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12-22-86

Brief of 45W/585 by Bernie McMahon - JSC I

→ Dept NSDD

Fall 1984 Study Directorate on Iran - NSC → new intelligence estimate  
(Trotter + Fortin)

Jan 85 Gohar-far - relationships w/ key Iranian "moderates"

<sup>- forward looking</sup>  
<sup>to US political support</sup>  
Bureaucracy response to Study Directorate

- Negative - no dealing w/ Iran - State + Def.

Debarifor - convinced U.S. Gov. to participate

- (agent of Iranian gov.)

- was story of "moderates" + post-Khomeini gov. a conviction or genuine opening?

- Israeli's - effort to bring US into  
Iranian go. policy.

- possible Iranian sting agent U.S. to  
get U.S. arms.

Driven by Iran-Israel - appealed to US sense  
of despair - hope re hostages

Skeptical by US.

When JP/ON replaced McF (Lieberman - presidential  
drive the process.

Undertaking once started required US to continue  
to show good faith to avoid damage to hostages.

### Issues

Role of NSC bureaucracy in bringing US political  
support to this initiative

Jan 85 - Goharifar - talks w/ issue - included

Furmark - who goes to Keshoggi

Spring 85 The G + K meet several times → Keshoggi paper  
K circulates paper to heads of G

June 95 G meets w/ Seder - quote some theory  
This theory becomes part of Seder-Fuller subtel est.

Seder meets w/ Kivick - same theory  
Kivick has met w/ G. separately (because  
G had been meeting w/ Nimrodi).

June  
95

NSC had Study Sec + new intell estimates, but  
no support from State & Def. - NSOB draft disc  
con by Seder

- no moderator / no post-K issues
- arms for hostages - looks like straight deal for Iran people
- efforts by Iran to get arms
- only the US got in hostages

The Israelis brought in directly to NSC (ME)  
Seder hostile / skeptical of CEK - Seder close to Israeli  
Seder's interest - intelligence - what Seder contacts could  
tell us. can get intell for Saddam - (Gob.).

Nimrodi - efforts to get grass out of Iran. (improving  
his bona fide by getting US into op. helped his effort)  
Also as level of weapons increased, needed US cover

July 3 - Kivick meets w/ ME (high pleasant respect)  
(per Seder - Pella told him that Israel was  
not selling arms to Iran before this encounter.  
Kivick also indicated no prior Israeli arm sub.

a - did US have intelligence to indicate Israel was selling weapons to Iran - McF denied knowing. USG has info that sales likely.

July 8<sup>5</sup>

Kinnick - McF - opportunity US should explore theory - Iranian moderate too nervous to deal directly w/ US - better to deal thru Israel Gov. plugged into moderate - per Kinnick - risks & exposure of moderate - Israeli tapes - thru Gobanifer & his contacts that + with highest person were released - presumably thru Kinnick

(Core - CIA - still meeting w/ new Iranian go-between) North - no action re straight arms - Kinnick neg.

McF - program should have been stopped - no half-cent channel. Wpua for Kinnick.

July -

McF meets w/ Shultz & Weinberger - McF cable to Shultz - lays out issues need to check credibility of go-between. Shultz - be careful of go-between - be sure we are not victimized by Israeli. McF - asked JP to check out go-between.

July 16 Shultz - Gobanifer was a fabricator

July Jeddah / Kinicki meeting -  
Jeddah advises Kinicki on how USG reacting to this

Jeddah goes to Israel to meet w/ Peres - claims he is a WH emissary.

US Amb (Jawa) to Israel complains about Jeddah  
Shultz asks McF

McF says Jeddah on his own hook.

In July mtg w/ Kinicki, McF provides some files  
for Jeddah to Kinicki.

Jeddah thinks he is the action officer & that  
McF has authorized him to deal w/ Israel - McF denies

July - 2nd McF - Kinicki mtg:

13 July McF goes to hospital (legum parent)

RR approves initiative per McF - explaining

OTR - RR skeptical re intermediaries

Theory of urgency - "moderate" need some bon fide  
after mtg w/ RR, McF calls Kinicki

July 30 Kinicki comes back to McF - sense of urgency increased

"moderate" - extremes - what about

US allying arms - moderate need to  
establish bon fide w/ military reimbursement guarantee.

Use limited def copies - McF claims this is  
Sudanese w/o diffusions - offshore - defuse copies

(Chomsky - NW 17 draft by ON  
The McF provided her w/ his comments (Nov-18)  
the NW 20 draft - but no take still carried forward)

Aug 6. RR. McF, Casey, Skully, Winkler, Regan

Only McF indicator RR made decision on  
sale of weapons to Iran - all other say  
no RR decision

NW 85 - McF → Skully Tel. call - Hawk  
shipment - (ON actively involved - signed)  
McF indicates RR approved.

Early Dec - McF to London to shut off  
arms shipments + terminate contact

Between Dec 10 - Jan 6

Jedrej brought McF to Wash.

Jedrej - 3 mtgs - Wash - CIA -

North memo - captured - hostage will die

Jedrej picks up that Bobanjan is problem for  
US. Jedrej tries to change image of

Bobanjan - Dec. 22

(McF. claims everything he knew he told Ponderstein)

(Ponderstein has expressed view that US demanded  
that Hawke be brought back because they did so w/o  
our permission)

Dec 85. Golan - town.

CIA wants Golan - photog. - facts

But Golan stop - put in

Nir (Israeli intel) comes to town to persuade

US participation -

CIA angles and - SW shipment -

McMahon (CIA) thinks we need a finding - that we are  
in covert action.

After Aug 4 mtg.

McF transmit Secord to Kevick

Sept 17 - Telen meets Kevick before shipment (Golan area)

Telen - Kevick - Golan (Aug 20)

mtg again after weapons shipment - Sept 4

(airplane had engine trouble on return trip)

Telen - Kevick - secret code -

late Aug. North alerted - 550C to Beirut area.

(1st time North comes to speaker)

(McF claims to read North into program - NW-16).

McF brought North - to do logistics on Hawk  
shipment - after Rabin call to McF)

Rabin → McF → N → McF

(No illusion about oil drilling)

McRobb - says Secord asked for CIA plane -

(North may have brought Secord in to do flight)

Tisone - CIA chief knew of flight - asked

Portuguese PM to help clear flight & that Hawk for sale

Sept 30.  
and

re shipment  
questions.

Hawke - rejected - wrong kind / Secret matter  
 ∴ no leakage given out. (intercepts created  
 to North & C. Allen)  
 So US needs to send TOWS - 1000

Jan - Nir shows up  
 Kumbak & Nemrodé taken out of picture

Jan 2 -

Odium check w/ McF several times re NSA  
 intercepts to North & Allen - McF social account  
 Art Muro - asst to Chm of JCS (died last week)

16-17<sup>th</sup>  
 Mid-Nov. - meant to see Dyf.

Wentby calls JP - JP says only met w/.

Jan 3 Mtg at Conroy's house -

Spokin, Conroy, JP, North.

Where to go based on Nir - JP mtg.

North - Spokin write finding - draft  
 (North forwards finding to JP)

CTR can provide professional help to strengthen  
 out situation

(After McF pronounced program dead, North  
 & Liden give up program w/ CTR in order to  
 save leakage)

Jan 7 mtg - Wentz & Shultz knew they had lost the day. knew all going forward w/ program, <sup>but not sure of funding!</sup>

Jan 16 mtg - Casey et al re new funding  
Spitzer, name, Wentz

- Notifying Casey.

- News - Pres authority - believed it was 30-60 day program

1000 rows / part of 4000 rows - Sign -

Jan 17 - Lt signed

replacement for Hawks  
reestablished our base files.

Demultimate event - plane to Iran loaded w/ weapons - idea surfaced - late Jan. High-level delegation to Tehran - hostages released - Per get on w/ dialogue - planned - Jan.

North called

McF - read into program by JP - claims

JP said Sucky & Sec St. fully <sup>aware</sup> ~~supportive~~.

(- just quit the opposite)

McF claims he did it for country; one last chance couldn't come to bureaucracy.

Was read finding over phone =

ON advised McF on return from Tehran about decision - claim he thought it was part of program

Wpms

NW<sup>85</sup> - 18 Hawks (Israel)

Feb<sup>86</sup> - 1000 rows

May<sup>86</sup> - 508 rows (replacement to Israel) (Aug 85) <sup>to Israel</sup>

Oct<sup>86</sup> - 500 rows

~~Aug. 86 may have~~

Forensic TX

Aug 85 TOWS - Israel

4 m Kartogzi raised

1 m Kartogzi own

5 m departed in Israeli Swiss acct.

5 m <sup>2m</sup> → Israel (cover cost of wages)

3 m left in acct

508 TOWS to Iran


Iran pd 6 m for Tows

6 m → Swiss Israeli acct (Iran deposit) for Iran Swiss acct

6 m → Gobinifar

Gob owed 6 m to Kartogzi

Transferred to Kartogzi's acct.



∴ 1 m split between Gob / Kartogzi / <sup>Swiss</sup> Investors  
(Jawn Rowe - Co that is private investor here)

Dec 85 Hawks

under

5 m up. by investors

6 m (or more) Iranian pd.

Kartogzi + investors - got their money back

may not have been profit

Some type of TX as Aug.

Forward TR on 1

Feb 86 TR

Kariboji - 10 m raised from private number  
10 m → Israeli Survey Dept. (no Kariboji 08)

1000 TOWS

North to Tweeter (CCA) → price for 000  
from Israeli acct 3.7 m put into CCA acct.  
North asked for lower cost for 000 - Russia

3.7 m → CCA acct → 000 acct

Wpro sent to CCA

Second bump = SAT to put up 1000 TOWS  
to Israeli Gov.

Israeli use own plane, but Second crew  
fly thru to Israel

5.7 cost pl by Israel in Europe

5.7 signed - Israeli acct

(Gobanija first price)

(less cost than 1st request)

5.7 + remainder = acct = 12. m

12 m transferred to Gobanija

(Israeli acct empty)

Gobanija over Kariboji 12 m - check  
on sign.

10 m to private number

1 m entered to P. number

1 m Kariboji

(no report to Gob. at this pt)

& Maud ? Gobinjin - suggests overcharging  
Iranian & directly funds to Afghanistan  
or FBN - Tell George Cave who  
cable back

Early April - ON plan written (Sook, gun man)  
Inventor put up money  
Iranian acct to pay US  
Stop W. pros.

Change Iranian cost markings  
(for Iran) \$12 m + cost (\$2 m for TOWS stopped by Iran)  
make Iran pay the \$2 m

Hawk  
Russell  
PARTS

\$1 m. TX cost  
2 m for TOWS pd by Iran  
3 m for inventor's profit  
\$4.5 m (actual w/pro cost)  
\$22.5 million

Korbinji -  
put to dead end

\$5m - Arab  
\$10m - 2 Corcoran  
\$15 → Iranian acct

Bryant  
Shymak

Iranian wants its money 7/1/77  
\$2 m (TOW remainder)  
4.5 m Hawk  
6.5 Iranian → CIA acct.

Coburn  
North  
Sawyer

James \$8.5 m acct -  
(Maud to his own acct?) → Second (for FBN)

USG → Iran 508 TOWS + Hawk Parts  
\$6.5 ← <sup>US</sup> Iran

176 Hawk parts pallets put on the plane  
Iranians balk - not \$22.5 for 1/4 of wpm.

Iranians agree to pay over 5 months  
total of \$8m for all Hawk spare

- Israeli acct
- Bobonjar acct
- Kartogji acct

\$5m → Arab minister

\$3m interest to Arab + Camb

(Deposit of \$40m to Canada)

Phase IV (Bobonjar taken out)

500 TOWS Oct 86

Iranians put up \$4m debt → Israeli

Israel → U.S. \$2.037

~~no middleman~~

→ (\$2m unaccounted for)

US - 500 TOWS to Israel

Sept 86 Israeli's indicate it  
will ship wpm to FON - Peru only.

Aug 86 - Elliott Abrams goes to Sultan & Brown  
to get \$10m. humanitarian

Abrams → CIA (Fico) <sup>alt.</sup> how to set up  
acct. FON open acct - Panama.

Abrams get back acct #.

Abrams goes to North w/ same prob - North  
gives Elliott his Swiss acct, Sultan \$10m → Swiss acct

Oct 86 - Abram asked North whether  
 happened to 40m - ON - never showed  
 up yet <sup>Oct</sup> - repeated. <sup>now.</sup>

Dec 1 Sultan says money went in August  
 to Lewis. 10 m

(No Abram assurance that money for  
 her name and only)



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TO:

FROM: JAY B. STEPHENS  
Deputy Counsel to the President

FYI: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENT: \_\_\_\_\_

ACTION: \_\_\_\_\_

- ① Any WH / NSC guidance after passage of Solent Accord.
- ② Iran intelligence cable

12-18-86 DTR Testimony HPSCI -

### Opening Statement

July 85 let learned of possibility of arms sale to Iran -  
Hospital - McF - OTR - RR

McF - Israeli - Iranian contact - RR OK

Aug 85 Mtg -

Israelis wanted to sell arms

Broo - cone discussed of Israeli sale

DTR mediation - RR reluctant

- Didn't know Arabization

- Didn't approve - what they do they do

Sept 85 9<sup>30</sup> bump

Israelis had actually sold 508 TOWs - to get them  
hooked out. Discussion. Do nothing about it. But  
Wt Israelis no US didn't condone ~ upset. McF to relay

December - Nov 85 - At Geneva - break in Mtg.

Movement in arms & hostages

later learned the involved 18 Hawk missiles from Iran to Iran  
(In Feb. US insisted these be returned)

Dec. 7 (residence) what to do about arms sale

concluded: McF tell contacts - no more activity

Early Jan 86 - Israeli intervention

12-18-84 DTR

Jan 6 - 9<sup>th</sup> briefing re Findlay  
 JP wanted Findlay in mtg  
 Let RR know in advance

Jan 7 NSPC mtg -

Differences of views -

Evidence of sincerity on both parties

RR approved

DTR hasn't seen finding - (see draft)

JP kept original in his safe.

Findlay: Taken account of by arm -

got from Iran - demerol T; Iran-Iraq war;  
 efforts to release hostages

Feb. 86 - Sale of 8000 (1000) by US to Iran  
 US paid.

Talbot came onto screen - March-April

Expected Iran comment to be but

- Early May - Iran indicated they wanted higher level contact  
 Discussion whether to send someone  
 Decided on McF -

May - Sat  
 wk.

Mtg w/ RR prior to his departure -

RR - JP - VP - McF - DTR - Deputy NSC

General charge to McF

McF reported to RR - limited success

Hostage came out in July (Yanks)

(Replenished 508 VOWs to Iran (May-June) - as part  
 of McF trip)

Oct. 86 Sale of 500 TRW's

Before sale - US contact w/ relative of Jean gabriel  
problem solved.

Channel still not broken off.

Nov. 24 AG revelation of skimming of money for Cousins

Nov. 21 - AG - something wrong w/ Larry testing -

met w/ RR - (Price set by DSO - interrupted  
suggestion price much higher)

Nov. 24 - AG advised RR

Money diversion - price raised - Swiss acct -  
Done by North - JP should have known.

1st time ever heard about this

## Stokes

Does he think mistake made -

- mistake of judgment in getting - history will tell
- implementation - diversion of funds - more  
than a mistake - may have been covered - not a lawyer

Authority to North & Prindler -

DFR December NSC / C75 relationship

Don't know North's area of responsibility

NSA - coordinate of NS issue - large authority

Tower Comair - role; covert ops; coverage;

P.4 OTR - 12-18-86

Ireland:

Iron - only operate NSC has been - OTR

Who should do operate -

Opening of channel - Ireland → NSC (McFarlane)

Not new contact - (1981-83)

∴ McF asked to follow up

1985 TX. were Israelis

(April-May 86 - Hawk batteries - remembered)

McCurdy:

WH procedure for access to Oms.

WH staff - Regan - Sec + Sp. Asst.

NSA & Sec State <sup>- 2 weekly mtgs</sup> from Secret access

NSC - doesn't meet on regular basis

Casby - goes thru OTR

Sec by - 1 w/ky mtg

North - met w/ RR 19 times - never 1 on 1

never just JP/N w/ Pms alone

Dennis Thomas - Asst to Pms - reports thru Regan

NSC mtg ~~from~~ Never discussed - OTR. possible

denial of funds

Not NSC - discussion about embassy help of 3rd countries.

JP met w/ RR alone on occasion

p. 5. OTR 12-18-86

JP never documented decision of funds of RR w/ OTR's point

### Cheney Decision not to notify Congress

This is only time Admin failed to notify Congress on covert action.

- Not much time spent on this

- CIA counsel had given opinion that current notice not necessary

- SG of fund some opinion.

at proper time would be long notice

(RR made decision - protect his version of matter)

RR-VP-OTR didn't know of decision - would have notified long ASAP - did

### Kostenman -

No invocation of Ex Priv.

9<sup>30</sup> briefing - OTR - JP - Kell / McDaniel attend most -

(Deputy NSA usually too paid & open)

- Should be fairly brief agenda

- plus may be some notes

NSC - of OTR - strong attendance - 95%

NSA responsible for notes & record of mtg

### Jungsten

No knowledge of disposition of money for sale of arms to Iran

p. 6 OTR 12-18-86

## Donib

McF reorganized 1985 - Dec.

good Transition to JP

## OTR

Should report directly to Pres

No covert activities - but if RL wants to develop a private channel - OK for NSC

but not handle or report -

## Relationships

Housing / budget - Admin purposes

Spencer - NSC org chart draft → speed work

Pres Conf - NSC being re-structured -

NSA attend many staff mtg

McF - OTR - Hijacking - return to OTR - enhanced

Matrix of Israel -

Establish pt of contact - give in Iran - ; Iran- Iraq war; Lebanese terrorism; influence these factors

## McEwen -

How to get story out - immunity -

OTR - narrative concept - of Com. judgment

WH will declassify - get story out.

## Role

NSC - what was mit of advice

State & Dept know of contacts w/ Iran -

CIA / NSA / OTR in favor

Turned to JP to carry out - work w/ CIA

P. 7. 12-15-84 OTR

ROE cont.

Foundations responsibility to carry out  
negotiate back to R.R.

RR would give guidance

Drug intelligence - CIA decision -

- Burroughs agreed to this policy of sharing intelligence

Brown - N & JP mistake - judgment / zeal  
raised issue of burden & immaturity  
Note should take blame if he screwed up.

OTR - aware of efforts to raise private money  
without "appeal" - OTR would like to find out

McHugh - When RR admitted RR re discussion  
Note admitted to RR re discussion of funds  
JP aware, but didn't want to do anything

Why weren't N & P called - ? -

Agrees w/ description of R.F. re relationship  
of NSA - C of S - Same w/ JP -  
C of S not involved in implementation - unless leg.

Dwyer -

who owns JP - P.M.

what if policy went bad -

- public impact

Pressing news discussed w/ OTR & RR

RR sold to McF to get about 1/2 million back

p.8 DTR 12-18-86

### Permltr

DTR agreed to make documents available to Com  
Director of funds - wrong - don't know if illegal  
speculate as to how screen occurred?

skimming went on

clandestine op - skimming not unusual

May have → pattern of skimming to continue

### Legal op. of AG/CDA -

Hawthorn - won't accept view that Ores can  
withhold info from Cong. - Emphasizes view  
that can't accept even AG opinion about  
withholding info.

### Stokes Immunity - discussion w/ RR

Pardon discussed - excluded -

use immunity better because it doesn't interfere  
w/ Ind Council. • If use immunity, can still pers.

Misc presents - upheld idea of Ind Council as that  
not affected - advance

R.R. has ruled out pardon -

Re Casey Testimony on Nov 21

Possible - Casey only (AG retains  
\$1M amount debit plus w/ intercept)

AG informant - no account of Court report by N + P  
Don't know if enough info to present - still  
pursuing event.

p. 9. 12-18-86 OTR

McCurdy

Statement in next 2 years  
Impressed by OTR's candor  
Advise OTR to seek out cooperative spirit  
at Congress.  
Suspicion between OTR - Cannon.

OTR response -

4 person intent = coop + significance

Cheney: Any guidance to WH staff after passage  
of Boland amendment - particularly  
any guidance for JP / N

RR & OTR never met w/ outside people  
Not serious re Second I  
No Kasegi contacts

Kastner

Second-RR - only w/ - larger group of  
Cannon suggestion at WH.

Q Dec 6-7 '85 and Jan 7 1985 What happened  
How was this program reconnected?

Interment by Israelis - further discussion  
worthwhile - JP need funding - some re currency.

Irvington

Would OTR give his advice again?

RR - no more arms to Iran.

Would not sell NKov arms if opening contact.

P.10 OTR 12-18-86

McCurdy -

argued for consultation w/ Congress to build consensus -

OTR - Tamm - Escobar - remain being

Langston - after session made, OTR don't recall any further discussion about notifying Congress. Collective decision -

Daniel OTR best testing comm has had.

Agree w/ nature of Iran contract -

Roe Issue of breach of contract:

Thought they would break contract after some events (Libya) NOT broken.

entire still there

Diversion of funds into pol. campaign?

OTR - no one in Rep party compares this.

No truth to his story.

Commercials did run - but funds didn't come from Iran arm sale.

Brown - AG interview of North - why not more info

McHugh - See State maintain he didn't know there was a

funding - See Day - unaware of transfer of intelligence info -

CIR agreed to provide intel to Day before CIR come to work (OTR not aware we are providing intelligence to Iran)

9.11. DTR 12-18-86

Mittling -

Was session made to cut out Sec 7 & 8 & 9  
CIA / NSA / State / DoD have been once a week  
my should have been stand

Shultz knew of policy

Bob Kelly - backchannel - designed to get

Jordan out.

Dwyer - Casey - R.R. - low gfr -

occasional - 2x / month

never said told to Pave about Iran arm deal

[ Comm - giving DTR cable on Iran intelligence  
showing - want letter back regarding  
to cable ]

Hamilt -

- we get cable

- documents - work of Comm

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 23, 1986

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

FROM: PETER J. WALLISON  
JAY B. STEPHENS

SUBJECT: Chronology of Iranian Events (Based upon  
December 22, 1986, Briefing of PJW and JBS  
by Bernard McMahon of the SSCI)

Set forth below is a chronology of events based upon hearings conducted during December on the Iranian arms transactions by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Parenthetical material indicates analytical theories, hypotheses, or additional explanatory or contradictory information.

Fall 1984

In the fall of 1984 the NSC issues a Study Directive on Iran in an effort to stimulate new strategic thinking regarding U.S. policy toward Iran. It appears that Fortier and Teicher are the principal architects of this directive which is circulated to the national security bureaucracy for reflection and comment. This Study Directive eventually leads to a draft NSDD which is circulated in the spring of 1985; a new intelligence estimate regarding the Iranian situation provided support for an Iran initiative. USG reaction to the NSC Study Directive is basically negative, especially from the State and Defense Departments.

Winter 1985

Ghorbanifar, who is believed to be an Iranian intelligence agent as well as a self-styled entrepreneur, launches an effort to convince the United States political bureaucracy of a scenario justifying a new initiative toward Iran. Ghorbanifar spreads the story that "moderates" in the Iranian government are interested in opening a dialogue with the United States and that the United States needs to prepare for the post-Khomeini period. In conjunction with this, Ghorbanifar also promotes the idea of Iran's impending economic crisis as well as its military crisis vis-a-vis the Iraqi war. One of the individuals to whom Ghorbanifar provides his information is Furmark who then approaches Khashoggi.

## Spring 1985

In the spring of 1985 Ghorbanifar and Khashoggi meet several times; these meetings give rise to the Khashoggi paper which Khashoggi circulates to the heads of a number of Middle Eastern countries. Ghorbanifar also meets with Michael Ledeen to push the same theory regarding the moderate faction in Iran. Ledeen during this period of time meets with Kimche, an Israeli intelligence agent, and Kimche also meets with Ghorbanifar. During this same period, Ghorbanifar also meets with Nimrodi, who is also a Mossad agent. Ghorbanifar's effort to convince the United States Government to participate in an Iranian initiative which presumably would entail shipment of arms to Iran ultimately stimulates a new CIA intelligence estimate. This Graham-Fuller intelligence estimate provides some intellectual underpinnings for the NSC Study Directive and supports the draft NSDD which is circulated in the spring of 1985.

(McMahon hypothesizes that Ghorbanifar was the instigator of an Iranian sting against the United States in order to get U.S. arms sales to Iran. He also hypothesizes that the Israelis became either a witting or unwitting partner in this Ghorbanifar sting because it was important to Israeli policy to bring the United States into the Israeli-Iranian relationship. The Israelis believed they needed to maintain an opening to Iran in order to obtain the return of Jews living in Iran and that arms sales probably were an integral part of their foreign policy scheme. Because the Israelis could not be seen as selling arms to Iran in violation of U.S. policy, it was in their interest to coopt the United States by having the U.S. join in the arms sale scheme. U. S. participation would provide necessary cover for Israeli action as well as preclude U.S. hostile reaction to Israeli arms sale policy. It would also permit Israel to upgrade the quality of weapons it could ship to Iran. According to McMahon, this whole scheme was driven by an Iran-Israel linkage which appealed to the U.S. sense of despair regarding the hostages. The original McFarlane/Ledeen exploration of a possible Iranian opening was later replaced by a Poindexter/North front which independently began to drive the process because of concern for the hostages. Once the United States began to participate in the process of showing our "bona fides", the U.S. had to continue to show its good faith in order to avoid perceived likely danger to the hostages if the U.S. dropped out of the process.)

June 1985

The NSC now has in place a new intelligence estimate to support its Iran Study Directive, but the national security/foreign policy bureaucracy does not support the draft NSDD which has been circulated to redefine U.S.-Iranian policy. At this point it appears that the proposed NSDD dies a natural death.

However, in June, Michael Ledeen makes a direct contact with McFarlane. Ledeen views the CIA with skepticism and has very close ties to Israeli intelligence. Ledeen also has met with Ghorbanifar in the spring of 1985 and builds a relationship with him based upon a perceived mutual distrust of the CIA. In meetings with the NSC, (McFarlane) Ledeen articulates the view that the U.S. can obtain valuable information and intelligence by dealing with the Iranian contacts, and he encourages the NSC to deal with the Iranian middlemen, namely Ghorbanifar.

(Ledeen may have been expressing the interests of the Israeli government in an effort to bring the U.S. into this initiative. In addition to the reasons for the approach discussed supra, Nimrodi, who had been spearheading the effort to get Jews out of Iran, could improve his bona fides with the Iranians by getting the U.S. to assist in the overall arms policy approach.)

July 1985

On July 3 David Kimche, an Israeli intelligence agent, meets with McFarlane to discuss the opportunity for an Iranian opening as well to shore up the credibility of the middlemen. McFarlane knows Kimche, and has substantial respect for him. Kimche indicated to McFarlane that there had been no prior Israeli arms sales to Iran. (Michael Ledeen indicated that Peres had told him and had stated publicly that Israel had not been selling arms to Iran before this initiative. Query: did the United States have information or intelligence which indicated that Israel had been selling arms to Iran previously?) In his meeting with McFarlane, Kimche emphasizes that this is an opportunity for the United States and Israel to explore together, and he indicates that the initial approach should be through Israel because the Iranians do not trust the United States. He notes that the moderates in Iran would have to expose themselves to establish this channel, and that Ghorbanifar is plugged into the moderates in Iran. He indicates that this information was confirmed through tapes to which he had access. He also underscores the credibility of Ghorbanifar by noting that the hostages from the TWA hijacking had been released through the personal intercession of Rafsanjani because of the influence of Ghorbanifar.

(According to McMahon, at the policy-making level U.S. policy during the next year appears to be predicated on the hope that one arms transaction would result in the release of the hostages, and that this would be a one-time event; the real interest of U.S. policy is opening a dialogue with Iran. At the operational level the U.S. approach seems to be primarily an arms for hostages swap. The Iranians, according to this theory, were really interested only in arms; consequently, they did not want to give up the hostages since they would then lose their bargaining leverage to obtain the arms they needed so badly.) (Apparently as recently as last week, George Cave of the CIA was told by an Iranian go-between that North had promised harpoons and the release of the Kuwaiti prisoners in an effort to obtain the release of U.S. hostages. Also, when McFarlane arrived in Tehran in May 1986, the Iranians did not know who he was. It was a remarkable coup for Ghorbanifar to bring direct U.S. arms shipments to Iran.)

In July McFarlane discusses the entreaty from Kimche with Shultz and Weinberger. McFarlane sends a cable to Shultz in which he lays out all the issues regarding an opening to Iran, and indicates that we needed to check the credibility of the go-betweens. Shultz responds to the McFarlane cable by emphasizing the need to be very careful of the go-betweens and to be sure that the U.S. is not victimized by the Israelis in pursuit of their own policy objectives. McFarlane indicates that he has asked John Poindexter to check out the credibility of the middlemen. On July 16 Shultz indicates that in his view Ghorbanifar is a complete fabricator. At this point in time the CIA claims it is not asked to check out the credibility of Ghorbanifar. (McFarlane may have indicated that he had not heard of Ghorbanifar by name until as late as December 1985.)

Also in July, Ledeen meets with Kimche to advise Kimche on how the USG was reacting to the proposed Iranian initiative. Ledeen goes to Israel and also meets with Peres and claims he is a White House emissary on this issue. U.S. Ambassador Lewis becomes aware of this and complains to Shultz about Ledeen's representations; Shultz then asks McFarlane to explain what Ledeen was up to; McFarlane advises Shultz that Ledeen is acting on his own initiative, and that he does not represent USG interests. (However, in his July meeting with Kimche, McFarlane does provide Kimche with Ledeen's bona fides. According to Ledeen, he perceives of himself as the action officer on this venture and believes that McFarlane has authorized him to deal with Israel (McFarlane denies).)

July 13, 1985

McFarlane goes to the hospital where the President is recovering from surgery and presents the proposal for exploring an initiative with Iran. The President, according to McFarlane, approves the exploration of this initiative (Regan is present); following this meeting McFarlane advises Kimche that the U.S. is willing to explore an opening to Iran.

July 30, 1985

Kimche comes back to discuss with McFarlane a new sense of urgency regarding the Iran situation. Apparently, the "moderates" are in a very difficult situation and need some demonstration of results to avoid a deterioration of the situation. Particularly, the moderates need to establish their bona fides with the revolutionary guards, and Kimche indicates that limited defensive weapons would provide the kind of evidence necessary to support them. According to McFarlane, he believes, and indicated to Kimche, that the distinction between an offensive and defensive weapons proposal is one of a distinction without a difference.

August 6, 1985

McFarlane raises the issue of arms to Iran in a meeting with the President; participating in the meeting were the President, McFarlane, Casey, Shultz, Weinberger, and Regan. Of the participants, only McFarlane concludes that the President made a decision supporting the sale of weapons to Iran; all other participants believe there was no Presidential decision on this matter.

Following the August 6 meeting, McFarlane transmits to Kimche approval for the Israeli shipment of arms to Iran. Before the shipment is made, Ledeen meets with Kimche, and he also meets with Ghorbanifar (August 20).

August 30, 1985

504 TOWS (508) are shipped from Israel to Iran; the airplane which delivered the weapons develops an engine fire on the return flight and is forced to make an emergency landing. (In late August, North is alerted to an impending hostage release and, apparently on his own initiative, activates JSOC to the Beirut area; this appears to be North's first entry into the picture. (McFarlane claims that he did not read North into the program until November 16 when he brought North in to resolve some logistical problems with respect to the Hawk shipment; this was only after Rabin had called McFarlane to get assistance.)

September 4, 1985

Ledeen meets with Kimche and, through a secret code, advises him of the impending hostage release.

September 15, 1985

Hostage Weir is released; this is a disappointment because all the hostages were expected to be freed. Following this period, there appears to be a discussion of the sale of Hawk missiles to Iran because Iran said it needed more weapons before additional hostages could be released. North then advises Ledeen that he is out of the picture as an operational officer and that North is taking over. North also requests General Odom at NSA to provide all the intercept traffic directly to North and to Charles Allen at the CIA; he claims that McFarlane is aware of this tasking.

November 16, 1985

McFarlane calls North from Geneva; McFarlane had just received a call from Rabin who noted the Israelis were having trouble with an aircraft scheduled to deliver materials to Iran. This is the first time that North is officially brought into the operation by McFarlane when McFarlane called him to seek his help in resolving the logistical problems. McFarlane also advises Shultz of the Hawk missile shipment and indicates that the President had approved it. On November 16 or 17 Secretary Weinberger receives an intercept which indicates the impending missile shipment. Weinberger calls Poindexter raising concern about this matter; Poindexter indicates that they will plan to meet the following week to review the whole issue. (McFarlane claims that everything he knew about this program he told Poindexter. Poindexter has expressed the view that the US demanded the return of the Hawk missiles because they were shipped without our permission. A CIA airplane was used in the November Hawk shipment; McMahan of the CIA believes that a Finding is necessary since we appear to be involved in a covert action.)

November 18-21, 1985

There are several phone calls between North and others to deal with logistical matters regarding the Hawk shipment; Secord is brought into the operation by North to go to Lisbon; he tells the Portugese that he represents the United States and needs clearance for a planeload of arms. In Lisbon the CIA station chief is aware of the proposed flight to Iran and asks the Portugese Prime Minister to help clear the flight; he is aware that the flight involves the shipment of Hawk missiles to Iran. He also apparently also knows it is a hostage release operation.

November 24, 1985

The Hawk missile shipment arrives in Tehran; the Iranians reject the missiles because they are the wrong type for their operational demands; the missiles have Israeli markings on them; and no hostages are released. From intercepts North apparently finds out that the Iranians have rejected the Hawk missile shipment; he knows that we do not have to demand their return. (The chronology which North prepared is in error in claiming that we did not find out about the rejection of the Hawks until January, 1986.)

December 7, 1985

Meeting at the White House residence attended by most principals to review the Iranian program. McFarlane goes to London following this meeting to review the situation with the middlemen. He determines that the program is over and that Ghorbanifar is a totally unreliable individual.

December 10, 1985

North writes a somewhat hysterical memo claiming that the hostages will die unless the United States continues this operation; this memo is prepared after McFarlane returns from London and after he advises North that the program is dead.

Mid-December 1985

Ledeen brings Ghorbanifar to Washington in an effort to rehabilitate Ghorbanifar and to renew US interest in the program. Through his contacts, Ledeen has picked up that Ghorbanifar appears to be the problem with respect to the US, and he sets up several meetings between Ghorbanifar and the CIA in an effort to rehabilitate him. In early January, the CIA polygraphs Ghorbanifar, and he fails the polygraph completely.

January 2, 1986

Nir appears in Washington as Peres' representative replacing Nimrodi. Nimrodi was one of the initial Israeli middlemen, and this appears to be an effort to restructure the program by bringing in new intermediaries. Nir talks with Poindexter. At this point Kimche and Nimrodi are then taken out of the picture.

January 3, 1986

There is a meeting at Casey's home including Casey, Sporkin, Poindexter, and North to discuss where the program should go based on the Nir-Poindexter meeting of the previous day. North and Sporkin engage in writing a Finding -- apparently, Sporkin did a couple drafts of a Finding on January 2 and 3. The theory of the draft Finding is that the CIA can provide professional help to straighten out the situation, but that they need a Finding to come into the situation officially. (It appears that after McFarlane pronounced the program dead in mid-December, North and Ledeen ginned up the program with the CIA in order to save the hostages.)

January 4, 1986

North sends Poindexter a memo indicating Sporkin and Casey support the program and forwarding a draft Finding for the President's signature.

January 7, 1986

The NSPG meets to review the proposed Finding. Shultz and Weinberger realize they have lost their argument and that the President intends to go forward with the program.

January 16, 1986

Casey, Sporkin, Poindexter, Weinberger, and Meese meet to review the Finding. At this meeting the issue of Congressional notification is discussed. Meese provides a legal opinion that the President has authority to carry on this intelligence operation without advising Congress immediately; apparently, Meese is under the impression that this is a 30-60 day program and that, upon completion, appropriate notification would be made. Also, at this meeting additional arms shipments to Iran, including a shipment of 4,000 TOWS, is discussed. Initially, an installment of 1,000 TOWS would be exchanged for the rejected Hawk missiles; this arms transaction is viewed as reestablishing our bona fides; it is also understood that a high-level delegation would go to Tehran to move the initiative forward.

January 17, 1986

The President signs the Finding.

January-March 1986

In late January the idea of sending a high-level delegation to Iran develops further. An arms shipment which would facilitate

the release of all the hostages is planned. After the release of the hostages, a high-level delegation would establish the contacts necessary to develop a policy-level dialogue with the Iranians. (The structure of the program had not changed substantially from the beginning. At the working level, the operational people viewed this as a straight trade of arms for hostages; at the policy level the players believed this was a one-time arms shipment which would facilitate the release of all the hostages and then the initiative could move forward to high-level government contacts.) Initially, the meeting in Tehran is scheduled for April, but it is delayed because of the Libyan bombing raid in early April. McFarlane claims he is opposed to going to Tehran, but believes this was one last chance to save the initiative. Poindexter advises McFarlane (contrary to fact) that Shultz and Weinberger are fully aware of the proposed trip to Tehran. McFarlane is concerned that this venture could not be left to the bureaucracy; he is read the Finding over the telephone.

#### February 1986

1,000 TOWS from US stockpiles are shipped to Iran.

#### May 1986

504 TOWS are shipped to Israel to replenish the Israeli stock which had been used for the previous August 30, 1985 shipment. McFarlane goes on mission to Tehran.

#### August 1986

Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams goes to the Sultan of Brunei to solicit \$10 million in humanitarian aid for the Contras. The Sultan indicates he is willing to contribute to this cause. Abrams goes to Allan Fires at the CIA to request assistance in setting up an account for the Sultan's contribution. The FDN opens an account in Panama to receive the funds, and Abrams is given the bank account number. At the same time, it appears that Abrams goes to North with the same problem regarding establishing a bank account. North gives Abrams North's Swiss bank account number, and it appears that the Sultan's \$10 million contribution is to be sent to the Swiss account. In October and again in November Abrams apparently asks North whatever happened to the \$10 million Sultan's contribution; North advises Abrams that it has not yet appeared in the Swiss bank account as late as November. On December 1 a State Department approach to the Sultan of Brunei confirms that the Sultan had indeed sent the \$10 million payment to the Swiss account in August. (It appears that Abrams sought no assurances that the Sultan's payment would be used only for humanitarian purposes.)

#### October 1986

The US ships an additional 500 TOWS to Iran.

## Financial Transactions for Iranian Arms Sales

Set out below is a preliminary description of the possible financial transactions surrounding the Iranian arms sales.

### August 1985 Israeli TOW Shipment

It appears that Khashoggi raised \$5 million, \$4 million from investors and \$1 million of his own funds, and deposited the \$5 million in an Israeli Swiss bank account. From this account, \$2 million was withdrawn to pay Israel for the cost of the TOW weapons; this left \$3 million in the Israeli account. The 504 TOWS were shipped to Iran; Iran paid \$6 million for this shipment. \$6 million was transferred to the Israeli Swiss account from an Iranian Swiss account. From the Israeli account, \$6 million was withdrawn to pay Ghorbanifar who owed \$6 million to Khashoggi on the advance of this sale; the \$6 million was transferred to a Khashoggi account. (Therefore, it appears that \$1 million in profit or interest was split between Khashoggi, his private investors, and possibly Ghorbanifar.)

### November 1985 Hawk Missile Shipment

Fewer details are available regarding this shipment, although it appears to have followed the same transactional lines as the August 1985 TOW shipment. It appears that \$5 million was put up by private investors, and that the Iranians paid at least \$6 million for the Hawk missiles. It appears that Khashoggi and private investors got their money back on their advance, although there may not have been any profit. (Since the Hawk missiles were rejected, it may be that no funds were transferred from Iran and that the financial advance was returned to the investors.)

### February 1986 TOW Shipment

Khashoggi raised \$10 million from private investors which was deposited in an Israeli Swiss account. North, working with Tweeten (CIA), negotiated a fair market value price for 1,000 TOWS from DOD; North apparently asked General Russo for a lower cost figure on the TOWS. A cost figure of \$3.7 million was finally arrived at for the 1,000 TOWS. From the Israeli account, \$3.7 million was withdrawn which was transferred to a CIA Swiss account to cover the cost of the TOWS; this amount was then transferred to DOD to pay for the TOWS. The weapons were then sent to the CIA. Secord appears to have brought in Southern Air Transport to pick up the 1,000 TOWS for delivery to the Israeli government. When the shipment arrived in Israel, Israel used its own plane to fly the arms to Iran, but the same crew from the Secord leg of the flight was used to fly the arms into Iran.

It appears that Iran paid \$5.7 million for this shipment of 1,000 TOWS; \$5.7 million was deposited in the Israeli Swiss account. This \$5.7 million plus the remainder in the Israeli account from the \$10 million advance (approximately \$6.3 million) meant there was approximately \$12 million in the Israeli Swiss account. This \$12 million was transferred to Ghorbanifar who owed \$12 million to Khashoggi who had advanced the financing on the sale. Out of this transaction, it appears that \$10 million went to the private investors who had put up \$10 million in advance; \$1 million went to the private investors as interest on their advance; and \$1 million went to Khashoggi for his promotional efforts. It appears that Ghorbanifar obtained no direct profit from this particular sale. (Note: This may differ from some of the North memoranda which suggest that Ghorbanifar may have gotten a cut out of each TOW missile which was sold.)

(On March 7, Ghorbanifar apparently suggested the possibility of overcharging the Iranians for arms being shipped to them and then diverting funds from these arms sales either to Afghan rebels or the FDN. Ghorbanifar made this suggestion to George Cave of the CIA who cabled it back to headquarters.)

#### May Hawk Missile Parts Delivery (Possible Thesis)

Consistent with the early April planning memorandum drafted by North which suggested a \$12 million diversion to the Contras, those planning Iranian arms sales determined that they would pass along to the Iranians this \$12 million proposed funding. In addition, the scheme involved charging the Iranians \$2 million to cover the cost of the TOWS previously shipped by Israel in August of 1985; the US was obligated to replenish the TOW stock, and it was believed that this \$2 million could be charged against the Iranians. In addition, included in the calculus was included \$1 million in transaction costs, \$3 million for investor profits, and approximately \$4.5 million for the actual cost of the weapons parts. The sum total of these costs came to approximately \$22.5 million.

Khashoggi then put together a deal to raise a \$15 million advance for the sale of these weapons; \$5 million was raised from an Arab investor and \$10 million was raised from two Canadians. This \$15 million was then deposited in the Israeli Swiss account. Israel wanted its payment for this shipment off the top. This payment included \$4.5 million for Hawk missile parts and \$2 million to cover the cost of the previously-shipped 504 TOWS (although the US had agreed to replenish this stock apparently without cost to the Israelis -- it appears the Israelis intended to collect twice on this first shipment). With the payment of \$6.5 million to the Israelis, there remained \$8.5 million in the Israeli Swiss account. This \$8.5 million apparently was moved to North's own Swiss account, and subsequently, may have been drawn down by Secord.

When McFarlane delivered the weapons parts to Iran in May in conjunction with his trip, only about one-sixth of the proposed Hawk parts were actually taken into Iran. The Iranians balked at paying \$22.5 million for one-sixth of the proposed shipment. As a result of negotiations, the Iranians agreed to pay a total of \$8 million for the Hawk spare parts over the course of three months. This \$8 million was transferred to the Israeli Swiss account; it was then moved to Ghorbanifar's account, then to Khashoggi's account. Of this \$8 million, \$5 million was used to repay the Arab investor, and \$3 million in interest was paid to the Arab and to the two Canadians. As a result of this transaction, there was a \$10 million deficit still owed to the Canadian investors. (It is this \$10 million apparently owed to the Canadian investors which gave rise to Furmark's being alerted to the problem of possible litigation over this issue, as well as to the probable disclosure of the whole transaction unless the Canadians were paid.)

#### October 1986 TOW Shipment

This transaction appeared to eliminate the middlemen. The Iranians in this case were willing to put up the money directly, and deposited \$4 million in the Israeli Swiss account to cover their payment for the 500 TOWS. Israel paid to the US \$2.037 million which was to cover the cost of the TOWS to the USG. The 500 TOWS were shipped to Israel, and then transshipped to Iran. This transaction left \$2 million unaccounted for in the Israeli account. (In conjunction with Peres' September 15, 1986, meeting with the President, Israel indicated it was planning to ship weapons to the FDN; one hypothesis suggests that the \$2 million in the Israeli account might have been used to cover the cost of the arms apparently shipped by Israel to the FDN.)

1-6-86

Briefing of Abakeris & Team

WFC  
JRW  
JBS  
DML  
AR

Opening - ASW

Abakeris

- Chronology

- avoid water torture

- Handle on info (CIA)

- accord of Comg

- Ex Brant coordinat - common monitoring system.

- List of issues / break chronology by issues

SA  
Sparks  
Pozdunk

L.A.  
Ball  
Whitby  
Turner

NSC  
Pearson  
Reagan

Abakeris  
Sentry  
+ 2 military  
counselors.

Mc Groth -

Congressional requests -

- SSC I

- representation / reimbursement issue

- documentation request -

- review of report for declassification

- HASC I

- documents

- staff interviews

-

Chronology of events

- multiple accounts - inconsistencies

Access to documents by former staff. / JP / w

Pres. Intell. Oversight Bd. / Campbell.

## (AR) FBI / DOJ

Review of documents for release

Removal of documents by FBI

(non-relevant resolution pending)

approx. 3000 documents -

Tower Comm'n -

Receipt of documents (came in year to FBI)

No claim of Ex-Privilege (advice to Pres - trusted exp)

## Terry Spearman

Out to bottom of the - Pres. act force

No speculation - disclose only solid facts.

Release of SSF report

Intent = absolute role

Press Problems -

- was it good policy
- cause for hostage
- Secession-making process
- Presidential knowledge of the issue
- Sequence of events
- Legal aspect - Boland / Am report / funds discussion

Problems:

Stonewall - early period - RT put out on link

Contradictions - Israeli role

Info = Dubin & Seiber

## Will Ball

Notice to Congress re hostage releases

Phase I - NOV. 4 → NOV. 23 -

Jan 17 Finding - issue of notice to Cong.

Acme for hostages -

Phase II  
Briefly of leadership by JP. - findings

P.R. informed re-partisan leadership re  
situation; the public announcement.

Phase III. Committee hearings -

failures: North/Prindster 5<sup>th</sup>

problems of Secomats to Comm.

Sp. ability

Concern about Casey's feeling

House Gov. Ops - Brooks - pushy for GAO  
- resistance to GAO involvement

For. Affairs Com - GAO role - demand

- generally view their role as closed

- Shultz / muse possible feeling

- turn-over to Select Comm.

Select Committees: balanced.

Scope - broad

- covert ops generally

- private assist to Contras

- This arm transfer / funds

- Tax returns -

- NSC / E.O.P. operational activity

Janoff - Oct 30 White

Select Comm

Procedures - witness appearance  
- Deposition by staff

Problems re protection of documents / disclosure  
Security procedures.

Tomorrow:

Introduce resolutions today - House -

Senate shortly - the week

Hearings - late Jan.

Staffing of Comm. -

Amending leg. activities by other Comm w/ jurisdiction  
- review - same transfer  
HFA / Intelligence Comm. / Armed Services

(Majority of both Select Comm suggested Carter Soviet program)

NSC (Deason)

Deason - Many process (inter agency) ongoing

Dec 6 Radio address + Vice Pres. speech.

Data base about complete row - <sup>authenticity</sup> integrity of content

Coordinator of FOIA requests

C. Dean McGrath, Jr. Activities  
Meeting with David Abshire January 6, 1987

I. Congressional Inquiries with Jay Stephens

- SSCI - Represented several witnesses (Coy & McDaniel) at Committee hearings
- Reviewed and provided documents pursuant to Committee request
- Reviewed the SSCI Report for declassification review
- Worked on the problems associated with the testimony of Lt. Col. Earle and Howard Teicher
- HPSI - Accompanied an NSC staff member (Florence Gantt) to an interview by HPSI staff
- Reviewed and provided documents pursuant to Committee request
- HFAC - Reviewed and provided documents pursuant to Committee request

II. Chronology of Events

- ° Reviewed documents for incorporation into a detailed chronology of events
- ° Prepared an abbreviated chronology for use in briefing the President

III. Requests for Representation by Earle and Teicher

- ° Requests for reimbursement of their attorneys
- ° Requests for documents

IV. Coordination with CIA, Defense, Justice and State

- ° Attend weekly meetings
- ° Attempt to assure security of documents released

V. President's Intelligence Oversight Board

- ° Requests for documents

Meeting With David Abshire  
Roosevelt Room  
6 January 1987

I. FBI Document Requests

- A. FBI Impounded Contents of OEOB Room 302 (North et al.)
- B. Copies of Documents Provided to Raul for Relevancy Determination
- C. Raul Provides List of Relevant/Non-Relevant Documents to Brenda Reger at NSC
  - 1. FBI removes originals of documents Raul determines are relevant
  - 2. FBI/Independent Counsel will at future time resolve non-relevant documents
- D. Raul Has Now Reviewed All Documents Provided by FBI

II. Search of WH Central Files

- A. Copies of All Relevant Documents Provided to FBI

III. Search of WH Staff Desk Files

- A. Copies of All Files Provided to FBI

IV. Tower Commission

- A. Copies of All FBI-Relevant Documents Provided to Tower via NSC
- B. Additional Documents Provided to Krieg/Tower Where Documents Relevant to Tower Case Studies but not FBI

V. HPSCI

- A. Raul Attended Staff Interviews of Paul Thompson and Wilma Hall