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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (8490160)	from Matlock to Robert McFarlane re: US representation at Andropov funeral (2pp)	2/10/84	P-1 P-5
2. memo (8490161)	from Matlock to McFarlane re: Chernenko (1p)	2/10/84	P-1 P-5
letter case (8490109)			
3. memo	from McFarlane to the President re: US-Soviet relations (3pp) <i>R 12/12/85 M1480 #5</i>	2/18/84	P-1 P-5
4. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: US-Soviet relations (1p) <i>R " " #6</i>	2/6/84	P-1 P-5
5. memo	from McFarlane to Matlock re: US-Soviet relations (1p) <i>R 6/5/97 du NLS 97-004</i>	1/28/84	P-1 P-5
6. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: meeting with Zagladin (1p)	2/20/84	P-1 P-5
7. memcon	re: Zagladin/Matlock meeting (7pp) <i>R 11/14/83 M02 002 #29</i>	2/15/84	P-1
8. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: Suzanne Massie call (1p)	2/22/84	P-1 P-5
9. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: Soviet and policy (1p)	2/25/84	P-1 P-5
10. memo	copy of item # 9 (1p)	2/25/84	P-1 P-5
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron February 1984 [2 of 2] 90887 Box 3			10/19/95

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- 2-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- 2-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- 2-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- 2-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
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- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
11. cable letter case (8490207)	re: Soviet policy (3pp) D 4/25/03 MDZ-002 #30	2/17/84	P-1
12. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: Chernenko letter and paper (1p)	2/27/84	P-1 P-5
13. memo	from McFarlane to the President re: Chernenko letter and paper (1p)	n.d.	P-1 P-5
14. briefing paper	re: US-Soviet relations (6pp) R 12/12/05 M1480 47	n.d.	P-1 P-5
15. checklist	re: US-Soviet issues (6pp) R " " #8	2/18/84	P-1 P-5
letter case (8401608)			
16. memo	from Matlock to Admiral Poindexter re: Soviet shipping to pick up grain (1p) R 11/14/03 MDZ-002 #31	2/27/84	P-1 P-5
17. e-mail	from Poindexter to Richard Levine re: Soviet shipping to pick up grain (1p) R r ~ #32	2/24/84	P-1
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8401609)			
18. memo	from Matlock to Poindexter re: corn sales (1p) R 11/14/03 MOZ-002 #33	2/27/84	P-1
19. e-mail	from Poindexter to Matlock re: corn sales (1p) R ~ ~ ~ #34	2/24/84	P-1
letter case (8490242)			
20. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: Senators Cohen and Biden on US-Soviet relations (1p) R ~ ~ ~ #35	2/28/84	P-1
21. memo	from McFarlane to the President re: Senators Cohen and Biden on US-Soviet relations (1) R ~ ~ ~ #36	n.d.	P-1
22. memo	from Shultz to the President re: meeting with Senators Cohen and Biden (1p) R 11/26/02 NL5M02-002 #37	2/27/84	P-1 P-5
letter case (8401652)			
23. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: meeting (1p) R 11/14/03 MOZ-002 #38	2/28/84	P-1
24. agenda	re: meeting on Soviet affairs (1p) R ~ ~ ~ #39.	3/2/84	P-1
25. memo (8401653)	from Matlock to McFarlane re: meeting with Suzanne Massie (1p) R ~ ~ ~ #40	2/28/84	P-1
26. Memo (8401653)	re meeting w/ Massie 1p.	3/1/84	P-1
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
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RESTRICTION CODES

Residential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawer

CAS 4/3/2007

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON FEBRUARY 1984 (2)

FOIA

M03-1480

Box Number 3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	
3	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE US SOVIET RELATIONS (#5)	3	2/18/1984	mvh 5/19/08
4	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE US SOVIET RELATIONS (#6)	1	2/6/1984	mvh 5/19/08
14	BRIEFING PAPER	RE US SOVIET RELATIONS (#7)	6	ND	mvh 5/19/08
15	CHECKLIST	RE US SOVIET ISSUES (#8)	6	2/18/1984	mvh 5/19/08

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Withdrawer CAS

Box Number 3

FOIA M02-002

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON FEBRUARY 1984 (2)

DATE 3/21/2007

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
16	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SOVIET SHIPPING (#31)	1	2/27/1984	
22	MEMO	SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE MEETING WITH SEN. COHEN AND BIDEN (#37)	1	2/27/1984	

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER ¹⁻²~~1-3~~ LISTED ON THE
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1984 FEB 18 PM 12:35
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President has seen _____

SYSTEM II
90109

Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 18, 1984

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

NLS M1480 #5

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *(RM)* BY *Inf*, NARA, DATE 12/12/05
SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Toward Defining a Strategy

A recent article by James Billington, Director of the Wilson Center and one of America's leading specialists in Russian history, culture and psychology, deserves your attention. Billington is a tough-minded supporter of our deterrence strategy, and his article provides some important insights in the current situation in the Soviet Union and some thought-provoking suggestions for steps we can take to influence the development of the Soviet system over the long run.

Billington's Arguments

The U.S.-Soviet relationship has been remarkably stable but destabilizing forces have grown as Soviet military might and international involvement has increased without a comparable increase in internal maturity and serenity. Much of Soviet insecurity stems from the regime's failure to exorcise Stalinism and build an internal basis for self respect. Instead, present leaders are reverting to Stalinist techniques of coercion.

We must acknowledge the complexity of the situation and differentiate several distinct elements in the Soviet-American rivalry:

- Economic: Here we have already won.
- Imperial: A new form of the traditional Russian policy of extending its borders by absorbing or subordinating smaller states, it is most tempting when the U.S. seems weak or irresolute.
- Ideological: An expansionist policy is justified on ideological grounds, and the leaders see in revolutions elsewhere a vindication of their ideology which has failed at home.
- Psychological: The Soviets have a love-hate relationship with the U.S. We are "the only power that can destroy them, and also the only civilization by which they can measure themselves."
- Thermonuclear: The danger is not deliberate use but the difficulty of avoiding use in an escalating situation and also the potential for blackmail.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc Vice President
E Meese; J Baker

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

We must reject the idea that reaching agreements with the Soviets is an end in itself and also the idea that the Soviet system is on the verge of collapse. The forthcoming generational change of Soviet leaders provides some basis for hope that the system will change. Future leaders will face a choice between a course of further centralization, militarization and oppression and one of moving toward a more open system. The U.S. cannot determine the outcome, but it can influence it.

In order to bring maximum influence to bear on this developing situation, we need a more comprehensive dialogue in three areas:

-- With the current leadership, a dialogue that is tough and specific;

-- With the broader society and postwar generation, a dialogue that is generous and general;

-- With both, a multinational dialogue addressing common problems of the future jointly with other countries.

This will permit us to raise our sights without lowering our guard, and will help the coming Soviet generation to forge better links both with their own past and with our broad, contemporary experience.

Comment

I agree with Billington's point that our policy should include both hard-nosed negotiations with the current Soviet leadership, and measures to influence the future evolution of Soviet society.

--Dealing with the Soviet Leaders: We already have under way a sound policy for dealing with the Soviet leaders. We must continue to expand the channels available and to probe for areas of possible negotiability, while recognizing that significant progress may not be possible this year. Power struggles may make it impossible for the Soviet leaders to make the hard policy changes necessary for an improvement in relations with us. We should, nevertheless, continue to convey to them a policy of firmness coupled with negotiability, which can have its own impact on the leadership struggle. Our basic message should be:

(a) That no improvement of relations will be possible without a change in their policies and behavior;

(b) That continued intransigence on their part will result only on a worsening of their own situation;

(c) That we are serious about negotiating fair arrangements in a variety of areas; and

(d) That your political strength at home gives you the ability to deliver on any deals reached.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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3

It will be particularly important to convey credibly the last two points. If the Soviet leaders conclude that no agreements are possible with you, they will simply hunker down and put all their efforts into making trouble (though almost certainly in ways that do not risk direct military confrontation). If, however, they are convinced that agreements are in fact possible, this will strengthen the arguments of those in the Soviet leadership who are inclined to make sufficient concessions to reach agreements with us.

--The Broader Soviet Public and Younger Generation: We have given less attention to means of influencing the successor generation than we have to dealing with the leadership. Andropov was moving in a neo-Stalinist direction. His successors, however, will be forced to choose whether to intensify centralization, repression and militarization of Soviet society, or to improve incentives, decentralize decision making and rely more on market factors.

While we can have only a marginal effect on the outcome of this internal Soviet process, we should do what we can to strengthen the tendencies toward greater decentralization and openness, since this would produce a Soviet Union with less commitment to the use of force and less willing to engage in costly foreign adventures. Therefore, even if the rivalry of our systems did not end (it would not), the U.S.-USSR interaction would be safer and more manageable.

Billington's suggestions for reaching the younger generation through greater expanded exchanges are apt. The fact is that the successor Soviet generation is as parochial as the current one. Opportunities to meet with Americans and to come to the United States can undermine officially-sponsored negative stereotypes about the U.S. and stimulate private doubts about the veracity of propaganda caricatures. While the persons involved will rarely if ever be able to influence policy decisions immediately and directly, broader exposure of Soviet citizens to the U.S. can over time produce pressures for more realistic and less rigid Soviet policies.

For these reasons, I believe you should consider reopening negotiations on an exchange agreement in the near future. Exchanges can be broadened considerably on the basis of private funding, and I am investigating ways that we can bring our influence to bear in encouraging private foundations to direct their efforts toward reaching a new Soviet audience, rather than multiplying contacts with regime propagandists like Arbatov.

Attachment: Tab A - Billington article

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

cc: The Vice President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JW*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Toward Defining a Strategy

Attached at TAB I is a Memorandum to the President containing a summary of the Billington article on U.S.-Soviet relations and a discussion of it which emphasizes the need to find ways to reach the younger Soviet generation more effectively, as we conduct our dialogue with the leaders.

Before drafting the memorandum, I had two extended discussions with Billington about his ideas. As yet, they are relatively inchoate, although he is doing a more detailed paper on means of approaching the dialogue in his second and third categories (with the younger generation and establishing a dialogue on global issues with third countries), which he promised to get to me this week. Basically he feels, and I strongly agree, that some means must be found to direct foundation money into new channels, so that we do not have a private-sector dialogue dominated by the Arbatovs and Zhukovs, as it has been up to now.

*Billington
had to
help*
I have discussed some of these thoughts with David Hamburg, President of the Carnegie Corporation, who has tentatively allocated a substantial sum to expanded exchanges with the Soviets, and he has asked to meet with me again in the near future. I believe we should also consider encouraging Billington--or another like-minded scholar--to organize a conference of foundation leaders active in the field, so that we can attempt to point them in the right direction. *Good idea*

The point of all of this is that it should be possible to implement some of Billington's ideas without major changes of U.S. policy or large commitments of federal funds. We must, however, do what we can to encourage effective goal setting and more effective briefing of U.S. participants.

Recommendation:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

DECLASSIFIED/REL

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Billington Article

NLS 141480 #6

BY *snf*, NARA, DATE 12/12/85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

System II
90109

SECRET

January 28, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *Bud*
SUBJECT: US-Soviet Relations: Toward Defining a Strategy

I would appreciate your preparing a summary of the attached article by Jim Billington as well as an assessment of it in the form of a memo to the President. It seems to me that there is much in common between Jim's prescriptions and your own. I would like to infuse the President with an historical appreciation of where we stand in the relationship and what we can expect in the way of Soviet leadership (goals and strategy). Finally, given what I believe we share (a basic pessimism toward any near-term movement away from the deeply Stalinistic values held by the current senior generation of leaders), we ought to propose how we should proceed so as to avoid catastrophe in our strategic relationship while seeking to at least keep alive the hope of an alternative future among the successor generation. I would like to get this to the President as soon as possible.

Many thanks.

cc: Adm Poindexter
Robert Kimmitt
Bill Martin
Don Fortier
Don Gregg

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 97-004 # 1
BY ddw, NARA, DATE 6/4/97

SECRET

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With Russia: After 50 Years

The 50th anniversary of Soviet-American diplomatic relations was observed this past week in conditions of severe tension and sourness and, because of the illness of Yuri Andropov, unusual political uncertainty on the Soviet side. We asked a leading American student of Soviet affairs to size up the larger Soviet scene and to suggest some ways in which the American relationship with Moscow might be steadied.

James H. Billington

A Time of Danger, an Opening for Dialogue


The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is unlike any confrontation of major powers in recent history—perhaps in all history. It has been remarkably stable, not having led to any direct fighting between the principal rivals in 35 years of Cold War. Yet it is a relationship that is inherently dangerous because of the unprecedented weapons available.

The main destabilizing force in the relationship in recent years has been the great increase in Soviet military might and international involvements without any comparable increase in internal maturity and serenity. The cold, unpleasant fact is that the U.S.S.R. is currently in a very dangerous stage in which old psychological insecurity still exists alongside awesome new power.

Part of Soviet insecurity results from the legitimate desire for respect of the Russian people, who have often been attacked militarily and disparaged culturally. But far more of the current insecurity comes from the leaders' own progressive retreat from previous halting attempts in the late 1950s and early 1960s to exorcise Stalin's ghost and to build some new basis for self-respect within Soviet society.

The aging Stalinist oligarchy and its swollen, corrupt bureaucracy effectively stopped de-Stalinization under Brezhnev, chose a chief of police as his successor, and now seem to be falling back increasingly on the high Stalinist technique of using targeted acts of violence to coerce the respect that they have given up trying to earn. In the combination of brutality and deception that accompanied the Korean airline tragedy and the treatment of imprisoned symbols of social conscience such as Yuri Orlov and Sergei Khodorovich, there seem to be new hints of inertial drift into the old Stalinist formula of terror without bounds or shame. It is born less of a traditional desire for dominance than of a totalitarian compulsion to disorient, divide and in some sense destroy everything that cannot be controlled.

All of this is so profoundly unpleasant that one set of Americans, largely on the left, prefers to say that this isn't really happening or doesn't really matter. Another set, largely on the right, prefers to say that nothing else really happens or matters. Sincere people on both sides increasingly call for heroic, one-sided solutions—



"The aging Stalinist bureaucracy seems to have recently found a kind of fountain of revolutionary youth in distant places. It seems compelled not so much to conquer new territory as to vindicate abroad an ideology that has conspicuously failed at home."

unilateral disarmament, unilateral crusades—often mixing disguised sermons to America into supposed analyses of Russia.

The beginnings of a more rational understanding may lie in acknowledging complexity and in differentiating several distinct elements in the Soviet-American rivalry: economic, imperial, ideological, psychological and thermonuclear.

Economically, there is no longer any serious competition. Capitalism has simply proven itself more dynamic and adjustable, and far more capable of effective production for human use. Communism as a functioning economic system is unlikely to have sustained appeal to anyone in the modern world who is free to make a first-hand comparison—unless of course the capital-

ist economy allows itself to self-destruct in some massive new economic crisis.

The imperial aspect of the superpower rivalry involves our confronting a new form of a traditional Russian policy of extending the nation's borders by absorbing or subordinating smaller powers and states. Traditional national interest lies at the base of Soviet pressure on Europe and the push into Afghanistan. Here the Soviets made a classical imperial gambit in the "great game"—a timely move on a target of opportunity that must have seemed irresistible at a time of American weakness and preoccupation elsewhere.

But the Soviets' justification for their involvement in Afghanistan—and the probable reason for their refusal to withdraw—is the purely ideological argument that the revolutionary process once begun cannot be reversed.

This argument points to the new tendency to propel Soviet foreign policy beyond the realm of traditional Russian national interest into the more dangerous field of ideological politics.

The aging Stalinist bureaucracy seems to have recently found a kind of fountain of revolutionary youth in distant places. It seems compelled not so much to conquer new territory as to vindicate abroad an ideology that has conspicuously failed at home. It has worked with cocky new revolutionary cadres from Vietnam and Cuba, even as it played on American self-doubt after Vietnam to expand in various ways into Kampuchea, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and South Yemen. It gradually came to accept the long-resisted Cuban contention that the road to revolution in Latin America must be essentially violent rather than peaceful.

Once China after Mao adopted a more pragmatic and inward-looking attitude, the U.S.S.R. became the main source of ideas as well as arms for what was perceived to be a rising revolutionary tide. The Soviets put venture capital of various kinds into distant, destabilizing forces, and increasingly risked becoming involved in crises that they might not be able to control.

All of this is further complicated psychologically by Russia's tradition of a love-hate relationship with its principal Western adversary. To Russians, America is now the only power that can destroy them, and also the only civilization by which they can measure themselves. Their love-hate feelings toward us suggest the persistence of feelings of psychological inferiority even in the presence of strategic parity.

The massive arsenal of nuclear weapons and rocketry possessed by both superpowers gives a historically unprecedented dimension to the rivalry. The danger is probably not so much that either side will deliberately set out to use them, but that some developing crisis in a fuzzy area may escalate to a point where it will be difficult for one party not to use them in order to avoid a humiliating defeat.

The new weapons also pose new possibilities for blackmail—the key element in the current campaign to prevent new missile deployments in Germany. The long-range objective is to divide, neutralize and eventually establish political dominance over Europe.

The immediate campaign is to convert the West's moral anguish over nuclear weapons into a political separation of Western Europe from the United States. Though so far unsuccessful in its short-run objective of preventing missile deployment in Germany, this campaign has helped change the basic international orientation of opposition parties in England and, increasingly, in Germany.

With the increasing pro-Soviet drift of the German Social Democratic Party, the U.S.S.R. is gaining a major new asset for resolving both its physical security and its psychological inferiority by establishing greater political dominance over Germany: the only "West" that really matters to them in Europe.

Is there any rational hope that an open America may in time be less threatened by the closed colossus in the U.S.S.R.?

There is plenty of irrational hope on the market. On the left, there is the vague idea—one that only increases the likelihood of black-

mail—that reaching agreement with the Soviets is an end in itself. This attitude is supported by gossip and disinformation accepted as evidence, or by wishful thinking about the putative plight of alleged "doves" and "liberals" within the Soviet leadership—for whose very existence there may be no real evidence.

On the right there is the hope that the Soviet system may be on the verge of convulsive economic collapse and/or national disintegration. Although there is hard evidence of deep problems in both areas, there is no indication of any such drastic imminent outcome and there are many reasons for rejecting the hidden assumption that "the worse for them the better for us."

"There is, I believe, a reasonable likelihood that the forthcoming generational change of leadership may bring with it greater change in policies than at any times since Lenin moved from War Communism to his New Economic Policy in 1921."

Any basis for rational hope must be found within their system rather than our preconceptions. There is, I believe, a reasonable likelihood that the forthcoming generational change of leadership may bring with it greater change in policies than at any time since Lenin moved from War Communism to his New Economic Policy in 1921.

There is a scholarly consensus that the Soviet economy is too stagnant, the society too corrupt and degenerating, and the administrative and productive system too saddled with deferred maintenance for anything short of massive reforms to be effective.

Simply to keep up as a great power, Soviet leaders will have to mobilize new energies from the broader society. This can be done realistically only by drastically extending the authority over Soviet life as a whole of one of the only two areas that are still productively efficient in the U.S.S.R.: either the command economy based on centralized military power or the market economy based on local entrepreneurial incentive (the growing "second" economy). While Russian tradition may favor the former, the imminence of an unnaturally delayed generational change in leadership may favor building more on the incentive principle.

There could hardly be a more dramatic contrast than between the basic experiences that shaped Yuri Andropov and the last Stalinist generation (the unending bloody convulsions of coerced industrialization and collectivization, artificial famines, incessant internecine purges, and heroic wartime sufferings) and the influences on those under 50. The latter are the better educated, psychologically less complicated products of a post-war period of small deeds, uninterrupted

peace and relative prosperity.

The coercive stand-pat policies of recent years with their emphasis on repression at home and aggression abroad will be very difficult to sustain in the absence of signs that they are succeeding. A new generation of leaders will lack the legitimizing authority that accrued to the older survivors from a period of great if bloody deeds. It will surely be tempted to reshape the system in terms of its own experiences and perhaps even to buy into the new ideal that appeared among its generation in the freer atmosphere of the '60s and early '70s.

The dissident movement was only the tip of an iceberg, most of which still lies submerged within the system. This movement of ideas represented an unofficial effort to continue the process of de-Stalinization that Khrushchev began and Brezhnev definitively stopped. There was—and continues to be in the new generation—an attempt to recover links with those elements of old Russian tradition that Stalin had systematically sought to destroy: Christianity, rural Russia, literature with an authentic moral mapping. This generation felt its way toward social criticism in the early '70s—codifying alternate versions of history through the oral counter-culture, staging satirical plays and forming a human rights movement and even a tiny free labor movement.

One cannot be sure that the new generation of leaders will identify with the higher moral aspirations of its own generation once in power, rather than with the quasi-Stalinist system through which they will have to rise to power. But so great is the social and economic need to mobilize fresh energy and enthusiasm, and so strong the psychological desire to find a worthy, non-Stalinist identity to make some sense of its sufferings, that one has to allow for the possibility of profound rather than merely cosmetic changes with the coming of this generation.

Americans cannot directly determine in any important way how the Soviet Union will evolve. Nor should we look for a maturing society with its own traditions to replicate or even approximate our own. But as the Soviets' principal adversary and object of fascination, we are more involved in their evolution than we may realize.

To me this suggests a need to begin, in the second half-century of our relations, a far more comprehensive Soviet-American dialogue than we have tried in the first 50 years.

The first need at this time of dangerously diminished dialogue is for increased but more clearly defined contacts between the two superpowers. All dialogue, especially at the higher levels, should be polite and respectful in tone—particularly since the Russians crave respect and may invisibly mimic our model. The dialogue should be of three quite different types, each with a different objective.

1. With the vestigial Stalinist oligarchy that is still in charge, we need a dialogue that is tough and specific. One should never be soft and general with Stalinists. The meaningless "general principles" of the 1972 Soviet-American summit facilitated rather than forestalled subsequent Soviet advances. Ingratiating approaches taken for domestic political reasons are invariably received as a sign of weakness and an invitation to further manipulation.

It is also important that there be only a sin-

gle, substantive dialogue on the high strategic questions, because unity, like firmness, is essential for closing a deal. One should feel neither intimidated by threats of a walkout nor compelled to make gratuitous demonstrations of flexibility to win vague good will. The older leaders know about war and almost certainly want an agreement in this area.

2. With the broader society and the postwar generation, we need an exploratory dialogue that is generous and general rather than tough and specific. Vastly expanded exchanges with this generation now may help build a basis for more comprehensive agreement later.

The social basis for repression in the U.S.S.R. today is the combination of a swollen state and a weak society. Broadened American exchanges with Soviet society as a whole—on a professional, regional, educational, cultural and purely random basis—will encourage the elements that make for civic responsibility. Economic contacts could suggest new models for management and encourage the kind of self-respect that might make Russians less psychologically dependent on gaining respect through the military.

3. A new category of dialogue would involve Russians and Americans with other countries in discussing and developing a new global agenda—perhaps looking to the year 2000. Such a format would provide the model for the next generation of Russians, who must look to us for new approaches to world order. Many of the problems are themselves multinational, and new ideas may be easier to accept if there are new forums that are multinational rather than binational.

Each of these dialogues would help overcome a weakness that has plagued American relations with the Soviet Union. The first helps to avoid the illusion of some liberals in assuming that Soviet society will naturally evolve into something better if only we are nice to the surviving Stalinists. The second, broader level moves beyond the dead-end reliance of some conservatives solely on material toughness. The third dispels the seductive belief, common to both liberal and conservative politicians (and to many Russians), that our many bothersome involvements in the world will drastically diminish once we cut a deal with the Russians and cut out everyone else.

Our continuing confrontation at the thermo-nuclear level clearly requires the first type of contact: tough and specific and at the highest level. We and the Soviets both have by now, it seems to me, an overriding responsibility not to leave the nuclear negotiating table until we have begun to limit and reduce the global menace we have co-authored, and not to make this overriding issue hostage to other issues.

The ideological aspect of Soviet-American confrontation is an ideal element for the broader level of dialogue that brings in the younger Soviet generation not yet in power. The peaceful discussion of ideas with this generation may help check the inertial drift of the vestigial Stalinists into endorsing revolutionary violence in distant places.

"The social basis for repression in the U.S.S.R. today is the combination of a swollen state and a weak society. Broadened American exchanges . . . will encourage the elements that make for civic responsibility."

Almost certainly the traditional imperial aspect of Soviet policy will increasingly become a greater concern of Russia's Eurasian neighbors rather than of the United States. Since the problem of Russia's borders involves deep psychological sensitivity on the Russian side and the very existence of many neighboring peoples, it should not be left to the play of chance but discussed in the third type of multilateral dialogue over a long period of time.

We clearly need to increase support for Russian studies throughout America, and we probably need one high-level place in government to provide comprehensive analysis and policy coordination for all our dealings with the U.S.S.R.

No longer can there be any room for illusions about a governing group that, in the Stalin era, produced one of the two greatest, sustained state-sponsored set of atrocities against its own subjects in the 20th century. There can be no excuse for weakness in dealing with those who have ceased in the last 20 years to permit talk about, let alone restitution for, the horror on which their power rests.

But we do not have to lower our guard to raise our sights. We can invent new forms of dialogue, reach limited agreements, and perhaps even devise new forms of joint activity that can substitute cooperation for confrontation. The coming Soviet generation would welcome fresh initiatives. In trying to find a non-Stalinist path into the future, they will want better links both with their own deep past and with our broad, contemporary experience.

Those who will continue the troubled Soviet-American dialogue in the years ahead may someday conclude that, for such vast countries and such expansive, complicated peoples, it might just be harder to take small steps than big ones.

The writer, director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, has written histories of Russian culture and the revolutionary tradition.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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January 28, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *Rud*
SUBJECT: US-Soviet Relations: Toward Defining a Strategy

I would appreciate your preparing a summary of the attached article by Jim Billington as well as an assessment of it in the form of a memo to the President. It seems to me that there is much in common between Jim's prescriptions and your own. I would like to infuse the President with an historical appreciation of where we stand in the relationship and what we can expect in the way of Soviet leadership (goals and strategy). Finally, given what I believe we share (a basic pessimism toward any near-term movement away from the deeply Stalinistic values held by the current senior generation of leaders), we ought to propose how we should proceed so as to avoid catastrophe in our strategic relationship while seeking to at least keep alive the hope of an alternative future among the successor generation. I would like to get this to the President as soon as possible.

Many thanks.

cc: Adm Poindexter
Robert Kimmitt
Bill Martin
Don Fortier
Don Gregg

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, First Deputy Chief,
International Department, CPSU Central
Committee
Stanislav Menshikov, assistant to Zagladin
Unidentified Soviet notetaker
Jack Matlock, NSC

DATE AND February 15, 1984, 2:00-3:30 P.M.
PLACE: Zagladin's Office, Central Committee Building,
Moscow, USSR

Matlock opened the conversation by saying that he regretted disturbing Zagladin during the sad and busy period he was going through, but he wished to take advantage of his presence in Moscow to deliver a reply to the message conveyed by Zagladin through Dr. Horowitz of Senator Kennedy's staff. Following his meeting with Zagladin on January 19, Dr. Horowitz had conveyed Zagladin's remarks to the White House, as Zagladin had requested. That message had been considered at high levels in the White House, and he wished to provide, in this informal fashion, our reaction and comment.

As we understood the message, it had essentially two parts: that great powers must allow each other "elbow room" in order to avoid dangerous confrontations, and that although relations between our countries were very bad, they could be improved with mutual effort, and that a Soviet analysis had indicated that a good place to start might be to work jointly on a treaty to ban chemical weapons.

Zagladin confirmed that this was the essence of the message given to Dr. Horowitz.

Matlock observed that we agree on the matter of "elbow room." We felt that we had in fact observed that principle in practice, and said that if the Soviets viewed the matter differently, he would convey any specific complaints they might have to Washington for consideration. He added that, in our view, the Soviets sometimes restricted their own "elbow room" by their public statements which diminished their own flexibility.

Regarding work on a treaty banning chemical weapons, the U.S. is serious in its desire to reach agreement on a treaty. As Secretary Shultz announced in Stockholm, we would be tabling a draft treaty at the CD in Geneva in coming months. It would be global in its coverage rather than regional, for reasons Shultz had explained to Gromyko in Stockholm. But from our point of view, verification will be the key to a viable treaty, and it is clear from our analysis that verification procedures must go well

beyond the sort of national technical means incorporated in previous arms control agreements. We know from long experience that the Soviets resist most forms of on-the-spot verification, yet they will be essential to any treaty acceptable to us. Unless the Soviet approach to verification changes substantially, therefore, we may have great difficulty coming to an agreement on this subject. For this reason, we wonder quite frankly whether CW is really the best place to start. Since we are serious in our intent to negotiate as many difference as we can, we think it might be useful to discuss the matter frankly, and to see if there are any other candidates at hand which might present fewer difficulties. Does Zagladin have any other ideas?

Zagladin (who took detailed notes himself on the above) said that it was important to allow each side elbow room. As he had told Horowitz, the Soviets recognized the dependence of the U.S. and its Allies on oil from the Persian Gulf, and would understand if circumstances should require action by the U.S. to sustain the flow.

As for a CW treaty, the Soviets have no problem with a global approach. They will study our draft and the verification provisions carefully, and maybe there will be fewer problems there than the U.S. anticipates. As for other areas, does the U.S. have any ideas?

Matlock said that we wondered if START is not an area which would benefit from our joint consideration. It is, after all, the central issue between us so far as arms control is concerned. And although the problems are large, they do not seem unsurmountable to us if the Soviets are willing to show the sort of flexibility we can offer. Progress in this area would be an important achievement in its own right, and could have a beneficial effect on our cooperation in other areas.

The U.S. has made clear that it does not seek to restructure Soviet strategic forces to the detriment of the Soviet Union. We believe both sides would benefit from moving toward systems providing greater stability, but how we do that is subject to negotiation. We are prepared to examine possible trade-offs between those elements of our forces which cause the Soviets greatest concern, in return for Soviet willingness to constrain those systems in their arsenal which give us concern. He is no expert in this area and this is not an appropriate time to discuss our ideas in detail, but Gen. Scowcroft would be visiting Moscow in March with a group from the Dartmouth Conference, and we feel it would be useful if he could be received privately at the policy-making level for a frank, informal and unbinding discussion of possibilities. The purpose would, of course, not be to negotiate, but simply to provide an opportunity for discussion with an expert who is thoroughly familiar with views in Washington.

Zagladin replied that two things were needed to move the relationship forward: an improvement in the atmosphere, and some concrete steps which would demonstrate that agreements are really possible. On the latter, the Soviets would take a careful look at our CW proposals. Otherwise, their agenda was covered in Amndropov's January 28 letter to the President. For example, U.S. ratification of the TTBT and PNE treaties, mentioned in that letter, would be considered as a clear signal that progress is possible. Regarding START, he would be glad to talk to Scowcroft when he is in Moscow.

Matlock said that we had already gone a long way to improve the atmosphere, but had yet to observe much restraint in Soviet rhetoric. As for concrete steps, we agree they are necessary, and we hope to help identify some in conversations such as this one.

So far as START is concerned, Zagladin continued, the Soviets see two problems. The first relates to the effect of the U.S. proposals on the structure of Soviet forces. Soviet forces are structured differently from U.S. forces both because of the historical development of the forces on each side, and because of geography. The U.S., for example, is much better situated to deploy submarines since it has many easily accessible ports. The Soviet Union, in contrast, has few, and they do not provide easy access to the oceans. The Soviets, however, are not against more stable systems in principle. Maybe this problem can be solved in negotiations.

The second problem for the Soviets is the fact that the U.S. deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe has introduced a new strategic factor. Since these systems can strike the Soviet Union, they must be considered strategic, and this is for them relevant to START.

Matlock countered that, if this is the case, then the U.S. must consider the SS-20's as strategic in the same sense, because they can strike our Allies, and we are bound by treaty to consider an attack on them as an attack on us.

Zagladin said that he took the point, but in that case the U.S. should not argue that British and French systems cannot be considered. Indeed, the idea that "Nitze floated with Kvitsinsky" just before the INF talks broke down could have been the basis for settlement if the U.S. had wanted one.

Matlock said that our understanding is that this was Kvitsinsky's idea and that Nitze had made it clear that it could hardly be accepted by Washington. The reasons are clear. The British and French systems are actually irrelevant to the central issue in INF. In his view, the central issue is the Soviet attempt, represented by their deployment of the SS-20's in Europe, to

decouple American and West European nuclear security. This simply cannot be accepted by NATO and the U.S. Indeed, it does not even seem in the Soviet long-term interest. For even if it should succeed, and it will not, it would produce dangerous instability in Europe, and probably a growing desire on the part of the Germans for their own national deterrent. These would be developments hardly in the Soviet interest. The British and French systems are not Alliance systems and do not provide the necessary coupling of U.S. and West European nuclear defense. They are, furthermore, in no sense a threat to the Soviet Union, given the enormous disparity in their size and that of the Soviet arsenal.

In short, we feel that the Soviets were never willing to deal with the central issue in INF, and that is why an agreement has eluded us. We regret that we must deploy, but so long as the Soviets insist on keeping some SS-20's there must be a counter-balance, and this is totally consistent with Soviet long-range security interests. But we would like to find ways to keep deployments to a minimum, and are willing to continue negotiating.

Zagladin then referred to the danger posed by the short flight time of the Pershings.

Matlock said that their flight time was the same as that of the SS-20's to Western Europe.

Zagladin agreed, but said that the great accuracy of the Pershing II's made them a particular threat.

Menshikov joked that "if you feel you need a counter, why don't you just buy SS-20's from us and deploy them in Western Europe?"

Matlock replied, "if that's an offer, you may have a deal," and added that he thought too much was made of short flight times. The fact is that any nuclear missile flight time is too short. Whether the flight time is 40 minutes or 4 minutes, any missile launch could be tantamount to suicide. We should therefore concentrate on making sure that neither side will ever feel it must launch a missile against the other. This is a vital interest for both of us.

Zagladin agreed with the latter thought.

Matlock then observed that, speaking entirely personally, the exchange on the capabilities of our various weapons suggested to him that it might be useful to arrange some way for our military leaders and experts to meet and talk over some of these things. It seemed clear that the Soviets, for example, were exaggerating the capabilities of some of our weapons, and drawing inferences which we would consider quite unwarranted. Maybe we do the same sometimes. Talking about it would not solve basic problems, but

might clear the air a bit and give each side a chance to air its specific concerns.

Zagladin indicated that this was worth thinking about. He then stressed that what is needed now are deeds.

Matlock replied that we agree completely. He noted, however, that Zagladin seemed to imply that the deeds must come from us. From our point of view, they should come from them. We have serious and basic problems with many Soviet actions and policies. Zagladin is familiar with them and there is no need to catalog them. In our view, there is no basis for expecting us to make the first step--although we have, in fact, tempered our rhetoric without a corresponding adjustment in Soviet statements. Note, for example, the contrast in tone of the Shultz and Gromyko speeches in Stockholm. Perhaps, in our informal discussions, we should try to find ways that we can move jointly on substantive issues.

Zagladin said that this, in fact, is a good time to make a "fresh start," and said that they would consider carefully what Matlock had said. He added that they would be very busy during the period leading up to the March 4 Supreme Soviet "elections," but that his assistant Stanislav Menshikov planned a trip to New York March 6 for a scheduled conference, and he hoped that he might have a response to our conversation by then, when the General Secretary's "election" would have occurred. [Note: in a technical sense, Zagladin seemed to be referring to Chernenko's "election" to a seat in the Supreme Soviet. This, however, is an utter formality and a foregone conclusion. He may, therefore, have been hinting that Chernenko is expected to be made Chief of State by "election" as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. If this is in the works, however, it is most unlikely to occur before March 8, since the Supreme Soviet normally meets several weeks after "elections" are held, and these will not occur until March 4.]

Matlock said that he would be pleased to arrange a meeting with Menshikov while the latter is in the U.S., and that Menshikov should let Hartman know of his precise travel plans, so that appointments could be arranged. He added that any messages for him could be passed through Hartman, who can communicate directly with the White House.

Matlock added that, before leaving, he would like to share with them a few purely personal observations, as an individual who knows the Soviet Union well and also has the perspective of one who has worked in the White House for several months. First, he urged Zagladin and his colleagues to study most carefully the President's January 16 speech, noting that it reflects the President's considered views about the direction he would like the relationship to move. He noted, for example, the stress

throughout on cooperation and a desire to solve problems. If the Soviets are concerned over the atmosphere of the relationship, then they could find many openings in the speech which could serve as a basis for improving it.

Regarding the President personally, Matlock said that it was clear that the Soviets misunderstood him. Yes, he does not like communism and is profoundly disturbed by many Soviet policies and actions. At the same time, he is genuinely a man of peace and understands clearly the necessity of the U.S. and USSR managing their inevitable ideological rivalry peacefully. He will defend our interests vigorously, but is also prepared to address real problems and to solve them in a way which does not threaten the security of the Soviet Union.

Matlock then noted that some commentators in the press had suggested that the President's call for dialogue and negotiation was politically motivated. This was a mistake -- although we can anticipate that everything he does this year will be seen by some in this light -- because the President really does not need agreements with the USSR to be re-elected. If we are able to agree on some things, this will be good. But if we aren't, it will be very clear to the American people that it is not President Reagan's fault, but rather Soviet intransigence. In sum, even though the issues will be debated in our campaign, the state of U.S.-Soviet relations is most unlikely to affect any votes. The real reason the President is calling for a dialogue is that he genuinely wants to make strides toward arms reduction during his stewardship. He wants it on his record.

If the Soviets wish to wait until 1985 to deal, then that will be their decision. If the President is reelected, his position will not change. He will be neither harder nor softer. But if we lose a year, the advance of technology may make the issues even more complicated. And the Soviets should bear another factor in mind. That is, that President Reagan can deliver on any agreements he signs. That has not always been certain with American presidents, and we can understand the frustration of other countries when they must deal with an American president who may not be able to mobilize the support of 67 senators to ratify treaties. History shows that American conservatives are better able to deliver than liberals.

Menshikov commented at this point that they knew a treaty signed by President Reagan would be ratified, but their problem was how to get him to sign one.

Matlock replied if they would make some realistic offers, they might find it easier than they think.

It was then agreed that Menshikov would get in touch with Matlock when he comes to the U.S. in March. As he departed, Matlock gave

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Zagladin a couple of pictures of Zagladin and his wife taken at a dinner Matlock hosted in 1981. Zagladin thanked him and reiterated, "It's a good time now to make a fresh start."

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 21, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Dobrynin's Birthday
Greetings

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, acting in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, has sent the President greetings on the occasion of his birthday (Tab B). Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he sign the letter (Tab A) to Dobrynin.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to Dobrynin

Tab B Letter from Dobrynin

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Dobrynin's Birthday Greetings

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, acting in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, has sent you greetings on the occasion of your birthday (Tab B). Attached at Tab A is a letter for your signature to Dobrynin thanking him and the Corps for the birthday greetings.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Dobrynin at Tab A.

OK No

— —

Attachments:

Tab A	Letter to Dobrynin
Tab B	Letter from Dobrynin

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I would like to thank you, and through you the Diplomatic Corps in Washington, for your birthday greetings and your wish that the coming years will bring peace and happiness to all Americans.

Allow me to extend my own greetings to you and the members of the Corps, and the hope that the peace and happiness you wish for the American people will be reflected in your own lands.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Anatoly Dobrynin
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps
Washington, D. C.

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 17, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Dobrynin's Birthday Greetings

Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, acting in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, has sent the President greetings on the occasion of his birthday (Tab B). Attached (Tab A) is a draft reply for the President's signature.

for Charles Hill
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- A. Draft Presidential Reply
- B. Ambassador Dobrynin's Birthday Greeting

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED RESPONSE

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I would like to thank you, and through you the Diplomatic Corps in Washington, for your birthday greetings and your wish that the next few years will bring peace and happiness to all Americans.

Allow me to extend my own greetings to you and the members of the Corps, and the hope that the peace and happiness you wish for the American people will be reflected in your own lands.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency Anatoly F. Dobrynin,
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps,
Washington, D.C.

DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

8404039

KS

February 6, 1984

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the Diplomatic Corps in Washington and my own behalf I would like to extend to you our sincere birthday greetings.

Allow us to wish you many more years of good health, happiness and peaceful life to you and to all American people.

With best personal regards,



Anatoly F. DOBRYNIN

Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps
in Washington, D.C.

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

U.S. - Soviet RelationsA Framework for the Future

What are the prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations in 1984? What should be our approach?

I. Premise

Chernenko's selection as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party may provide an opportunity to put our relations on a more positive track. Even before Andropov died, there were signs that the Soviets were accepting the necessity for an intensified dialogue. Now they have started to diminish their hostile rhetoric somewhat and have indicated a readiness to examine privately proposals for solving some problems.

As a Soviet leader, Chernenko has many initial weaknesses. He may have come to power as the head of a relatively weak coalition, and his freedom to maneuver may be severely circumscribed. His public image is not strong, and he may well turn out to be only a brief transitional figure. Nevertheless, he probably does not view himself in that light, and we can assume that he will attempt to consolidate his power and put his own stamp on history. In that effort, an ability to improve relations with the United States would be an important asset to him, and to be seen publicly dealing with you as an equal would bolster his image greatly in the Soviet Union. In short, he needs you more than you need him, and he knows it.

This does not mean that he can sell the store. Crucial strategic decisions will continue to be made by a collective--essentially the same collective which ran things under Andropov. But it is likely that this collective had already begun to recognize the need for the Soviet Union to adjust some of its policies before Andropov died, and Chernenko's accession could hasten that process. The change of the face at the top could make it easier to adjust policies, implicitly blaming past failures on the "previous administration."

To say that these things could happen is, of course, not the same as saying that they will, or even that the odds favor them happening. The Soviets still harbor a deep and fundamental hostility to your Administration, are tough and cynical bargainers, and will be reluctant to do anything that they believe would facilitate your reelection and vindicate your policy of strength.

Your reelection is of strategic importance for the United States in establishing an effective long-term policy for dealing with the Soviet threat. This means that we must stress in public your call for dialogue and your desire to reduce tensions and solve problems. Tangible progress and a summit that produced positive

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results could be helpful if the Soviets decide to bite the bullet and adjust their policies sufficiently to make this possible. But if they continue to resist realistic negotiation, you must be in a position by late summer or fall to make clear that this is their fault, not yours.

For the next few months, however, we should carefully avoid raising public expectations for a summit or any specific accords with the Soviets. To do so would gravely weaken our negotiating leverage with the Soviets, and leave a public impression of failure if they refuse to deal with us realistically. In private, however, we should promptly begin to explore the possibilities for moving ahead in some important areas, and to test Chernenko's willingness and ability to meet at least some of our legitimate concerns. If we play our cards right, we may well be able to induce Chernenko to pay something in advance for the improvement in relations and summit which would be very helpful to him personally.

On the Soviet side, one principal argument against meeting our concerns in some important areas is likely to be that your policy is so hostile that no accommodation is possible, and any attempt to negotiate seriously would only result in Soviet concessions without a deal. It is, therefore, in our interest to make it clear that we will negotiate seriously if the Soviets are willing to meet our legitimate concerns. Such a posture would not only maximize whatever chances exist for major agreements in 1984, but would provide a sound basis for rapid progress in 1985, if the Soviets are unable to get their act together until then, or if they hold back for fear of helping you get reelected. We should not, of course, attempt to stimulate their interest by making prior concessions of substance. This would only encourage them to continue on their track of trying to get concessions from us without making any of their own. Indeed, our aim should be to obtain some prior concessions from them, particularly if you are to agree to a summit. In this regard we should recognize that there are doubtless limits on what Chernenko can deliver; he can hardly pull Soviet troops out of Afghanistan or make major decisions of strategic significance. But he can deliver on such matters as human rights cases and Jewish emigration if he wishes.

All of this suggests that we should move rapidly to put more content into the dialogue, and to search for more efficient modalities. We should stick to the broad agenda set forth in your January speech, but need to concentrate particular attention on issues where the Soviets can find a direct interest in responding. Regarding modalities, we need channels which permit off-the-record frankness and which are isolated from leaks.

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While concentrating on communicating with the leadership (whoever that may be at a given moment), we should also expand opportunities for more broad and effective contacts with a wider public, particularly persons now in their forties and fifties (the successor generation).

II. The Substance

It is difficult to predict where on our four-part agenda progress might be possible. In 1983 the Soviets sent a signal in the human rights field by releasing the Pentecostals; this year it could be somewhere else. So we should keep pushing on all fronts, while keeping public expectations low unless and until something concrete materializes.

A. Regional Issues

In our dialogue with the Soviets on regional issues, it will be difficult at this stage to strike direct deals. Thus, our near-term objective would be to engage them in a frank interchange regarding the dangers of given situations. Such a discussion would massage Soviet amour propre by treating them as equals (of sorts). It might also serve to alert us and them to particularly delicate aspects which should be taken into account in policy making. Being seen in consultation with the Soviets on these issues helps allay public anxieties and can increase leverage with other parties. Conceivably, the process could lead to reciprocal unilateral actions which might defuse particularly dangerous aspects of regional conflicts, although this is likely to occur only if relations in other respects improve.

The regional issue most likely to attract genuine Soviet interest is the Middle East -- Lebanon specifically. At this stage, we should steer away from tactical discussions and asking them to do favors, i.e., UNIFIL. Our objective should be to use a larger strategic discussion to stress the danger of events spiraling out of control of either of us and producing an Israeli-Syrian confrontation which would have serious dangers for both of us.

There is also room for a broad discussion of European issues, where we could drive home some of the dangers for Soviet policy of their present "splitting" tactics. And in general we believe our emphasis on greater Soviet restraint in unstable regions indicates more routine, substantive exchanges among experts on various regions.

B. Arms Control

START is the most important of the issues between us, and the one most likely to interest the Soviets in substance. Here, our objective should be to stimulate their interest in defining a common framework for further negotiations. Even if they are moving toward a START/INF merger, there are many pros and cons, and they are clearly unsure of where they want to go. It would be to our advantage to get back into dialogue and even back to

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the negotiating table. Even if an agreement should elude us, the very existence of START negotiations which offer hope of successful conclusion can exercise a moderating influence on Soviet behavior in other areas. By laying out some more specific ideas on a START framework we can hasten their deliberations, and perhaps be back in a serious dialogue by this summer (as a number of Eastern European leaders predict).

MBFR is important not because an agreement is likely this year or next, but because we have an opportunity to demonstrate that we are serious in our negotiating intent: that concessions on their part will evoke corresponding moves on ours. Our opening position at the next round is thus crucial in conveying the overall message that we are prepared to negotiate seriously.

On INF, we should do nothing other than reaffirm our position that they should return to the negotiating table. If the Soviets propose some combination of INF and START, we should examine their ideas carefully. The CDE, the CD in Geneva and bilateral talks on CBM's such as the hot line will have a higher profile than hitherto, but can be expected to yield only modest results in the absence of progress on larger issues.

C. Human Rights

While the Soviets will continue to make any discussion on human rights difficult, we should persevere. Last year the Soviets did move on the Pentecostals in the context of improving relations, and we are once again hearing from official Soviets that they see some improvement. We should continue to focus on major cases like Shcharansky, Sakharov and Orlov, and on the need to reopen Jewish emigration. This is an area where deals may be possible if arranged through private, off-the-official-record contacts. If movement in other areas indicate that a summit would be useful, we should push hard for human rights improvements as a precondition.

D. Bilateral

In the bilateral area, Secretary Shultz' meeting with Gromyko opened up a number of possibilities. Gromyko responded positively to the need to examine specific measures to prevent another KAL. Since then, the Soviet representative at ICAO has proposed a US-Japan-USSR group to look at such measures. We have developed a set of specific measures. Our objective should be to reach agreement on these measures this year.

We also should take steps which improve our direct communication and contact with the people in the Soviet Union -- to give practical effect to your own stress on talking directly to the people in your January 16th speech and again in the State of the

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Union. That is the objective of a consulate in Kiev (strongly supported in recent letters to the Congress and the Administration by Ukrainian-American organizations) and a cultural exchanges agreement.

By moving forward ourselves in these two areas now, we can help to channel in sensible directions the upsurge of interest across the country in greater people-to-people contacts and limit exploitation by the Soviets. Also to avoid naive groups dominating this area, we should try to establish a mechanism for better guidance and coordination of private efforts. This could be used to encourage those with a tougher-minded track record in dealing with the Soviets, i.e., the American Council of Young Political Leaders.

Some in Congress are interested in inviting a delegation of Supreme Soviet members this year. This could be a way for us to meet possible successors to Chernenko, such as Gorbachev. However, we will want to weigh carefully the risks of negative exploitation.

In other areas of possible bilateral cooperation, the Soviets have not responded formally to our space rescue proposal but informal indications are not promising. There are a variety of other areas of cooperation which could be pursued should we decide to do so.

III. Channels

There are a number of channels we should be utilizing.

We should continue the correspondence with Chernenko, but recognize that it is unlikely that he will be candid, both out of fear his letters will be leaked and in order to protect his negotiating positions. Nonetheless, it is one means of being certain that our views are getting through to the leadership without distortion. And it could help to provide some momentum. Chernenko's letter to you of February 23 made it clear that he accepts the need for an intensified dialogue, but he did not alter any substantive Soviet positions. Your reply can be used to press some of the key points on our agenda.

We also should hold early and regular exchanges between Secretary Shultz and Dobrynin and between Hartman and Gromyko on the full range of our concerns.

On the critical START issue, in the absence of negotiations in Geneva, the Secretary's talks with Dobrynin will be the main channel. As a parallel process we should consider sending a special emissary to Moscow. His mandate would be not to negotiate but to explain; a man like Brent Scowcroft would be able to set forth our views more fully and directly than passing through Dobrynin.

If there is sufficient movement, we should consider another Shultz-Gromyko meeting.

Finally, we should consider some other forms of dialogue. As noted earlier, on regional issues like the Middle East our specialists should meet. In addition, we should consider sending a group of middle-level policy officials to Moscow to cover a broad range of subjects and touch base with key Soviet organizations, including the Central Committee. And military-to-military discussions are a possibility: discussion of such matters as strategic doctrine or comparison of each other's threat assessments might be useful topics.

IV. Timetable

The following timetable is possible:

--Shultz/Dobrynin within a week to 10 days: further on START framework and propose some of other consultations.

--Hartman/Gromyko: propose Middle East discussion by specialists and/or discussions by policy planners.

--Scowcroft: Brief him on our approach to use privately during his planned trip to Moscow beginning March 8.

--Another Shultz/Gromyko meeting: we should not push for this yet but wait and see how other issues develop. If the Soviets seem interested, we could try to arrange a meeting in May or early June. We also should consider whether to invite Gromyko to Washington to see you when he is here in September for the UNGA.

V. Bureaucratic Preparation

If the Soviets do begin to deal more seriously in areas of interest to us, we must be able to move rapidly in order to sustain momentum. This may require some adjustment of our bureaucratic procedures to make quick decisions possible. It would be useful to clarify as many immediate issues as we can, and to "pre-position" approved negotiating plans, to be used as developments warrant. A list of the more important U.S.-Soviet issues with summaries of their status is attached.

February 18, 1984

CHECKLIST OF US-SOVIET ISSUES:
STATUS AND PROSPECTSI. ARMS CONTROL

START: Status. Soviet deferral of resumption reaffirmed by Gromyko in Stockholm, but with Vice President, Chernenko called nuclear arms control major area for positive US-Soviet discussion. Soviets know we have new things to say on START in restricted channels (Dobrynin pressed Hartman to volunteer Thursday).

Prospects. If Framework presented to Soviets soon, some possibility of getting detailed confidential discussion underway over next few months (though they may continue to insist on something on INF/FBS as precondition to serious talks).

INF: Status. Soviets continue fixated on U.S. INF, and refuse resumption without some expression of U.S. "willingness to return to the situation that existed before deployments;" in Stockholm Gromyko shied away even from quiet discussions in restricted channels. Prospects. Near-term chances of renewed separate INF talks minimal. Gromyko pointed toward inclusion of U.S. INF systems in any resumed START talks, was informed that any negotiation dealing with GLCMs and P-IIs must also deal with SS-20s.

MBFR: Status. Talks to resume March 16. President's letter to Chernenko said we are prepared to introduce some new ideas and to be flexible on data if Soviets flexible on verification.

Prospects. Difficult to be too optimistic on these long-running talks, but some forward movement seems possible by summer assuming early Allied agreement on new proposal enabling us to respond to Soviets soon.

US-SOVIET CBMs: Status. January session moved us forward on upgrade of Hotline, but Soviets most reluctant on some of our more ambitious proposals. Soviets appear interested in principle in nuclear terrorism discussions. We are now coordinating USG proposal with Allies before going to Soviets. Prospects. Follow-on session on communications CBMs tentatively set for April; basic Hotline upgrade agreement possible by early summer. Could talk with Soviets on nuclear terrorism within a month assuming Allied support firms up; would not move multilaterally until some agreement with Soviets.

CDE: Status. Early sparring in Stockholm with basic NATO and Soviet approaches still far apart, and Soviets pushing declaratory measures such as Non-Use-of-Force Treaty; NATO seeks substantive notification measures. Prospects. We should pursue private dialogue underway in Stockholm. Realistic compromise proposals may be months or even years off without high-level political decisions, i.e. a package with points satisfying both sides.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~NLS M1480 #8BY 314, NARA, DATE 12/12/05

NON-PROLIFERATION: Status. Third round of highly technical and essentially non-political bilaterals just concluded in Vienna; both sides see them as valuable mechanism for policy coordination in this area. Prospects. Soviets have proposed and we are ready to agree to another session for December.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS: Status: Secretary Shultz announced to the CDE that we will be presenting a draft CW treaty in coming months; once State and ACDA competing versions are reconciled, a text will be submitted for interagency clearance. OSD opposes concept of such a treaty, but has proposed US-Soviet bilateral verification discussion. Prospects: Final treaty will not be ready for CD submission before April at the earliest; we may wish to pick up bilateral discussion proposal in interim.

NUCLEAR TESTING: Status: Soviets have turned down our proposals to discuss verification before ratification of 1976 TTBT treaty every time, and believe they have the propaganda high ground in calling for discussion only after it is ratified. Prospects: An interagency group is studying further approaches to the Soviets. One option involves ratification of TTBT in exchange for Soviet consent to on-site verification of a few nuclear calibration tests. Some agencies oppose any change in our position on basis of our non-compliance report to Congress.

ASAT ARMS CONTROL: Status. Soviets probably intend to make this major issue and Tsongas Amendment may prevent our testing the U.S. ASAT system absent talks with Soviets. Basically very little possible on this now until fundamental verification problems resolved. Some confidence-building measures are now being discussed within the USG and could be proposed for discussion with Soviets. Prospects: Proposals for CBMs or prohibiting certain acts could be discussed once USG study completed, but would be of less interest to Soviets than ASAT ban.

MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS: Status. Little dialogue between military establishments except in Incidents-at-Sea context, and we have held back from proposing regular exchanges between Weinberger and Ustinov or Chiefs of Staff. Prospects. A proposal of a Weinberger-Ustinov or Vessey-Ogarkov meeting could be made whenever we deem appropriate. Ex-CJCS David Jones plans to visit Moscow as member of Dartmouth Group delegation in March. Soviets, however, are likely to be extremely cautious until some progress made on other issues.

II. REGIONAL ISSUES

MIDDLE EAST: Status. Talking with Soviets here and Moscow, and Soviets negotiating with French on UN role in Lebanon.

Prospects. Soviets unlikely to do much to help us in Lebanon, but nervous about Syrian-impelled confrontation with us. Could acquiesce in UN role and possibly eventual Syrian withdrawal in return for commitments on U.S. and Israeli forces. Further discussion in Shultz-Dobrynin and Hartman-Gromyko channels could be useful to avoid miscalculation.

AFGHANISTAN: Status. Soviets dug in for long term, but feeling pressure. Talks under UN auspices may resume in April. Pakistan welcomes US-Soviet bilateral contacts as supporting its efforts, but last US-Soviet "experts'" talks in Moscow in July 1982.

Prospects. As pressure on the ground rises, Soviets may look to further cross-border incursions on Pakistan, to UN process and/or to direct talks with us as safety valve. We could make some points about role of guarantors in overall settlement that included withdrawal timetable if we wished to probe their longer-term intentions and prove we support UN process.

SOUTHERN AFRICA: Status. Steady progress now on South African disengagement from Angola, and discussions on shape of final settlement continue with some prospect for success, but Soviets could still block either through SWAPO or in Luanda. Chet Crocker talked with Soviets three times in 1982, but not since.

Prospects. Sending Hartman in with an update could give Soviets a better feel for the dilemmas they face.

KAMPUCHEA: Status. Soviets combine support for Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea with more active policy vis-à-vis ASEAN states, and item has not ranked high in bilateral dialogue.

Prospects. No immediate prospects of inducing the Soviets to decrease aid to Hanoi.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS

EMIGRATION/ANTI-SEMITISM: Status. Decline in levels of Jewish and other emigration continues, with last year's Jewish total about 3% of 1979 figure. Perennial topic in high-level meetings since 1981; latest "representation lists" on divided families and spouses and U.S. nationals handed over to Gromyko's deputy in Stockholm; Secretary raised anti-Semitism with Dobrynin after Stockholm; Bronfman visit to Moscow now uncertain.

Prospects. Return to large numbers unlikely, but Soviets could make some gestures -- through quiet diplomacy or to public figures -- in election year, and numbers could rise slightly as function of overall atmosphere in relationship.

SOVIET DISSIDENTS: Status. Andropov era saw rounding up and sentencing of all but a handful of Soviet dissidents. We raise these issues at regular intervals, including at Stockholm, but Sakharov still in Gorkiy, Orlov is going to internal exile after finishing seven-year sentence, and Shcharanskiy is still in jail. Prospects. Again not good, although, again, gestures are probably more possible under Chernenko, and we should encourage through quiet diplomacy.

IV. BILATERAL ISSUES

MARITIME BOUNDARY: Status. We offered a 50-50 split in the disputed territory in the Bering Sea. January negotiations in Washington complicated by unacceptable new Soviet position claiming additional areas for their exclusive economic zone and continental shelf rights. Prospects. New round is expected but not yet scheduled for near future. If Soviets move off their new position, an agreement would be possible within a few months at most. If they dig in, there will be extended negotiations.

KAL SAFETY MEASURES: Status. Discussions have begun in Montreal with Soviets and Japanese on installation of beacons, improved communications, and designation of emergency landing fields in the Soviet Far East along KAL 007 route. Prospects. Soviets have proposed US-Soviet-Japanese experts' group and signalled willingness to take concrete air safety steps under the ICAO umbrella. Action should be possible, but Soviets will remain wary of accepting even implicit responsibility for shootdown, and results could take months.

KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES: Status. Advance teams preparing for the formal opening of consulates under 1974 agreement were withdrawn as an Afghanistan sanction; now we have no official presence in Ukraine, while Soviets continue activities in New York out of their UN Mission. Last summer both sides agreed to move forward again, but progress ended with KAL; Secretary reiterated agreement in principle to Gromyko in Stockholm, noting timing must be right. Prospects. A negotiating strategy is awaiting NSC approval; Soviets say they are ready to open consulates at any time; talks could resume immediately; agreement could be reached and TDY advance teams could perhaps be in place by summer. Detailed arrangements could delay formal opening for some years.

EXCHANGES AGREEMENT: Status. We allowed US-Soviet cultural exchanges agreement to lapse after Afghanistan. Programs dropped off in both directions, but Soviets can arrange tours through private U.S. organizations, so we cannot exact reciprocity in the absence of agreement. We cannot mount USIA travelling exhibits in the Soviet Union, and Soviets now blocking Hartman's efforts

to run cultural programs out of his residence. Two sides agreed in principle in July to begin negotiations, but movement stopped with KAL; Secretary reiterated agreement in principle to Gromyko in Stockholm. Prospects. Draft proposal is far advanced, but would require high-level approval. It would probably take some months to negotiate agreement, but might be completed this year.

CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS: Status. First round of talks aimed at alleviating some of our ongoing visa and other consular problems with Soviets recessed in May after FBI refused to agree to additional entry point by sea at Baltimore (in addition to San Francisco) in return for two new points offered by Soviets (Brest and Nakhodka). Prospects. If FBI lifts veto on Baltimore, talks could resume at any time and produce balanced package of useful small housekeeping steps.

SIMULATED SPACE RESCUE: Status. Proposed to Soviets in late January. They have yet to respond. Prospects. Soviets have not appeared enthusiastic to date. We need response soon if there is to be any hope of making simulated rescue flight this summer.

COAST GUARD SEARCH AND RESCUE TALKS: Status. Soviets agreed just before KAL to discuss S&R procedures with senior Coast Guard officials, looking perhaps toward an agreement on coordination of search operations in Bering Sea. They deflected our December efforts to set up a meeting. Prospects. Soviets would probably agree now. Discussions and a possible agreement could be impressive following our well-publicized frictions during the KAL search and rescue operation.

PRIVATE/CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS. Status. Already an upsurge of interest in expanding people-to-people contacts; some in Congress want to invite a Supreme Soviet delegation this year. Prospects. To limit exploitation by Soviets, we might encourage tougher-minded experienced groups like American Council of Young Political Leaders to visit. Supreme Soviet visit could attract major Soviet figure to U.S.

LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AGREEMENT RENEWAL: Status. 10-year agreement, which has some utility in facilitating U.S. business efforts in Moscow, expires in June. Prospects. U.S. could propose renewal in the next few weeks. The Soviets would probably accept.

JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION: Status. A scheduled meeting was cancelled as an Afghanistan sanction, and this official, cabinet-level body has thus not met since 1978. Prospects. We could propose meeting later this year, assuming we have had a positive response on other economic steps.

FISHERIES AGREEMENT RENEWAL: Status. Extended twice under this Administration and up for renewal in July, this agreement has allowed a joint fishing venture that benefits U.S. fishermen. Soviets have not been allowed to fish directly in U.S. waters since Afghanistan. Prospects. Approval of an 18-month extension would permit improved planning by U.S. fisherman. USG could consider giving the Soviets a direct fish allocation at any time.

CURRENT AGREEMENTS: Status. There are US-Soviet cooperative agreements in force on the environment, health (including artificial heart research), housing, and agriculture that have functioned at low levels, partly because of the political atmosphere and partly because of restrictions on high-level US-Soviet contacts. Soviets interested in reviving these exchanges and giving them appropriate leadership. Prospects. Agreements could be given additional content by USG side with the participation of higher-ranking U.S. officials.

NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENTS: Status. A number of agreements were allowed to lapse after Afghanistan, some of which would be in our favor to renegotiate. They include the areas of space, transportation, and basic sciences and engineering. Prospects. Soviets are on record as favoring renewal and expansion of agreements, and these cases, affected agencies also new agreements. Transportation could be renewed by exchange of notes we had partially carried out before KAL. Others would take some time to develop proposals and negotiate agreements.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

February 27, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDexter

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Soviet Shipping to Pick up Grain

Regarding your note to Richard Levine of Feb. 24, my understanding that the requirement that Soviet ships apply 14 days in advance before entering U.S. ports (without assurance that permission will be granted) is the result of our allowing the Maritime agreement with the Soviets expire.

The 14-day request requirement is standard in the absence of a bilateral agreement. From 1972 until (I believe) 1982, we had a Maritime Agreement with the Soviets which gave them the right to enter 40 specified U.S. ports (established on the basis of reciprocity, with regard to Defense sensitivity) on four days advance notice. This agreement provided for shipment of a third of the grain trade in U.S. bottoms (with the Soviets picking up the tab for the differential cost) and a third in Soviet bottoms. So long as we had excess ships available for the trade, it was advantageous to us, since it in effect forced the Soviets to subsidize our merchant marine.

My understanding is that we did not renew the agreement when it last expired, in part because of Poland, and in part because we no longer had the excess tonnage to use in this trade.

Unless and until there is an economic benefit to us from such an agreement, I would strongly advise against one. The Soviets derive substantial benefits, since the four-day notice rule can be used to enter the market for carriage to third countries, and they pick up considerable hard currency in this trade. (Under the 14-day request rule, they are not able to assure shippers in advance that their ships will be allowed to pick up a scheduled cargo in a particular port.)

cc: Levine, Fortier, Robinson

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 1407-002 #31

BY

CS

NARA, DATE 11/14/03

MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: Richard Levine
To: Richard Levine

+02/24/84 10:30:07

~~-- SECRET --~~

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Soviet Shipping to Pick Up Grain

This morning the VP met with American corn growers who had met earlier with an official at the Soviet Embassy. The growers report that the mood this year was much more upbeat than the mood displayed last year by the same man. They discussed various things that could be done to improve agricultural relations. The Soviet raised the issue of reducing the 14 day waiting period to clear Soviet ships into US ports. The Soviets consider this discriminatory. What are the facts?

copy to: Matlock, Fortier, Robinson

cc: NSRMK --CPUA BOB KIMMITT

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MOZ-002 #32

BY GS, NARA, DATE 11/14/03

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

February 27, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: More on Corn Growers

Regarding your memo of Feb. 24, I see no objection to an invitation to the Soviet Minister of Agriculture to visit the U.S. I'm not sure this will do much for sales, but it would look good domestically this year. It could also be used to revive some projects which are of broader interest to us, such as 4-H sponsored exchanges of young people. I'll check out with State and get back to you.

On the matter of the Soviet agricultural counselor's travel, this is purely a matter of reciprocity. We let him travel so long as our agricultural attaches have no problems. But they often do have problems, and their travel is crucial to obtaining accurate crop forecasts. (The data they obtain on the spot is correlated with data obtained by other means, and fed into a computer modeling program; without the on-the-spot data, the predictions are much less accurate.) Because of the importance of our predictions of the Soviet crop for markets here, I do not believe we should relent on our insistence on reciprocity.

cc: Bob Kimmitt

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 1402-002 #33

BY CW, NARA, DATE 11/14/03

MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA
To: Jack Matlock

TO: Jack Matlock

+02/24/84 10:35:19

~~-- SECRET --~~

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: More on Corn Growers

The VP also reports that the Soviet suggested that we invite the Soviet Agricultural Minister to the US to help increase grain sales. Check out this idea. The Soviet also suggested that we allow the agriculture counselor to travel to the farming areas of this country. The growers correctly pointed out that the problem there is reciprocity. The Soviet said maybe they could do something about that.

cc: NSRMK --CPUA BOB KIMMITT

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NLS M102-002 #34

BY CIS, NARA, DATE 11/14/03

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 28, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jm*
SUBJECT: Senators Cohen and Biden on U.S.-Soviet Relations

Secretary Shultz has sent a memorandum to the President reporting on his meeting with Senators Cohen and Biden, who provided a read-out of their trip to Moscow just after the Andropov funeral.

The Senators spent much of their time with Soviet academic specialists in arms control and foreign policy, explaining the build-down concept. They also met with First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko and Acting Chief of State Kuznetsov.

Among their general observations were the following:

-- The Soviets are profoundly suspicious, but are willing to talk.

-- The Senators believe a "significant gesture" on our part is needed, and they recommend specifically early ratification of the TTB and PNE treaties.

-- The Senators believe that any U.S. proposals should be conveyed to the Soviet leaders confidentially in special channels.

A memorandum is attached at TAB I conveying the Shultz memorandum to the President.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Secretary Shultz's Memorandum to the President

cc. Chris Lehman, Ron Lehman, Sven Kraemer

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 1402-002435
BY CIS NARA, DATE 11/19/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Senators Cohen and Biden on U.S.-Soviet Relations

Secretary Shultz has sent you a memorandum reporting on his conversation with Senators Cohen and Biden following their recent trip to Moscow. They spent most of their time discussing the build-down concept for START, but made several observations as a result of their talks. Their major points include:

-- The Soviets are profoundly suspicious, but are willing to talk.

-- The Senators believe a "significant gesture" on our part is needed, and they recommend specifically early ratification of the TTB and PNE treaties.

-- The Senators believe that any U.S. proposals should be conveyed to the Soviet leaders confidentially in special channels.

The Secretary's memorandum is at TAB A.

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 102-002 #36
BY CIS, NARA, DATE 11/14/07

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: Conversation with Senators Cohen and Biden on
U.S.-Soviet Relations

I met with Senators Bill Cohen and Joe Biden February 23 to hear about their visit to Moscow over the past weekend. Invited by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, they had lengthy exchanges with senior Soviet arms control and foreign policy academics, as well as with Gromyko's top deputy Korniyenko and acting head of state Kuznetsov. Though much of their time in Moscow was devoted to detailed discussion of the "build-down" approach to strategic arms reductions, the Senators did come away with certain general impressions and suggestions of note.

The Senators found that the Soviets remain profoundly suspicious of our motives and do not fully understand many of our recent initiatives. Despite Cohen and Biden's arguments to contrary, the Soviets doubt the seriousness of the Administration's commitment to constructive U.S.-Soviet relations; believe that your offer for dialogue with them is motivated by 1984 electoral politics; and indeed, are ready to attribute to us an anti-Soviet animus that has them frightened. At the same time, however, the Soviets also displayed to the Senators an interest in talking substantively with us. Both Senators urged the Soviets not to make the mistake of trying to "wait out" the Presidential elections this year.

The Senators urged a significant gesture on our part that would demonstrate unmistakably the political will and bureaucratic discipline of this Administration to follow through on the policy of dialogue you set forth in your January 16th address. Biden and Cohen suggested in this regard our early ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. The Senators believed that to be effective, any U.S. initiative would have to be conveyed to the Soviet leadership in a confidential manner and through special channels -- to do otherwise, they feel, would only risk further Soviet misunderstanding and automatic dismissal.

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NLS M02-002 #37

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/26/02

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 28, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Meeting Scheduled for March 2, Concerning
Soviet AffairsIssue

To discuss our strategy toward the USSR in 1984 and obtain the President's guidance on possible future actions on our part.

Background

George Shultz has held several meetings of a small group of senior officials and experts to discuss our future strategy in dealing with the Soviets. A paper based on these discussions and the possibilities offered by the Chernenko succession has been submitted to the President.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum to the President (Tab I).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Talking Points/card

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS MOZ-002 #38
BY CIS, NARA, DATE 11/14/03

DECLASSIFIED

1652

NLS MOZ 002 #39

BY CAS NARA, DATE 11/14/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEETING ON SOVIET AFFAIRS

DATE: March 2, 1984
LOCATION: Treaty Room (Residence)
TIME: 2:15 - 3:45 P.M.

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE:

To discuss our strategy toward the USSR in 1984 and obtain your guidance on possible future actions on our part.

II. BACKGROUND:

George Shultz has held several meetings of a small group of senior officials and experts to discuss our future strategy in dealing with the Soviets. A paper based on these discussions and the possibilities offered by the Chernenko succession has been submitted to you.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Shultz
Secretary of Defense Weinberger
Director of Central Intelligence Casey
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, NSC Staff

IV. PRESS PLAN:

None

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

Invite Secretary Shultz to lead off the discussion, and pursue those points on which you desire more clarification or additional discussion.

Attachments:

Tab A Talking Points/card

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 28, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Meeting Scheduled for March 1 with
Suzanne MassieIssue

To have private meeting.

Background

Mrs. Massie met with the President on January 17. She has since visited the Soviet Union, where she had extensive discussions with Soviet cultural and Church figures.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Talking Points/cards

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MOZ-002 #40BY CH, NARA, DATE 11/14/03

Talking Points

- I have read the papers you sent over. (Note any particular points you want to explore.)
- George, why don't you lead off with your thoughts on how we should proceed with the Soviets?

MEETING ON SOVIET AFFAIRS

- I HAVE READ THE PAPERS YOU SENT OVER. (NOTE ANY PARTICULAR POINTS YOU WANT TO EXPLORE.)
- GEORGE, WHY DON'T YOU LEAD OFF WITH YOUR THOUGHTS ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED WITH THE SOVIETS?

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on March 2, 1984

for The President of the White House:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

The Vice President

STATE

Secretary George P. Shultz
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, DOB 3/12/26, SSN 022-24-3856
DEFENSE

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

CIA

Director William J. Casey

NSC

Robert C. McFarlane
Jack F. Matlock

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing, White House Requested by Rachel C. Ashley
Room No. Map Room, Residence Room No. 368 Telephone 5112
Time of Meeting 2:15 Date of request February 28, 1984

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH MRS. SUZANNE MASSIE

DATE: March 1, 1984
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 12:00 - 1:00 (Lunch)
FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

I. PURPOSE:

To have private meeting.

II. BACKGROUND:

Mrs. Massie met with you on January 17. She has since visited the Soviet Union, where she had extensive discussions with Soviet cultural and Church figures.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Mrs. Suzanne Massie
Robert C. McFarlane
Michael Deaver

IV. PRESS PLAN:

None

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

The informal setting will give you the opportunity to hear from Mrs. Massie about her recent trip to Moscow and her impressions of the mood among Soviet intellectuals. You might also wish to seek her views on steps we might take to bolster our influence among the Russian people.

Attachments:

Tab A Talking Points/card

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
BY  NARA Date 10/17/95

Talking Points

- I enjoyed our discussion in January, and thank you for coming to Washington to continue it.
- Was the mood in Moscow different during your recent trip from what you found last fall?
- I've tried to make clear that we have no quarrel with the Russian people and that our problems are with the Communist regime. Is this message getting through?
- I've heard that there is something of a revival of religious feeling in Russia. Is this true? How much is the Orthodox Church a tool of the Communist regime?
- How much confidence do the Russian people have in their own government? Do they really believe what Soviet propaganda tells them?
- Is there anything more we can do to bring our influence to bear on the Russian public -- and on the other nationalities in the Soviet Union?

MEETING WITH SUZANNE MASSIE

- I ENJOYED OUR DISCUSSION IN JANUARY. THANK YOU FOR COMING TO WASHINGTON TO CONTINUE IT.
- WAS MOOD IN MOSCOW DIFFERENT DURING YOUR RECENT TRIP FROM WHAT YOU FOUND LAST FALL?
- TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR WE HAVE NO QUARREL WITH RUSSIAN PEOPLE. OUR PROBLEMS WITH COMMUNIST REGIME. IS THIS MESSAGE GETTING THROUGH?

- 2 -

- I' VE HEARD SOMETHING OF A REVIVAL OF RELIGIOUS FEELING IN RUSSIA. IS THIS TRUE? HOW MUCH IS THE ORTHODOX CHURCH A TOOL OF COMMUNIST REGIME?
- HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE DO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE HAVE IN THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT? DO THEY REALLY BELIEVE WHAT SOVIET PROPAGANDA TELLS THEM?
- IS THERE ANYTHING MORE WE CAN DO TO BRING OUR INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON RUSSIAN PUBLIC -- AND ON OTHER NATIONALITIES IN SOVIET UNION?

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on March 1, 19 84
for President of White House:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

MASSIE, Suzanne

NSC

Robert C. McFarlane
Jack F. Matlock

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing Requested by Rachel C. Ashley
Room No. Oval Office (for lunch) Room No. 368 Telephone 5112
Time of Meeting 1200 Date of request Feb. 29, 1984

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742