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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 4, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER  
FROM: MICHAEL A. McMANUS, JR. *McManus*  
SUBJECT: 1985 State of the Union  
Communications Plan Update

As you requested this morning, attached is an updated communications plan for the 1985 State of the Union Address.

You'll notice that the only unconfirmed action item is the 4 p.m. White House press briefing with Regan and McFarlane. We're told that Speakes wants to talk with Regan about this.

COMMUNICATIONS PLAN  
1985 STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6

- o 10:00 a.m. RR meets with GOP congressional leaders. Oglesby  
Discusses themes of speech.
- o 11:30 a.m. Network anchors. Mathis  
Luncheon in Roosevelt Room for network anchors with briefing on SOTU themes by Regan, Svahn, and McFarlane. RR drop by.
- o 3:00 p.m. Foreign Press. Small  
Ken Dam or Mike Armacost briefs foreign news media on foreign policy themes and foreign impact of domestic policy initiatives. Foreign press center.
- o 3:00 p.m. Columnists and Weekend Commentators. Mathis  
Roosevelt Room briefing for major columnists and t.v. weekend commentators on SOTU themes by Regan, Svahn and McFarlane.
- o 4:00 p.m. White House Press Corps. Speakes  
Briefing in White House Briefing Room by McFarlane and Regan on content and themes of SOTU. Embargoed fact sheet released. Authorized quotes released for evening news. (T)
- o 4:00 p.m. Cabinet briefing by Craig Fuller. Fuller
- o 4:30 p.m. Core group of surrogates. Ryan  
Surrogates are briefed by Fuller in Roosevelt Room on budget and SOTU themes.

o 5:00 p.m. Administration Appointees Briefing. Fuller

Presidential appointees are briefed by Fuller on major themes of speech. Talking points and fact sheets are provided. Room 450 (Includes Public Affairs Officers.)

o 6:00 p.m. Congressional Television Tapings. Oglesby

Supportive Senators -- with talking points and fact sheet -- videotape reaction to Senate Republican Conference for feeds to local stations on nationwide basis. Senate Television Studio.

o 9:00 p.m. The President delivers the State of the Union Address -- Capitol Hill.

o 10:30 p.m. Congressional Reaction. Oglesby

Favorable Members of Congress, armed with fact sheets and talking points (provided by the White House), hold press conferences, television interviews and issue statements supportive of RR's address. Statuary Hall.

o 10:30 p.m. Mayors and Governors Reaction. Verstandig

Office of Intergovernmental Affairs briefs key supportive Mayors and Governors throughout the day; encourages them to hold news conferences in home towns following Address to show support.

SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIVITIESACTION

- Speech summary, talking points and fact sheets are prepared for early distribution. Baroody
- Speech materials provided to entire press list, editorial page editors, specialized press nationwide. Mathis
- Speech materials sent out to all Administration spokesmen in all agencies. Baroody
- Speech materials provided through the Republican National Committee to State Chairmen and other supporters nationwide. Baroody
- Fact sheets and talking points provided to key congressional supporters. Oglesby
- Op-ed pieces are written, signed by Administration officials and placed for late week and weekend use across the country. Baroody
- Public Liaison special briefings for relevant interest groups to be arranged in days following SOTU. Donatelli

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 8, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM:

PAM BAILEY

*Pub*

SUBJECT:

COMMUNICATIONS PLAN FEBRUARY 11 through APRIL 5

We may want to break the communications plan between February 19 and April 5 into two distinct but complementary phases.

The first, February 19 to March 18 could follow a strategy of presenting RR as an activist leader in selling his program and inspiring the Nation to respond to the challenge of a Second American Revolution. Through events, travel and meetings he could reinforce the major themes of his State of the Union Address. (Freedom and peace; opportunity, growth and jobs; traditional values; and the future.) Spotlighting a particular theme would coincide with the timing and strategy of related legislative initiatives.

At the same time, surrogates and external supporters could be utilized to get the facts out on the budget and to develop broad-based support for RR's proposals. The Citizens for America initiative is one example. Each Cabinet member could be asked to develop and implement his/her own communications plan for his/her budget to key groups, regions and the media.

From March 19 to Easter RR could travel (to 30-40 swing Congressional districts or however Legislative Affairs recommends) leading up to date-certain for the budget vote. The effort would be intensive and unprecedented, hitting several stops each day. A detailed plan including relevant interest groups, surrogates, and media relations activity would be tied into and complementary to RR's efforts.

Attached for review and discussion at our February 11 Communications Planning Group meeting are a proposed agenda (TAB A); SOTU themes and related policy initiatives for which we need guidance on anticipated timing (TAB B); and a February 11 to March 19 communications plan showing those events currently scheduled (TAB C).

COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING MEETING  
February 11, 1985

- I. Discuss General Strategic Approach:  
February 19 - March 18  
March 19 - Easter recess
  
- II. Review Key Themes and Legislative Timetable
  
- III. Develop Approach to Coordinate Themes, Scheduling  
and Legislative Strategy (i.e. select key themes,  
ask Ryan to propose events and schedule consistent  
with legislative strategy and timing).

THEMES

LEGISLATION

- |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| I. OPPORTUNITY, GROWTH, JOBS<br>(deficit reduction, reduce<br>role of government, create<br>new businesses, tax reform,<br>deregulation) | o budget vote<br>o tax reform<br>o line item veto<br>o balanced budget<br>amendment<br>o enterprise zones<br>o trade talks<br>o trade policy<br>o JTPA<br>o Youth Wage<br>o eliminate govt.<br>subsidies (farm,<br>Amtrak, etc.) |
| II. TRADITIONAL VALUES<br>(faith, family, education,<br>work, compassion, volunteerism,<br>neighborhood, courage)                        | o tuition tax credit<br>o education<br>o abortion<br>o school prayer<br>o crime                                                                                                                                                  |
| III. FREEDOM, PEACE                                                                                                                      | o SDI<br>o Defense Budget<br>o U.S.-Soviet Talks<br>o MX missile<br>o Defense of Freedom<br>(3rd world econ.<br>dev., CentralAm.,<br>Afghanistan)                                                                                |
| IV. FUTURE, YOUTH, CHALLENGE<br>(high tech, space,<br>entrepreneur)                                                                      | o space station<br>o commercialization<br>of space                                                                                                                                                                               |

Monday, February 11

ACTION

MAJOR EVENT: King Fahd State Visit

o 10:00 a.m. RR welcomes King Fahd. \_\_\_\_\_

o 2:45 p.m. RR interview with New York Times \_\_\_\_\_

o 7:15 p.m. Fahd State Dinner. \_\_\_\_\_

Tuesday, February 12 (Lincoln's Birthday)

MAJOR EVENT: RR Hosts New Pioneers Luncheon.

o 12:00 noon RR hosts lunch for New Pioneers (includes award-winning scientists, engineers and inventors). \_\_\_\_\_

oo Trade press notified for coverage and follow-up interviews. \_\_\_\_\_

oo Morning news shows alerted. Segment possible? \_\_\_\_\_

oo One-on-one interviews arranged following lunch. \_\_\_\_\_

Wednesday, February 13

MAJOR EVENT: RR to ranch.

o TBD RR interview with Santa Barbara Daily News. Press \_\_\_\_\_

Thursday, February 14 (Valentine's Day)

RANCH

Friday, February 15

ACTION

RANCH

Saturday, February 16

MAJOR EVENT: Radio Talk.  
Topic?

Monday, February 18 (Washington's Birthday)

Tuesday, February 19

MAJOR EVENT: RR Presents High Tech Awards.

- o (T) 9:30 a.m. Bi-Partisan Congressional Leadership. \_\_\_\_\_
- o 1:00 p.m. RR drop-by briefing for high tech press. \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Media Relations day-long briefing for high tech and business press.
- o 1:30 p.m. RR presents National Technology awards to 11 individuals. \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Local media and trade press alerted for coverage and follow-up interviews. \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Media Relations does day-long briefing for high tech and business press. \_\_\_\_\_
- o 4:00 p.m. RR meeting with Senate Armed Services and appropriations committees. \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo News coverage?

Wednesday, February 20

ACTION

MAJOR EVENT: Prime Minister Thatcher Visit.

- o 12:00 noon RR meeting and lunch with PM Thatcher. \_\_\_\_\_
- o 1:15 p.m. RR seminar meeting with Thatcher. \_\_\_\_\_
- o 2:30 p.m. Press Conference preparation. \_\_\_\_\_

Thursday, February 21

MAJOR EVENT: News Conference.

- o 11:00 a.m. RR drop-by Room 450 for Leadership of National Conference of State Legislators. \_\_\_\_\_
- o 8:00 p.m. RR News Conference. \_\_\_\_\_

Friday, February 22

MAJOR EVENT: RR Meeting with Commission on Excellence in Education.

- o 11:00 a.m. RR meets with Excellence on Education Commission \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Secretary Bennett and Gardner brief press following meeting. \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Fact sheet released on progress in education. \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Satellite interviews set up with Gardner and Bennett. \_\_\_\_\_

- o 1:15 p.m. RR interview with Business Week. \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Key points? RR looks ahead to next four years. Key points could include prospects for growth, opportunity and the future through high tech, entrepreneurs, American "pioneer" spirit as exemplified at lunch.

Saturday, February 23

MAJOR EVENT: Radio Talk: Topic?

Sunday, February 24

- o 7:30 p.m. RR hosts Nation's Governors for dinner. \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Remarks focus?

Monday, February 25

MAJOR EVENT: RR Address to Governors.

- o 11:30 a.m. RR speech to Nation's Governors. \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Remarks topic? \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Remarks distributed to editorial boards, columnists and major media nationwide. \_\_\_\_\_
- o 2:00 p.m. RR drop-by 450 briefing for Grace Commission \_\_\_\_\_
- o 2:45 p.m. RR interview with Germond and Witcover \_\_\_\_\_

Tuesday, February 26

ACTION

MAJOR EVENT: RR meeting with Joint Chiefs of Staff (?)

- o 9:30 a.m. (T) RR meeting with GOP Leadership \_\_\_\_\_
- o 11:00 a.m. RR meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff \_\_\_\_\_
- o 1:30 p.m. RR drop-by briefing of ALEC. \_\_\_\_\_

Wednesday, February 27

MAJOR EVENT: RR Presents Medal of Science.

- o 9:00 a.m. RR breakfast with GOP Senators class of '80. \_\_\_\_\_
- o 11:30 a.m. RR presents Medal of Science to 19 U.S. scientists and engineers \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Local media and trade press alerted. Follow-up and home town interviews arranged. \_\_\_\_\_

Thursday, February 28

MAJOR EVENT: ?

Friday, March 1

ACTION

MAJOR EVENT: ?

o 9:45 a.m. RR meeting with President of Sudan. \_\_\_\_\_

o Evening RR address to CPAC dinner. \_\_\_\_\_

Saturday, March 2

MAJOR EVENT: RR Radio Talk.  
Topic? \_\_\_\_\_

Monday, March 4

MAJOR EVENT: ?

o 11:30 a.m. RR presents Adult Literacy Awards. \_\_\_\_\_

Tuesday, March 5

MAJOR EVENT: RR meets with P. M. Craxi.

o 11:30 a.m. RR meets with P.M. Craxi of Italy. \_\_\_\_\_

Wednesday, March 6

ACTION

MAJOR EVENT: ?

Thursday, March 7

MAJOR EVENT: ?

o 11:45 a.m. RR drops-by briefing for National  
Newspapers Association.

---

Friday, March 8

MAJOR EVENT: ?

Saturday, March 9

MAJOR EVENT: Radio Talk.  
Topic?

---

Monday, March 11

MAJOR EVENT: ?

Tuesday, March 12

ACTION

MAJOR EVENT: RR meets with President Muborak.

o 11:30 a.m. RR meets with President Muborak of Egypt. \_\_\_\_\_

Wednesday, March 13

MAJOR EVENT: ?

o 1:15 p.m. RR drops-by briefing for American Business Conference. \_\_\_\_\_

Thursday, March 14

MAJOR EVENT: ?

Friday, March 15

MAJOR EVENT: ?

o 10:45 a.m. RR presentation of shamrocks. \_\_\_\_\_

Saturday, March 16

ACTION

MAJOR EVENT: RR Radio Talk.  
Topic?

Sunday, March 17 (St. Patrick's Day)

MAJOR EVENT: RR to Quebec.  
RR in Quebec.

Monday, March 18 RR in Quebec.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

By NARA *ARJ* Date *10/20/04* February 11, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM:

PAT BUCHANAN

*PJB*

*Bill -  
won't go  
try to call - shelf  
route to Buchanan*

Just talked for fifteen minutes with Jesse Jackson; he will be out of the hospital Wednesday; had it pretty rough he said, but improving now. Suggest holding off on the telephone call; because the first thing Jackson will say is to ask for a personal meeting with the President to discuss "enterprize zones," and we don't want to commit to that right now.

On the radio speech, an excellent idea; however, my view is that we should treat it as a "presidential" subject, and thus do it in the Camp David Series, rather than go down to the Black Radio Stations, which has to me a connotation of patronizing. If you think it advised, I can get the speech shop working up a draft on the successes, achievements and enduring problems of Black America, and how the President thinks the country should best proceed with its "unfinished agenda," etc.

*OK*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TO: Pat Buchanan

FROM: MICHAEL K. DEEVER  
Assistant to the President  
Deputy Chief of Staff

Information

Action

Can I have you thoughts on  
this please.

Thanks.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 8, 1985

*Pat B.*  
*Can I have your*  
*thoughts on*  
*this pls.*  
*Mike*

MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE DEEVER

FROM: PETE ROUSSEL *PR*

SUBJECT: Our Black Effort

In connection with Black History Month and in view of such negative articles as the attached, here are some suggestions for your consideration.

1. Call Jesse Jackson. He's in Howard University Hospital suffering from exhaustion and possible pneumonia. This would be certain to generate coverage, and, if confined to extending wishes for a prompt recovery, would seem to have no downside.
2. It was in the USA TODAY interview (January 17, 1985) that the President first talked about the black populace not being informed by their leaders as to the Administration's efforts on such things as Enterprise Zones, aid to black colleges, fair housing, inflation reduction, etc. The implication was left, as in the case of the budget, that the President might like to take this message directly to the rank-and-file without it being diluted by the black leadership.

*↓*  
*PRB*  
*Announcement*

*NOTE*

In this regard, why not consider having the RNC buy time on key black radio stations throughout the country and have a series of 5-minute messages by the President broadcast on these issues. Perhaps a trip could be considered to a predominantly black area (maybe a black radio station within a potential Enterprise Zone) from where one one of the broadcasts could emanate and, thus, further highlight the effort.

*NOTE*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM:

PAMELA G. BAILEY *PAB*

SUBJECT:

Communications Plan  
February through April

We agreed at the February 11 communications meeting that our basic strategy over the next several weeks should be to emphasize positive, forward-looking events, enabling RR to continue stressing the major themes of his State of the Union Address. (Tab A) As an activist, future oriented leader, RR would maintain and build upon the enormous popular support for his overall program -- calling upon this support when needed in specific, major legislative battles. Senate budget floor action would be the week of March 18 and MX votes during the week of March 18 and 25.

Fred Ryan's memo presents scheduling options consistent with this strategy over the long-term. Once we've agreed on events and/or additional travel, a detailed communications plan supplementing that schedule can be developed.

For the short-term, we should review the attached two-week communications plan (Tab B) for the time period immediately after California. While this schedule has news events nearly every day, it lacks any consistent or sustained theme. Should we make additions? If so, what? Does Legislative Affairs have any special need during this time?

Also, looking ahead to the first 10 days of March, do we want to build in some travel to specific Congressional areas?

Finally, do you want to discuss ideas for a communications plan leading up the Geneva talks, March 12?

cc: Michael A. McManus

THEMES

LEGISLATION

- I. OPPORTUNITY, GROWTH, JOBS  
(deficit reduction, reduce  
role of government, create  
new businesses, tax reform,  
deregulation)
- II. TRADITIONAL VALUES  
(faith, family, education,  
work, compassion, volunteerism,  
neighborhood, courage)
- III. FREEDOM, PEACE
- IV. FUTURE, YOUTH, CHALLENGE  
(high tech, space,  
entrepreneur)
- o budget vote
  - o tax reform
  - o line item veto
  - o balanced budget amendment
  - o enterprise zones
  - o trade talks
  - o trade policy
  - o JTPA
  - o Youth Wage
  - o eliminate govt. subsidies (farm, Amtrak, etc.)
  - o tuition tax credit
  - o education
  - o vouchers
  - o abortion
  - o school prayer
  - o crime
  - o SDI
  - o Defense Budget
  - o U.S.-Soviet Talks
  - o MX missile
  - o Defense of Freedom (3rd world econ. dev., CentralAm., Afghanistan)
  - o space station
  - o commercialization of space

Monday, February 18 (Washington's Birthday)

ACTION

Tuesday, February 19

MAJOR EVENT: RR Presents High Tech Awards.

- o (T) 9:30 a.m. Bi-Partisan Congressional Leadership. \_\_\_\_\_
- o 1:00 p.m. RR drop-by briefing for high tech press. \_\_\_\_\_
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- o 4:00 p.m. RR meeting with Senate Armed Services and appropriations committees. \_\_\_\_\_
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MAJOR EVENT: Prime Minister Thatcher Visit.

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Thursday, February 21

ACTION

MAJOR EVENT: News Conference.

- o 11:00 a.m. RR drop-by Room 450 for Leadership of National Conference of State Legislators. \_\_\_\_\_
- o 8:00 p.m. RR News Conference. Opening Statement? \_\_\_\_\_

Friday, February 22

MAJOR EVENT: RR Meeting with Commission on Excellence in Education.

- o 11:00 a.m. RR meets with Excellence on Education Commission \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Secretary Bennett and Gardner brief press following meeting. \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Fact sheet released on progress in education. \_\_\_\_\_
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  - oo Key points? RR looks ahead to next four years. Key points could include prospects for growth, opportunity and the future through high tech, entrepreneurs, American "pioneer" spirit as exemplified at lunch.

Saturday, February 23

MAJOR EVENT: Radio Talk: Topic?

Sunday, February 24

ACTION

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  - oo Remarks topic? \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Remarks distributed to editorial boards, columnists and major media nationwide. \_\_\_\_\_
  - oo Supportive Governors scheduled for follow-up interviews. \_\_\_\_\_
- o 2:00 p.m. RR drop-by 450 briefing for Grace Commission \_\_\_\_\_
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Tuesday, February 26

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Thursday, February 28

MAJOR EVENT: ?

Friday, March 1

MAJOR EVENT: ?

- o 9:45 a.m. RR meeting with President of Sudan. \_\_\_\_\_
- o Evening RR address to CPAC dinner. \_\_\_\_\_

Saturday, March 2

MAJOR EVENT: RR Radio Talk.  
Topic? \_\_\_\_\_

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 13, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL DEEVER

FROM: MAX FRIEDERSDORF *M-F*

SUBJECT: Comments on Presidential Themes and Events through May 1985

*sent to FR*  
*for comments*  
*before 11:00*  
*Comm meeting*

Per your request, my comments on Fred Ryan's memorandum:

I generally agree with taking the high road, i.e., "The Future," and "Education," and "High Tech."

However, these commendable and altruistic goals must be based on a foundation of economic growth at home and stability in the world.

We need the underpinning of less government, lower taxes and a strong national security to come thru, in all of these events, despite the somewhat escoterie approach to the "Future," "Education," and "High Tech."

Fred's excellent proposed events for February thru May, all present opportunities, albeit subtle in some cases, for our economic growth and national defense themes necessary for prodding the Congress.

Your April 15 suggestion for an introduction of the tax reform bill is a natural, and could be orchestrated with full fanfare.

Your imagination is more fertile than mine, but I could envision the President delivering the bill personally to the Congressional leadership, accompanied by some representative tax payers or he could go to Boston (another tea party?); to Independence Hall; to the I.R.S., visit some H. & R. Block offices to soothe harried tax payers; the options are limitless.

I'm a little nervous about the space shuttle launching event. Public reaction to Garn's participation has been skeptical. I have a gut feeling about this one and would rather see the President attend the landing rather than take off.

All of the other suggestions seem to be tried and true forums for the President and offer excellent opportunities to promote his themes.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 20, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: PAMELA G. BAILEY *Pub*

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Black Strategy Follow-up Memo

You asked for my thoughts on the attached memo.

Summary Points

1. The memo is a collection of comments and ideas on how to deal with the "black problem." It is not a strategy.
2. The paper has no clear objective. It assumes that we should be appealing to blacks in general without stating a purpose (i.e., is the purpose to have more blacks of all ages and economic group "approve" of RR; or do we want more young blacks to vote Republican; or do we want to reach those over 50 in the South, etc?)
3. It wrongly promotes the need to develop new policies rather than new communication strategies.

Recommendations

1. Survey data should be analyzed in order to determine objectives for a black initiative. Careful thought should be given to attitudes as broken down by age, economic status and region. I would assume blacks are no more monolithic in their views, concerns and priorities than whites.

2. Once objectives are set, a detailed plan can be developed to achieve them. This plan would probably be much more based in the communications area than in policy. I disagree with the need to "develop a policy package that addresses the very real problems of black Americans from a conservative standpoint." RR doesn't develop policy "packages" for particular special interests -- he argued against such an approach in the last election. RR's policies over the last four years have worked "to address the very real problems of black Americans" and, indeed, of all Americans. The challenge now seems to be how to better explain to minorities the benefits of his policies -- not how to design new ones.
3. Symbolic visual actions should not be lightly dismissed. Events such as RR's ceremony signing the MLK legislation, welcoming home Lt. Goodwin, and honoring Mother Hale have gone a long way toward visually demonstrating that RR is truly President of all the people. Public Liasion, the Political Office and Congressional Liasion should be encouraged to continue recommending such events -- not only for blacks but for all minority groups. There are a host of events we could undertake to show how RR's policies have benefitted blacks -- (i.e., job training, education reforms, crime bill, etc.).
4. Is a special strategy needed only for blacks or -- if we're talking about communication initiatives -- should various White House offices be asked to work with Public Liaison to develop targetted communications plans for several minority groups? For instance, how can we justify a special initiative for blacks but not Hispanics?

#### General Comments

The basic points of the paper are uncomfortably similar to the special interest pandering we so criticized the Democrats for during the campaign.

I would find it hard to justify a reexamination of our policies to see what more we can do to respond to the concerns of blacks -- unless we want to undertake a similar review of policies to help Hispanics, women, labor, Asian-Americans, etc.

This approach is not RR's way. He and his policies for economic growth, freedom, opportunity and jobs are right for all Americans.

Suggestions that we foster a "public debate" on the problems of black Americans are misguided, too. It would be a contradiction of all that RR has stood for to push for a debate on policies as they affect a particular segment of the population.

Finally, I would recommend that before any major RR policy statement be made on civil rights that careful analysis be done on why. The paper is accurate in stating we face a "perceptual" problem in civil rights and that the civil rights lobby's vested interests is a major cause of the problem. But, again, who would we be trying to reach? Blacks, whites, black leaders? One or all? This may be an area where actions can speak louder than words. I'm not sure that a war of words will do anything other than provoke the traditional leaders to debate and criticize. Our purposes may be better served by not dealing with the issue on their terms. I suspect civil rights and other basic terminology will always mean something different to Brad Reynolds compared to Vernon Jordan -- even though our end result may be the same. This may be an area where action, events, and visuals can convey RR's strong civil rights commitments better than speeches and new policy packages.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 12, 1985

*Pam  
give me  
your thoughts  
on this -*

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD REGAN  
MICHAEL K. DEEVER ✓

FROM: JAMES CICCONI *JWC*

SUBJECT: Follow-Up on Black Strategy

In a previous memo, I outlined a possible strategy for reaching out to black Americans. Assuming agreement on the need for such an effort, it is perhaps useful at this point to provide a more detailed discussion of certain elements.

Basics of a New Approach

1. Any new approach to blacks must be rooted in substance, not just atmospherics: the latter should showcase the former. This is admittedly different from our past efforts, but it is a difference born of necessity. Efforts based largely on scheduling and symbolism have worked with groups where our policy disagreements are minimal. Blacks, however, perceive themselves to be at odds with most policy priorities of this Administration. The resulting gap can only be closed by affirmatively seeking common ground with a significant segment of black Americans.
2. We must be prepared to sustain any new effort over the long term. Gains from an issue-oriented approach will be incremental, and perhaps barely noticeable in the short run.
3. We must walk before we can run. Any initial gains will be among upwardly-mobile blacks who are part of, or entering, the middle class; broader targeting would be premature. Upwardly-mobile blacks should be inclined toward this Administration's policies, but for a number of reasons have not been supportive. In effect, we must package our policy message for them and, at the same time, minimize other obstacles to their support.
4. We must prevent major goofs. The biggest single obstacle to increasing our black support in the first term was our own inability to foresee the perceptual consequences of certain decisions, some of which were considered to be minor at the time. While most of the Administration has grown more sensitive in the wake of Bob Jones, such misjudgments still represent a danger which, unless avoided, can undo any political gains from our new strategy.

5. For the immediate future, we must avoid the "established" black leadership. As stated previously, such leaders are unremittingly hostile to this President and cannot be expected to take a constructive approach. The current black leadership seems, quite frankly, more interested in personal publicity and enhancing their influence within the Democratic Party than they are in new approaches to black problems. In fact, they are personally and rhetorically linked to a philosophy which cannot be reconciled with our own. Thus, meetings would not only be unproductive, but would serve to strengthen the position of such hostile leaders within their own organizations, and among blacks generally. Instead of allowing ourselves to be pressured into such old, no-win patterns, we should seek out other blacks with whom there is a chance of reaching common ground.
6. We should make clear that favoritism on grants and contracts is out-of-bounds, and will not be considered as an aspect of our strategy. Too often, political support by certain voter group members is viewed as a license to demand favoritism on grants or contracts. Our resistance to this pattern has led to criticism from some of our black supporters; however, it is absolutely essential that we not fall into this "spoils system" trap in the same way that previous Administrations have. As part of our Hispanic strategy, we made clear that no one in the White House, including the Hispanic liaison, would discuss grants or contracts, and we must be similarly adamant with our black supporters. The political base we build among blacks must rest on common policy ground, and not on hope of personal financial benefit.

#### Shaping our Alternative

1. We should work to develop a policy package that addresses the very real problems of black Americans from a conservative standpoint. This can include new ideas, as well as established Administration policies (e.g., enterprise zones, youth opportunity wage) that would be re-packaged to highlight their appeal to black Americans.
2. Such a package need not be confined to economic issues, but could also include criminal justice and social policy issues. Blacks, for example, are victimized disproportionately by crime, yet black politicians are the most ardent foes of tougher criminal laws. Similarly, the break-up of the black family has been an increasing and alarming trend for over twenty years, and has arguably been exacerbated by federal policies. Such issues, often ignored by the Democrats, have good potential for attracting blacks to the Republican Party if our solutions make sense.

3. Our main emphasis should be on the overall philosophical difference between our policies and those of the liberal Democrats. In effect, we would stress the concept of providing incentives for self-reliance, versus the failed course of increased dependence on government. Current policy dynamics favor our approach for several reasons. First, our policies are largely untried, and therefore hold some prospect for success, while the liberal methods have been tried on a massive scale and, for the most part, have failed. Second, decreasing government resources make the liberal approach impossible to sustain financially, and dictate that alternatives be tried. Third, there is no longer a national consensus in support of the liberal approach; in fact, the opposite is now true. Fourth, there is a significant intellectual trend, manifested in a continuing series of books and articles, toward questioning the social policies of the past twenty years. Given such developments, we stand a decent chance of attracting more adherents to our philosophy among black Americans.

#### Fostering Public Debate

1. We should attempt to foster, and fuel, a public debate on policies aimed at addressing the problems of black Americans. This is in our interest because, as noted above, the policy dynamics favor our argument. Our insurgent ideas will be pitted against a liberal philosophy that has not yet been questioned on a national scale, and which will be difficult to defend. In short, we should foster a public debate because we can have every expectation of winning it.
2. We should encourage Republican elected officials to participate in the debate, even if their policy prescriptions differ somewhat from ours. For example, it is to our advantage that some GOP Congressmen are publicly pushing a black legislative package, because such actions add to the debate without an appearance of White House orchestration.
3. Relatively minor items on the President's schedule can also add to the public debate. These could include, for example, wire photos with the author of a new book, a publicized phone conversation with someone like Thomas Sowell, or a Presidential message to a conference that might otherwise go unnoticed.
4. Administration and Republican Party officials can begin publicly referring to the fact that "a national debate is now occurring" on the social policy of the past twenty years, with hints that a change is needed. The President can also acknowledge the debate in passing public references.

5. We must be prepared to give access, and, thereby, credibility, to black groups that show interest in publicly espousing new approaches to black problems, even if we differ on particulars. One example is the new Council for a Black Economic Agenda, which met with the President last month in a session that drew a surprising amount of press attention (along with criticism from black leaders that was based transparently on egotism). We should not, however, tie ourselves to only one group: our interest in fostering debate is better served by a variety of groups, all of which are competing for public (and White House) attention.
6. Once the ground has been prepared through ample public discussion, the President should raise it to a higher level of prominence by publicly laying out our policy package, and then engaging fully in the philosophical discussion. (The President's personal involvement will increase the level of public attention to such an extent that our policy alternative must be ready, and capable of withstanding scrutiny.)

#### The Civil Rights Problem

1. Any new approach to blacks cannot ignore the perceptual problem we face on civil rights. Many black Americans feel, quite simply, that this Administration has worked to reverse the legal gains of the Sixties, and some even accept the notion that this President is anti-civil rights. If we are to move forward, we must "clear the decks" in this area.
2. Our difficulties on civil rights are rooted mainly in inaccurate perceptions that have been propagated by Washington's civil rights lobby. This group subsists on fear that the days of state-sanctioned discrimination will return, and it creates that fear through alarmist predictions, misrepresentation of motives, exaggeration of current problems, and by downplaying the progress that has been made.
3. With the objectives of the Sixties largely achieved through legal and even attitudinal changes, we have seen the civil rights movement of that era displaced by the civil rights lobby of today. No longer seeking the moral goals of equality, they are, like any other lobby, seeking to create, defend, and extend special programs and status for the group they represent. In this context, their vested interest in creating misperceptions about our civil rights record is understandable; indeed, it is to be expected in the same way that the environmental lobby can be expected to distort our actions in that area. We should, therefore, deal with them accordingly.

4. We should also recognize that we have unintentionally aided such programmed misperceptions in two ways. First, we have sometimes taken actions without considering the appearance that would be created among blacks (e.g. Bob Jones, and our delays regarding the Voting Rights Act). Second, we have unnecessarily picked fights on issues that are tangential to our Administration's civil rights policy goals (e.g. the Dade County set-aside case). The first point has been taken care of, to the extent it can be, by experience derived from our past mistakes. The second point, however, is still a concern. We dissipate our effectiveness and blur our message if we allow ourselves to be drawn into legislative and legal battles on even minor civil rights issues. Our energies and political capital should instead be expended on those issues that bear directly on our philosophy and on which we can set forth a well-reasoned public argument (quotas and busing are two such examples). Also, since such determinations involve policy, there must be a high degree of coordination by the White House. We must not allow our civil rights policy to be made on an ad hoc basis by mid-level agency officials, as often occurred in the past.
5. We can also address the "fear factor" by beginning to lay out what we are for, as well as what we oppose, in the area of civil rights. By outlining what we favor and support, we draw implicit limits on our future actions, and negate unspoken black concern about how far we are prepared to go. This can be accomplished through a civil rights policy statement, a Presidential speech, or both.

#### Pacing our Effort

1. Our effort to offer policy alternatives to black Americans must be properly paced. We should not attempt to do everything at once, nor should we move before the groundwork has been properly laid.
2. For the next several months, we should concentrate on the effort to foster a debate regarding U.S. social policy. As noted previously, this should be done in a low-key manner, building toward an eventual speech by the President. However, such a speech (to lay out our philosophy and policy alternatives) should not be given until the budget battles are well on their way to resolution. To do otherwise would risk both a conflict in our priorities, and accusations that we were trying to distract attention from painful domestic budget cuts.
3. A statement or speech on civil rights should also be held in abeyance until spring, but should be delivered several weeks in advance of the philosophy/policy alternatives speech.

4. The specific policy points for each statement or speech should be quietly developed by the White House, beginning immediately, in order to be ready for a late spring target date.
5. A senior White House official should be designated to coordinate implementation of this strategy over an extended period of time.
6. A suggested timetable would be as follows:

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Mid-May to June -- civil rights policy statement and/or Presidential speech on civil rights

Late May or early June -- Presidential speech on economic/social policy package and philosophy

The effort will, of course, need to extend well past June, but it is preferable to delay further decisions until reaction to the above steps has been assessed.

cc: John A. Svahn  
Frank Donatelli

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 20, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: PAMELA G. BAILEY *Pub*

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Black Strategy Follow-up Memo

You asked for my thoughts on the attached memo.

Summary Points

1. The memo is a collection of comments and ideas on how to deal with the "black problem." It is not a strategy.
2. The paper has no clear objective. It assumes that we should be appealing to blacks in general without stating a purpose (i.e., is the purpose to have more blacks of all ages and economic group "approve" of RR; or do we want more young blacks to vote Republican; or do we want to reach those over 50 in the South, etc?)
3. It wrongly promotes the need to develop new policies rather than new communication strategies.

Recommendations

1. Survey data should be analyzed in order to determine objectives for a black initiative. Careful thought should be given to attitudes as broken down by age, economic status and region. I would assume blacks are no more monolithic in their views, concerns and priorities than whites.

2. Once objectives are set, a detailed plan can be developed to achieve them. This plan would probably be much more based in the communications area than in policy. I disagree with the need to "develop a policy package that addresses the very real problems of black Americans from a conservative standpoint." RR doesn't develop policy "packages" for particular special interests -- he argued against such an approach in the last election. RR's policies over the last four years have worked "to address the very real problems of black Americans" and, indeed, of all Americans. The challenge now seems to be how to better explain to minorities the benefits of his policies -- not how to design new ones.
3. Symbolic visual actions should not be lightly dismissed. Events such as RR's ceremony signing the MLK legislation, welcoming home Lt. Goodwin, and honoring Mother Hale have gone a long way toward visually demonstrating that RR is truly President of all the people. Public Liasion, the Political Office and Congressional Liasion should be encouraged to continue recommending such events -- not only for blacks but for all minority groups. There are a host of events we could undertake to show how RR's policies have benefitted blacks -- (i.e., job training, education reforms, crime bill, etc.).
4. Is a special strategy needed only for blacks or -- if we're talking about communication initiatives -- should various White House offices be asked to work with Public Liaison to develop targetted communications plans for several minority groups? For instance, how can we justify a special initiative for blacks but not Hispanics?

#### General Comments

The basic points of the paper are uncomfortably similar to the special interest pandering we so criticized the Democrats for during the campaign.

I would find it hard to justify a reexamination of our policies to see what more we can do to respond to the concerns of blacks -- unless we want to undertake a similar review of policies to help Hispanics, women, labor, Asian-Americans, etc.

This approach is not RR's way. He and his policies for economic growth, freedom, opportunity and jobs are right for all Americans.

Suggestions that we foster a "public debate" on the problems of black Americans are misguided, too. It would be a contradiction of all that RR has stood for to push for a debate on policies as they affect a particular segment of the population.

Finally, I would recommend that before any major RR policy statement be made on civil rights that careful analysis be done on why. The paper is accurate in stating we face a "perceptual" problem in civil rights and that the civil rights lobby's vested interests is a major cause of the problem. But, again, who would we be trying to reach? Blacks, whites, black leaders? One or all? This may be an area where actions can speak louder than words. I'm not sure that a war of words will do anything other than provoke the traditional leaders to debate and criticize. Our purposes may be better served by not dealing with the issue on their terms. I suspect civil rights and other basic terminology will always mean something different to Brad Reynolds compared to Vernon Jordan -- even though our end result may be the same. This may be an area where action, events, and visuals can convey RR's strong civil rights commitments better than speeches and new policy packages.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 12, 1985

*Pam  
give me  
your thoughts  
on this -*

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD REGAN

MICHAEL K. DEEVER ✓

FROM: JAMES CICCONI *JWC*

SUBJECT: Follow-Up on Black Strategy

In a previous memo, I outlined a possible strategy for reaching out to black Americans. Assuming agreement on the need for such an effort, it is perhaps useful at this point to provide a more detailed discussion of certain elements.

Basics of a New Approach

1. Any new approach to blacks must be rooted in substance, not just atmospherics: the latter should showcase the former. This is admittedly different from our past efforts, but it is a difference born of necessity. Efforts based largely on scheduling and symbolism have worked with groups where our policy disagreements are minimal. Blacks, however, perceive themselves to be at odds with most policy priorities of this Administration. The resulting gap can only be closed by affirmatively seeking common ground with a significant segment of black Americans.
2. We must be prepared to sustain any new effort over the long term. Gains from an issue-oriented approach will be incremental, and perhaps barely noticeable in the short run.
3. We must walk before we can run. Any initial gains will be among upwardly-mobile blacks who are part of, or entering, the middle class; broader targeting would be premature. Upwardly-mobile blacks should be inclined toward this Administration's policies, but for a number of reasons have not been supportive. In effect, we must package our policy message for them and, at the same time, minimize other obstacles to their support.
4. We must prevent major goofs. The biggest single obstacle to increasing our black support in the first term was our own inability to foresee the perceptual consequences of certain decisions, some of which were considered to be minor at the time. While most of the Administration has grown more sensitive in the wake of Bob Jones, such misjudgments still represent a danger which, unless avoided, can undo any political gains from our new strategy.

5. For the immediate future, we must avoid the "established" black leadership. As stated previously, such leaders are unremittingly hostile to this President and cannot be expected to take a constructive approach. The current black leadership seems, quite frankly, more interested in personal publicity and enhancing their influence within the Democratic Party than they are in new approaches to black problems. In fact, they are personally and rhetorically linked to a philosophy which cannot be reconciled with our own. Thus, meetings would not only be unproductive, but would serve to strengthen the position of such hostile leaders within their own organizations, and among blacks generally. Instead of allowing ourselves to be pressured into such old, no-win patterns, we should seek out other blacks with whom there is a chance of reaching common ground.
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