sit down and devise a formula for nuclear arms reductions that is consistent with the security interests of both our nations. So let us focus on the concrete task of reaching agreements in this spirit, rather than wasting our energies debating further the meaning of "equality and equal security."

I would like to reaffirm once again the readiness of the United States to explore with the Soviet Union possible ways for moving forward on the nuclear arms negotiations. As I have said previously, we have a number of specific ideas to present for overcoming some of the fundamental differences that have divided us in the negotiations. We are prepared to discuss these in private diplomatic channels or between our respective negotiators. If the Soviet side is prepared to match U.S. flexibility, I would hope that, by this means, the way could be cleared to resumption of formal talks on nuclear arms reductions. I would welcome any concrete suggestions you might have on how to proceed.

I am pleased that we agree on the importance of exchanges of views on regional problems. As you state, such exchanges should be directed toward the peaceful settlement of local disputes and the strengthening of peace. Over the past three years, the United States has taken the initiative to discuss a number of regional problems in precisely this spirit. For example, we have initiated formal consultations with your country's experts on Afghanistan and southern Africa. While such exchanges have not been as fruitful as we had hoped, I would like to pursue them, with the objective of establishing a more productive dialogue on regional issues. I believe it would be useful for our experts to hold more detailed discussions of developments in southern Africa -- as Foreign Minister Gromyko has suggested -- because there are promising signs of progress toward a diplomatic settlement. Such a settlement would serve the interests of the states in the area, and of all those who value stability and prosperity there.

The Middle East and Persian Gulf is another area where a further exchange of views would be helpful. In this regard, I was pleased to read of your personal commitment to seeking an end to the Iran/Iraq conflict and to avoiding any actions which might lead the parties to prolong or expand it. I wish to assure you that the United States shares these objectives, and that we will continue making every effort to achieve them.

To improve mutual understanding on this issue, Secretary Shultz has on several recent occasions voiced to Ambassador Dobrynin our concerns about any expansion of the war to other areas of the Persian Gulf. In doing so, we have tried to communicate the importance we attach to maintaining freedom of navigation there for the ships of all nations. We believe our interest in supporting this principle of international law serves all and threatens none, and we regret the misrepresentations of our position which have appeared in the official Soviet news media. Such commentaries cannot serve to calm tensions in the area.

With respect to our bilateral relations, I think we agree that we should seek to enlarge the areas of mutually beneficial cooperation and inject real content into our bilateral agreements. My representatives will continue to present specific proposals in this regard, and I hope that the Soviet side will not put any artificial barriers in the way of progress.

I must add that I am disappointed that you did not respond to the appeal in my March 6 letter concerning humanitarian issues. Steps in this area could have a substantial impact on other aspects of our relations, and I hope that you will continue to give them serious consideration.

To conclude, let me state once again that the United States is ready for a turning point in our relations with the Soviet Union. We have made a concerted effort to put content into our dialogue. We have a number of specific ideas to explore with you on questions of vital importance to both our peoples. We intend to continue our efforts in this direction. Real progress, however, will

require similar efforts on the part of the Soviet Union.

I look forward to receiving your comments on the thoughts I have expressed.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko
Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONSYSTEM II
90448~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *AB*

SUBJECT: Response to Chernenko's March 19 Letter

We have drafted a response to Chernenko's March 19 letter (attached), taking into account my meeting with Dobrynin last Monday, Art Hartman's exchange with Gromyko last Tuesday, and the guidance you provided in NSDD-137 on nuclear arms control strategy.

The letter serves a number of the policy objectives you stressed at the March 27 NSC meeting:

-- it counters the Soviets' arguments about an alleged U.S. "threat" by describing some of the Soviet actions and military programs which make them appear a threat to us;

-- it reaffirms the U.S. commitment to arms control and our readiness to be flexible in the search for agreements; and

-- it attempts to reassure the Soviets we are not a threat, and to "get Chernenko's attention," by expressing our readiness to consider in the CDE a non-use of force undertaking if the Soviets agree to some of the specific confidence-building measures we have proposed.

On this last point, the Soviets at all levels have been asking for just such a "concrete signal" from us. Although they are now giving somewhat more attention to outer space arms control, they also have been signalling for months that they consider our attitude toward non-use of force as a kind of litmus test of U.S. "seriousness" in the arms control field. Chernenko's April 4 message to the Socialist International cited non-use of force once again. By highlighting our willingness to move in reciprocal fashion on this issue, therefore, our proposed letter provides tangible evidence for Chernenko of your commitment to moving the relationship forward.

The Soviets today invited Jim Goodby to Moscow for consultations with his Soviet counterpart; we are now working on the dates. This would be an opportunity to begin exploring the idea.

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DECL: OADR

BY *CH* NARA, DATE *10/17/05*

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- 2 -

Jim Goodby is confident that our Allies will support our pursuit of a trade between non-use of force and CBMs at the next round of the CDE. In fact, the Allies and he have been planning on the Western countries agreeing to a working group discussion of non-use of force -- which would represent implicit acceptance of it. Gromyko, however, may try to obscure the significance of our willingness to have working group discussions unless we broach the idea directly with Chernenko -- only through the letter can we ensure that you will get credit for our move.

Without this language on CDE, there will be nothing in this letter to get Chernenko's attention. Pending your approval of the proposal, we have put the relevant language in brackets.

In addition to the above, our proposed reply reviews the rest of our arms control agenda (our paramount interest in START and INF; our disappointment that the Soviets have failed to take up the offer of private exploratory exchanges; and our desire for progress on CW and MBFR). The subsequent discussion of regional problems takes into account Gromyko's interesting démarche on southern Africa and my agreement with Dobrynin to more intensive exchanges on regional issues, including the Mideast and Persian Gulf. The letter concludes with paragraphs on bilateral issues and human rights, noting in particular your regret at Chernenko's failure to respond to your appeals for humanitarian gestures.

Bureaucratic Considerations: In NSDD-137, you requested a letter to Chernenko be drafted focusing on START and INF -- the flexibility we have shown to date, our readiness to reopen talks anytime, anywhere, etc. -- and refuting Soviet allegations about the U.S. threat. We believe our draft, while perhaps not going into all the detail envisaged in the NSDD, fulfills its main requirements without neglecting other areas of our agenda. For this reason, we believe that this letter should be sent now, and that it not be coordinated with the other agencies. Based on previous experience, reaching consensus in the SACPG on anything specific will take weeks if not months. Moreover, I believe strongly that, as a general rule, the drafting of Presidential correspondence should not become the province of the bureaucracy. Of course, as constructive ideas develop from the process launched by the NSDD, they can be incorporated into other letters to Chernenko.

A Final Point: A Supreme Soviet session has been called for early next week, and it is widely anticipated in Moscow that the meeting will "elect" Chernenko as Chairman of the Presidium, the titular Head of State. Thus our draft includes bracketed language congratulating Chernenko on his new appointment, and addressing him as "Mr. Chairman."

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- 3 -

If you approve our proposed reply, I would envisage having Art Hartman deliver it in Moscow next week. I would at the same time call in Dobrynin to give him a copy, as well as to continue our discussions of last Monday.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached reply to Chernenko's March 19 letter.

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DRAFT REPLY TO CHERNENKO'S MARCH 19 LETTER

Dear Mr. General Secretary [Mr. Chairman]:

I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 19, together with the views expressed by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin in recent discussions with Ambassador Hartman and Secretary Shultz. I welcome the fact that you too recognize the value of direct exchanges of views on the important issues in US-Soviet relations. Because of my earnest desire to move our relationship forward, I wanted to provide an early response.

[First of all, I would like to add my voice to those of the many other heads of state and government who are congratulating you on assuming the new and responsible position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. As one who appreciates both the challenges and the opportunities of high office in the public service, I look forward to productive working relations with you in your new capacity, to the mutual benefit of our two countries.]

In looking at the present state of affairs between our two countries, I believe it would be useful to reflect upon our differing perceptions of one another. You have expressed concern about U.S. actions and military programs which you see as threatening to the Soviet Union. I fully appreciate the priority you attach to the security of the Soviet state, particularly in light of the enormous costs shouldered by the Soviet people in helping to defeat Nazi Germany. I hope, however, that you will recognize that there are many Soviet actions and military programs that we and our Allies consider to be no less threatening to our own vital security interests.

For example, the Soviet Union continues to ship massive quantities of arms to sensitive areas near America's borders, and appears bent on promoting instability rather than peaceful

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- 2 -

change in many areas of the developing world. Your country's large-scale and sustained use of force in Afghanistan, in close proximity to one of our closest friends, Pakistan, makes less reassuring your government's frequent avowals of peaceful intent.

Perhaps of greatest concern to us is the enormous increase in recent years in Soviet nuclear forces targeted against the United States and our allies. This build-up may have been designed to attain parity with the United States, yet at some point in the last decade that goal was achieved; we have good reason to question, therefore, why the growth in Soviet nuclear forces has nonetheless continued unabated.

Take strategic offensive forces as an example. Since 1970, the Soviet Union has deployed three new types of ICBMs, five new types of SLBMs, and at least thirteen modernized versions of existing missiles. As you well know, the USSR is now flight-testing two new ICBMs, plus another new type of SLBM. As we see it, you claim to be responding to U.S. programs, yet your new missiles have been deployed years ahead of their U.S. counterparts, not to mention in greater numbers.

In the area of ballistic missile defense, your country has been engaged for many years in a research effort similar to that recently initiated in the United States and, indeed, is the only nation to deploy an active ABM system; moreover, your deployment of a network of advanced radars gives us legitimate grounds to question whether the USSR is laying the basis for a nationwide ABM defense of the USSR. And there are, of course, other aspects of existing arms control agreements where the concerns we have raised with you have not been alleviated.

As you know, your country's deployment of the SS-20 has been of especially grave concern both to the United States and our

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- 3 -

allies. Since NATO's December 1979 decision, when your country asserted that a "balance" existed in intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Soviet Union has deployed 238 additional SS-20's with over 700 additional warheads. These missiles constitute a far greater threat to the security of the western alliance -- both in quantitative and qualitative terms -- than previous Soviet missiles, which had fewer warheads and lower accuracy.

These are some of the realities of the international situation as we see it. I recognize that neither of us will be able to persuade the other as to who is to blame for the present poor state of our relations. Nor would it be productive for the two of us to engage in a lengthy debate on this subject. I do want to reassure you that the United States has not, does not and will not threaten the Soviet Union. We have never fought each other. We must never do so. Let us work together toward this end.

In this regard, I believe the Stockholm conference provides an opportunity for both our nations to take steps to reduce some of the apprehensions about each other's military activities. I was encouraged by your expression of hope for positive results at Stockholm and your support for measures aimed at building confidence between East and West. As you know, we and our Allies have presented a package of specific measures which, if implemented, could substantially reduce the dangers of misunderstanding and miscalculation in Europe.

[If the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate seriously on such concrete confidence-building measures, the United States will be prepared to discuss the question of reciprocal assurances against the use of force. You have asked for a "concrete signal" in the area of arms control, and your representatives have specified that U.S. willingness to agree on non-use of force would be considered such a signal. In this connection let me add that I

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- 4 -

am pleased that our Ambassadors to the Stockholm conference have agreed to get together soon. This will provide an opportunity to discuss an arrangement that would meet both countries' concerns.]

There are many other arms control topics where we hope to move forward in the weeks and months ahead. As I said in my previous letter, the Western countries plan to present new proposals at the Vienna negotiations which will provide a solid basis for progress on the related issues of data and verification. In the Conference on Disarmament, we will be tabling this month a draft treaty to ban chemical weapons. In addition to this step in the multilateral forum, perhaps the time has come when bilateral consultations on the issue could advance the prospects for an effective and verifiable ban.

While the foregoing issues are important, and while there may be other arms control areas -- including those raised in your letter -- where steps forward could be made, we have always considered the central element of our dialogue on arms control to be the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. The United States has advanced proposals that would substantially reduce the most threatening nuclear weapons system on both sides. We have demonstrated considerable flexibility in an effort to respond to the concerns your negotiators have expressed. I must state frankly that I am disappointed that the Soviet Union has not yet shown similar flexibility, or taken advantage of the opportunity for private discussions on ways to make progress in the START and INF negotiations.

I am well aware of your views regarding the impasse in these negotiations. You are, I am sure, equally aware of the fact that we and our Allies do not agree with your analysis of the balance in intermediate-range missiles or your assessment of the

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- 5 -

"obstacles" that supposedly stand in the way of further negotiations. For our part, we are prepared to consider any equitable outcome, and to halt, reverse or eliminate entirely our deployments of Pershing and cruise missiles in the context of an agreement between the two sides. It is simply unrealistic for you to ask us to remove our missiles without an agreement.

Experience has shown that neither side can hope to impose its view of the situation on the other as a precondition for negotiations. Rather, what is needed is for our diplomats to sit down and devise a formula for nuclear arms reductions that is consistent with the security interests of both our nations. So let us focus on the concrete task of reaching agreements in this spirit, rather than wasting our energies debating the meaning of "equality and equal security."

Therefore, I would like to reaffirm once again the readiness of the United States to explore with the Soviet Union possible ways for moving forward on the nuclear arms negotiations. As I have said previously, we have a number of specific ideas to present for overcoming some of the fundamental differences that have divided us in the negotiations. We are prepared to discuss these in private diplomatic channels or between our respective negotiators. If the Soviet side is prepared to match U.S. flexibility, I would hope that, by this means, the way could be cleared to resumption of formal talks on nuclear arms reductions. I would welcome any concrete suggestions you might have on how to proceed.

I am pleased that we agree on the importance of exchanges of views on regional problems. As you state, such exchanges should be directed toward the peaceful settlement of local disputes and the strengthening of peace. Over the past three years, the United States has taken the initiative to discuss a number of

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- 6 -

regional problems in precisely this spirit. For example, we have initiated formal consultations with your country's experts on Afghanistan and southern Africa. While such exchanges have not been as fruitful as we had hoped, I would like to pursue them, with the objective of establishing a more productive dialogue on regional issues. I was pleased to note that Foreign Minister Gromyko raised southern Africa with Ambassador Hartman. I believe it would be useful for our experts to hold more detailed discussions of developments in that region, because there are promising signs of progress toward a diplomatic settlement. Such a settlement would serve the interests of the states in the area, and of all those who value stability and prosperity there.

The Middle East and Persian Gulf is another area where a further exchange of views would be helpful. In this regard, I was pleased to read of your personal commitment to seeking an end to the Iran/Iraq conflict and to avoiding any actions which might lead the parties to prolong or expand it. I wish to assure you that the United States shares these objectives, and that we will continue making every effort to achieve them.

To improve mutual understanding on this issue, Secretary Shultz has on several recent occasions voiced to Ambassador Dobrynin our concerns about any expansion of the war to other areas of the Persian Gulf. In doing so, we have tried to communicate the importance we attach to maintaining freedom of navigation there for the ships of all nations. We believe our interest in supporting this principle of international law serves all and threatens none, and we regret the misrepresentations of our position which have appeared in the official Soviet news media. Such commentaries cannot serve to calm tensions in the area.

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- 7 -

With respect to our bilateral relations, I think we agree that we should seek to enlarge the areas of mutually beneficial cooperation and inject real content into our bilateral agreements. My representatives will soon be presenting a number of specific proposals in this regard, and I hope that the Soviet side will not put any artificial barriers in the way of progress.

I must add that I am disappointed that you did not respond to the appeal in my March 6 letter concerning humanitarian issues. Steps in this area could have a substantial impact on other aspects of our relations, and I hope that you will continue to give them serious consideration.

To conclude, let me state once again that the United States is ready for a turning point in our relations with the Soviet Union. We have made a concerted effort to put content into our dialogue. We have a number of specific ideas to explore with you on questions of vital importance to both our peoples. We intend to continue our efforts in this direction. For real progress to be made, however, it will require similar efforts on the part of the Soviet Union.

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
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT REILLY

April 12, 1984

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK 

SUBJECT:

Letter to Bishop Francis A. Quinn

"A soft answer turneth away wrath" -- and for that reason, I would advise quite a different approach in answering the Bishop's letter. I don't believe making debating points will be convincing -- except that it would confirm to him that no one is listening to what he says.

In the first place, I would point out that, just after he sent his letter, the President delivered a major address on U.S.-Soviet relations, in which he outlined an approach which encompasses many of the Bishop's thoughts. (Include a copy of the January 16 speech -- one is attached.)

Second, on the specific points, I'm not sure it is worth the time to refute each of them, but some are quite easy to answer, and in a conciliatory way. For example:

1. The President has made clear that he would welcome a summit meeting that is well prepared and could produce positive results. We are currently in an intensive dialogue with the Soviets to try to find areas where we can narrow our differences. When it becomes apparent to both of us that a meeting of chiefs of state would help the process, one will doubtless follow. But in the meantime one must understand not only that an ill-prepared summit could do more harm than good (if the top people cannot make progress, then this would inhibit their subordinates), but also that a summit cannot be "called" by the U.S. alone. The Soviet leaders have made it clear that they have no interest in meeting unless and until they feel that progress can be made. Obviously, there can be no meeting unless both parties agree to one.

2. We have frequent senior level meetings with Soviet representatives. They are marked by civility and we are preserving confidentiality. We certainly agree that these qualities are essential to an effective diplomacy.

3. The President met with Prime Minister Trudeau last December, when they discussed, inter alia, Mr. Trudeau's proposal for a five-power conference. We are not opposed to such a conference in principle, but at least three of the five potential parties have rejected the idea at this time. We are, however, in regular diplomatic and high-level consultation with all of them on the issues involved.

4. Of course we consider all proposals seriously. However, history has taught us to be skeptical that sweeping declarations act as a real impediment to war. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, for example, did nothing to stop the slide into World War II. And all members of the United Nations are committed not to use force in international relations. In general, we feel that if we are to deal with the peace issue effectively, we must work to reduce the real causes of war and violence, and to see to it that violence cannot be used successfully to impose one nation's will on another.

5. We feel that our approach in the various arms control talks is indeed vigorous, hopeful and imaginative. In the case of nuclear weapons talks, it was the Soviets who walked away from the negotiating table. We hope they will come back soon, because our positions are flexible and we earnestly desire to reach agreement. (Include publications available from State on our INF and START positions)

6. We have many women active in our diplomacy, including our Ambassador to the United Nations and our Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic. We do not choose persons on the basis of sex, however, any more than we do on the basis of race or religion, and we have not noted a correlation of conciliatory skills and sex. These depend on the professional and human qualities of each individual.

7. Despite our strained relations, activity under the cooperative agreements in force with the USSR never ceased entirely. Exchanges of students and scholars, for example, have continued. We would, however, like to expand these activities as you suggest and are currently discussing ways to do so with Soviet representatives.

8. We feel that the President's speech of January 16 represented the sort of overture you recommend.

9. We certainly agree that all normal people yearn for peace. Nothing has a higher priority for us.

10. As the President put it in his January 16 speech, we do not view our strength as an instrument to cow the Soviets into submission but, first, to insure that there not be a war between us, and second, to give us something to bargain with. Strength can facilitate negotiation with an adversary who expects something in return for concessions made.

11 Of course.

12. Of course we agree with the first part. But the other two paragraphs deserve comment. First, we do not believe that the Soviet leaders want a war with the United States. We equally

want none with them. As the President has said many times, "If the Soviet leaders want peace, then there will be peace." But we must recognize that military strength can be used not only to make war, but to intimidate. The Soviet preference is clearly to obtain the fruits of a military victory without fighting. We must conduct ourselves in such a manner as to preserve peace and prevent the successful use of the threat of force to undermine our freedoms.

13. If some claim that the U.S. is an arms merchant to the world, then they labor under a misperception. The Soviet Union is by far the largest supplier of arms to the Third World. Most nations do have legitimate defense needs, and we cannot ignore these. On the other hand, we can and do exercise great prudence both in the quantity and types of arms supplied to other countries. Clearly, we cannot deprive the nations of Western Europe of the means to defend themselves, or Israel, or many other countries in the world. Nevertheless, we recognize that far too much is being spent on arms, and we are trying to assist other countries to settle their regional disputes without resort to arms. There has been encouraging progress recently in some areas such as Southern Africa, and frustration, despite our best efforts, in others, such as Lebanon. But we are determined to keep on trying.

14. We have no desire at all to attempt to establish a Pax Americana. But as one of the strongest countries in the world, many peoples intent on preserving their freedom and working out their problems peacefully must depend on us for support of various kinds. We provide much more economic aid than military support to the Third World. We also feel that the whole civilized world has a stake in insuring that terrorism not become an international norm. No sense of economic or political grievance can justify attacks on innocent people, and the fact that some regimes, such as the Libyan and the Iranian, have resorted to terrorism as an instrument of national policy is one of the most disturbing of contemporary problems. We are determined to act, in concert with other countries, to stamp out this hideous practice.

15. We agree with you on the importance of maintaining support for the United Nations. But we are obligated not only to provide support, but to encourage the United Nations system to take corrective action when the activities of some of its agencies begin to run contrary to the objectives of those agencies.

In sum, we are in total agreement on the need to preserve the peace, and I feel that the President's approach is congruent in most essential respects with yours.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 11, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter to Anne Higgins from Terry E. Branstad

I recommend that you forward the memorandum to Sally Kelley
at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memo to Sally Kelley
Tab II	Incoming correspondence

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 11, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Letter to Anne Higgins From Terry E. Branstad

We have reviewed and concur with the Department of State's proposed draft letter to Mr. Terry E. Branstad in response to his letter to Ms. Higgins regarding American-Soviet student exchange this summer.

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8409408

Date April 10, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: Anne Higgins From: Terry E. Branstad

Date: 3-21-84 Subject: Approves of David Wheelers
suggestion that an American - Soviet student exchange be held
this summer and hopes White House will give it serious attention

WH Referral Dated: 3/29/84 NSC ID# 219126
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- X A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

Draft Reply

Dear Governor Branstad:

I have been asked to reply to your letter of March 21 to Special Assistant to the President Ann Higgins expressing support for a proposal by David Wheeler of the University of Iowa.

At Ms. Higgins' request the Department of State replied to Mr. Wheeler. I am pleased to enclose a copy of that reply.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure: As stated

The Honorable
Terry E. Branstad,
Governor of Iowa,
State Capitol,
Des Moines, Iowa.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 3, 1984

Mr. David Wheeler,
University of Iowa,
E-144 Currier,
Iowa City, IA

Dear Mr. Wheeler:

I have been asked to reply to your letter of February 20 to Anne Higgins in the White House proposing that a forum/exchange of American and Soviet youth leaders be held this summer.

The Department considers that in principle exchanges between American and Soviet young people can be useful and serve the cause of better mutual understanding when conducted on a basis of reciprocity and open expression of views. Based on considerable experience, we believe that people-to-people exchanges of this sort work best when organized on a private basis between American and Soviet organizations. A number of American organizations have contacts with Soviet youth organizations and experience in carrying out exchanges with them. Among them are: The American Friends Service Committee, 1501 Cherry Street Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215-241-7000); the American Council of Young Political Leaders, 426 "C" Street., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002 (202-546-6010); the Citizen Exchange Council, 18 East 41st St. #1900, New York, NY 10017 (212-889-7960); and the YMCA of the USA, 101 N. Wacker Dr., Chicago, IL 60606 (312-977-0031). You may find it useful to discuss your proposal with one or more of these groups.

Should you arrange for Soviet youth to attend meetings in this country, you should be in touch with the Department's Office of Soviet Union Affairs (202-632-2248).

Sincerely,

R. Mark Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs

8409408

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

MARCH 29, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 219126

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MARCH 21, 1984

TO: ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: THE HONORABLE TERRY E. BRANSTAD
GOVERNOR OF IOWA
STATE CAPITOL
DES MOINES IA 50319

SUBJECT: APPROVES OF DAVID WHEELERS SUGGESTION
THAT AN AMERICAN - SOVIET STUDENT
EXCHANGE BE HELD THIS SUMMER AND HOPES WHITE
HOUSE WILL GIVE IT SERIOUS ATTENTION

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

*rec'd 5/5/84
2325 3/28/84*

RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: _____ Media: L Individual Codes: 2110 _____

Prime Subject Code: FO005-01 Secondary Subject Codes: CQ 165 _____
ST 015 _____

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

SIGNATURE CODES:

CPn - Presidential Correspondence
 n - 0 - Unknown
 n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
 n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
 n - 3 - Ron
 n - 4 - Dutch
 n - 5 - Ron Reagan
 n - 6 - Ronald
 n - 7 - Ronnie

CLn - First Lady's Correspondence
 n - 0 - Unknown
 n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
 n - 2 - Nancy
 n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence
 n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
 n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

B - Box/package
 C - Copy
 D - Official document
 G - Message
 H - Handcarried
 L - Letter
 M - Mailgram
 O - Memo
 P - Photo
 R - Report
 S - Sealed
 T - Telegram
 V - Telephone
 X - Miscellaneous
 Y - Study



TERRY E. BRANSTAD
GOVERNOR

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

STATE CAPITOL
DES MOINES, IOWA 50319
515 281-5211

219126

8409408

March 21, 1984

Ms. Anne Higgins
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Ms. Higgins:

Recently, David Wheeler wrote to you with the suggestion that an American-Soviet student exchange be held sometime soon, perhaps as early as this summer. David feels strongly that such an exchange would be helpful in promoting greater understanding among the peoples of the world's two super-powers.

I believe there is merit in David's suggestion and would urge that you or someone else on the White House staff give it the serious consideration it deserves.

Thank you and best regards.

Sincerely,

Terry E. Branstad
Governor

TEB/cd
cc: David Wheeler