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9

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1. 78446	MEMO	MATLOCK TO FRANK LAYNE RE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW REQUESTS R 8/5/2010 M244/1	1	11/28/1983	B1
2. 78447	MEMO	MATLOCK TO ADMIRAL POINDEXTER RE STATUS OF CONSULATES AND EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS WITH THE USSR R 8/5/2010 M244/1	1	11/30/1983	B1
3. 78448	NOTE	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE ATTACHED MEMO FROM PERLE (DUPE OF 78396) PAR 8/5/2010 M244/1	1	11/28/1983	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 25, 1983


Dear Mr. Crozier:

Thank you for your letter of October 25, and for the reports you sent. They are indeed fascinating. I could add a number of examples to the evidence that a "Russian Party" exists in a very substantial way, and within the CPSU itself.

I very much enjoyed our lunch in Washington and hope you will let me know when you come again. It would be a great pleasure to continue "comparing notes."

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock

Mr. Brian Crozier
309 The Linen Hall
162-168 Regent Street
London W1R 5 TB
England

10/31
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FROM BRIAN CROZIER

The Hon. J. Matlock,
National Security Council,
The White House,
Washington DC.

25 October 1983

Dear Mr. Matlock,

I was delighted to meet you on my recent visit to Washington, and to have had the benefit of your experience and special knowledge. I was particularly interested to hear of your African experiences.

I am sorry I have taken so long to come back to you, but I am only now emerging from a rather heavy work load.


I enclose photocopies of the two reports I mentioned to you, which I sent to certain of my clients in December 1982 and last July. The source in both cases was the NTS. The earlier piece is certainly in line with the revelations and assessments of Alexander Zinoviev, but in some respects goes further. This was apparently one of a number of conversations between senior Soviet visitors and NTS interpreters at joint Soviet-German meetings.

The latter does seem to be in line with some of your own observations arising out of your period in Moscow.

I hope we may meet again from time to time.

With all best wishes.

Yours sincerely,



THE USSRA VIEW NEAR THE TOP

In recent months some members of the Soviet establishment (the "nomenklatura") have been having occasional conversations with former compatriots of theirs in Europe while on official missions. One such conversation, recently, was recorded with the knowledge and consent of the person concerned. The following is a transcript of the conversation, slightly edited to avoid any possibility of identification of the source. The conversation took place shortly before the death of Brezhnev and the appointment of Yuri Andropov to succeed him as General Secretary of the CPSU.

Because of the enormous means at the disposal of the KGB, any reports of such conversations must naturally be treated with caution. We are, however, satisfied that this exchange did take place, while the views expressed are of such frankness, verging at times on brutality, that it is hard to see what advantage Yuri Andropov's former organisation could derive out of propagating them, even in so indirect a manner. It is worth adding the comment that the views are in no sense those of a dissident, actual or potential, but those of a member of a privileged sector of Soviet society who is cynically aware of the regime's deficiencies, and appropriately contemptuous of the West's vulnerability, gullibility and venality. Some passages are underlined: the emphasis is of course ours.

"PEACE"

"Reagan and his plans for increasing arms do, of course, present us with a problem. We shall have to strain our economy still further. But the Movement for Peace is well launched, and will make American action more difficult, especially in Europe. For this we have inexhaustible funds. Demonstrations, articles in the press, bribes, and so on, cost much less than one rocket, and it brings good results. We must rid ourselves of Party puritanism of the Suslov type, as this hinders our efforts to unite all the left in the West. It is also necessary to pay more attention to the Church, and not scare church-goers with bellicose atheism, or with persecution of various evangelical hystericals. Regretfully, our elderly are no longer able to grasp this completely. In the meantime, the churches can play an effective role in the anti-American and anti-NATO campaigns and attempt to achieve unilateral disarmament in the West.

"To weaken still further the position of the Americans we could disarm a little without weakening our superiority. Regretfully, our strategic thought is unmanoeuvrable, it has become rigid. We are not capable of elastic retreat: one step backwards, two forward, as Vladimir Ilyich said. And not because of risks, but because our military-industrial complex, as a bloc, cannot be shifted from its place. They will not allow any cuts of military expenses. This is why we have very limited possibilities for effective talks in Geneva."

AFGHANISTAN

"Afghanistan does not pose a problem for us. The hysterics have ended, and we are in Afghanistan and will remain there. That which has been captured is ours. For the military, Afghanistan is an excellent ground for experiments of various sorts. Our losses are minimal. The tears of a few thousand mothers or brides are not a great tragedy. The bulk of the people has totally accepted our thesis: 'If we hadn't taken Afghanistan, it would have been taken by the Americans, or, which is worse, by the Chinese.' This fully satisfies people."

POLAND

"Poland? Of course, among some dissatisfied elements certain 'ideas' have appeared, but it will not be possible to spread the Solidarity disease among us. This is our internal problem. The

Poles have nowhere to go, and I am sincerely surprised that they do not understand this. We have no differences of opinion with the West: the problems of Poland have to be decided without external interference. Jaruzelski must deal with this — this is the best of the alternatives available. The European politicians also agree with this. So it is assumed that everything there will end peacefully. If Jaruzelski is not able to cope, then he himself will call us. One way or another, we will show the Poles that there is no return from 'real socialism'. The unavoidable course of history cannot be stopped. We will not leave places to which we have come or will come. This has never happened and will never happen."

TRADE WITH THE WEST

"Everything is fine with the West. As long as 'democracy' exists there, we can dodge around as we wish. There will be no sanctions. We shall always find countries, or industrial concerns, which will want to trade. And we will receive from them what we need, to the detriment of others. During talks I often heard: 'The politicians have their concerns, while we, the businessmen, have ours; we need good profitable deals, regardless with whom.' Of course, the politicians themselves are interested in trade with us."

DOVES AND HAWKS

"On the basis of everything said previously, I can affirm that our foreign policy is successful.

"In the West they readily 'make conditions' with the notional 'doves' and 'hawks' in the Kremlin, they discuss 'the power struggle' and 'the conflict of interests'. This is all nonsense with which the 'Sovietologists' (what a science!) litter their own brains and those of others. We welcome this, and when the opportunity arises, the APN* unofficially throws a few logs into the fire."

THE 'MAFIA'

"In reality it is the mafia which reigns with us — one hand washes the other, everybody is a relative of the other, and none will ever speak against the other. And it is the same in a wider sense: those who find themselves within the nomenklatura, they are there forever, together with their heirs, and each nomenklatura member will defend another nomenklatura member.

"They are not geniuses sitting in the Politburo. They hold on firmly to the basis of party politics — 'forward for the victory of socialism!', 'down with the imperialists!'. These are not just empty slogans — this is the leadership in action, as Stalin used to say. The 'brains trust', the reviewers of the Central Committee Secretariat, the body that serves them, is a highly qualified apparatus which works on ways of converting these slogans into real politics: these slogans are the symbols of the policy: to widen the socialist camp wherever possible, to wring out the imperialist camp wherever possible. Animosity to the West and its bourgeois-democratic system is an unchangeable foundation of our policies. Furthermore, of our life. And this foundation is untouchable, one cannot doubt it, even less to loosen it. In this we are all united."

THE KGB

"Of course this does not mean that there is no friction within our structure. The relations between the party apparatus and the KGB are to a lesser or a larger degree tense. The members of the Central Committee, of course, are not under the control of the KGB; however, the KGB tries to conduct secret surveillance over them as well. The party leadership does not totally control the activities of the KGB, even though it is written down on paper; there are departments in the KGB which due to their tasks are not subject to control. And if we speak of a force capable of exerting influence on the decisions of the Politburo, then those people can only be from the security forces."

SOVIET UNIONTHE "RUSSIAN PARTY"

The existence of a "Russian Party" (Russkaya Partiya) within the Soviet Union has been confirmed by a recently exiled writer, Georgi Vladimov. Its existence, and its peculiar characteristics, need to be seen in the context of: (a) President Reagan's call, in his speech in London on 8 June 1982, for a campaign to promote democratic institutions in Communist countries in the light of the crisis in the Soviet system; and (b) the subsequent remarks by Secretary of State George P. Shultz on the occasion of a two-day conference in the Department of State, Washington.

The object of the State Department conference was to consider ways of implementing the President's proposed campaign. The US, he said, would not seek to foment violent unrest in Communist countries, but considered it a responsibility, "both moral and strategic" to meet the call for help from those seeking to bring about change.

On 24 February 1983, Shultz developed these ideas further when he said: "Change must come from within, not be dictated from outside. It must follow a path dictated by national and local tradition."

Again, speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 15 June 1983, Shultz seemed finally to discard the 1947 concept of "containment". He said: "Where it was once our goal to contain the Soviet presence within the limits of intermediate post-war reach, now our goal must be to advance our own objectives." (Emphasis added.)

The President's new policy towards the Soviet bloc and empire marks a radical break with that of previous governments, especially Jimmy Carter's. On the basis of his speech and of Shultz's remarks (which need to be studied in their full text), it is possible to infer the following guidelines:

1. Democratic change in the USSR must be achieved by non-violent means.
2. Such change must take a constructive form — that is, avoiding anarchy, chaos and disorder.
3. It must take place within a strategic conceptual framework, taking full account of local conditions and traditions.
4. Any new regime in Russia should create greater stability, in contrast with the present rigid, but inherently unstable, autocracy.

Moreover, any Western initiatives flowing from these guidelines must be consistent with two fundamental aims: to stop Communist expansion in both its overt and subversive forms; and to avoid a direct military confrontation.

If the tentative programme outlined above is to have any chance of success, it is clear that: (a) the individuals or groups involved within the Soviet Union need to be close to the levers of power; and (b) they will need to have a sympathetic base within the population.

The analysis below suggests that it is easier to meet the second of these provisions than the first.

WHAT IS THE "RUSSIAN PARTY"?

Professor Richard Pipes (now back at Harvard but until some months ago responsible for the formulation of a policy towards the Soviet Union, which served as a basis for Shultz's remarks) has spoken several times of Russian nationalists who could reform the USSR. In an interview in Time in March 1982, for instance, he said:

The people who run the Soviet Union are really very hawkish and the alternative to them is not a still more hawkish group, but rather a group that is more reform-minded. These are dedicated, intelligent Russian nationalists who believe that hostility to the US and confrontation abroad have become counter-productive: they worry whether the Soviet economy can support such egregious imperialism. I think it is worth a gamble to support these elements.

These are the people to whom Vladimov (see above) referred as "the Russian Party". He explained, however, that they were not in the normal sense of the word a party. They do not meet, or have card-carrying members. They are simply groups of like-minded individuals who occupy places of authority at various levels of the Soviet system. Their one uniting feature is their Russian patriotism and the belief that the course which the Marxist-Leninist CPSU has charted will lead their country (Russia not the USSR) to destruction. During World War II, Russian patriotism was cleverly exploited by Stalin, who re-introduced old Russian imperial insignias and traditions into the Army, and had Orthodox priests blessing troops going into battle for "Mother Russia". By the end of the war, it was generally accepted that the Russians as a nation were both the main demographic stronghold of the Soviet system and its main "beneficiaries". A change started in the 1960s. A widening rift developed between Russian patriotism and Soviet Leninism. The attempt by the regime to Sovietise Russian life began to meet with resistance. The more the Soviet leaders claimed that they had succeeded in creating a new entity — a Soviet nation, a Pax Sovieticus — the more Russian national awareness grew.

During the 1960s the number of Russian literary, musical and art groups grew rapidly. Organisations for the preservation of the Russian heritage blossomed.

The Sovietisation of Russian life nevertheless grew rapidly. Urbanisation and industrialisation affected the Slavic populations more than the rest. Torn from their rural roots, they provided the bulk of skilled industrial manpower. A relative numerical decline of the Slavs in the USSR began, which contributed to their alienation from Soviet society. Slavic fertility has now fallen to one of the lowest levels in the world (35 for every 1,000 births), while the Slavic mortality rate is the only one of all the industrialised nations to have increased significantly (1960-1981: males 66-62, females 73-68).

Social diseases have increased dangerously, especially mass drunkenness and criminality. Several of the Russian patriotic groups now springing up are increasingly voicing their concern and trying to offer an alternative to Pax Sovieticus. Their chosen battlefields have been: the environment and moral issues; their weapons are Russian culture and tradition.

These groups see the contemporary Soviet leadership as a force which not only damages Russian national interests but is slowly destroying Russian society. The "Russian Party" manifests itself in anti-modernisation, the desire for spiritual fulfilment, a concern for the environment, conservatism, romanticism, criticism of the consumer society, the negation of women's liberation, condemnation of moral degradation allegedly caused by social change, criticism of urbanisation, and a glorification of pre-revolutionary Russian culture.

For historical reasons, it is not surprising that writers are strongly represented in the "Russian Party". The "country" writers, as they have become known, have flourished, although all forms of dis-

sent are strongly repressed. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the spiritual godfather of some of these writers has claimed that the most remarkable achievement of Russian literature within the Soviet system is not that of dissident authors well known in the West, but of writers who are established within the system.

One of the better known "country" writers is Valentin Rasputin. In perhaps his most celebrated novel, Farewell to Mataraia, he uses symbolism to powerful effect. A village flooded by the dam needed for a huge new power-station symbolises Russia itself and its agonies. Although Rasputin was recently "beaten up by hooligans" in Moscow, his writings continue to appear in the Soviet media.

It is not easy to define the frontiers of this new Russian literature. Although the mainstream ignores the party and the official ideology, some "country" writers do recognise the CPSU. At times, the movement takes a crude form of obscurantism and xenophobia. This aspect is undoubtedly encouraged by the KGB.

With this caveat, one can list the main journals and authors involved in the "Russian Party". The most representative magazine is certainly Nash Sovremennik (Moscow, editor Sergei Vikulov); Sever (Petrozavodsk, editor Dmitri Gusarov), the journal which has been leading the campaign against the diversion of the Siberian rivers, and has recently come under strong attack in the official press. In Leningrad, the literary journal Avrora (editor Gleb Goryshin) caught Western attention with a satirical attack on Brezhnev on his 75th birthday (see the references to Romanov in the other article on the Soviet Union in this issue).

Several other publications should be noted. They include: Moskva (Moscow, editor Mikhail Alexeev), Ogonek (Moscow, editor Anatoly Safronov), Molodaia Gvardiya (Moscow, editor Anatoly Ivanov), Sibirskiye Ogn'i (Novosibirsk), Volga (Saratov, editor Nikolai Palkin), Neva (Leningrad), and Podiom (Voronezh).

The views of the "Russian Party" can also be found in other journals and newspapers, but not in such a systematic way. The following newspapers are worthy of note: Sovetskaya Rossiya, Sovetskaya Kultura, and Literaturnaya Rossiya. One reliable source estimates that on a regional level within the Russian Federated Republic, nearly half the newspapers report the "Russian Party" at least in spirit, if not consistently in content.

A number of authors also need to be mentioned, for their personal fate is an important indicator of how the "Russian Party" is faring with the Soviet establishment (the Nomenklatura). These writers include: Sergei Zalygin, Vasily Belov, Vladimir Soloukhin, Fedor Abramov, Victor Astafiev and Valentin Rasputin (mentioned earlier).

The above-mentioned writers have privately expressed great fears about the future, and spoken of the great danger that could face the whole world if radical measures are not taken quickly. Although some of the writers expressing these views are dissidents (Borodin and Vladimov are two examples), the majority prefer to influence the establishment from within, rather than cross the demarcation line into dissidence. Nevertheless, a number keep in close contact with opposition groups. Soloukhin, for example, has published one of his writings in Grani ("Facets"), the quarterly literary journal closely linked with the NTS (Alliance of Russian Solidarists). The result was attacks in the Soviet press and restrictions on travel for one year. There was no talk of trials or of expulsions from the writers' union. If one recalls the treatment of the dissident writers Sinyavsky and Daniel in the 1960s, this mildness is almost unimaginable.

"RUSSIANS" WITHIN THE MVD

One reason for Soloukhin's survival is his popular base. In 1963, he started an organisation to preserve Russian cultural monuments — which now has a membership of nearly 30 million. More significant is the fact that these writers are known to have protectors within the Soviet hierarchy. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) was known to have individuals who strongly supported the "Russian Party".

Against this background, the appointment of Fedorchuk, a career KGB chief, as head of the MVD was an ominous sign. Since his appointment, two significant events have taken place:

1. The militia has been structurally reorganised. From the end of last year, militia personnel are serving as conscripts, away from their locality and for a period of two years. This would make it virtually impossible for any counterforce to be built up among the militia — an unlikely prospect anyway, in a notoriously corrupt force.
2. Nearly 30 per cent of middle- and high-ranking officers within the MVD have been purged and replaced by KGB personnel.

The expulsion of police chief Nikolai Shchokolov, known to have "Russian Party" sympathies, from the Central Committee is another indicator of KGB tactics to deal with the Russian nationalists. Too much should not, however, be read into such changes which could also be connected with Andropov's anti-corruption drive.

CHURCH AND ARMED FORCES

Russian Orthodox church-goers number more than 32 million. In a political system where religion is always a handicap and is often suppressed, these are impressive figures. Many people who attended Father Dudko's church are now involved in politically motivated, underground religious groups. (Dudko was a dissident priest who later recanted.)

Such journals as Veche, Moskovski Sbornik and Zemlya reflect the unofficial side to the Russian nationalist revival.

The free trade union movement, SMOI, also espouses nationalist views. It sees the main hope for a united strong opposition in a triad of Nationalism, the Faith and Labour. This formula, they argue, worked well in Poland and would have succeeded without Martial Law and the threat of Soviet tanks.

Similar views have also been expressed in the Soviet Army, where some draw a distinction between Russian nationalism and Soviet patriotism. The continuing war in Afghanistan and the increased intake of Muslims into the Soviet Army (for demographic reasons) enhanced this perception. There is overt as well as covert evidence for this view. On 1 August 1982, for instance, 50 bronzed young men in uniforms took part in a demonstration in Pushkin Square in Moscow, marching in formation and singing nationalist and anti-Semitic songs, before dispersing after about 20 minutes. From the evidence available, no one is known to have interfered, and of course the whole incident received no publicity in the controlled press.

Other defiant actions by military personnel have also been reported and some have even been documented. The famous Col. Penkovsky, who cooperated with Western intelligence agencies in the 1960s, did so mainly because of his belief that the Soviet regime was leading the country into a catastrophic war. Some years later, Igor Sergeivich Glagolev, who maintained intermittent contact with the NTS while acting as an adviser to Gromyko, did so for ideological reasons.

In 1968, officers and sailors of the Baltic Fleet formed an organisation called the Union of Fighters for Political Freedom. The ideologist of the group, Gennady Gavrilov, was a party member and

naval weapons specialist who had served in nuclear submarines. The investigation established that Gavrilov was also editor of the group's programme, which stated that "immeasurable quantities of blood and dirt had covered our flag during the Bolshevik period, and the only solution was the armed struggle of the masses". The document circulated in four Soviet fleets, as well as in the following towns: Kronstadt, Tallin, Padliski, Lapae, Klaipede, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev and Baku.

Strong disquiet in the Soviet Navy was also indicated by a mutiny on the Soviet destroyer Storozhevoi on 8 November 1975. The mutiny was led by the first officer (Zampolit), who arrested members of the crew who refused to cooperate, then tried to sail into Swedish waters. The Krivak class warship (the Soviet Navy had eight of them in 1975) was manned by a 250-strong crew, 50 of whom died when Storozhevoi was shelled by Soviet aircraft, and when naval vessels were sent to intercept it. An undisclosed number of the mutineers were shot after a court martial in Riga, as indeed were other deserters in Berlin in 1953, in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

ANDROPOV HITS BACK

Andropov is now mobilising the forces at his disposal to suppress the "Russian Party". The means he is employing include the KGB, of course, but are much broader in range. His main resource is the Party bloc. He has also alerted the "military-industrial complex" to root out the "Russian Party" elements.

Andropov's promotion of the Azerbaijan party boss, Aliyev, to the Politburo can be interpreted as part of the picture, to the extent that it moves away from the heavy over-representation of Russians in the ruling group.

The military-industrial complex naturally sees the "Russian Party" as its mortal enemy. The cornering of economic resources by this group, to fulfil its huge and ever-growing programme, draws heavily on the Slavic population for its manpower. Afghanistan, moreover, has shown that the only reliable forces are the Slavic ones: the predominantly Muslim units sent into Afghanistan initially proved unreliable. (One high-ranking Soviet source has also claimed that troops involved in the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and on subsequent occupation duties are also not being used because they would be unable to "swallow" propaganda to the effect that the Soviet Army in Afghanistan is fighting against the Americans and Chinese.)

One of the main "battlefields" of the struggle for the allegiance of the population is in central Russia, where the scheme to industrialise agriculture, if successful, would leave only a small percentage of the rural population in the Russian villages, and would thus play a significant role in destroying Russian culture and traditions. The Soviet Communists present industrialisation and the accumulation of armaments in terms of the greatness and power of the Soviet State. Thus they compete with the environment-minded Russian nationalists in appealing to Russian xenophobia. (Indeed, they attempt to make a similar appeal to the Soviet — not ethnic — xenophobia of the non-Russian nationalities in the USSR — to stimulate mutual distrust and antagonism.)

Similarly, through the KGB and organs of the International Department, the regime encourages anti-Russian attitudes in the West — the rationale being that the West would have nothing to gain if the Soviet regime collapsed, since a Russian nationalist regime could present an even greater threat to Western survival.

The growing intensity with which Andropov's apparatus is waging its campaign against Russian nationalism confirms the view that the regime sees the "Russian Party" as a serious challenge.

We have devoted some space to this question because we believe it is important, in the light of the new American policy towards Communism, that the true situation in the USSR should be understood by the United States and other Western governments. It is clearly in the interests of the West that the "Russian Party" should be encouraged, for example, through the various Russian-language broadcasting services beamed on the Soviet Union.

The outcome of the Soviet Communist campaign to suppress the Russian nationalists is wide open and speculative. By hitting at the main Slavic group upon which the functioning and survival of the regime are heavily dependent, the Soviet leadership places itself in a quandary which is by definition almost insoluble. It has no alternative, however, but to intensify the repression, even if the long-term effects are bound to be a further weakening of the economic and social system.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 28, 1983

Dear Ms. Davis:

Thank you for your letter of November 15 and for the enclosed study entitled The Atlantic Alliance and U.S. Global Strategy. I shall read it with great interest and appreciate your thinking of me.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Jack F. Matlock", written over a horizontal line.

Jack F. Matlock

Ms. Jacquelyn K. Davis
IFPA
Central Plaza Building, Tenth Floor
675 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.

In association with The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University



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November 15, 1983

Mr. Jack F. Matlock
Senior Director,
European & Soviet Affairs
National Security Council
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Mr. Matlock:

Enclosed please find a copy of the most recent
Special Report of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
entitled The Atlantic Alliance and U.S. Global Strategy.

I look forward to receiving your comments.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

Jacquelyn K. Davis

Jacquelyn K. Davis

JKD:swm

Enclosure

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 28, 1983

Dear Arch:

Thank you very much for sending the copy of Workers Under Communism. I will read it with interest. Though I came across little detailed information about Vietnamese workers in Czechoslovakia when I was there, it was clear that they were not welcomed by the Czech and Slovak population. (They were, however, not resented as much as the Cubans, who tended to be more active, and thus intrusive, from the point of view of ordinary Czechs and Slovaks.)

It was good to see you at Ditchley and I hope our paths will cross again before long.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock

Mr. Arch Puddington
Editor, Workers Under Communism
275 Seventh Avenue, 25th Floor
New York, New York 10001

Workers Under Communism

A Journal of Information and Analysis

275 Seventh Avenue, 25th Fl.

New York, N.Y. 10001

(212) 989-8130

11/28

November 23, 1983

The Honorable Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director of European
and Soviet Affairs
The National Security Council
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Jack:

It was good meeting you at Ditchley. I thought you might be interested in the latest issue of Workers Under Communism. You should take special note of my piece on the use of Vietnamese workers in the Soviet bloc, particularly the section on Czechoslovakia. Also note the article on the ILO.

Sincerely,



ARCH PUDDINGTON
Editor

AP:ggw
opeiu 153
encl.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 28, 1983

Dear Dr. Jordan:

Thank you for your letter of November 7, 1983, inviting me to take part in the conference CSIS is sponsoring in Brussels on January 12-14, 1984.

As I previously informed your office by telephone, I will unfortunately be unable to participate in the conference because of commitments here at that time. However, I appreciate your thinking of me, and hope that I may be able to take advantage of future opportunities, if such should occur.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock

Mr. Amos A. Jordan
President. Center for Strategic &
International Studies
Georgetown University
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Did not see until 16th
Is offer still open?
When must they know
finally,
For coordination, is anyone
else on NSC staff
invited?

[Signature]

① Offer is still open.

② Need to know by next week.

② Paula was invited & has
accepted. ✓

Please call to say I have
tried to fit into my schedule
but will not be able to -

Done
11/28/83
rec

[Signature]

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Helen Kitchen
Michael Ledeen
Robert Leiken
Todd Leventhal
Edward N. Luttwak
Cornelius Glen McWright
Francis X. Murray
William Perry
Paul Craig Roberts
Barry Rubin
Alan Ned Sabrosky
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November 7, 1983

Mr. Jack Matlock
National Security Council (NSC)
Old Executive Office Building
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Jack:

The Center for Strategic and International Studies is sponsoring a major international conference, "The Future of NATO and Global Security", at the Palais d'Egmont in Brussels on January 12-14, 1984. The conference will bring together 175 prominent U.S., European, and Japanese leaders to assess the broad range of security problems now confronting NATO and the industrial democracies.

Henry Kissinger will chair the conference. Leo Tindemans (our host as Belgian Foreign Minister), Senator Sam Nunn, Helmut Schmidt, and Senator Ichiro Hatoyama will serve as co-chairmen. Each of these individuals will address the conference. We will also have a series of working groups ranging across the central security questions, including the vital role of economics and both public and parliamentary opinion.

The conference will be most timely, coming just after the initial INF deployments scheduled for December 1983, and as NATO begins to face up to a number of critical issues. Because of your contributions to developing a better understanding of consequential issues facing the alliance, we would like to invite you to join us in Brussels.

Should you accept our invitation, CSIS would be pleased to provide round-trip economy class travel to Brussels, plus hotel accommodations (The Brussels Hilton) and meals during the conference. The pertinent information on the conference and registration material is attached. We would appreciate it if you would list, in order of priority, your preference for participating in a working group (see attachment.)

OVERSEAS REPRESENTATIVES: Joseph Godson / Kenichi Ito / Joyce Starr


RESEARCH COUNCIL: Walter Laqueur, Chairman / James H. Billington / B. Boutros Boutros-Ghali / Robert F. Byrnes / Murray Feshback / Curt Gasteyer / Stephen P. Gilbert / Pierre Hassner / Robert J. Henle, S.I. / Samuel Huntington / Charles Issawi / Bernard Lewis / Laurence W. Martin / Thierry de Montbrial / John Norton Moore / Theodore H. Moran / David D. Newsom / Alec Nove / Robert Osgood / Robert Scalapino / Paul Seabury / Hugh Seton-Watson / Gaston J. Sigur / Henri Simonet / Robert E. Ward / Ben I. Wattenberg / Albert Wohlstetter / Roberta Wohlstetter / Aharon Yarin

We do hope that you will be able to accept. This conference will be one of CSIS' major efforts during 1984, and we expect that it will make a signal contribution to alliance thinking. Your participation would go a long way to ensuring its success.

Please RSVP by returning the attached material to Mary Park, Conference Coordinator. Due to space limitations we would appreciate your responding as soon as possible and at the latest by November 15. For inquiries, please contact Mrs. Park on 202-775-3261.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Amos A. Jordan".

Amos A. Jordan
President

Attachments



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

November 9, 1983

Dear Conference Participant:

Executive Travel and Tours has been chosen by CSIS to act as travel agent for "The Future of NATO and Global Security" conference to be held in Brussels, Belgium, January 12-14, 1984.

Please return the form directly to Executive Travel or enclose it with the other return forms to me no later than November 15.

We certainly hope you will be able to join us in Brussels.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Mary B. Park".

Mary B. Park
Conference Coordinator



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

THE FUTURE OF NATO AND GLOBAL SECURITY

BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

JANUARY 12-14, 1984

WORKING GROUP SELECTION FORM

Listed below are the seven working groups, please select your preferences in ranking order 1-4 and return along with the response form in the enclosed envelope.

- ☐ I. THE SOVIET UNION
- ☐ II. ECONOMICS
- ☐ III. WESTERN DEFENSE
- ☐ IV. DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL
- ☐ V. PUBLIC OPINION AND PARLIAMENTS
- ☐ VI. JAPAN AND WESTERN SECURITY
- ☐ VII. REGIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

RESPONSE FORM

THE FUTURE OF NATO AND GLOBAL SECURITY

BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

JANUARY 12-14, 1983

Please fill in and return no later than November 15, 1983 in the enclosed envelope to:

Mary B. Park
Conference Coordinator

☐

I WILL ATTEND

☐

MY SPOUSE WILL ACCOMPANY ME*

☐

I WILL BE UNABLE TO ATTEND

NAME _____

TITLE _____

ORGANIZATION _____

ADDRESS _____

BUSINESS PHONE _____ HOME PHONE _____

EMERGENCY CONTACT _____ PHONE _____

*Spouses are invited to attend all dinner functions. CSIS will also provide for hotel accommodations during the conference, but cannot provide transportation to Brussels.

ETJ

Executive Travel and Tours

NATO and GLOBAL SECURITY CONFERENCE
January 12 - 14, 1984

Executive Travel and Tours has been selected by the Center for Strategic International Studies, Georgetown University, to handle the travel arrangements for individuals attending the CSIS conference in Brussels, Belgium, January 12 - 14, 1984.

To assist in arranging your travel plans please complete the form below and return it to Executive Travel and Tours, Suite 100, 1477 Chain Bridge Road, McLean, Virginia 22101, or call JoAnne or Jackie at (703) 556-6561. This should be done at your earliest convenience. Be sure to include your seating preference and any other special requirements you may desire. Executive Travel will assure that all preferences receive priority consideration through our special arrangements with the carriers.

Sample round-trip air fares, based on current tariffs, are presented for your information and planning:

From:	<u>Los Angeles</u>	<u>Dallas</u>	<u>Chicago</u>	<u>Washington</u>	<u>New York</u>
Apex **	\$ 840.00	\$ 737.00	\$ 715.00	\$ 606.00	\$ 550.00
Coach	1484.00	1408.00	1370.00	1250.00	1150.00
Business	2236.00	1870.00	1752.00	1548.00	1398.00
First	3778.00	3470.00	3410.00	3030.00	2780.00

**restrictions apply

Please reply by November 15, 1983 to guarantee reservations at lowest applicable fares.

Name: _____

Address: _____

Telephone: (business) _____ (home) _____

Seating Preference: _____ smoking/non-smoking _____ aisle/window

Other Requirements: _____

PURCHASE ORDER # 209 ECONOMY CLASS ONLY AMERICAN CARRIER ONLY

PLEASE APPLY TO CSIS AMERICAN EXPRESS CARD:

Departure City and Date: _____

Return Date: _____



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

THE FUTURE OF NATO AND GLOBAL SECURITY

January 12-14, 1984

Brussels, Belgium

Agenda

THURSDAY, JANUARY 12

All Day	Registration	Palais d'Egmont
6:00pm	Reception	
7:00pm	Dinner	
	CSIS Introduction Amos A. Jordan, Jr. President, CSIS	
	Greetings Joseph Luns Secretary-General of NATO	
	Welcome Speech Leo Tindemans Foreign Minister, Belgium	
9:00pm	Adjourn	

FRIDAY, JANUARY 13

8:00-8:45am	Breakfast
9:00am	Introductions
	Keynote Address Henry A. Kissinger Counselor, CSIS
10:30am	Coffee Break
10:45am	Third Plenary Speech (Iichiro Hatoyama)

FRIDAY, JANUARY 13 (continued)

12:00 noon-1:30pm

Luncheon

Fourth Plenary Speech
(Senator Sam Nunn)

2:00-3:45pm

Working Groups, First Paper

- I. The Soviet Union (including
East-West Relations in Europe)
- II. Economic Challenges and Responses
- III. The Structure of Western Defense
(including U.S. Defense Policy)
- IV. Defense and Arms Control
- V. Public Opinion and Parliaments
- VI. Japan and Western Security
- VII. Regional Security Problems

3:45pm

Coffee Break

4:00-5:45pm

Working Groups, Second Paper

6:45-7:45pm

Reception

7:45-9:30pm

Dinner

Fifth Plenary Speech
(Helmut Schmidt)

SATURDAY, JANUARY 14

8:00-8:45am

Breakfast

9:00am

Plenary Report on Working Group I

9:30am

Plenary Report on Working Group II

10:00am

Coffee Break

10:15-11:15am

Plenary Reports on Working Groups VI and VII

11:45am-12:45pm

Luncheon

1:15-2:30pm

Plenary Reports on Working Groups III, IV and V

2:30-2:45pm

Coffee Break

SATURDAY, JANUARY 14 (continued)

2:45-4:00pm	Synthesis of Reports (Robert Hunter, James Schlesinger, Jean Francois-Poncet and Viscount Davignon)
4:00-4:15pm	Concluding Remarks (Drs. Kissinger and Jordan)
4:30pm	Conference Adjourns
4:30-5:30pm	Final Reception

NOTE: Each working group will have two papers, for a total of fourteen, which will be distributed in advance of the conference.

THE FUTURE OF NATO AND GLOBAL SECURITY

January 12-14, 1984
Brussels, Belgium

SYNOPSIS OF WORKING GROUPS

Each of the working groups will include two papers designed to present current and future problems and to propose alternative solutions. Following the conference, each author will incorporate conclusions based on conference discussion prior to publication.

Working group chairmen and paper writers follow working group titles and subtitles.

I. The Soviet Union - chaired by Ambassador Robert Ford, Canada

- a.) Policy towards the Soviet Union - Can the West Agree?
(Are the differences of view/interest so profound that there will have to be a "least common denominator" alliance?)

-- William Hyland, United States

- b.) Change and Challenge in Eastern Europe - Toward An Allied Strategy
(How will NATO respond to future challenges to Soviet authority by Eastern Europe, both in the short and long-term,)

-- Richard Davy, United Kingdom

II. Economic Challenges and Responses - chaired by Robert Hormats, United States

- a.) The Global Economy in the 1980's: Underpinning the Structure of Security
(How do global economic policies help or hinder Western Security, and what should be done about it?)

-- Ambassador Bunroku Yoshino, Japan

- b.) Economics and Western Security in the Third World
(What is the significance and the challenges of North-South economic relations?)

-- Thierry de Montbrial, France

III. The Structure of Western Defense - chaired by General Sverre Hamre, Norway

- a.) Rethinking Continental Defense: Techniques, Technology and Coalition Defense Structure
(What is the potential impact on allied conventional defense of new technologies and doctrines?)

-- Franz-Josef Schulze, West Germany

- b.) U.S. Defense Policy: European Commitments vs. Global Engagement
(The future structure of U.S. military forces in Europe and the merits of a true "coalition" defense posture for NATO)

-- Robert Komer, United States

IV. Defense and Arms Control - chaired by Brent Scowcroft, United States

- a.) Weapons, Doctrines, and Arms Control: Weaving a Sealess Web.
(The evolution and interactions between nuclear force structure, doctrines and arms control.)

-- Lawrence Freedman, United Kingdom

- b.) After two track: Relating Theater and Intercontinental Weapons and Arms Control
(Relating nuclear weapons issues at intermediate - and intercontinental ranges, following initial INF deployments, with emphasis on both force structure and arms control.)

-- James Thomson, United States

V. Public Opinion and Parliaments -- chaired by Peter Corterier, West Germany

- a.) Citizens, Change and Security: Sustaining the Consensus
(In particular, what is the impact of generational change plus neutralist and pacifist movements?)

-- John Reilly, United States

- b.) Parliaments, Security and Economic Choice: What must "Give?"
(Will economic priorities dictate future defense strategies or vice versa? What will be the impact of generational change, etc.?)

-- Gro Harlem Brundtland, Norway

VI. Japan and Western Security - chaired by Robert O'Neill, I.I.S.S.

- a.) Japan in the Pacific: The Structure of Security
(What role should Japanese self defense forces play in the Pacific theater?)

-- Seizaburo Sato, Japan

- b.) The West Together: Japan's Role Beyond the Pacific
(How can Japan's strategy of "comprehensive" security be incorporated into the shared global security responsibilities of the industrial democracies?)

-- Makoto Momoi, Japan

VII. Regional Security Problems - chaired by Congressman Motoo Shiina, Japan
(The increasing importance of "outside of area" problems either to individual allies or to the alliance as a whole - including differences of view about the nature and source of threats, and the nature of and responsibility for Western responses.)

a.) Tensions within the West: The Middle East

-- Dominique Moisi, France

b.) Tensions within the West: The Caribbean

-- Catherine Kelleher, United States

Mary B. Park
Conference Coordinator
Center for Strategic & International Studies
1800 K Street N.W. Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS) November 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK LAYNE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Declassification Review Requests F83-957
F83-1043

I strongly recommend that the attached material not be released for declassification. It relates to Chief of State correspondence, some not through regular channels, and some of the persons involved are still alive and active.

Official release of the actual documents, regardless of whether the substance has already reached the public domain (a point I am unable to determine), would impair the ability of the Administration and its successors to deal confidentially with the Soviet Union at the Chief of State level.

If State does not agree with this reasoning, they should be requested to clear the State position at least at the level of the Undersecretary for Political Affairs before resubmitting to the NSC for consideration.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~WITH TOP SECRET~~
~~ATTACHMENTS~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M08-244 #78446
BY RW NARA DATE 8/5/10

78447 C

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 30, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Status of Consulates and Exchange Agreements
with USSR

According to NSDD-102 (KAL actions), negotiations on these topics were "suspended." This remains our policy. I don't think there is any confusion about this in the bureaucracy. I doubt that we need a clarification unless and until a decision is made to change NSDD-102.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 108-244#78447

BY RW NARA DATE 8/5/10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28 AUG 83

TO: Admiral Poindexter
FROM: Jack Matlock
SUB: Attached Memo from Poole

OSD participated in the interagency meetings prior to the decision.

However, the President decided to proceed with negotiations on consular and an exchanges agreement in a meeting with Shultz and the scheduled NSC meeting was cancelled.

Subsequently, State was directed to develop negotiating plans on a close-hold basis. OSD was not included in this since - in State's opinion - OSD did not have a direct interest [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I believe that State's call was defensible, since the technology control aspects are handled elsewhere and there was no direct DoD interest.

[REDACTED] otherwise [REDACTED]

Jack

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)(6)

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NLR/M08-244 #78448
BY R/W NARA DATE 8/5/10



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

17 NOV 1983

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: OSD Participation in Decisions on US-Soviet Exchange
and Consulate Matters

Whether to proceed with new US-Soviet scientific and cultural exchanges and whether to negotiate with the Soviets the opening of new consulates are issues involving political, intelligence, and technology transfer questions in which OSD has great interest. Those issues were discussed in the Soviet Nationalities Interagency Working Group, which produced the recent draft NSDD and in which OSD participated actively.

I have learned, however -- originally from a Hedrick Smith article in The New York Times -- that decisions on exchanges and consulates were taken last summer in a forum which did not include OSD. As those decisions were suspended following the attack on KAL 007, I hope you can assure me that they will not be implemented without further interagency review in which OSD will be invited to participate.

Richard Perle
Richard Perle

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Home Leave

I would like to take a brief home leave over the Christmas and New Year's holidays, specifically from December 22 to January 3. The office will be covered during this period by a reduced staff, but I believe this will be adequate, given the holidays. Ty Cobb will be in the office the week following Christmas, and Peter Sommer will be available in Washington if he is needed.

My home leave address is Pompano Beach, Florida, and I could of course return to Washington rapidly if an unexpected crisis should require my presence.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve leave from December 22, 1983 until January 3, 1984.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


November 30, 1983

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for your letter of November 25 and the enclosed pictures. They will provide my wife and me valued souvenirs of the pleasant evening we spent with you and Mrs. Suja.

With our warm regards and best wishes to you and Mrs. Suja,

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Jack F. Matlock". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Jack" and last name "Matlock" clearly distinguishable.

Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant
to the President

His Excellency
Dr. Stanislav Suja
Ambassador
Embassy of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic
3900 Linnean Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

11/29

The Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Washington, D. C.

November 25, 1983

Excellency,

Enclosed please find some pictures from a very pleasant meeting with you and your charming wife in our residence other day. I am sending also photographs of two gobelin-tapestries located in the building of our Embassy /as promised/, but unfortunately I was not able so far to discover the names of authors. I asked my Ministry for an assistance. I let you know immediately as soon as I get an appropriate information.

With our best regards to Mrs. Matlock.

Please accept, Excellency, assurance of my highest consideration.

Stanislav Sujar

Dr. Stanislav SUJA
Ambassador

The Honorable
Jack F. Matlock
National Security Council
Room 368
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506

~~COMPUTER DISK~~ TRANSFER SHEET

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Series: _____

File Folder Title: Matlock Chron - Nov 1984 [4 of 4]

The following material was withdrawn from this segment of the collection and transferred to a separate parallel file for preservation purposes.

Description:

Snapshots
Matlock at informal dinner

6 color

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