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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8490115)			
1. memo	from Matlock to Robert McFarlane re: Andropov letter and Shultz Dobrynin meeting (1p) <i>R 11/13/83 MOZ-002 #20</i>	2/1/84	P-1
2. memo	from McFarlane to the President re: Andropov letter and Shultz- Dobrynin meeting (1p) <i>R 11/26/82 NLS MOZ-002 #22</i>	n.d.	P-1
3. memo	from George Shultz to the President re: Dobrynin meeting (2pp) <i>R 11/26/82 NLS MOZ-002 #22</i>	1/30/84	P-1
letter case (8400897)			
4. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: Green-Pearce initiative (1p) <i>R 11/13/83 MOZ-002 #23</i>	2/3/84	P-1
5. memo	from McFarlane to the President re: Green-Pearce peace initiative (2pp) <i>R #24</i>	n.d.	P-1 B5
letter case (8490109)			
6. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: US-Soviet relations (1p) <i>R 12/12/85 M1480 #1</i>	2/6/84	P-1 B5
7. memo	from McFarlane to the President re: US-Soviet relations (3pp) <i>R " " #2</i>	n.d.	P-1 P-5
3. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: US-Soviet relations (1p) <i>R 6/5/97 NLS 97-004</i>	1/28/84	P-1 P-5
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron February 1984 [1 of 2] GA-90887 <i>Box 3</i>			10/19/95

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- 1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- 2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- 3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- 4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- 5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
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- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
8.9 memo (8490142)	from Matlock to McFarlane re: US Soviet relations (1p) <i>A 12/12/05 M1480 #3</i>	2/6/84	P-1 P-5
letter case (8400327)			
9.10 memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: Avital Shecharansky's letter to the President (1p) <i>R 11/13/03 M02-002 #25</i>	2/6/84	P-1
10.11 memo	from Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re: letter to the President (1p) <i>R 11/14/03 M02-002 #26</i>	n.d.	P-1
11.12 memo	from Hill to McFarlane re: letter to the President (1p) <i>R 11/14/03 M02-002 #27</i>	2/1/84	P-1 P-5
12.13 memo	from Hill to McFarlane re: letter to the President (1p)	1/12/84	P-1 P-5
13.14 memo (8490129)	from Matlock to McFarlane re: MBFR (2pp)	2/7/84	P-1 P-5
14.15 memo (8490146)	from Matlock to McFarlane re: Suzanne Massie's trip to Moscow (1p) <i>R 11/14/03 M02-002 #28</i>	2/7/84	P-1
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron February 1984 [1 of 2] QA 90887 <i>Box 3</i>			10/19/95

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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 4/3/2007

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON FEBRUARY 1984 (1)

FOIA

M03-1480

Box Number 3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
6	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE US SOVIET RELATIONS (#1)	1	2/6/1984 <i>mvh 5/19/08</i>
7	MEMO	MATLOCK TO THE PRESIDENT RE US SOVIET RELATIONS (#2)	3	ND <i>mvh 5/19/08</i>
9	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE US SOVIET RELATIONS (#3)	1	2/6/1984 <i>mvh 5/19/08</i>

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer CAS

Box Number 3

FOIA M02-002

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON FEBRUARY 1984 (1)

DATE 3/21/2007

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
12 MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO MCFARLANE RE LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT (#27)	1	2/1/1984	

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90115

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

February 1, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JAM*
SUBJECT: Andropov Letter and Shultz-Dobrynin Meeting

Dobrynin gave Secretary Shultz a letter from Andropov during their meeting Monday, January 30 (TAB A). The letter is in reply to the President's letter of December 23.

As Shultz points out in his covering memorandum, Andropov's reply accepts the need for a dialogue, but continues to blame the U.S. for the current state of our relations. At the same time, his formulation on what it would take to continue the nuclear arms control process is the broadest to date and leaves more room for maneuver than earlier Soviet positions.

Andropov reiterates much of the Soviet arms control agenda, and makes a special pitch for negotiations on space systems. On MBFR, he suggests that the West has had enough time to study the East's proposals and that a concrete answer is expected when the negotiations resume.

In his conversation with Shultz (TAB B), Dobrynin was more direct in seeking our views on ways to make progress on strategic arms. Shultz refrained, however, from using the contingency talking points on START which he would have used in Stockholm if Gromyko had shown more interest. Dobrynin confirmed Soviet readiness to examine our ideas in the ICAO framework for improving navigation aids on the Pacific airline route where KAL went off course.

I have attached a memorandum to the President which transmits Secretary Shultz's reports on his meeting and the letter. I am working on a more detailed analysis of the letter and suggestions for a reply.

Recommendation:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter from Andropov

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS M07-002 #20
BY *CVJ* NARA, DATE *11/14/13*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Letter from Andropov and Shultz Meeting with
Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin gave George Shultz a letter from Andropov to you during their meeting January 30 (TAB A). It is in reply to your letter of December 23. While it reiterates standard Soviet positions on most substantive issues, it does accept the necessity for an improved dialogue. In particular, it provides a broader formulation of what it would take to get the nuclear arms control process back in motion, thus creating more maneuver room on that issue.

There was little additional substance in the Shultz-Dobrynin conversation (TAB B). However, Dobrynin seemed eager to elicit more of our ideas on START and hinted that our views could influence their internal arms control debate. Shultz refrained from going further than we already have on this subject. Dobrynin also confirmed Soviet willingness to listen to our ideas about improving navigation aids on the Pacific route where the KAL flight went off course.

I will shortly provide a more detailed analysis of the Andropov letter and recommendations on where we go from here, but thought that you would want to take a look at the letter and Shultz's preliminary report immediately.

Attachment:

Tab A Letter from Andropov
Tab B Shultz-Dobrynin Conversation

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS MOZ-002 #21
BY CS, NARA, DATE 11/14/05

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

January 30, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Dobrynin, January 30

I met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin for a little over an hour this afternoon to follow up on my meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm and reestablish contact with him before I left for Latin America. Dobrynin had read a transcript of the Stockholm session, and we generally agreed in our assessment of it:

-- We agreed that, as Gromyko had said, the meeting was "necessary," and that it had produced a real exchange of views.

-- Establishing a private channel for confidential communications, with Dobrynin the key interlocutor for the Soviets in Washington, was especially useful, and we should make a real effort to get something accomplished.

-- Nuclear arms negotiations are on hold for now, so that the immediate future would see us concentrating on negotiations in the non-nuclear field and other issues.

On the nuclear talks, I said we are ready to talk and waiting for their ideas. He responded by suggesting that while they were not prepared to negotiate now, they want our thoughts on relating INF and START, and more generally any ideas we have for making progress on strategic arms. He hinted that our views could influence their internal arms control debate.

I raised human rights as a category we need to talk about, and expressed our particular concern about rising anti-semitism in the USSR. He gave the pro forma answer that anti-semitism is not and has never been Soviet policy.

We touched briefly on the Mideast, and I said that if regional tensions explode anywhere it is likely to be there.

I also brought up KAL. As I had with Gromyko, I said we hoped our representatives in Montreal could make progress toward agreement on technical steps to ensure that nothing like it ever happened again. Dobrynin confirmed Soviet willingness to listen to our ideas on this.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

NLS MO2-002#22

BY LOI NARA, DATE 11/26/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

We concluded with a one-on-one session. Here I mentioned that we would be getting back to them on our idea for a joint space rescue project, and noted we hope for progress when MBFR talks resume. Dobrynin gave me the text of a letter from Andropov in response to your last letter to him, delivered in Moscow December 24. We will be transmitting this separately together with an analysis.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM

0897
Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 3, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Green-Pearce Initiative

Attached at TAB I is a Memorandum to the President explaining the problems with giving support to the Green-Pearce suggestion, and at TAB A a letter from the President to them.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Letter to Messrs. Green and Pearce
Tab B	Proposal by Tom Green and Terry Pearce

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS MOZ 002 #23
BY Crs, NARA, DATE 11/14/03

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: "Peace Initiative" by Tom Green and Terry Pearce

Issue

Whether to give encouragement to a "peace initiative" by businessmen Tom Green and Terry Pearce.

Facts

Friends of Albert Schwabacher, Tom Green and Terry Pearce, have sent you a proposal (TAB B) for a private appeal to Deng Xiaoping, Yuri Andropov and yourself to issue a statement simultaneously that you commit your respective countries to the elimination of war between countries within ten years. They have sent the suggestion to Deng by a private emissary and would like your approval to send it to Andropov with your backing.

Discussion

This is an innocent, well-meaning, but unfortunately misguided effort. The Soviets have already accused you of making general suggestions for peace purely for political effect. They would interpret a proposal such as this in that light, and it could undermine our efforts to get them on a concrete negotiating track which deals with the hard specifics necessary to reduce tensions. Furthermore, it would tend to legitimate their practice of floating grand-sounding proposals such as non-use-of-force pacts, nuclear freezes and the like which are dangerous because they would constrain our deterrent while the Soviets ignore them in practice.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend that you sign the letter at TAB A, which explains to Messrs. Green and Pearce why the overture they suggest could be misunderstood by the Soviets at this time and thus have the opposite effect of that intended.

OK No

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 102002424

BY CS, NARA, DATE 11/19/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Attachments:

Tab A	Letter to Tom Green and Terry Pearce
Tab B	Proposal by Tom Green and Terry Pearce

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JW*

SUBJECT:

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Toward Defining a Strategy

Attached at TAB I is a Memorandum to the President containing a summary of the Billington article on U.S.-Soviet relations and a discussion of it which emphasizes the need to find ways to reach the younger Soviet generation more effectively, as we conduct our dialogue with the leaders.

Before drafting the memorandum, I had two extended discussions with Billington about his ideas. As yet, they are relatively inchoate, although he is doing a more detailed paper on means of approaching the dialogue in his second and third categories (with the younger generation and establishing a dialogue on global issues with third countries), which he promised to get to me this week. Basically he feels, and I strongly agree, that some means must be found to direct foundation money into new channels, so that we do not have a private-sector dialogue dominated by the Arbatovs and Zhukovs, as it has been up to now.

I have discussed some of these thoughts with David Hamburg, President of the Carnegie Corporation, who has tentatively allocated a substantial sum to expanded exchanges with the Soviets, and he has asked to meet with me again in the near future. I believe we should also consider encouraging Billington--or another like-minded scholar--to organize a conference of foundation leaders active in the field, so that we can attempt to point them in the right direction.

The point of all of this is that it should be possible to implement some of Billington's ideas without major changes of U.S. policy or large commitments of federal funds. We must, however, do what we can to encourage effective goal setting and more effective briefing of U.S. participants.

Recommendation:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____ **DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED**

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Billington Article

NLS M 1480 #1

BY shf, NARA, DATE 12/12/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M/480 #2

BY amf, NARA, DATE 12/12/05

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Toward Defining a Strategy

A recent article by James Billington, Director of the Wilson Center and one of America's leading specialists in Russian history, culture and psychology, deserves your attention. Billington is a tough-minded supporter of our deterrence strategy, and his article provides some important insights in the current situation in the Soviet Union and some thought-provoking suggestions for steps we can take to influence the development of the Soviet system over the long run.

Billington's Arguments

The U.S.-Soviet relationship has been remarkably stable but destabilizing forces have grown as Soviet military might and international involvement has increased without a comparable increase in internal maturity and serenity. Much of Soviet insecurity stems from the regime's failure to exorcise Stalinism and build an internal basis for self respect. Instead, present leaders are reverting to Stalinist techniques of coercion.

We must acknowledge the complexity of the situation and differentiate several distinct elements in the Soviet-American rivalry:

-- Economic: Here we have already won.

-- Imperial: A new form of the traditional Russian policy of extending its borders by absorbing or subordinating smaller states, it is most tempting when the U.S. seems weak or irresolute.

-- Ideological: An expansionist policy is justified on ideological grounds, and the leaders see in revolutions elsewhere a vindication of their ideology which has failed at home.

-- Psychological: The Soviets have a love-hate relationship with the U.S. We are "the only power that can destroy them, and also the only civilization by which they can measure themselves."

-- Thermonuclear: The danger is not deliberate use but the difficulty of avoiding use in an escalating situation and also the potential for blackmail.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

We must reject the idea that reaching agreements with the Soviets is an end in itself and also the idea that the Soviet system is on the verge of collapse. The forthcoming generational change of Soviet leaders provides some basis for hope that the system will change. Future leaders will face a choice between a course of further centralization, militarization and oppression and one of moving toward a more open system. The U.S. cannot determine the outcome, but it can influence it.

In order to bring maximum influence to bear on this developing situation, we need a more comprehensive dialogue in three areas:

-- With the current leadership, a dialogue that is tough and specific;

-- With the broader society and postwar generation, a dialogue that is generous and general;

-- With both, a multinational dialogue addressing common problems of the future jointly with other countries.

This will permit us to raise our sights without lowering our guard, and will help the coming Soviet generation to forge better links both with their own past and with our broad, contemporary experience.

Comment

I agree with Billington's point that our policy should include both hard-nosed negotiations with the current Soviet leadership, and measures to influence the future evolution of Soviet society.

--Dealing with the Soviet Leaders: We already have under way a sound policy for dealing with the Soviet leaders. We must continue to expand the channels available and to probe for areas of possible negotiability, while recognizing that significant progress may not be possible this year. Power struggles may make it impossible for the Soviet leaders to make the hard policy changes necessary for an improvement in relations with us. We should, nevertheless, continue to convey to them a policy of firmness coupled with negotiability, which can have its own impact on the leadership struggle. Our basic message should be:

(a) That no improvement of relations will be possible without a change in their policies and behavior;

(b) That continued intransigence on their part will result only on a worsening of their own situation;

(c) That we are serious about negotiating fair arrangements in a variety of areas; and

(d) That your political strength at home gives you the ability to deliver on any deals reached.

It will be particularly important to convey credibly the last two points. If the Soviet leaders conclude that no agreements are possible with you, they will simply hunker down and put all their efforts into making trouble (though almost certainly in ways that do not risk direct military confrontation). If, however, they are convinced that agreements are in fact possible, this will strengthen the arguments of those in the Soviet leadership who are inclined to make sufficient concessions to reach agreements with us.

--The Broader Soviet Public and Younger Generation: We have given less attention to means of influencing the successor generation than we have to dealing with the leadership. Andropov was moving in a neo-Stalinist direction. His successors, however, will be forced to choose whether to intensify centralization, repression and militarization of Soviet society, or to improve incentives, decentralize decision making and rely more on market factors.

While we can have only a marginal effect on the outcome of this internal Soviet process, we should do what we can to strengthen the tendencies toward greater decentralization and openness, since this would produce a Soviet Union with less commitment to the use of force and less willing to engage in costly foreign adventures. Therefore, even if the rivalry of our systems did not end (it would not), the U.S.-USSR interaction would be safer and more manageable.

Billington's suggestions for reaching the younger generation through greater expanded exchanges are apt. The fact is that the successor Soviet generation is as parochial as the current one. Opportunities to meet with Americans and to come to the United States can undermine officially-sponsored negative stereotypes about the U.S. and stimulate private doubts about the veracity of propaganda caricatures. While the persons involved will rarely if ever be able to influence policy decisions immediately and directly, broader exposure of Soviet citizens to the U.S. can over time produce pressures for more realistic and less rigid Soviet policies.

For these reasons, I believe you should consider reopening negotiations on an exchange agreement in the near future. Exchanges can be broadened considerably on the basis of private funding, and I am investigating ways that we can bring our influence to bear in encouraging private foundations to direct their efforts toward reaching a new Soviet audience, rather than multiplying contacts with regime propagandists like Arbatov.

Attachment: Tab A - Billington article

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

cc: The Vice President

With Russia: After 50 Years

The 50th anniversary of Soviet-American diplomatic relations was observed this past week in conditions of severe tension and sourness and, because of the illness of Yuri Andropov, unusual political uncertainty on the Soviet side. We asked a leading American student of Soviet affairs to size up the larger Soviet scene and to suggest some ways in which the American relationship with Moscow might be steadied.

James H. Billington

A Time of Danger, an Opening for Dialogue


The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is unlike any confrontation of major powers in recent history—perhaps in all history. It has been remarkably stable, not having led to any direct fighting between the principal rivals in 35 years of Cold War. Yet it is a relationship that is inherently dangerous because of the unprecedented weapons available.

The main destabilizing force in the relationship in recent years has been the great increase in Soviet military might and international involvements without any comparable increase in internal maturity and serenity. The cold, unpleasant fact is that the U.S.S.R. is currently in a very dangerous stage in which old psychological insecurity still exists alongside awesome new power.

Part of Soviet insecurity results from the legitimate desire for respect of the Russian people, who have often been attacked militarily and disparaged culturally. But far more of the current insecurity comes from the leaders' own progressive retreat from previous halting attempts in the late 1950s and early 1960s to exorcise Stalin's ghost and to build some new basis for self-respect within Soviet society.

The aging Stalinist oligarchy and its swollen, corrupt bureaucracy effectively stopped de-Stalinization under Brezhnev, chose a chief of police as his successor, and now seem to be falling back increasingly on the high Stalinist technique of using targeted acts of violence to coerce the respect that they have given up trying to earn. In the combination of brutality and deception that accompanied the Korean airline tragedy and the treatment of imprisoned symbols of social conscience such as Yuri Orlov and Sergei Khodorchikov, there seem to be new hints of inertial drift into the old Stalinist formula of terror without bounds or shame. It is born less of a traditional desire for dominance than of a totalitarian compulsion to disorient, divide and in some sense destroy everything that cannot be controlled.

All of this is so profoundly unpleasant that one set of Americans, largely on the left, prefers to say that this isn't really happening or doesn't really matter. Another set, largely on the right, prefers to say that nothing else really happens or matters. Sincere people on both sides increasingly call for heroic, one-sided solutions—



"The aging Stalinist bureaucracy seems to have recently found a kind of fountain of revolutionary youth in distant places. It seems compelled not so much to conquer new territory as to vindicate abroad an ideology that has conspicuously failed at home."

unilateral disarmament, unilateral crusades—often mixing disguised sermons to America into supposed analyses of Russia.

The beginnings of a more rational understanding may lie in acknowledging complexity and in differentiating several distinct elements in the Soviet-American rivalry: economic, imperial, ideological, psychological and thermonuclear.

Economically, there is no longer any serious competition. Capitalism has simply proven itself more dynamic and adjustable, and far more capable of effective production for human use. Communism as a functioning economic system is unlikely to have sustained appeal to anyone in the modern world who is free to make a first-hand comparison—unless of course the capital-

ist economy allows itself to self-destruct in some massive new economic crisis.

The imperial aspect of the superpower rivalry involves our confronting a new form of a traditional Russian policy of extending the nation's borders by absorbing or subordinating smaller powers and states. Traditional national interest lies at the base of Soviet pressure on Europe and the push into Afghanistan. Here the Soviets made a classical imperial gambit in the "great game"—a timely move on a target of opportunity that must have seemed irresistible at a time of American weakness and preoccupation elsewhere.

But the Soviets' justification for their involvement in Afghanistan—and the probable reason for their refusal to withdraw—is the purely ideological argument that the revolutionary process once begun cannot be reversed.

This argument points to the new tendency to propel Soviet foreign policy beyond the realm of traditional Russian national interest into the more dangerous field of ideological politics.

The aging Stalinist bureaucracy seems to have recently found a kind of fountain of revolutionary youth in distant places. It seems compelled not so much to conquer new territory as to vindicate abroad an ideology that has conspicuously failed at home. It has worked with cocky new revolutionary cadres from Vietnam and Cuba, even as it played on American self-doubt after Vietnam to expand in various ways into Kampuchea, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and South Yemen. It gradually came to accept the long-resisted Cuban contention that the road to revolution in Latin America must be essentially violent rather than peaceful.

Once China after Mao adopted a more pragmatic and inward-looking attitude, the U.S.S.R. became the main source of ideas as well as arms for what was perceived to be a rising revolutionary tide. The Soviets put venture capital of various kinds into distant, destabilizing forces, and increasingly risked becoming involved in crises that they might not be able to control.

All of this is further complicated psychologically by Russia's tradition of a love-hate relationship with its principal Western adversary. To Russians, America is now the only power that can destroy them, and also the only civilization by which they can measure themselves. Their love-hate feelings toward us suggest the persistence of feelings of psychological inferiority even in the presence of strategic parity.

The massive arsenal of nuclear weapons and rocketry possessed by both superpowers gives a historically unprecedented dimension to the rivalry. The danger is probably not so much that either side will deliberately set out to use them, but that some developing crisis in a fuzzy area may escalate to a point where it will be difficult for one party not to use them in order to avoid a humiliating defeat.

The new weapons also pose new possibilities for blackmail—the key element in the current campaign to prevent new missile deployments in Germany. The long-range objective is to divide, neutralize and eventually establish political dominance over Europe.

The immediate campaign is to convert the West's moral anguish over nuclear weapons into a political separation of Western Europe from the United States. Though so far unsuccessful in its short-run objective of preventing missile deployment in Germany, this campaign has helped change the basic international orientation of opposition parties in England and, increasingly, in Germany.

With the increasing pro-Soviet drift of the German Social Democratic Party, the U.S.S.R. is gaining a major new asset for resolving both its physical security and its psychological inferiority by establishing greater political dominance over Germany: the only "West" that really matters to them in Europe.

Is there any rational hope that an open America may in time be less threatened by the closed colossus in the U.S.S.R.?

There is plenty of irrational hope on the market. On the left, there is the vague idea—one that only increases the likelihood of black-

mail—that reaching agreement with the Soviets is an end in itself. This attitude is supported by gossip and disinformation accepted as evidence, or by wishful thinking about the putative plight of alleged "doves" and "liberals" within the Soviet leadership—for whose very existence there may be no real evidence.

On the right there is the hope that the Soviet system may be on the verge of convulsive economic collapse and/or national disintegration. Although there is hard evidence of deep problems in both areas, there is no indication of any such drastic imminent outcome and there are many reasons for rejecting the hidden assumption that "the worse for them the better for us."

"There is, I believe, a reasonable likelihood that the forthcoming generational change of leadership may bring with it greater change in policies than at any times since Lenin moved from War Communism to his New Economic Policy in 1921."

Any basis for rational hope must be found within their system rather than our preconceptions. There is, I believe, a reasonable likelihood that the forthcoming generational change of leadership may bring with it greater change in policies than at any time since Lenin moved from War Communism to his New Economic Policy in 1921.

There is a scholarly consensus that the Soviet economy is too stagnant, the society too corrupt and degenerating, and the administrative and productive system too saddled with deferred maintenance for anything short of massive reforms to be effective.

Simply to keep up as a great power, Soviet leaders will have to mobilize new energies from the broader society. This can be done realistically only by drastically extending the authority over Soviet life as a whole of one of the only two areas that are still productively efficient in the U.S.S.R.: either the command economy based on centralized military power or the market economy based on local entrepreneurial incentive (the growing "second" economy). While Russian tradition may favor the former, the imminence of an unnaturally delayed generational change in leadership may favor building more on the incentive principle.

There could hardly be a more dramatic contrast than between the basic experiences that shaped Yuri Andropov and the last Stalinist generation (the unending bloody convulsions of coerced industrialization and collectivization, artificial famines, incessant internecine purges, and heroic wartime sufferings) and the influences on those under 50. The latter are the better educated, psychologically less complicated products of a post-war period of small deeds, uninterrupted

peace and relative prosperity.

The coercive stand-pat policies of recent years with their emphasis on repression at home and aggression abroad will be very difficult to sustain in the absence of signs that they are succeeding. A new generation of leaders will lack the legitimizing authority that accrued to the older survivors from a period of great if bloody deeds. It will surely be tempted to reshape the system in terms of its own experiences and perhaps even to buy into the new ideal that appeared among its generation in the freer atmosphere of the '60s and early '70s.

The dissident movement was only the tip of an iceberg, most of which still lies submerged within the system. This movement of ideas represented an unofficial effort to continue the process of de-Stalinization that Khrushchev began and Brezhnev definitively stopped. There was—and continues to be in the new generation—an attempt to recover links with those elements of old Russian tradition that Stalin had systematically sought to destroy: Christianity, rural Russia, literature with an authentic moral meaning. This generation felt its way toward social criticism in the early '70s—codifying alternate versions of history through the oral counter-culture, staging satirical plays and forming a human rights movement and even a tiny free labor movement.

One cannot be sure that the new generation of leaders will identify with the higher moral aspirations of its own generation once in power, rather than with the quasi-Stalinist system through which they will have to rise to power. But so great is the social and economic need to mobilize fresh energy and enthusiasm, and so strong the psychological desire to find a worthy, non-Stalinist identity to make some sense of its sufferings, that one has to allow for the possibility of profound rather than merely cosmetic changes with the coming of this generation.

Americans cannot directly determine in any important way how the Soviet Union will evolve. Nor should we look for a maturing society with its own traditions to replicate or even approximate our own. But as the Soviets' principal adversary and object of fascination, we are more involved in their evolution than we may realize.

To me this suggests a need to begin, in the second half-century of our relations, a far more comprehensive Soviet-American dialogue than we have tried in the first 50 years.

The first need at this time of dangerously diminished dialogue is for increased but more clearly defined contacts between the two superpowers. All dialogue, especially at the higher levels, should be polite and respectful in tone—particularly since the Russians crave respect and may invisibly mimic our model. The dialogue should be of three quite different types, each with a different objective.

1. With the vestigial Stalinist oligarchy that is still in charge, we need a dialogue that is tough and specific. One should never be soft and general with Stalinists. The meaningless "general principles" of the 1972 Soviet-American summit facilitated rather than forestalled subsequent Soviet advances. Ingratiating approaches taken for domestic political reasons are invariably received as a sign of weakness and an invitation to further manipulation.

It is also important that there be only a sin-

gle, substantive dialogue on the high strategic questions, because unity, like firmness, is essential for closing a deal. One should feel neither intimidated by threats of a walkout nor compelled to make gratuitous demonstrations of flexibility to win vague good will. The older leaders know about war and almost certainly want an agreement in this area.

2. With the broader society and the postwar generation, we need an exploratory dialogue that is generous and general rather than tough and specific. Vastly expanded exchanges with this generation now may help build a basis for more comprehensive agreement later.

The social basis for repression in the U.S.S.R. today is the combination of a swollen state and a weak society. Broadened American exchanges with Soviet society as a whole—on a professional, regional, educational, cultural and purely random basis—will encourage the elements that make for civic responsibility. Economic contacts could suggest new models for management and encourage the kind of self-respect that might make Russians less psychologically dependent on gaining respect through the military.

3. A new category of dialogue would involve Russians and Americans with other countries in discussing and developing a new global agenda—perhaps looking to the year 2000. Such a format would provide the model for the next generation of Russians, who must look to us for new approaches to world order. Many of the problems are themselves multinational, and new ideas may be easier to accept if there are new forums that are multinational rather than binational.

Each of these dialogues would help overcome a weakness that has plagued American relations with the Soviet Union. The first helps to avoid the illusion of some liberals in assuming that Soviet society will naturally evolve into something better if only we are nice to the surviving Stalinists. The second, broader level moves beyond the dead-end reliance of some conservatives solely on material toughness. The third dispels the seductive belief, common to both liberal and conservative politicians (and to many Russians), that our many bothersome involvements in the world will drastically diminish once we cut a deal with the Russians and cut out everyone else.

Our continuing confrontation at the thermo-nuclear level clearly requires the first type of contact: tough and specific and at the highest level. We and the Soviets both have by now, it seems to me, an overriding responsibility not to leave the nuclear negotiating table until we have begun to limit and reduce the global menace we have co-authored, and not to make this overriding issue hostage to other issues.

The ideological aspect of Soviet-American confrontation is an ideal element for the broader level of dialogue that brings in the younger Soviet generation not yet in power. The peaceful discussion of ideas with this generation may help check the inertial drift of the vestigial Stalinists into endorsing revolutionary violence in distant places.

"The social basis for repression in the U.S.S.R. today is the combination of a swollen state and a weak society. Broadened American exchanges . . . will encourage the elements that make for civic responsibility."

Almost certainly the traditional imperial aspect of Soviet policy will increasingly become a greater concern of Russia's Eurasian neighbors rather than of the United States. Since the problem of Russia's borders involves deep psychological sensitivity on the Russian side and the very existence of many neighboring peoples, it should not be left to the play of chance but discussed in the third type of multilateral dialogue over a long period of time.

We clearly need to increase support for Russian studies throughout America, and we probably need one high-level place in government to provide comprehensive analysis and policy coordination for all our dealings with the U.S.S.R.

No longer can there be any room for illusions about a governing group that, in the Stalin era, produced one of the two greatest, sustained state-sponsored set of atrocities against its own subjects in the 20th century. There can be no excuse for weakness in dealing with those who have ceased in the last 20 years to permit talk about, let alone restitution for, the horror on which their power rests.

But we do not have to lower our guard to raise our sights. We can invent new forms of dialogue, reach limited agreements, and perhaps even devise new forms of joint activity that can substitute cooperation for confrontation. The coming Soviet generation would welcome fresh initiatives. In trying to find a non-Stalinist path into the future, they will want better links both with their own deep past and with our broad, contemporary experience.

Those who will continue the troubled Soviet-American dialogue in the years ahead may someday conclude that, for such vast countries and such expansive, complicated peoples, it might just be harder to take small steps than big ones.

The writer, director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, has written histories of Russian culture and the revolutionary tradition.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Tom and Terry:

Thank you for calling to my attention your proposal entitled "Taking the Essential Step Now to End War between Nations in Our Lifetime."

I think you are to be commended for the imagination and hard work which went into developing this proposal. I know that it required considerable personal sacrifice on your part and I admire your faith in the possibility of reaching out to the humane instincts which God has given every human being.

But in considering your proposal, I must give careful thought to how Chairman Andropov is likely to interpret it. The fact is that when I called for an expansion of our dialogue in an effort to solve problems between us, the Soviets charged me with political grandstanding and ill intentions. Now, I'm not going to give up on my effort to engage the Soviets in an intensive problem-solving dialogue. That effort is going forward, and I hope it will bring some concrete results soon. I fear that if I endorse your proposal at this time, the Soviets would interpret it as a ruse, to get off our problem-solving agenda. I know that this is not your intent, but feel that the Soviets are likely to view it that way.

Tom and Terry, your selfless efforts to promote peace provide another wonderful example of what I have always said makes America great: the dedication of our people to contribute their time and talents to making the world a better place. I

hope that the time will soon come when proposals such as yours can be accepted by our adversaries in the true spirit in which they are offered. It is my goal to bring us to that point.

Thank you again for sharing your idea with me.

Sincerely,

Mr. B. Tom Green
Mr. N. Terry Pearce
2349 Spanish Trail
Tiburon, California 94920

DRAFT

TAKING THE ESSENTIAL STEP NOW TO END WAR BETWEEN NATIONS IN OUR LIFETIME

JANUARY 1984

TO: President Yuri Andropov
Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping
President Ronald Reagan

This message is being privately presented to each of you by individuals you know and trust, who represent only themselves. The idea carried is merely a new form of one which is already yours. It is to take an essential step, now, which will make possible, in our lifetime, a shared goal: the end of war between nations. It is the power of history, and the contributions of millions before you, which have created the unique conditions which now allow you to play this significant role in human history. This week, the idea is being offered to all three of you through similar informal channels:

- To Deng Xiaoping -
- To Ronald Reagan - (names deleted for the Progress Report)
- To Yuri Andropov -

PROLOGUE

Throughout history and in virtually every country of the world, shifts have occurred in the attitude of the populace which appear to have been sudden, and which precipitated the taking of action to bring about a fundamental and monumental change in the direction of cultures. These sudden shifts were brought about by some dramatic, catalytic action which merely confirmed that which was already wanted could be. These dramatic actions changed what appeared to be a "dream" into an attainable, practical goal to be achieved. The many problems were then addressed and solved to bring about the previously only dreamed-about results. This is a plan to evoke such a shift in attitude on a global scale.

GOAL

To create a global political climate in early 1984 which, for the first time in history, actually supports and facilitates achieving the monumental challenge of ending war between nations in our lifetime.

This climate of possibility will be created through an effectively implemented dramatic, catalytic action which focuses the worlds' commitment on this goal. A measurement of the goal's achievement will be a working, non-violent process of conflict resolution.

SCOPE

The plan is to create the necessary climate of commitment to the goal. Implementation will not require you or any leader or any country to change a position, nor does this plan address solutions to the many complex problems which will need resolution before the end of war and the threat of war as an instrument of national policy can be accomplished. The plan will be effective in focusing all such efforts, for the first time, so the result will be accomplished - the establishment of a continuing process of

BASIS

For all things done, at least three elements are present in sequence:

- The result is wanted. (Will)
- The result is seen as really possible. (Commitment is made.)
- Actions are taken to produce it.

If will is assumed, then the achievement of a goal depends on it being seen as possible in a way that spurs action to accomplish the result. The difference between dreams that are merely dreamt and goals that are actually realized is the commitment, expressed strongly enough to evoke possibility, which brings reality to the result.

Much of the world population now wants to end war as an instrument of national policy, and much action is being taken to bring it about. The goal is not reached because the world does not see the whole, the result of the end of war between nations, as a real possibility. Accordingly, nations are working on the parts: disarmament, the Middle East, Central America, containment, detente trade, cultural and scientific exchanges, - as one would work on a jigsaw puzzle with one critical element missing: the boxtop. The boxtop for this puzzle is the whole: the goal of finding a way to end war and the threat of war as instruments of national policy. It is a goal shared by much of the world and one we can now commit to achieving by some time in the foreseeable future.

Possibility can be evoked by someone with the perceived power to produce the result declaring the possibility, stating the commitment, and thereby enrolling others totally in the result. In a family, such goals are often set by parents, in business by the chairman, and for nations by the body or individual with the power in the proper domain. Various bodies in each of your countries literally declare social change, and Heads of State literally declare war. In these examples, such declaration evokes possibility in a way that spurs action. Agreement by everyone isn't necessary, and in fact action opposing the result is often brought forth by such declaration. The result is seen as possible by all, whether they agree with the result or not.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

- The Reformation
- The end of slavery in the United States
- India's independence from Great Britain
- Egypt - Israeli "peace"
- America's Man-on-the-Moon
- American/Chinese normalization

In all of these cases, the declarer, the one who recognized and stated the real possibility, changed the "dream" to a goal, expressed a commitment to achieve it, and is recognized as the significant participant, even though all of the complex problems remained to be solved. Those credited with the cited events are clearly Luther, Lincoln, Ghandi, Sadat, Kennedy and Nixon/Mao. Others who followed did the work inside of the commitment and brought about the result.

We assert that the primary distinction between these examples and the end of war between nations is one of scale. There has not been a worldwide goal in the history of the planet, yet the basis for accomplishment, the principles, are the same. What catalytic action now could create a similar climate of real possibility for the ending of war as an instrument of national policy?

THE PLAN

A new global climate can be established by a joint televised declaration by the three of you: President Reagan, President Andropov and Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping stating your commitment, and your countries' commitment, to the goal of ending war between nations by a definite time. This commitment will be to have in place, and working, a non-violent process of conflict resolution between nations, by a specific time in the foreseeable future, perhaps within ten years.

The commitment will be dramatically stated, simultaneously, to the people of your individual countries, and then directly by you to each other's countries and to the world, via international media. Such a joint declaration by you, who have the perceived power to make it so, will be the catalytic action which will create the necessary climate to allow the work going on to actually bring about the result.

The declaration will not require you or any leader to change his position on the method of bringing about the result and will create the atmosphere, overnight, for constructive discussion and re-evaluation of those positions in light of the fresh, time-specific commitment to the now-transcendent common interest: finding a way to end war between nations in our lifetime.

The declaration will include an invitation by you to the rest of the world to join in the commitment, and will be immediately followed that same day by announcements by each leader of a package of feasible unilateral actions, no matter how small. These actions will be initiated to demonstrate each nation's commitment to the goal, and to accelerate the process of bringing about the desired result. The actions will grow in number and significance until the result, a process of real peace, is achieved.

RISKS

If the time is not right, the shift in global attitude will not occur, and the world will continue on its present course. You will only receive credit for trying. If the time is right, and the shift occurs, your nations, and all nations, now supported by the world's commitment, will not just address but will solve the real and complicated challenges to achieving the goal. You and your three nations will have facilitated a magnificent step in human history. The risk of the present course is great. The risk of the declaration is minimal.

DISTINCTIONS

Other "agreements" regarding ending war have been made in the past, all have served and all have been insufficient, including the commitment in the U.N. Charter. There are differences in this idea:

1. THE-TIME-IN-HISTORY. The result is truly wanted by a critical mass of the world's people. This result is now deeply desired, and is greatly strengthened by the awareness of the real and growing threat of human extinction.
2. THOSE COMMITTING. You, the leaders of the three most powerful countries, collectively, have the perceived power to take the actions necessary to realize this first formal global goal.
3. THE FORMAT Making for the first time a joint, time-specific commitment directly to the others' countries, and to the world, is dramatic and evoking. The first-time use of this form of world-wide television makes attention of the world possible.
4. THE CONTENT Past declarations of commitment to end war have all had provisions of exception. This one commits only to achieving the goal, the end of war as an instrument of national policy by a definite date. The umbrella of common interest is broad, with the end being measurable: an effective, non-violent process of conflict resolution, in place and working by a specific time.

FORMAT-DETAILS

No summit meeting is required. Each of you will first address your nation, stating your commitment, and then directly address, via media, the other two countries, stating the same commitment. Each declaration contains common elements:

- The commitment of you and your country to the goal: to end war between nations by a specific time agreed to in advance, perhaps within ten years, and to have in place and working, a non-violent process of conflict resolution between nations by that specific time.
- An invitation to the rest of the world to join in the commitment.
- A statement that within the next 24 hours, at a specific time, actions will be announced by each of you to demonstrate your commitment to finding a way to achieve this historic goal. These will be unilateral, and as substantive as possible; however, the presence of action is more significant than the substance.

CONCLUSION

The declaration is simple, safe and serves your personal interest. No positions need be changed by this dramatic statement.

The statement of the goal by you, who have the perceived power to accomplish it will create the necessary climate by making the goal real and achievable to the world, and the specific date set for its achievement will allow for safe transition to the now-realizable condition of a world in which war between nations is unacceptable.

The emissaries bringing this thought support you in playing a pivotal role as one of three who can actually state this commitment for the world. History has brought you this opportunity. The world will commit to the goal sometime. If you wish, you can take this initiative now to create the historical turning point which will allow the goal's achievement in your family's lifetime.

The substance of The Declaration of Commitment will be your joint statement:

"I hereby commit (my country) to the goal of ending war between nations within ten years, and invite the world to join in this commitment. I will announce (within 24 hours) unilateral actions to demonstrate our intention."

NEXT STEPS

Within one week, your initial reactions, delivered to the individual presenting this will be exchanged with the private emissaries to the other leaders. You will each be informed of the others' responses. Your response to your emissary should include:

- Your willingness to pursue the plan another step if the others are.
- Your general concurrence with the procedures delineated below, unless modified by consensus.

General Procedures:

1. The substantive message of the declaration made by all of you will be identical. Any refinements necessary in the language of the declaration or in the date by which a means for a safe transition will be achieved, will be mutually agreed. The specific date stated as the goal in the declaration will be before the year 2000.
2. The date for making the declaration will be mutually agreed and will be before April 1984.
3. There will be no public acknowledgement of these discussions prior to the declaration. Any inquiries will be responded to in the same way; we suggest: "We are always looking for ways of opening discussions on subjects of mutual interest, and we continue to do so."
4. Any consultation with allies will be done in strict privacy at the highest levels.
5. Each leader will address his nation first. The sequence of speaking to other nations will be determined by lot. A copy of your and the other leaders' remarks to the other two nations will be exchanged three days before the declaration.
6. One week prior to the declaration, each party will deliver to the others concurrently, the list of minimum intended unilateral actions each plans for announcement within 24 hours of the declaration. Three days before the declaration, the list will again be exchanged, with any modifications.
7. The working language for these exchanges will be English. A possible text for a United States version of the declaration of commitment by President Reagan is included with this document only to provide a general sense of content, not to suggest specifics.

The initial response of the other two leaders and protocol for the next exchange will be communicated through these same private emissaries within two weeks of your initial response.

History has given you the unique privilege of being one of the first three spokesmen for the whole world. It is an honor to be part of bringing this history shaping opportunity to you.

TAKING THE ESSENTIAL STEP NOW

TO END WAR BETWEEN NATIONS

BACKGROUND OF PRINCIPALS

In the spring of 1983 Tom Green and Terry Pearce chose to take one year sabbaticals from their careers as business executives. This choice was made out of their shared commitment to a specific, pragmatic goal, and out of their conviction that the time is right-now - for its achievement. This goal is to take the essential step, between now and June of 1984, which will allow the abolishing of war between nations to be realized in our lifetime - perhaps in this decade. The initial ideas for a plan emerged between March and May, and since June, Tom and Terry have been working full-time on this project. Significant progress has been made to date. What follows are brief highlights of their careers prior to this time. Detailed resumes are available on request.

B. TOM GREEN

Since graduating from Stanford in 1966 with a B.S. in Civil Engineering and a Masters in Business Administration, Tom has held positions of increasing management responsibility with organizations such as General Mills and Transamerica, as well as five years as a partner in a privately held corporation. Specifically, he has held positions in the finance and marketing areas, and has been General Manager of divisions for both General Mills and Transamerica. In May of 1982 he left the corporate environment and initiated, with G.G. Jampolsky, M.D., a series of projects with the theme Children As Teachers of Peace. These projects were based on the idea that the shared experience of childhood can be a powerful bridge to peace, and included connections with world citizens such as Mrs. Anwar Sadat, Mother Teresa, and the Dalai Lama. A book, a television special, and several other on-going international activities resulted over a period of several months. Tom is known for getting results by focusing on the few factors essential to that end, and for enabling people to tap into their own strength and to act on it.

S.S.# 558-44-3716 2849 SPANISH TRAIL, TIBURON CA 94920 415-435-9663

TERRY PEARCE

Terry earned a B.S. degree from Linfield College, Oregon in 1965. He completed 16 years of experience with IBM in November of 1982, having acted on Divisional staff and in middle and senior line management. Through his work in a rapidly changing market of computer and office supplies, he has developed strengths in recognizing the need for adaptability to produce results. Accordingly, he is skilled in organizational dynamics, channels of delivering products to markets, and in the development and productivity of people through recognizing individual differences. His final position with IBM was Northwest District Manager, Systems Supplies Division, and carried responsibility for \$40 million in sales, \$8 million in expense and 100 people in 10 states. From January to March of 1983, Terry acted as a consultant to assemble management for a start-up medical operation, and then jointly developed the focus and plan for the initial phase of this project.

S.S.# 543-42-5431 400 SAN RAFAEL AVE, BELVEDERE, CA 94920 415-435-0510

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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
AO/679

4 January 1984

Dear Mr. President:

I have been asked by President Chaim Herzog
to transmit to you the enclosed letter from
Mrs. Avital Sharansky.

Sincerely,


Meir Rosenne
Ambassador

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

January 11, 1953

Dear Mr. President:

I appeal to you again on behalf of my husband, Anatoly, encouraged by the information we have received from many sources that you have personally intervened in the past in efforts to secure his release. The international media have publicized the capture of an East German spy by American agents. We are confident that if an East-West exchange is decided upon, you will exercise the considerable powers of your office to ensure that Anatoly's release is included as part of the agreement. From my encounters with representatives of other governments, I have learned that only the United States, under your direction ~~The~~ President, is prepared to consider the freedom of prisoners of conscience, such as Anatoly, as one of its

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 6, 1984

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: What If Andropov Dies?

NLS M1420 #3
BY *mat*, NARA, DATE 12/12/05

The sudden cancellation of Ustinov's visit to India suggests some major development on the Soviet internal scene, and the possibility which comes most readily to mind is that Andropov's condition has taken a turn for the worse. Without trying to make a prediction regarding what may in fact be happening, I believe we should give some preliminary thought to how we would react to Andropov's demise.

I believe that Andropov's passing should not be used as an argument for changing our basic policy: it is sound and should be pursued regardless of the identity of the Soviet leader. However, the President will have to make a quick decision as to whether to attend the funeral, and the decision could have an effect both on our public diplomacy and on our dialogue with Andropov's successor.

Most of the pros and cons regarding Presidential attendance at the funeral are readily apparent. On the "pro" side, it would relieve pressures for unplanned summitry and strengthen our stance in favor of dialogue. Among the "cons" are that it would be paying homage to a man even more inimical to U.S.-Soviet relations than Brezhnev, who was a secret policeman to boot, and in an election year it might smack of grandstanding.

My initial view is that the "pros" would slightly outweigh the "cons" if a successor has been named as General Secretary, since pressures for premature summitry could be relieved by a 30-minute meeting, and direct understandings reached regarding channels of communication. On the other hand, I would see no point in the President's going if a successor has not been named.

You may wish to ask George Shultz to give some thought to this question when he returns Wednesday. I have asked Rick Burt to have his people put together the relevant material on a very close-hold basis. I don't believe we need interagency tasking, which would risk press leaks, although Weinberger and Casey should presumably be consulted before a recommendation is made to the President.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

February 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *Jaw*

SUBJECT:

Avital Shcharansky's Letter to President

Mrs. Avital Shcharansky has written the President urging that he consider arranging an exchange of her husband for a recently captured East German counter-intelligence agent. The letter came to State via Chaim Herzog and the Israeli Ambassador to the United States (TAB II).

State recommends that Mark Palmer, who discussed the matter with Mrs. Shcharansky in Stockholm January 18, invite her to see him the next time she is in Washington, and that the Israeli Embassy be informed of the recent conversation and our desire to remain in close touch with her.

State's recommendation seems appropriate, and I have prepared a Kimmitt to Hill Memorandum approving this course of action.

Recommendation:

That you authorize sending the Kimmitt to Hill Memorandum at TAB I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

TAB I Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum
TAB II Memorandum of February 1, 1984, from the State Department

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS *M02 202 225*
BY *CS* NARA, DATE *6/14/03*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Letter from Avital Shcharanskiy to the
President (S)

The course of action suggested in your memorandum of
February 1, 1984, is approved. (U)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MOZ-002 #20

BY CV, NARA, DATE 2/5/85
11/14/03

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 1, 1984

~~SECRET/NODIS~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter From Avital Shcharanskiy to the President

Avital Shcharanskiy, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy's wife, has written to President Reagan to urge that he consider exchanging her husband for a recently captured East German counter-intelligence agent. The letter came to us via Chaim Herzog and the Israeli Ambassador to the United States.

As you will recall, the White House recently approved our request that Ambassador Hartman be authorized to respond verbally to a letter from Anatoliy's mother to the President (Tab A). Our concern was that the President not go on record in a letter that might become public and we have the same reservation in this case. We suggest that instead of a written response, we call Avital and suggest that she meet with Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Palmer, who has met with her a number of times (most recently in Stockholm), the next time she is in Washington.

In fact, the ideas which Mrs. Shcharanskiy raised in her letter to the President written on November 11, 1983 were discussed in her meeting with Mr. Palmer on January 18th. She is satisfied that our approach is the correct one. If you approve of this course of action, we suggest that we inform the Israeli Embassy of our latest conversation with Mrs. Shcharanskiy and that we will remain in close touch with her.

Attachment:

Tab A. Hill/McFarlane memo of January 12, 1984

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

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BY CH NARA, DATE 7/5/03~~SECRET/NODIS~~
DECL. DATE

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Invitation to Conference on Economic Sanctions and
the Western Alliance

You have received a letter from Bill Bader of SRI inviting you to an off-the-record conference on "Economic Sanctions and the Western Alliance" (Tab II). The conference will be held in the Mansfield Room at the Capitol from 3:00 - 8:30 on March 14. Senators Lugar and Biden are co-hosts and a large number of CEO's of major corporations have been invited.

I doubt that your schedule would permit attendance at the entire conference. The dinner, which is scheduled for 6:30 - 8:30, might be easier to schedule, but I would recommend against your attending that event without the others, since Dennis Healey, the speaker, can be expected to deliver a strong attack on the Administration's sanctions policy. Unless you perceive an objection, I will try to attend all the sessions and can give you a report.

RR
Roger Robinson concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter at Tab I thanking Bader for the invitation but regretting that your schedule will not permit attendance.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Letter to Mr. Bader
Tab II	Letter from Mr. Bader

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter of January 25 inviting me to attend the discussion meeting on "Economic Sanctions and the Western Alliance," scheduled for March 14.

It certainly promises to be an interesting and important conference, but my schedule unfortunately will not permit me to attend. I understand Jack Matlock will be there, and he can brief me on the proceedings.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Mr. William B. Bader
Vice President
SRI International-Washington
1611 N. Kent Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209



January 25, 1984

The Honorable Robert C. MacFarlane
Assistant to The President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. MacFarlane:

I am writing to invite you to be a participant in a special, off-the-record discussion meeting on "Economic Sanctions and the Western Alliance." This meeting will take place on Wednesday, March 14, 1984, at 3:00 p.m. in the Mansfield Room of the U.S. Capitol. SRI International is organizing this discussion in conjunction with Senators Richard Lugar and Joseph Biden of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and, respectively, Chairman and Minority Leader of its Subcommittee on European Affairs.

As you know, the issue of economic sanctions involves not only commercial but also vital political and security considerations in the conduct of East-West relations. A particularly critical aspect of the problem, as the recent past has shown, pertains to the considerable differences in the way we and our European friends and allies assess the proper and effective management of East-West affairs. At the same time, there is also disagreement within the United States -- both within the government and between government and the business community -- about the place and role of East-West trade within the framework of our national, commercial, and security interests.

The key questions, both in our domestic and in the transatlantic debates, turn on whether embargoes and sanctions are likely to produce a modification of Soviet international behavior. And, of course, whether that goal can be achieved unilaterally or only by acting in concert with Western Europe and Japan. How to achieve alliance unity is a vexing problem in itself, especially in view of the different levels of dependence on East-West trade. Finally, to oversimplify, there is continuing confusion about the relative commercial as well as political costs and benefits of merely proceeding along the policy lines of the past several years.

The current controversies concerning the Export Administration Act, shifting European attitudes, and the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, make this a particularly appropriate time to bring together a highly select group of individuals from Congress, the Executive Branch, the business sector, labor, the world of scholarly expertise, the media, and the public affairs community for a close examination of the subject.

The Honorable Robert C. MacFarlane
Page 2

The meeting will be the second in a new series of such SRI-sponsored events on critical policy subjects. The first, "U.S. Economic Relations with the People's Republic of China," was held last year and was a particularly fruitful session.

The aim of the March 14 conference is to generate a frank, off-the-record exchange of views and information among high-level policymakers and specialists who share a close interest in the connection between East-West trade and Western Alliance relations.

The agenda will deal with three connected themes: (1) The U.S. National Interest: Reconciling Security and Commercial Concerns; (2) The Politics and Economics of East-West Trade (sensitive technologies, strategic goods, credits and commerce); and (3) U.S. Export Controls and the Western Alliance. Each theme will be introduced briefly by a senior expert who will outline the salient issues and questions for discussion between 3:00 and 6:00 p.m. At 6:30 p.m., the group will reconvene for a reception and working dinner at which the discussion will focus on the U.S.-West European dimension of the subject. We are pleased that The Right Honorable Denis W. Healey, a member of the House of Commons and formerly Chancellor of the Exchequer in the most recent Labor Government, will be the dinner speaker.

Knowing of your keen interest and involvement in these critical matters, we hope you will personally be able to join us and take an active part in the discussion. Since space at the conference table is strictly limited to 48 participants, please let us know by Friday, February 16, whether you will be able to take part.

Sincerely yours,



William B. Bader
Vice President

*I think you
will enjoy this affair.
Bob Imman + Bill Nyland
will introduce the themes -
and we expect a large
turnout. CEO*



A Special, Off-The-Record Conference

On

Economic Sanctions and the Western Alliance

Wednesday, March 14, 1984

3:00 p.m. - 8:30 p.m.

United States Capitol
Mansfield Room (S207)
Washington, D. C.

Conference Co-Hosts:

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
United States Senator from Indiana

Dr. William F. Miller
President and Chief Executive Officer
SRI International

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden
United States Senator from Delaware

Dr. William B. Bader
Vice President
SRI International-Washington

- AGENDA -

Discussion Chairman: Dr. Ivo John Lederer

- 3:00 p.m. I. Welcoming Remarks and Introduction
- 3:15 p.m. II. The U. S. National Interest: Reconciling Security
and Commercial Concerns
 Overview: The Honorable William G. Hyland*
- 4:15 p.m. III. The Politics and Economics of East-West Trade
 Overview: Dr. William B. Bader
- 5:00 p.m. IV. U. S. Export Controls and the Western Alliance
 Overview: Admiral Bobby R. Inman
- 5:45 p.m. V. Concluding Perspectives
- 6:30 p.m. VI. Reception and Working Dinner
 Special Address: The Right Honorable Denis W. Healey
- 8:30 p.m. Adjournment

* To be reconfirmed.

SRI International-Washington
1611 N. Kent Street • Arlington, VA 22209 • Tel: (703) 524-2053 • Cable: SRI INTL WDC



- INVITEES -

Economic Sanctions and the Western Alliance

March 14, 1984

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

U. S. Senate

The Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr.
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden
The Honorable Bill Bradley
The Honorable Alan Cranston
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
The Honorable Charles McC. Mathias
The Honorable Warren B. Rudman
The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes
The Honorable Pete Wilson

U. S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Dante B. Fascell
The Honorable Tom Lantos
The Honorable Timothy E. Wirth
The Honorable Ed Zschau

EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The White House Staff

The Honorable James A. Baker, III
Chief of Staff and Assistant to The President

The Honorable George A. Keyworth, II
Science Advisor to The President
and Director, Office of Science and
Technology Policy

The Honorable Robert C. MacFarlane
Assistant to The President for
National Security Affairs

The Honorable Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to The President
and Senior Director for European/
Soviet Affairs

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy
Chief of Staff
Office of The Vice President

Department of Agriculture

The Honorable John R. Block
Secretary of Agriculture

Department of Commerce

The Honorable Lionel H. Olmer
Under Secretary for International Trade

Department of Defense

The Honorable Richard N. Perle
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Policy)

EXECUTIVE BRANCH (continued)

Department of State

The Honorable Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Honorable H. Eugene Douglas
U. S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs

Department of The Treasury

The Honorable Donald T. Regan
Secretary of The Treasury

Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Export-Import Bank

The Honorable William H. Draper, III
President and Chairman

U. S. Information Agency

The Honorable Charles Z. Wick
Director

U. S. Trade Representative

The Honorable William E. Brock

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and Chief Executive Officer

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and Chief Executive Officer

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International Sector

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and Chief Executive Officer

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of New York

The Honorable Anthony M. Solomon
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Chairman of the Executive Committee

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and Chief Executive Officer

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Technology Corporation

Admiral Bobby R. Inman
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The Honorable G. William Miller
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Monsanto Company

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Former Vice Chairman of the Board
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President

The U. S.-Soviet Trade
and Economic Council

Mr. Dudley W. Miller
President

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Distinguished Visiting Professor
of National Security Affairs
The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute

The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
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Center for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University

Dr. Edwin A. Deagle, Jr.
Director
International Relations Division
The Rockefeller Foundation

General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Senior Fellow
The Hudson Institute

Dr. Ed A. Hewett
Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

The Honorable William G. Hyland
Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The Honorable Philip M. Kaiser

Dr. Bruce K. McLaury
President
The Brookings Institution

Dr. Enid C. B. Schoettle
Program Officer In Charge
International Affairs Program
The Ford Foundation

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (ret.)

Mr. Joseph E. Slater
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The Aspen Institute

The Honorable Helmut Sonnenfeldt
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The Brookings Institution

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Research Institute on International Change
Columbia University

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Mr. Hans Heymann
Distinguished Visiting Professor
Defense Intelligence College

Dean William F. May
Graduate School of Business Administration
New York University

Professor Fritz Stern
Columbia University

Dr. Raymond Vernon
Center for International Studies
Harvard University

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

His Excellency Sir Roy Denman
Head of the Delegation of the European
Economic Council

The Right Honorable Denis W. Healey

MEDIA

Ms. Flora Lewis
The New York Times

Mr. Art Pine
The Wall Street Journal

Mr. Hobart Rowen
The Washington Post

Mr. Strobe Talbott
Time Inc.

Mr. George F. Will

SRI INTERNATIONAL

Dr. William F. Miller
President and Chief Executive Officer

Dr. William B. Bader
Vice President
SRI International-Washington

Mr. J. Ronald Nater
Vice President
World Business Division

Mr. Paul A. Laudicina
Director
International Policy Analysis

Dr. Ivo John Lederer
Consultant to SRI International

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90146

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY~~

February 7, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *gm*
SUBJECT: Suzanne Massie's Trip to Moscow

Suzanne Massie returned to New York from Moscow February 6 and telephoned me today to give me a preliminary report on her visit there.

She said that she had been well received and she thought her trip had done good. While the Soviet officials she saw (mainly USA Institute and Ministry of Culture) had their hackles up and were very critical of the Administration, their attitude softened as her stay progressed.

She was told that they were in favor of concluding an exchanges agreement, and that the best way to proceed was for Shultz to propose to Dobrynin a resumption of negotiations. (The implication was that making the proposal in Moscow might create bureaucratic difficulties.)

Overall, she felt that the message was that they accepted the need for more dialogue and would welcome it, but still feel constrained to make a show of harboring deep suspicions regarding our ultimate intentions.

Mrs. Massie plans to come to Washington next Monday to brief me in greater detail.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS MOZ-002 #28
BY CU NARA, DATE 11/14/03

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

February 8, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MC FARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK SUBJECT: Request of Congressional Wives for Meeting on
Soviet Jewry

A group of Congressional wives has requested a meeting with you the morning of April 3 to discuss U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union as it relates to Soviet Jewry (Tab II). Co-chairwomen of the organization are Helen Jackson, Joanne Kemp, Teresa Heinz, Dolores Beilenson and Shirley Metzenbaum.

If you are in Washington that day, I believe it would be useful for you to meet briefly with the group. I suggest, therefore, that we set up a meeting where you could come by (preferably at the beginning) for five to ten minutes, and I would be available to continue the meeting and answer questions in more detail.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter at Tab I, agreeing to arrange a meeting on April 3, and to attend personally if possible.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Letter to Mrs. Jackson
Tab II	Incoming correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mrs. Jackson:

Thank you for the letter of February 3 from you, Mrs. Kemp, Mrs. Heinz, Mrs. Beilenson and Mrs. Metzenbaum, regarding the International Conference of Parliamentary Spouses which you will be hosting here April 2-4.

I will be pleased to arrange a meeting at the NSC April 3 to discuss U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union as it relates to Soviet Jewry. I hope my schedule at that time will permit me to attend the meeting, but in any event, Jack Matlock, our Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs, will be on hand to discuss this important subject with you.

I appreciate the commitment your group has made to bring the problems facing Soviet Jewry to public and parliamentary attention, and I send my best wishes for your upcoming conference.

Sincerely,

Mrs. Helen Jackson
Congressional Wives for
Soviet Jewry
2027 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036



CONGRESSIONAL WIVES FOR SOVIET JEWRY

February 1, 1984

FOUNDING CO-CHAIRWOMAN
Helen Jackson

CO-CHAIRWOMEN

Joanne Kemp
Teresa Heinz
Dolores Beilenson
Shirley Metzenbaum

Executive Committee
(in formation)

Gail Bartlett
Lana Bethune
Jill Biden
Carolyn Bonker
Molly Boren
Ellen Boschwitz
Phyllis Coelho
Diane Cohen
Evie Dannemeyer
Cindy Daub
Lucille de la Garza
Jody Dixon
Elizabeth Dole
Penny Durenberger
Valerie Frost
Annie Glenn
Rhoda Glickman
Sally Gorton
Andrea Gray
Elaine Hatch
Elsie Hawkins
Rita Hollings
Olivia Jones
Barbara Levin
Vicky Levin
Jan Levine
Doris Matsui
Carolyn Mattingly
Elizabeth McEwen
Corinne Michel
Valery Moorhead
Elizabeth Moynihan
Catherine Mrazek
Nancy Murkowski
Nuala Pell
Harriet Pressler
Cheryl Sensenbrenner
Marie Smith
Sheila Smith
Joan Specter
Martha Sundquist
Janet Waxman
Wren Wirth
Addie Yates
Cece Zorinsky

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

FEB 3 1984

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

The Congressional Wives for Soviet Jewry, a group formed in 1978 by wives of members of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives to organize efforts on behalf of the Jewish minority in the U.S.S.R., is hosting an International Conference of Parliamentary Spouses for Soviet Jewry April 2 - 4, 1984 in Washington, D.C.

We request the opportunity to meet with you on the morning of April 3, or as your schedule permits. We would like to discuss the current United States policy towards the Soviet Union and how that policy affects the Jewish minority in the Soviet Union.

In April 1982, some of us attended a conference in Ottawa, Canada, organized by the Canadian Parliamentary Spouses Association. This was our first such international effort. The program was an outstanding success. We met with senior Canadian officials, Members of Parliament, media, and the human rights community. At the conclusion of the conference, we made a joint commitment to continue, and indeed expand, the contact through an annual conference.

For further information and assistance, you may contact Robin Saipe at the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, Washington office (265-8114). We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Helen Jackson

Helen Jackson
Founding Co-Chairwoman

Joanne Kemp

Joanne Kemp
Co-Chairwoman

Teresa Heinz

Teresa Heinz
Co-Chairwoman

Dolores Beilenson

Dolores Beilenson
Co-Chairwoman

Shirley Metzenbaum

Shirley Metzenbaum
Co-Chairwoman

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 10, 1984

FOR CHUCK DONOVAN

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gruenwald

I suggest replacement of last sentence beginning "Your suggestion is in the spirit of..." with the following:

"If we make progress in this effort, we will be able to think seriously about proposing the sort of conference you suggest. I appreciate your sharing the idea with me."

^{IL}Lenczowski, ^{RWR}Robinson, and ^{AM}McMinn concur.

1152

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 2/7/84

To: Carol Cleveland

Are there any NSC objections
to this reply to Mr. George Gruen
wrtld regarding his suggestion
for a U.S.-U.S.S.R. economic con-
ference? The letter was forwarded
to us by Mr. Baker's office.

Thanks.



CHUCK DONOVAN
Presidential Correspondence
Office
Room 94, x7610

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 16, 1984

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION
ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

The East Room

10:00 A.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: During these first days of 1984, I would like to share with you and the people of the world my thoughts on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace: relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow, the United States will join the Soviet Union and 33 other nations at a European Disarmament Conference in Stockholm. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace.

We will be in Stockholm with the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress. We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities to peace.

Through times of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered. We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere.

I believe that 1984 finds the United States in the strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union. We've come a long way since the decade of the '70's, years when the United States seemed filled with self doubt and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence by armed forces and threat.

Over the last 10 years, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their gross national product to military expenditures as the United States, produced six times as many ICBMs, four times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and they began deploying the SS-20 intermediate range missile at a time when the United States had no comparable weapon.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. So, when we neglected our defenses,

MORE

the risks of serious confrontation grew.

Three years ago, we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is now in the midst of the best recovery since the '60's. Our defenses are being rebuilt, our alliances are solid, and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They've been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. Well, if so, I think they can see now they were wrong.

This may be the reason that we've been hearing such strident rhetoric from the Kremlin recently. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This understandable but profoundly mistaken.

Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out. America's deterrence is more credible and it is making the world a safer place. Safer because now there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or question our resolve.

Yes, we are safer now. But to say that our restored deterrence has made the world safer is not to say that it's safe enough. We're witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to approve peace and protect our way of life. But deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must, and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as serious and constructive as possible. A dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms.

There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition. And if we do so, we might find areas

MORE

in which we could engage in constructive cooperation. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for demonstrating with equal conviction our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. That's why 1984 is a year of opportunities for peace.

But if the United States and the Soviet Union are to arise to the challenges facing us, and seized the opportunities for peace -- we must do more to find areas of mutual interest and then build on them.

I propose that our governments make a major effort to see if we can make progress in three broad, problem areas. First, we need to find ways to reduce, and eventually to eliminate, the threat and use of force in solving international disputes. The world has witnessed more than 100 major conflicts since the end of World War II. Today there are armed conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their origins in local problems. But many have been exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates. And of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion.

Fueling regional conflicts and exporting violence only exacerbate local tensions, increase suffering, and make solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult. Further, such activity carries with it the risk of larger confrontations. Would it not be better, and safer, if we could work together to assist people in areas of conflict in finding peaceful solutions to their problems? That should be our mutual goal.

But we must recognize that the gap in American and Soviet perceptions and policy is so great that our immediate objective must be more modest. As a first step, our government should jointly examine concrete actions that we both can take to reduce the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas. And if we succeed, we should be able to move beyond this immediate objective.

Our second task should be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world. It's tragic

MORE

to see the world's developing nations spending more than \$150 billion a year on armed forces -- some 20 percent of their national budgets.

We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs. With regard to nuclear weapons the simple truth is America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. Today, we have far fewer nuclear weapons than we had 20 years ago, and in terms of its total destructive power our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years.

Just three months ago we and our allies agreed to withdraw 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after the withdrawal of 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe three years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, provide great stability, and build confidence.

Our third task is to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding. Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free exchange or interchange of information and ideas increase confidence. Sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we've had serious concerns about Soviet compliance with agreements and treaties. Compliance is important because we seek truly effective arms control. However, there's been mounting evidence that provisions of agreements have been violated and that advantage has been taken of ambiguities in our agreements.

In response to a congressional request, a report on this will be submitted in the next few days. It is clear that we cannot

MORE

simply assume that agreements negotiated will be fulfilled. We must take the Soviet compliance record into account both in the development of our defense program and in our approach to arms control.

In our discussions with the Soviet Union, we will work to remove the obstacles which threaten to undermine existing agreements and a broader arms control process. Examples I've cited illustrate why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we're determined to try and try again. We may have to start in small ways, but start we must.

In working on these tasks, our approach is based on three guiding principles -- realism, strength and dialogue. Realism means we must start with a clear-eyed understanding of the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength is essential to negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we're weak, we can do neither. Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial, and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is our strength of spirit and unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We're stronger in all these areas than we were three years ago. Our strength is necessary to deter war and to facilitate negotiated solutions. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return, but America can now offer something in return. Strength and dialogue go hand in hand. We're determined to deal with our differences peacefully through negotiations. We're prepared to discuss the problems that divide us and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders who never shied from expressing their view of our system, but this doesn't mean that we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us imperialist aggressors and worse or because they cling to the fantasy of a Communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk. Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshaken, but we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

MORE

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war, and especially nuclear war, is priority number one. A nuclear conflict could well be mankind's last. And that is why I proposed over two years ago the zero option for intermediate range missiles. Our aim was, and continues to be to eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I've said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country would do everything to avert the threat of war. Well, these are encouraging words, but now is the time to move from words to deeds. The opportunity for progress in arms control exists. The Soviet leaders should take advantage of it.

We have proposed a set of initiatives that would reduce substantially nuclear arsenals and reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation.

The world regrets -- certainly we do -- that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces and has not set a date for the resumption of the talks on strategic arms and on conventional forces in Europe. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table to work toward agreements in INF, START, and MBFR. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we'll meet them halfway.

We seek to reduce nuclear arsenals and to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call confidence building measures. They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we proposed to exchange advance notification of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on Congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct channels of communication.

Last week, we had productive discussions with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications including the hot line.

Now, these bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We're working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities and to diminish the risk of surprise attack.

MORE

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires ways for both of us to diffuse tensions and regional conflicts.

Take the Middle East as an example, everyone's interest would be served by stability in the region and our efforts are directed toward that goal. The Soviets could help reduce tensions there, instead of introducing sophisticated weapons into the area. This would certainly help us to deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship. Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union and over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians and others who wish to join their families abroad.

Our request is simple and straightforward, that the Soviet Union live up to its obligations. It has freely assumed those obligations under international covenants, in particular its commitments under the Helsinki Accords.

Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship. Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

Our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence, peaceful competition and constructive cooperation, will serve our two nations and people everywhere. It is a policy not just for this year, but for the long term. It's a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us halfway, we will be prepared to protect our interests and those of our friends and allies.

But we want more than deterrence. We seek genuine cooperation. We seek progress for peace. Cooperation begins with communication. And, as I've said, we'll stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting this week with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us.

MORE

It also calls for the best in a Soviet Union. We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat. It is the language of progress. We proved this thirty-five years ago when we had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and could have tried to dominate the world. But we didn't. Instead, we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind.

We helped rebuild war ravaged economies in Europe and the Far East, including those of nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now among our staunchest friends.

We can't predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risk of nuclear war.

It's not an impossible dream, because eliminating these risks are so clearly a vital interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each other. There's no reason why we ever should. Indeed, we fought common enemies in World War II. Today our common enemies are poverty, disease, and above all, war.

More than twenty years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as valid today as when he announced it. "So let us not be blind to our differences," he said, "but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Well, those differences are differences in governmental structure and philosophy. The common interests have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere. Just suppose with me for a moment -- that an Ivan and an Anya could find themselves in, oh, say, in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain or a storm with a Jim and Sally -- and there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they, then, debate the differences between their respective governments? Or would they find themselves comparing notes as about their children, and what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company, they would probably have touched on ambitions, and hobbies, and what they wanted for their children, and problems of making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways, maybe Anya would be saying to Ivan, "Wasn't she nice? She also teaches music." Or Jim would be telling Sally what Ivan did, or didn't like about his boss. They might even have decided they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon. Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars.

People want to raise their children in a world without fear and without war. They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistence that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all borders.

If the Soviet government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms and know in doing so that we have helped fulfill the hopes and dreams of those we represent and, indeed, of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

Thank you. (Applause.)

Dixon
Date: 1/27/84

TO: ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: **KATHERINE CAMALIER**
*Staff Assistant to
James A. Baker, III*

☐ Information

☒ Action

Mr. Baker asked if you would please send an appropriate/routine response from the President to George Gruenwald and then carbon copy George Dixon and our office.

Thanks.

First Bank System

George H. Dixon
Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer

January 17, 1984

Mr. James A. Baker, III
Chief of Staff and
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Jim:

You already receive more mail than you can possibly handle, so I'm ordinarily not moved to take advantage of our acquaintance (during President Ford's Administration) and add to your burden.

But the proposal for a joint U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. Economic Conference, copy attached, to President Reagan, which was developed by a good friend has it seems to me great merit. I commend it to you.

With best wishes for 1984.

Sincerely yours,



GHD:rl1
Attachment

REVISED COPY

GEORGE GRUENWALD
1000 NORTHSTAR CENTER
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402

November 24, 1983

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT: Joint U.S.A. - U.S.S.R. Economic Conference

Dear Mr. President:

Here is a concept with both peace-keeping and economic benefits, if it should succeed -- and less lofty but worthwhile benefits if it fails.

The Concept

Often, in a confrontation, it is wise to seek out an area which suits mutual self-interest.

Although reduction of the nuclear arms race suits such interests, the fears for a society's survival, for loss of relative power and political leadership charges the issues with emotion. The viability of military options are unmeasurable before the fact, highly subjective and not entirely controllable by either of the superpowers.

Therefore, what is an option?

The Proposal

This is a proposal that the United States should take leadership in a suggestion which may benefit the self-interests of both the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.

This suggestion is based on the presumption that economists from each country have already separately determined the beneficial effects of a dramatic lowering of their respective national debts, and that each knows how this will affect the value of money, the health of domestic economy, the ability to compete in international markets, the ability to raise technology and to modernize both the industrial infrastructure and to improve the quality of life for the citizenry.

And that each country wishes to achieve these results.

President Reagan
from G.Gruenwald

The Process

Economic (not military) representatives of the two superpowers will meet to discuss the implications, the trade-offs and the sources for the dramatic defense establishment drain of money into non-productive channels. Such a meeting will dramatize the benefits of an economic solution to the superpower confrontation -- as well as underscoring the benefits to society. Both superpowers will benefit from this worldwide perception of rational wisdom.

The Objective

The conference will recommend appropriate budget reductions in non-productive areas, to generate funding for each sovereign state's economic improvement, relative to its different needs, such economic benefits being financed by a reduction in defense spending overkill (and I use the word advisedly). It is clearly not the goal to develop a stalemate of spheres of influence detrimental to the interests of the onlooking other nations.

Possible Consequences

The plan will work.

Failing that...

The conference will occur, and the two powers will develop a dialog on a rational plane, not ridden with military confrontation fears. This will extend the process into a commission, a series of meetings on segments of the economic issues, some of which may be resolved to the benefit of both countries.

Failing that...

The conference will occur and will not resolve anything, will not be rational, will not significantly remove tensions...but it will begin a new thinking process, it will delay the rush to a military brink.

Failing that...

The conference will NOT occur.

The United States will (at the very least) be given credit by the world community for an even-handed approach to the superpower confrontation problem: with the only goal being benefit to both societies, which can have consequent benefit for the rest of the world.

Mr. President, I believe it is worth a try.

Sincerely,

George Gruenwald