

Middle America and the Emerging Republican Majority

Tonight, I would like to address myself to several questions. First, is a Republican majority emerging in the United States; second, does the Republican strategy aim at the so-called "Forgotten American" or "silent majority"; and third, is this a legitimate strategy and electorate upon which to base a political era?

As you probably know, I have made the idea of an "Emerging Republican Majority" into a book. It is the book's thesis and mine that the 1968 presidential election marked the end of the liberal, New Deal era of American politics. I think we are beginning a new cycle, an era of New Federalism, as the President has called it, which will be rooted not in the fading big cities but in suburbia, the American Heartland and the boom corridors of Florida, Texas, Arizona and California.

For a century and a half, American politics has moved in 32-36 year regimes or cycles, and the time seems to be upon us again now. Other recent developments support this concept. In the past, major population shifts have generally triggered a new cycle. So has the atrophy and obsolescence of an old regime. Let me be more specific. As of 1968, thirty-six years, the usual life of a political cycle, had passed since the start of the New Deal in 1932. Large scale movement of Southern Negroes into Northern cities, together with a suburban counter exodus of whites, has redrawn America's population map. Moreover, the once-innovative New Deal has become a tired, affluent and

arrogant Liberal Establishment. If history follows precedent, the confluence of these factors signals a political upheaval in motion, the beginning of a new cycle.

I don't want to assert this cyclical framework as a rigid, infallible rule. But I do think that it offers a useful, generalized backdrop against which to consider the idea of an emerging Republican majority.

The nature of the new majority - or potential majority - seems clear. It is largely white and middle class. It is concentrated in the South, the West and suburbia. It is largely conservative, but it has a number of unconservative outlooks as well.

On the basis of the 1960, 1964 and 1968 elections, the South, the West and suburbia are the regional bulwarks of Republican presidential strength. Political parties do not shift gears overnight, especially when they have this degree of momentum behind them. They pursue the impetus and trend which put them in office. And therefore I suspect that the ruling politicians of the Grand Old Party will continue to look in these directions.

Nevertheless, talk about the Nixon Administration writing off the Northeast is foolishness. The President carried Vermont, New Hampshire, Delaware and New Jersey in 1968, and I am sure that he is aiming to do much better in 1972. The 1969 New Jersey election results underscore this opportunity. The President may not do as well in the

Northeast as he does in other regions, but he should still carry a majority of the eleven Northeastern states.

Let me toss out another idea. Within the Republican party, a major fight is raging between liberals and conservatives, between Northerners and Southerners and Southwesterners. Indeed, one can legitimately argue that it is within the ranks of the Republican Party, and no longer the Democratic Party, that the great sectional, ideological and programmatic issues of the day are now being fought out and resolved. If a shift of this sort is actually occurring, it will have a profound meaning. Throughout American political history, one of the parties has always been the major, decisionmaking one, and the other has played a minor, responsive role. If the great decisionmaking of the decade is shifting into the Republican Party, then that raises still another sign of cyclical change.

I expect to discuss all of this in greater detail, but for now I would like to turn to the next question: What is the strategy of the Nixon Administration? Is it aimed at the "silent majority" of "Forgotten Americans"?

Yes, but in a positive way. My belief is that the Administration has given top priority to solving those problems which are of the greatest concern to the greatest number of Americans, the problems for which an action-constituency exists right now. In a list, I would include four major items: winning an honorable peace in Vietnam; ending inflation

here at home without causing high unemployment; reclaiming our physical environment; and reducing the current high and dangerous crime rate.

These are the problems the President talked about in his State of the Union message, and, admittedly, they are also the greatest concerns of "Middle America" or "the forgotten American". But solving these problems - if indeed it can be done - would not just benefit Middle America. The whole nation will benefit.

Now I realize that to some people, the terms "Middle America" and "forgotten American" are code words of reaction, constituencies of negativism. I disagree.

True, they can be appealed to in negative terms. So can any constituency. But Middle America is really "the people" - the man in the street - and "the people" is an idea - and a constituency - central to American democracy.

If you picture Middle America in geographic and socio-economic terms, it is a combination of the South, the West and the blue-collar and middle-class North, quite similar to the coalition that Richard Nixon put together in 1968.

Those critics who posit this Middle American grouping as essentially negative would do well to look at their history books. From the era of Thomas Jefferson right down to the New Deal, the constituencies that now make up Middle America have been the horsepower of national progress.

In 1800, the South, the Appalachian frontier and the working class Northeast launched Jeffersonian Democracy;

In 1828, the South, the trans-Appalachian West and the working-class North launched Jacksonian Democracy;

In 1896, the South, the West and the working-class North gave William Jennings Bryan support that almost put populism in the White House;

And in 1932, the South, the West and the working-class North launched Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal.

This is the political ancestry of Middle America, and of what may be an emerging Republican majority. It is a good ancestry, a positive ancestry.

Now I know the immediate reaction some of you must have. You will say that the Jefferson, Jackson, Bryan, and Roosevelt revolutions all came from the Left, and that they have nothing in common with the slow-moving Middle American bent of the Nixon Administration. So let's look at this idea.

Past political upheaval in the United States has not come from the Left but from the people.

✓ In the past the elites engendering popular revolt were economic elites, landed or industrial elites committed to economic conservatism. Thus, popular change had to come from the Left.

1 No more. Technology and economic growth have raised the old working-class constituency to a new affluence, enlarging the old middle class into Middle America.

And at the same time, a separate and antagonistic new Establishment has grown at the top of American society. This is the historically unique Liberal Establishment. In the past, Establishments were toryhoods of no-change: landowners, industrialists, people whose affluence was rooted in stability. But this is no longer where the fast action is. The new Establishment is liberal, a toryhood of change, people who make their money out of plans, ideas, communication, social upheaval, happenings, excitement.

This new Liberal Establishment - the media, the Knowledge Industry, research and development, the universities and think tanks, the foundations and corporate conglomerates - is to the Left of prevailing American opinion. It is to the Left of dustbowl Oklahoma; it is to the Left of Levittown; it is to the Left of Main Street. The average American is fed up with the excesses of the Liberal Establishment. He is fed up with change for change's sake, with calculated erosion of middle-class values and standards, with fashionable liberal bigotry towards Irish, Italians, Poles, farmers, suburbanites and blue-collar workers. These values are not progress. They are progress perverted. And for the first time in history, it is possible that corrective popular upheaval can only come from the Middle American Right.

This is America's oncoming political revolution.

The target is Establishment liberalism, the phoney revolution of the glossy magazines, which mocks Nixonism and Middle America as cottage cheese and Sears Roebuck. Let's look at this self-proclaimed coalition of futurism, humanism and progress. Who and what is it?

It is Scarsdale, Park Avenue, Wall Street, the Episcopal Church, the major metropolitan newspapers and television networks, the best suburbs and universities, the Beautiful People.

If the list is familiar, it should be. These are the places and institutions that have attacked virtually every great popular political movement that America has produced. Some of them are now attacking popular conservatism and the Nixon Administration. They laugh at Vice-President Agnew like their forebears laughed at Social Security, Harry Hopkins and the WPA.

If you look at the national strongholds of Democratic liberalism, you get a similar portrait.

In 1968, the richest precincts in America, Beacon Hill, Scarsdale, East Side Manhattan and Philadelphia's Society Hill, all voted solidly against Richard Nixon. But these are not precincts of progress. They all have a record of opposing popular change. They voted against Jefferson, against Jackson, against Bryan and against Roosevelt.

Then there is New England, historic seat of America's political, economic and cultural establishment. No part of the country gave stronger support to the liberalism of the Democratic Party in 1968.... and no part of the country can match New England's record of backing old regimes, institutionalized ideologies, worn-out establishments. Regionalism has no place in Federal policymaking, but it is an instructive fact of political history. Let me cite some of that history:

In 1800, New England gave the nation's top backing to John Adams and the fading politics of Federalism;

In 1828, New England led the nation in supporting John Quincy Adams against the popular revolution of Andrew Jackson;

In 1896, New England led the nation in defending Robber-Baron Republicanism against the populist assault of William Jennings Bryan;

In 1932, New England was the only section of the United States to give majority support to the bankruptcy of Hoover Republicanism.

This is a pattern which sheds a little light on the extent to which liberalism has become a status quo. Liberalism is now ensconced in the proven political geography of privilege, obsolescence and defeat.

Let me emphasize that the purpose of this analysis is not to laud or condemn any region or cultural group. It is simply to set a context for the idea of Middle America as a constituency upon which a new and positive political era can be built.

Now I would like to draw my own theory into a little bit of doubt. The emerging Republican majority - or at least the emerging Republican coalition - is a unique combination of the two American political mainstreams.

It reaches beyond the South, the populist West, the lower-middle-class urban areas and other parts of the historic Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, New Deal mainstream of popular politics. Both Middle America and the emerging Republican majority also include the rural, small-town and suburban North. And much of this electorate is the historic constituency of the Federalists, the Whigs and the old conservative Republican

Establishment. This is the old standpat electorate. The traditional status quo vote.

Although elements of the conservative and popular mainstreams seem to be joining together in a new politics of Middle America, they have never meshed before in any lasting way. If the new coalition works, this could be another creative and enduring popular political era, one that tears down obsolescence and builds anew. If it doesn't, this could be a short-lived Whig era, a basic marking of time, a standpattism, a mere re-arranging of existing programs and institutions that breaks no really new ground.

No question is more crucial to the American political future and to the legitimacy of the idea of Middle America. "The People" have always stood for forward motion. Is this where the GOP is going? Or will a kind of organization-man, Madison Avenue Whiggery prevail?

Many parts of the Republican Party are not comfortable with the new popular politics of the South, West and lower middle-class city sidewalks. They prefer the Whiggery of moderation, of reshuffling the status quo.

This presents a real and important paradox. Many of the areas of the country that today claim the label "conservative" are the unconservative areas of our political history, the areas of anti-Establishment insurgency. And liberalism is most outspoken in many of the old status quo conservative bailiwicks. But if history is precedent, only the popular cause can shape a creative new era.

Granted it is confusing to talk about popular, progressive conservatism. Perhaps we should throw away our political labels. They are not really of much use and new ones would make more sense. However, we are probably stuck with existing terms, and it may well be that a new political era of Middle America - rooted in the historic anti-conservative sections of the nation - will have to mobilize under the banner of "conservatism." However, this will not be the old conservatism, but a new popular ideology of pragmatic combat with status quo liberalism.

This, I think, is what the Nixon Administration is trying to do. This, I think, is the hope of the "silent majority" which the Administration is trying to translate into action. The test of this new politics will be positive achievement on behalf of the great, ordinary Lawrence Welkish mass of Americans from Maine to Hawaii. Its programs must aim at Middle America as society's new constituency of forward motion, not reaction. It must aim at making the city sidewalks smile again as in the days of Al Smith, at wiping the coal soot off the face of Appalachia, at equally cheering the lives of poor Italians, Southerners and Negroes, and at making the Arkansas bus driver think that our government is his as well as The New York Times'. In the end, I believe, the strategy of the Republican Party, the idea of Middle America, the incumbent Administration's place in history, will all be judged by the strides made toward these simple and ordinary objectives.

In closing, I would like to say that Middle America is not just a strategy or a coalition. It is the essential bedrock of American society. Its failure will be nobody's victory. Its success will be the renaissance of an entire nation.

The Constituency and Significance of
the 1969 Republican Gubernatorial
Victory in Virginia

By Kevin Phillips
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Introduction

In 1965, Linwood Holton ran for Governor of Virginia on the Republican ticket and was defeated, receiving 41% of the total vote.

Four years later, Holton ran again and won, amassing 54% of the total vote and forging a quite different regional and ideological support pattern.

The political circumstances of 1969 differed considerably from those of 1965, and therein lies the explanation of Holton's victory. In his first campaign, the GOP candidate had run slightly to the left of moderate conservative Democrat Mills Godwin. As a result, Holton won his votes from Negroes, anti-organization Tidewater liberal Democrats, northern Virginia suburbanites (both liberals and Republican loyalists) and Western Virginia traditional Republican voters. Except in traditionally Republican counties and some suburban areas, the 1965 Holton vote did not strongly correlate with 1960 Nixon strength because Holton had captured few votes among the conservative Democrats who constituted (and still constitute) a large bloc of those Virginians who vote Republican for President. Holton's first candidacy ran against the re-alignment grain of both Virginia and national Republicanism.

However in 1969, Holton's opponent was no conservative but moderate Democrat William Battle, victor in a bitter primary and runoff. This enabled Holton to take a position more consonant with

national and state GOP re-alignment, and he ran slightly to Battle's right. As a result, Holton's 1969 support pattern, built mostly on Republican and conservative Democratic backing, correlates quite strongly with 1960 and 1968 Nixon support.

Several facts stand out clearly in an analysis of Holton's victory. First, wherever Richard Nixon was strong in 1968, Holton was strong in 1969. The correlation between Nixon support and Holton support is emphatic. "Nixoncrats" furnished Holton's crucial 1965-1969 gains. Back in 1965, Holton had been opposed by many of these conservative Democratic Nixon voters (not a few were adherents of the conservative Democratic Byrd machine). In 1969, they supported him first because the conservative (Pollard) had lost the Democratic primary, but also because of his new identification with Richard Nixon, national Republicanism and the Nixon GOP's image of moderate conservatism and non-hostility towards the South. The Nixon visits to Virginia - those of both the President and his family - played an essential role in firming up the Nixon electorate for Holton. The GOP contender and Democratic nominee Battle were quite close in ideological position, and without the essential link to Nixon and national Republicanism, Holton (who trailed Battle in the polls before the President's visit and election eve Vietnam speech) would probably have won far fewer votes from hesitant Democratic conservatives.

A similar but second key point about Holton's 1969 vote profile is that his Democratic supporters, save for the unique

Richmond Negro situation, were conservatives rather than liberals. From Virginia Beach to Winchester, Holton's support and 1965-1969 gains typically correlate with Democratic primary support for defeated conservative Pollard and successful moderate Battle rather than with support for defeated liberal Democrat Howell. Most Negro and white working class Howell backers remained within the Democratic party, casting November votes for Battle. It is crystal clear that conservative rather than liberal Democrats shifted to the Virginia GOP in 1969.

In this connection, it is important to detail Holton's low level of Negro support. Except in Richmond, where he won the endorsement of Negroes out to topple the state and local Democratic machine so that they could take over, Holton won only about 20% of the Negro vote (see Chart 3). In Richmond, he won about 58%, for a statewide total of approximately 25%.

Another factor is the relationship of the Holton vote to the 1968 Wallace vote. Those who voted for Wallace in 1968 appear to have divided as follows in 1969: middle-class voters, suburbanites and rural (mostly Southside) Pollard-Byrd supporters to Holton; blue-collar workers, labor (Norfolk-Portsmouth-Newport News), poor whites and most Henry Howell primary supporters to Battle. In general, the 1968 Wallaceites who voted for Holton profile more like the Nixon electorate. Indeed, many were probably 1960 Nixon supporters who will presumably back the President again in 1972.

As for the geographic pattern of Holton's 1965-1969 gain, it was predominantly conservative, being sharpest in "Southside" Virginia. This is the Southern-oriented part of the state, in turn the stronghold of the Dixiecrats, George Wallace and the once-powerful Byrd machine. Whereas in 1965, Holton had captured only 10-20% of the Southside vote, conservative increments of Nixon-Byrd-Pollard voters pushed the Holton total up to 45% in 1969. Both Chart 3 and Map 2 illustrate the Southside surge. Other major Holton gains occurred in Richmond and its burgeoning, fiercely conservative suburbs, the nearby Tidewater and the conservative Shenandoah Valley. There was no particular Holton surge in suburban Northern Virginia where Holton's percentages closely approximated those of 1965, and his vote totals, though well above 1965 levels, lagged far behind Nixon's 1968 levels.

The whole thrust of the 1965-1969 change in Holton's vote pattern is conservative, a coming together of the Republicans and much of the state's conservative Democratic electorate. The support registered for Holton by 58% of Richmond's Negroes (in other races they went 5:1 Democratic as usual) is one of the handful of exceptions that prove the rule.

The nature of Holton's new coalition suggests that his victory was principally a reflection of A) his identification with Nixon Republicanism and B) the splintering of and conservative

exodus from the Democratic Party. Linwood Holton's victory was not personal but situational. Clearly his conservative, Byrd Democrat gains were situational. And in areas where Republicanism was already established and the Democratic Party was not splitting apart - Northern Virginia suburbia, the mountains - Holton's vote was much like that of other 1969 GOP candidates and very much in the pattern of (although smaller than) Nixon's 1968 electorate.

To fully amplify and explain the 1969 Virginia results and the future configurations they suggest, it is useful to structure group and regional perspectives. In the first vein, analyses follow of the 1969 Virginia behavior of A) Republicans; B) conservative Democrats; C) liberal Democrats; and D) Negroes.

On a regional basis, analyses follow for A) Northern Virginia suburbia; B) the Shenandoah Valley; C) Greater Richmond; D) the Western Mountains; E) Southside; and F) Norfolk-Portsmouth-Newport News-Hampton Roads.

I. Group Behavior

During the late Nineteen-Sixties, Virginia's electorate broke down roughly as follows.

Race: White - 85%; Negro - 15%

Politics: Republican - 30%

Conservative White Democrat - 35%

Liberal White Democrat - 20%

Negro (Democrat) - 15%

The 30% Republican ratio represents an estimate of the average GOP share of the vote for local and lesser state offices. On the other hand, the ideological breakdown of the Democratic electorate is necessarily imprecise. A higher ratio of Democrats can be rated "conservative" on the race issue than on questions of economics and fighting the "big boys" of the state's financial power structure.

In the past, Republican gubernatorial candidates in Virginia usually sought to augment their own moderate-to-conservative white party constituency by aiming at anti-organization (liberal) Democrats and Negroes. Conservative Democratic votes went to the candidates of the conservative (Byrd) machine that controlled the party. And so long as the Democratic Party remained the vehicle of Virginia conservatism and the state power structure, its gubernatorial candidates always won. This situation prevailed through 1965, even though conservative Virginia Democrats were becoming increasingly disillusioned with the national Democratic Party as well as increasingly unable to control their own state Democratic Party.

Then in 1968, only 15-35% of white Virginia supported the Democratic presidential nominee, and the conservative exodus from the party accelerated. With more Negroes voting than ever before and conservatives switching to the GOP, the conservative gubernatorial candidate lost a three-way Democratic primary in 1969, and a moderate ultimately triumphed in the run-off.

This set the scene for the Republican Party to assume a new role in Virginia politics as the state vehicle of the moderate-to-conservative Virginia majority that had already abandoned the Democrats on a national level. The different reactions of Republicans, conservative Democrats, liberal Democrats, Negroes and Wallaceites illustrate the re-alignment process.

A. Republicans

Virginia's Republican Party strength centers in two areas - Northern Virginia's Washington, D.C. suburbs and the traditionally Republican western highlands. These are the sections of the state that, in addition to voting for GOP presidents, elect local Republican county officials, state legislators and congressmen. Map 1 shows the areas in question.

In 1965, a number of these counties gave majorities to Linwood Holton. As the map shows, no other counties in the state did so. Holton's first race was very much in keeping with the GOP's unsuccessful past: wholly inadequate support in Virginia's large majority of traditionally Democratic counties.

Virginia's traditional and suburban Republicans probably accounted for at least three quarters of Holton's 41% vote share. Although the great bulk of Virginia's Republicans voted for Holton in 1965, a small percentage backed conservative Democrat Godwin. In 1969, Holton's Republican support was probably well nigh complete. Infinitely more meaningful was his ability to go beyond it and tap conservative Democrat support.

B. Conservative Democrats

Conservative Democrats are probably the largest single voter bloc in Virginia. Their greatest numbers are concentrated in the predominantly rural area which rolls south from Leesburg and Winchester to Petersburg and Suffolk in the east and Lynchburg in the west (see Map 2).

In 1948, this was Virginia's best Dixiecrat country; in 1968 most of Wallace's best areas fell within these bounds. This geographic sweep has always been the bulwark of Democratic gubernatorial victory. Then in 1969, these counties produced the highest ratio of primary support for conservative (Byrd) candidate Fred Pollard. When Pollard lost - the first gubernatorial defeat for the conservatives in many years - the conservative Democratic element looked for a new power base.

On the presidential level, an increasing number of conservative Virginia Democrats have been voting Republican since the first

"golden silence" of Senator Harry Byrd two decades ago. But not until 1969 did a conservative Democratic primary loss trigger the same movement on the state level.

In comparison with his dismal 1965 showing among conservative Democrats, Linwood Holton ran very well in 1969. He picked up the conservative Democrats who have long voted Republican for president - in terms of 1960 and 1968, call them the Nixoncrats - and he added the Byrd-Pollard supporters among those who had backed George Wallace in 1968. Midway in Holton's campaign, his conservative Democratic support was fattened by the switch to the GOP of several hundred prominent Richmond Democrats.

On a geographical basis, Holton's greatest 1965-1969 gains, averaging 20-30 percentage points, came in Southside Virginia, heartland of the old conservative Democrat hegemony. Map 3 shows the counties where conservative Democrat Pollard won better than 30% of the July primary vote. And as Map 3 shows, this was the same area where Holton scored his best gains. Southside counties where Holton had received only 8-15% of the vote in 1965 gave him 40-50% backing in 1969.

This vote did not come from Negroes or white liberals. It came from conservative Democrats and Nixoncrats. From one end of Virginia to the other, with only a few exceptions (like black Richmond and a few Tidewater areas), the best Holton precincts

were those that had produced three, four and five-to-one ratios of primary support for moderate Battle and conservative Pollard. The best Holton precincts were ones which had gone ten-to-one against the liberal Democratic primary candidate, and the worst Holton precincts were those which had voted ten-to-one for the liberal primary candidate.

For example, in suburban Washington's Fairfax County, top Pollard precincts like Thompson's and Lorton produced not only the largest 1965-1969 Holton percentage gains but some of the top Holton percentages. On the other hand, the precincts that produced the top liberal percentages in the Democratic primary gave Battle his only precinct successes in November.

In Norfolk, the pattern was the same. The best Pollard precincts were the top Holton precincts, and the liberal, Howell precincts were the worst Holton precincts. Likewise in Virginia Beach, where the top Pollard precincts - Cape Henry and Linkhorn - topped Holton's list.

In and around Richmond, the best Holton totals came in the precincts Pollard had carried in July. Suburban Henrico County's Tuckahoe and Rollingwood, the top two Pollard precincts, led Holton's list. And within Richmond, the pattern again showed the top Pollard precincts - Dover Road (2), University of Richmond, Tuckahoe, Lock Lane - as Holton's best. All of these heavily

pro-Pollard areas went two or three-to-one for Holton. (As indicated, Richmond also offers a unique instance of Negro Howellites voting for Holton).

To the west, in Lynchburg, the precincts that went for Pollard were also Holton's. The liberal precincts - Howell's in the primary - voted for Democrat Battle in the election.

Chart 1 illustrates how, in Fairfax County and Norfolk, two areas where the GOP potential is supposed to rest on liberal Democrats, the 1969 Holton vote correlates not with liberal Democratic insurgence but with the crossing-over of conservative Pollard and Battle supporters.

Whether in cities like Virginia Beach, Norfolk, or Richmond, or suburbs like Chesterfield-Henrico or Fairfax, or in rural Southside Virginia, Holton scored well and made his major gains among conservative Democrats. These gains brought the profile of Holton's electorate more in line with the Nixon constituency he had been unable to replicate in 1965. Moreover, it stimulated the more basic state level re-alignment of the conservative wing of the Democratic Party already moving towards presidential Republicanism.

C. Liberal Democrats

Holton did not make major gains among liberal Democrats, and in some areas he actually lost some liberal support he had enjoyed in 1965 against a more conservative opponent.

The black vote will be described in a separate group analysis, but suffice it to say that except in Richmond, Holton's percentage was not high (and frequently fell below his 1965 ratios).

The white liberal Democrats of Virginia center in three areas: Northern Virginia suburbia, the Tidewater (including Norfolk, Portsmouth and Newport News) and the unionized mining counties of the western mountains.

As for the Tidewater, Holton won most Tidewater counties, scoring small to substantial gains over 1965. Generally speaking, his gains came in more conservative areas, but in some counties he carried Howell strongholds. Quite a few Tidewater counties (places like New Kent, King and Queen, Gloucester, Mathews, James City and Charles City) have very small populations. The voting strength of the Tidewater lies in Norfolk, Portsmouth, Newport News and Hampton Roads. In these areas, Holton won only one-fifth of the Negro vote, and probably only one-quarter to one-third of the poor white (economic liberal) vote. The large majority of anti-Establishment poor whites - most voted for Wallace in 1968 and for populist liberal Henry Howell in the Democratic primary - backed Democratic candidate Battle in the general election.

The Tidewater Wallace vote appears to have split two ways. On one hand, most of the poor whites, especially the labor union

members and other economic liberals who voted for Howell, appear to have gone solidly Democratic. (Holton's AFL-CIO endorsement, given to crack the Byrd machine, not the Democratic Party per se, appears to have cut little ice.) The Wallaceites who backed Holton were the lower-middle-class and middle-class elements, mostly conservatives who opposed Howell in the Democratic gubernatorial primary. The poor white Wallace electorate, populist by nature, liberal in economic philosophy and pro-Howell in the 1969 Democratic primary, gave minimal support to Holton.

Nor did Holton do particularly well in the traditionally insurgent and anti-Byrd machine mining counties of western Virginia. In several - Russell, Scott - he fell below his 1965 ratios. Holton lost Buchanan, Giles, Lee, Russell, Tazewell and Wise counties, plus the cities of Norton and Bristol. Of these, Richard Nixon had carried Giles, Lee, Russell and Bristol City in 1968. While Holton improved his 1965 showing, his gains in the western mountain counties were not great, and were principally confined to the bloc of counties where Pollard had run fairly well in the Democratic primary.

Northern Virginia suburbia (see subsequent regional analysis) has a number of liberal areas, and most of them gave Holton ratios

similar to or lower than those of 1965. As Chart 4 shows, Holton's 1969 percentages in Arlington, Fairfax, Alexandria and Falls Church were almost the same as those of 1965. And within the region, Holton's 1965-1969 gains in conservative areas were generally balanced by percentage slippages in strong liberal areas, albeit the changes were not too great.

In Virginia's areas of liberal Democratic strength, Holton's vote gains generally did not come from these groups but, as indicated, from dissident conservative elements. Nor was there any great pro-Holton turnout. Increases in the vote between 1965 and 1969 were similar to those in other areas of the state. Lastly, as Chart 2 shows, Holton generally trailed Nixon's 1968 popular vote - despite higher presidential turnout, it must be remembered that Nixon was in a three-way race - across most of Virginia's more liberal regions.

In sum, although Holton did win some liberal Democratic votes, such a pattern consisted more of exception than rule. Liberal Democrats are gaining increasing power within their party, and most of them supported it in 1969.

D. Negroes

Negroes cast about 15% of Virginia's total vote in 1969, and their support for Linwood Holton was about 25% statewide.

The one major Negro concentration where Holton scored well was in Richmond, where the local Negro voter council backed Holton.

Supporters of defeated liberal Democrat Henry Howell, they endorsed Holton to break the back of the conservative Democratic machine (by electing a Republican governor) so that liberals - in Richmond mostly black - could take over the Democratic Party. Richmond Negroes voted four and five-to-one Democratic except in the gubernatorial race, where, as Chart 3 shows, Holton won about 56-58% of the black vote.

Outside of Richmond - and 85% of Virginia's Negroes do live outside the city - Holton won only 15-20% of the black vote. As Chart 3 illustrates, the black precincts of Portsmouth, Norfolk and Newport News gave Holton only 13-20% support. In Danville and Lynchburg, the major cities of substantially Negro Southside Virginia, the largely black precincts gave Holton 20-25% support, part of which probably reflects a small white minority. Out in the rural Southside precincts that are at least two-thirds Negro, Holton's defeats were by decisive majorities, although mixed residential patterns make analysis more difficult than in the cities. All in all, Tidewater, Southside and other rural Negroes appear to have gone only 15-20% for Holton, a low level of Republicanism akin to the North. The exceptional situation in greater Richmond, however, probably puts Holton's overall statewide Negro support at a roughly 25% level.

Further evidence of the insecurity of Holton's 1969 Richmond Negro vote came in a December, 1969 citywide state senate by-election.

A black Democrat was elected to the state senate against the opposition of a white Republican and a white conservative Democrat. Negro Richmond, having gained its power within the Democratic Party, bloc-voted for its own candidate against the Holton-backed Republican who won the bulk of the white vote.

Black Virginia was a mainstay of the Democratic Party in 1969 and there is little indication of a contrary trend developing.

II. Regional Behavior

The highest levels of 1969 Republican strength in Virginia came in the western mountains, the Shenandoah Valley, Northern Virginia suburbia and greater Richmond. With the exception of Richmond, these areas have few Negroes.

In the Norfolk-Portsmouth-Tidewater and in Southside, Republican strength reached 55-65% among white voters, but Holton ran about even with Battle because of Democratic strength among the large Negro population.

On a statewide basis, the races in Virginia appear to have divided as follows:

Virginia (Statewide)

	<u>Holton</u> <u>Vote Share</u>	<u>Battle</u> <u>Vote Share</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Vote</u>
Whites (85% of State)	50%	35%	85%
Negroes (15% of State)	<u>4%</u>	<u>11%</u>	<u>15%</u>
	54%	46%	100%

But in the Tidewater and Southside, Negroes cast 25-30% of the vote, and the ratio appears to be more in the following vein:

Southside-Tidewater

	<u>Holton Vote Share</u>	<u>Battle Vote Share</u>	<u>Total Vote</u>
Whites (75%)	45%	30%	75%
Negroes (25%)	<u>5%</u>	<u>20%</u>	<u>25%</u>
	50%	50%	100%

The major phenomenon of 1969 is the high level of Republican support among moderate-to-conservative white voters all over the state.

A. Northern Virginia Suburbia

Northern Virginia's fast-growing suburbs are increasingly prone to vote Republican in presidential, gubernatorial, congressional and now state legislative contests.

As a general rule, the GOP support pattern mixes Republican and conservative Democratic voters. Liberal Democrats (suburbanites and Negroes), increasingly dominant in their own party, rarely support Republican candidates.

The 1969 Holton pattern in Alexandria, Arlington, Falls Church and Fairfax fits this moderate-conservative mold. Holton's 1969 percentages were very close to those of 1965, and his pluralities were not much changed. Within the four cities and

counties, Holton generally scored 1965-1969 gains in conservative areas and suffered small 1965-1969 losses in some activist, liberal areas. Holton's largest leads over Nixon came in strong Pollard-George Wallace precincts like Lorton. In silk-stocking suburbs, Holton frequently captured lower percentages than Nixon. Chart 4 shows the 1965, 1968 and 1969 GOP two-party vote shares in Alexandria, Arlington, Fairfax and Falls Church. Chart 5 compares Nixon and Holton's vote shares in selected Fairfax precincts.

Holton's 1969 support was much more party than personal. His statewide running mates and local candidates fared as well or almost as well. Holton's percentages were much lower than those won by conservative GOP Congressmen Broyhill and Scott. In comparison with President Nixon, Holton won about the same share of the two-party vote. However, as Chart 2 shows, the gubernatorial race elicited a much smaller turnout than the presidential election, and Holton won far fewer votes than Nixon had in 1968.

Northern Virginia suburbia appears to be moving into the Republican column with the key impetus coming from both the steady influx of suburbanites and the changeover of conservative, oldline Democrats (including lower middle-class whites).

B. The Shenandoah Valley

Reaching from Winchester to Lexington, the Shenandoah Valley encompasses a prime conservative stretch of Virginia. The northern

section - Winchester, Clark County and so forth - is the homeland of the Byrd political dynasty and has a long Democratic tradition, now eroding as the Democratic party changes coloration. The southern part of the Valley, especially the old German-settled area in Shenandoah, Rockingham and Page counties, is traditionally Republican. The entire Shenandoah went strongly Republican in both the 1960 and 1968 presidential races, giving Richard Nixon large leads.

In 1965, Holton did not carry the northern Shenandoah counties, and his victories were confined to the old German counties. He carried the Valley by about one thousand votes, losing most of the local conservative Democratic electorate to Battle. Three years later, Nixon swept through the Valley like Civil War cavalry, carrying every city and county and amassing a thirty thousand vote lead.

With the defeat of the conservatives in the 1969 gubernatorial primary, the scene was set for conservative Democratic disaffection and re-alignment to seep down to the gubernatorial level, and that is what happened. Holton carried all the cities, lost only two small counties, and won the Valley by fifteen thousand votes. His increment came from conservatives, and was largest in the old Byrd stomping grounds. As Chart 6 shows, Holton scored 15-30 percentage point gains between 1965 and 1969 in the Byrd country of the Upper

Shenandoah and nearby Piedmont, counties where conservative Pollard had done well in the primary.

No other section of the state matched these 1965-1969 GOP gubernatorial gains except for Southside, greater Richmond and the Tidewater, the other principal places where large numbers of conservative Democrats switched to the Republican candidate.

Area conservatism seems to be forming up on the Republican side of the fence, and future years should see the GOP cement this position. The GOP may pick up a conservative Democratic congressional district.

C. Greater Richmond

The greater Richmond area has voted Republican in every presidential race since 1952, however local GOP candidates have not been able to tap much of this potential because of the conservative bent and appeal of the Richmond area and Virginia Democratic Party.

Linwood Holton won only about 30% of the Richmond area vote - Richmond City, Colonial Heights City, Chesterfield and Henrico counties (suburbia) - in 1965. But he did not trail too far behind Democrat Mills Godwin because a third party conservative candidate won nearly a quarter of the vote. Holton's 1965 electorate was a patchwork quilt of Negroes, liberal Democrats and Republicans.

Then in 1968, Richard Nixon swept the area. The suburban Richmond counties of Chesterfield and Henrico so despised the

national Democratic Party that they gave Hubert Humphrey only 15% of the vote. The rest divided 60:25 between Richard Nixon and George Wallace. The City of Richmond, where Humphrey profited from a Negro bloc vote, split 48:41:11 between Humphrey, Nixon and Wallace. Colonial Heights almost obliterated Humphrey. The 1968 Nixon lead in the four counties and cities was 37,000.

A year later, Linwood Holton rolled up an edge of 33,000, winning 64% of the total vote. His Richmond area support was unique in that it came from both ends of the spectrum - white conservative Democrats moving into the GOP and Richmond City Negroes voting for a Republican governor to hasten the demise of the conservative element and its control of the Democratic Party.

Black Richmond, as well as the small Negro population in Richmond's suburban environs, gave Holton considerably more than half of its vote in 1969, a marked increase over 1965 levels. But Holton rolled up much higher support ratios - 70% or more - in the middle-class and upper-middle-class prime Pollard precincts of Richmond and its suburbs. This too represented a huge increase in support over 1965. Greater Richmond's poor white areas, although staunchly opposed to the national Democratic Party, divided about evenly between Holton and Democratic gubernatorial candidate Battle.

The course of re-alignment seems clear enough, but it was clarified by a December, 1969 Richmond citywide election for a

vacant seat in the Virginia State Senate. A black Democrat was elected with a plurality; a Holton-backed Republican ran second, a conservative Democrat third. Negro Richmond bloc-voted for the black Democrat, giving the white Republican almost no support. Less than 5% of the white electorate backed the Negro; the majority voted Republican rather than conservative Democratic.

It seems very likely that Negroes will take over or play a usually-dominant role in Richmond Democratic politics. In turn, this should cement their Democratic loyalty and firm up the Republicanism of the conservative white electorate of greater Richmond. The greater Richmond congressional district, now held by a conservative Democrat, could turn Republican soon.

Richmond's suburbs are growing at a huge rate, faster than all other Virginia counties save Fairfax. Their escalating Republicanism should be of increasing importance in statewide elections.

D. The Western Mountains

Virginia's Western highlands are the one part of the state that has very few Negroes and a tradition of Republicanism that reaches back to Civil War days. The region has voted Republican for president since 1948 (excluding 1964) and is currently represented in Congress by two Republicans. Democratic strength is concentrated in a half-dozen mining counties as well as a few machine-controlled counties.

As Map 1 shows, this region together with the southern Shenandoah, furnished most of the traditionally Republican counties and cities that backed Linwood Holton in 1965. Holton inflated his support in 1969 by only 5-10%, much less than his statewide average gain.

This is not the part of the state where the GOP is making major strides, however the Republicans are shoring up existing strength and the Western Mountains should continue to favor Virginia Republican candidacies.

E. Southside Virginia

Southside Virginia, once a fortress of conservative Democratic tradition, has been moving away from the Democratic Party during the Nineteen-Sixties. Most of the counties between Danville and Norfolk clung to their old loyalties in the 1960 presidential race, but since then they have not produced Democratic presidential majorities.

Stalwartly southern in outlook, "Southside" is the most strongly Negro section of Virginia. At least a dozen counties are more than 40% black. Increasing black voting is the only source of national Democratic strength. The local white population is extremely conservative and voted about 8:1 against Hubert Humphrey in 1968.

Despite considerable presidential Republicanism - concentrated in urban-suburban middle-class precincts - Southside has

until recently given almost no support to local and state house GOP candidates. In 1965, Linwood Holton scored 10%-30% levels in most of the Southside counties. His best levels came in a few anti-organization areas.

Nixon and Wallace split the Southside white vote in 1968, with the lion's share - 60% - going to the Alabaman. Humphrey won solid support from the black vote, which constitutes about a quarter of the Southside electorate.

In 1969, many of the Southside counties were among the state's strongest territories for conservative, Byrd machine gubernatorial candidate Pollard. Map 2 illustrates the geography of Pollard support and conservative Democratic tradition. With Pollard's defeat, Southside conservative Democrats, like others in Virginia, saw an era come to an end.

The November general election saw a majority of white Southsiders swing to the GOP gubernatorial candidate for the first time in many years. As Map 3 shows, Southside was the part of the state where Holton scored his best 1965-1969 gains.

Most Southside counties gave Holton between 40-50% of the vote, because although the Republican contender won about 60% of the white vote, he lost the sizeable Negro vote by at least 4:1 ratios. In Danville, Lynchburg, Emporia, Greensville, Chesapeake and any other Southside urban locales where the Negro vote can

be sorted out - almost all Southside rural precincts are racially mixed - it went 4:1 against Holton.

Generally speaking, Holton's best precincts - this is true throughout Southside - were the middle-class and upper-middle class precincts that had produced Nixon's highest 1968 support levels. In such areas, the middle-class and upper-middle class Wallace vote also broke in favor of Holton. In most counties, the top Nixon precinct (or the top Nixon-Wallace precinct) turned out also to be the top 1969 Holton precinct.

The large Southside Wallace vote divided raggedly, and by locales as much as by economic class. The middle-class and conservative Byrd-Pollard element usually voted for Holton. The poorer whites generally voted for Battle or for the two minor party conservative candidates. A half-dozen or so Southside counties gave the two rightwing minor party candidates 5-15% of the vote. Back in 1965, the third-party conservative had done much better. It is evident in the 1969 returns that Southside conservatism is moving into the Republican Party.

F. Norfolk-Newport News-Hampton

The Tidewater and its major shipyard, navy and industrial cities are one of Virginia's more liberal areas. Not only are there large local Negro and organized labor groups but there is a considerable local Democratic tradition of opposition to the party's hitherto dominant conservative element.

Eisenhower carried the Tidewater and its major cities in 1952 and 1956 (a sizeable GOP Negro vote helped him), but the Democrats won narrowly in 1960 and more solidly in 1964. Nixon and Wallace split most of the white vote in 1968, while Humphrey won 95% black support.

Running for governor in 1965, Linwood Holton was badly defeated in Norfolk, Newport News, Portsmouth and Virginia Beach. He did not tap much Democratic insurgency on either the liberal or conservative side. This changed in 1969.

July and August 1969 saw liberal Democratic gubernatorial candidate Howell carry the urban Tidewater - his home base - in both the primary and the run-off. However he lost the run-off to moderate Democrat Battle.

Both conservatives and Howell liberals were disappointed in the outcome, but they behaved differently in the general election. Henry Howell ultimately endorsed Battle, and most Howellites voted for Battle. In Norfolk, Portsmouth, Newport News and Virginia Beach, Howellite poor whites went two-to-one for Battle and Negroes about five-to-one for Battle. Chart 1 shows how the top Howell precincts in Norfolk also became the top Battle precincts.

On the other hand, Norfolk's top Pollard precincts gave Holton his best vote (Chart 1 shows the parallelism). Holton won lower-middle class, middle class and upper-middle class votes,

mostly conservative. His best precincts were usually also those where Nixon had run strongest in 1968. In such areas, he combined the Nixon vote and middle-class elements of the Wallace vote. In the Tidewater area as in the rest of Virginia, Holton combined the Republican and conservative Democratic votes. In so doing, he followed the pattern laid down in the 1968 Norfolk-Portsmouth congressional race, when the primary victory of a liberal Democrat had enable GOP candidate Whitehurst to triumph by combining the Republican vote and the conservative Democratic vote.

Like Northern Virginia suburbia, the Tidewater is an area of liberal Democratic strength, however the Republican pattern and opportunity is to combine with the conservative Democrats leaving their party because of growing liberal influence.

III. Conclusion

For the first time, the GOP in 1969 achieved in Virginia on a state level what it has several times recently achieved on the presidential level: combination of the Republican and conservative Democratic electorates into a functioning majority. Virginia is a basically conservative state - suburbanization around Richmond and Washington is re-enforcing not weakening this bias - and the new conservative coalition should move towards statewide dominance under the GOP label, making the Democrats into a shaky


minority coalition of Negroes, Tidewater Howellites, Western Mountain miners and other Democrats and the liberal element of Northern Virginia suburbia.

Map 1

Regions of Virginia Republicanism

INDEPENDENT CITIES

MAP KEY NO.	CITY	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	MAP KEY NO.	CITY	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
1.	ALEXANDRIA	10	19.	LEWISTOWN	7
2.	BRISTOL	9	20.	LYNCHBURG	6
3.	BURMA VISTA	7	21.	PARTISVILLE	8
4.	CHARLOTTESVILLE	7	22.	RENFORT NEWS	1
5.	CHESAPEAKE	4	23.	NORFOLK	3
6.	CLINTON FOWLE	4	24.	NORFOLK	3
7.	COLONIAL HEIGHTS	4	25.	PETERSBURG	4
8.	COVINGTON	5	26.	PORTSMOUTH	2
9.	DANVILLE	5	27.	RADFORD	3
10.	EMPHORIA	10	28.	RICHMOND	5
11.	FAIRFAX	10	29.	ROANOKE	6
12.	FALLS CHURCH	10	30.	SALEN	6
13.	FRANKLIN	4	31.	SOUTH BOSTON	7
14.	FREDERICKSBURG	5	32.	STAUNTON	4
15.	GALAX	5	33.	SUFFOLK	1
16.	HAMPTON	1	34.	VIRGINIA BEACH	7
17.	HARRISONBURG	7	35.	WAYNESBORO	1
18.	HOPKINS	4	36.	WILLIAMSBURG	1
			37.	WINCHESTER	7




Western Virginia
Appalachian Mountain and
Shenandoah German Traditional
Republican Voting

Areas of pre-civil rights revolution
Republican strength in Virginia

Cities and counties giving a majority of the total vote
to Linwood Holton in 1965

Map 2

Virginia's Belt of Traditionally Democratic Rural Conservative Strength



Map 3

The Region of Principal 1965-1969 Republican Gubernatorial Gains




CHART 1

Norfolk City and Fairfax County - the
Parallel Between Holton General Election
Support and (Conservative) Pollard Primary
Support and Between Battle General Election
Support and (liberal) Howell Primary Support

A. Norfolk City

Top Five Holton Precincts
(1969 General Election)

20th Precinct
19th "
15th "
26th "
33rd "

Top Five Pollard Precincts
(1969 Democratic Primary)

26th Precinct
19th "
30th "
15th "
20th "

Top Five Battle Precincts
(1969 General Election)

17th Precinct
4th "
9th "
42nd "
2nd "

Top Five Howell Precincts
(1969 Democratic Primary)

2nd Precinct
6th "
4th "
17th "
14th "

B. Fairfax County

Top Five Battle Precincts
(1969 General Election)

Kirkside
Sugarlands
Bucknell
Westlawn
Sherwood

Top Five Howell Precincts
(1969 Democratic Primary)

Kirkside
Bailey's
Sugarlands
Barcroft
Westlawn

CHART 2

A Comparison of the 1969 Holton Vote
and the 1968 Nixon Vote in Liberal
Areas of Virginia

Northern Virginia Suburbia

	<u>Nixon 1968</u>	<u>Holton 1969</u>
Alexandria	13,265	8,987
Arlington	28,163	18,311
Fairfax	57,462	38,032
Falls Church	2,005	1,370

Norfolk-Tidewater

Newport News	12,744	11,678
Norfolk	22,302	20,683
Portsmouth*	9,402	9,638

Western Virginia Mining Area

Bristol City	1,930	1,113
Lee County	4,450	3,955
Scott County	5,345	3,869
Washington County	6,665	4,680
Wise County**	5,004	5,149

* George Wallace won 12,000 votes in Portsmouth.

** Holton's old home county.

Chart 3

Holton and the Negro Vote

<u>City/County (Precinct/Ward)*</u>	<u>Holton Vote Share, 1969</u>
Richmond, Precinct 18	61%
" " 62	62
" " 63	56
" " 64	53
" " 66	53
" " 67	58
Charles City County ¹	27
Danville, Ward 3	21
" " 9	21
Hampton, Phoenix Precinct	31
" Aberdeen Precinct	34
Lynchburg, 1st Precinct, 3rd Ward	25
" 1st Precinct, 2nd Ward	23
Newport News, Dunbar Precinct	17
" Jefferson Precinct	19
" Newsome Park Precinct	19
" Chestnut Precinct	20
" Lee Precinct	22
Norfolk, 2nd Precinct	17
" 4th Precinct	17
" 6th Precinct	21
Portsmouth, 26th Precinct	15
" 27th Precinct	13

* Included in this list are the top Negro wards and precincts of all of Virginia's major cities.

1 - Charles City County, the most heavily Negro in the state, is roughly 70-75% Negro.

CHART 4

1965-1969 Trends in Northern
Virginia Suburbia

<u>City/County</u>	<u>Republican Share of the Two-Party Vote</u>		
	<u>1965</u> (Holton)	<u>1968</u> (Nixon)	<u>1969</u> (Holton)
Alexandria	52%	48%	51%
Arlington	53	52	52
Fairfax	55	56	55
Falls Church	53	52	49

CHART 5

Comparison Between 1968 Nixon Percentages
and 1969 Holton Percentages in Selected
Fairfax Precincts

<u>Precinct</u>	<u>1969 Nixon</u> <u>Share of</u> <u>Total Vote</u>	<u>1969 Holton</u> <u>Share of</u> <u>Total Vote</u>
<u>Silk-Stocking Suburban</u>		
Waynewood	60%	58%
Cooper	61	64
Chain Bridge	57	59
Chesterbrook	59	58
Cardinal	60	58
<u>Substantially Jewish Suburban</u>		
Barcroft	47	55
Sugarland (Reston)	37	41
<u>Substantially Negro and</u> <u>Federal Employee</u>		
Kirkside	30	33
<u>Lower-Middle Income White</u>		
Lorton	38 (Wallace-32)	58
Jermantown	41 (Wallace-33)	65

CHART 6

1965 - 1969 Trends in the Upper
Shenandoah and Adjacent Piedmont

<u>City or County</u>	<u>Holton Share of Total Vote 1965</u>	<u>Holton Share of Total Vote 1969</u>
Clarke County	28%	46%
Culpeper County	26	51
Fauquier County	29	49
Fluvanna County	21	53
Frederick County	40	66
Madison County	38	62
Orange County	30	57
Warren County	37	51
Staunton City	47	62
Winchester City	38	58