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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8400327)			
1. memo	from Matlock to Robert McFarlane re: letter to the President (1p)	1/23/84	P-1 P-3
2. memo	from Charles Hill to McFarlane re: letter to the President (2pp)	1/12/84	P-1 P-3
3. cable	from AmEmbassy Moscow to the Sec. of State re: letter to the President (7pp) <i>R 11/26/02 NLSM02-002 #9</i>	11/18/83	P-1
letter case (8490095)			
4. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: Shultz-Gromyko meeting (1p) <i>R 11/13/03 #10</i>	1/24/84	P-1
5. memo	from Richard Burt to the Secretary re: meeting (1p) <i>R 11/26/02 NLSM02-002 #11</i>	n.d.	P-1
6. memo	from Shultz to the President re: meeting (1p) <i>R " " #12</i>	n.d.	P-1
7. memcon	re: Shultz-Gromyko meeting (28pp) <i>R " " #13</i>	1/18/84	P-1
letter case (8400677)			
8. memo	from Matlock to Robert Kimmitt re: press talkers on Shultz-Gromyko meeting (1p) <i>R 11/13/03 #14</i>	1/24/84	P-1
9. memo	from Hill to McFarlane, et al. re: press themes (1p) <i>R 11/26/02 NLSM02-002 #15</i>	1/23/84	P-1
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron January 1984 [3 of 3] OA 90887 Box 3			10/19/95

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

2. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(B)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8490108)			
10. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: message (1p) <i>R 11/13/03 MDZ-002 #16</i>	1/27/84	P-1 P-5
11. memo	re: message (3pp) <i>L - *17</i>	1/26/84	P-1
letter case (8409344)			
12. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: Soviet Olympic - related requests (3pp)	1/29/84	P-1 P-5
13. memo	from McFarlane to the President re: Soviet Olympic request (3pp)	n.d.	P-1 P-5
14. letter	to Matlock re: response to request for information (2pp)	1/27/84	P-1
15. report	(1p) <i>D. 10/14/04 MDZ-002 #19</i>	1/27/84	P-1
16. memo (8400897)	from Matlock to McFarlane re: peace initiative (1p)	1/31/84	P-1 P-5
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron January 1984 [3 of 3] GA 90887 <i>Box 3</i>			10/19/95

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
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- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer CAS

Box Number 3

FOIA M02-002

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JANUARY 1984 (3)

DATE 3/21/2007

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
				
10 MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE MESSAGE (#16)	1	1/27/1984	

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 23, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RONALD K. PETERSON
Office of Assistant Director for Legislative
Reference
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: H.J.Res. 355

We have reviewed and concur with the Department of State's proposed report on H.J.Res. 355, expressing the sense of Congress that "The number of diplomatic and consular personnel representing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United States may not exceed the number of such personnel representing the United States in the Soviet Union."

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

9364


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 23, 1984

FOR BOB KIMMITT

I recommend that you sign the attached memorandum to Ronald K. Peterson.

C. Lehman concurs.


JACK F. MATLOCK



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

December 20, 1983

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-
National Security Council

SUBJECT: State proposed report on H.J.Res. 355, expressing the sense of Congress that "The number of diplomatic and consular personnel representing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United States may not exceed the number of such personnel representing the United States in the Soviet Union."

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than

TUESDAY, JANUARY 10, 1984.

Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler (395-4710)
the legislative analyst in this office.

Ronald K. Peterson
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures
J. Barie



DEC 15 1983

Dear Mr. Stockman:

In accordance with established procedure, there is transmitted herewith a proposed report on H.J. Res. 355.

Please inform the Department whether there is any objection to the submission of this report.

With cordial regards,

Sincerely,

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

Enclosure:

Six copies of
Proposed Report.

The Honorable
David A. Stockman, Director,
Office of Management and Budget.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary has asked me to respond to your request for Executive Branch comments on H.J. Res. 355, expressing the sense of Congress that "the number of diplomatic and consular personnel representing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United States may not exceed the number of such personnel representing the United States in the Soviet Union."

The Department of State agrees with the general sense of H.J. Res. 355 that there should be equality of treatment for U.S. Government personnel in the Soviet Union and Soviet Government personnel in the United States, and that there should be a rough equivalence in numbers between our diplomatic and consular staffs. However, we do not agree with several of the statements contained in H.J. Res 355 and oppose the specific recommendation made in the resolution to seek absolute equality in numbers between U.S. and Soviet staffs.

With regard to paragraph two of the preambular section of the resolution, we would note it is incorrect to state that "the Soviet Government imposes restrictions on the number of United States Government diplomatic and consular personnel in the Soviet Union, while the United States Government has not imposed similar restrictions on Soviet diplomatic and consular personnel in this country." In fact, the exact opposite is true.

Since 1980, the United States has established a ceiling of 320 for the number of Soviet diplomatic and consular personnel at their missions in Washington, D.C. and San Francisco. In addition, a subceiling of 41 accredited personnel has been established for the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco. Over the past three years, the United States has reduced the number of Soviet commercial representatives permitted in this country by forty percent (there are now 58 commercial representatives in the United States). The United States has also established an unofficial ceiling of 36 for the total number of Soviet news correspondents permitted to reside in this country.

Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.

By contrast, the Soviet Union has not established formal limits on the U.S. presence in the Soviet Union, although there are de facto constraints due to the unavailability of suitable housing and other facilities. It is also logical to assume that since the United States has imposed ceilings on Soviet officials, the Soviet Government is less willing to allow the U.S. presence in its country to grow.

With regard to paragraph three of the preambular section of the resolution, it is fair to state that the Soviet Union does impose "restrictions on United States diplomatic and consular personnel which limit their ability to travel." However, it should also be noted that the United States imposes similar, reciprocal, restrictions on Soviet personnel in this country.

Finally, concerning the operative section of H.J. Res. 355, we would note that the Department of State at present employs some 556 persons at its Embassy in Moscow and Consulate General in Leningrad, while the Soviet Government employs a total of 460 persons at its Embassy in Washington, D.C. and Consulate General in San Francisco. Of the 556 persons at our mission in the Soviet Union, 220 are local and third country staff, while 336 are Americans. On the Soviet side, 7 are local employees (i.e., Americans), and the remaining 453 are Soviet citizens. The Department of State has closely analyzed for many years the related questions of security, mission effectiveness, rough equivalence in personnel numbers, and equal treatment of diplomatic representatives. We have concluded that there would be no significant advantages to be gained by insisting on exact equivalence in every employee category and that the capabilities of our Embassy and Consulate General in the Soviet Union are roughly equal to those of the Soviet Embassy and Consulate General in this country. Therefore, we oppose the recommendation contained in the operative section of H.J. Res. 355.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1-2
040 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 14470 01 OF 03 181533Z C06/14 001182 NOD881
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W.

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P 181526Z NOV 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2668

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 14470

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SHUM, UR, US
SUBJECT: IDA MILGROM APPEALS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN
--- AND CDE DELEGATES

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 14234, (B) MOSCOW 12647

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: EMBOFFS MET BRIEFLY WITH ANATOLIY SHCHARAN-
SKIY'S MOTHER IDA MILGROM OUTSIDE A MOSCOW THEATRE ON
NOVEMBER 10. SHE BRIEFLY TOLD US OF HAVING RECEIVED A
LETTER FROM ANATOLIY IN OCTOBER (REF A) AND PROCEEDED
TO GIVE US TWO WRITTEN APPEALS ON HIS BEHALF: ONE TO
PRESIDENT REAGAN AND ONE TO THE DELEGATIONS OF THE CDE
PREPARATORY CONFERENCE IN HELSINKI. EMBASSY'S INFORMAL
TRANSLATION OF THE LETTERS CONTAINED IN PARAS. 3 AND 4.
COMMENT AND SUGGESTED ACTION CONTAINED IN PARA. 5.
ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS WILL BE POUCHED TO EUR/SOV. END
SUMMARY.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

TO PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RONALD REAGAN
RESPECTED MR. REAGAN!

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M02-002 #9

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/26/02

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 14470 01 OF 03 181533Z C06/14 001182 NOD881

- IN JULY OF 1983, WHEN I LEARNED OF THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT'S REACTION TO THE REFUSAL OF MY SON, ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKIY, TO APPEAL FOR A PARDON, I TURNED TO MR. SHULTZ. IN MY LETTER I TRIED TO REPORT THE TRUTH ABOUT THE SITUATION OF MY SON, INNOCENTLY LANGUISHING IN PRISON, AND ABOUT HIS POSITION AND THE POSITION OF THE SECURITY AGENCIES WITH REGARD TO HIM. THEY ARE THE ONES WHO CREATED THE "SHCHARANSKIY AFFAIR" AND WHO CONTINUE THEIR PRESSURE ON MY SON, TRYING TO SECURE ADMISSIONS OF NON-EXISTENT GUILT FROM HIM. I RECEIVED IN RESPONSE FROM MR. SHULTZ A LETTER IN WHICH HE TOLD ME THAT YOU, RESPECTED MR. REAGAN, ARE CONCERNED BY MY SON'S FATE AND PROMISE TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE FOR HIS RELEASE. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS I ALLOW MYSELF TO TURN TO YOU NOW:

- 1. I WANT TO EXPRESS MY HEARTFELT THANKS FOR YOUR SHARING IN MY FAMILY'S GRIEF;

- 2. I WANT TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY PROFOUND SHOCK THAT THE EFFORTS OF THE U.S., DIRECTED IN 1983 AT FREEING ANATOLIY, WERE NOT CARRIED THROUGH TO THE END. I DO NOT KNOW OF ALL THE STEPS TAKEN BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN THIS DIRECTION, BUT THE FACT THAT THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING WAS SIGNED AND MY SON REMAINS IN CONFINEMENT, WHEN HIS RELEASE WAS ONE OF THE CONDITIONS FOR SIGNING THE DOCUMENT, HAS SHAKEN THAT GREAT HOPE WHICH HAS FOR MANY MONTHS SUSTAINED MY LIFE'S STRENGTH. HOW TO LIVE ON, HOW TO HELP MY SON SURVIVE UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THAT BRUTAL REGIMEN, UNDER WHICH HE HAS ALREADY BEEN MORE THAN SIX YEARS. AND HOW MUCH TIME STILL REMAINS! AND HE IS SO VERY ILL!

- 3. I APPEAL TO YOU, RESPECTED MR. REAGAN, AND ASK YOU TO SAVE MY SON'S LIFE, AND THIS MEANS TO ACHIEVE

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HIS RELEASE. I AM NOT A POLITICIAN, I AM NOT A DIPLOMAT,
I AM AN ORDINARY WOMAN, A MOTHER OF SONS. I DO NOT
KNOW WHICH PATHS MUST BE FOLLOWED TO ACHIEVE MY SON'S
RELEASE. BUT I UNDERSTAND THAT THE GOVERNMENT LEADERS
OF A GREAT POWER HAVE MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL TO HELP
SAVE THE LIFE OF AN INNOCENT MAN. AND THIS IS WHAT I
ASK OF YOU. SAVE MY SON! I ENTREAT FATE TO ALLOW ME
TO MEET ANATOLIY AT LIBERTY IN THIS LIFE. BUT I AM,
AFTER ALL, AN ELDERLY PERSON, AND THE TIME SPAN OF OLD
AGE IS SHORT! SO I ASK YOU FOR IMMEDIATE HELP! I
CALL ON YOUR DUTY TO HUMANITY AND I BELIEVE THAT YOUR
MIND AND HEART WILL SHOW YOU THE WAYS WHICH WILL RETURN
MY SON TO FREEDOM. AND THE FIRMNESS OF YOUR WILL AND
PERSISTENCE ARE A RELIABLE GUARANTEE OF ACHIEVING ONE'S
AIM. AND I HOPE!!

- WITH THE MOST PROFOUND RESPECT,

- I. MIL'GROM

NOVEMBER 1983

END TEXT.

4. BEGIN TEXT.

TO THE DELEGATE-REPRESENTATIVES OF 35 COUNTRIES WHO
HAVE ASSEMBLED IN HELSINKI TO HOLD THE FIRST STAGE OF
THE CONFERENCE ON MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN TRUST AND
SECURITY

- I AM THE MOTHER OF ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKIY, WHOSE

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Department of State

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ACTION NODS-00

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P 181526Z NOV 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2669

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 14470

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SHUM, UR, US
SUBJECT: IDA MILGROM APPEALS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

FATE IS WELL KNOWN TO ALL OF YOU. I APPEAL TO YOU AGAIN, NOT FOR THE FIRST TIME, AND ASK YOU TO UNDERTAKE THE DEFENSE OF MY SON, WHO WAS THE VICTIM OF A PROVOCATION. YOU, PARTICIPANTS IN THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT WHO SEALED WITH YOUR SIGNATURES THE FINAL ACT, WHICH PROCLAIMED THE LINK BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL DETENTE AND OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MY SON'S LIFE. HE, LIKE MANY OTHER FREEDOM-LOVING AND DARING PEOPLE, ASSUMED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MONITORING FULFILLMENT OF THE DECISIONS OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS AND OF OPENLY REPORTING TO ALL GOVERNMENTS ON ALL VIOLATIONS. AND THIS WAS UTILIZED BY THE AUTHORITIES TO CREATE THE SO-CALLED "SHCHARANSKIY AFFAIR" AND TO PASS AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE--13 YEARS DEPRIVATION OF FREEDOM. MY SON'S INNOCENCE AND THE ILLEGALITY OF THE SENTENCE PASSED BEHIND CLOSED DOORS BY AN "OPEN COURT" HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY CONFIRMED BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, AND THIS IS KNOWN TO WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AND TO YOU, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL 35 COUNTRIES. BUT MY SON, WHO BELIEVED IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS, HAS NOW BEEN IN PRISON FOR ALMOST SEVEN YEARS AND HAS

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Department of State

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BEEN SUBJECTED TO CONSTANT TORTURES AND PRESSURES. TODAY HE IS NOT ONLY IMPRISONED, HE IS VERY SERIOUSLY ILL. FREEDOM FOR ANATOLIY IS A MATTER OF LIFE OR DEATH. NOW YOU HAVE GATHERED AT A PRELIMINARY MEETING... TO STRENGTHEN TRUST... THIS MEETING, WHICH WILL AFFECT THE RESULTS OF THE FUTURE CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM, CANNOT AND MUST NOT IGNORE SUCH CASES OF THE CRUEST OF VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND--SIMPLY--FREEDOM TO LIVE. SUCH CASES, WHICH CONTRADICT THE SPIRIT OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE, MUST EVOKE PROTEST FROM YOU, THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING. I WISH TO REMIND YOU THAT MY SON, ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKIY, A JEW, WANTED TO LIVE IN HIS HISTORIC HOMELAND, ISRAEL, TOGETHER WITH HIS WIFE AVITAL SHCHARANSKIY. BUT HE WAS REFUSED THIS, AND SUBSEQUENTLY THEY ANNOUNCED HE WAS A SPY AND IMPOSED THIS OMINOUS SENTENCE THROUGH CRUDE VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW.

- RESPECTED DEPUTIES! YOU ARE NOW PREPARING FOR THE FIRST STAGE OF A MEETING OF A CONFERENCE TO STRENGTHEN TRUST... CONSIDER WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO SPEAK OF TRUST WHEN AN INNOCENT PERSON CONTINUES TO REMAIN IN PRISON? CONSIDER AND TAKE STEPS. I ASK YOU--SAVE MY SON.

- I. MIL'GROM
NOVEMBER 1983
END TEXT.

5. COMMENT AND SUGGESTED ACTION: MRS. MILGROM'S CONCERNS AS EXPRESSED HERE ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE CONVEYED ORALLY TO EMBOFFS IN OCTOBER (REF B), AND SHE CLEARLY BELIEVES, OR WANTS TO BELIEVE, THAT OUR

SIGNING THE MADRID AGREEMENT WAS MADE EXPRESSLY CONTINGENT ON HER SON'S RELEASE. GIVEN OUR LONG-

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Department of State

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PAGE 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 14470 02 OF 03 181534Z C06/14 001239 NOD883
STANDING CONCERN WITH THE SHCHARANSKIY CASE WE FEEL
THAT A RESPONSE TO HER APPEAL IS IN ORDER. SUCH A
RESPONSE SHOULD, WE BELIEVE, SEEK TO CORRECT MRS.
MILGROM'S APPARENT MISUNDERSTANDING REGARDING OUR
SIGNATURE OF THE MADRID AGREEMENT, AND MIGHT BUILD
ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE USG SHARES YOUR DEEP SENSE OF GRIEF AND FRUSTRATION OVER THE SOVIET UNION'S CONTINUED INCARCERATION OF YOUR SON.

-- AS YOU KNOW, OUR DELEGATION AT THE MADRID CSCE CONFERENCE REPEATEDLY SOUGHT FROM THE SOVIETS A COMMITMENT THAT ANATOLIY WOULD BE RELEASED. THE SOVIET DELEGATION DID SUGGEST THAT CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO EARLY RELEASE FOR ANATOLIY. WHILE OUR SIGNING THE MADRID AGREEMENT WAS NOT MADE EXPRESSLY CONTINGENT ON HIS RELEASE, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES THAT THEIR FAILURE TO RELEASE ANATOLIY WILL HAVE SERIOUS EFFECTS FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

-- THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE YOUR SON'S CASE WITH THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT WE CONSIDER HIS CONTINUED IMPRISONMENT A VIOLATION OF BOTH THE HELSINKI AND MADRID AGREEMENTS.

-- THE CDE PREPARATORY MEETING IN HELSINKI HAS COMPLETED

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 14470 03 OF 03 181534Z C06/14 001235 NOD882
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2670

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 14470

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SHUM, UR, US
SUBJECT: IDA MILGROM APPEALS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

ITS WORK. WE WILL MAKE SURE THAT YOUR APPEAL IS
BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE DELEGATES TO THE FULL
CONFERENCE WHEN IT CONVENES IN JANUARY.
HARTMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

January 24, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Shultz-Gromyko Meeting, January 18, 1984

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation (Tab I) of the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Stockholm, as prepared by State. Although it is an advance, unofficial copy which has not yet been reviewed by Secretary Shultz, you may wish to review it. It is being handled on very close hold in State, and Shultz has given orders that only one file copy be held in the Executive Secretariat.

As soon as Secretary Shultz has reviewed and cleared the memorandum, it will be sent officially for submission to the President.

Attachment:

Tab I Advance text of Shultz-Gromyko memcon

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS M02002 #10
BY CH, NARA, DATE 11/13/03



Department of State

ACTION MEMORANDUM
S/S

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

TO: The Secretary
FROM: EUR - Richard Burt
SUBJECT: Record of your Stockholm Meeting with Gromyko

Attached is the full memcon of your discussions with Gromyko in Stockholm, under cover of a memorandum to the President.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachments: As Stated

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MOZ-002 #11

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 11/26/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT: Record of My Stockholm Meeting with Gromyko

Attached is the full memorandum of conversation from my January 18 meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS M02-002 #12
BY LOI NARA, DATE 11/26/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~DECL: OADR~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Meeting between Secretary Shultz and
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

Date: January 18, 1984

Time: 1500 - 2010 hours

Place: Soviet Embassy, Stockholm, Sweden

U.S. PARTICIPANTS:

The Honorable George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
The Honorable Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. Ambassador, Moscow
The Honorable Jack F. Matlock, Senior Advisor, NSC Staff
The Honorable Richard R. Burt, Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
William Krimer, Interpreter (Notetaker)

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS:

A.A. Gromyko, First Deputy Premier, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
G.M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
V.G. Makarov, Ambassador, Personal Aide to Gromyko, MFA
S.P. Tarasenko, Counselor, Deputy Chief, USA Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
V. Sukhodrev, Counselor, 2nd European Department, MFA,
Interpreter (Notetaker)

Foreign Minister Gromyko thought it would probably be advisable to agree at the outset of today's talk that the subject matter of discussions will cover two main areas: (1) the current international situation, i.e. questions of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the United States; and (2) the bilateral relations between the two countries. Of course, these two areas were extremely broad and included a variety of elements. If some element or other were considered by one of the sides to be unsuitable for discussion, it would of course be senseless to discuss it. Thus, the discussions should cover those questions where both sides agree there was room for discussions, taking into account past experience.

Secretary Shultz said that prior to leaving Washington he had discussed this and other matters with Ambassador Dobrynin. They had touched on the question of the agenda for this meeting. The Secretary took it that Dobrynin had received some response from Gromyko with regard to the general outline of the

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agenda. Depending on how broadly the two items named by Gromyko were viewed, he would think that their views should be compatible. We had identified arms control as one item for discussion; regional issues, such as the Middle East, as a second item; and human rights as a third item. Then there were a variety of strictly bilateral issues, such as trade, as a fourth item. Of course in each of these items there were various categories and, while the words were perhaps different, generally he felt that both sides meant the same thing.

Gromyko said that he had not consented to all the specific issues mentioned by the Secretary, but, as he had said, the two broad areas for discussion would be the international situation and bilateral relations. He thought that, as he had told Dobrynin, this was the direction in which the discussions should go. He noted that the Secretary had named a number of other items, among them, for example, human rights. Since the Secretary had named this matter, he would tell him at the very outset of their discussion that he did not intend to discuss any such topic. Of course, the Secretary could talk about it if he insisted, but Gromyko would not enter into discussion of this item.

The Secretary said that of course it would be up to Gromyko whether he would wish to respond to something the Secretary would say. That was Gromyko's privilege. But the Secretary said that he must make some comments.

Gromyko repeated that he would tell the Secretary at the very outset that he would not enter into discussion of this topic. The two of them already had some experience when one side does not wish to discuss some specific issue. He would only say again that he would not discuss this item because the Soviet Union would not allow anyone to interfere in its internal affairs. To raise this issue would therefore be an evident waste of time. Surely it would be too much of a luxury for foreign ministers to lose time on that sort of item. As for himself he had no wish to lose time. As for the Secretary, he could of course do so, but without Gromyko's participation. He would suggest that the Secretary feel free to speak on the two items named, i.e. the international situation and bilateral issues. Or, if the Secretary preferred, Gromyko would lead off and talk on our bilateral relations. He thought that neither of them would feel constrained and they would have enough room to exchange views, particularly about the Stockholm Conference. At the Conference the Secretary had expressed the views of the U.S. Administration and today Gromyko had expressed the views of the Soviet Government and the Soviet leadership. He thought it would not be superfluous if he said something in addition to what he had stated publicly.

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The Secretary thanked Gromyko and said he would proceed to some items. The first thing he would say was that he had come to listen to Gromyko's speech and had been disappointed. He entirely disagreed with some, in fact most, of Gromyko's statements, and found many of them unacceptable. However, he did not want to take the time to go through that speech now, but would instead address the nature of our relationship and its content.

As the Secretary had told Dobrynin upon the latter's departure from Moscow at the end of last November, the President wanted to see our relations in a more constructive state. Therefore he would speak not only in the context of the various issues we had been discussing with Gromyko in one forum or another, but also address the mechanisms for achieving a more constructive relationship. He would note that contacts between himself and Gromyko had been greatest in well-publicized forums, generating a great deal of public attention. On the other hand, it seemed to President Reagan -- and the Secretary had the impression that Dobrynin had agreed with this -- that it would be useful to establish a private channel for discussions which would be out of the limelight and not open to public commentary. The President had said that he would like to see something like that take place.

For that to be effective he thought it would be necessary to manage things carefully so that it would be clear that an individual speaking in such private discussions was speaking for his country and that this would be known to each side. For the United States, the President had asked the Secretary to help him manage this process. We would expect the people on our side of this table to take part in such discussions as well as other designated people at times. He believed it would be appropriate for such discussions to be held between Ambassador Dobrynin and himself or whomever he would designate. Ambassador Hartman would be the appropriate interlocutor in Moscow, and the President would expect him to be used in this capacity. Whenever he and Gromyko met it was a public event, but beyond this sometimes experts on a specific subject would have to be designated and it should be clear to both sides that they spoke for their country.

The Secretary had one further point. When Dobrynin had returned from Moscow he had discussed this with the Secretary and told him that Gromyko had authorized this process. Both he and Dobrynin had emphasized to each other the importance of such discussions carrying real content, so as to make progress, and not just be dialogue for the sake of dialogue. To sum up, beyond the publicly known meetings between officials of the two countries there was room for private discussions. Dobrynin had

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said that Gromyko had approved of this and, if that was indeed the case, one should reflect on how to proceed from here.

Gromyko said he first wanted to address the Secretary's comments about his speech at the Conference. In that speech he had outlined in some detail the Soviet attitude to some of the questions that were within the context of the task facing the Stockholm Conference. He had focused attention on some specific matters and saw no need to expand on this now. On the other hand, it was absolutely impossible to regard the issues before the Stockholm Conference in isolation from what happened beyond the Conference hall. From this standpoint, he naturally had to touch on U.S. foreign policy. In his speech in Washington President Reagan had talked about the international situation as a whole and commented on Soviet foreign policy. As is his custom, he had not minced words or spared words in choosing expressions to depict Soviet foreign policy from a very broad perspective. The Secretary had said that a number of statements in Gromyko's speech today -- in fact almost all of them -- were unacceptable to him. He had to tell the Secretary that he regarded this statement as praise for his speech. This was precisely the reaction he had expected. Indeed, he would have been put on his guard if the Secretary had said that the Soviets were quite right in saying what they had.

The Secretary interjected that he was glad to hear that Gromyko was not on his guard.

Gromyko continued by saying that he had pointed to U.S. policy as the principal cause of the increase in tensions in the world today and of the dangerous situation currently existing. He also had to tell the Secretary that the speech he had delivered yesterday, as well as the President's speech, were unacceptable to the Soviet side in many respects, in fact with regard to most of their elements.

Of course, the Secretary's speech and the President's speech had contained some individual words or phrases which, taken separately, had not generated any Soviet doubts. But the entire structure of the two speeches was hostile to the Soviet Union, to the Soviet policy of peace; and that was the only assessment of the two speeches that he could arrive at. He would point out that what was important for the Soviet leadership were not individual phrases or words, not the music, so to speak, but the actual content of those statements.

He would ask the Secretary what sort of a thesis it was to speak of the "artificial division of Europe," Gromyko continued. What kind of a proposition was that? Obviously the Secretary

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and the President did not like the fact that there were some socialist states in Europe and, obviously, the Soviet side did not like the fact that there were some capitalist states on the other side. He would put it even more broadly. The U.S. did not like the fact that there were socialist states in the world and, of course, the Soviets did not like it that there were imperialist states in the world. But, he would ask, what were they then to do? If both sides stood on such a position, there would be a wall between them, a blank wall built of steel or concrete or whatever. In that case it would of course be impossible to find any points of contact in any of the discussions. He would recall that after arriving in Stockholm, just as previously in Madrid and in Belgrade and Helsinki before that, he had believed it important to find the points of contact between various positions. Such contacts were sought consistently by all the 35 participants in the Conference. If points of contact were found, this would indeed be tremendously important for the international situation as a whole.

Gromyko said this was his response to the Secretary's comments regarding the unacceptability of Gromyko's speech. He would point out that the essence of his speech today consisted of trying to seek and find common language between the socialist states and the capitalist states, as well as between the Warsaw Treaty Organization states and the NATO states. This was the main objective the Soviet delegation would strive for at the Stockholm Conference.

The Secretary interrupted at this point to say that before Gromyko proceeded further, he wanted to clarify something that was evidently based on a misunderstanding. Our position was that if any country wanted to have a socialist system, that would be up to the people of that country to decide; we believed it would be up to them. Based on his observation, socialist systems did not work very well, but that was a separate question. It was not the cause of the wall between us. The main problems were those of free movement across the wall, free interchange of people and ideas. Both the President and he had tried to say as clearly as possible that we recognized that our two systems were very different and that we did not care if any country chose either system of its own free will. If indeed a country chose socialism, so be it. However, we did not believe that the difference between our systems should preclude a constructive relationship between us. These were two different things.

Gromyko continued by noting that the Secretary had touched on a question of procedure. He thought we had agreed that certain specific matters could be discussed in private discussions out of the limelight of the media and public. It

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was clearly agreed that on the U.S. side the Secretary would speak for the President, as would whomever he designated, for example Ambassador Hartman. But this was purely a matter of procedure, an organizational matter. It was high time for such private discussions to take place. Today it seemed useful to talk about international politics because the world situation was very acute, relations between our two countries were bad, and the general situation throughout the world was very tense. He had intended today to touch on some of these matters, but had not felt that the Secretary was prepared to discuss them. On the other hand, where else should these most acute and timely matters be discussed if not at meetings such as the present one?

Gromyko noted that in his interjection the Secretary had ended by stating the correct proposition that, if a country wanted to have a socialist system, it should be allowed to live; and if a country wanted its people to live under a capitalist system, it should equally be allowed to live. This was basically a correct conclusion. However, the trouble was that the actual policy of the United States was not in line with that conclusion. Why was it necessary to consider that the evil or the cause of the present tensions was the division of Europe into socialist and capitalist countries? This statement by the Secretary was in conflict with what he had said just now. Somehow he was not making ends meet.

Further, if the Secretary's last comment was correct, that meant people must have the right to live under whatever system they preferred, why then declare a crusade against socialism? This false -- and he would even say illiterate -- slogan concealed efforts to motivate people to fight against the socialist system even in the countries that had chosen that route. The Soviet side categorically objected to anything of the sort. Furthermore, this was a clearly unscientific primitive concept, but it was precisely this that made it impossible to reach agreement on the questions facing the forum in Stockholm today.

The Secretary said that he would try once again to explain his views. Socialism as a system of organizing economic activity had been advocated by many people. In his opinion it did not work well for people, but, as he had said, if people wanted to organize their activities that way, that was their privilege. It was not this that he objected to in Gromyko's comments on what Gromyko had picked out of the Secretary's speech. It was not economic activity, but the lack of freedom of people that had led to the division as represented by the Berlin Wall, not socialism as such, but the restrictions on interaction between the people on both sides. Taking the

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Soviet Union and the United States as two countries existing in this world, we believed, and Gromyko had said that he believed, that it should be possible to find areas where we can reach mutually satisfactory conclusions. Indeed, we would not be engaged in discussions if this were not so. We were not trying to reform the socialist countries and did not think the Soviet side would attempt to reform capitalist countries, but these were different issues.

The Secretary certainly agreed with Gromyko that the present forum right here was the one in which the two sides should discuss the main questions troubling the world today and troubling our two countries. In his speech today and earlier, in Madrid, Gromyko had emphasized that one of these issues concerned arms, and particularly nuclear arms and our mutual desire to reduce their numbers. In this light the Secretary would comment on various areas of arms talks and would express our views.

First, the Secretary would comment on strategic arms reductions. We have held five rounds of talks in that area, and while it was fair to say that some progress had been achieved, we were still far from resolving the issues. Reflecting on that, it seemed to him that what we were seeing was that Soviet strategic forces and our strategic forces, both very impressive and large, were structured very differently from each other. The decisions of the two countries on which road to follow in the development of arms produced a great asymmetry between the forces of each side.

On the one hand, as we looked at the situation, we saw Soviet heavy MIRVed ICBMs with tremendous throw-weight and great destructive potential, which appear to us to be a destabilizing factor; we wanted to see them reduced. Reading their account of the negotiations, it seemed that the Soviets had expressed concern over U.S. heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles. In the Soviet view these were considered a threat. Thus, in the negotiations we have talked of various forces and each side had offered proposals, but he and the President wondered whether we would not get further if we could find a common framework that would encompass these problems.

If we could agree on such a framework, then it would be possible to tell our negotiators to go back to the negotiating table and work out the details. In such a framework neither side would try drastically to restructure each other's forces, but would identify in the negotiations many different items and would establish a relationship between them. Therefore, we thought it would be worthwhile in private discussions to seek a framework that would include heavy ICBMs on the Soviet side and

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heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles on the U.S. side. We thought that through such a framework it might be possible to make the negotiations fruitful.

Thus, on START it would be well to set a date for resumption of the talks, the Secretary said, but that was not his point. He simply wanted to raise with Gromyko the possibility of establishing a framework in private discussions that could lead to progress. If that was of interest to Gromyko we were prepared to explore this matter in greater detail.

With reference to so-called INF, the Secretary said he would not have much to say. As we reviewed the negotiations, we noted that there had been progress in some areas, such as aircraft, but on the main issues there had been no agreement. Now deployments were taking place, and the Soviet side had chosen to leave the negotiations. If Gromyko had any suggestions as to how to proceed in the discussion of this subject, the Secretary would be very pleased to hear them.

On the subject of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, the Secretary continued, we believed that the Soviet side should agree to a date for resumption and return to the talks, to which we give a high priority. We recognize that in the Eastern proposals of February and June, with some subsequent clarifications, the East had taken positive steps on the subject of verification and specification of reductions. We were studying ways to build on these positive steps. On the President's instructions, the Secretary had made the point to Dobrynin that progress on verification would lead to flexibility on our side on the so-called data issue. Thus, in MBFR, we believed it would be well to set a date and resume in Vienna. We were also prepared to move in the form of a private dialogue between us and the Soviet Union; undoubtedly our Ambassador Abramowitz would be an important person in this regard.

On the subject of the CDE meetings here, the Secretary noted that of course discussions were just starting. As he had indicated in his speech, we would be tabling proposals soon. Here he would also make a procedural comment: our delegation chiefs had worked well together during the preparatory talks. We had also taken the point the Soviets had made in diplomatic channels that we should work together in a businesslike fashion for genuine progress, and he agreed. Ambassador Goodby, he thought, was well known to people in that field in the Soviet Union, so Gromyko would recognize that he was a capable and competent person.

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On the subject of chemical weapons, which Gromyko had raised this morning and earlier, it was our view that since they were easily transportable, it would be more appropriate to find a global rather than a regional solution. For this reason our emphasis was on the proposal the U.S. had made in Geneva. As he had said earlier, here we will be able to table a draft treaty in Geneva, emphasizing verification in this connection. Verifiability was a difficult but very important matter.

These were some of the comments the Secretary wanted to make with reference to the various forums in which the topics Gromyko had properly identified as matters of concern in our country and in the world would be discussed.

Gromyko said that first of all, he wanted to reply to one of the questions the Secretary had touched on at the beginning of their talk today. The Secretary had raised the question of human rights, blowing it out of all proportion. He would say that the Secretary was probably well aware of the Soviet appraisal of his entire position on this question. Gromyko was convinced that the U.S. position on this subject was entirely pervaded by falsehood, and that the U.S. was exploiting this matter for propaganda purposes. In essence, the Soviet position was more or less generally shared in the world, and it was that nowhere else were human rights violated so much as in some of the places in the Western hemisphere that were so dear to U.S. hearts, not to mention in the U.S. itself.

Gromyko said he would ask the Secretary not to ask him to be more precise; he could of course be more precise, but he did not believe he should waste time on this matter. If he were to talk on this subject he would only restate his assessment of the human rights situation as it existed in the United States. The Secretary had spoken of the importance of people moving across borders, the importance of reunifying families, etc., but he would simply point out that he did not know of a single instance where these matters had caused wars to break out. The Soviet Union was unshakeable in that position. He would not want to devote any time to the details of these matters.

The Secretary said he was surprised that it was Gromyko who had raised the subject of human rights. He was ready to discuss this topic and there were a few comments he wanted to make:

-- First, the Secretary wanted to express his admiration for the Soviet Union for taking a decision on the Pentecostal families. The decision had been up to the Soviet Union, and it had been made. It showed that progress was possible.

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-- Second, he wanted to say that with reference to individual issues, President Reagan preferred a process of quiet diplomacy in this area.

-- Third, he wanted to mention the cases of Shcharanskiy, Sakharov and Begun, as people of great interest to the United States.

-- Further, he would also mention a subject we had discussed with the Soviets many times: the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and its radical decline in recent years.

-- He also wanted to note that Edgar Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress, had made an arrangement to come to Moscow to discuss issues concerning Jews in the Soviet Union. The Secretary hoped that Gromyko would receive him and work with him.

-- On a more traditional note, the Secretary recalled that at their earlier meeting in New York he, in the usual practice, had given the Soviet side a list of people who claimed U.S. citizenship under our laws, but had been refused permission to leave the Soviet Union. He would like Ambassador Hartman to provide Minister Korniyenko with an updated list of such cases, and also lists of persons seeking to join members of their families in the U.S. and of binational divided spouses. (Ambassador Hartman passed these lists to Korniyenko following the meeting.)

Gromyko then referred to another subject touched on earlier by the Secretary, negotiations on strategic arms. He had to tell the Secretary that the Soviet side was very disappointed by the state of affairs in connection with these negotiations. On the question of strategic arms no headway had been made at all. The proposals made by the U.S. side clearly indicated that there was not the slightest desire on the U.S. side to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet side believed that this was the very reason the U.S. advanced such proposals, i.e. so that there should be no agreement. The reasons why the Soviet side had come to that conclusion had been explained to U.S. representatives, to the Secretary personally, and to his predecessor on numerous occasions.

Today, our respective representatives were not engaged in negotiations, Gromyko continued. He had understood the Secretary to say that he was very interested in progress and could say something additional on that subject. Well, that of course would be up to him; the Secretary could say anything he wished, Gromyko said. But he had to tell the Secretary now

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that once the U.S. had proceeded with deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe, the situation had changed radically. Following the beginning of that deployment it had become completely impossible to consider further discussions of strategic arms other than by linking them to the medium-range weapons.

Once they were deployed in Western Europe, all such weapons -- and all those additional medium-range weapons that the U.S. was planning to deploy in Europe -- were, from the Soviet standpoint, arms of strategic significance. After all, what was the difference from the Soviet standpoint between nuclear weapons that were deployed many thousands of kilometers away from Soviet territory and those that were deployed much closer: one thousand, fifteen hundred or perhaps only several hundred kilometers away? While these were medium-range weapons from the standpoint of their characteristics and parameters, from the standpoint of their capacity to reach Soviet territory they were strategic arms.

Gromyko asked the Secretary to consider the situation that would arise if the Soviets were to agree to continue talks on strategic arms under conditions when there can be no discussion of medium-range weapons. It would be completely unnatural and would deceive people about the true situation. This was one aspect of this issue. Thus, through deployment of medium-range weapons in Western Europe, the United States had obtained an additional strategic potential against the Soviet Union. Should this not be taken into account at the negotiations on strategic arms?

Quite apart from that, Gromyko said, during the negotiations on the SALT II Treaty, the Soviet Union had stated that it was absolutely necessary to discuss the question of nuclear weapons, taking account of U.S. forward-based systems. He would ask the Secretary to follow his step-by-step analysis, for otherwise there could be no meaningful discussion. At that time, during the SALT II negotiations, the U.S. side had said that it would very much complicate the problem of reaching an agreement on a SALT II treaty if FBS were linked to the SALT II negotiations. At that time a sort of compromise had been reached -- as Gromyko had on a number of occasions been obliged to remind some U.S. officials who had not been engaged in those negotiations and perhaps were not aware of this matter. As for himself, he had had the pleasure to be engaged in negotiating these matters, and he recalled that by way of a compromise the two sides had achieved what was recorded in the SALT II Treaty, including agreement on the heavy ICBMs of the Soviet Union. As a result the Soviet Union had agreed not to seek resolution of the question of FBS in the SALT II Treaty. But then, of

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course, the Soviet side had stated that in the follow-on negotiations in the future, after SALT II, this question -- FBS -- would have to be resolved. Meanwhile, SALT II was to be "delinked" from U.S. FBS, as the Americans called it.

Now Gromyko asked, did not the question of U.S. FBS arise in connection with consideration of medium-range systems, and does it not have a direct bearing on all future negotiations on strategic arms? This followed clearly from the SALT II negotiations. Even if there had been no deployment of U.S. medium-range arms, this question would have arisen in any event.

These are the two main watertight arguments in favor of not ignoring the deployment of U.S. medium-range arms in Europe, Gromyko said. This might perhaps be entirely new for some people on the U.S. side, but he would think that even the new people on the U.S. side engaged in these matters must be informed of it. After all, the generation of people who have been actively engaged in those negotiations was still alive and well. Moreover, the records of those negotiations were also very much alive.

Taking into account all those circumstances, and also the fact that the policy of the United States with respect to arms, especially strategic arms, was clearly aimed at achieving a dominating position come what may, the Soviet side had to engage in thorough reconsideration of the new situation which had arisen after U.S. deployment of new weapons in Western Europe. The Soviet side would have to do a lot of thinking before reaching decisions on where to go from here.

If the Secretary were to assume that strategic arms negotiations could continue as if nothing had happened, while negotiations on medium-range nuclear arms were in abeyance, he would be very much mistaken. The Soviet side would have to reflect on all of these matters before deciding on how to proceed. With respect to the Geneva negotiations on medium-range arms, the Soviet position was crystal clear. He was convinced that to continue those talks, given the present policy of the United States, would mean to participate in U.S. attempts to deceive people. He believed that Washington's present position was not intended to lead to agreement with the Soviet Union.

Thus, all the statements the Soviet side had made on this subject remained fully in force, Gromyko went on. His discussions of these matters with the Secretary in no way constituted continuation of the Geneva negotiations, and should

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in no way be seen as steps toward continuation of those negotiations or toward new negotiations. He repeated that it was not to be construed as continuing the old talks or starting new ones. In order for negotiations to resume, the U.S. would have to change its positions and, as he had already said, express willingness to return to the situation existing before deployment of new U.S. missiles in Western Europe had begun. Under those conditions the talks could be resumed, but otherwise the Soviet side would simply be helping the U.S. to hold up a screen concealing the true state of affairs.

Gromyko said he knew that from time to time the U.S. had made statements to the effect that things in Geneva had been proceeding well. But in fact the U.S. side had been engaged in erecting an impenetrable wall in the path of any progress at the talks. If, upon returning to Washington, the Secretary were to report to the President and others that the Soviet position was such as Gromyko had just stated it and as it had been stated by Yuri Andropov and in other official statements of the Soviet side, he would be correct. However, should the Secretary report differently, Gromyko would have to correct any misstatement, and possibly in public.

Gromyko said that the Soviet Union would like to have all those problems resolved, but in that case the United States would have to abandon its present policy, which was aimed at securing a dominating position for itself, and be guided in its conduct of relations with the Soviet Union by the principles of equality and equal security. As for the Soviet side, it had no desire to achieve a dominating position, and this was clear from the entire policy conducted by the Soviet Union and from its moral stand. The Soviet Union wants to be on an equal footing with the United States. If this will be what the Secretary reports in Washington, he will be correct.

If such a policy were adopted, Gromyko said, it would not be difficult to find common language in Geneva, as well as outside Geneva, and at this meeting in Stockholm. He alleged that what the Soviet side had witnessed was an endless series of insulting statements about the Soviet Union, building an additional solid fence preventing good relations. However, if one were to reflect on matters objectively, he would say that he did not believe that the United States was desirous of having a collision with the Soviet Union. There were surely some rather primitive people in the U.S. who considered the possibility of such a collision, but those were people who could not see beyond the four walls of their rooms. He would note, however, that one met with such talk in the U.S. Sometimes there was talk of nuclear war, of a clash with the

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Soviet Union, as if this were some sort of picnic. This surely could not produce any positive results.

The Secretary interjected that his mother had told him when learning to drive to avoid collisions with Mack trucks. As far as he was concerned, in the field of international diplomacy, the Soviet Union was a Mack truck.

Gromyko said he now wanted to say a few words about chemical weapons. As he understood it, the Secretary was emphasizing the importance of that question and that was good. The Soviet side too believed this matter to be important. It was not a new issue: for a number of years it had been discussed in various forums, including such a broad forum as the United Nations. Negotiations had also been conducted between our two countries on chemical weapons. But neither the wider nor the narrower negotiation had led to any progress in resolving this matter.

Speaking frankly, Gromyko said, he would tell the Secretary how the Soviet side viewed the frequent attacks against the Soviet Union now current in the United States, as if the Soviet Union had been using chemical weapons somewhere in Asia or elsewhere. As he saw it, the U.S. was simply trying to divert public attention away from this entire issue and from the need to resolve it and achieve a ban on chemical weapons. He certainly did not believe that U.S. officials were so ignorant as not to know that the Soviet Union has not been doing anything of the kind. Thus, if the Secretary were interested in knowing the Soviet position, Gromyko could state to him officially that the Soviet Union wanted to see this problem resolved in an international accord on chemical weapons. The Soviet side was prepared to discuss such a ban in a broad forum or in bilateral negotiations with the U.S. Either way, the Soviet Union was prepared to go ahead, and it was his belief that agreement on this problem would generate a more favorable atmosphere for resolution of other matters as well.

He would suggest that they both see whether the U.N. Disarmament Committee in Geneva had broad enough shoulders to bear up under an attempt to resolve this matter. Personally, it was his hope that it will be able to bear up, and he would continue to issue appropriate instructions to the Soviet Delegation in Geneva. The Soviet Union wanted to reach such an agreement and called upon the United States to join it in an effort to reach it. Such an agreement would really cast a ray of light in the present gloomy international atmosphere and would have beneficial effects in other areas, too. Furthermore, it would also be beneficial to our own bilateral relations.

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Gromyko said that this was basically what he wanted to convey to the Secretary with reference to the Secretary's statements. He would conclude his remarks by expressing his wish that the Stockholm Conference contribute to an improvement of the international atmosphere. If so, it would also help with a number of problems, particularly the adoption of confidence-building measures. The Soviet Union was prepared to act constructively, provided the United States was similarly disposed. The Soviet Union was not at all opposed to some measures, but it would favor adopting such measures as were fully justified by the facts. He would point out quite frankly that with reference to any issue requiring solution one could formulate proposals in such a way as to be clearly unacceptable. On the other hand, they could also be formulated in a way to be acceptable to all. He repeated that the Soviet Union was not opposed to confidence-building measures with reference to maneuvers and other matters at the Stockholm Conference. All this can come about if no one sets himself the goal of undercutting the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries in order to secure for himself the commanding heights, so to speak. Should such a position be taken, there would be no positive outcome at the Stockholm Conference. There would not be the result he believed was desired by the majority of the countries here. He would urge the Secretary to reflect on that matter in terms of perhaps finding common language for our two sides.

Referring to the Vienna negotiation mentioned by the Secretary, Gromyko said that it should not be thought that the process of the Vienna negotiations had been interrupted. That forum was still in being. The two sides had declared a recess and had simply not yet agreed on a resumption date, but the process itself was still alive. He thought that if it were acceptable to the U.S. side, some date in mid-March could be agreed upon for resumption, perhaps the 16th of March or thereabouts. He would only want to express one reservation. If these negotiations were only used once again to throw dust into people's eyes, then the Soviet side might be forced to take steps somewhat similar to those it had been compelled to take with respect to the negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. He would hope that the Vienna negotiations would not enter upon such a path. It was sad, very sad, that there was no progress at those negotiations, and he believed that perhaps the reductions discussed in Vienna also did not fit in with the plans of the Western participants. He said, "Well, we will see."

In addition, he wanted to tell the Secretary that should the Secretary present matters on MBFR or the other negotiations to public media in such a way as to imply that this, in fact, meant that the Soviet Union was abandoning the position it had

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stated with respect to nuclear arms, that would distort the Soviet position, and in that case, he would be forced to state publicly that these kinds of generalizations were far from reality, and he would be forced to put things in their proper place. He therefore hoped that this would not be necessary.

The Secretary said he had a few comments on the points made by Gromyko. First of all, he noted Gromyko's statement that the Soviet Union sought equality with the United States and did not wish to have a collision with the U.S. He could state that the avoidance of such a collision and equality with the Soviet Union were also our aims. Thus he could agree with both formulations.

Secondly, turning to the talks on nuclear missiles which have now stopped, the Secretary said he had understood Gromyko to say that deployment of our medium-range missiles in Europe was regarded by the Soviet side as a strategic matter even though these missiles were medium in range, and that therefore they had a bearing on the strategic arms talks. It was his impression that Gromyko thus appeared to be in the process of reflecting on how such talks could be structured if they began again. He would say that we would consider any suggestion Gromyko might make regarding these forums.

But the forums would not change the fact that there are problems involved, the Secretary said. He felt he had to make the point that we could not consider talks where U.S. medium-range missiles were involved, but Soviet medium-range missiles were not. This was because SS-20s were deployed and could strike our allies. If Soviet missiles should hit them they would be hitting us, because we were bound together with our allies. He was not asking Gromyko to agree to this formulation, but was only telling him how we saw things. Therefore, if Gromyko had a suggestion concerning renewed or new negotiations, we would listen with interest, but they would have to include negotiations on SS-20s if Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles were included.

Next, the Secretary noted that Gromyko had taken up the subject of chemical weapons and had expressed readiness to try to reach agreement. The Secretary welcomed that statement. For its part, the U.S. was ready to work hard on this subject.

He also noted Gromyko's comments regarding the old problem of compliance. In the past Gromyko had raised this matter as an important one. We believed it of crucial importance to arms control and other agreements. In this connection, some questions had arisen, and he informed Gromyko that the President, as directed by Congress, was in the process of

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submitting a report to Congress. He was sure that Gromyko had been informed of the extensive briefing we had given the Soviet Embassy in Washington on the contents of that report, and he would therefore not repeat the details. But he could tell Gromyko that the President's report was classified. Compliance was an important matter, and questions needed to be resolved through careful exploration.

Returning to the question of chemical weapons, the Secretary welcomed Gromyko's positive statement here. As he had said, we would be ready to table a draft treaty soon. This was an important issue; like the Soviet side, we wanted to see progress. He might add that in the minds of many people the matter of biological weapons should be resolved as well, but that was a separate subject.

Regarding Gromyko's statement about the CDE in Stockholm, he agreed that it was important to structure any idea in such a way that it would be useful to Warsaw Pact as well as NATO countries. If we wanted to reach agreement it would be well for the heads of our respective delegations, who are both professionals in this field, to maintain liaison and avoid problems that might arise as a result of failure to exchange views. We were prepared to do that.

With reference to Gromyko's comments about MBFR, the Secretary welcomed his idea of reconvening the negotiations in March. The 16th seemed to be an acceptable date for us, and he would suggest that this be put into diplomatic channels. The date appeared to be O.K. He believed that we could arrive at agreement in Vienna. The U.S. had no wish to put dust in anyone's eyes on this subject or any other.

In reply, Gromyko referred to the question of so-called violations of agreements and obligations. He noted that the Secretary had not been able to resist the temptation of bringing up something in that area. Gromyko said that he was not familiar with the details of the President's report to which the Secretary had referred, but when he learned the details he would respond in kind. The Soviet side can show how the U.S. treats its obligations, and point to some things about its conduct.

The Secretary said as a point of information that Mr. Burt had given a briefing to Mr. Sokolov of the Soviet Embassy in Washington and had informed him of the details of the report in question. Gromyko noted that this had been done in general terms and repeated that, taking into account all the circumstances, the Soviets would respond in kind.

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Gromyko asked the Secretary if he had anything to say on our bilateral relations. He noted that they have been in a state of disarray for some time. These matters had been discussed on many occasions with representatives of the present U.S. Administration, with the Secretary personally as well as with his predecessor and other U.S. political leaders. As he had said in his speech today, the U.S. Administration had done a great deal with "an easy hand" to destroy what had been built up in the 1970s. In a word, it had proved the truth of the thesis that it is much easier to destroy than to build. The United States has been engaged in destroying, with a big stick as it were, what had been built up by others. He did not know what the U.S. had in mind now, whether the Administration still adhered to the same views it had expressed immediately after coming into office. If the Secretary had something new he could tell Gromyko that might help to improve our relations, he would be interested to hear it.

The Secretary replied that he did not believe that what he had to say was new, but he would comment briefly on our bilateral relations. He knew that the Hotline talks had been going forward and promised to produce good results. On non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, he knew that another round of discussions is scheduled and this was an area where our interests were parallel, so that was worthwhile. On depiction of our Pacific maritime boundary, we were glad to have received a positive response from the Soviet side. Further, we continue to believe that trade can go forward as long as it is mutually beneficial, conducted on commercially sound terms, and not militarily related. Agribusiness is a good example of mutually beneficial, non-strategic trade. The Secretary also wanted to make a comment about a vast stretch of the Pacific where the Korean airliner had been lost. He understood that various questions were under discussion within ICAO, such matters as fixed navigation aids, radio beacons, and communications links between responsible civil aviation officials. These can help avoid a situation where an airliner is unable to determine its position from outside sources. This could be worked out constructively, if the Soviet side agreed.

On opening consulates in Kiev and New York and beginning negotiations on a new cultural agreement, the Secretary said the agreement in principle made last summer to go forward still stands. However, the timing needed to be right. It was difficult to move forward in the atmosphere of recent months.

The Secretary noted that there were many other issues of great importance. They were not necessarily bilateral issues, but they were nevertheless of interest to both of our countries. Gromyko had mentioned Lebanon in his speech. This

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was a matter of major interest to both of us, and it was of tremendous significance to other Middle East issues. The Secretary was interested in hearing Soviet views and would be glad to present ours. He would say that there were also some interesting developments in southern Africa. He had long thought this was an area where our two countries should both be interested in achieving constructive progress. We have people directly involved in these matters on our side, such as Assistant Secretary Crocker, who are available to engage in discussion on this subject.

There was a wide range of regional issues of very great importance. Expressing his personal opinion, the Secretary thought that if one talked about tensions in the world today, we should realize that the place generating the worst tensions was clearly the Middle East -- not just Lebanon and the Palestinian issues, but also the war between Iran and Iraq, as well as developments inside Iran itself, which he found very disturbing. Although these are not bilateral issues, they were issues of mutual concern which might be discussed.

Gromyko said that to a certain extent the Secretary had helped him. He had intended to touch upon some purely bilateral issues and then go on to regional matters. Now he would change the order so as to discuss the regional matters first and then proceed to bilateral issues. After all, the two categories touched one another.

Gromyko said he could agree with the Secretary that the Middle East area was an area that almost daily generated very acute problems. He was convinced that these acute problems are generated as a result of the policy pursued by the U.S. and Israel which, of course, is constantly buttressed by the U.S. He was certain that if the U.S. wanted to act in a manner to prevent many of these problems from arising, with its influence upon Israel, it could prevail on Israel to change its aggressive policy. After all, Israel occupied Arab lands, the Golan Heights, and it retained them to this day as if it were master of these territories. In fact, what Israel did in wresting these territories from their rightful owners were aggressive and bandit-like acts. Since the U.S. invariably supported Israel, it had to share responsibility for this situation. Very often, particularly in Washington, it was frequently said, "What about Syria, Syria, Syria?" Earlier it was asked, "What about the Palestinians, Palestinians, Palestinians?" One or the other or both were blamed for the tensions in that area. In actual fact, Syria is a victim of aggression by Israel. Israel tore off a slice of Syrian territory and is now taking completely illegal steps to formalize this act of aggression. The Palestinians remain

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without a homeland of their own; that is, they had a homeland in the past, but not today. This is the main reason for the dangerous tensions in the Middle East. In the past the U.S. supported Israel politically for many years in discussions in the United Nations, in our bilateral discussions and in other forums. Now direct U.S. military support for Israel was growing.

Also, today the U.S. has intruded into the Middle East with its own military forces, setting up military bases wherever it considers this possible. U.S. troops are actually in Lebanon. The question arises: on what grounds? The Secretary might answer that Gemayel had requested U.S. military forces to come in, but surely it was a fact that Gemayel had done so virtually with a gun pointed at his head. Can that agreement be taken seriously? Obviously not. U.S. forces are present in the Middle East and particularly in Lebanon as occupation troops, as interventionists. The Soviet Union believes that U.S. troops should not be in the Middle East as a whole.

The U.S. would be acting rationally if it were to withdraw its troops from that area. It was a real shame that the U.S. was not sparing the blood of its soldiers, its young men there. They should be taken out of there, removing this additional cause of tensions in the Middle East -- a step which would promote an easing of the situation. Of course, British, Italian and French forces must also leave. One hears, of course, such arguments as, "What will then happen to the inhabitants of Lebanon? After all, they will slaughter each other."

In this connection, Gromyko said he wished to recall a bit of history, going back to the years 1917 and 1918 when the socialist revolution had taken place in Russia. A great many foreign people, including U.S. troops commanded by General Greyson, came to Russia. This is well described in a book entitled "American Adventure in Siberia" which, he thought, Ambassador Hartman might have read. At that time it was also said that, after all, the Russians were fighting each other there, and it was necessary to intervene and help one side to win. First, he would note that nothing came of this intervention in Russia. Secondly, he asked, what sort of reasoning is that? Is it reasonable to believe that foreigners must support one side against the other in a civil war? After all, you had your own Civil War too. (At this point the Secretary interjected that, on this point, at least, Gromyko was stating a fact.) You know, if such actions were to be legalized, one would have to find a large furnace and immediately burn all the documents of international law, all treaties and agreements.

Thus, it is not what will happen in Lebanon when foreign forces are withdrawn that one should worry about. If you were to ask about Syria, it has repeatedly stated that if Israel and the other occupants withdraw, it will withdraw its forces as well. The Soviet Union has good relations with Syria, Gromyko said, and he was in a position to reaffirm once again that the Syrians will pull out their forces if other foreign forces are withdrawn.

Thus, retaining U.S. forces in Lebanon is not going to improve the reputation of the U.S., which has already been undermined. The Soviet Union's position with respect to Israel is crystal clear. The Soviet Union has never agreed with extremist demands from extremist groups to throw Israel into the sea. He would remind the Secretary that, jointly with the U.S., the Soviet Union had stood at the cradle of the state of Israel. At that time he was leading the Soviet delegation in the UN and had raised his hand in voting for the establishment of an independent state of Israel. At that time the decision had been taken to set up both a Jewish and an Arab state in Palestine. The Soviet Union believed that Israel was entitled to independent existence, but this did not mean that it was entitled to commit aggression.

Thus, it was necessary for the U.S. to withdraw its troops from the Middle East in general, and from Lebanon in particular. It was necessary for Israel to withdraw as well. These troops were the main reason for tensions in the Middle East, along with other foreign troops. No matter what one might call them -- an international or multinational or peacekeeping force -- that did not change anything at all.

Gromyko recalled that in the past the U.S. had frequently asked the Soviet Union to bring its influence to bear upon Syria to act in a more restrained manner. He had to point out that the Soviet Union had done so on quite a few occasions, and that the Syrians had accepted such approaches with understanding. It was therefore not the Syrians who were now at fault in the situation in Lebanon, but the aggression that had been committed there. This was the Soviet assessment of the situation in Lebanon and in the Middle East.

Of course, it is hardly possible to resolve all the troubles there in one fell swoop. But just the same, if the U.S. and other countries were to withdraw their troops, the situation would be defused, and once all factions felt that they did not enjoy foreign support, the Lebanese themselves would come together and agree. Ultimately this would mean less bloodshed and less terrorism. This was what the Soviet Union advocated.

Gromyko noted that for some reason in recent years there were no contacts with Washington concerning the Middle East. He would not want to appear as a supplicant with outstretched hand, but he was sure that without withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, one could not promote a general settlement in the Middle East. The Soviet Union was not interested in seeing a conflagration in that area, and he did not believe that the U.S. was interested in seeing such a conflagration either.

The Secretary thought Gromyko would not be surprised to learn that he could not agree with many aspects of his analysis. However, there were some things in Gromyko's statement with which he did agree. Perhaps that could lead to some constructive developments.

First, the Secretary noted, Gromyko had said that the Soviet Union did not wish to see an explosion in the Middle East. Neither do we. Second, he agreed that if all foreign forces were out of Lebanon there would be a better chance for the Lebanese to be able to construct their country. We agreed on this as an objective. He wanted to assure Gromyko that the U.S. had no wish to keep forces in that country. The question was how to bring about the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and that was a hard question. We knew that good first steps had almost been achieved in the so-called Security Plan. We believe it could bring a better reconciliation between the various forces there. But once again, something broke down between Jumblatt and Gemayel.

Nevertheless, if such steps were taken, they could be precursors of a further withdrawal of Israeli forces. If discussions emerged in which Syria made a statement about its intent to withdraw, we could see a whole process taking shape fairly promptly. We were working toward law and order there as foreign forces left the area. We would like to see programs of that kind succeed.

In thinking about this problem, it was also necessary to consider the existence of Palestinian camps in various parts of Lebanon. This is because many Lebanese do not like the Palestinians. We thought that U.N. forces could play a constructive role in providing security in those camps. Obviously this has to be a Lebanese effort as well, and it would be good if this kind of process could come about. But it too often breaks down. We do believe that a positive move from Syria could accomplish a great deal. We had many discussions with Israel; for example, they were successful in obtaining a relief of the siege of Deyr-al-Qamr. At any rate, we are working on this line of action, and it could be a way toward withdrawal of all foreign forces, including our own in Lebanon and Soviet troops in Syria, if the Soviets supported it.

Gromyko said the Soviet side believed that if the U.S. and its pals in the area withdrew their forces from Lebanon, it would compel the Lebanese themselves to find solutions faster. He hoped the Secretary would agree that it now appeared as though the U.S. was simply acting out of fear of some negative consequences if it should withdraw its troops. He also hoped the Secretary would agree that this does not sound very convincing. He believed that the U.S. had very often provided all-out support to Israel, even in those cases where the U.S. could have avoided departing from a position of principle. And yet, each time that Israel merely expresses a desire for the U.S. to provide its shoulder for support, the U.S. does so. Whether or not the U.S. now has a treaty of strategic alliance with Israel, it is in fact constantly providing support. He doubted that people in the Middle East have such a weak memory as to forget these facts quickly. He had nothing further to add on this regional problem.

Gromyko said he wanted to comment briefly on regional problems in the Caribbean and Latin America. Of course, for a long time the Soviets had been observing what was happening in that Caribbean region. This was especially true for the last few months. The Secretary would understand why he spoke of the last few months, because it is precisely in that period that the situation became especially aggravated and tensions increased. He believed this was entirely the fault of U.S. policy. The U.S. did not like the internal systems of Cuba or Nicaragua. He would point out that he did not know very much about Nicaragua, except that it was a small nation and that it had not wished to live under the hated dictatorship of Somoza, which the people of Nicaragua had overthrown. They wanted to live as they wished, and they were entitled to do so, as any other people. Washington claimed that their internal system was a threat to the vital interests of the U.S. How could that be possible?

To provide even a shadow of credibility to this Washington position, it was said that Nicaragua probably acted at the direction of the Soviet Union and with the help of the Soviet Union. He would only point out that the Soviets did not know these people. They saw them for the first time during an official visit to the Soviet Union. Gromyko had met their foreign minister twice when he had come to Moscow. He would note that he had met more often with the Secretary than with the Nicaraguans. The situation with respect to Cuba was somewhat similar, although the Cuban socialist state had been in existence much longer. But now the U.S. was ceaselessly arranging all sorts of attacks against both Nicaragua and Cuba. Gromyko emphasized Nicaragua because of allegations in Washington to the effect that the Nicaraguans posed a threat to

the vital interests of the U.S. Surely, the Secretary realized full well that no one would believe this to be at all possible. The U.S. had even gone so far as to state officially in Washington that unless Nicaragua changed its internal system to please Washington, the U.S. might take some military action there. Naturally, this was something that had aroused indignation throughout the world.

Gromyko pointed out that he had not mentioned Grenada. The Secretary probably knew how this was perceived throughout the world and in the Soviet Union. This was simply something that had aroused amazement. Here was a good example of the "transparency" about which so much had been said here in Stockholm. Just 24 hours before the U.S. invasion, Washington had assured the world that it had no plans for an invasion of Grenada. "There's transparency for you," Gromyko exclaimed. The Secretary probably did not expect anything but condemnation from the Soviet Union as a result of U.S. acts in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada. This area was very remote from the Soviet Union. But he was mentioning it and talking about it because it concerned a matter of principle.

South Africa was also remote from the Soviet Union. Had the U.S. ever tried to do anything to put an end to South Africa's aggression toward Angola? The answer was that it had done nothing at all. If for some reason the Soviet Union's position was not well known to the Secretary, Gromyko was sure that it should be quite clear now. The Soviet Union believed that every nation, large and small, had the right to its own independent development. Washington sometimes pronounced the same principle -- the right of any people to its own independent development. But all these pronouncements were forgotten as soon as they conflicted with U.S. actions.

Gromyko said that he had spoken at great length on some of these matters, and had done so to be sure that the Secretary was completely aware of Soviet policy in this regard. The Soviet Union was resolutely against any country dictating to any other country the internal order that should exist there. In response, the Secretary might say, "What about Soviet forces in Afghanistan?" It was true that Soviet forces were still there, but did the Secretary know that the previous leadership of Afghanistan as well as the present one had asked the Soviet Union eleven times for help in repelling the daily intervention against Afghanistan from Iran and from Pakistan? He might ask "Has the Nicaraguan government ever appealed to the U.S. for help?" The answer, of course, was -- never. But the Afghan Government had appealed for help against the intervention, and the Soviet Union had provided it in accordance with the U.N. charter. He would now state officially to the Secretary that

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the Soviet Union wanted to see Afghanistan as an independent and non-aligned state which would maintain good relations with the U.S., with the Soviet Union and all other countries of the world. And yet, at the U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. was trying by hook or by crook to pass a resolution aimed at stepping on Soviet toes, so to speak. He would add that the U.S. keeps on feeding the intervention against Afghanistan from Pakistan and from that good friend of the U.S., Iran, and all this for the only reason that the internal regime in Afghanistan is not to the liking of the U.S. The U.S. is providing arms to the interventionists, and the Soviet Union knows this very well because of serial numbers and the like on arms that wind up in Soviet hands.

Further, just as in the case of the Caribbean region, the U.S. is in effect protecting the racist regime in South Africa, which has committed many aggressive acts against other African countries. If the Soviet Union and the U.S. were to act justly in that area, they would jointly put South Africa in its place. The Soviet Union wants nothing in Angola, but it is certainly opposed to South African aggression against Angola. South Africa has been throwing U.N. resolution after U.N. resolution into the wastebasket -- resolutions for which both our countries have voted regarding independence for Namibia. He was certain that the U.S. too should be opposed to South African actions, as was the Soviet Union. He thought that not only the Soviet Union, but the U.S. too would be interested in preventing a spread of the racist contagion beyond the borders of South Africa. By the way, the situation there too was such that some day the majority of the people of South Africa will have their say -- their time will surely come.

Gromyko repeated again that he had spoken at great length, but noted that these were the kinds of questions that poisoned relations between our two countries. He had wanted to set them forth in detail. After all, he and the Secretary had sat down at this table in order to make clear to each other one another's policies with respect to each issue discussed. He felt he had done that, and had pointed out that the Soviet Union wanted nothing in Nicaragua, nothing in Angola, and nothing in Afghanistan except that the people of these countries themselves have the possibility to decide their own affairs. The Soviet Union wanted to see Namibia independent and Afghanistan independent and non-aligned. He believed that the U.S. too should be interested in these same objectives.

The Secretary said that he did not want to go through the details in each of these areas, but he did have a few comments.

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First, on Central America, one of the key problems was interference by the Nicaraguans in the internal affairs of other countries by providing arms to insurgents; they often came through Cuba, often originating from the Soviet Union and sometimes from others. There were many other problems in that area. It was a poor area, and people there needed help. It was for this reason that President Reagan had persuaded Gromyko's friend, Henry Kissinger, to investigate the situation there. Kissinger had produced a good report, and the Secretary would be glad to give a copy to Gromyko. He would arrange to have a copy given to Gromyko, and it would be well worth reading.

A great deal had been written about Grenada, and a White Paper had been issued which was at variance with much of what Gromyko had to say. The Soviet Embassy had received a copy and he would suggest that Gromyko's people look it over.

On South Africa, the Secretary said, we hold no brief for the racist policies of South Africa, and we have criticized them. It was an area that suffers from conflict and tension. It was an area also a long way from our home, but we are trying to help. The Secretary also believed that this was an area where we could jointly do something useful. As he had already pointed out, there were some recent events in the area that were interesting, and he thought that consultations between us might have a direct positive influence there. As for Afghanistan, we too would welcome a free, independent and non-aligned country; we thus share this objective with the Soviet Union. The United Nations has initiated negotiations; we wish them well because it is clear that we cannot have a free, independent and non-aligned Afghanistan unless Soviet forces are withdrawn from the country.

Gromyko interjected that the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces just as soon as intervention in Afghanistan ceases. The Secretary said that there was a hopeful process of negotiations underway.

Our combat forces had already been withdrawn from Grenada and he was sure we would withdraw our forces from Lebanon, the Secretary said, before the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan. In Grenada all that is left is a small support contingent. These three areas represent different cases, and they provide examples of situations where we could hope that if we had better relations with the Soviet Union, with more discussions between us, we could get beyond accusing each other and could carefully explore why things take place, perhaps achieving constructive results.

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At this late hour, he wanted to say to Gromyko that more constructive relations were what we wanted. He believed that more frequent private discussions would help this process along. As he had said earlier, we would like to engage in such discussions. He felt that he had to look at Gromyko not only as the Foreign Minister of a great power but also as a human being. As Foreign Minister, Gromyko had without a doubt more diplomatic experience than any other person in the world. He had seen a great many and a great variety of achievements. He would now ask Gromyko to look at the situation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, to think about the possibility of establishing more constructive relations between us and to think that he and the Secretary (with guidance from the President), might see a better day. We are ready to work on that.

Gromyko said that if he understood the Secretary correctly, he had spoken in favor of more frequent exchanges of views between the two of them; he shared this wish. He noted that some U.S. officials (here he was not blaming the Secretary personally) believed it to be to their credit that they exchanged views with whomever one wished, but not with the Soviet Union. That was surely a primitive approach. Thus, this was a constructive wish, if indeed it reflected the Secretary's true intentions. He was in favor of such exchanges.

Gromyko also noted the Secretary's enumeration of several specific bilateral matters and took satisfaction in the fact that these were proceeding, albeit slowly. With respect to depiction of our Pacific maritime boundary, the Soviet Union had advanced a specific proposal which, in fact, was an alloy of the proposals of each country. He would urge the Secretary to devote some attention to this matter.

With respect to certain aviation problems the Secretary had mentioned, he would note that both countries had representatives in ICAO, and he would suggest letting them work out some positions that might be acceptable to both our countries and to others. He believed this should be possible so long as no attempt is made to impose a solution on any of the sides.

As for the opening of consulates and cultural relations, he believed that some progress could be made and would like to know the Secretary's specific considerations. Whenever he felt it would be possible to set them out for the Soviet side, they could be examined carefully. As for opening consulates, he would ask how many years this matter had already dragged on? Here were two major powers that were unable to resolve such a pigmy question. Now that pigmy begins to look like a huge monster in the eyes of some people. As for cultural relations,

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it would be good to arrange them to the mutual satisfaction of both sides.

Gromyko then noted that some difficulties had arisen in connection with some other agreements between our two countries in terms of understanding what state they were in. Some of them were evidently in a state of hibernation. Some people evidently thought that these agreements should die; for his part, he believed that they should be brought back to life. He would ask the Secretary to take a look at them, and if something did not suit him, to let the Soviet side know.

Gromyko noted that they had discussed a number of issues today, and felt that such a discussion had indeed been necessary. It would be good if the Secretary were to take into account the observations he had expressed today. This could help to elicit points of contact between the sides.

As for the Stockholm Conference, Gromyko thought that he probably could not promise that some arguments would not arise at the Conference between our two countries; they would. But he would be very much in favor of maintaining consultations in order to have such arguments eventually result in joint positions. Soviet representatives at the Conference will be prepared to consult with U.S. representatives and not only regard each other with suspicion. If the Secretary would instruct his delegation to take a confrontational attitude only, obviously this would produce no results. Gromyko was in favor of searching for all possibilities of achieving results and his delegation would be instructed accordingly.

The Secretary said that those would be the instructions he gave to our delegation as well.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 24, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK 

SUBJECT:

Press Talkers on Shultz-Gromyko Meeting

State has supplied the talking points at Tab I for use with the press in briefing on the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Stockholm. They seem appropriate.

DL
Lenczowski and *MB* Brazil concur.

Attachment:

Tab I Memo from State with talking points for the press

cc. Bob Sims
Mark Brazil

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MOZ-002 #14
BY CIS NARA, DATE 11/13/03



8402036 thru 8402043
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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January 23, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane, The White House ----- 8402036
Mr. William B. Staples, ACDA ----- 8402037
Mr. Raymond Lett, Department of Agriculture ---- 8402038
Mrs. Helen Robbins, Department of Commerce ----- 8402039
Col. John Stanford, Department of Defense ----- 8402040
Cdr. Timothy R. Hartung, Joint Chiefs of Staff - 8402041
Mr. Christopher Hicks, Treasury Department ----- 8402042
Ms. Teresa Collins, U.S. Information Agency ---- 8402043

SUBJECT: Press Themes on Shultz-Gromyko
Meeting and US-Soviet Relations

Attached is a set of press themes for use by Administration officials in commenting on Secretary Shultz's January 18 meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and the current state of US-Soviet relations.

Administration officials should adhere closely to these themes. Casual public speculation at this time about US-Soviet relations could seriously undercut our foreign policy goals.

Attachment: As Stated

Corvey

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NLS M02-002 #75
BY LOI NARA, DATE 11/26/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~DECL: OADR~~

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Themes on Shultz-Gromyko Meeting and US-Soviet Relations

-- Secretary Shultz's five-hour meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko provided the opportunity for a full review of the current US-Soviet bilateral relationship. There were no breakthroughs on substantive issues, but the tone was business-like and non-polemical.

-- The Secretary reiterated the President's commitment to a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at finding solutions to the many real problems in the US-Soviet relationship. He made clear our objections to the misrepresentation of American policy contained in Gromyko's CDE speech, and expressed the view that, despite our differences, we should get down to the business of building a more stable and constructive relationship.

-- The Secretary reviewed U.S. arms control positions. He reiterated the President's commitment to arms control and our desire to resume negotiations. Gromyko said that INF deployments made it impossible to move ahead on those talks. He indicated, however, that the MBFR talks could resume.

-- Discussion of bilateral issues as well as regional issues was substantive and extensive. The two ministers discussed such issues as the recent talks on upgrading the Hotline and upcoming talks on nuclear non-proliferation.

-- There was a serious exchange of views on the Middle East, southern Africa, Afghanistan and the Caribbean.

-- There was also a discussion of human rights, in which the Secretary gave U.S. views on specific problems as well as the overall Soviet human rights performance.

-- Both sides agreed the meeting was useful and that there should be more such serious exchanges. No new dates or levels of discussions were specified.

-- At this time any further public discussion of the meeting or speculation about future developments in US-Soviet relations would be counterproductive.

-- As President Reagan stressed in his January 16 speech, the United States seeks a more productive working relationship with the Soviet Union. Respecting the confidentiality of our diplomatic exchanges is vital if we are to move forward on arms control and resolution of outstanding international and bilateral problems.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

January 27, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: "Message" from Zagladin

Dr. Lawrence Horowitz, Administrative Assistant to Senator Kennedy, briefed John Poindexter and me on his trip to Moscow last week, and specifically on a "message" which Zagladin asked him to convey to the White House during a conversation on January 19. A memorandum of the conversation with Horowitz is attached at TAB I.

The specific message was that the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations is serious, but there is one area left where a start could be made to get back on a negotiating track. That is, working jointly on a CW treaty, and if we can do this successfully, that could put us back on "the right road."

Apart from the message, Zagladin made other comments of interest. During a tirade against Reagan Administration policy, he observed that great powers must allow each other to save face, and cited as a hypothetical example that if oil supplies through the Persian Gulf were cut off, the Soviets would understand that the U.S. would have to act to restore the flow.

COMMENT: Zagladin, the Deputy Head of the Central Committee International Committee, can be presumed to be an authoritative interlocutor who reflects senior Party views and, probably, Andropov's. Given the very intrusive character that any effective verification of a CW treaty would require, it is hard to understand his reasoning that this is the place to start in putting us back on a negotiating track. I believe, however, that this message deserves an answer and a frank, informal discussion of the pros and cons of various possible alternatives. This is probably precisely what Zagladin was aiming at.

Attachment: Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~

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BY CS, NARA, DATE 4/13/03

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NLS M02-002 #17

SYSTEM II
90108

BY CIS NARA, DATE 11/13/03

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Horowitz Conversations in Moscow

DATE & PLACE: January 26, 1984; Admiral Poindexter's Office

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Lawrence Horowitz, Administrative Assistant to
Senator Edward Kennedy
Admiral Poindexter
Jack Matlock

Horowitz said that he had come over to deliver a message from Zagladin, with whom he had a long conversation in Moscow on Thursday, January 19--that is, after the President's speech on U.S.-Soviet relations and the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Stockholm (although it was not certain that Zagladin had yet received a report of the meeting).

Horowitz said that his meeting with Zagladin began with Zagladin delivering a lengthy and vitriolic polemic against U.S. policy and the President personally. He even compared the present situation to the thirties and the President to Hitler, in the sense that he seemed to be preparing for war. He said the Soviets could not figure out what our aims were. He asked rhetorically if we were trying to frighten them, and observed that our policies had forced Soviet decisions on new weapons which had already been taken and the results of which would be apparent in two to three years. He observed that the Soviets will sacrifice whatever is necessary not to fall behind the U.S.

Zagladin then asked, again rhetorically, if the U.S. was trying to isolate them in the world, and answered that this would not work either. Then he observed that great powers have to allow each other to save face in a difficult situation, and noted, for example, that if oil supplies from the Persian Gulf were cut off, the Soviets would understand if the U.S. considered it necessary to take action to restore the flow. But then he complained about what he called a U.S. "propaganda campaign" directed at the Soviet people. He claimed that the Soviet people fear war, but that "Our greatest fear is what if--God forbid--Reagan is re-elected. Every door in every negotiation would be closed."

At this point, according to Horowitz, there was a total change in Zagladin's tone. He asked if it would be possible for Horowitz to deliver a message to the White House, and alluded to the fact that the request might appear strange, given the fact that

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

Horowitz works for a Senator on the other side of the aisle. Horowitz assured him that, nevertheless, he was sure he could deliver a message if this was desired.

Zagladin then said that the situation between our two countries is serious, but that Soviet decision-makers have analyzed it and have found one area where progress might be possible. The only realistic first step seems to them to lie in the area of chemical weapons. If we could work jointly on a treaty in this area and bring it to a successful conclusion, then that would "start us on the right road."

Once this "message" was delivered, the rest of the discussion went back and forth on a variety of subjects, during which Zagladin told Horowitz that Andropov was on the mend and, indeed, that he had seen Andropov that very morning.

Other Conversations: Horowitz is a physician and had some contact with Soviet doctors. One told him that Andropov is suffering from instage renal disease, combined with hypertension. He had responded well to treatment, but had an unexpected downturn in December, from which he is recovering, is now working about three hours a day, and is likely to appear in public before the March 4 local elections. Horowitz was questioned at length, without direct reference to Andropov but clearly with the latter in mind, regarding how to deal with anesthesia during an operation on a patient who had recently undergone surgery. There was also discussion of possible new drugs which suppress the immune reaction, which suggested that consideration was being given to a kidney transplant.

During a conversation with Academician Velikhov, the latter expressed grave concern over U.S. BMD research. He said that the Soviets had researched the field and were convinced that BMD is in fact feasible, although enormously expensive, and commented that the Soviets considered it potentially supportive of first strike intentions. When questioned on the logic of this, Velikhov responded that no defensive system could be a hundred percent effective, but if a nation built one it could launch a first strike confident that the BMD would limit damage from a retaliatory strike to acceptable proportions.

Horowitz said that his principal contact in Moscow was Andrei Pavlov of the State Committee for Science and Technology, with whom he had worked during the 1978 visit of Senator Kennedy and that Pavlov's deputy, Valery Antonov, accompanied him at all times. (Pavlov had been instrumental in 1978 in arranging a meeting between Kennedy and Brezhnev after the meeting was initially refused.) He also noted that, before leaving, he received a call from a person named "Latva," who was identified as a personal assistant to Andropov, and who thanked him for coming. He took this as a signal that Andropov was aware of his visit and wished that fact to be known.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

3

Horowitz said that he had also discussed some "private matters" and expected to have further contacts if he could be of use to us. He said that Senator Kennedy considered the matter beyond politics and was ready to be of assistance if we desired, but would not be at all offended if we did not desire. He asked that his report not be disseminated widely and was assured that access to it would be confined to the West Wing.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1984

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MICHAEL K. DEEVER,
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Olympic-Related Charter Flight and Port Call
Requests

Soviet sports authorities are attempting to use the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) as a conduit for pressing certain demands on the US Government. We are particularly concerned that they are trying to use that channel to circumvent established procedures for the clearance of Soviet charter flights and port calls by Soviet passenger ships. These procedures have been developed to ensure that all interested USG agencies are consulted on such clearance requests, so that, in addition to commercial factors, policy, national security and intelligence factors are taken into consideration. A basic element in these procedures is that clearance requests must be in government-to-government channels, in the form of written communication either between the Soviet Embassy and the Department's Office of Soviet Union Affairs or between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US Embassy in Moscow. Use of these channels, with which the Soviets are quite familiar, ensures that all necessary information is transmitted and reduces the potential for confusion and delay.

The Department will accept only those Soviet clearance requests that are submitted in these official channels; it will not accept requests submitted through LAOOC. I would appreciate it if you reminded LAOOC that such requests are properly government-to-government matters and that it should decline to act as a middleman for the Soviets on them. We have reminded the Soviet Embassy at the working level that we will require the same formal requests for clearance of Olympic-related charter flights and port calls as for any other flights or calls.

I also call to your attention the memorandum of December 10 from Mr. McFarlane to the Secretary of State indicating that consideration of Soviet Olympic-related flights would be deferred until about January 15.

Edward J. Derwinski

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

949
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee

Los Angeles, California 90084 USA
Telephone (213) 209-1984
Telex 194694 • (Int'l) 4720482



Reply To:
1015 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 905
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone (202) 682-1984

December 16, 1983

MEMO TO: MICHAEL A. MCMANUS, JR.
FROM: JAY MOORHEAD 
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND FOR SOVIET REQUESTS

Per your request, the LAOOC asks that the White House take the following factors into consideration while making decisions on the Soviet requests:

1. The Soviet requests should be viewed as consistent with the Olympic Charter. Any country making a similar request to the U.S. government should be handled in the same way as the Soviet request.
2. U.S. policy regarding the Olympics (including the Olympic Family) and U.S. State Department policy regarding the Soviets, should be viewed as two distinct policies.
3. The Administration must take into consideration that any policy restricting the Soviet ship and airplanes will create a negative environment for the LAOOC and the U.S. government, creating the possibility of an Eastern Bloc boycott.
4. The Soviets are fully prepared to abide by all existing U.S. laws regarding the entry of their passenger and cargo ship -- including subjecting the vessel to inspection by the U.S. Customs Service and appropriate U.S. government agencies.
5. We support the Soviet requests, but suggest that the U.S. government put conditions on the request for docking the ship. For example, subject the ship to periodic inspections, in order to satisfy the objections that may be raised by the U.S. government agencies.

6. Since, the Soviet Olympic delegation may number over 1,000 plus, large amounts of cargo including horses, yachts, rowing shells, canoes, sports equipment and other logistical support materiel, it has been customary for the Soviet NOC to make similar requests at previous Olympic games where seaports were available. Given the distance and economics involved these requests reflect their typical preparation to participate in the Games. The requests therefore will be viewed in the Soviet Union and other nations as a test of U.S. willingness to abide by the Olympic Charter and facilitate the logistical support of foreign Olympic teams.

QUESTIONS OF THE SOVIET OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
WITH REGARD OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE SOVIET
OLYMPIC TEAM TO LOS ANGELES ON AEROFLOT FLIGHTS
TO THE LAOOC

- 1) Official confirmation for permission to use the Aeroflot Charter flights to transport the Soviet Olympic Delegation. It is planned to fly up to 25 round trips on the aircraft IL-62M and 2-3 round trips on aircraft IL-76T: Sports inventory and other belongings (Possibly horses). Anticipated start: July 1-10th, possible ending: August 15-30th, 1984. Aircraft load: 100-160 passengers.
- 2) Confirmation of agreement on flight route Moscow-Shannon-Havanna-Los Angeles and return.
- 3) Order of formalizing flights on definite dates, through Diplomatic channels, through the LAOOC, CAB, local Traffic Control.
- 4) Recommendations from American officials for commercial and technical servicing of Aeroflot flights including supply of fuel. Identifying servicing carrier and fuel-supply co. at main and auxiliary airports.
- 5) Permission for arrival to Los Angeles of 2 Aeroflot specialists (representative and engineer) in order to organize the arrival and service the flights.

It is anticipated that the specialists will arrive one month before the beginning of transportation operations, and will leave one month after their termination. Procedure for formalization of obtaining permissions.

- 6) Auxiliary airports on U.S. territory for Aeroflot aircraft. Characteristics of main and auxiliary airports. Estimate of navigation and landing taxes and fees. Any local requirements or landing rights. *which airports in an emergency?*
- 7) Obtaining visas for working crew members for flights to basic and auxiliary airports. Formalization of visas for 2-3 changing flight crews in Los Angeles as well as the possibility of their moving to auxiliary airports. Also visas for above mentioned specialists of Aeroflot, to basic and auxiliary airports.
- 8) Permission for Soviet and foreign passengers, Olympic participants and tourists to fly on Soviet planes. Possible permission to land in New York (Kennedy) and Washington (Dulles) airports to pick up and discharge same passengers.
- 9) Agreement on mutual recognition of flight documents between American carriers and Aeroflot for both individual passengers and cargo. *tax, airway bills*
- 10) Permission for members of Olympic teams of other countries and tourists to fly on Aeroflot at their request.

- 11) Customs exemptions on spare parts on flights of Aeroflot, American or other carriers in case of need.
- 12) Accommodations for crew members and representatives as well as transportation between airports and hotels.
- 13) Provisions for security of Aeroflot aircrafts at basic and alternative airports.
- 14) Possibility of rental cars for Aeroflot personnel. Hiring of some local help (1 or 2) for temporary employment.

Tr LG/PFL
12/2/83

City of Los Angeles
" " December 1983

MEMORANDUM

On the discussions between the representatives of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee and the representatives of the National Olympic Committee of the USSR (a list of names of those participating is attached).

The Soviet side gave the following information: the National Olympic Committee of the USSR made the decision to deliver part of the sport inventory, equipment, specific national foods and non-alcoholic beverages as well as part of the Sports delegation on board of the Soviet passenger ship "Gruzia" (Black Sea Shipping Company) rented by the Committee. The ship's size is as follows:

Length	-	156.18 meters
Width	-	21.82 meters
Depth	-	5.9 meters

Capacity 480 passengers berths; cargo space in the horizontal method of loading and unloading has 2 circumferences of 5400 cubic meters. The ship has three access ramps: at the bow, at the stern, and one on the right side.

The ship plans to arrive in port on July 15-20 and to remain there until the closing of the Olympic Games.

During the time the ship is docked, a portion of the above listed property will be stored, part of the sporting delegation will reside aboard ship, the ship will be used as a place for the Soviet delegation to conduct cultural entertainment, rest and recreation for part of the athletes.

In connection with this, the Soviet side has asked to examine and decide the following question connected with the stay of the ship in port:

- 1) The Port Authority of Long Beach, on the basis on the inquiry of the agency of the Soviet ship company "W. Diamond," agreed to grant a place at Pier #2 for the docking of "Gruzia" for the specified time. The Soviet side would like to receive confirmation from the Organizing Committee and the Port Authority of Long Beach that they do not require any additional agreements with the Government of the USA for entering and docking the ship, and that this place of docking will be retained for the ship for the whole time of her stay in the port, i.e. from July 15-20 to August 15th, 1984.
- 2) Conforming with the recommendations of the authorities of the Port of Long Beach and the Organizing Committee, it is necessary to take effective measures for the protection of the ship during the period of its mooring.

The Soviet side feels it is necessary to have guarantees that the LAOOC, the authorities of the port, and other organizations will take all necessary measures required from them to ensure the security of the ship at dock in agreement with corresponding international and local practices and will indicate the necessary security measures which the master of the ship must undertake with their assistance.

- 3) During the ship's mooring, the crew, passengers (part of the delegation), some athletes participating in the cultural events and in recreation, and the cargo will be on board. The ship will be visited by guests of the master and of the Head of the delegation. The Soviet side requests the acceptance by U.S. Officials that the following individuals have the authority to approve entry to the ship while in port:

- The Master of the Ship
- The Head of Delegation
- The Olympic Attache

The above-mentioned persons in agreement with U.S. authorities will establish three kinds of passes:

- a) For members of the crew
- b) For those living on ship
- c) For short time visitors

These passes will be issued by the Soviet side; these passes will be the basis for unimpeded passage onto the ship and from her.

The Soviet side would like confirmation that the above mentioned cargo located on board, may be loaded and unloaded without impediment and delivered to places of usage.

The ship will be supplied without any impediment with all necessary items: food, water, fuel etc. for its normal operation.

- 4) In view of the long distance between the USSR and the USA, the difference in time, the different languages, large number of members of the Soviet delegation, the Soviet side requests permission for operating the ship's radio station in its transmitting range.
- 5) Taking into consideration the length of the stay of the Soviet ship in the port and the necessity of solving many questions, the Soviet side feels it is expedient to have the representative Morflot USSR present in port during the length of this stay.

The American side having considered the above questions replies as follows:

STATUS OF THE OLYMPIC ATTACHE

- 1) Diplomat with diplomatic passport and diplomatic visa (A-1), Diplomatic tagplates for a car.
- 2) Free admission to all Olympic facilities (villages, sport sites, etc) without the regular notification required of Soviet Diplomatic and Consular officials.
- 3) Free admission to international airport for flights to San Francisco and Washington D.C. twice a month.
- 4) Free admission to shortest highway between Los Angeles and San Francisco.
- 5) Free admission to the airport to meet Soviet delegations.
- 6) Free admission to the Soviet ship in the port of Los Angeles.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


January 30, 1984

TO: JACK MATLOCK

Jack:

Could you please look through these papers, particularly those clipped together at back. The two gentlemen involved have significant sponsorship with the President. Do you think that their going through with it would have any serious downside consequences? Please advise. I am afraid it is not going to go away.

Many thanks.


Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment

12:40 p.m.
January 30, 1984

*Do you
have
original
paper?
(attached)*

RCM:

Tom Green and Terry Pearce called --

Progress continues. They want to bring you up-to-date and make two requests.

Where the plan is now is that the document has been delivered to Deng Xiaoping. Our emissary has requested a tentative response by February 10.

We have identified the appropriate emissary to take the document to the Soviets: Bill Verity. They believe that you are familiar with him in that he has carried a few documents for President Carter and one as well for President Reagan. He is with USA-USSR Trade Council and is the former Chairman of ARMCO. Their first request: they want to arrange an appointment for Mr. Verity to meet with you either Wednesday afternoon or Thursday of this week. He is coming to Washington and will be meeting with Amb. Dobrynin.

They have talked to George Kennan and a number of people who felt his counsel and his possible participation going with Mr. Verity might be useful. He is two weeks short of being 80 years old and feels very strongly about not doing many activities that require a lot of energy but is very ^{is} intrigued by the plan. He wants confirmation that it truly supported by the government before taking the next step; wants to be sure that this isn't just some private effort without the blessing of the government. Could you or someone from your office call George Kennan and indicate knowledge and support of the plan and request that he look at it seriously with regard to giving his counsel and participation.

How do you wish to handle?

1) Appt with Bill Verity:

☐ Squeeze him in

☒ Unable to do this week;
willing to do later

Other: _____

2) Call to George Kennan:

☐ Yes

☒ No

Do you wish to brief an NSC staff person and turn this project over to them for handling?

☒ Yes: Matlock

☐ No, I will handle

*I have
been
engaged
on other
issues!
This will
have to
wait for a
couple of weeks*

January 27, 1984

RCM:

Terry Pearce called --

He wanted to report to you that progress continues. He and Tom Green are currently focussing on quickly finalizing the American emissary. They will keep you informed as things move along.

Wilma

[You met with them on January 12 after referral from Cathy Osborne for the President.]

January 6, 1984

RCM:

Cathy Osborne called --

Albert Schwabacher, a very, old, old, old friend of the President's who is from the San Francisco Bay area -- corresponds regularly with the President and they talk on the telephone regularly called on December 26.

For background, Cathy offered that Mr. Schwabacher is with Dean Witter Reynolds; very wealthy; very smart. He and a couple of friends are very concerned and very involved about a "peace plan." Cathy doesn't know whether they are putting a report together or what, but they called the President and asked him who they should talk with in Washington. The President told them to come in and talk with "Bud."

Cathy advises that Mr. Schwabacher will call on Monday afternoon to try to arrange an appointment to get together with you for himself along with two reputable friends:

Tom Green 415/435-9663

Terry ^{Pierce} ~~Pierce~~ (sp?) 415/435-0510

They have talked with Vance, Carter and have Nixon's new book (private printing) "The Real Peace".

Cathy just wanted to alert you that they would be calling and allow you to decide whether you would meet with them personally or ask someone else to do.

Given fact that Mr. Schwabacher is a very, very good friend of President's, do you want me to schedule when he calls?

☒ Yes

☐ Refer to JMP

Other: _____

1/9 in D.C. at 293-3100 X 1017

Wilma

Cathy Osborne

*Holmes
Guttle*
*mtg scheduled
11:00 AM Thurs, 1/12*

1 Bud -

Your ability to see this idea for what it is comes from your humanness - Thank God you are where you are.

The dramatization referred to on the draft is attached. It is no way an attempt to craft a speech, but rather is only an example to evoke the experience of the shift in climate resulting from whatever the three choose to say.

We are proceeding to refine and translate the document of delivery and to finalize arrangements with the emissaries. We will call early next week and know you will contact us with any thoughts that would serve to assist us in avoiding mistakes.

Warmest regards,
 Yours Tom

TAKING THE ESSENTIAL STEP NOW

TO END WAR BETWEEN NATIONS IN OUR LIFETIME

Note: This fictional dramatization is only an example, and the President of the United States might say something like this. He would say only what is true for him, and we are not writing his speech. This draft is only a form of support for him to express whatever is truly his vision of peace between nations.

The President of the United States of America's Speech, Early 1984

As announced earlier, our regularly scheduled program has been rescheduled to permit a special address by the President, the topic of which has not been announced. No one here knows what the President will be speaking about, or why he has chosen 10:00 in the morning to do so. We have just learned that with him in the Oval Office are his wife Nancy, their children and closest friends, Vice President Bush, former Presidents Carter, Ford, and Nixon, all of the Democratic Presidential candidates, House Speaker O'Neill, and Senator Baker - obviously a remarkable and historic gathering. The President is about to speak.

Ladies and gentlemen, from the Oval Office in the White House, The President of the United States...

(over, please...)

TAKING THE ESSENTIAL STEP NOW

TO END WAR BETWEEN NATIONS WITHIN TEN YEARS

A Dramatization

"My fellow Americans, today it is my privilege to report to you on the most significant turning point in human history: the time when the world has chosen to move to end war between nations...to move beyond the use or threat of mass destruction as an acceptable means of resolving our conflicts as nations. I am speaking to you at this time of day and with these other representatives of our nation because right now, simultaneously, President Andropov and representatives of the Soviet government are addressing the people of the Soviet Union, and Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping and representatives of the government of the People's Republic of China are addressing their people.

Our three nations, and in fact all nations, have vast differences. We do not embrace their forms of government; they do not embrace ours. Without being blind to the real differences between people, we know the people of all nations have common human interests. We all inhabit the planet, breathe the same air and cherish our children's future.

This growing interdependence, combined with the real and increasing threat of mutual extinction, and the contributions by millions today and throughout history toward this goal of peace, create the conditions in which the time is right, NOW, to bring forth peace between all nations. No nation, no leader alone, can produce world peace. Many have tried and it has not been achieved. For the first time in human history it is now time for the world to focus on and commit to ending war between nations.

Accordingly, in concert with President Andropov for the Soviet Union, and Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping for the People's Republic of China, and using the power heretofore used by our Presidents to declare war, I hereby declare and commit the United States of America to achieving the end of war between nations within ten years, and we invite everyone in the world to join in this commitment.

Fellow Americans, peace between nations is possible now. There will be risks. We will maintain our freedom and security. It will not be easy, and with your support and that of the world's people, in the next 10 years we will develop an effective, non-violent means of resolving our conflicts as nations. We will realize conditions where war and the threat of war are obsolete as instruments of national policy.

In a few moments, President Andropov and Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping will be directly addressing you stating their countries' commitment to us and to the world, and I will be directly addressing their nations on your behalf. Then this evening I will be speaking to you and a joint session of Congress about specific actions already underway and being taken today to produce peace between nations within ten years, and about the role each of us can play in this shared journey.

As I said last Thanksgiving, "Let us work for peace, and as we do, let us remember the lines of the famous hymn, 'Oh God of love, Oh King of Peace, make wars throughout the world to cease.' Thank you, good day, and God bless you."

TAKING THE ESSENTIAL STEP NOW
TO END WAR BETWEEN NATIONS

BACKGROUND OF PRINCIPALS

In the spring of 1983 Tom Green and Terry Pearce chose to take one year sabbaticals from their careers as business executives. This choice was made out of their shared commitment to a specific, pragmatic goal, and out of their conviction that the time is right now - for its achievement. This goal is to take the essential step, between now and June of 1984, which will allow the abolishing of war between nations to be realized in our lifetime - perhaps in this decade. The initial ideas for a plan emerged between March and May, and since June, Tom and Terry have been working full-time on this project. Significant progress has been made to date. What follows are brief highlights of their careers prior to this time. Detailed resumes are available on request.

B. TOM GREEN

Since graduating from Stanford in 1966 with a B.S. in Civil Engineering and a Masters in Business Administration, Tom has held positions of increasing management responsibility with organizations such as General Mills and Transamerica, as well as five years as a partner in a privately held corporation. Specifically, he has held positions in the finance and marketing areas, and has been General Manager of divisions for both General Mills and Transamerica. In May of 1982 he left the corporate environment and initiated, with G.G. Jampolsky, M.D., a series of projects with the theme Children As Teachers of Peace. These projects were based on the idea that the shared experience of childhood can be a powerful bridge to peace, and included connections with world citizens such as Mrs. Anwar Sadat, Mother Teresa, and the Dalai Lama. A book, a television special, and several other on-going international activities resulted over a period of several months. Tom is known for getting results by focusing on the few factors essential to that end, and for enabling people to tap into their own strength and to act on it.

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TERRY PEARCE

Terry earned a B.S. degree from Linfield College, Oregon in 1965. He completed 16 years of experience with IBM in November of 1982, having acted on Divisional staff and in middle and senior line management. Through his work in a rapidly changing market of computer and office supplies, he has developed strengths in recognizing the need for adaptability to produce results. Accordingly, he is skilled in organizational dynamics, channels of delivering products to markets, and in the development and productivity of people through recognizing individual differences. His final position with IBM was Northwest District Manager, Systems Supplies Division, and carried responsibility for \$40 million in sales, \$8 million in expense and 100 people in 10 states. From January to March of 1983, Terry acted as a consultant to assemble management for a start-up medical operation, and then jointly developed the focus and plan for the initial phase of this project.

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DRAFT

TAKING THE ESSENTIAL STEP NOW TO END WAR BETWEEN NATIONS IN OUR LIFETIME

JANUARY 1984

TO: President Yuri Andropov
Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping
President Ronald Reagan

This message is being privately presented to each of you by individuals you know and trust, who represent only themselves. The idea carried is merely a new form of one which is already yours. It is to take an essential step, now, which will make possible, in our lifetime, a shared goal: the end of war between nations. It is the power of history, and the contributions of millions before you, which have created the unique conditions which now allow you to play this significant role in human history. This week, the idea is being offered to all three of you through similar informal channels:

- To Deng Xiaoping -
- To Ronald Reagan - (names deleted for the Progress Report)
- To Yuri Andropov -

PROLOGUE

Throughout history and in virtually every country of the world, shifts have occurred in the attitude of the populace which appear to have been sudden, and which precipitated the taking of action to bring about a fundamental and monumental change in the direction of cultures. These sudden shifts were brought about by some dramatic, catalytic action which merely confirmed that which was already wanted could be. These dramatic actions changed what appeared to be a "dream" into an attainable, practical goal to be achieved. The many problems were then addressed and solved to bring about the previously only dreamed-about results. This is a plan to evoke such a shift in attitude on a global scale.

GOAL

To create a global political climate in early 1984 which, for the first time in history, actually supports and facilitates achieving the monumental challenge of ending war between nations in our lifetime.

This climate of possibility will be created through an effectively implemented dramatic, catalytic action which focuses the worlds' commitment on this goal. A measurement of the goal's achievement will be a working, non-violent process of conflict resolution.

SCOPE

The plan is to create the necessary climate of commitment to the goal. Implementation will not require you or any leader or any country to change a position, nor does this plan address solutions to the many complex problems which will need resolution before the end of war and the threat of war as an instrument of national policy can be accomplished. The plan will be effective in focusing all such efforts, for the first time, so the result will be accomplished - the establishment of a continuing process of practical peace - in our lifetime.

BASIS

For all things done, at least three elements are present in sequence:

- The result is wanted. (Will)
- The result is seen as really possible. (Commitment is made.)
- Actions are taken to produce it.

If will is assumed, then the achievement of a goal depends on it being seen as possible in a way that spurs action to accomplish the result. The difference between dreams that are merely dreamt and goals that are actually realized is the commitment, expressed strongly enough to evoke possibility, which brings reality to the result.

Much of the world population now wants to end war as an instrument of national policy, and much action is being taken to bring it about. The goal is not reached because the world does not see the whole, the result of the end of war between nations, as a real possibility. Accordingly, nations are working on the parts: disarmament, the Middle East, Central America, containment, detente trade, cultural and scientific exchanges, - as one would work on a jigsaw puzzle with one critical element missing: the boxtop. The boxtop for this puzzle is the whole: the goal of finding a way to end war and the threat of war as instruments of national policy. It is a goal shared by much of the world and one we can now commit to achieving by some time in the foreseeable future.

Possibility can be evoked by someone with the perceived power to produce the result declaring the possibility, stating the commitment, and thereby enrolling others totally in the result. In a family, such goals are often set by parents, in business by the chairman, and for nations by the body or individual with the power in the proper domain. Various bodies in each of your countries literally declare social change, and Heads of State literally declare war. In these examples, such declaration evokes possibility in a way that spurs action. Agreement by everyone isn't necessary, and in fact action opposing the result is often brought forth by such declaration. The result is seen as possible by all, whether they agree with the result or not.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

- The Reformation
- The end of slavery in the United States
- India's independence from Great Britain
- Egypt - Israeli "peace"
- America's Man-on-the-Moon
- American/Chinese normalization

In all of these cases, the declarer, the one who recognized and stated the real possibility, changed the "dream" to a goal, expressed a commitment to achieve it, and is recognized as the significant participant, even though all of the complex problems remained to be solved. Those credited with the cited events are clearly Luther, Lincoln, Ghandi, Sadat, Kennedy and Nixon/Mao. Others who followed did the work inside of the commitment and brought about the result.

We assert that the primary distinction between these examples and the end of war between nations is one of scale. There has not been a worldwide goal in the history of the planet, yet the basis for accomplishment, the principles, are the same. What catalytic action now could create a similar climate of real possibility for the ending of war as an instrument of national policy?

THE PLAN

A new global climate can be established by a joint televised declaration by the three of you: President Reagan, President Andropov and Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping stating your commitment, and your countries' commitment, to the goal of ending war between nations by a definite time. This commitment will be to have in place, and working, a non-violent process of conflict resolution between nations, by a specific time in the foreseeable future, perhaps within ten years.

The commitment will be dramatically stated, simultaneously, to the people of your individual countries, and then directly by you to each other's countries and to the world, via international media. Such a joint declaration by you, who have the perceived power to make it so, will be the catalytic action which will create the necessary climate to allow the work going on to actually bring about the result.

The declaration will not require you or any leader to change his position on the method of bringing about the result and will create the atmosphere, overnight, for constructive discussion and re-evaluation of those positions in light of the fresh, time-specific commitment to the now-transcendent common interest: finding a way to end war between nations in our lifetime.

The declaration will include an invitation by you to the rest of the world to join in the commitment, and will be immediately followed that same day by announcements by each leader of a package of feasible unilateral actions, no matter how small. These actions will be initiated to demonstrate each nation's commitment to the goal, and to accelerate the process of bringing about the desired result. The actions will grow in number and significance until the result, a process of real peace, is achieved.

RISKS

If the time is not right, the shift in global attitude will not occur, and the world will continue on its present course. You will only receive credit for trying. If the time is right, and the shift occurs, your nations, and all nations, now supported by the world's commitment, will not just address but will solve the real and complicated challenges to achieving the goal. You and your three nations will have facilitated a magnificent step in human history. The risk of the present course is great. The risk of the declaration is minimal.

DISTINCTIONS

Other "agreements" regarding ending war have been made in the past, all have served and all have been insufficient, including the commitment in the U.N. Charter. There are differences in this idea:

1. THE-TIME-IN-HISTORY. The result is truly wanted by a critical mass of the world's people. This result is now deeply desired, and is greatly strengthened by the awareness of the real and growing threat of human extinction.
2. THOSE COMMITTING. You, the leaders of the three most powerful countries, collectively, have the perceived power to take the actions necessary to realize this first formal global goal.
3. THE FORMAT Making for the first time a joint, time-specific commitment directly to the others' countries, and to the world, is dramatic and evoking. The first-time use of this form of world-wide television makes attention of the world possible.
4. THE CONTENT Past declarations of commitment to end war have all had provisions of exception. This one commits only to achieving the goal, the end of war as an instrument of national policy by a definite date. The umbrella of common interest is broad, with the end being measurable: an effective, non-violent process of conflict resolution, in place and working by a specific time.

FORMAT-DETAILS

No summit meeting is required. Each of you will first address your nation, stating your commitment, and then directly address, via media, the other two countries, stating the same commitment. Each declaration contains common elements:

- The commitment of you and your country to the goal: to end war between nations by a specific time agreed to in advance, perhaps within ten years, and to have in place and working, a non-violent process of conflict resolution between nations by that specific time.
- An invitation to the rest of the world to join in the commitment.
- A statement that within the next 24 hours, at a specific time, actions will be announced by each of you to demonstrate your commitment to finding a way to achieve this historic goal. These will be unilateral, and as substantive as possible; however, the presence of action is more significant

CONCLUSION

The declaration is simple, safe and serves your personal interest. No positions need be changed by this dramatic statement.

The statement of the goal by you, who have the perceived power to accomplish it will create the necessary climate by making the goal real and achievable to the world, and the specific date set for its achievement will allow for safe transition to the now-realizable condition of a world in which war between nations is unacceptable.

The emissaries bringing this thought support you in playing a pivotal role as one of three who can actually state this commitment for the world. History has brought you this opportunity. The world will commit to the goal sometime. If you wish, you can take this initiative now to create the historical turning point which will allow the goal's achievement in your family's lifetime.

The substance of The Declaration of Commitment will be your joint statement:

"I hereby commit (my country) to the goal of ending war between nations within ten years, and invite the world to join in this commitment. I will announce (within 24 hours) unilateral actions to demonstrate our intention."

NEXT STEPS

Within one week, your initial reactions, delivered to the individual presenting this will be exchanged with the private emissaries to the other leaders. You will each be informed of the others' responses. Your response to your emissary should include:

- Your willingness to pursue the plan another step if the others are.
- Your general concurrence with the procedures delineated below, unless modified by consensus.

General Procedures:

1. The substantive message of the declaration made by all of you will be identical. Any refinements necessary in the language of the declaration or in the date by which a means for a safe transition will be achieved, will be mutually agreed. The specific date stated as the goal in the declaration will be before the year 2000.
2. The date for making the declaration will be mutually agreed and will be before April 1984.
3. There will be no public acknowledgement of these discussions prior to the declaration. Any inquiries will be responded to in the same way; we suggest: "We are always looking for ways of opening discussions on subjects of mutual interest, and we continue to do so."
4. Any consultation with allies will be done in strict privacy at the highest levels.
5. Each leader will address his nation first. The sequence of speaking to other nations will be determined by lot. A copy of your and the other leaders' remarks to the other two nations will be exchanged three days before the declaration.
6. One week prior to the declaration, each party will deliver to the others concurrently, the list of minimum intended unilateral actions each plans for announcement within 24 hours of the declaration. Three days before the declaration, the list will again be exchanged, with any modifications.
7. The working language for these exchanges will be English. A possible text for a United States version of the declaration of commitment by President Reagan is included with this document only to provide a general sense of content, not to suggest specifics.

The initial response of the other two leaders and protocol for the next exchange will be communicated through these same private emissaries within two weeks of your initial response.

History has given you the unique privilege of being one of the first three spokesmen for the whole world. It is an honor to be part of bringing this history shaping opportunity to you.