Calendar of Events

WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
Smithsonian Institution Building Washington D.C. 20560 202 357-2115

FEBRUARY & MARCH 1983

Noon Discussion
Monday
February 28

Remarks by Clare Boothe Luce, writer, editor, former Ambassador to Italy, former Member of Congress

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Dinner*
Tuesday
March 1

Dinner in honor of Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, Member and former Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Wilson Center, and Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Speakers: Henry M. Jackson, United States Senator from Washington

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations

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Noon Discussion
Wednesday
March 2

"Soviet Consumption and GNP: Are Western Estimates Radically Off?"

Igor Birman, editor, Russia magazine

Colloquium
Thursday
March 3
4-6 pm

"The Skybolt Crisis, 1962: Harold Macmillan, the 'Special Relationship,' and the French Connection"

Alistair Horne, London, former Fellow, The Wilson Center

Commentators: McGeorge Bundy, Professor of History, New York University

Ernest May, Fellow, The Wilson Center; Charles Warren Professor of History, Harvard University

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Evening Dialogue*
Tuesday
March 8

"Totalitarianism and Authoritarianism: A Workable Distinction?"

Speakers: Sidney Hook, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford

Michael Walzer, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

Noon Discussion Wednesday March 9	"Prokofieff and the Cult of Personality: On the 30th Anniversary of the Deaths of Prokofieff and Stalin" Malcolm Brown, Professor of Music, Indiana University
Colloquium Wednesday March 9 4-6 pm	"The Evolution of the State under Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina, 1976-1982" Oscar Ozlak, Center for the Study of the State and Society, Buenos Aires
Noon Discussion Tuesday March 15	"Contemporary Political Trends" George E. Reedy, Nieman Professor of Journalism, Marquette University; former Fellow, The Wilson Center
Evening Dialogue* Tuesday March 15	Forthcoming Delegation of U.S. House of Representatives to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., with present and past Fellows of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center
Noon Discussion Wednesday March 16	"U.S./U.S.S.R. Grain Trade: Prospects for the Future" Donald Novotny, Director, Grain & Feed Division, U.S. Department of Agriculture
Noon Discussion Tuesday March 22	"The Problems and Prospects of the Atlantic Alliance" Jan Hendrik Lubbers, Ambassador of the Netherlands to the United States
Colloquium Tuesday March 22 4-6 pm	"Intellectuals and Nationalism in Postwar Japan: Takeuchi Yoshimi, Yoshimoto Ryumei, and Eto Jun" Lawrence Olson, Professor of History, Wesleyan University; former Fellow, The Wilson Center
Noon Discussion Wednesday March 23	"The Papal Assassination Attempt: New Evidence on a Soviet Connection" Paul Henze, Resident Consultant, Rand Corporation; former Fellow, The Wilson Center

Colloquium Wednesday March 23 4-6 pm	"An Anthropological Approach to Caribbean Social History" Sidney Mintz, Professor of Anthropology, The Johns Hopkins University; former Fellow, The Wilson Center
Colloquium Thursday March 24 4-6 pm	"Issues and Nonissues in Russian Social History and Historiography, 1890s-1920s" Michael Confino, Fellow, The Wilson Center; Samuel Rubin Professor of Russian and East European History, Tel Aviv University
~~Noon Discussion~~ Wednesday March 30	~~"National Security Decision Making: Soviet and~~ American Variance" Tyrus W. Cobb, Lt. Col., USA, Associate Professor of International Politics, United States Military Academy

*By invitation

It is suggested that events be confirmed on the day of the event by telephoning Louise Platt or Cynthia Ely, 357-2115.

THE WILSON CENTER

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
STUDIES PROGRAM

Samuel F. Wells, Jr., *Secretary*

TO Cicconi — Regret JAB Calif P/s.

15 February 1983

AD Pl. do. 2-23 Done

Mr. James A. Baker, III
Assistant to the President
and Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Jim:

I would like to invite you to attend an evening dialogue on Monday, February 28, 1983 to examine the question "Does the United States Strategic Force Need the MX?" As you know, the President's Blue Ribbon Commission will shortly submit its recommendations on how the MX missile should be based. The debate over the optimum basing mode has raised larger questions about the vulnerability of the U.S. strategic force, in particular whether a new land-based system is the appropriate response to those concerns.

To address this important issue, we have invited three distinguished experts to present three different perspectives on the problem. Dr. Ronald Lehman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Theatre Nuclear Forces Policy, will present the Administration's argument for deployment of the MX. Dr. Richard Garwin, Professor of Public Policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and Fellow at the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center, will explore alternatives to the MX, and Dr. Jeremy Stone, Director of the Federation of American Scientists, will discuss the arms control option for dealing with MX.

The session will begin with refreshments in the Wilson Center rotunda at 6:00 p.m. with the proceedings to begin promptly at 6:30 p.m. A buffet supper will be served at about 7:30 p.m. The seminar will reconvene after dinner at 8:30 p.m. when participants will have the opportunity to exchange views in detail; we will adjourn by 10:00 p.m. This meeting will be off-the-record to encourage a frank and uninhibited discussion.

Please let us know whether you will be able to attend by calling our office at 357-2968, before Thursday February 24. We hope you will be able to join us.

Yours sincerely,

Sam

Samuel F. Wells, Jr.

WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20560 202 357 2968 CABLE: WILCEN

THE WILSON CENTER

February 14, 1983

AA
P/ RSVP. I'm going = alone.
Thanks
JC
2-23 - Done

Mr. James Cicconi
Special Assistant to the President
and to the Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Cicconi:

I am writing on behalf of the Board of Trustees of The Wilson Center to invite you to a small dinner and evening to honor Max Kampelman for his outstanding service as Chairman of our Board of Trustees from 1979 to 1982. As you know, Max served in this capacity--and has continued to serve energetically as a member of this Board--concurrently with fulfilling his continuing duties with distinction as Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

We hope very much that you and your spouse will be able to attend this special evening on Tuesday, March 1, and join with our Board in honoring a distinguished American who has done so much for this presidential memorial, as well as for the country.

The evening will begin with a social hour at 6:30 p.m. in the beautiful old castle building of the Smithsonian. Dress will be informal. The Wilson Center is on the third floor of the castle facing the Mall at 1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W. There is parking on Jefferson Drive in front of the building. Please enter the building through the east door; a guard will direct you from there.

The Board and the Center's director, James Billington, join me in expressing the hope that you will be able to be with us for the evening.

Sincerely,

Bill Baroody

William J. Baroody, Jr.
Chairman of the Board

R.S.V.P to Louise Platt or Cynthia Ely at 202-357-2115.

THE WILSON CENTER

TO CICCONI

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Wilson Center

THE WILSON CENTER

JAMES H. BILLINGTON, *Director*

Regret and mailed 2/2 bk

REGRET IN CA/IF. with RR TO CICCONI

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Board of Trustees of The Wilson Center

DATE: 26 January 1983

FROM: James H. Billington, Director

SUBJECT: Board meeting and other meetings at the Center

This memorandum is to bring you up to date on some events planned for the near future at the Center and to remind you of the upcoming Board meeting.

The next Board of Trustees meeting will be on Tuesday, March 1, from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. It will be followed by a dinner honoring Max Kampelman for his service as Board chairman, as well as his chairmanship of the U.S. Delegation to the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I hope we can have a good Board attendance at both the meeting and the dinner following. I am enclosing a card for you to indicate if you will be able to be here for either or both of these events.

Also enclosed is a revised list of committee assignments as announced by Chairman Baroody at the October Board meeting. If you have questions or comments, please give me a call. As you know, Secretary Schweiker, of Health and Human Services, has resigned and will soon be succeeded by Margaret Heckler.

Board members are all also particularly welcome at two other events to be held soon here at the Center. First, the Fellowship Committee of the Board will be meeting at 9:30 a.m. on February 1 in the Regents' Room here at the Center. Any member of the Board would be welcome. We would need advance notice to send out the stack of material if you plan on being there.

The Wilson Council will be meeting on the morning of Thursday, February 3, beginning at 10:00 a.m. Some Board members have in the past been able to sit in on these meetings and to become more familiar with the valuable role the Council is playing in the Center's private fund-raising needs. Now that we are launched on a major endowment campaign, it would be particularly helpful to have more contact between the Board and the Wilson Council.

I would be grateful if you would return the enclosed card to let us know whether you will attend the March 1 Board Meeting and dinner following and the February 3 Wilson Council meeting.

Enclosures

THE WILSON CENTER

James H. Billington, *Director*

January 5, 1983

TO: Members of the Board of Trustees

FROM: William J. Baroody, Jr., Chairman

SUBJECT: Revised Board Assignments

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:
Mr. Baroody, Chairman;
Mr. Ripley, Vice Chairman;
Messrs: Baker, Bennett, Kampelman, Mosbacher and Shultz

FINANCE COMMITTEE:
Mr. Mosbacher, Chairman;
Messrs: Barreaux, Kampelman, Oppenheimer, Powers*, Ripley, Shultz, and Wick

PERMANENT SITE COMMITTEE:
Mr. Ripley, Chairman;
Messrs: Baker, Boorstin, Schweiker**, Warner and Wick

FELLOWSHIP COMMITTEE:
Mr. Warner, Chairman;
Messrs: Barreaux, Bennett, Clark, Kampelman, Ripley and Ms. Scott

PROGRAM COMMITTEE:
Mr. Eizenstat, Chairman;
Messrs: Baker, Oppenheimer, Schweiker**, Warner and Wick

PUBLICATIONS AND MEETINGS COMMITTEE:
Mr. Wick, Chairman
Messrs: Boorstin, Clark, Eizenstat Mosbacher and Schweiker**

*designates non-Board member Mr. John J. Powers, Jr., Chairman of The Wilson Council.

**to be succeeded by Margaret M. Heckler, subject to confirmation

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f Wilson Center

THE WILSON CENTER

JAMES H. BILLINGTON, *Director*

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Board of Trustees DATE: 27 October 1982

FROM: James H. Billington

SUBJECT: Follow-up from Board Meeting and Date of Next Meeting

We were pleased to have so many of the Board members at the October 6 meeting. We were also pleased to have Secretary Schweiker's excellent presentation at the Wilson Council meeting the following day, Secretary Shultz at our Inter-American Dialogue a few days later, and James Baker at a special New York evening a few days earlier. We are truly grateful for such full Board support and participation. We hope to have more Board meetings in cooperation with the Council in the future, and are planning a special event in conjunction with the next Board meeting, honoring Max Kampelman both for his role as former chairman of the Wilson Center Board and for his services to the nation as chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Please hold on your calendar Tuesday, 1 March 1983, 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the Board meeting and in the evening, 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. for the dinner.

As you may recall from the October meeting, Chairman Baroody requested that all members contact him soon to indicate any special personal preference or suggestions for others in serving on committees of the Board. If you have not yet done so, we hope that you can by the end of next week.

cc: James Cicconi

AA

Re last TP above, pl call Mernie. JHB prefer to continue Wkg on JAB's behalf on the Program Comm. Ask her to pass on to Baroody, or else get # and leave message w/ his asst. Thanks

11-1-82 – Done (spoke w/ Estelle in B's off.)

357-2763
Mernie Weathers

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM CICCONI

FROM: T. A. D. THARP T.T.

SUBJECT: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Regarding your memo of October 22, be advised that Baroody and Mosbacher were approved by Senior Staff for reappointment on October 6.

They will actually be reappointed this Friday. Thank goodness they have been holding over in the meantime.

10-28

Left message for Billington w/ lady standing in for Mernie (she's on leave this week).

THE WILSON CENTER

PROGRAM ON AMERICAN SOCIETY
AND POLITICS

Michael J. Lacey, *Secretary*

Jim: I wanted to slip this to you yesterday, but you got out of the Board meeting before I could reach you. Can we discuss? Mike Lacey

TO: James W. Cicconi
Special Assistant to the President
and Assistant to the Chief of Staff
The White House

DATE: October 5, 1987

FROM: Michael J. Lacey MJL

SUBJECT: Wilson Center Conference

Jim Billington suggested that I get in touch with you to see if we couldn't get some White House people to attend a major conference we have coming up on October 23 and 24. The subject is "The Role of the State in Recent American History," and the papers being prepared for it (I am enclosing for you one of them on the civil service by Hugh Heclo) are very wide ranging, enough, I think, to be of real interest to some of the administration people. We would be delighted to have you join us if you could possibly get free, and I have attached a letter of invitation with details. But I hasten to add that I understand how difficult it is for someone in your position to get loose for a weekend.

Because of his interest in this general field, we will call Richard Williamson and see whether he could come (we are also planning a conference on federalism for next February and hope to get him involved). But in checking around I have been told that there are two White House people who would be ideal for this group, and I wanted to find out whether you agree and could help us to approach them. They are Christopher DeMuth, and Richard Beale. Should we try to involve them?

We expect to have a small group of about 24 people for this conference, and they will represent some of the best people in the country in history and political science. We intend bureaucratically to use it as a kind of planning group, and know that as the papers are discussed and criticized we will get ideas for Wilson Center conferences for the future as a follow-up. It would be very helpful to us therefore if we could get someone with an interest in this area to join us from the White House. No preparation would be required other than to read the papers, and the group is small enough that it will be an informal gathering.

THE WILSON CENTER

PROGRAM ON AMERICAN SOCIETY
AND POLITICS

Michael J. Lacey, *Secretary*

October 5, 1982

Mr. James W. Cicconi
Special Assistant to the President
& Assistant to the Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Jim:

I am writing to invite you to join us for a conference during the weekend of October 23 and 24. The subject for the conference is "The Role of the State in Recent American History," and the session is being sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center's program on American Society and Politics. It will be held at "Belmont", the Smithsonian Institution's conference center, a country estate located between Washington and Baltimore. We will begin on the evening of Friday, October 22, and will finish up at lunch on Sunday.

Three papers being prepared now will form the basis for discussion. Professor Morton Keller of Brandeis University will offer an introductory paper which will set up the problem by focusing on relations between politics and the state from the period of the founding up through the New Deal. Professor Otis Graham of the University of North Carolina will concern himself with relations between society and the state since the New Deal, and will discuss the controversies over the role of government that have been elaborated since that time. He will also suggest some areas in which the investment of fresh attention might be helpful. The third paper is by Professor Hugh Heclo of the Government Department at Harvard University, and it deals with the state and America's higher civil service.

The conference center can accommodate only 24 people, and so we are trying on a selective basis to pull together some of the people in political science and history, and from government as well, who have been most concerned with the problems involved in this admittedly broad area of interest. We are hoping that the discussion of the papers presented will help us at the Wilson Center to decide whether some form of continuing involvement in the area on our part would be useful, and if so, of what kind.

If you can get free for that weekend, we can provide for your accommodation during the conference. No advance preparation would be necessary, other than to read the papers before we get underway, and I will get these to you prior to the meeting. The group involved is small enough that we should all be able to fit around the same table, and I am hoping that you will be able to join us. Please let me know, either by phone (357-2965) or by letter whether you can accept, and let me ask also that you do so at your earliest convenience, so that we can go alternates if necessary.

If you have any questions in connection with the conference, I would be happy to try and answer them for you, and in the meantime I shall look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Mike

Michael J. Lacey

THE STATE AND

AMERICA'S HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE

Hugh Heclo
Harvard University

THE STATE AND AMERICA'S HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE

Hugh Heclo
Harvard University

In an European setting any discussion of the state poses familiar issues of structure, philosophy, and history. The situation is different in the United States. To speak of the state summons images of permanance, of coherence, of a self-contained quality in government that sounds alien to American ears. The American state is everywhere and nowhere.

One approach to this amorphous subject is to consider the American state in terms of the officials who man it. In this paper I will concentrate on one of the most direct human embodiments of any established state, the higher civil service.

The higher civil service in the United States is a study in ambiguities. Topbureaucrats' status, their role in policy-making and politics, their relationship to the larger society--all these features are poorly defined in American central government and subject to immense counter pressures. It is even questionable whether or not there actually is an American higher civil service, at least not in the sense by which that term is used in other countries. To study the higher civil service in Washington, we need to think not only of hierarchies with formal, clear career lines, but also of loose groupings of people where the lines of policy, politics, and administration merge in a complex jumble of bodies.

Washington seems to have everything. Look for the equivalent of French corps and you will find the closed, elitist model reflected to some degree in the membership of the Forest Service, Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Geological Survey, Federal Highway Administration, or Justice Department Anti-Trust Division. Look to duplicate the British Administrative class and you find resemblances in the State Department's Foreign Service and the President's budget agency. Although not as self-consciously managed as their Japanese counterparts, administrative cohorts in Washington have

been created by major events such as the New Deal of the 1930s, the Great Society/New Frontier initiatives of the 1960s, and the Nixon-Ford policies of the 1970s. Lawyers have carved out their own niche in the personnel structure of federal agencies and frequently play the role of organizational negotiators along Norwegian lines. Likewise, strong bureau chiefs can claim the German title of "political bureaucrats" in advancing their programs with Congress, political interests and department heads. And surely their is no lack of pettifoggery Italian-style in insulated pieces of Washington officialdom.

Each foreign image can be found in America's higher civil service, but none is complete as a characterization of the whole picture. To suggest that one or another pattern predominates would be midleading. And yet to think that the senior bureaucracy is simply a random collection of people and styles would be obtuse. Like any montage, the U.S. higher civil service is best appreciated by its themes, not its individual pictures.

One such theme is the unmanaged quality of America's higher civil service. By that I do not mean that there is runaway growth or absence of legalistic constraints. Far from it. Growth in personnel has been meager and restrictive personnel regulations abound. I mean that no one looks after the higher civil service as such, and certainly senior bureaucrats themselves do not (as in other countries) oversee its workings, traditions, and fate.

A second theme, related to the first, is the peculiar absence of a formal civil service presence in the central executive institutions of government, especially the President's Office and the offices of major department heads. This situation appears to have been a gradual development of the last forty years or so: one part a "disappearing act" by senior officials who once made up such a presence, and one part a failure to

discover effective new ways of using senior careerists as these central offices have grown over the years. But whatever the explanation, the result is clear. Compared to its counterparts in other countries, the U.S. higher civil service seems hollow at the center.

A final theme explored in this paper concerns a profound and probably growing duality in the higher civil service as an informal personnel system. Certainly, it is possible to identify a schizoid quality in the upper level bureaucracy of every country. This condition is the natural byproduct of having to accommodate twin tasks in any higher civil service: overall supervision of the administrative machinery below and personal advisory relations with political ministers above. The effect in many countries is to create a kind of bifurcation in the civil service itself--service in the French cabinets and grands corps versus the more narrow career corps; German political bureaucrats who are state secretaries and the gradations of less political work below them; those at the top of the British administrative class and all the others; Japan's "politically sensitive" bureaucrats enmeshed in the web of conservative politics across the top of government versus the purer organization men below; and so on. The United States, on the other hand, has erected this dual need into a two-track system of top bureaucratic manpower, a formal civil service bureaucracy and an informal political technocracy.

The three themes are of course related. If the system as a whole tends to be unmanaged, how can there be any reliable civil service presence at the center or any coherent organization of the dual tasks at the top of the bureaucracy? If the civil service is largely excluded from the executive center, i.e., Presidency, how can it be managed or even imagined to have a topside structure? With no real top but instead a duality of senior bureaucratic manpower, what is there to be represented at the center? And so the circle of ambivalence about the higher civil service continues unbroken in Washington. In the past several years, a

new attempt has been made to reconstitute the senior executive personnel system of the bureaucracy, but as we shall see there are powerful historical and political forces working against any movement in the direction of a European or Japanese style of higher civil service. The real definition of America's higher civil service is being written, not in the language of formal personnel statutes, but in the quiet, informal understandings that shape people's careers in public service. In this as perhaps in no other country, the higher civil service is molded by forces external to itself. Its emerging structure, broadly understood, is shaped by changes in the larger political society, its character stamped by the unwritten no less than the written polticial constitution.

A Historical Anomaly

The ambiguous position of the higher civil service in the United States owes much to history. Taken as a whole, these background conditions add up to a situation that is uniquely American compared with most other bureaucracies.

In the first place, the national civil service was founded and developed only well after the basic constitutional framework of the nation had been established. The written constitution of 1787 was generally silent concerning the administrative nature of the new national government, leaving the eventual growth of the bureaucracy subject to successvie feats of improvization. Once the Founders had settled on the principle of a single executive head in the form of the President and his appointment of department heads with advice and consent of the legislature's Senate, their constitutional advice about the remainder of any administrative arrangements was, in effect "leave it to Congress and [sotto voce] the President.[1/]

Unlike its counterpart in other countries, the national bureaucracy in Washington had no roots in a pre-existing monarchical or aristocratic government (as Britain, France, Norway for example). Neither was it grounded in the struggle to attain nationhood (Germany, Italy) or to protect that nationhood against foreign threats (as in Japan). The first civil service law began to make itself felt in Washington almost a century after the constitutional design had been established and almost 20 years after the chief threat to that design--the War between the States--had been settled. During all this time the main threats had been internal, Federalists versus anti-Federalists, Abolition versus Slave states. Rather than a rallying point for defense of the nation, what small bureaucracy there was in these times became part of the spoils for which antagonists for different definitions of that nationhood contended. The result is that civil servants have appeared on the government scene in a way that seems somewhat detached from the accepted structure of American political institutions. That fact has helped foster ambivalent public sentiments about "Washington bureaucrats," although no one would want to claim constitutional history is the only factor at work.[2/] Perhaps the most important effect of their detachment from constitutional history has been within the minds of bureaucrats themselves. There is less basis for American senior bureaucrats to feel sure of their place in government as civil servants as such (rather than as particular kinds of professionals, specialists, etc.). Their profession as civil servants, their responsibility as representatives of the national state, has never been a part of the constitutional culture.

A national bureaucracy not only failed to develop in tandem with the constitution and nation-building process. It also lagged behind the development of more or less democratic forms of political participation. This is a second important distinction of the higher civil service in the United States compared with other countries. A popularly-elected lower house of the national legislature was of course part of the original design for government in 1787, and Congress as a whole, not the President,

retained the power to regulate the appointment of the bulk of the Federal workforce.[3/] Within the next few decades, voting became an accepted right of virtually all adult white males, and mass political parties and organized interest groups were well underway. This gave the American national bureaucracy a more permeable, less elitist administrative structure than the European or Japanese cases and, for the same reason, heightens the similarity with the Chilean civil service. Before the higher civil service could establish its own coherent identity or defind its prerogatives, other political structures or modern democracy were in place and making demands.

Paradoxically, the fact that the U.S. civil service was born into a democratically mobilized world was a powerful impulse for seeking a clear separation between politics and administration. By the last quarter of the 19th century, the civil service concept was generally regarded as synonymous with the protection of administrative machinery against political influence. This approach severely inhibited any serious attention to defining the legitimate political functions of a higher civil service. It was a model that fit the expanding technical requirements of modern government, but it also fit the political needs of the situation. Bureaucrats were less vulnerable to the political crowds if they could justify their existence in terms of technical expertise. Congressmen could find the presence of high-paid bureaucrats politically acceptable on the same grounds.[5/] Civil service reformers had paid little attention to the higher civil service because it would inevitably blur the line between politics and administration. The advocates of managerial modernization did likewise because it had little to do with either efficient routinization or technical specialization in the government workforce. And certainly politicians in Congress and the White House had little reason to jeopardize their credientials as democratic representatives by championing such an elitist concept. The higher civil service therefore has been an outstanding "non-subject" in the development of American central government.

Here then is a combination of forces admirably suited to confuse the status of high level bureaucrats in Washington. If they had been identified with the creation and defense of the American nation-state, if they had been already in place to help socialize the emerging crowd of democratic politicians to understand their ways, if the Constitution sanctioned their existence with its mantle of authority, if they were expected to serve as aides to politicians as well as technical specialists or democratically programmed bits of machinery--if some or all of these conditions were met, the political status of America's higher civil service would be much less problematic. Instead, the United States has, at most, tolerated the existence of "Washington bureaucrats" and evolved a complex system of high level administrative personnel that is both democratic and technocratic. Seen in relation to other countries, this is a remarkable combination of characteristics. No one could have invented it. America's higher civil service--broadly understood--is an unintended byproduct molded between the internal demands of government and the external demands of the larger political society. Generations of personnel experts in the US have envied the tidy bureaucratic system of Europe. Growing up around them, untidy and unobvious to be sure, has been a democratic technocracy that may have much to say about the prospects for self-government in many nations.

The Dual Structure

Seen as a whole, the Washington bureaucracy has a dual, or two-track system of administrative management: one growing out of the formal civil service rules of the personnel system and one based on an informal, but also technocratic quasi-bureaucracy of appointed manpower. Consider the gross structure of several departments as shown in Table 1.

The general distribution is more important than the exact numbers and job titles. These American images of departmental management contrast with the situation found in other developed countries in these respects: there are (1) more appointive political positions extending (2) farther down into the administrative structure and (3) combining career and political appointments at some of the same levels in the agency hierarchy.[6/]

During 1979, new rules for a 'Senior Executive Service' brought somewhat more order to these arrangements. But this reform did not alter the basic mixed structure of career and political personnel in the bureaucracy. Approximately 8,000 managerial positions located predominately in the supergrade level (but not 2,000 mainly scientific and professional jobs at the same level) compose the Senior Executive Service. Approximately 45 percent of these 8,000 positions are reserved for career civil servants by virtue of the political sensitivities associated with the work (e.g. Internal Revenue Service auditors, contract-awarding executives, and so on.) The remaining 55 percent may be filled either by career or politically-appointed executives, but the number of political executives may not total more than 10 percent (i.e. 800) of all Senior Executive Service appointments. The new senior executive system is obviously not the whole picture because Presidential and other political appointees at the higher "Executive Schedule" level (see Table 1, ranks I-V) can also be deeply engaged in administrative management of the departments and agencies. Governmentwide there are roughly 550 of these appointees, ranging from the 13 Cabinet secretaries at level I to the over 400 appointees at levels IV and V who often do head major departmental divisions.

Who are these people? One may well ask. Certainly they are unknown to the general public and largely unmentioned in the news media. In some respects, political executives and career executives share characteristics that distinguish them from senior bureaucrats in Europe. In other respects, they differ from each other in significant ways. Table 2 lays out some of these key differences and similarities.

by Rank as of 1975-76

TABLE 1.

RANK	DEPARTMENT					
	Agriculture		Housing and Urban Development		Justice	
	P	C	P	C	P	C
Executive Schedule						
I	1	-	1	-	1	-
II	-	-	-	-	2	-
III	1	-	1	-	3	-
IV	6	-	11	-	16	-
V	3	-	7	-	6	-
Supergrade Level						
18	10	11	5	2	17	6
17	15	37	21	15	42	15
16	36	162	17	67	88	64
Mid-level Grades						
15	20	1151	28	571	14	1096
14	7	2422	14	1075	39	1959
13	6	5151	10	1756	56	5047

Source: Unpublished data from the respective personnel offices of each department. For further details of position classification, see Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1977), pp.36-43.

Table 2. Selected Characteristics of Senior Bureaucrats in Different Countries, 1970-71

	Britain	France	Germany	Italy	United States car.ex.	United States pol.
Father's Occupational Status						
high managemt.& professional	51%	66%	46%	46%	39%	49%
lower " " "	17	30	21	36	30	27
skilled non-manual	16	3	19	16	11	11
lower non-manual	5	0	2	0	7	7
skilled manual	5	1	11	3	7	4
semi- & unskilled manual	8	0	1	0	7	2
Bureaucrat's Educational Background						
below university level	14%	na	1%	0%	0%	3%
law	3		65	53	18	28
humanities	38		2	0	6	7
social sciences	12		17	36	29	38
technical, hard sciences	26		14	10	42	10
university major unknown	7		2	1	5	15
Has One or More Relatives in Politics or the Civil Service Now or in Past	48%	50%	80%	67%	37%	33%
Father Employed in Government	20%	na	32%	41%	9%	0%
Percentage Who Have Spent at least One-Quarter of Adult Life Outside their respective National Govt.	12%	37%	49%	2%	30%	78%
Percentage Who Have Served in a National Ministry other than Present Ministry	51%	na	32%	18%	27%	15%

Source: Joel D. Aberbach and Robert D. Putnam, "Paths to the Top," (reproduced), paper presented to the Conference on Frontiers in Comparative Analysis of Bureaucratic and Political Elites, Waassenaar, Netherlands, November, 1977.

In general, the senior bureacratic manpower of every country is unrepresentative in the sense of being drawn disproportionately from the university educated, middle class and professional sectors of each nation's population. However, judging from a comparison of the parents' occupational status vis-a-vis the general population in each country, both political and career executives in America appear less unrepresentative than their counterparts in British, French, German or Italian bureaucracies. Their educational backgrounds suggest an American bureaucracy run mainly by people from the social, technical and hard sciences compared with a European elite trained in the law and humanities. Most significant of all (and the information is scanty), both political and career executives in the United States betray little evidence of a family tradition in government service; as observers have noted for at least 150 years, Americans have been less apt than Europeans to create a "political class." All these data add to the picture of democratic technocracy that distinguishes bureaucratic life in Washington from that in London, Paris, Bonn or Rome.

And yet there are also important differences between the two tracks of senior bureaucratic manpower within the United States. One track, the de jure higher civil service, may be regarded as a grouping of persons at the upper end of government personnel systems characterized by civil service rules, in other words (in the U.S. tradition) by an open, competitive examination of non-political qualifications. In this sense, we know a top civil servant when we see one by virtue of his or her place in a formal personnel structure.

Even under this formalistic description, the situation in the Federal Government is very complex. What really exists is a collection of civil services, for there are a number of personnel systems thriving at the periphery of the so-called "general schedule" civil service that can be

said to use civil service-type rules in their operations. All of these 'services' have resolutely opposed every attempt to integrate them into the larger system overseen by the Civil Service Commission (or, since 1979 reforms, the Office of Personnel Management). In March 1979, approximately 70 percent of full-time civil service employment (excluding postal workers) fell under the general schedule and the remainder in other self-contained pay systems. Thus, the higher civil service in Washington is something of a verbal artifact embracing the effectively autonomous leadership of units such as the Foreign Service and Forest Service, FBI and CIA, National Park Service and Atomic Energy Commission, Veteran's Administration, Tennessee Valley Authority and so on and on.

By and large, the senior bureaucrats of this de jure, conglomerate civil service spend the bulk of their adult lives working inside the national government, more similar in this respect to the British administrative class than senior bureaucrats on the continent. But unlike the British elite--and more on the lines of top Italian and Japanese officials--the American career executives also tend to develop their careers within the confines of a single agency. This is generally both the base that supports their careers and the ladder on which they (again though, unlike their Japanese counterparts on the bureau "escalators") either climb or stagnate. These American bureaucrats may be better educated and more white collar than the mass of American citizens (also more white colored and male) but there is also something distinctly non-elitist in their more technical education and devotion to specialized programs. It is the bureau and its program that crosscuts any tendency there may be to aggregate the advantages of their diverse positions into a presumption of governmental or social privilege. Indeed, the Program is more likely than not defined in terms of some type of service to one or another interest in the society at large, whether it be conservation for farmers or nuclear energy supplies to skeptical consumers.

But the vexing question remains, are these people the sum and substance of America's higher civil service? Certainly not in the sense that would be familiar to Europeans or Japanese. The career executives of the de jure higher civil service do not serve with any continuity as direct subordinates and assistants to the top appointed or elected political ministers. They do not oversee the general work of officialdom in their departments as a whole. Their work typically filters through a political subordinate of the minister--an executive aide, special assistant, assistant secretary or the like--and for most career executives, a distinct sense of unease would set in were they to spend long hours working with "the political brass" as it is sometimes known. (As far as I can tell, every agency has a special name by which careerists refer to the usually separate complex of offices housing political executives, but the connotation is always one of a distant "them.")

It has not always been they way. As Leonard White noted there was also a dual system in the public service of the 19th century, but in that period more or less permanent staff was also present atop the departmental structures. The chief clerks were "the pivots on which daily business turned."[7/] As ministers and their very few political assistants came and went, the chief clerks continued to superintend the departmental workforce in the daily grind of government paperwork. When the minister (or Cabinet secretary as they are know in the United States) was away, the chief clerk could be found filling in as acting secretary, not a rare occurrence in those un-airconditioned days in Washington. The chief clerk received the daily mail, distributed it to political officers and subordinate clerical staff, supervised the writing of all letters going out of the department, the distribution of publications, and the collection of subordinate clerks' monthly timesheets when that innovation was introduced. But this form of management could not hope to keep pace with the more complex, less routinized work of government, and by the end of the First World War this embryo form of higher civil service had largely disappeared amid a welter of problems and temporary officials.[8/]

Yet there are people today who are regularly counted on to service cabinet secretaries and other top appointees and who oversee the workings of departmental machinery. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how the work of government could go on if there were not such people. If we loosen our concept of the higher civil service so as to include indeliberately organized, loosely woven career lines, then the outlines of a second, de facto higher civil service begin to emerge.

The unilluminating term generally used for these persons is "In and Outers." This is an unhelpful concept because it can apply to anyone with a temporary stint in government, especially the top poltical appointees whose tenures are short and sometimes (as one U.S. Senator put it) possessing all the impact of a snowflake on the bosom of the Potomac. The public careerists, as I will call them, do occasionally rise to the ranks of Secretary or agency head. In fact, as the role of political parties and their patronage power had declined, public careerists have become a more prominent source of senior political appointments. Approximately one-half of President Reagan's top appointees in the winter of 1980-81 had held subordinate appointments in earlier administrations. But what truly distinguishes public careerists is not that they are part of any coherent, political career ladder, as is the case for example with the progression of British political executives (from parliamentary secretary, to junior minister, to senior minister).

What distinguishes the de facto, higher civil service of public careerists is their ability to combine top level assistance to senior presidential appointees with some measure of familiarity about the issues and processes of government. What they know about policies--and public policy issues have become an increasingly complex area of technical specialization--makes the public careerists useful to the senior political executives. What the public careerists know about the ins and outs of government work and their own networks of personal contacts in Washington helps this de facto higher civil service use, if not administratively control in a classic bureaucratic sense, the machine of government.

It would be fruitless to try to draw clear lines around the careers of those participating in this informal system of bureaucratic executives. Some who participate in it are former career civil servants, especially those who are ambitious to expand their careers beyond the boundaries of their agencies. Some have worked in Congressional staff positions. Some are academic experts with a penchant for government affairs. Any attempt to apply a single label such as public careerists does some injustice to the complexities involved. But the key point is that these are people who build their careers around problems of public policy and do so outside the confines of the formal civil service personnel system. They are not like career executives, who spend their lives within one or another government agency. Neither are they exactly like senior political appointees, who are often transient on the scene of public affairs and have little prospect for reentering government. Table 3 suggests something of the intermediary position held by public careerists: less experienced in government jobs than career executives but far better grounded that the normal run of presidential appointees. This latter feature is particularly striking inasmuch as the information shown is for a time when a new Republican administration had been in office less than two years and after a preceding eight years of control by the Democrats; yet over one-half of the non-career executives had already had more than five years prior experience in government at one time or another.

The potential recruitment pool for the de facto civil service is indeed immense. Since the mid-1950s the number of full-time permanent Federal employees had remained unchanged at approximately 3 million persons, but the size of the so-called indirect Federal workforce has grown to an estimated 8 million persons; of these, an estimated 3 million are doing work that Federal employees would have to do themselves to keep the government operating if the indirect employees were not there. I am certainly not suggesting that these millions of people themselves are public careerists

Table 3 Political and Career Executives' Experience in the Federal Government, 1970

Years of Government Experience	Percentage of All: Presidential Appointees	Noncareer Supergrades	Career Supergrades
under 2	69	40	3
2 to 5	19	7	11
6 to 10	6	14	9
over 10	6	39	77

Source: Adapted from Heclo, A Government of Strangers, p.101

as I have been using the term. But if one could look behind the numbers, deep into the tangle of relationships that is implied by this indirect or third-party government, what one would find are significant numbers who learn a great deal about particular policies and the administrative processes that go with them. Because of what they know and can do, at least by reputation if not in practice, they are likely to be called on when a new Administration or new Secretary begins "staffing up" and looking for "some good people who can help us," as the sayings go.

When not holding temporary positions in the executive branch or mushrooming Congressional bureaucracy, public careerists can be found in academic departments, think-tanks, interest group associations and public interest lobbies, law firms, consulting and policy research firms and so on (rarely in state and local governments but sometimes in the lobby organizations for state and local governments!). The one thing that these places have in common is a stake in concrete problems of public policy and programming. The number of potential roosts for public careerists has grown phenomenally in recent years as the Federal government has intervened in more policy areas and used various profit and non-profit organizations--rather than the government workforce--to do its work. The largely inadvertent result has been to expand a kind of on-the-job training by which persons outside the formal civil service system acquire policy expertise and a working familiarity with many aspects of government administration.

The evidence can be only impressionistic, but it seems that more and more bright, young people who are interested in public service see their futures in terms of the loosely structured career lines of public careerists. To build a career in the formal civil service structure is likely to be regarded as plodding and unambitious. Better a stint teaching at a graduate school of public policy and management or organizing the RFP process (requests for proposals to be funded by federal agencies) for some new

policy evaluation firm. Better still to gain an academic position that combines only a little teaching with opportunities for extensive writing and consulting on particular problems of public policy, or to become a partner in a law firm or management consulting company dealing with particular policy issues. When back in government, public careerists will hold jobs that are formally designated as political appointments, but they are likely to know much more about the intricacies of given policies and their special brand of politics (with Congressional staff, interest groups, the analytic community and so on) than they are to know about political parties and elections. The best of these public careerists will know a great deal about the administrative machinery of government and so form a very useful link between senior Presidential appointees and lower level career bureaucrats in the agencies. The worst are in Washington merely to build a resume and promote their particular policy preferences with little regard to administrative realities.

Policy and Politics in the Dual Structure

By now it should be clear that there can be no simple model describing the role of America's higher civil service in politics and policy-making. Even the concept of a higher civil service is diffuse and subject to differing interpretations. "The" higher civil service is really an inadvertant byproduct shaped within a quadrilateral of four immensely powerful political forces.

First, the higher civil service is part of an executive branch that the framers of the Constitution designed to have a single executive head, the President. Second, however, it is also part of an administrative structure that is beholden to a legislature--or more accurately various specialized parts (committees and subcommittees) of a legislature--that has enduring and independent power to shape administration. Congress can deny the civil servant and his organization funds, overturn decisions, specify

actions and generally make the bureaucrat's life miserable in a dozen says. Third, administrative leadership is vested in a mix of permanent careerists and transient appointees who have only the most tenuous attachment to either Presidents or Congressmen as party politicians. Finally, the Washington bureaucracy has depended more and more on largely independent third parties in the private sector and subnational government level to accomplish its purposes.9/

One way of summarizing all this is to say that the basic organzing principle--more unintentional than planned--of the higher civil service is horizontal. For members of both de jure and de facto systems, the lines of loyalty run outward through programs and policies rather than upward to bureaucratic or political superiors. That is, of course, a gross simplification of a very complex system, but it does encapsulate the essential difference of higher civil service work in the United States compared to other Western nations.

Thus, high level career officials in the de jure civil service find it most useful to work closely with those in Congress and outside groups who have an enduring stake in the programs of their particular agencies.10/ Parochialism is its own reward, for in identifying one's career with a given bureau and its program lies long-run safety from political interference and personal advancement in the agency. Unlike the situation in France, which tends to eliminate risks for civil servants taking an overtly political role, the American system imposes extreme risks on any careerist performing the higher civil servant's role in working closely with top political ministers. Given the general American ambivalence about the Washington bureaucracy and narrowly technocratic assumptions about civil servants' work, given the transience and weak political position with Congress and the public of top Presidential appointees, it is not surprising that career executives feel vulnerable if they are too closely identified with the department's "political brass." If France subsidizes civil servants to become politicans, America penalizes career bureaucrats for performing as higher civil servants.

The horizontal rather than vertical principle also applies to public careerists. Those closest to the Cabinet secretary or agency head are not so much his political lieutenants as they are members of his personal entourage or liaison staff to outside groups. Public careerists mixed elsewhere in the administrative structure are political subordinates only in the most formalistic sense (job titles and payscales) of that term. More realistically, they should be seen as peers drawn from collateral networks of analysts, lobbyists, and other activists in public affairs for whom politics is policy. This is true in foreign affairs no less than in domestic policy where the horizontal alliances tend to be more obvious. Some flavor of the processes at work can be gained by looking more closely at one small example from the new Reagan administration. This portrait of a "defense intellectual" is drawn from the career of W. Scott Thompson, a 39 year old professor and member of the Reagan transition team for Defense issues.

> "The main challenge of conservative intellectuals is to beat down the New Class in the State Department and Defense Department." Thompson speaks in equally confident tones of sending the new message of toughness to the Russians...Nine years ago he was on the foreign policy task force of George McGovern's presidential campaign. Thompson disagreed with McGovern's posture, but felt a need to occupy a formal place on his team. "It was an exercise in damage limitation," he says...A few years later in 1975-76 he became a White House Fellow and served as assistant to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, establishing Republican credentials.... When Jimmy Carter became President he shunned hard-line Jackson and Moynihan Democrats in making his foreign policy and defense appointments. Those shunned founded the Committee on the Present Danger....Most members were old enough to have held high office in the Johnson and Kennedy Administrations, but there was a younger cadre, and Thompson was chief among them. "The Committee on the Present Danger has been the most influential elite-affecting institution in American history,"

> says Thompson. "It has not tried to influence the masses." ....The views of the Committee...were elaborated in an anthology... edited by Thompson and published in 1980 by the Institute for Contemporary Studies, a California based think tank founded in 1975....by, among others, Edwin Meese, now the President's counselor, and Caspar Weinberger, now Secretary of Defense...In the 1980 presidential campaign, Thompson offered himself as an advisor to any and all candidates who shared his perspective. When Alexander Haig considered a run at the Republican nomination, Thompson secured a hearing for him...before the Massachusetts Republican State Committee...Then he served as chief of John Connally's national security task force. But when Ronald Reagan emerged from the field, Thompson joined his camp...He says he has been offered jobs he has turned down (in the new administration), and is mulling over others. "I'm on the standard lists," he says. "I'm on 20 lists. I like what I'm doing now, being a plugged-in intellectual."[11/]

Other public careerists may be a little more adept at hiding their candle, but the same pattern repeats itself again and again in Washington: for large numbers of people at senior levels of the bureaucracy, engagement in public office and politics occurs through the vehicle of policy issues and the networks of people associated with them. Far from increasing political control from the top of the department or the White House, adding more and more "political appointments" tends to diffuse control through the spread of horizontal loyalties.

Missing from this picture of mixed career bureaucracies and policy technocracies is "politics" in the traditional party-political meaning of that term. Neither career nor political executives have any tradition of serving in the national legislature, although some movement back and forth between legislative staff positions and the executive bureaucracy has become more common in recent decades. There is also little experience

with senior bureaucrats serving in elective or appointive positions in state and local government (contra France and West Germany for example). Career officials in the Federal service are prohibited from engaging in all but the most routine grassroots, non-partisan political activity.[12/] Public careerists face no such prohibition but their policy interests generally lead them to shun the "non-substantive" and often tedious work associated with Congressional careers or state and local government service. Likewise, career civil servants almost never rise to the top ranks of political appointments although, as we have seen, they can be found migrating into lower level political executive positions and there is some tendency for public careerists to form part of the potential pool for senior Presidential appointments.

In this American system it is obviously very difficult to view the bureaucracy as an autonomous participant in policy making. At the senior levels of government, where matters of high policy are discussed and hopefully settled, the field of relevant "others" extends outwards, across institutions, through public careerists and into the networks mobilized around particular policy issues. At lower levels, where policy lies disguised as problems of administration, career executives and the mixture of lower level political executives have a field of discourse that also extends outwards in a similar way, even if the subject matter is expressed in terms of hard program details rather than high policy. In this setting, the hardest problem is to make the conversation that is policy-making extend upwards and downwards within the government. The sideways talk outside the state apparatus comes naturally. Only in America would "implementation" seem an exciting new frontier of policy analysis and academic fashion!

The Hollow Center

It is at this point--the nature of policy and administration as an up and down conversation within the machinery of government--that we come to the core problem in the search for a role in any higher civil service in Washington. The one institution with an inherent interest in taut verticle strength in the executive branch is the Presidency. That is the inevitable consequence of a Constitution vesting the executive function in a single rather than a plural head chosen independently of the legislature. As the Federalist Papers put it,

> Energy in the Executive is a leading character of good government....The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity....This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and co-operation of others in the capacity of counsellors to him.[13/]

The logic of the Constitution means that there can be no government-wide, coherent higher civil service unless it is somehow attached to and led from the Presidency. Anything less must represent less than the executive branch as a whole. Only the Presidential office has a vested interest in integrating the diverse parts.

And yet there is a powerful political logic that had mulitated against the constitutional logic for the higher civil service. Everything said earlier about the difficulty of career executives working in close relations with senior political executives applies in extremis to the Presidency.

Secure in their horizontal loyalties, Congressmen, departmental bureaucrats and outside groups are deeply hostile to anything that smacks of permanent officialdom near the President. Likewise, Presidents and their transient aides suspect any official who has been closely identified with the work of a preceding administration. And always in the background is the pervasive historical attitude that civil servants are at their best on narrowly technical matters and unfit for working in a political environment on questions of general policy--precisely the situation in the White House. It seems strange to say but it is true: the surest way for a higher civil servant to cut short his career in government is to work faithfully as a higher civil servant to the President.

This political logic means that the closer one approaches the person of the President, the farther into the background recede higher civil servants in both the de facto and de jure senses of that term. One searches in vain for anything even approaching a higher civil service presence in the Executive Office of the President as a whole. A closer look at the President's Executive Office will help clarify the paradox of a hollow center in the American higher civil service.

At the fringes of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) have traditionally been a number of special purpose units, usually put there at the insistance of one or another group convinced that the Presidential seal of office will highlight the importance of their concerns. Consumer issues, drug abuse, and urban affairs are recent examples, as are the current environmental and science offices. Their staffs are generally a hodgepodge of personnel, some detailed from operating agencies, some from outside the government but all have an evanescent quality as far as the larger working of the President's office is concerned.

Closer to the core of the EOP are four units, each with its own characteristics. The oldest is the Office of Management and Budget, and for some years after moving in 1939 from the Treasury Department to the President's office, this unit approached being a general staff agency for the Presidency with a fairly well defined structure of higher civil service careers. Much of that tradition has been lost in the past 15 years and several layers of political appointees now tend to insulate career staff from direct contact with senior presidential staff, much less the President himself. The political OMB appointees do reflect some of the characteristics of the de facto higher civil service discussed earlier but so far, the unpopularity of the budget decisions they must enforce has limited their chances for returning elsewhere in government. By and large, a generation of senior civil servants with careers built through years of work in this part of the central machinery of government has simply disappeared and not been replaced.

The National Security Council and Council of Economic Advisers constitute two more parts of the core EOP staff agencies. The personnel of each is drawn from powerful communities of policy professionals, the one in foreign affairs and the other in economics. Frequently young staff members will reappear later as more senior members of the NSC and CEA. Some, after a stint on the outside move on to departmental positions and vice versa. In other words, these staffs have something of the quality of public careerists discussed earlier, although it must be immediately added that their main interest is almost always on matters of policy rather than administrative machinery and process.

The Domestic Council is a recent addition to central EOP operations, and its personnel have had the more diverse quality one would expect in a policy area where, unlike foreign affairs and economic policy, there is no well developed community of specialists. Its staffs have generally been a mixture of personal acquaintances with an analytic bent and tie to the Presidential candidate, young policy specialists from outside government, and detailed departmental staff to work on topical policy problems.

Often their small numbers and inexperience in the ways of the bureaucracy has led to considerable dependence on the much larger, more institutionalized staff of OMB for indepth staffwork. At the same time, the loosely structured, highly maneuverable nature of Domestic Council personnel, as well as their perceived closeness to the White House, facilitates dealings with high ranking political appointees in a way that is no longer open to OMB careerists (who are likely to leave such matters to their own layer of appointees).

Taking these four units of central EOP machinery as a whole, one can say that each is (on the record of the past decade) likely to be headed by a senior personal assistant to the President, supported by a staff whose leading members are policy specialists drawn from outside and at the fringes of the Federal Government. One might stretch terms and call these people informal higher civil servants (their careers are not heavily government-based), but three things should be recalled before going very far with that label. First, their service is highly compartmentalized, limited to one of these four units at present or at any time in the future. An NSC staffman simply will not turn up later as a CEA, OMB or DC staffer, and the same applies for each of the other offices. Even if one accepts that there can be an informal type of higher civil service, that clearly does not apply to the EOP as a central entity, only to its parts.

A second reservation is that in all these offices, the general preoccupation is with policy problems and decisions, not with the administrative workings of government. Where there is administrative involvement it is likely to be concerned with checking to see that painfully arrived at presidential decisions are in fact being carried out. But this kind of 'checking for obedience' hardly amounts to the oversight of administrative machinery normally associated with the functioning of a higher civil service. The one exception to these statements has been the Office of Management and Budget, which for a few brief periods in its history had an administrative management staff engaged in high level work.

In general, however, this staffwork has lacked presidential backing, grown narrowly technical and largely atrophied. The Office of Administration that appeared in 1977 is a newly created housekeeping unit for the EOP (mail service, library etc.) with a relatively large number of low level civil service positions and a topside staff of non-career employees. It is revealing of the place of a "higher civil service" in the central machinery of government that with a change in political control of the White House, virtually all of the staff in even this routine EOP establishment (in the British sense) unit disappeared after the 1980 Presidential transition.

The third problem in speaking of an informal higher civil service within the perimeters of OMB/NSC/CEA/DC professional staffs is that these people simply do not interact directly with their chief client, the President. If he is their 'minister,' then they are not part of the strategic center of his activities. Only the head of each of these units is in <u>that</u> position, along with a number of other people in the White House. The White House Office, the second largest piece of the EOP, is, of course, itself a deviously complex bureaucracy. But none of the persons heading up the major units there is a civil servant in the de jure sense; that designation applies to only the lower level clerical staff and by no means all of them. Neither can the non-clerical White House staff be fitted into the category of higher civil servants in the de facto meaning of the term. By and large there is no expectation that they will have or have had anything to do with the administrative machinery of government. With only very rare exceptions, they have never before worked in the immediate environs of a President and never will again (Bryce Harlow, James Baker, and Lloyd Cutler being major exceptions in recent history). The White House is not a place for civil servants or public careerists.

It has not always been so. In the period roughly between the 1890s and the late 1930s, the staff immediately surrounding a President had acquired its own dual nature. The office of Secretary to the President had a long and checkered career. Generally filled by personal friends, young political aides, and an occasional relative, the Secretary's position gradually became more specialized and by the outbreak of World War II there were four personal aides performing different functions as FDR's secretaries. However, there was also a second side to White House staff assistance. As routine functions of the Presidency expanded after 1890, a more permanent staff to deal with these tasks gradually took shape behing the scenes. By the end of the 1930s, the White House was virtually the only place left in the executive branch where the old Chief Clerk's role (see page 13) still persisted. It did so in the person of Rudolph Forster. Forster's exact title varied over the 45 years in which he served in the White House, but by the 1930s Forster was most commonly identified as Executive Clerk to the President and was responsible for supervising administrative functions of the White House much as Chief Clerks had done for departments. Under his jurisdiction fell the expanding offices for mail, correspondence, files, records, messengers, spending accounts and personnel. Seeing the overwhelmingly routine nature of these tasks, presidential scholars have generally dismissed the role of the executive clerk and its eventual demise as unimportant.

In fact the executive clerk's position and what happened to it are central to understanding the absence of a higher civil service function in the central executive institution of government. Far from being routine, executive clerk operations were highly judgmental. Far from being relegated to lowly organizational levels, the executive clerk worked directly and intimately with Presidents, their senior aides, leading political figures (even attending the President's senior political staff meetings every day during the Truman Administration). Beyond the mechanical handling of paper lay terribly important functions of advice, warning, presidential protection, and institutional memory in an office chronically subject to disruptive changes. In short, there were the makings here of a higher civil servant's performance.

Rudolph Forster and Maurice Latta, who served as assistant clerk and succeeded Forster as executive clerk in 1943, both joined the White House in 1898 as civil service stenographers on detail from Federal agencies. In subsequent years Forster and Latta shared two desks opposite each other directly outside the President's office (comparable to the still traditional position of Cabinet Office civil servants outside the British Prime Minister's office). All visitors to and from the President passed by the desks. All incoming correspondence and materials for the Presidents passed over those desks. All presidentially signed documents and written instructions from the President (since the Executive Clerk had to pass them on to the messenger service for delivery) went past the eyes of the Clerk. This continued not only inthe drowsy days of Presidential leadership in the 1920s but also during the tenure of Franklin Roosevelt.[14/]

It could not last. As the Presidency acquired vastly greater responsibilities in the build-up to World War II, the position of Executive Clerk gradually faded in significance. It was a gradual process because Forster continued to be regarded by FDR as indispensable, and the smartest of the new "administrative assistants" to the President (created in 1939) used Forster's knowledge and advice about government processes to smooth their ways. But an Executive Clerk's office that merely perpetuated the traditional Chief Clerk functions had little chance of maintaining its position amid the growing responsibilties of the Presidency. That much is obvious. Less obvious are the underlying political constraints that stifled any chance that civil service responsibilities at the center could keep pace with the Presidency. Simply try to imagine the constraints at work if one were the Executive Clerk trying to keep up with the frenzy of Presidential work and transitions. Any holdover civil servants from a previous administration were inevitably subject ot profound suspicion. Since one's loyalty is always in doubt, the best practical rule is to demean the services one might have offered, viz. do not push yourself; let the successive waves of Presidential aides be assured that they, not you, know how things should be done. Wait for the phone to ring with questions as to how things could be done.

As the White House and Executive Office of the President became suffused with more and more temporary aides--visible to outsiders and confident of their proven loyalty to the President--the phone rang less frequently. In essence, there was no client for a higher civil service presence in the Presidency. Not Presidents or their aides and certainly not Congressmen or departmental bureaucrats. Hollowing out the center of any potential higher civil service was a process that fed on itself. No Executive Clerk could reasonably feel justified in trying to attract high-quality civil service staff to the White House. Working hard, doing well, and serving faithfully an incumbent would very likely lead to nothing with the next administration. Far from helping one's career in the government service, it was a road that offered political vulnerability or routine paper shuffling in deference to the ever growing number of political appointees in the White House.

Events have confirmed the political logic. Perhaps the easiest way to see the overall trend is simply to observe the physical position of the Executive Clerk in the never-ending struggle for White House office space. The time honored position had two administrative careerists seated together in the office directly outside the President's door; one of these was the Executive Clerk, the other his senior assistant. When Foster died in 1943, the Forster/Latta duo was replaced by Latta and another careerist, William Hopkins, who had already been in the White House 14 years; Hopkins succeeded Latta during the Truman Administration and remained Executive Clerk until retiring under Nixon. While the personnel continuity is impressive, so too is the loss of office stature. Early in the Eisenhower administration, the President's new staff secretary was added to the Clerk's office, forcing the Clerk's assistant to an office downstairs and breaking the traditional career duo. Later in the Eisenhower years, with a new staff secretary, a wall was built, a new staff secretary office carved out, and a walkway created between the President's office and that of his senior assistant. No longer was the Executive Clerk at the point of access to the President. In the Johnson administration the space needs of even more

Presidential aides took over what had once been a washroom (turned into a private room for rest after Eisenhower's heart attack) and combined this area within the remnant of the Executive Clerk's office. The Clerk then moved upstairs in the White House to what had been a telephone room. In the Nixon administration, assistants to Presidential aides acquired the upstairs space and the Executive Clerk ended up in the basement. There the Executive Clerk was remained, with most of his even routine functions taken over by a new office of administration housed outside the White House and manned by temporary appointees.

Trivial as these developments seem, they illustrate a larger point concerning the problematic existence of any civil service functions in proximity to the President. What the Executive Clerk's office could not become was a focus of continuing responsibility for the operation of the central executive institution of government. Failing to include that function, "the" higher civil service should mainly be regarded as a term of art in American central government.

A Prologue to Democratic Technocracy

America's higher civil service is an unmanaged affair, weak in the central executive apparatus and extensive in horizontal links to the larger political society. The two faces of the higher civil service, de facto and de jure, are really both reflections of the profound duality in modern government--at once inward-oriented by the immense technical complexity of modern policy and outward-directed by the broader social cooperation on which its policies depend.

The profile of the senior bureaucracy is therefore etched by the interaction of powerful external agents on the hard surface of government expertise. The great strength of this system is its capacity to make government accessible to those who are actively interested in affecting its work. The great dangers are that the government will be unable to act as a collective enterprise (rather than a collection of interests) and fail to represent those ordinary people who are not actively mobilized to affect its work. No nation seems likely to reverse the growing need for technical expertise at all government levels. What America's "non-system" of public careerists may have to offer are some hints about tilting the inevitable technocracy in more broadly democratic directions. What Washington has yet to discover is a means of meshing its formal and informal higher civil service with Presidential leadership and more unified government.

Without some way of linking the broad base of public support for non-partisan merit principles in government work to the everyday staff services offered top departmental political executives and the Presidency itself, then one must continue to search in vain for any coherent higher civil service role in American government. That linkage may not be enough to overcome the historic cross-pressures on the bureaucracy, but without it there is no hope at all for a truly effective higher civil service in Washington.

In 1978, President Carter signed into law the first comprehensive Civil Service Reform Act since the passage of the original statute in 1883.[15/] It would clearly be premature to try and judge the full impact of this major act, but there are four features that reaffirm the thesis of this paper. The real definition of America's higher civil service is being written not so much in formal personnel laws as in the ambiguous, informal understandings that shape people's careers in public service.

Finally, there is simply no meaningful system for using the higher civil servants of the Senior Executive Service in the Executive Office of the President. The Office of Management and Budget, with 40 percent of all Executive Office staff, has its own procedures for its own purposes. Several other units do likewise, and the White House Office, with 30 percent of total Executive Office manpower, has no systematic means for using the Senior Executive manpower. As far as the Presidency is concerned, the new, reformed system is merely a formal accounting device for registering personnel numbers, not a tool for managing government.

The conclusion seems inescapable. Neither the historic constraints, nor current practice, nor the 1978 reforms point toward a significantly different future for the formal, de jure concept of a higher civil service in American government. Yet there is a system, and it carries with it the strengths and dangers of a democratic technocracy. To find a higher civil service function developing we must loosen our categories, take a deep breath, and keep an eye on the public careerists.

NOTES

1/ A useful overview is contained in James Q. Wilson, "The Rise of the Bureaucratic State," The Public Interest, Fall 1974. For a more comprehensive review of the issues discussed in this section of my paper, see House of Representatives Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, History of Civil Service Merit Systems of the United States and Selected Foreign Countries, 94 Cong. 2nd sess. (GPO, 1976).

2/ There is little comparative information regarding public attitudes toward the higher civil service in different countries. The most relevant studies contain some hints that, during the 1960s at least, Americans were more trusting of national administrators than they appear to be today, more confident than citizens of western Europe that they could organize to influence administrative decisions, and less cynical about the integrity of public bureaucracies than were citizens in less developed countries. See M. J. Jennings et al, "Trusted Leaders", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 30, (Fall 1966), pp. 368-84; Senate Committee on Government Operations, Confidence and Concern: Citizens View American Government, 93 Cong. 1st sess. (GPO, 1973), part 2. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 70-73; Samuel J. Eldersveld et al, The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Democracy (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1968).

3/ Article II, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.

4/ Cf. William Dudley Foulke, Fighting the Spoilsmen, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1919).

5/ Creation of higher grade positions in the civil service, as for example with the addition of supergrades in the Classification Act of 1949, has always been debated and politically accepted in Congress largely on the grounds of attracting specialists and experts into the government service and not as a means of promoting a system of more high level, general assignments for the existing bureaucracy. See for example, Congressional Record, daily edition, Sept 14, 1950, and Sept 21, 1950, pp. 15036-37, 15558.

6/ Further details comparing U.S. executive structure with that in France and Britain are contained in James W. Fesler, Public Administration: Theory and Practice, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1980), pp. 132-35.

7/ Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians. (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 352.

8/ The only other time that a department-wide civil service begins to come into view is during the 1950s and early 1960s. Following recommendations publicized by the Hoover Commission on government organization, the major executive departments established posts that were usually termed Assistant Secretary for Administration. The original expectation was that these positions, although filled through Presidential appointment, would be held by careerists from the general civil service and that they would serve as each Secretary's chief deputy for internal department management. Most of these offices therefore encompassed budgeting, personnel, and procurement functions. The intentions for these assistant secretaries were clearly not realized during the 1960s and 1970s for reasons discussed in Heclo, op.cit., chapter 2.

9/ This point is discussed more fully in Frederick C. Mosher, "The Changing Responsibilities and Tactics of the Federal Government," Public Administration Review, winter, 1980-81; and Samuel H. Beer, "The Modernization of American Federalism," Publius, Fall 1973.

10/ See for example, Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, "The Overlapping Worlds of American Federal Executives and Congressmen," British Journal of Political Science, vol. 7, no. 1, January 1977.

11/ Sidney Blumenthal, "Portrait of a Defense Intellectual," Boston Sunday Globe, February 8, 1981, p. C-2.

12/ Permissible political activities are spelled out in 5 US Code of Federal Regulations, sections 733.111 to 733.122. The prohibition has been challenged several times, most recently in 1973, but has been upheld by the Supreme Court as being constitutional. United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 US 548 (1973).

13/ The Federalist, Number 70.

14/ A lively, popular account of the Presidential Secretaries is in Michael Medved, The Shadow Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1979). Enticing hints of Forster's work, despite his passion for anonymity, and of FDR's regard for him are in FDR, "Memorandum to Bill Hassett," Sept 4, 1942; and "M. H. McIntyre to Rudolph Forster," May 1, 1937, all in Rudolph Forster Papers, Box 1, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

15/ The Act and its passage are described in Felix A. Nigro, "The Politics of Civil Service Reform," (reproduced), paper presented to the 1979 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. A preliminary and largely negative evaluation of SES experience to date is contained in Peter Smith Ring and James L. Perry "Reforming the Upper Levels of the Bureaucracy: A Longitudinal Study of the Senior Executive Service," Graduate School of Management, University of California, Irving, 1982 (mimeographed).

THE WILSON CENTER

JAMES H. BILLINGTON, *Director*

July 16, 1982

Mr. James W. Cicconi
Special Assistant to the
President and to the
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Jim:

Our dinner/discussion meeting with Senator Larry Pressler on Wednesday of next week (July 21) will consider the role of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--and the Congress more broadly--in foreign policy. I think that you and/or another key White House figure or two might find it of interest to join us.

The dinner will be a small one for only about twenty-five guests. Among those who have accepted are Stansfield Turner, Millicent Fenwick, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, G. Philip Hughes, Richard Burt, Robert Pranger, Philip Odeen, and several of our own Wilson Fellows like Bill Leuchtenburg as well as other leading scholars.

Senator Pressler is in the midst of a major research and writing project on this subject, and after his introductory presentation, the discussion will be opened to the Center's guests.

We do hope that you will be able to join us at 7:00 p.m. in our library for what promises to be an interesting evening and ask that you respond to my assistant, Ada McDill, on 357-2763. The evening will be over by 10:00 p.m.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

James H. Billington

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE CLARK

FROM: Jim Cicconi

SUBJECT: Wilson Center Foreign Policy Discussion

The Wilson Center, on whose board Jim Baker sits, is having a dinner discussion next Wednesday on the role of Congress in foreign policy.

As you can see from the attached letter they already have a fairly prominent cast of participants, and I thought either you, Bud or John Poindexter might be interested in attending. If so, please let me know and I will be happy to make the arrangements with Jim Billington.

Thanks.

FGC

THE WILSON CENTER

JAMES H. BILLINGTON, *Director*

May 27, 1982

Mr. James W. Cicconi
Special Assistant to the President
and to the Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Jim:

Here is the letter on June 3; Walter Ong has a huge book coming out on this subject. He is a very deep Jesuit thinker--the heir to (and far more respected in the scholarly world than) Marshall McLuhan, and his book on the subject of how electronic technology is transforming thought will make a real splash, I believe, when it comes out in the fall. We will have some other interesting people there: Dave Packard (chairman of Hewlett-Packard), Frank Shakespeare, Dan Boorstin, Joan Manley (chairman of Time-Life books), Plato Malozemoff (chairman of Newmont Mining and a very interesting as well as quietly influential business leader), the novelist Herman Wouk, Michael Maccoby (head of the Harvard project on technology and work), Frank Haig (a Jesuit physicist, university president, and brother of the Secretary of State), Frank Lindsay (chairman of ITEK and of the CED), Tim Wirth (head of the House committee dealing with some of these matters), and others. There should be no more than 25, and it would be a pleasant dinner and discussion with no formal program. I hope you and Rich and/or any other key person that you think specially appropriate from the administration will come. Please let me know as soon as you know, and I will not make other calls into the White House so as to be sure not to cross wires.

With many thanks,

Sincerely,

James H. Billington

Enclosure

THE WILSON CENTER

JAMES H. BILLINGTON, *Director*

I write to invite you to attend a special dinner discussion that we are planning for June 3, 1982, at the Woodrow Wilson Center. The subject of the evening will be the question "How does technology transform thought?" Father Walter Ong, University Professor of Humanities at St. Louis University, will discuss how the electronic media are changing thought. In his earlier work, Professor Ong has treated the transition from oral to written thought in the sixteenth century, which he characterized as "the decay of dialogue," the movement "from the art of discourse to the art of reason." Are we now on the threshold of a change equally momentous in patterns of thought, again marked by a powerful new technology?

Our evening will begin with a social half-hour at 6:30 p.m. Dinner and our discussion will follow at 7:00 in the Regents' Room of the Smithsonian Institution "Castle" Building. We will adjourn our discussion promptly at 10:00 p.m.

Joining us for this evening will be members of the Wilson Council whose spring meeting will be held that day. The Council is the Center's advisory committee, and among its members are the chief executives of some of this country's most prominent high technology corporations. Their participation and yours will add much to a discussion that we expect to be especially stimulating and memorable.

I hope you can attend.

Sincerely,

James H. Billington

Enclosure