

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
N-1	Memo	Notziger to Dent re: Middle America, 2 pp.	10/27/69	C (Nixon)

FILE GROUP TITLE

WHSE S M O F HARRY DENT

BOX NUMBER

8

FOLDER TITLE

1970 Middle America [10/27]

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
N-1 [doc. 263]	Memo	Notziger to Dent re: Middle America, 2 pp.	10/27/69	C (Nixon)

FILE GROUP TITLE

WHSE SMOF HARRY DENT

BOX NUMBER

8

FOLDER TITLE

1970 Middle America [10/2]

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: Harry S. Dent

Box Number: 8

Folder: 1970 Middle Amercia [1 of 2]

<u>Document</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
263	Return Private/Political



OFFICE OF THE
VICE CHAIRMAN

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 19, 1969

Honorable Harry Dent
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Harry:

I have recently traveled in the South and the Midwest. I wanted to let you know that in my judgement Vice President Agnew has captured the thinking of the so called "man on the street". Attached is an editorial from the Baptist Standard with its masthead. From this editorial, you can detect a thread of what is occurring throughout the nation. Without a doubt the Vice President has emerged as a hero everywhere except Washington, D. C. and New York City.

Best regards,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Luther".

Luther Holcomb

Attachment:

Copies sent to V.P. & Tom Huston
12/22

Editorials

John J. Hurt

Speak, Vote, Get Action

Rise up, ye who are inclined to timidity. Quit apologizing for your absence from "Who's Who." You have got a voice. You have got a vote. You can get action.

Spiro Agnew has proved as much. He has demonstrated that the masses are tired of regimentation. He has given new hope to the fellow who punches a time clock; to the little lady who still washes her dishes by hand. There's also a smile on the face of the man who dreams of the day he may have a private office; of the woman waiting for that second car in the family garage.

Our comment doesn't concern the merits or demerits of Agnew's attack on radio and television news or on the newspapers. We'll leave that to the owners who got clobbered. Instead, we are focused on telegrams, letters, and telephone calls Agnew generated and the self-examination which is resulting.

Power corrupts when those on the throne forget they are to serve the people. The masses are inclined to indifference. They had rather let others do their thinking, shoulder the responsibility and look to the future. It is when the hierarchy becomes selfish and ruthless that another comes along and the hierarchy is tossed aside.

It was the great mass of people, the little folk and those not so little, who told the respected merchants to keep their stores closed on Sunday. Those grasping for the last dime in their money bags still violate the law but their day will come. It would come sooner if the masses would shout their protests at the district attorneys and others who swore to uphold the law.

Several of the newspapers in Texas are restricting advertising for the worst of motion pictures. The people had tired, in fact tired long ago, of theater displays which made scandal pages. Time and Newsweek, along with other national periodicals, now disgrace themselves with cover art more appropriate for Playboy. They will quit when the people speak.

Turn to the other side of the coin. Many in places of leadership risk their future for a position they know is right but lacks popular support. Wisdom doesn't ride necessarily with the majority. Extend the right to disagree without dipping the pen of protest into acid. And, if in agreement, offer a word of encouragement. Such salve helps to heal the wounds others inflict.

Turn back to our premise. You have a voice. You have a vote. You can get action.

The Baptist Standard

VOLUME 81

NUMBER 50

CIRCULATION 372,594

Published weekly except last week of year by Baptist Standard Publishing Company, 2222 San Jacinto Street, Dallas, Texas 75221. Second-class postage paid at Dallas, Texas.

JOHN J. HURT Editor
DONALD T. MCGREGOR Associate
JOHN A. WELCH Business Manager
Wendell Neeley Church Pages
C. Raymond Phillips Promotion
Editors Emeritus
David M. Gardner E. S. James

Board of Directors: Chairman George W. Hawkes, H. Strauss Atkinson, Ralph D. Baker, J. Carroll Chadwick, Dave Cheavens, W. LeRay Fowler, Harvey W. Hoffman, Ned P. King, Howard A. Lee, Orba Lee Malone, Frank L. Moore, Joe Pickle, H. Bailey Stone Jr., Joe E. Trull and Presnall H. Wood.

Subscriptions: Individual \$2.30; foreign \$2.55. Groups (six or more) \$1.80 or if handled through church budget, 12½ cents each per month.

When changing address send label from recent copy and new address to Baptist Standard, P. O. Box 688, Dallas, Texas 75221.

December 10, 1969

Middle America

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

File

TO : Harry Dent
Deputy Counsel to the President

DATE: November 13, 1969

FROM : Kevin P. Phillips
Special Assistant to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: Southern/Blue-Collar Strategy

Enclosed find an article from this month's Commentary
(magazine of the American Jewish Committee) which generally
supports the thesis of my book.

Gothen Hotel

212 FE 7-2200

Rm 15109

Phillips

Is There a New Republican Majority?

Andrew Hacker

PRESERVATION COPY

IT IS NOT easy to argue that Richard Nixon's election marks a revival of Republican fortunes. While he need not apologize for entering the White House with less than a popular majority—after all, Abraham Lincoln, Harry Truman, and John Kennedy shared that distinction—his is nevertheless the smallest plurality any candidate has mustered since 1912. Moreover, he failed to carry a Republican Congress on his coattails; and his campaign showed no success at all in inducing dissident Democrats to change their registrations. Gallup's latest survey could only find 30 per cent of the electorate willing to call themselves Republican, hardly a popular base for a party entering a new era.

As a participant-observer of Republican persuasion—I confess to having voted for Nixon four times—I pay more attention than most to plans and prescriptions for improving my party's performance. However, just recently, and for the first time in almost twenty years of GOP-gazing, I have seen an analysis which rises above wishful thinking. Kevin Phillips, currently a young assistant to the incumbent Attorney General, believes that our country now possesses an "emerging Republican majority." His book* may or may not be mistitled—only the next few years will tell for sure—but his argument deserves serious attention, if only because its major premises may guide future Republican campaigns.

At the same time, Phillips's proposals should be seen as the end-product of a generation-old dialectic within the GOP, and I think it important to take a page or two to set the stage for what he has to say. The Republicans' problem has been their propensity for second place in most elections most of the time over the past 39 years. For the great Sisyphean rock remains the Democratic registration roll, which has held its majority ranking for more than a generation. In every election, the GOP's candidates must start their seductions from scratch: Democratic defections simply do not carry over from one contest to another. Hence the perennial quest for one or another bloc of voters who can be uprooted from

the Democratic weedbed and transplanted in Republican loam.

If nothing else, the Republican malaise has been of benefit to the publishing industry: in politics, as elsewhere, there is something about a loser which appeals to authors; and my five-foot shelf of party books has at least four volumes on the GOP for every one about the Democrats. Louis Harris started the ball rolling a decade and a half ago by spending 231 pages asking, *Is There a Republican Majority?* Eisenhower had just received 55 per cent of the vote, and was to do even better on his second time around. Yet he made no Republican converts. "The key elements in the Eisenhower majority are by and large a new breed of political independents," Harris wrote. The swing-voters Harris had in mind were sensible suburban types, grown too sophisticated to settle for Main Street maxims or Prairie pieties of the Robert Taft variety. Harris therefore suggested a "moderate, middle-of-the-road" course as the best way for the GOP to woo marginal voters who give candidates their eventual majorities. The Harris theory has worked in Senate and gubernatorial races, especially on the two coasts where Thomas Kuchel, Clifford Case, Hugh Scott, Mark Hatfield, Edward Brooke, and a dozen or so other liberal-leaning Republicans adopted postures having independent appeal. But it didn't work for Richard Nixon in 1960.

Nixon's 1960 campaign was not at all Neanderthal. (Indeed his major domestic difference with John Kennedy was that he favored spending federal funds on school construction, whereas Kennedy wanted money for teachers' salaries as well as buildings.) While it has been customary to point out that Nixon came within two-tenths of a percentage point of the Presidency that year, my own view is that he was lucky to have done as well as he did. The real trouble is that "moderation" can end up as "me-too-ism"; and, as Wendell Willkie and Thomas Dewey learned, voters tend to prefer the real article. If Nixon's defeat consigned Harris's handbook to the remainder counters, it spurred Republican printing presses into two directions.

Barry Goldwater's *The Conscience of a Con-*

* *The Emerging Republican Majority*, Arlington House, 482 pp., \$7.95.

ANDREW HACKER is professor of government at Cornell. He has written frequently in these pages on Republican and Presidential politics.

servative and Phyllis Schlafly's *A Choice Not an Echo* were more than exercises in economic orthodoxy and anti-Communist ideology: they also proposed a novel strategy for Republican revival. A third of all adult Americans never bestir themselves to the polls, an apathy social scientists have usually attributed to the inability of lower-class citizens to see elections as relevant to their lives. The Goldwater forces took a different view, and not simply because they suspected anything social scientists said. To their eyes, most of the stay-at-homes were true-blue conservatives, unwilling to waste their time choosing between Tweedledee and another egg. Give them a real choice—an opportunity to vote for a principled conservative—and they would flock to the polls, bringing Republican strength well over the majority mark. If evidence were needed, one had only to look at Arizona, where Goldwater himself won successive victories by uncovering hitherto hidden sentiments. In 1964, Goldwater carried Arizona again. And Alabama and Georgia and Louisiana and South Carolina and Mississippi. And that was all. The theory was wrong.

So to Nixon's nomination last year, and his less-than-auspicious showing against a decimated and dispirited Democratic party. And hence the earlier-than-usual appearance of new programs for Republican resuscitation. Predictably enough, some are suggesting that moderate Republicanism be given another chance. The most active moderate publicity-mill is the Ripon Society, whose offices off Harvard Square have over the last several years issued a steady stream of position papers on subjects ranging from Ronald Reagan and Cuban refugees to Selective Service and the military-industrial complex. All are intelligently written, handsomely produced, and largely unread by the Republican rank-and-file. Though the Society sends its releases to a large mailing-list, it seems to carry on without meetings or members. I have reason to believe that Nelson Rockefeller mails them a five-figure check every so often, an amount sufficient for his and their purposes.

The Lessons of Victory,* put together by 17 young men on the Ripon payroll, argues that Nixon's victory was nothing to boast about. In many parts of the country the party fared worse than in 1960, and anyone unconnected with the Johnson-Humphrey record would probably have won. The authors are pretty well persuaded that Nixon is still the same old Nixon, reminding us that even in last year's campaign he "assured his audiences that Johnson and Humphrey were not traitors on so many occasions that he created the impression that he expected people to think they were." Yet what really annoys the Ripon authors is their party's paranoia about anything new: "At many rallies, including Nixon's cli-

mactic appearance at Madison Square Garden on Halloween night, anyone wearing a beard was systematically turned away." Hence their proposal that the GOP should make a pitch not only to enlightened suburbanites (especially those who "admired Eugene McCarthy's integrity") but also to black voters and union members. They are upset that Nixon attracted only 750,000 black votes and that only one union delegate (the Glass Blowers' president) was at Miami.

This approach *has* succeeded—on the state level. In addition to the old stand-bys—Javits, Case, Percy, et al.—those of the Ripon persuasion can point to new Senatorial entrants such as Charles Mathias, William Saxbe, and Robert Packwood, who ran ahead of Nixon in Maryland, Ohio, and Oregon last year. The real difficulty is that moderate Republicanism has not been able to make much headway when the party foregathers to nominate its national candidates. The treatment accorded Nelson Rockefeller and George Romney at recent GOP conventions shows clearly that the sorts of people chosen as Republican delegates simply will not settle for a candidate to the Left of Nixon. Nor can it be claimed that the last several conventions have been unrepresentative of rank-and-file Republican opinion: as an insider I will attest that recent proceedings have mirrored grassroots GOP sentiment as perfectly as any gathering can.

About midway through *The Lessons of Victory* the authors ask, "What accounted for Richard Milhous Nixon's plurality in 1968?" "The reason," they tell us, "is quite simple: the middle class got bigger." This is true. The American middle class has been expanding, and from its attitudes and aspirations may be deduced a good deal of the nation's political future. However, I am not at all persuaded that the Ripon writers know as much as they should about the character and composition of this social stratum. It is true they are well-acquainted with the suburbs that sported McCarthy bumper-stickers, but middle-class America also extends into precincts seldom visited by moderate Republicans. Kevin Phillips understands this terrain far better than the Ripon Society ever will, and therein lies the force of his appeal for a far different kind of Republican reconstruction.

THOUGH A graduate of Harvard Law School, Phillips writes less as a Harvard man and more as a boy from the Bronx. But the upper, semi-suburban, reaches of that borough: the Bronx of Mario Procaccino and Paul Fino—homeowning, church-going, and uneasy over its association with the larger city. If most Harvard graduates never go home again—after all, their law degree is a ticket to new ambitions and eminences—Phillips returned to the Bronx where he spent four years as assistant to Fino, the borough's only Republican Congress-

* Dial, 411 pp., \$6.95.

man. He caught John Mitchell's eye early in Nixon's 1968 campaign, largely because of his shrewdness with statistics and his aptitude for electoral analysis, both of which are fully evident in *The Emerging Republican Majority*. If like others before him he attempts to show how the GOP can recruit new adherents, he relies less on casual observations and more on the 200 maps and tables he deploys in the course of his countrywide canvass. It is an impressive exercise and a plain-spoken application of social science to a real political problem.*

The Phillips thesis may be simply stated. The Republicans, he writes, now have an "opportunity to fashion a majority among the 57 per cent of the American electorate which voted to eject the Democratic party from national power." Of this 57 per cent, about 43.5 per cent came from Republicans, while the remaining 13.5 per cent were supporters of the American Independent Party. Thus the GOP should make a serious and strenuous bid for the 9,906,473 citizens who cast their ballots for George Corley Wallace. Courting a bloc of this magnitude is a legitimate political pursuit. (Between now and 1972 the Democrats will try to make inroads of their own into the Wallace constituency.) The only question at issue is what kind of appeal one makes to citizens who once succumbed to the charms of an Alabama governor.

As I read him, Phillips proposes that the GOP approach Wallace's supporters on their own terms: not to persuade them out of their prejudices, but rather to produce a Republican record paralleling that promised by the Wallace party. But this is not simply a replay of the "Southern strategy" advanced by Goldwater's staff in 1964 and reactivated by Strom Thurmond last year. For only half of Wallace's votes came from the South; the attraction he held for Northern voters emerges as of far greater significance.

At the same time, Phillips's comments on the South carry more than regional implications. It is in the Republicans' interest, he suggests, to encourage black voting in the former Confederate states. "Maintenance of Negro voting rights is essential to the GOP," Phillips points out, although not out of affection for the Fourteenth Amendment. For only if Southern blacks become more dominant in Democratic politics will Southern whites flee to a Republican haven. "Unless Negroes continue to displace white Democratic organizations, the latter may remain viable spokesmen for Deep Southern conservatism." Phillips has nothing against Deep Southern conservatism; he just wants it enlisted in Republican service, in state and local elections as well as at the Presidential level. (Right now Republicans hold only 13 per cent of the seats in Southern legislatures.) He has no objections whatever to the Democrats becoming an all-black party: in fact, the more Julian Bonds and Charles Evers

the better. Such a party would soon descend to minority status, winning only a few rural counties and a handful of ghetto precincts and leaving all the white refugees to the GOP.

This tactic clearly has relevance to the North, where the Wallace vote ran to 10 per cent in Kansas and Michigan, and 12 per cent in Ohio and Indiana. (Indeed, even in New York City, almost one voter in ten pulled the Wallace lever in Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens neighborhoods like Parkchester, Greenpoint, and South Ozone Park.) Most of these voters were Democrats indulging their periodic penchant for punishing their own party; the sort of thing many of them did when they voted for William Buckley or against Carl Stokes and Richard Hatcher for mayor. But their grievances against liberal legislation and litigation may have grown to the point where their loyalties are, in Phillips's words, "in motion between a Democratic past and a Republican future."

The trick, then, is to steal Wallace's thunder without repelling bedrock Republican voters. And the way to achieve this is not by imitating his method but rather by co-opting his message. One of the reasons Wallace got only five million votes in the North was that he was just a bit too square. Consequently, the issues he raised, treated with just a shade more sophistication, could well be turned to Republican advantage.

RESTYING itself as a party of "populist conservatism"—Phillips's term—the GOP should, he says, appeal to the apprehensions of wage-earning homeowners and white-collared taxpayers.† And in the North as in the South this would be a white party, welcoming Americans of every region who find themselves disquieted over black behavior—whether criminal or constitutional. This posture would probably produce some losses among groups put off by so scapegoat a strategy. Yet even when aggregated, these elements add up to less than meets the eye. For example, young people. Phillips's slide-rule reveals that the average voter is aged forty-seven and those under twenty-five cast less than 8 per cent of the ballots. (Moreover, within the group we call "youth" many more work as secretaries or garage mechanics than attend elite universities.) The Ripon-Rockefeller notion that

* I might add that the book is completely without charm or humor, in fact chillingly so in many places. Moreover, Phillips emerges as a skilled technician unencumbered by literary awareness. Thus on page 83, for example, he supports a point of his own by straight-facedly quoting a passage from *The American Establishment* in which Richard Rovere outlines the theories of "Werner Von Fromm."

† Phillips calls these voters "lower-middle class," but many of them are working-class Americans earning just as much money as their white-collar counterparts. The real difference between these classes is that a worker can be relatively content on \$9000 a year, while the middle class finds this a poverty wage.

PRESERVATION COPY

the GOP can gain black votes emerges as political science-fiction: even when the party could find a James Farmer to run under its banner, he got only 27 per cent of the vote in Bedford-Stuyvesant. In fact, the task of fashioning a Republican majority may actually be speeded up by refusing to court liberal-leaning elements in the electorate. In any populist program it is wisest to write off opinionated minorities who demand basic programmatic changes in return for their votes. A good case in point is the current governor of California, who won his million-vote margin largely by implying that he had no wish for the support of blacks, intellectuals, or the poor. ("One of the few suburbs that Reagan lost," Phillips writes with apparent approval, "was rich, theatrical, and quite Jewish Beverly Hills.")

Phillips also shows a shrewd statistical eye for the nation's growth patterns. Parts of the country still under the "Yankee sphere of influence" tend to be areas of decline: not only central cities like New York, Providence, and Philadelphia, but also out-dated factory towns such as Scranton, Fall River, and Duluth. Even if they persist in their Democratic habits, their electoral weight diminishes with every passing year. The real population explosion is occurring in the "Sun Belt Conservative Cities"—Anaheim, Tulsa, Shreveport, Orlando, Albuquerque—where patriotism and piety commingle with split-level housing and aerospace employment. The Republicans have already begun to make inroads here; but they have yet to plumb the anxieties of these sun-loving citizens. A populist posture is well-suited to this constituency, and for its platform Phillips suggests—somewhat more diplomatically than Wallace—the politics of "ethnic polarization." Implicit in Phillips's state-by-state tabulations is the message that a "large national majority" of voting Americans can be mobilized by approaching them in terms of their lowest common denominator: white fear of the black presence.*

ETHNIC POLARIZATION is already enmeshed in our politics, although mainly at the local level. If many of these racial antipathies are based on stereotypes, the anxieties infecting white Americans still have good statistical foundation. Disproportionate numbers of addicts and criminals are black, and strange black faces in one's neighborhood do in fact signal greater probability of theft or violence than unknown white visitors. (Any white person who claims that he can pass a group of black youths on a dark street as equably as a group of whites is an out-and-out liar.) The widespread approval of measures like preven-

* To be sure, white radicals can also be used as an issue, particularly privileged undergraduates who cut classes to disrupt campuses or party conventions. But such confrontations are not really a principal concern of the people Phillips wants to win over; they are certainly secondary to race.

tive detention assumes that the detained defendants will not only be black but also presumptively dangerous; and popular opposition to putting civilians on police review boards has been spurred by the desire to give the police greater freedom in arresting black criminals. Whether or not "racist," these fears are not unreasoned. The stumbling-block, properly emphasized by civil libertarians, is that any wholehearted attempt to round up black criminals will—as does any round-up—inevitably lead to the conviction of at least some innocent black citizens. (And any white person who believes that the conviction of an innocent black is "less important" than the conviction of an innocent white, is a racist.) Furthermore, the air of arrogance worn by many blacks and the disdainful demonstrations of the Panthers and Afro-American societies on campuses has converted not a few erstwhile liberals to the law-and-order campaign.

None of this needs to be said, of course. But if the issue comes to the surface, it is possible to argue that tensions of this sort simply continue an old political tradition. "Ethnic polarization," Phillips writes, "is a longstanding hallmark of American politics, not an unprecedented and menacing development of 1968." Perhaps he really believes that an explicit white-black stand-off in our day will be analogous, say, to Boston's Back Bay-Irish animosities of an earlier time. Others might conclude that the race-based populism of an all-white party could bring repression less akin to Boston and more like that of the Black-and-Tans.

But any talk of populist politics remains largely theoretical until such a movement is mustered and mobilized, indeed brought into being by politicians willing to rouse such sentiments to the surface. This is what William Jennings Bryan, Joseph McCarthy, and George Wallace all tried in turn; and all failed because their personal styles were not attuned to a variety of regions and classes. Indeed, in the past, populist success has depended on an appealing personality—an ingredient Phillips hardly mentions—and charismatic men are rare commodities in Republican circles. About the only Republican I can think of who might fill this bill on a national scale would be Ronald Reagan: his smooth, suburban appearance appealed to Californians in every part of that prototypical state; and my own guess is that had his party nominated him last year he might even have won. However, Reagan will be well into his sixties by 1976, and there is no one else remotely like him on the Republican horizon.

As an alternative, the GOP may try to speed the polarizing process by administrative means. And at this point the moving spirit seems to be our very un-charismatic Attorney-General, to whom *The Emerging Republican Majority* is partially dedicated. (Richard Nixon shares this

honor.) It may well be that a mixture of action and inaction on John Mitchell's part will have the desired effect: conveying to Wallaceites and other dissident Democrats that the Republicans can be relied upon to keep the blacks in their proper place. But I am not sure that voters of this sort can be counted on to get the message: postponement of desegregation suits, the arrest and indictment of activists, and similar Justice Department initiatives may fail to come across as a coherent program. Still and all, this is the best the party can do with the personnel it now has: populism via bureaucratic procedures rather than soul-stirring rallies or pulsating television performances.

BUT PHILLIPS also has plans for reforming his party from the inside, and here he may encounter his greatest obstacle. If he finds the GOP "much too establishmentarian," this does not mean that the Republicans are an aristocratic or a patrician preserve. Indeed, John Lindsay, Ogden Reid, and the two Rockefellers just about exhaust the list of upper-class offspring willing to stand up on platforms and appeal for votes. (In fact, scions of old families who get the political urge usually choose the Democrats, who always reserve some room for pedigreed candidates.) Thus, while the well-to-do may write occasional checks for the GOP, they have left the running of the party to people rather different from themselves.

The Republican "establishment" consists largely of small-town lawyers backstopped by the merchants and businessmen based in medium-sized cities.* This is America's true bourgeoisie: self-employed, self-reliant, and not a little pleased over their own success and superiority. If not always of Yankee antecedents—Spiro Agnew cannot claim Anglo-Saxon bloodlines—most are still apt to invoke puritan precepts when confronted with conditions they do not understand. At the same time, the segment of the middle class these men symbolize has lost much of its influence and importance, and therein lies much of the Republican problem. For GOP committees continue to look like local business clubs, frightening off less prepossessing citizens whose newly-acquired conservatism ought to be attracting Republican interest. In the past the Republican rank-and-file was remarkably quiescent, deferring to the bankers and merchants who made policy and selected candidates. Phillips's proposal is that these worthies make room for the clerks and salesmen who have hitherto stood outside the GOP threshold. In addition, he faces up to the religious implications inherent in any Republican expansion program. For a broadened GOP base would necessarily involve giving power and preferment to Catholics, something this essentially Protestant party has always been slow to do.†

Therefore, much of Phillips's message is ec-

umenical, and he chides his party for failing to enlist Catholics in the Republican fold. His own experience in the Northern Bronx showed him that Irish and Italian voters could be turned into enthusiastic Republicans when given a candidate with whom they could identify. Many Catholics now have lower-middle-class incomes but retain remnants of their working-class past, and one way for the GOP to win them over is by giving more of its nominations to men with names like Edward Derwinski, Martin McKneally, and Paul Fino.

Curiously, Phillips hardly mentions New York's Conservative party, which has done exceptionally well with Catholic voters in recent elections.* The Conservative Senatorial candidate, James Buckley, got over 17 per cent of the statewide vote in 1968; and in 16 of the state's 41 districts Conservative votes ran from 20 to 29 per cent. Indeed, what Phillips would like is a Republican-Conservative coalition in all parts of the country, welding white Protestants and Catholics together in an equitable admixture of candidates and compatible issues. Moreover, while the official ideology of the Conservative party runs parallel to the position of the *National Review*, it has confined its campaigns to closer-to-home questions such as preserving neighborhood schools, crime in the streets, and keeping the blacks at bay. What is also instructive is that the great majority of Buckley supporters voted for Nixon rather than Wallace. Still and all, all too many of these Buckley-Nixon voters still register—and continue to regard themselves—as Democrats. Only if they are weaned away from the party of their parents and grandparents can they be counted upon—as upstate New York Republicans can—to pull GOP levers as a matter of reflex.

And in this regard the Conservatives provide another clue. Irish and Italians wearing Robert Hall suits have been made to feel at home at Conservative rallies in Syracuse, Sunnyside, and Suffolk County. The Conservatives have come across as a truly lower-middle-class party, carrying none of the snobbish connotations associated with GOP county committees. Hence the big problem for the Republican party, in New York and elsewhere, is in its internal arrangements. If I may paraphrase an unlikely authority, the specter which will haunt the Grand Old Party is a class struggle between its upper-middle establishment and the lower-middle arrivals it hopes to attract. Future dinners may have to be held in American Legion halls rather than at the local Sheraton Inn, with GOP burghers forgoing their martinis in favor of beer. Phillips seems willing to have the catering done by Kentucky Fried

* See Stephen Hess and David S. Broder, *The Republican Establishment*, and my review in *COMMENTARY*, December 1967.

† See Milton Viorst's *Fall from Grace: The Republican Party and the Puritan Ethic*, New American Library, 1968.

not so
it is
mentioned
and in
just the
vein

Chicken, but I am not sure how many other Republicans have an appetite for paper cups and plastic plates.

THOUGH THE "large national majority" that Phillips hopes to attract to the GOP consists of relatively prosperous citizens—homeowners and taxpayers who now have something to lose—it would be a mistake to assume that they oppose federal spending and government subsidies. Phillips commits this error when he opines that "Wallace's vote would probably have dipped much lower had Richard Nixon chosen to rally aberrant multitudes of 1964 Goldwater backers by sounding the anti-Great Society^{*} clarion. . . ." Nonsense of this sort weakens much of Phillips's case. In the first place, Goldwater himself was never supported by "multitudes": if he got 27 million votes, at least 20 million of these came from Republican regulars like my Anglo-Saxon in-laws who come to the aid of their party no matter who is nominated. But more important, a large majority of voters do in fact favor Great Society-type programs—or at least those which assist the middle class: Medicare, aid to education, tax reform, consumer protection. They may complain about taxes, civil-rights enforcement, and welfare for people less upstanding than themselves. But they hardly favor dismantling Social Security or turning TVA over to Tennessee Edison. In fact, most of the Wallace voters Phillips wishes to attract have enjoyed federal subsidies and services for most of their lives. Wallace himself sensed this and hence emphasized the racial issue throughout his campaign.

What this means is that if the GOP is to win over lower-middle-class clerks in Queens, steelworkers in Youngstown, and retired police lieutenants in San Diego, it will have to embrace the tradition of Tory Democracy^{**}. That is, it will have to deliver at least those public programs which provide amenities for Americans in the \$7000-\$15,000 income range. Such services can be supplied even while other measures freeze welfare payments and public housing, repress racial

and radical protest, and adjust the Constitution to facilitate criminal convictions. We know from recent experience that punishing unpopular minorities can win local elections; nevertheless, in the long run the lower-middle class will want its share of subventions, whether in the form of parochial school aid for their children, nursing-home subsidies for their grandparents, or new commuter trains for themselves. Outlays such as these—which the Democrats are always willing to promise—can be expensive. At the moment, it remains to be seen how many Republican regulars would accept expenditures of this magnitude.

WHILE HARDLY a Benjamin Disraeli, Richard Nixon probably sensed the scope of his party's problem even before Kevin Phillips put pen to paper. For if John Mitchell sits at his right hand, he has made a secure place for Robert Finch on his left. While the one adviser's indifference to civil rights and civil liberties can raise Republican popularity in many precincts, the other's sympathy for public spending and activist assistants fills a less flamboyant but nonetheless necessary role. If Nixon gives simultaneous attention to these twin approaches, I predict his easy reelection. And if GOP candidates at lesser levels can stir themselves to support such a double-edged strategy, the party may well begin to chalk up majorities as it has not since the days of Calvin Coolidge.

Merging the Wallace constituency with the Republican rank-and-file, though not an appealing prospect, stands out as a real possibility. By coalescing the class Alexis de Tocqueville once called the "eager and apprehensive men of small property" and making use of anxieties that more gentlemanly generations thought best to ignore, the line between majority rule and majority tyranny could easily be crossed. The losers would be those Americans the Republicans will have written off. And their reaction to repression and repudiation—which is not my topic at this time—would have an impact of its own on the character and quality of this country's political life.

* For "Great Society", read social engineering, not medicare, social security or aid to education

** No. Just populist economics.

PRESERVATION COPY

Phillips

Is There a New Republican Majority?

Andrew Hacker

IT IS NOT easy to argue that Richard Nixon's election marks a revival of Republican fortunes. While he need not apologize for entering the White House with less than a popular majority—after all, Abraham Lincoln, Harry Truman, and John Kennedy shared that distinction—his is nevertheless the smallest plurality any candidate has mustered since 1912. Moreover, he failed to carry a Republican Congress on his coattails; and his campaign showed no success at all in inducing dissident Democrats to change their registrations. Gallup's latest survey could only find 30 per cent of the electorate willing to call themselves Republican, hardly a popular base for a party entering a new era.

As a participant-observer of Republican persuasion—I confess to having voted for Nixon four times—I pay more attention than most to plans and prescriptions for improving my party's performance. However, just recently, and for the first time in almost twenty years of GOP-gazing, I have seen an analysis which rises above wishful thinking. Kevin Phillips, currently a young assistant to the incumbent Attorney General, believes that our country now possesses an "emerging Republican majority." His book* may or may not be mistitled—only the next few years will tell for sure—but his argument deserves serious attention, if only because its major premises may guide future Republican campaigns.

At the same time, Phillips's proposals should be seen as the end-product of a generation-old dialectic within the GOP, and I think it important to take a page or two to set the stage for what he has to say. The Republicans' problem has been their propensity for second place in most elections most of the time over the past 39 years. For the great Sisyphean rock remains the Democratic registration roll, which has held its majority ranking for more than a generation. In every election, the GOP's candidates must start their seductions from scratch: Democratic defections simply do not carry over from one contest to another. Hence the perennial quest for one or another bloc of voters who can be uprooted from

the Democratic weedbed and transplanted in Republican loam.

If nothing else, the Republican malaise has been of benefit to the publishing industry: in politics, as elsewhere, there is something about a loser which appeals to authors; and my five-foot shelf of party books has at least four volumes on the GOP for every one about the Democrats. Louis Harris started the ball rolling a decade and a half ago by spending 231 pages asking, *Is There a Republican Majority?* Eisenhower had just received 55 per cent of the vote, and was to do even better on his second time around. Yet he made no Republican converts. "The key elements in the Eisenhower majority are by and large a new breed of political independents," Harris wrote. The swing-voters Harris had in mind were sensible suburban types, grown too sophisticated to settle for Main Street maxims or Prairie pieties of the Robert Taft variety. Harris therefore suggested a "moderate, middle-of-the-road" course as the best way for the GOP to woo marginal voters who give candidates their eventual majorities. The Harris theory has worked in Senate and gubernatorial races, especially on the two coasts where Thomas Kuchel, Clifford Case, Hugh Scott, Mark Hatfield, Edward Brooke, and a dozen or so other liberal-leaning Republicans adopted postures having independent appeal. But it didn't work for Richard Nixon in 1960.

Nixon's 1960 campaign was not at all Neanderthal. (Indeed his major domestic difference with John Kennedy was that he favored spending federal funds on school construction, whereas Kennedy wanted money for teachers' salaries as well as buildings.) While it has been customary to point out that Nixon came within two-tenths of a percentage point of the Presidency that year, my own view is that he was lucky to have done as well as he did. The real trouble is that "moderation" can end up as "me-too-ism"; and, as Wendell Willkie and Thomas Dewey learned, voters tend to prefer the real article. If Nixon's defeat consigned Harris's handbook to the remainder counters, it spurred Republican printing presses into two directions.

Barry Goldwater's *The Conscience of a Con-*

ANDREW HACKER is professor of government at Cornell. He has written frequently in these pages on Republican and Presidential politics.

* *The Emerging Republican Majority*, Arlington House, 482 pp., \$7.95.

servative and Phyllis Schlafly's *A Choice Not an Echo* were more than exercises in economic orthodoxy and anti-Communist ideology: they also proposed a novel strategy for Republican revival. A third of all adult Americans never bestir themselves to the polls, an apathy social scientists have usually attributed to the inability of lower-class citizens to see elections as relevant to their lives. The Goldwater forces took a different view, and not simply because they suspected anything social scientists said. To their eyes, most of the stay-at-homes were true-blue conservatives unwilling to waste their time choosing between Tweedledee and another egg. Give them a real choice—an opportunity to vote for a principled conservative—and they would flock to the polls, bringing Republican strength well over the majority mark. If evidence were needed, one had only to look at Arizona, where Goldwater himself won successive victories by uncovering hitherto hidden sentiments. In 1964, Goldwater carried Arizona again. And Alabama and Georgia and Louisiana and South Carolina and Mississippi. And that was all. The theory was wrong.

So to Nixon's nomination last year, and his less-than-auspicious showing against a decimated and dispirited Democratic party. And hence the earlier-than-usual appearance of new programs for Republican resuscitation. Predictably enough, some are suggesting that moderate Republicanism be given another chance. The most active moderate publicity-mill is the Ripon Society, whose offices off Harvard Square have over the last several years issued a steady stream of position papers on subjects ranging from Ronald Reagan and Cuban refugees to Selective Service and the military-industrial complex. All are intelligently written, handsomely produced, and largely unread by the Republican rank-and-file. Though the Society sends its releases to a large mailing-list, it seems to carry on without meetings or members. I have reason to believe that Nelson Rockefeller mails them a five-figure check every so often, an amount sufficient for his and their purposes.

The Lessons of Victory,* put together by 17 young men on the Ripon payroll, argues that Nixon's victory was nothing to boast about. In many parts of the country the party fared worse than in 1960, and anyone unconnected with the Johnson-Humphrey record would probably have won. The authors are pretty well persuaded that Nixon is still the same old Nixon, reminding us that even in last year's campaign he "assured his audiences that Johnson and Humphrey were not traitors on so many occasions that he created the impression that he expected people to think they were." Yet what really annoys the Ripon authors is their party's paranoia about anything new: "At many rallies, including Nixon's cli-

mactic appearance at Madison Square Garden on Halloween night, anyone wearing a beard was systematically turned away." Hence their proposal that the GOP should make a pitch not only to enlightened suburbanites (especially those who "admired Eugene McCarthy's integrity") but also to black voters and union members. They are upset that Nixon attracted only 750,000 black votes and that only one union delegate (the Glass Blowers' president) was at Miami.

This approach *has* succeeded—on the state level. In addition to the old stand-bys—Javits, Case, Percy, et al.—those of the Ripon persuasion can point to new Senatorial entrants such as Charles Mathias, William Saxbe, and Robert Packwood, who ran ahead of Nixon in Maryland, Ohio, and Oregon last year. The real difficulty is that moderate Republicanism has not been able to make much headway when the party foregathers to nominate its national candidates. The treatment accorded Nelson Rockefeller and George Romney at recent GOP conventions shows clearly that the sorts of people chosen as Republican delegates simply will not settle for a candidate to the Left of Nixon. Nor can it be claimed that the last several conventions have been unrepresentative of rank-and-file Republican opinion: as an insider I will attest that recent proceedings have mirrored grassroots GOP sentiment as perfectly as any gathering can.

About midway through *The Lessons of Victory* the authors ask, "What accounted for Richard Milhous Nixon's plurality in 1968?" "The reason," they tell us, "is quite simple: the middle class got bigger." This is true. The American middle class has been expanding, and from its attitudes and aspirations may be deduced a good deal of the nation's political future. However, I am not at all persuaded that the Ripon writers know as much as they should about the character and composition of this social stratum. It is true they are well-acquainted with the suburbs that sported McCarthy bumper-stickers, but middle-class America also extends into precincts seldom visited by moderate Republicans. Kevin Phillips understands this terrain far better than the Ripon Society ever will, and therein lies the force of his appeal for a far different kind of Republican reconstruction.

THOUGH A graduate of Harvard Law School, Phillips writes less as a Harvard man and more as a boy from the Bronx. But the upper, semi-suburban, reaches of that borough: the Bronx of Mario Procaccino and Paul Fino—homeowning, church-going, and uneasy over its association with the larger city. If most Harvard graduates never go home again—after all, their law degree is a ticket to new ambitions and eminences—Phillips returned to the Bronx where he spent four years as assistant to Fino, the borough's only Republican Congress-

* Dial, 411 pp., \$6.95.

man. He caught John Mitchell's eye early in Nixon's 1968 campaign, largely because of his shrewdness with statistics and his aptitude for electoral analysis, both of which are fully evident in *The Emerging Republican Majority*. If like others before him he attempts to show how the GOP can recruit new adherents, he relies less on casual observations and more on the 200 maps and tables he deploys in the course of his countrywide canvass. It is an impressive exercise and a plain-spoken application of social science to a real political problem.*

The Phillips thesis may be simply stated. The Republicans, he writes, now have an "opportunity to fashion a majority among the 57 per cent of the American electorate which voted to eject the Democratic party from national power." Of this 57 per cent, about 43.5 per cent came from Republicans, while the remaining 13.5 per cent were supporters of the American Independent Party. Thus the GOP should make a serious and strenuous bid for the 9,906,473 citizens who cast their ballots for George Corley Wallace. Courting a bloc of this magnitude is a legitimate political pursuit. (Between now and 1972 the Democrats will try to make inroads of their own into the Wallace constituency.) The only question at issue is what kind of appeal one makes to citizens who once succumbed to the charms of an Alabama governor.

As I read him, Phillips proposes that the GOP approach Wallace's supporters on their own terms: not to persuade them out of their prejudices, but rather to produce a Republican record paralleling that promised by the Wallace party. But this is not simply a replay of the "Southern strategy" advanced by Goldwater's staff in 1964 and reactivated by Strom Thurmond last year. For only half of Wallace's votes came from the South; the attraction he held for Northern voters emerges as of far greater significance.

At the same time, Phillips's comments on the South carry more than regional implications. It is in the Republicans' interest, he suggests, to encourage black voting in the former Confederate states. "Maintenance of Negro voting rights is essential to the GOP," Phillips points out, although not out of affection for the Fourteenth Amendment. For only if Southern blacks become more dominant in Democratic politics will Southern whites flee to a Republican haven. "Unless Negroes continue to displace white Democratic organizations, the latter may remain viable spokesmen for Deep Southern conservatism." Phillips has nothing against Deep Southern conservatism; he just wants it enlisted in Republican service, in state and local elections as well as at the Presidential level. (Right now Republicans hold only 13 per cent of the seats in Southern legislatures.) He has no objections whatever to the Democrats becoming an all-black party: in fact, the more Julian Bonds and Charles Evers

the better. Such a party would soon descend to minority status, winning only a few rural counties and a handful of ghetto precincts and leaving all the white refugees to the GOP.

This tactic clearly has relevance to the North, where the Wallace vote ran to 10 per cent in Kansas and Michigan, and 12 per cent in Ohio and Indiana. (Indeed, even in New York City, almost one voter in ten pulled the Wallace lever in Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens neighborhoods like Parkchester, Greenpoint, and South Ozone Park.) Most of these voters were Democrats indulging their periodic penchant for punishing their own party: the sort of thing many of them did when they voted for William Buckley or against Carl Stokes and Richard Hatcher for mayor. But their grievances against liberal legislation and litigation may have grown to the point where their loyalties are, in Phillips's words, "in motion between a Democratic past and a Republican future."

The trick, then, is to steal Wallace's thunder without repelling bedrock Republican voters. And the way to achieve this is not by imitating his method but rather by co-opting his message. One of the reasons Wallace got only five million votes in the North was that he was just a bit too square. Consequently, the issues he raised, treated with just a shade more sophistication, could well be turned to Republican advantage.

RESTYING itself as a party of "populist conservatism"—Phillips's term—the GOP should, he says, appeal to the apprehensions of wage-earning homeowners and white-collared taxpayers.† And in the North as in the South this would be a white party, welcoming Americans of every region who find themselves disquieted over black behavior—whether criminal or constitutional. This posture would probably produce some losses among groups put off by so scapegoat a strategy. Yet even when aggregated, these elements add up to less than meets the eye. For example, young people. Phillips's slide-rule reveals that the average voter is aged forty-seven and those under twenty-five cast less than 8 per cent of the ballots. (Moreover, within the group we call "youth" many more work as secretaries or garage mechanics than attend elite universities.) The Ripon-Rockefeller notion that

* I might add that the book is completely without charm or humor, in fact chillingly so in many places. Moreover, Phillips emerges as a skilled technician unencumbered by literary awareness. Thus on page 83, for example, he supports a point of his own by straight-facedly quoting a passage from *The American Establishment* in which Richard Rovere outlines the theories of "Werner Von Fromm."

† Phillips calls these voters "lower-middle class," but many of them are working-class Americans earning just as much money as their white-collar counterparts. The real difference between these classes is that a worker can be relatively content on \$9000 a year, while the middle class finds this a poverty wage.

the GOP can gain black votes emerges as political science-fiction: even when the party could find a James Farmer to run under its banner, he got only 27 per cent of the vote in Bedford-Stuyvesant. In fact, the task of fashioning a Republican majority may actually be speeded up by refusing to court liberal-leaning elements in the electorate. In any populist program it is wisest to write off opinionated minorities who demand basic programmatic changes in return for their votes. A good case in point is the current governor of California, who won his million-vote margin largely by implying that he had no wish for the support of blacks, intellectuals, or the poor. ("One of the few suburbs that Reagan lost," Phillips writes with apparent approval, "was rich, theatrical, and quite Jewish Beverly Hills.")

Phillips also shows a shrewd statistical eye for the nation's growth patterns. Parts of the country still under the "Yankee sphere of influence" tend to be areas of decline: not only central cities like New York, Providence, and Philadelphia, but also out-dated factory towns such as Scranton, Fall River, and Duluth. Even if they persist in their Democratic habits, their electoral weight diminishes with every passing year. The real population explosion is occurring in the "Sun Belt Conservative Cities"—Anaheim, Tulsa, Shreveport, Orlando, Albuquerque—where patriotism and piety commingle with split-level housing and aerospace employment. The Republicans have already begun to make inroads here; but they have yet to plumb the anxieties of these sun-loving citizens. A populist posture is well-suited to this constituency, and for its platform Phillips suggests—somewhat more diplomatically than Wallace—the politics of "ethnic polarization." Implicit in Phillips's state-by-state tabulations is the message that a "large national majority" of voting Americans can be mobilized by approaching them in terms of their lowest common denominator: white fear of the black presence.*

ETHNIC POLARIZATION is already enmeshed in our politics, although mainly at the local level. If many of these racial antipathies are based on stereotypes, the anxieties infecting white Americans still have good statistical foundation. Disproportionate numbers of addicts and criminals are black, and strange black faces in one's neighborhood do in fact signal greater probability of theft or violence than unknown white visitors. (Any white person who claims that he can pass a group of black youths on a dark street as equably as a group of whites is an out-and-out liar.) The widespread approval of measures like preven-

* To be sure, white radicals can also be used as an issue, particularly privileged undergraduates who cut classes to disrupt campuses or party conventions. But such confrontations are not really a principal concern of the people Phillips wants to win over; they are certainly secondary to race.

tive detention assumes that the detained defendants will not only be black but also presumptively dangerous; and popular opposition to putting civilians on police review boards has been spurred by the desire to give the police greater freedom in arresting black criminals. Whether or not "racist," these fears are not unreasoned. The stumbling-block, properly emphasized by civil libertarians, is that any wholehearted attempt to round up black criminals will—as does any round-up—inevitably lead to the conviction of at least some innocent black citizens. (And any white person who believes that the conviction of an innocent black is "less important" than the conviction of an innocent white, is a racist.) Furthermore, the air of arrogance worn by many blacks and the disdainful demonstrations of the Panthers and Afro-American societies on campuses has converted not a few erstwhile liberals to the law-and-order campaign.

None of this needs to be said, of course. But if the issue comes to the surface, it is possible to argue that tensions of this sort simply continue an old political tradition. "Ethnic polarization," Phillips writes, "is a longstanding hallmark of American politics, not an unprecedented and menacing development of 1968." Perhaps he really believes that an explicit white-black standoff in our day will be analagous, say, to Boston's Back Bay-Irish animosities of an earlier time. Others might conclude that the race-based populism of an all-white party could bring repression less akin to Boston and more like that of the Black-and-Tans.

But any talk of populist politics remains largely theoretical until such a movement is mustered and mobilized, indeed brought into being by politicians willing to rouse such sentiments to the surface. This is what William Jennings Bryan, Joseph McCarthy, and George Wallace all tried in turn; and all failed because their personal styles were not attuned to a variety of regions and classes. Indeed, in the past, populist success has depended on an appealing personality—an ingredient Phillips hardly mentions—and charismatic men are rare commodities in Republican circles. About the only Republican I can think of who might fill this bill on a national scale would be Ronald Reagan: his smooth, suburban appearance appealed to Californians in every part of that prototypical state; and my own guess is that had his party nominated him last year he might even have won. However, Reagan will be well into his sixties by 1976, and there is no one else remotely like him on the Republican horizon.

As an alternative, the GOP may try to speed the polarizing process by administrative means. And at this point the moving spirit seems to be our very un-charismatic Attorney-General, to whom *The Emerging Republican Majority* is partially dedicated. (Richard Nixon shares this

honor.) It may well be that a mixture of action and inaction on John Mitchell's part will have the desired effect: conveying to Wallaceites and other dissident Democrats that the Republicans can be relied upon to keep the blacks in their proper place. But I am not sure that voters of this sort can be counted on to get the message: postponement of desegregation suits, the arrest and indictment of activists, and similar Justice Department initiatives may fail to come across as a coherent program. Still and all, this is the best the party can do with the personnel it now has: populism via bureaucratic procedures rather than soul-stirring rallies or pulsating television performances.

BUT PHILLIPS also has plans for reforming his party from the inside, and here he may encounter his greatest obstacle. If he finds the GOP "much too establishmentarian," this does not mean that the Republicans are an aristocratic or a patrician preserve. Indeed, John Lindsay, Ogden Reid, and the two Rockefellers just about exhaust the list of upper-class offspring willing to stand up on platforms and appeal for votes. (In fact, scions of old families who get the political urge usually choose the Democrats, who always reserve some room for pedigreed candidates.) Thus, while the well-to-do may write occasional checks for the GOP, they have left the running of the party to people rather different from themselves.

The Republican "establishment" consists largely of small-town lawyers backstopped by the merchants and businessmen based in medium-sized cities.* This is America's true bourgeoisie: self-employed, self-reliant, and not a little pleased over their own success and superiority. If not always of Yankee antecedents—Spiro Agnew cannot claim Anglo-Saxon bloodlines—most are still apt to invoke puritan precepts when confronted with conditions they do not understand. At the same time, the segment of the middle class these men symbolize has lost much of its influence and importance, and therein lies much of the Republican problem. For GOP committees continue to look like local business clubs, frightening off less prepossessing citizens whose newly-acquired conservatism ought to be attracting Republican interest. In the past the Republican rank-and-file was remarkably quiescent, deferring to the bankers and merchants who made policy and selected candidates. Phillips's proposal is that these worthies make room for the clerks and salesmen who have hitherto stood outside the GOP threshold. In addition, he faces up to the religious implications inherent in any Republican expansion program. For a broadened GOP base would necessarily involve giving power and preferment to Catholics, something this essentially Protestant party has always been slow to do.†

Therefore, much of Phillips's message is ec-

umenical, and he chides his party for failing to enlist Catholics in the Republican fold. His own experience in the Northern Bronx showed him that Irish and Italian voters could be turned into enthusiastic Republicans when given a candidate with whom they could identify. Many Catholics now have lower-middle-class incomes but retain remnants of their working-class past, and one way for the GOP to win them over is by giving more of its nominations to men with names like Edward Derwinski, Martin McKneally, and Paul Fino.

Curiously, Phillips hardly mentions New York's Conservative party, which has done exceptionally well with Catholic voters in recent elections.* The Conservative Senatorial candidate, James Buckley, got over 17 per cent of the statewide vote in 1968; and in 16 of the state's 41 districts Conservative votes ran from 20 to 29 per cent. Indeed, what Phillips would like is a Republican-Conservative coalition in all parts of the country, welding white Protestants and Catholics together in an equitable admixture of candidates and compatible issues. Moreover, while the official ideology of the Conservative party runs parallel to the position of the *National Review*, it has confined its campaigns to closer-to-home questions such as preserving neighborhood schools, crime in the streets, and keeping the blacks at bay. What is also instructive is that the great majority of Buckley supporters voted for Nixon rather than Wallace. Still and all, all too many of these Buckley-Nixon voters still register—and continue to regard themselves—as Democrats. Only if they are weaned away from the party of their parents and grandparents can they be counted upon—as upstate New York Republicans can—to pull GOP levers as a matter of reflex.

And in this regard the Conservatives provide another clue. Irish and Italians wearing Robert Hall suits have been made to feel at home at Conservative rallies in Syracuse, Sunnyside, and Suffolk County. The Conservatives have come across as a truly lower-middle-class party, carrying none of the snobbish connotations associated with GOP county committees. Hence the big problem for the Republican party, in New York and elsewhere, is in its internal arrangements. If I may paraphrase an unlikely authority, the specter which will haunt the Grand Old Party is a class struggle between its upper-middle establishment and the lower-middle arrivals it hopes to attract. Future dinners may have to be held in American Legion halls rather than at the local Sheraton Inn, with GOP burghers forgoing their martinis in favor of beer. Phillips seems willing to have the catering done by Kentucky Fried

not so;
it is
mentioned
and in
just this
vein.

* See Stephen Hess and David S. Broder, *The Republican Establishment*, and my review in *COMMENTARY*, December 1967.

† See Milton Viorst's *Fall from Grace: The Republican Party and the Puritan Ethic*, New American Library, 1968.

Chicken, but I am not sure how many other Republicans have an appetite for paper cups and plastic plates.

THOUGH THE "large national majority" that Phillips hopes to attract to the GOP consists of relatively prosperous citizens—homeowners and taxpayers who now have something to lose—it would be a mistake to assume that they oppose federal spending and government subsidies. Phillips commits this error when he opines that "Wallace's vote would probably have dipped much lower had Richard Nixon chosen to rally aberrant multitudes of 1964 Goldwater backers by sounding the anti-Great Society* clarion. . . ." Nonsense of this sort weakens much of Phillips's case. In the first place, Goldwater himself was never supported by "multitudes"; if he got 27 million votes, at least 20 million of these came from Republican regulars like my Anglo-Saxon in-laws who come to the aid of their party no matter who is nominated. But more important, a large majority of voters do in fact favor Great Society-type programs—or at least those which assist the middle class: Medicare, aid to education, tax reform, consumer protection. They may complain about taxes, civil-rights enforcement, and welfare for people less upstanding than themselves. But they hardly favor dismantling Social Security or turning TVA over to Tennessee Edison. In fact, most of the Wallace voters Phillips wishes to attract have enjoyed federal subsidies and services for most of their lives. Wallace himself sensed this and hence emphasized the racial issue throughout his campaign.

What this means is that if the GOP is to win over lower-middle-class clerks in Queens, steelworkers in Youngstown, and retired police lieutenants in San Diego, it will have to embrace the tradition of Tory Democracy.** That is, it will have to deliver at least those public programs which provide amenities for Americans in the \$7000-\$15,000 income range. Such services can be supplied even while other measures freeze welfare payments and public housing, repress racial

and radical protest, and adjust the Constitution to facilitate criminal convictions. We know from recent experience that punishing unpopular minorities can win local elections; nevertheless, in the long run the lower-middle class will want its share of subventions, whether in the form of parochial school aid for their children, nursing-home subsidies for their grandparents, or new commuter trains for themselves. Outlays such as these—which the Democrats are always willing to promise—can be expensive. At the moment, it remains to be seen how many Republican regulars would accept expenditures of this magnitude.

WHILE HARDLY a Benjamin Disraeli, Richard Nixon probably sensed the scope of his party's problem even before Kevin Phillips put pen to paper. For if John Mitchell sits at his right hand, he has made a secure place for Robert Finch on his left. While the one adviser's indifference to civil rights and civil liberties can raise Republican popularity in many precincts, the other's sympathy for public spending and activist assistants fills a less flamboyant but nonetheless necessary role. If Nixon gives simultaneous attention to these twin approaches, I predict his easy reelection. And if GOP candidates at lesser levels can stir themselves to support such a double-edged strategy, the party may well begin to chalk up majorities as it has not since the days of Calvin Coolidge.

Merging the Wallace constituency with the Republican rank-and-file, though not an appealing prospect, stands out as a real possibility. By coalescing the class Alexis de Tocqueville once called the "eager and apprehensive men of small property" and making use of anxieties that more gentlemanly generations thought best to ignore, the line between majority rule and majority tyranny could easily be crossed. The losers would be those Americans the Republicans will have written off. And their reaction to repression and repudiation—which is not my topic at this time—would have an impact of its own on the character and quality of this country's political life.

* For "Great Society", read social engineering, not Medicare, Social Security or aid to education

** No. Just populist economics.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 4, 1969

*File
on
mid Am*

TO: HARRY DENT

FROM: HENRY C. CASHEN II *HC*

SUBJECT: The Forgotten American

Pursuant to our conversation of this afternoon, attached is a copy of a memorandum on "The Forgotten American" prepared by the Bureau of the Budget which will continue to work on this subject for us.

Attachment.

Wash

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

November 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY CASHEN

SUBJECT: The Forgotten American

In response to your request for a paper on the "forgotten American", we have addressed ourselves first to defining the term. The development of a specific profile for this group should precede the assessment of the impact of existing Federal programs on the forgotten American.

Other population groups which government has singled out for special attention -- the poor, the aged, the veteran -- are easily defined along a single demographic scale. The forgotten American group is not so simply defined. To single out such people statistically, it is necessary to use several population characteristics in combination (e.g., income, education, age, and type of employment). The way in which such variables are combined should be arrived at by testing it against the political idea it represents -- by checking the ability of the variables to predict the membership of a specific electorate, for example.

We can suggest definitions for the forgotten American. For instance, he might be described as a family head whose age is between 25 and 65; whose annual income is between \$4,000 and \$15,000; who has less than a college degree; and who is employed in a blue-collar or service occupation. Such definitions could be made increasingly more refined. However, any such definition must ultimately be validated against situations which it is agreed are representative of the forgotten American concept.

Once a specific set of definitions has been settled upon, the relationship of the group to Federal programs and to the income tax can be systematically examined. Such an examination should be conducted in the contexts of both the group's needs and the treatment of the group relative to other social classifications. Careful definitions, followed up by this kind of analysis, must be obtained before the forgotten American can become a serious subject for governmental programming.

Budget Bureau manpower will be scarce until the budget is submitted in January. James R. Storey of my staff has worked on this project and will be available for participation with you in this exercise as time permits.



RICHARD P. NATHAN
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

Middle America
MURPHY PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.

BURLINGTON, WISCONSIN • PHONE 763-3566

DR. R. R. SPITZER
PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER

November 3, 1969

Mr. John Whitaker

Mr. Rogers Morton

Mr. Harry Dent

SUBJECT:

Suggestions to assist the administration to better serve rural America and to help the Republican Party to capitalize on basic rural and agricultural strengths in '70 and '72.

Earlier Correspondence; BACKGROUND

Our October 16, 1969 memorandum to President Nixon ...details '67-'68 campaign highlights and suggests action suggestions. (Exhibit I)

Another action summary is outlined in our August 15, 1969 letter to Harry Dent and Chairman Morton. (Exhibit II)

ACTION IDEAS...For Republican National Committee

1. Involve an "Advisory Committee" working with your excellent communication and steering people. I have no criticism of past and present efforts. Yet, the fact is that most national Republican literature seems urban dominated...copy and pictures.

America's farm radio, thousands of weekly and hometown papers, farm magazines, special mailings can be involved and could greatly multiply our Republican Party efforts if we recognize this segment of Republican strength.

Room

Mr. John Whitaker
Mr. Rogers Morton
Mr. Harry Dent

-2-

November 3, 1969

Specifically, we need to hire a Frank Gildner, Gene Trumble, Orion Samuelson, Emmett Barker to help get this job done.

2. There is a fine opportunity...right now of "telling the rural-farm story." A counterpart of the Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, might be organized. It would embrace trade associations, weekly publications, rural radio, rural T.V., agri-industry, 4-H, FFA, Co-ops. Instead of spelling out the differences in farm organizations, let's concentrate on telling the basics and the rural story, the many pluses of agriculture.

Involve experts like Harold DeGraff, Ed Covell who are familiar with an effective approach to the American consumer. A combination of best professionalism plus grass roots knowhow would make a great contribution.

Explain to city people how they benefit from nutritious food, from effective farm programs, lower food prices, in relation to income, than any other nation in the world. Better quality, too.

On this effort, the Republican Party can be a catalyst...not in the forefront, yet close enough to get credit. Rural America is ready for this effort. He who starts it will be highly regarded...a real hero.

Recommendations for Individual State Republican Organizations:

The patterns established in the Rural Nixon Campaign in Wisconsin and Oregon in '67-'68 are efforts as good as I know. A. B. Herman suggested that they might be the most effective of recent years. The keys here were good planning, involvement of

Mr. John Whitaker
Mr. Rogers Morton
Mr. Harry Dent

-3-

November 3, 1969

key leaders, getting commitments in each county, by organization, by industry, the right leadership, motivation, assignment of responsibility, communication.

Recommendations for President Nixon:

A Rural Affairs Council is a natural and will be "well received". We are pleased to see Mr. Nixon working with Dr. Hardin following through on this and involving many of the Cabinet. But, I do think that in due time it should also include one or more White House assistants. Dr. Hardin will be pretty much alone representing agriculture on an urban oriented Cabinet.

There's need for a strong person with strong agricultural ties...one who believes in rural America with the zeal and conviction. While considerate of other needs and their points of view, he will be a crusader for rural America, its philosophical, its economic and moral strengths, its answers to our nation's problems.

With the many problems, many demands, I don't see any present Cabinet member with time for the complete commitment to this cause. It's a Rogers Morton that we need at Cabinet level, working with Secretary Hardin, fighting for him, widening the definition of agriculture and rural America. He must be a leader for the cause, the champion of the rural people. His role could be similar to Dr. Moynihan of Urban Affairs.

Rural Affairs would not interfere but support the Department of Agriculture. In addition, it can help find other answers. For example, many towns of rural America need employees. My town is one of those. Other towns, need industries. Instead of "saving the cities", let's save the nation!!

Mr. John Whitaker

-4-


November 3, 1969

Rural industries can also provide farm people a greater opportunity for off the farm, full or part-time employment in factories, near their farm homes...out of the cities.

Thus we will solve some of the basic deterioration that had gone on in the cities.

Roots take hold in the small town. Responsibility becomes the rule.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bob Spitzer". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial "B" and a long, horizontal stroke extending to the right.

RRS:ch
Encl.

cc: Dr. Clifford Hardin
Mr. Fritz Behrens

October 16, 1969

GOOD AFTERNOON, MR. PRESIDENT:

WE THANK YOU FOR SEEING US. We thank Chairman Morton, Secretary Hardin and Harry Dent for their significant help.

OUR IDENTITY:

Our group is a cross section of the leadership of your 1968 National '67-'68 Agriculture and Food Campaign for Nixon, structured under the Citizens for Nixon Committee.

As Chairman of that committee, I reported to Charles Rhyne and Tom Evans. We also worked on specific projects with Allan Greenspan, Herb Klein, James Keogh, Robert Ellsworth and others in your New York Headquarters.

PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING:

We are proud of our efforts and our support for you. America needed a great President and we personally feel that you have the qualities that history will record as a great President.

We are not here with wisdom to meet the many problems of the hour... nor are we here to ask for dollars or for appointments.

We are here for the opportunity to tell you about our people, the folks of rural and agricultural America. We feel very strongly that your administration and your advisors can profit from a sensitivity to what folks "from the country" have to say.

When you asked me very early in the Wisconsin Campaign (more than two years ago) personally and subsequently through John MacIver and John Mitchell to work for you in agriculture...you invited participation from folks like these men. We believe this effort had a tremendous effect. We believe rural America made a significant contribution to your victory and to help change history.

Recently, Chairman Rogers Morton and Harry Dent asked us to summarize campaign efforts and post election thoughts.

EXCERPTS OF OUR REPORT TO CHAIRMAN MORTON AND HARRY DENT:

Rural America (the farms, agri-business and towns under 50,000) have been and will be the biggest single source of Republican strength on the total American scene.

President Nixon is indeed doing a tremendous job. We do understand the need to solve the problems of inflation, the cities and Viet Nam. He has no stronger supporters for his efforts than the people we represent.

But, rural America wants to be heard, wants understanding, wants to be full team members. The sheer weight of superbly qualified, urban-oriented leaders in the administration has silenced the voice of rural America.

Rural America filled a significant role in this last election and its contribution to the stability, the character, productivity of this Nation in peace and war is tremendous.

Great opportunity exists to solidify the Republican position. Our administration can be the first in decades that puts adequate emphasis towards rural America as well as urban.

Rural performance on November 8 and during the campaign was significant and perhaps not fully appreciated. Some of this committees efforts include --

1. The Agriculture and Food Committee organized in 47 states and by agricultural industry.
2. Rural people played vital roles in critical Wisconsin and Oregon decisions.
3. They were behind the scenes in Miami.
4. They helped at Mission Bay.
5. Responded to request from Mr. Nixon's writers.
6. Stretched a very few rural advertising dollars to significant impact.
7. Organized the "Concerned Editors for Nixon".
8. Generated participation and publicity from regional and national meetings.

9. Involved the agricultural press, farm magazines, trade associations, ag intellectuals, colleges.
10. They were the difference in many key states, New Jersey, Missouri, Illinois, California!..

But...since November 8, except for sincere interest from Secretary Hardin and his associates, many in this rural group have been omitted.

1. Few have been asked to serve in government. Some outstanding men were available and wanted to be involved.
2. New Jersey Ag Chairman, Duke Galetta has stated - "it would be difficult to put our New Jersey county farm & food chairmen back to work for the Republican cause in view of the lack of attention on labor matters. I'm thankful for victory for Mr. Nixon, but who's going to help us with our farm work? "
3. Similar letters have come from parts of Iowa and other states. A letter from Oregon National Republican Committeeman is enclosed.
4. Rural districts in Montana and Wisconsin have been lost to Democrats in recent special elections.
5. Agricultural education continues to be de-emphasized in the federal offices of education.
6. We hear lots of news reports, conversation of poverty and food stamps but see too little about the American farmer and rural America.

Secretary Hardin has assembled an outstanding group of top people . We have the highest praise for the under secretaries and his special assistants. We would hope there can be follow through to strengthen the rest of the Department with capable, qualified Republican people. I'm told that of the 200 second level posts in the USDA, 197 are Democrats. WOW...if true, we must do something on this.

We believe that rural America deserves more voices near the President and the Secretary of Agriculture deserves broader support. American agriculture has done such a tremendous job. It is too frequently the silent or forgotten hero. It even finds itself on the defensive.

We have suggested...

1. Strong endorsement of Chairman Morton's suggestion to add staff people to Republican Headquarters who can communicate with rural America, farm radio, rural t.v., farm trade association, farm press. Men like Trumble, Gildner, McDonald's farm radio people...specialists.
2. Mr. Morton's suggestion of a Rural Affairs Council would be tremendous. William Galbraith and Fritz Behrens of Dr. Hardin's office report that Senator Carl Curtis also believes this to have great potential. Congressman Odin Langen, Henry C. Schadeberg...others agree.

And, why not "equal time" for rural America at White House level?

And, could more White House appointments have a strong rural flavor?

Rural America deserves a counterpart to the head of Urban Affairs. You will recall that 30% of the people live in towns under 2,500. Food, farm and agriculture related jobs employ 40% of the nation's payroll. Problems and opportunities of rural America are not just agricultural but social, too. There's great strength in rural America. A Department of Rural Affairs deserves some consideration.

AGRICULTURE CAN EASILY DECIDE FUTURE ELECTIONS

Agriculture is much larger and more important politically and economically than most people realize:

- A. Farming employs more workers than the combined employment in transportation, public utilities, the steel industry, and the automobile industry.
- B. Agriculture's assets are equal to about half the market value of all corporation stocks on the New York Stock Exchange.
- C. Three to four of every ten jobs in private employment are related to agriculture.
- D. Several major industries, which are an essential part of modern agriculture are little known by the average urban and suburban dweller. For example, the feed manufacturing industry is the sixteenth largest industry in the United States with annual sales about five billion dollars. There are many other similar examples.

- E. Two of the last three presidential elections were decided by a "thread". Agriculture's vote will frequently make the difference in such an election.

Suggestions from earlier visits with Dr. Hardin and in a letter to Herb Klein (June 23, 1969).

1. Secretary Hardin suggested that we bring in representative Leaders of our National Agriculture effort to meet with Mr. Nixon. He liked the fact that this would be a group not with an ax to grind but a pledge of help and ideas with willingness to work as salesmen for logically conceived farm and rural programs.
2. There is a great opportunity to "tell the rural and small town story". It needs to be told within our country and it could hold great power to tell this story overseas. It could win friends for our nation as compared to some of the news. Agriculture is less publicized than space, less spectacular than violence and protest but a great tribute to free men working in a free nation.
3. A concept of the President's "Nutritional Fitness Program" could put nutrition on a positive basis instead of talking only poverty and hunger. (Since this early suggestion, we are pleased to see definite steps in this direction).
4. It would surely be good if Mr. Nixon could make more speech reference to agriculture on occasion and the rural areas so these people don't feel overlooked! Mr. Nixon is the hero of the common folk, the folks who work for a living, hold basic values and love of God and country high. They aren't politicians and sometimes were so busy working we even fail to tell our story or to express ourselves. But, we represent a great majority of American folks...and especially rural America.

SUMMARY:

We like the people around you, particularly those who seem to possess a combination of matured intelligence and wisdom, political sensitivity, humbleness and experience with reality. We're especially grateful to Mr. Rogers Morton, Mr. Harry Dent and Secretary Hardin. We owe them thanks for this visit.

It's been very difficult for someone like ourselves to reach you. Until your wonderful response last week, we felt pretty much on the outside. A similar experience was evident in the Young Presidents Organization Conference held in Washington, September 24 - 28, 1969.

During the campaign, rural America turned on the forces for basic values, responsibility and multiplication of votes. We believe rural America and agriculture can do the same to help your total administration.

The suggestion on a "Nutritional Fitness Program" has been initiated. You've appointed a White House Task Force on Rural Affairs...great!

Now, Chairman Morton's and Senator Curtis's idea of a Rural Affairs Council at a White House level has great merit.

We would hope that your tremendous schedule will still allow you to personally involve yourself and stay close to this great strength, rural America.

Frank Gildner's "newspaper report"...re: first copy of Rural Victory Report is attached for your personal records.

WE ARE AT YOUR COMMAND.

Robert R. Spitzer

EXHIBIT II

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 19, 1969

FOR: John Ehrlichman
Bob Haldeman
Peter Flanigan
Harry Flemming
Bryce Harlow
Dr. Burns
Pat Moynihan
William Galbraith

FROM: Harry S. Dent *HSD*

Attached is a memo very much worth reading. It comes from a gentleman who was the National Chairman of the Farmers for Nixon organization. Last week Chairman Morton and I listened to this gentleman articulate the need to give greater recognition to rural America through programs, appointments, and actions by this Administration.

The subject area of agri-business must constitute at least 40% of the people in the USA. These people constitute many of the votes which elected this Administration in 1968.

This gentleman has a good message for us so I pass it on to you for your consideration and suggestions. He is very strong on the idea that we should have a Rural Affairs Council, or at least a Special Consultant to the President at the White House.

In addition, this gentleman and a few of his cohorts should meet with the President sometime this fall. Their ideas should be presented briefly, and they should be thanked for a job well done.

This gentleman really impressed Chairman Morton and me.

Enclosure

bcc: Rogers C. B. Morton
Dr. R. R. Spitzer ✓

MURPHY PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.

BURLINGTON, WISCONSIN • PHONE 763-3566

DR. R. R. SPITZER
PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER

August 15, 1969

Mr. Harry Dent
Presidential Aid
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Congressman Rogers Morton
House of Representatives
214 Cannon House Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C.

Confirming your request for a written summary of
our suggestions:

Rural America (the farms, agri-business and towns
under 50,000) have been and will be the biggest
single source of Republican strength on the total
American scene.

President Nixon is indeed doing a tremendous job and
we do understand the need to solve the problems of
inflation, the cities and Viet Nam.

But, rural America wants to be heard, wants under-
standing, wants to be full team members. The sheer
weight of superbly qualified, urban-oriented leaders
in our administration has silenced the voice of rural
America.

Rural America filled a significant role in this last
election and its contribution to the stability, the
character, productivity of the Nation is tremendous.

Great opportunity exists to solidify the Republican
position. Our administration can be the first in
decades that puts emphasis towards rural America as
well as urban.

Mr. Harry Dent
Cong. Rogers Morton
Page -2-
August 15, 1969

Rural performance on November 8 and during the campaign was significant.

The Agriculture and Food Committee organized in 47 states and by agricultural industry.

Rural people played vital roles in critical Wisconsin and Oregon decisions.

They were behind the scenes in Miami.

They helped at Mission Bay.

Responded to requests from Mr. Nixon's writers.

Stretched a very few rural advertising dollars to significant impact.

Organized the "Concerned Editors for Nixon"

Generated participation and publicity from regional and national meetings.

Involved the agricultural press, farm magazines, trade associations, ag intellectuals, colleges.

They were the difference in many key states.

Mr. Harry Dent
Cong. Rogers Morton
Page -3-
August 15, 1969

But...since November 8, except for sincere interest from Secretary Hardin, many in this rural group have been omitted.

Few of our major recommendations "for jobs" were given consideration.

New Jersey Ag Chairman, Duke Galetta has stated - "it would be difficult to put his county farm chairmen back to work for the Republican cause in view of the lack of attention on labor matters."

Similar letters have come from parts of Iowa and other states.

Rural districts in Montana and Wisconsin have been lost to Democrats.

Agricultural education continues to be de-emphasized in the federal offices of education.

We hear conversation of poverty and food stamps but see too little about the American farmer and rural America.

Secretary Hardin has assembled an excellent group of top people. We have the highest praise for the under-secretaries, assistant secretaries and his special assistants. We would hope that there can be follow through to strengthen the rest of the department with capable, qualified Republican people.

Mr. Harry Dent
Cong. Rogers Morton
Page 4
August 15, 1969

We believe that rural America deserves more voices near the President and that the Secretary of Agriculture deserves broader support. Our suggestions include:

1. Strong endorsement of chairman Morton's suggestion to put some staff people at Republican Headquarters that can communicate with rural America, farm radio, rural t.v., farm trade association, farm press.
2. Mr. Morton's suggestion of a Rural Affairs Council would be tremendous. Mr. Galbraith of Mr. Hardin's office reports that Senator Carl Curtis also believes this to have great potential.
3. Suggestions from an earlier letter to Herb Klein dated June 23, 1969 include:

Secretary Hardin has suggested that we bring in representative leaders of our National Nixon effort to meet with Mr. Nixon. This would be a group not with an ax to grind but a pledge of help and willingness to work as salesmen for a logically conceived farm program. This meeting is pending.

We have been talking with Dr. Hardin and Copp Collins about the opportunity of "telling the rural and small town story." It needs to be told within our country and it would hold great power to tell this story overseas. It would win friends for our nation as compared to some of the news.

Mr. Harry Dent
Cong. Rogers Morton
Page -5-
August 15, 1969

A concept of the President's
"Nutritional Fitness Program"
could put nutrition on a positive
basis instead of talking only
poverty and hunger.

Could some White House appointments
have a strong rural affairs flavor?
It seems to me that Rural America
deserves a counterpart to the head
of Urban Affairs. You will recall
that 30% of the people live in towns
under 2,500. Food, farm and
agriculture related jobs employ
40% of the nation's payroll.
Problems of rural America are not
just agricultural but social, too.
There's great strength in rural
America. It seems to me that a
Department of Rural Affairs deserves
some consideration.

I'm told that of the 200 second level
posts in the USDA, 197 are Democrats.
WOW...if true, we must do something
on this.

It would surely be good if Mr. Nixon
could make more reference to
agriculture on occasion and the rural
areas so these people don't feel
overlooked!

Mr. Harry Dent
Cong. Rogers Morton
Page -6-
August 15, 1969

Frank Gildner's "newspaper report" which you saw
in proof form is being finalized and will be available
in two to three weeks.

Mr. Dent and Chairman Morton...I'd really like to join
you and folks of your choice in discussing this with Mr.
Nixon.

We are at your command. Until your wonderful response
last week, we felt pretty much on the outside.

Sincerely,

RRS:dw

cc: Mr. Harry Dent
Presidential Aid
% Summer White House
San Clemente, California

Congressman Rogers Morton
National Republican Headquarters
1625 Eye Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

*File
Middle
America*

November 1, 1969

TO: Harry S. Dent
FROM: Joel M. Fisher *J*
SUBJECT: Comments of Richard Scammon, former director,
Bureau of the Census, October 29, 1969

Since Scammon was so candid, I thought you might be interested in a summary of his remarks, as they apply to future years:

It is clear that in the 1970's political power will shift to the suburbs. Sometimes our concerns over problems comes a bit late; it appears that the problems of the cities are somewhat reduced as far as knowing the solutions, or expressing our concerns. This was true for agriculture in the 1920's.

The movement has been out from the cities; accompanied by an increased percentage of education. The constituency is relatively affluent, essentially middle aged. Even if the 18 year-old vote were instituted nationally, the average voting age would be 40 (it's now close to 50). The decision-making arena for American politics today is still the 35-65 age-range. It is quite possible that the influence of the young (as per Chicago) could be counter-productive. This might be less so in the next 25 years. Nevertheless, that average is 40, and we are talking about an essentially white electorate (91%) on the national level.

These people are less committed to parties as an electorate. They are drawing their knowledge from television, and can be reached much more so than 25 years ago. Their capacity to reach out is equally increased. It would appear that personalities will be as successful in future elections as they can be now. The present situation isn't basically different from 25-50 years ago (i.e., Teddie Roosevelt). As a matter of fact, Ceasar bringing grain back to Rome to attract voters to his platform was an earlier manifestation of this. It's probably safe to assume the pattern will continue.

Re Issues in the 1970's: the basic questions will remain fundamental, and generally domestic. Race will increase as an issue.

1968 was similar to past elections, except for the South. In the 1970's, one major issue will be the GOP's ability to create a new party of the center. The out-party will have difficulty grabbing back the center; besides their current internal dissension which includes a strong labor vs. intelligensia rift (and vice versa).

The 1970's are for 'grabs'. Nobody knows the specific issues and personalities. The in-party has some controls, but it can't be definite.