

RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	Note	Handwritten note with salary figures, 2 pp.	n.d.	G
2	Form	Customs Declaration, 2 pp.	1/9/1973	G
3	Map	Camp David, 1 p.	n.d.	A
4	Note	Handwritten note with salary figures, 1 p.	n.d.	G
5	Report	Monthly Cabinet Report: Outer Space Celestial Bodies Treaty, 3 pp.	n.d.	B
6	Note	Handwritten meeting notes, 9 pp.	n.d.	B
7	Report	Report on Cambodia, 20 pp.	n.d.	B

COLLECTION TITLE

WHCF: SMOF: Alexander Butterfield

BOX NUMBER

19

FOLDER TITLE

White House APB Misc

PRMPA RESTRICTION CODES:

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and returned private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DEED OF GIFT RESTRICTION CODES:

DOG Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

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DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
8	List	Facts – Allegations – Opinions, Etc. about unnamed individual, 7 pp.	n.d.	A & D

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DEMOCRATS

Lawrence O'Brien challenged Meany's claim that "extremists" are taking over the party, but he admitted the Democrats have their share. O'Brien issued a carefully worded statement rebutting the charge. "The extremists who call themselves Democrats are a tiny but vocal minority," O'Brien said. "They do not decide the policies of our party and they do not represent the mainstream of thought within our party. They are destructive and negative people who in some instances are working to defeat Democratic candidates. They will not be successful and they will not prevail." O'Brien said, however, he agreed with Meany "that extremists within the Democratic party have the potential to alienate voters who normally associate themselves" with the party, particularly some of the nation's 20 million union members. "I certainly do not intend to allow extremists to take over the Democratic party," O'Brien said. Meany had said the Democratic party "has disintegrated" and "almost has got to be the party of the extremists insofar as these social liberals or new lefts or whatever you want to call them have taken over the Democratic party."

* * * *


FARM

The Administration opposes the new Farm Support Bill approved last week by the Senate Agriculture Committee, Secretary Hardin said. Hardin asserted the measure, which included more rigid price guarantees for farmers than the House bill, would boost government costs to "unacceptable levels."

* * * *

GOLDWATER-STATE

Sen. Goldwater persuaded the State Department to drop its appointment of Arthur Olsen as Director of the Office of Public Affairs because of articles he wrote critical of Goldwater during the 1964 presidential campaign. The State



JOHN J. McCLOY
ONE CHASE MANHATTAN PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10005

March 12, 1974

Dear Mr. President:

On my return from Tucson where Mrs. McCloy and I attended the services for Lewis Douglas, my brother-in-law, I felt I should write you to say that last Wednesday evening I watched your televised news conference at The White House. I admired very much your courage and your patience in what must have been an exacting and disagreeable experience. I was shocked by the rudeness and the wolf-pack character of the questioning which marked, with few exceptions, the course of the conference. I imagine that it was felt that a public response had to be made to the sequence of indictments, new suspicions and hostile comments which a determined body of the media continue to make, but I am beginning to doubt the advisability or the propriety of continuing these news conferences under conditions such as they exist today. To subject The President of the United States continuously to these cheap shot attacks on the part of the media representatives demeans the office and increases an already too prevalent disrespect for constituted authority.

*- King & H
note
Is he right?*

I have become convinced that the deep-seated animosity of certain sections of the press toward you and your administration has now arrived at a point where it is quite prepared to disregard the damage which is being done to the welfare of the country by the continued harassment of the President. This is a condition which we can ill afford to put up with in a world so beset with problems and so dependent upon our constructive participation in them.

I doubt that the correspondents in their present mood and motivation can be induced to alter the character of the conferences and I would, therefore, hope that a more dignified, fairer and more reliable method of communicating your views to the American people could be found.

Respectfully yours,



The President
The White House

Washington, D. C. 20500

POVERTY

Sen. Bayh said that President Nixon had allowed a citizen watchdog effort over poverty programs "to fall apart in shabby fashion," and urged him to reactivate it. Bayh called on Nixon to fill all 21 vacancies that now exist on the National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity. Bayh said the Council has not met since the last of its members' terms expired in March, 1969.

* * * *

CENSUS

The Census Bureau said California is apparently the most populous state in the nation, putting New York second, for the first time in at least 100 years.

* * * *

ANGELA DAVIS

Amid speculation she was no longer in the country, ousted UCLA philosophy instructor Angela Davis was linked in published reports with another of the guns used in the bloody Marin County courtroom kidnapping.

* * * *

LEGION

The American Legion and thousands of young people who don't like its stand on the Vietnam war are coming to Portland and massive efforts are under way to keep them apart. About 14,000 Legion delegates are expected, and officials anticipate an influx of 40,000 to 50,000 young people. "They say they know the best for America," said a spokesman for a youth group calling itself the People's Army Jamboree. "We are going to tell them they are wrong." Gov. McCall has ordered 6,000 National Guard troops into the Portland area for a training exercise on Aug. 28 opening day of the convention. Area police and firemen's leaves have been cancelled for the convention.

* * * *

✓ *SNR*
H-note

(RN) - 7pre-4-30-73
 (Period was 69-70)

8/22/70

4

Agnew's mission is to tell Asian leaders the Administration will stand by them despite its hope that they provide more of their own defense. Another key Agnew message: Don't be upset by Senate doves urging an even faster US withdrawal from Southeast Asia. His task has been complicated by the latest success of the war opponents -- approval of amendments that would curb supplemental allowances paid troops sent to Vietnam by Korea, Thailand and the Philippines, and bar use of US funds to pay foreign troops fighting for Laos and Cambodia. While the amendments may be junked in Senate-House conference, they seem certain to stir reaction in Asia. In Thailand, Agnew faces questioning from leaders who fear the Administration may be planning an almost total pullout from SE Asia over the next several years. There have been rumors Agnew might go to Cambodia. State Dept. officials declined to deny the rumors. The new trip by the Veep was evidently planned hurriedly, because most of Agnew's party left Washington Friday to join the Vice President in LA without a definite itinerary.

* *

Right JNR

Mike Mansfield said he was quite willing to debate with Vice President Agnew but felt "any differences between us should be placed on a high plane." This should be done "to the end that we will maintain the dignity, the integrity, and the dedication of the Senate as a body, of Senators as individuals and, may I say, of the Vice President himself, as the presiding officer of this institution. I would hope that if and when we debate the economic and other issues, we would do so not on the basis of personalities but on the basis of facts and figures." The Majority Leader was commenting on a speech made by the VP.

* *

RN

9/7/70

4

VIOLENCE AND BOMBINGS

In Minneapolis a man was blown to fragments by a bomb, he was reportedly carrying -- eight bombings in five weeks; first fatality; considerable NBC footage (Sunday) from Minneapolis where it occurred. CBS had brief 15-second report.

Number 2 story on CBS Saturday was film of the bombing of Los Angeles Hall of Justice in which Manson trial is taking place. Relatively light damage. Explosion also noted on NBC. Lengthy film report on NBC of FBI version of events leading up to Madison explosion. Search continues for the 4 charged with that crime. Also reported was bombing of police station in an Iowa town.

CHILE

✓ who was he? jnn
Both networks had film reports (Saturday) on the semi-upset in Chile where the first Marxist to win a free election in a western hemisphere country appears likely to be named President by the Chilean Congress. Tens, and possibly hundreds, of thousands of Allende supporters in the streets. Some concern over reaction of Army, altho it has traditionally stayed out of politics. CBS reporter called election a victory not only for Marxists but also for Chilean democracy.

(RN)
NBC's Valeriani said State Dept. has no intention of interfering in election by the Congress: "that kind of diplomacy has been outgrown.", said one official. US feels it can get along with Chile if Allende wants to.

7/23/70

BAYH

Senator Bayh criticized Vice President Agnew for rhetoric Bayh said was pitting rich against poor, black against white in America. "We can't solve our problems with this kind of hate-peddling by the second highest official in the nation. It seems almost as though he is intentionally making people more tense with the statements he makes."

* * * *

MORTON

✓ This is kept - if up

(RN)

Rogers Morton charged that "Democratic permissiveness has contributed to ~~crime, violence and campus unrest.~~" Morton escalated GOP Republican efforts to link Democrats with bombings and shooting of policemen. Accusing Democrats of ducking the law and order issue, Morton said, "On election day every Democratic candidate will bear the cross of incredibility. The electorate, he added, "does not trust, cannot trust, the Democratic Party." Morton singled out Kennedy and Ramsey Clark for special criticism. "A year and a half ago, he (Kennedy) helped raise funds to pay the bail for radicals at Berkeley. Now he goes to Boston University and warns the students that 'violence has no role on the college campus.'" The Republican Chairman quoted Clark as saying that he...Clark...was like Bobby Seale in "many ways, maybe not in as many ways as I should be." It was one of the most hard-hitting speeches by a top Republican on the law and order issue since the fall campaign began.

* * * *

ADLAI

Some of the biggest names on the GOP roster have been practically tripping over each other's toes in Illinois this month in a common cause: To beat Adlai III and to keep Ralph Smith in the Senate. All indications are that the GOP visitors, ranging from President Nixon on down, were not wasting their time. Smith appears to be closing fact on Stevenson. Stevenson is probably still ahead, largely on the basis of his name, his political exposure, and his well-publicized record.

10/7/70

aligned with RN.... The Kirk camp isn't sure how helpful Nixon and Agnew would be. "Nixon hurt us in Brevard County," said a Kirk aide, referring to space employment layoffs. (AP)

* *

It's going to take Spiro Agnew, Martha Mitchell and probably the personal campaigning of RN to keep Republicans in the running for a Florida seat the GOP needs for control of the Senate. The seat was considered in the bag a few months ago. What changed things was folksy Lawton Chiles, a slow-talking attorney from the citrus belt who captured the imagination of voters and literally walked away with the Dem nomination by hiking 1,003 miles from Pensacola to the Florida Keys because "it's been so long since the people have met a real, live candidate for the Senate." While the "walking Senator" was waging an amiable, no-issue primary campaign against a formidable field, Bill Cramer was engaged in a bitter, intraparty fight. The GOP result left scars that may not heal by Nov. 3. (UPI)

* * * *

ROMNEY

Handwritten notes:
✓ *trans?*
✓
RN (circled)

Lenore Romney, who gave up a movie career for marriage, finally took her own show on the road this year in a campaign for the Senate. The final reviews won't be in until Nov. 3. Present indications are the show will fold. But not if she can help it. She is a woman to be reckoned with. The latest polls picture her with support from only 24% with Hart enjoying the preference of 63%. Yet "there is a dedication in her that just keeps her going," an aide says. "I know it may sound corny, but there is a Mormon missionary zeal there." The Romney campaign has had to roll with one punch after another since it started. As a result, the Michigan spotlight has turned to the campaign for governor between Milliken and Democratic State Sen. Sander Levin. Milliken has maintained a slight lead in recent polls and still is considered the favorite, though by a much smaller margin than earlier in the year. (UPI)

* * * *

A Public Opinion Survey released in Tel Aviv shows that 70 per cent of the Israelis questioned favor continuing the suspension of the Peace Talks until Egypt rolls back its missiles.

* * * *

BRITAIN

Prime Minister Heath pledged to reassert Britain's world influence beginning with active new roles in S.E. Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. "We are leaving behind the years of retreat," Heath told the conservative's Annual Convention. "We are determined to establish the reputation of Britain once again, a reputation as the firm defender of her own interests and the skillful and persistent partner of all those who are working for a lasting peace."

* * * *

TITO-BRANDT

Brandt and Tito agreed that the U.S. and Canada must take part in any European Security Conference. Brandt said Tito "was impressed by the way in which President Nixon presented his case and the seriousness with which he discussed the problems of both S.E. Asia and the Middle East."

* * * *

U.S. - RUSSIA

Deepening policy conflicts over the Middle East and other hotspots have pushed relations between Russia and the U.S. to their lowest point in two years and stalled RN's "era of negotiation" policy. Behind the tougher U.S. line which has emerged sharply at State is reported to be a feeling by RN that he and his Admin. are being tested by the Soviet Leadership on their determination to stand firm on critical issues. He is represented as believing the Russians must be shown clearly that while he committed his Admin. to "an era of negotiation" he is prepared to meet their challenges with whatever measures may be required. In strategic terms some authorities think Russia's reasons for acting as it has in many instances this year may be the result of a Kremlin policy decision to try to split the U.S. and its European allies. (AP, Hightower Analysis)

* * * *

from the House, but if they became Sen. Weicker and Gov. Meskill it would be a good trade.

Jarriel noted that even in this generally friendly crowd, there were some demonstrators on the fringes. He concluded that everyone seems to agree that the only way to stop them from appearing is "to stop the fighting."

Handwritten: H - correct this

CBS lead had Pierpoint reporting on RN's foray into Italian-American Connecticut -- 20% of population claims such heritage. Footage of arrival and greeting by Weicker and Meskill followed by motorcade clip -- an event which Pierpoint said was carefully timed to noon hour to get out a good crowd -- and it did get out a good crowd. RN spent an hour or so with editors at briefing session -- that made trip official, said Pierpoint, so the taxpayers, not the GOP, paid for it. Then to Stamford's Italian-American center where RN boosted GOP, then talked of peace and brotherhood. About :30 sound clip of RN on heritages of America, Pierpoint said GOP candidates feel he's helped them considerably but that will really depend, said reporter, on how many Italian-Americans and other ethnics can be pulled from Dems.

Handwritten: RN

NBC's Herb Kaplow said, "ballyhoo politics" was a more important reason for coming than the briefing. RN again went through motorcade ritual, said Kaplow voice over, as he tried to pump victory into Weicker and Meskill campaigns. Then to Stamford to dedicate the center (20% Conn.

INDIANA

*It's not
even close*

Fighting the toughest battle of his political career, Sen. Hartke is faced with serious trouble in his home territory of Southern Indiana. According to voters surveyed by the Chicago Tribune, support for Nixon's war policy has emerged as a major issue of the Indiana campaign, far ahead of taxes, law and order and the economy. Hartke needs to carry Southern Indiana by a large plurality. Assessments of the vote in the Southern Indiana area show Hartke only slightly ahead of Roudebush, if not even.

* * * *

WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Trying to "build something out of the ashes of defeat," Senate backers tried to woo opponents with a compromise plan the ladies may not like. They proposed scrapping language that would have assured women "equality of rights under the law" in favor of a milder assurance of "equal protection of the laws" already guaranteed men under the 14th amendment.

* * * *

McINTIRE

Rev. McIntire announced plans for a series of monthly "Patriots' marches for Victory in VN," climaxing with another rally at the Washington Monument May 8. Two of the rallies will be staged in San Clemente.

* * * *

RENNIE DAVIS

Davis has threatened to "paralyze" traffic in the nation's Capital May 1 if the Administration has not set a deadline for an end to US involvement in Indochina. Davis said he and his "supporters" would cause traffic jams in Washington that day by blocking major thoroughfares with junked cars. He referred to the mass tie-up as "Gandhi's last stand," and said it would only be the first of several "passive" efforts to harass the government into negotiating peace in southeast Asia. Davis, who recently returned from Paris where he claims to have conferred with NVN and V.C. negotiators, said he learned that if RN agrees to a cease-fire and a deadline for an actual end to the war that the NVN and V.C. will agree to release all POW's even while US troops still are in the country, as long as their departure is

10/17/70

2

Inevitably the nets compared the Grand Jury report to the Scranton Commission. NBC's Chancellor noted that it did not tally with the Scranton Commission and the FBI reports on the subject. ABC had film of Scranton simply refusing to comment at all since it might prejudice the case. However Commission members Ahern and Joe Rhodes (on NBC film) took decided exception to the Grand Jury. Ahern said he still feels the violence was not justified and was fully in accord with the Commission's findings. (Ahern's comment briefly noted by CBS.)

Joe Rhodes declared the jury was "politically motivated" and was more like "Mississippi justice than was the Mississippi jury." To explain that, Rhodes said at least the Mississippi jury did not indict anyone, since both were at fault. Rhodes went on to say he was "convinced what they have done is very serious" and is what is dividing our country.

Chancellor and HKS both noted reports (seen by us in Wash. Star and LA Times) that RN is not pleased with Scranton's Report. Smith said some aides believe it questioned RN's leadership. Chancellor said people are wondering if Scranton will be invited to give his report in the WH before election day. John also recalled that the AG had said if the Grand Jury didn't move with indictments then Justice would. The AG refused comment until he has seen the jury report.

Of reports of RN's displeasure with Scranton, CBS noted Scranton's comment that those stories aren't true and in fact WH staff has prepared quite favorable appraisal.

10/17/76

4

MIDDLE EAST

All networks had film of Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad's "blistering" attack on the US and charging we were responsible for the war and the breakdown of the talks. CBS' Richard Hottelet added that Riad had called the US plan dead -- killed by US and Israel, thus standstill violations are beside the point. The ceasefire's future after December 6 is uncertain, said Hottelet.

NBC had film segments which included Yost (Riad's speech "goes far" to confirm US thesis that public debate will not help), and the Egyptian delegate (quiet diplomacy was forcing Egypt towards surrender so we must return to public debate). Third segment was of the Israeli delegate who charged the USSR with complicity in the violations.

John Scali said Riad's speech provided a "gloomy setting" for the Rogers-Gromyko meeting since it appears the Soviets will take the same "uncompromising line" manufactured in Moscow. The propaganda line will be trumpeted around the world. The Soviets seem less concerned with peace than with maximum support for the new Egyptian leaders. Scali, as he has noted several times this past week, said Rogers has photographic evidence of the ceasefire violations but is reluctant to show them for fear of making a bad situation worse.

Speaking on the Rogers-Gromyko dinner, Marvin Kalb of CBS said that not since RN took office has US-USSR relations been worse -- or suspicions

1/17/70

✓ 5/23
H - obviously?
a Turkey

RN

A political media manager says the Administration pursued a formula he deems vital for success: "Create a threat and make your candidate be the savior." "Brilliantly executed," said Gayle Essary of the campaigning by RN and VP Agnew. Essary disputed the claim of Dem. image-maker Guggenheim that the GOP suffered a voter backlash stirred by Nixon. "You can't appeal to people on a rational level," Essary asserted. Nixon and Agnew "were creating a threat to the security of the voter which he could feel and see and experience. Then, they presented their candidates as being the saviors." Essary, who handled two pro-Administration candidates in losing Senatorial campaigns, believes that elections are decided on the basis of emotional appeal rather than ideology. His institute uses a sociological approach based in large part on studies of behavior patterns of rodents and primates. His campaigns ignore the 13% of the population classified as "Alphas" and "Betas" -- those who have achieved leadership positions -- and aim instead at the 80% classified as "gammas." "The gammas are what has been called the Great Silent Majority. and Mr. Agnew is the head gamma," said Essary.

* * * *

OKLA.

A recount of Oklahoma's ballots has confirmed that Democrat David Hall has won the Gubernatorial race. Hall upset Dewey Bartlett. Hall led by 2,182.

* * * *

TYDINGS

Fulbright charges the Administration purposely withheld until after the election a report clearing Tydings of conflict-of-interest charge.

* *

A spokesman for Tydings suggested the State Department possibly contributed to Tyding's defeat by delaying the report.

* * * *

Rogers session on Hill was featured by all nets. He said "political imperatives" -- lack of public support -- would prevent any US ground action in Cambodia. Still the Fulbright - Church crew was skeptical of extent of US commitment.

Sevareid sharply criticized big labor for its current behavior both here and abroad. Public won't tolerate unions' "barbaric" conduct, he warned.

On CBS-TV Morning News Rather used up about 4 minutes to tell about news conferences, not about RN's remarks altho Kalb did follow with report on VN statement. Rather interviewed one of the more objective backfields seen in a long time -- Loory, Deakin, Lisagor and Osborne. Their familiar gripes were noted: not enough conferences; "RN has an obligation to come before the press"; institution is in risk of decay; it is an anarchic, incoherent event; it's good for President to expose himself to nation.

Rather said there were tougher questions but still not enough followup. Dan thought RN was a "little off-stride", perhaps due to long interim since last one or his awareness of criticism. Rather concluded by saying there's a belief -- perhaps more of a hope -- that RN will hold more news conferences.

✓ *was
what did
we do*

RN

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... A

Wednesday, December 16, 1970

PRESS

Photos of RN at Commerce are on several front pages. If not page 1, they are seen inside. Also widely played, dominating Post front page, is photo from Tass Indian session. Stories on Trillion dollar economy stories emphasize RN's positive remarks on US system but also note made that figure is puffed up by the inflation RN has tried to cure and that it would have been reached earlier had there not been economic slow-down. (A bit contradictory.)

Laird's news conference is subject of many leads. Basically his warning of more bombings gets most coverage -- it is seen to escalate debate over "understandings" supposedly reached under LBJ. Other stories from session: Laird to go to VN; ties pullout to POW freedom; backs Griffin proposal for unilateral GVN release of some wounded NVN POWs; promises withdrawals to continue on schedule.

Other stories of prominence today: 1) Mercury in tunafish -- FDA says don't worry yet but a million cans are called back in; 2) Govs. conference continues to find sniping at WH but Veep moves in to defend party tactics and plead for unity; 3) SST gets firm vote of support (205-185) in House; 4) Senate seems rather confused and bottled up over RN's aid bill for Cambodia, et al with doves apparently fighting a losing rear-guard action; 5) Wire story on Hickel's inability to see RN is seen everywhere -- some

Completely ignore

(RN)

"RN's decision to include Connally in his Cabinet was obviously motivated by cynicism, shrewd politics and hard-nosed pragmatism, a combination reminiscent of LBJ at his wheeling and dealing best. And look where it got him." ... Things seem to be running backward at the WH. (Newsday edit)

* *

The political gains RN expects are clear enough but what is puzzling is why Connally took the job. Why should he expose himself -- to sharing the blame if things go badly. No easy answer suggests itself although the move does point up the liberal-conservative Dem split. He is close to RN philosophically -- and his selection makes sound political sense for RN. "Unfortunately, however, it is not at all clear that it makes any economic sense." (Phil. Evening Bulletin edit)

* *

Rarely has the capital been so surprised as when Connally's appointment was announced. But the choice seems entirely logical, so much so that many are hailing it as a master stroke. It may win bipartisan support for economic policies, help RN carry Texas, and smooth over resentments of the campaign. Still things may not work out as planned. For example, Connally is strong in Texas but not to be ignored is the downgrading of the Texas GOP implicit in the move. Also those most alienated by the campaign will not see Connally as a gesture of conciliation. He has his admirers but the poor, the black, the Chicanos, the civil libertarians, the doves and labor are not among them. This does not diminish his capacity to serve. But it does make him difficult to regard as the symbol of togetherness which RN has said he wants to achieve. (Robert Roth in Phil Evening Bulletin)

* *

Connally -- at the March 4 Cabinet meeting -- displayed a quality RN decided would make him a good

TOAST FOR RECIPROCAL BANQUET
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1972

of

All corrections
RNLs

It is a great privilege while we are guests in your country
to be able to welcome you and the Chinese who are present here
~~as~~^{our} guests this evening. On behalf of Mrs. Nixon and all of the
members of our Official Party, I want to express my deep
appreciation for the boundless and gracious hospitality which you
have extended to us. # As you know, it is ^{the} a custom in our country
that the members of our press have the right to speak for themselves
and that no one in Government can speak for them. But I am sure
that all those from the American press ~~and from third countries~~
~~who~~^{well} ~~are~~th here tonight grant me the rare privilege for an American
~~President to speak on behalf~~^{of speaking for} of the press ~~and to extend~~^{for the opportunity} their
appreciation to you and your Government for the many courtesies
you have extended to them, ^{you} which have made it possible for the
story of this historic visit to be read, seen and heard by more
people all over the world than on any ~~other~~ previous occasion in
history.

As we near the conclusion of the very extensive private
talks that I have had with you and Chairman Mao and the Secretary

- (2) You believe deeply in your system.
- (3) We believe just as deeply in our system.
- (4) It is not our common beliefs that have brought us together here but our common interests and our ^{common}~~earnest~~ hopes ----

NOT RN

- 1. The interest that each of us has to maintain our independence and the security of our peoples;
 - 2. The hope that each of us has to build a new world order in which nations and peoples, with different systems and different values, can live together in peace -- respecting one another while disagreeing with one another;
- (1) Letting history, rather than the battlefield, be the judge of their different ideas.

Weinberger Veto - The bill provides no new research authority and the creation of a new separate aging research institute would wastefully increase the proportionate administrative costs of conducting already on-going research.

Buzhardt (Chapman) Approval

Recommendation

I recommend that you sign S. 775. We have talked to Cap Weinberger about it. He does not feel that the Government will fall if you do not veto this bill and understands the arguments for approval.

☒ APPROVE ☐ DISAPPROVE

@fn

(7) No

Normal markings

Overseas
Attachment
2955

CENTRAL FILES-

April 23, 1969

→ 23 Mc. on Ap 1969

TO IDE

From KLEINER & McLaren

RE / ITT / CANTEN MEX

Tudy Brown

CH

4/7/69

Mc Laren to

Attorney General

Re Acquisition of Canten Corp

by ITT Proposed

Complaint Seeking

Preliminary Injunction

3/12/69

Statement by

Richard Mc Laren

Original

To Fred Bugharoff

This copy made because 7/73

of importance of subject.

To the Administrator

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1969

1/26/miami
-3
TIVE

Dear Mike:

I was extremely interested to learn about the admirable initiative undertaken by you and 30,000 other young people at the Miami Teen-age Rally for Decency held last Sunday.

This very positive approach which focused attention on a number of critical problems confronting society strengthens my belief that the younger generation is our greatest natural resource and therefore of tremendous hope for the future.

I hope that you will express my appreciation to everyone involved and my congratulations on the success of their efforts.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

Mr. Mike Levesque
401 To-To-Lo-Chee Drive
Hialeah, Florida 33000

*I hope to see you on my
next visit to Florida-*

11-4-17
THE PRESIDENT

RECOMMENDED PRESIDENTIAL TELEPHONE CALL

TO: Mr. and Mrs. Sammy Davis, Jr.

RECOMMENDED BY: RONALD L. ZIEGLER

(Olson concurs)

BACKGROUND:

You will recall that on June 29, you called Sammy Davis, Jr., who at the time was performing at Lake Tahoe. In a letter Sammy asked if you would call his wife, Altovise, at some point.

Mrs. Davis - Altovise (pronounced: Al-toe-vēēs) - is a dancer who occasionally performs with her husband.

*Call not made
may be made
later. (A week
following)*
Bob Brown, who is a close friend of Sammy's, learned from him that Sammy has been booked to host the Johnny Carson Show for one week in October. Sammy particularly asked for the month of October, because he felt this would be the time most advantageous to the Administration. His plan is to invite Administration officials and Nixon supporters on the show. There is also the possibility that he may invite you on the show "just to drop by."

His recent two week performance at Lake Tahoe was oversold and crowds of people milled around and waited in lines for hours trying to get tickets for the show. His reviews were outstanding.

Later

Letter attached →

*↑
(RN)*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

P. 14.0
ACTION

July 7, 1972

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM : PETER M. FLANIGAN

SUBJECT : Secretary Peterson's Delegation to Moscow


- (1) The first meeting of the US-USSR Commercial Commission is expected to take place in Moscow on July 20.
- (2) The currently proposed makeup of the US delegation is as follows:

Secretary Peterson
Under Secretary of Commerce Lynn
Assistant Secretary of Commerce Gibson
Assistant Secretary of State Armstrong
Assistant Secretary of Treasury Bennett
James Mitchell of Commerce
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Deane Hinton
Lon Fuller

- Chairman
- Vice Chairman
- Maritime Agreements
- Lend Lease
- Tax and Financial
- Legal Matters
- NSC
- CIEP
- Consultant (Legal)

- (3) Peterson and I have taken the position that membership in the delegation should be limited to working members. Accordingly, it is not proposed to take any representatives of the CEA or the STR, though both Eberle and Stein have indicated a desire to be included. If the grain agreement has not been signed prior to July 20, a representative from the Department of Agriculture will be included in the delegation.

Regarding the above listed membership in the delegation:

Approve 

Disapprove _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EXECUTIVE

ME1/PT

FG19

PPS-2

July 20, 1972

Dear Mrs. Pecora:

We mourn with you, your children and the many friends of your distinguished husband at his untimely death. Mrs. Nixon and I want you to know how much you are in our thoughts and prayers, and how deeply we grew to admire the considerable talents, energy and devotion he brought to his important duties as Under Secretary of the Department of the Interior.

The leadership and direction he gave to my Administration's programs in the important area of conservation and resource development will benefit our society for a long time to come, and can be a tremendous source of pride for you and your children.

We hope that your son and daughter will continue to be guided by the inspiring contributions which their father made to our national well-being, and that they may draw upon his example as they shape their own lives.

With our deepest sympathy and prayers,

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

★X
Mrs. William T. Pecora
4572 Indian Rock Terrace, NW.
Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED
JUL 24 1972
CENTRAL

*Bill was a strong man
and a good man. We
all admired him immensely -*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PETER M. FLANIGAN

SUBJECT: Report on Corporation for
Public Broadcasting (CPB)

1. It is your long term goal to establish the policy that no taxpayers' funds will be used by CPB to create or distribute programs in the public affairs field. Under this policy, government funds would only be used for educational and cultural programming.

2. To make this policy effective it has been necessary to get control of the Board, to replace Frank Pace with Tom Curtis as Chairman, and to replace Macy with Henry Loomis as President. Your new board members were confirmed last month, with Curtis to be confirmed within the next few weeks. Pace being ill, the expectation is that Loomis will be appointed President within the next several months.

3. The current disposition of the Board is to accept the control of Administration appointees under the Curtis leadership. Jack Wrather has been appointed to the board committee to select a new chairman from among the board members (to be Curtis) and Tom Moore chairman of the committee to review policy, both of these being your appointees and supporting your policies.

4. In order to prevent our goal for CPB from becoming an election issue, all have agreed that the enunciation of the new policy (no funds for any public affairs programming) should be put in place at the Board Meeting in December of this year.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: KEN COLE
THROUGH: ED HARPER *EH*
FROM: RICHARD BODORFF *RB*
SUBJECT: President Lincoln's Amnesty Policy

Attached is information detailing President Lincoln's policy with respect to soldiers absent without leave. Lincoln took three steps in this regard:

1. On March 10, 1863, he issued a "Proclamation Granting Amnesty to Soldiers Absent Without Leave". (Tab A) It orders that:
 - a. Military personnel absent without leave return to their units.
 - b. Those returning shall be restored to their respective units without punishment, except loss of pay and allowance during absence.
 - c. Those not returning be arrested as deserters and punished under law.
2. On February 26, 1864, he commuted the sentences of all deserters who had been condemned to death to imprisonment during the war, and empowered Commanding Generals to restore to duty deserters who would benefit the service. (Tab B)
3. On March 11, 1865 he ordered under law that:
 - a. All deserters return to their units within sixty days or be deemed to have voluntarily relinquished their citizenship.
 - b. Pardons be granted to those who return to their units, ("or to such other organizations as they may be assigned to") and serve the remainder of their original terms of enlistment, and, an additional period equal to the time lost by desertion. (Tab C)

*war ended
4/9/1865*

E. nat

RN

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN *[initials]*

August 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

FROM

JOHN EARLICHMAN *E*

Attached is George Shultz' memo containing the substance of his talk with George Meany.

*It closely duplicates a prior
memo of Shultz's phone call
on this subject -*

?
Not R

obviously

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OIC DAY FILMING

Friday - September 29, 1972

3:00 p.m.

The Family Theater

THE PRESIDENT:

BACKGROUND

On October 11, 1972, there will be a special OIC Day with a closed circuit national television show to be shown in 43 cities throughout the nation. The theme of the show is "Everybody Can Be Somebody" and participants will include Sammy Davis, Jr., Bob Hope, Aretha Franklin, Nancy Wilson, Bing Crosby, Duke Ellington, Lionel Hampton and others. The show will emanate from the Waldorf Astoria on the evening of the 11th with dinner beginning at approximately 6:30 p.m. and the telecast at approximately 8:30 p.m.

You have agreed to deliver a filmed message that will be shown over the closed circuit system and carried to all 43 cities. Your message, approximately four-and-a-half minutes in length, will be filmed in the White House Theater by the Navy Photo crew. Mark Goode will supervise the filming preparations.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- 3:00 p.m. You proceed to the White House Theater where the Photo Crew will be set up.
- 3:03 p.m. Speaking from a Presidential podium, you deliver your message, reading from the suggested script. (attached).
- 3:08 p.m. Filming concludes. You return to the Oval Office.
- Press Plan: There will be no press coverage of the filming.


Stephen Bull

100 52

The President's Reading Copy

HIGH PRICES SPEECH
October 17, 1969

RS
↓

gone after

Today I would like to share my thoughts with you about a problem that worries millions of Americans -- high prices that keep getting higher.

1. All across this land, hard working men and women look at paychecks that say they've had a raise.

(1) But they wonder why those bigger checks just don't buy any more than their lower paychecks bought four years ago.
2. All across this land, men and women in their retirement, who depend on insurance and on Social Security and on their life savings, look at their monthly checks and wonder why they just can't seem to make ends meet any more.
3. And all across this land, housewives wonder why they have to pay 66 cents a pound -- and in some areas much more -- for hamburger that cost 53 cents four years ago; people who are ill want to know why in those four years the cost of one day in a hospital has gone from \$27 to \$48; children who pay a nickle for a candy bar want to know why that bar is only half as big as it used to be.

Let me now turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front.

1. At the time we launched our search for peace I recognized that we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation.

- (1) I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace -- a plan which ~~could~~ ^{will} bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with a major shift in U. S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 30.

? maybe

1. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine -- a policy which not only ~~would~~ ^{will} help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

? maybe

- (1) We Americans are a do-it-yourself-people -- an impatient people.

- 29 -

(1) I, however, would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this nation to be ~~affected~~ ^{dictated} by those who hold that point of view and who resort to demonstrations in the streets to impose it on the nation.

(RN)

1. If a vocal minority, however fervent in its cause prevails over both reason and the will of the majority -- this nation has no future as a free society.

It is my belief that the great majority of Americans do not want the United States to lose in Vietnam.

1. They do want to end the war.
2. But they want to end it with a just peace -- just to us, just to South Vietnam and just to North Vietnam.

(RN)

A → *enact*

I have outlined to you tonight a plan which will bring that kind of peace.

1. The more support we can have throughout the nation for that plan and for that kind of peace, the sooner the war will end.

- (1) Because, let us understand -- North Vietnam cannot

casualties are down as a result of Cambodia and withdrawals are continuing. The Administration is confident it will reach a meaningful agreement at SALT and is working to relax East-West tensions over Berlin. In the Mideast the Administration is also enjoying success. If the talks produce peace it will be a diplomatic coup, but even if they don't RN can say he did more than anyone else to stop the fighting. It might be more accurate to attribute these favorable turns to a Russian desire to tidy up their European lines before tackling China, rather than crediting the Administration. But Bob Finch says "It isn't all happenstance, the President is the maestro, and he has orchestrated it beautifully!" (John Carroll in 8/30 Balt. Sun)

* *

Evans and Novak reported that RN comes out badly in a poll in Warren, Mich., a suburb of Detroit. The small sampling shows Muskie far ahead, with those surveyed expressing displeasure with RN's handling of unemployment and economic problems in general. But even a lower rate (11%) express approval for RN's handling of student demonstrations. They complain he is "too soft on students." There may be irony in the fact that liberal Muskie comes off better than RN, but it is the voters' anti-student attitude which is most significant. It underlines David Broder's comment that this is "not the year of the student in American politics." (8/20 Milwaukee Journal edit.)

* *

The scent of elections is drawing RN into a dalliance with crowds and it raises fears about his safety. He is trying to refute his own record of aloofness, and there is a danger that he will pay decreasing heed to the tragedies that overtook the politicians of the 60s. In their book, Scammon and Wattenberg note that "the sweaty,

✓ GRB
H & E - note
(RN)

9/23/70

2

in the Middle East. If the 6th Fleet assumes a role in the crisis, that would make it difficult for Tito to play the role of host. Apart from misgivings over the Middle East impact, the announcement that Nixon planned to visit Yugoslavia has aroused considerable enthusiasm among both officials and ordinary citizens. It would offer a possibility of strengthened Belgrade ties with the most powerful Western nation. The visit may offer a chance of more Western help for this country's now lagging economy and at the same time strengthen Yugoslavia's position of independence from the sort of Soviet domination which is exercised over much of the rest of Communist East Europe. One Yugoslavia official says the Russians are likely to be displeased by the Nixon visit, which would seem to imply that Yugoslavs could rely on American support should the Kremlin choose to get tough with Tito. (AP)

* *

Irish newspapers say all of Mr. and Mrs. Nixon's relatives apparently have left the old sod. The Nixons had expressed a desire to see the places where some of their ancestors lived before emigrating to America. Reporters were unable to find anybody connected with either the President's family or his wife's.

* * * *

HIJACKS

RN

Sen. Mathias blamed the plight of American hijack hostages in Jordan, in part, on a US preoccupation with Southeast Asia. Mathias said he had recommended that a strong message be conveyed to the hostages' captors "making it clear that, if our citizens are not quickly released, we will have no choice but to consider extreme alternatives for which the hijackers must bear full responsibility."

* * * *

Presidential Talking Points

Significant Breakthrough and the Need for the Right Agreement

-- We have made a significant breakthrough in the negotiations on Vietnam. An honorable settlement, consistent with the terms that we have always set for ourselves, is now within our grasp.

-- The task now is to finish the final details and make sure the agreement produces a real peace and not an uneasy armistice. We will not be stampeded into signing until we are completely satisfied.

-- Very significant progress has been made on the major issues. We can finish within weeks assuming there is mutual good will.

-- The military provisions of the draft agreement are fully within the framework that I outlined in my May 8 speech: an internationally supervised ceasefire, and all our prisoners returned in exchange for our withdrawal.

-- The political provisions fully reflect our basic principle that the South Vietnamese determine their own future. The communists have dropped their demands for Thieu's resignation and a coalition government. The agreement is consistent with the US-GVN proposal of January 27, 1972. Indeed, that plan specified presidential elections within six months, preceded by Thieu's resignation, while the current agreement leaves the timing and nature and level of the elections to the South Vietnamese themselves, and does not provide for resignation. The National Council, stipulated in the current agreement, is similar to the mixed electoral commission that we proposed in January.

-- We will conclude this agreement as rapidly as possible and will not be deflected once we are satisfied with its provisions.

-- On the other hand, after years of conflict and suffering, we will take the necessary time to avoid any ambiguities to make sure this is peace and not an armistice.

-- We will not rush into a settlement that has remaining uncertainties and ambiguities because of any artificial Communist deadline. For years the enemy refused to negotiate on terms that would be fair to both sides, and insisted on imposing a political future on South Vietnam. When they have held up a reasonable settlement for so long, they are the last ones to insist on wrapping it up in three weeks.

-- In the negotiating process the Government of South Vietnam has a right to participate fully, as it has all along. They will be in South Vietnam after we leave.

The Agreement Compared to the Opposition's Terms

-- To say that we could have had this agreement four years ago is nonsense. The Communists themselves, in their public statement of October 26, acknowledged that they had made significant concessions on October 8 which they had never offered before. They agreed to a ceasefire first and a political solution later, dropped their demands for Thieu's resignation and a coalition government, and gave assurances on Laos and Cambodia.

-- Even the most summary comparison with the plans of the opponents in this country underlines the fundamental differences.

-- Our opponents would withdraw unilaterally and leave the return of prisoners up to the good will of Hanoi. We have insisted on and received a commitment to return all prisoners in parallel with our withdrawals.

-- Our opponents would withdraw unilaterally and let the fighting among the South Vietnamese continue. We have insisted on and received a commitment to a ceasefire among all parties.

-- Our opponents would give no consideration to the problems of Laos and Cambodia. We have achieved a satisfactory resolution of those questions.

-- Our opponents have indicated that they would withdraw all forces throughout Southeast Asia. We have made clear that we would keep forces in the region outside of Indochina.

-- Our opponents would cut off military aid to South Vietnam, even if this were not required by the agreement. We will maintain military aid on a replacement basis and there are no restrictions on our economic aid.

-- Our opponents would withdraw all meaningful support from the GVN and its leadership, freely inviting their collapse. We have achieved a major breakthrough which leaves the present government and leadership in place with unrestricted American economic support and the political future of South Vietnam to negotiations among the South Vietnamese.

WEEKLY SCHEDULE

Monday

- 7:30 a.m. ... Breakfast meeting with Haldeman, Cole, Chapin and Higby
- 8:00 a.m. ... Meeting of key staff (Roosevelt Room)
- 8:30-9:30 a.m. ... Mtg notes; mail; personal time
- President's "out" basket
- Cabinet contacts (agenda items, mtg plans, appts, etc.)
- Lunch
- President's "out" basket
- Projects: 1) ABM;
 - 2) Overseas reductions;
 - 3) Memos for RN file;
 - 4) T. Braun activities;
 - 5) Master Presidential game plan;
 - 6) Book on contingency plans
- Prelim. News Forecast and Adjusted Final News Plan
- President's "out" basket
- Final review

Tuesday

- 7:30 a.m. ... Breakfast meeting with Haldeman, Cole, Chapin and Higby
- 8:00 a.m. ... Meeting of key staff (Roosevelt Room)
- 8:30-9:30 a.m. ... Mtg notes; mail; personal time
- President's "out" basket
- Cabinet contacts (agenda items, mtg plans, appts, etc.)
- Lunch
- President's "out" basket
- Projects: 1) ABM;
 - 2) Overseas reductions;
 - 3) Memos for RN file;
 - 4) T. Braun activities;
 - 5) Master Presidential game plan;
 - 6) Book on contingency plans
- Weekly Personnel Report
- President's "out" basket
- Final review

Wednesday

- 7:30 a.m. ... Breakfast meeting with Haldeman, Cole, Chapin and Higby
- 8:00 a.m. ... Meeting of key staff (Roosevelt Room)
- 8:30-9:30 a.m. ... Mtg notes; mail; personal time
- President's "out" basket
- Cabinet contacts (agenda items, mtg plans, appts, etc.)
- Lunch
- President's "out" basket
- Projects: 1) ABM;
 - 2) Overseas reductions;
 - 3) Memos for RN file;
 - 4) T. Braun activities;
 - 5) Master Presidential game plan;
 - 6) Book on contingency plans
- President's "out" basket
- Final review

Thursday

- 7:30 a.m. ... Breakfast meeting with Haldeman, Cole, Chapin and Higby
- 8:00 a.m. ... Meeting of key staff (Roosevelt Room)
- 8:30-9:30 a.m. ... Mtg notes; mail; personal time
- President's "out" basket
- Cabinet contacts (agenda items, mtg plans, appts, etc.)
- Lunch
- President's "out" basket
- Projects: 1) ABM;
 - 2) Overseas reductions;
 - 3) Memos for RN file;
 - 4) T. Braun activities;
 - 5) Master Presidential game plan;
 - 6) Book on contingency plans
- Final News Plan
- President's "out" basket
- Final review

Friday

- 7:30 a.m. Breakfast meeting with Haldeman, Cole, Chapin and Higby
- 8:00 a.m. Meeting of key staff (Roosevelt Room)
- 8:30-9:30 a.m. Mtg notes; mail; personal time
- President's "out" basket
- Cabinet contacts (agenda items, mtg plans, appts, etc.)
- Lunch
- President's "out" basket
- Projects:
 - 1) ABM;
 - 2) Overseas reductions;
 - 3) Memos for RN file;
 - 4) T. Braun activities;
 - 5) Presidential game plan;
 - 6) Book on contingency plans
- President's "out" basket
- Final review

Saturday

- President's "out" basket
- Cabinet contacts (agenda items, mtg plans, appts, etc.) -- (if necessary)
- Projects: 1) ABM;
 - 2) Overseas reductions;
 - 3) Memos for RN file;
 - 4) T. Braun activities;
 - 5) Presidential game plan;
 - 6) Book on contingency plans
- Lunch
- President's "out" basket (if necessary)
- Final review

In addition:

- 1) Weekly mtg of ABM campaign planning committee (as scheduled)
- 2) Bimonthly political coordinators mtg (as scheduled)
- 3) Sit in with President during meetings, office calls, etc. (as scheduled)
- 4) Prepare Cabinet Mtg agenda for President (2-3 days prior to scheduled meetings).

Specific Items for Discussion

- Avoid the time lag between the East Room entry by the Color Guard and the entry by the President and his guest.
- Designate persons to start applause.
- Avoid the necessity for tricky or awkward maneuvers.
- Ensure that the Vice President is thoroughly briefed whenever he is scheduled to be present.
- Know every detail of how interpreters will be used when foreign dignitaries are involved . . . how many will be present -- their names -- where they will be throughout the evening -- what each will do -- etc.
- Brief Social Aides to be of more assistance to guests (foreign guests especially) as they come from the receiving line and prepare to find and join their dinner partners.
- Brief Social Aides to operate on almost a man-to-man basis when foreign dignitaries are present; especially when foreigners are not English-speaking.
- Brief Social Aides not to congregate in the Red Room during the exchange of toasts . . . or in the Green Room near the open doorways during the entertainment.
- Outline strict guidelines for members of the press to follow, and ensure some means of seeing that these guidelines are enforced.
- Discuss the desirability of allowing the honored guests a brief 5-minute freshening-up period immediately after termination of the receiving line . . . that is, if nothing else is planned between that moment and the beginning of the entertainment.
- See that copies of the final scenario are distributed to all persons who might be concerned or involved (the President, Mrs. Nixon, the Social Office, the Military Assistant's office, Ambassador Mosbacher's office, the Vice President's office, Haldeman, Butterfield, Bull, etc.)
- Ensure that the Secret Service review its plan for the entire evening with an eye toward keeping agents well dispersed and preventing any possible appearance of "security overkill".
- Assign someone the responsibility to make it clear to entertainers that their after-dinner performances must be limited in duration -- 20-25 minutes, and never longer than 30 minutes.

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ZIEGLER
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: Daily Reporting

On October 7th the President asked that a Media Monitoring Report be ~~established~~ and prepared each week day for his review. On that same date you named yourself as the individual who would assume responsibility for monitoring the Washington Post and the New York Times. I explained to you then that monitors would be required to take note of any cases of significantly unfair reporting -- and optionally, any cases of particularly favorable reporting from a writer or commentator other than a "known friend" -- and bring such information to my attention, in any form whatever ^{(memo, handwritten note, telephone call),} by 10:45 each week day morning.

The report was initiated on October 9th, and on that day, after failing to hear from you by 11:00 a. m. , I tried ^{unsuccessfully} to get through to your office. ~~but unsuccessfully~~ (I believe ~~because~~ your morning press conference was in session at the time.) With no alternative I scanned the 2 papers quickly and reported for you.

Again on October 10th I failed to hear from you. At about 11:15, at my own initiative, I managed to see you in your office and

obtained information sufficient for the daily reporting purpose~~s~~

~~you failed to contact me~~
~~I did not hear from you~~ on the succeeding 4 days and ^{it was} only with some difficulty, and by devoting extra time of my own ~~was I~~ ^{that I} was able to get your part of the ^{media monitoring} material into the report. (Jerry Warren was helpful during this period.)

^{at Bob Haldeman's direction,}
On October 17th, ^A we combined the Media Monitoring Report with the Daily News Plan Critique, ^{a daily review} being rendered already, in your name, by Tim Elbourne). Throughout the following week I took time to monitor the 2 newspapers and insert whatever information was appropriate in the Media Monitoring portion of the new comprehensive report. Tim Elbourne's section was well prepared each day and submitted to me in the manner prescribed.

It then became obvious that because Tim had to read over the Post and the Times as a part of his early morning news review there was no reason for me to do the same ^{him}... so, I asked him (Tim) to take special note of, and bring to my attention, any instances

of unfair reporting by staff writers of the 2 newspapers.

Tim did not feel that this would present any extra burden, ~~was~~
and I don't think ^{it} ~~it~~ has, for all has gone well with the Media
Monitoring portion of the report ever since.

Let me focus now on the Daily News Plan Critique -- the
week day review of newspaper and TV play given to White
House news items mentioned in your news forecast of the
previous day. Five times in the past 5 weeks your office
has failed to render this material which constitutes
part I of our daily report to the President. The first
delinquency occurred on Monday, October 27th. Evidently
Tim Elbourne was out of town and the designated "back-up"
man, Bruce Whelihan, had not monitored the newspapers or
evening TV news shows because he "was at Camp David" over
the weekend. " Tim was away on a second occasion and Bruce
was out of town also, ~~was~~ attending a funeral. The date was
November 5th. There was no report on November 10th because
all of your staff had spent the weekend in Florida. The 4th
delinquency occurred on Friday, November 28th . . . presumably
because that day was a sort of half-holiday . . . a part of the
(Thursday through Sunday) Thanksgiving vacation. Today marked

the 5th time that a report failed to reach my office.

Understandably relocations of your staff members during Presidential trips generate some problems; but certainly nothing insurmountable. To my own way of thinking, a week day report is a week day report ... even though ^{conditions are such that} it may have to be rendered as "negative". ^{Again,} Moreover, it would seem to me that ^{this particular report having been} ~~the reports~~ having been instituted at the request of the President, ^{and the fact that it is} ~~and the fact that it is~~ something which he expects to receive each working week day, would lend some special significance to its ^{through} preparation and warrant its regular and timely submission.

I am writing all of this ~~now~~ so that you will have an opportunity to review whatever internal system has been set up within the Press Office prior to my shifting the office to which your portion of this comprehensive report is submitted from mine to John Brown's.

Beginning on Wednesday morning, December 3rd ~~(10:45)~~

John Brown, in his capacity as Staff Secretary, will be expecting the Media Monitoring Report from Herb Klein's office and the Daily News Plan Critique from your office. Assuming each report has been

properly prepared, John will have only to staple them together,
add a cover sheet, and handcarry them to Bob Haldeman by
11:30. Your personal interest in this report will be of great
help.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Determined to be an
Administrative Marking
Not National Security Information
By JUS NARA Date 3/5/2016

Chron

THE PRESIDENT'S INFORMATION ONLY

Subjects of National Security FYI papers on your back table (in the Oval Office) are listed below:

Actions on Cambodia	May 13th
General Wheeler's Talk with Shah of Iran	May 13th
Actions on Cambodia	May 12th
April Monthly Report of U.S. Mission to U.N.	May 12th
Middle-East Situation	May 12th
Nasser's "Appeal" to you -- A New Diplomatic Initiative	May 12th
Sisco's Reflections After Mid-East Trip	May 12th
A Fabrication Which Resulted in Soviet Expulsion from the Ivory Coast	May 12th
Population Levels Which Might Be Supported If World Food Production Could Be Raised to Level Currently Achieved Through U.S. Agricultural Methods	May 12th
Implications of Proposed Reduction of USG Personnel in the Philippines	May 12th
Vietnam Indicators Report	May 12th
Letter from PM Lon Nol	May 11th
Actions on Cambodia	May 11th
Report of Actions on Behalf of the President (Miscellaneous Topics)	May 11th
Letter from PM Papadopoulos	May 8th
Letter of Appreciation from Chiang Kai-shek	May 8th

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

Seabeds Convention to Determine Continental Shelf Boundary and Seaward Regime	May 8th
PM Trudeau's Response to Your Letter of April 7	May 6th
Response from President Pompidou on Indo-China	May 6th
Kosygin's Press Conference on Cambodia	May 6th
Amb. Smith's Report on SALT	May 6th
Strikes Against Enemy Supply Routes in NVN	May 6th
Further Foreign Reactions to Cambodian Developments	May 6th
Proposal for Attacks on Additional Base Areas in Cambodia	May 5th
The Kremlin Scene	May 5th

I have weeded out the old "Cambodia Situation Reports".

Doc.

TOP SECRET

RESUME OF ACTIVITY

TO

SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION

RESUME OF ACTIVITY TO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION

Monitored and coordinated from the White House are actions planned and implemented by the Department of Defense, the Cabinet (excluding DoD, and the private sector). Additionally, some use is being made of resources available through political organs within the separate states, but because of the non-partisan nature of the Safeguard campaign, such effort is limited in its intensity and directed almost entirely toward generating an increased flow of pro-ABM mail to the Senate. On the other hand, continuous and unlimited emphasis is given to media assistance, and the encouragement of media support nationwide. These key (underlined) elements of our campaign are listed below -- each followed by a short paragraph describing the kinds of significant actions which have been undertaken in the past, or which are now in progress.

- (1) Defense: Nearly all of the pro-Safeguard testimony to Congressional committees has been delivered by top civilian and military officials of DoD. Other activities to-date include: 12 personal appearances on television; 27 briefings to civilian groups; 10 special briefings to large Congressional groups; 43 speeches to predominantly non-military audiences; 22 backgrounders to representatives of magazine and news publications, TV networks, citizen groups, and the Congress; 10 press conferences; and 31 articles written and published in both military and civilian publications. Apart from the aforementioned items, 33 Armed Forces Day addresses were made throughout the country, most of which stressed or at least touched upon the wisdom of the President's Safeguard decision. Then, too, a multitude of Safeguard symposiums, public debates, and seminars have been held -- and pamphlets and other materials have been distributed to publishers, daily newspapers, broadcasters, columnists, business community and industrial leaders, etc. ... on 8 separate occasions and respectively in the following quantities: 2,500; 650; 1,500; 5,000; 15,000; 7,900; 1,500; and 1,500.

- (2) Cabinet: All Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials have been well briefed on the Safeguard system and its significant relationship to the maintenance of a secure nation. Through the Cabinet Secretary and the public information officers in each Department, these officials (whenever and wherever appropriate) inject pro-Safeguard logic into their formal and informal addresses around the nation ... and, as well, into radio, TV, and other interviews made public.
- (3) Private Sector: Two citizen groups are sufficiently organized and financed to promote Presidential support within the private sector. They are the "Citizens Committee for Peace with Security" and the "Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy". The first mentioned of these committees -- composed of Len Hall, George Champion, Neil McElroy, Clare Luce, Vince Lombardi, John Sutro, Bill Casey, John Mulcahy, Barry Leithhead, Morris L. Leibman, and some 50 others -- is gaining momentum at an ever-increasing rate. With headquarters in New York, its mission is to educate the public. This is being done through close coordination with the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy, the American Security Council, the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Disabled American Veterans, and other such organizations. It is also in the process of contacting some of the nation's most influential business leaders in an effort to bring pressure to bear, through such persons, on "uncommitted" Senators. At the present time this committee is conducting a poll which so far indicates strong support for the President's decision. The "Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy" directs its efforts chiefly toward the scientific and academic communities. Its aim is to convey to the public the fact that there are hundreds of thousands of intellectuals who strongly support the President in this vital matter. With its membership including such persons as Paul Nitze, Dean Acheson, Dr. Albert Wohlstetter, Robert Lovett, Dr. Eugene Wigner and about a dozen more, the committee plans to project its message via newspaper advertisements and public appearances. In

addition to these private groups are such well-established organizations as the American Security Council, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion, Disabled American Veterans, the Navy League, Air Force Association, and many others ... all of which have formally resolved to support the President and to campaign actively in the interests of other citizens doing the same. It is important to add that the AFL-CIO Executive Council recently adopted a formal statement declaring its support of the President's decision. The Council's message, made public on May 17th, said in essence: "The AFL-CIO has never joined in attacks upon the efforts of any Administration to carry out the solemn responsibility of providing a strong national defense ... and we shall not do so now. The objective of meeting the pressing social and economic problems facing the country should not be regarded as precluding the need for a strong defense because both are essential to the security and progress of the nation." Finally, specific contacts with "uncommitted" Senators are being undertaken by certain individual members of the Business Council.

- (4) Political: Apart from the Vice President's close liaison with state governors, a member of the White House Staff communicates regularly with state GOP chairmen to help promote a pro-Safeguard mail campaign which hopefully will counteract the currently predominant anti-Safeguard mail being received by most U. S. Senators. Moreover, we are planning to publicize soon the results of a national Gallup poll now being made -- a poll which we believe will indicate that some 47 percent of the American public favor the Safeguard project while approximately 26-27 percent are either opposed or undecided.
- (5) Media: The media effort has ensured numerous nationwide mailings of pertinent Safeguard materials to editors, syndicated columnists, political writers, broadcasters, etc. It has seen to it that key Administration officials, and distinguished private citizens who favor the ABM, have appeared on such programs as the Today Show, the Tonight Show, CBS Morning News, Issues and Answers, Meet the Press, etc. Media representatives have been responsible for arranging most of the press conferences,

backgrounders, and other events which have clarified the President's position with regard to the Safeguard system. Vital to the over-all campaign have been the person-to-person contacts made with newspaper editors and publishers nationwide. Such contacts have resulted in Earl Richert, Editor of the Scripps-Howard chain, promising strong Safeguard support in seven daily newspapers in Texas, Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana. Safeguard support was likewise assured by sixteen Copley chain newspapers in Illinois and California. Insofar as the separate states are concerned emphasis has been placed on newspaper contacts in those several states represented by "uncommitted" (or "target") Senators. A copy of a special report on this activity is attached herewith ... along with separate news analysis (on legal-size paper) prepared by the Department of the Air Force.

Under

Tax Bill: RU 7-10 days

Sty Duns for taking credit

Under new bill - all things

Final. no tax if you go HBR
ATC

Blair

John B...

Colt

~~John B...~~

Good

Will low inc taxpayer dropped
get hi-inc taxpayers

inc tax - same as ours

Students get break - can earn up to 1700 & pay no tax

This when added to inc in pass the
manager rebates housing

lowers the highest rate for earnings - from 70 to 5
net - reduces disinclination vs savings

Bad

- per exemption - then one amendment -
not fair to the average man

- it reduces revenues - if it turns out to
be a net tax
bill might be done

Game Plans

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Game Plans

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1st Bill: RU 7-10 days

Stop Duns for taking credit

Under new bill - all things

limit. no tax if you go 40 hrs
ATC

~~Blair~~

~~John Brown~~

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good

Trill low inc taxpayer dropped
get hi-inc taxpayers

min inc tax - same as ours

Students get break - can earn up to 1700 & pay no tax

This when added to inc in pers exempt
income rebates housing

lowers the highest rate for earnings - from 70 to 50%
plus - reduces discrim vs singles

bad

- no exemption - there once amendment - it's
not fair to the average man.

- it reduces revenues - if it turns out to be
fiscally out tax source
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Game Plans

Game Plans

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Statement before Hammarskjold Forum of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York
on the Issues of International Law Involved in
United States Military Actions in Cambodia

New York, May 28, 1970

By John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser,
Department of State

I welcome the opportunity to present the Administration's views on the questions of international law arising out of the current South Vietnamese and United States operations in Cambodia.^{1/}

I do not intend to review in any detail the legal justification of earlier actions by the United States in Viet-Nam. In 1966 the previous Administration set forth at some length the legal justifications for our involvement in South Viet-Nam and our bombing of North Viet-Nam.^{2/}

^{1/} The views of the Administration on the military and political issues have been expressed clearly by the President and other officials. See, in particular, President Nixon's address of April 30, 1970, reprinted in State Dept. Bulletin of May 18, and his press conference of May 8, reprinted in the New York Times on May 9. See also, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard's address of May 15, 1970 in Fort Worth, Texas.

^{2/} Meeker, "The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam", March 4, 1966, submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 8, and published in the State Department Bulletin of March 28, 1966.

In general, reliance was placed squarely upon the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, recognized by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. This legal case involved the showing that North Viet-Nam had raised the level of its subversion and infiltration into South Viet-Nam to that of an "armed attack" in late 1964 when it first sent regular units of its armed forces into South Viet-Nam. The build-up of American forces in South Viet-Nam and the bombing of North Viet-Nam were justified as appropriate measures of collective self-defense against that armed attack.^{3/}

The legal case presented by the previous Administration was vigorously attacked and defended by various scholars of the international legal community.^{4/} Many of the differences rested on disputed questions of fact which could not be proved conclusively. This Administration,

^{3/} They were also justified on that basis in U.S. reports to the United Nations, pursuant to Article 51. See the texts of the letters from Ambassador Stevenson to the Security Council, dated February 7 and February 27, 1965, reprinted in the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 22, 1965, p. 240, and March 22, 1965, p. 419.

^{4/} See the collection, in two volumes, The Viet-Nam War and International Law, edited by Richard A. Falk, and published in 1968 and 1969 by the American Society of International Law.

however, has no desire to reargue those issues or the legality of those actions which are now history. In January 1969, President Nixon inherited a situation in which one-half million American troops were engaged in combat in South Viet-Nam, helping the Republic of Viet-Nam to defend itself against a continuing armed attack by North Viet-Nam. Our efforts have been to extricate ourselves from this situation by negotiated settlement if possible, or, if a settlement providing the South Vietnamese people the right of self-determination cannot be negotiated, then through the process of Vietnamization.^{5/} The current actions in Cambodia should be viewed as part of the President's effort to withdraw United States forces from combat in Southeast Asia.^{6/}

^{5/} The President reviewed our efforts at negotiation and the progress of Vietnamization in his statement of April 20, 1970, published in State Dept. Bulletin, May 11, 1970 and stated: "...our overriding objective is a political solution that reflects the will of the South Vietnamese people and allows them to determine their future without outside interference."

^{6/} In his address of April 30, announcing the use of force in Cambodia, President Nixon said: "We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Viet-Nam, and winning the just peace we all desire. We have made and will continue to make every possible effort to end this war through negotiation at the Conference table rather than through more fighting in the battlefield."

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the questions of international law arising out of our actions in Cambodia. It is important for the Government of the United States to explain the legal basis for its actions, not merely to pay proper respect to the law, but also because the precedent created by the use of armed forces in Cambodia by the United States can be affected significantly by our legal rationale. I am sure you recall the choice that was made during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 to base our "quarantine" of Cuba not on self-defense since no "armed attack" had occurred, but on the special powers of the Organization of American States as a regional organization under Chapter 8 of the U.N. Charter.^{7/} Within a narrower scope the arguments we make can affect the applicability of the Cambodian precedent to other situations in the future. I believe the United States has a strong interest in developing rules of international law that limit claimed rights to use armed force and encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes.

^{7/} See Chayes, "Law and the Quarantine of Cuba", 41 Foreign Affairs (1963) 550.

One way to have limited the effects of the Cambodian action would have been to obtain the advance, express request of the Government of Cambodia for our military actions on Cambodian territory. This might well have been possible.^{8/} However, had we done so, we would have compromised the neutrality of the Cambodian Government and moved much closer to a situation in which the United States was committing its armed forces to help Cambodia defend itself against the North Vietnamese attack. We did not wish to see Cambodia become a co-belligerent along with South Viet-Nam and the United States. We are convinced that the interests of the United States, the Republic of Viet-Nam, and Cambodia, and indeed the interests of all Asian countries, will best be served by the maintenance of Cambodian neutrality, even though that neutrality may be only partially respected by North Viet-Nam.

8/

On May 1 a Cambodian spokesman said that "the Cambodian Government as a neutral government cannot approve foreign intervention." However, on May 5, Lon Nol issued the following statement: "In his message to the American people of April 30, 1970, President Nixon made known the important measures which he had taken to counter the military aggression of North Vietnam in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. One of these measures concerns the aid of the U.S. in the defense of the neutrality of Cambodia violated by the North Vietnamese. (cont'd)

(footnote continued)

"The Government of Salvation notes with satisfaction the President of the United States took into consideration in his decision, the legitimate expressions of the Cambodian people who only desire to live in peace within their territory, independent, and in strict neutrality. For this reason, the Government of Cambodia (GOC) wishes to announce that it appreciates the views of President Nixon in his message of April 30 and expresses to him its gratitude.

"It is time now that the other friendly nations understand the extremely serious situation in which Cambodia finds itself and come to the assistance of the Cambodian people who are victims of armed aggression. The Government of Salvation renews on this occasion its appeal for assistance made April 14, noting that it will accept from friendly countries all unconditional and diplomatic, military and economic assistance."

Later statements have indicated even more clearly the Cambodian Government's approval of our actions.

As the President has made clear, the purpose of our armed forces in Cambodia is not to help defend the Government of Cambodia, but rather to help defend South Viet-Nam and United States troops in South Viet-Nam from the continuing North Vietnamese armed attack.^{9/} This limited purpose is consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, first set forth by the President at Guam on July 25, 1969,^{10/} that the nations of the region have the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for their defense.

The North Vietnamese have continued to press their attack against South Viet-Nam since 1964 and have made increasing use of Cambodian territory in the furtherance of that attack. They have used Cambodia as a sanctuary for moving and storing supplies, for training, regroupment

^{9/} This is to be distinguished from the furnishing of weapons and ammunition to Cambodia pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act, 75 Stat. 424, 22 U.S.C. §2161-2410, which is done to improve the ability of Cambodia to defend itself.

^{10/} The President's statements were not for direct quotation, but the New York Times of July 26, 1969 contains a fair summary of his remarks. The President later clarified the Doctrine in his address to the nation on Viet-Nam of November 3, 1969 and in his Report to the Congress dated February 18, 1970 on U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's.

and rest of their troops and as a center of their command and communications network. I assume that these facts are generally accepted, but it might be useful to give a few examples.

In the past five years, 150,000 enemy troops have been infiltrated into South Viet-Nam through Cambodia. In 1969 alone, 60,000 of their military forces moved in from Cambodia. The trails inside Cambodia are used not only for the infiltration of troops but also for the movement of supplies. A significant quantity of the military supplies that support these forces came through Cambodian ports.

Since 1968 the enemy has been moving supplies through southern Cambodia to its forces in the Mekong Delta. Further, in the spring and summer of 1969, three to four regiments of regular North Vietnamese troops used Cambodian territory to infiltrate into the Mekong Delta. Up to that time, there had been no regular North Vietnamese combat units operating in this area.

As many as 40,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops were operating out of the Cambodian base areas against South Viet-Nam prior to April 30. As the war in

South Viet-Nam intensified, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops have resorted more frequently to these sanctuaries and to attacking from them to avoid detection by or combat with United States and South Vietnamese forces.

During 1968 and 1969 the Cambodian bases adjacent to the South Vietnamese provinces of Tay Ninh, Pleiku, and Kontum have served as staging areas for regimental-size Communist forces for at least three series of major engagements -- the 1968 Tet offensive, the May 1968 offensive and the post-Tet 1969 offensive.

Many of these North Vietnamese actions violate Cambodian neutrality. Flowing from the Fifth Hague Convention of 1907^{11/} are the generally accepted principles that a neutral may not allow belligerents to move troops or supplies across its territory, to maintain military installations on its territory, or to regroup forces on its territory. A neutral is obligated to take positive action to prevent such abuse of its neutrality either by attempting to expel the belligerent forces or to intern them.

^{11/} 1 Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America (1968) 654.

Both the previous Cambodian Government under Prince Sihanouk and the present Government headed by Lon Nol have made efforts to limit, if not prevent, these violations of Cambodia's rights as a neutral. While the Sihanouk Government did not, in our judgment, do all that, under international law, it should have done, it unquestionably made some efforts. As a legal matter, it is clear that a neutral must take active measures commensurate with its power to protect its territory from abuse by a belligerent. It is likewise clear that a neutral's "duty of prevention is not absolute, but according to his power." ^{12/} In any event, however, the control and restraint exercised by the previous Cambodian Government was progressively eroded by constant North Vietnamese pressure. Prior to the ouster of Prince Sihanouk, regular supply of arms and munitions through the Port of Sihanoukville had become an established fact.

^{12/} As the Harvard Research in International Law pointed out in its 1939 Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, "A neutral State is not an insurer of the fulfillment of its neutral duties. It is obligated merely to 'use the means at its disposal' to secure the fulfillment of its duties." ³³ American Journal of International Law (1939), Suppl., p. 247.

After the change of government on March 18, in which the United States was not involved in any respect, Cambodian police and other officials were driven out of many localities in the border area. When it became apparent to North Viet-Nam that the new Cambodian Government was not willing to permit the same wide scope of unneutral use of its territory by North Vietnamese forces as the previous government, the decision was evidently taken to expel all Cambodian Government presence from the border areas and move militarily against the Cambodian army, with a view to linking up all the sanctuaries and the Port of Sihanoukville. This would have produced a unified and protected sanctuary from the Gulf of Siam along the entire border of South Viet-Nam to Laos, with virtually unrestricted movement and unlimited supply access. The threat posed by such a situation of renewed and increased attacks against United States and Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam is obvious. We also knew that enemy forces were instructed to emphasize attacks on U.S. forces and increase U.S. casualties.

That is the rapidly developing situation the President faced at the time of his April 30 decision to

make limited military incursions into the sanctuaries in Cambodia, which had been militarily occupied by North Viet-Nam. It was impossible for the Cambodian Government to take action itself to prevent these violations of its neutral rights. Its efforts to do so had led to the expulsion of its forces. In these circumstances, the question arises of what are the rights of those who suffer from these violations of Cambodian neutrality.

It is the view of some scholars that when the traditional diplomatic remedy of a claim for compensation would not adequately compensate a belligerent injured by a neutral's failure to prevent illegal use of its territory by another belligerent, the injured belligerent has the right of self-help to prevent the hostile use of the neutral's territory to its prejudice.^{13/} Professor Castrén, the distinguished Finnish member of the

^{13/} According to Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare (1959) 538: "Should a violation of neutral territory occur through the complaisance of the neutral state, or because of its inability, through weakness or otherwise, to resist such violation, then a belligerent which is prejudiced by the violation is entitled to take measures to redress the situation, including, if necessary, attack on enemy forces in the neutral territory."

International Law Commission has stated that "If, however, a neutral State has neither the desire nor the power to interfere and the situation is serious, other belligerents may resort to self-help." 13a/

The more conservative view is that a belligerent may take reasonable action against another belligerent violating the neutral's territory only when required to do so in self-defense. 14/

13a/ Castrén, The Present Law of War and Neutrality (Helsinki, 1954) 442. See also II Guggenheim, Traité de Droit International Public (Geneva, 1954) p. 346.

14/ II Oppenheim, International Law (7th ed. 1952) 698. This is true whether or not the neutral has met its obligations to use the means at its disposal to oppose belligerent use of its territory. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict (1954) says (p. 401): "One clear principle is that, the right of self-preservation apart, an aggrieved State is clearly not entitled to violate the neutral's territorial integrity, simply because his enemy has done so. Diplomatic representations and claim are the proper course." A Columbia Law Review Note concludes: "Military action within neutral territory may be justified as a measure of self-defense or as an appropriate response to the failure of a neutral state to prevent the use of its territory by belligerent forces... It is suggested ... that international law should permit and encourage primary reliance on self-defense as a justification". Note, "International Law and Military Operations against Insurgents on Neutral Territory", 68 Col. L. Rev. 1127 (1948). See also Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Reports 1949, 34-35 and 77.

The United States Department of the Army Field Manual relating to the Law of Land Warfare states the following rule: "Should the neutral State be unable, or fail for any reason, to prevent violations of its neutrality by the troops of one belligerent entering or passing through its territory, the other belligerent may be justified in attacking the enemy forces on this territory." ^{15/} This rule can be traced to, among others, the decision of the Greco-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal after the First World War which had to deal with the German bombardment of Salonika in Greece. During the war the Allied forces had occupied Salonika despite Greece's neutrality and the Germans responded with a bombardment. The Tribunal stated that Allied occupation constituted a violation of the neutrality of Greece, and that it was immaterial whether the Greek Government protested against that occupation or whether it expressly or tacitly consented to it. The Tribunal then concluded that "in

^{15/} FM 27-10 (July 1956) para. 520, p. 185. Similar provisions were contained in the U.S. Rules of Land Warfare of 1940 (para. 366) and in the British Manual of Military Law (para. 655). See Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare (1959) p. 538, n. 23.

either case the occupation of Salonika was, as regards Germany, an illicit act which authorized her to take, even on Greek territory, any acts of war necessary for her defense".^{16/}

When the British navy entered then neutral Norway's territorial waters in 1940 to liberate British prisoners on the Altmark, a German auxiliary vessel, a thorough analysis of that case by Professor Waldock led him to the conclusion that in some circumstances a breach of neutrality by one belligerent threatens the security of the other belligerent in such a way that nothing but the immediate cessation of the breach will suffice.

"Accordingly" -- he continues -- "where material prejudice to a belligerent's interests will result from its continuance, the principle of self-preservation would appear fully to justify intervention in neutral waters." ^{17/}

^{16/} Coenca Brothers v. The German State, 1927, translated in Briggs, The Law of Nations: Cases, Documents and Notes (1938) pp. 756-58.

^{17/} Waldock, "The Release of the Altmark's Prisoners," 24 British Year Book of International Law (1947) p. 216, at 235-36. See also Tucker, The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea (Naval War College, International Law Studies, Vol. XLX, 1955, p. 262).

As far back as the 18th Century, Vattel had this to say:

On the other hand, it is certain that, if my neighbour offers a retreat to my enemies, when they have been defeated and are too weak to escape me, and allows them time to recover and to watch for an opportunity of making a fresh attack upon my territory... [this is] inconsistent with neutrality... [H]e should...not allow them to lie in wait to make a fresh attack upon me; otherwise he warrants me in pursuing them into his territory. This is what happens when Nations are not in a position to make their territory respected. It soon becomes the seat of the war; armies march, camp, and fight in it, as in a country open to all comers.^{18/}

The United States itself has sometimes in the past found it necessary to take action on neutral territory in order to protect itself against hostile operations. Professor Hyde cites many such instances of which I would note General Jackson's incursion into Spanish West Florida in 1818 in order to check attacks by Seminole Indians on United States positions in Georgia; the action taken against adventurers occupying Amelia Island in 1817, when Spain was unable to exercise control over it; and the expedition against Francisco Villa in 1916, after

^{18/} 3 E. DeVattel, Le Droit des Gens (Ienwick transl. 1916) §133, at 277 (emphasis added).

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^{18/} 3 E. DeVattel, Le Droit des Gens (Ienwick transl. 1916) §133, at 277 (emphasis added).

his attacks on American territory which Mexico had been unable to prevent.^{19/}

I have summarized these precedents and the views of scholars and governments principally to show general recognition of the need to provide a lawful and effective remedy to a belligerent harmed by its enemy's violations of a neutral's rights. I would not suggest that those incidents and statements by themselves provide an adequate basis for analysis of the present state of the law. We all recognize that, whatever the merits of these views prior to 1945, the adoption of the United Nations Charter changed the situation by imposing new and important limitations on the use of armed force.^{20/} However, they are surely authority for the proposition that, assuming the Charter's standards are met, a belligerent may take action on a neutral's territory to prevent violation by another belligerent of the neutral's neutrality which the neutral cannot or will not prevent, providing such action is required in self-defense.

^{19/} I Hyde, International Law (2d ed., 1945), pp. 240-44.

^{20/} In particular, Article 2, para. 4 of the Charter.

In general, under the Charter the use of armed force is prohibited except as authorized by the United Nations or by a regional organization within the scope of its competence under Chapter 8 of the Charter, or, where the Security Council has not acted, in individual or collective self-defense against an armed attack. It is this latter basis on which we rely for our actions against North Vietnamese armed forces and bases in Cambodia.

Since 1965 we and the Republic of Viet-Nam have been engaged in collective measures of self-defense against an armed attack from North Viet-Nam. Increasingly since that time the territory of Cambodia has been used by North Viet-Nam as a base of military operations to carry out that attack, and it long ago reached a level that would have justified us in taking appropriate measures of self-defense on the territory of Cambodia. However, except for scattered instances of returning fire across the border, we refrained until April from taking such action in Cambodia. The right was available to us, but we refrained from exercising it in the hope that Cambodia would be able to impose greater restraints on enemy use of its territory. However, in late April a new and more

dangerous situation developed. It became apparent that North Viet-Nam was proceeding rapidly to remove all remaining restraints on its use of Cambodian territory to continue the armed attacks on South Viet-Nam and our armed forces there.

Prior to undertaking military action the United States explored to the fullest other means of peaceful settlement. We awaited the outcome of the Cambodian Government's efforts to negotiate with the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong agreed limitations on the use by the latter of Cambodian territory -- without success. We have continually tried in the Paris Talks to bring about serious negotiation of the issues involved in the war. Soundings in the Security Council indicated very little interest in taking up the North Vietnamese violations of Cambodian territorial integrity and neutrality. We welcomed the French proposal looking to the possibility of an international conference although not publicly for fear of discouraging Hanoi's participation. The Soviet Union, after initially indicating interest, backed away.

We were particularly pleased with the calling of the Djakarta Conference of interested Asian states to deal with the Cambodian problem on a regional basis. The best long-run approach to East Asian security problems lies through cooperative actions such as this. In the short run, however, they cannot be expected to provide an adequate defense to the North Vietnamese military threat.

The United States has imposed severe limits on the activities of U.S. forces. They will remain in Cambodia only a limited time -- not beyond July 1 -- in a limited area -- not beyond 21 miles from the border -- and with a limited purpose -- to capture or destroy North Vietnamese supplies, to destroy base installations, and to disrupt communications. To the maximum extent possible, we have directed our forces at enemy base areas and have tried to avoid civilian population centers. We have limited our area of operations to that part of Cambodia from which Cambodian authority had been eliminated and which was occupied by the North Vietnamese.

The Cambodian Government and the Cambodian people are not the targets of our operations. During the period from 1967 to 1970 the Cambodian Government became increasingly outspoken in its opposition to the North Vietnamese occupation. In fact, Sihanouk's purpose in going to the Soviet Union and China when he was deposed was to solicit their help in persuading the North Vietnamese to get out of Cambodia. The Lon Nol Government has expressed its understanding of our actions.^{21/}

Our actions in Cambodia are appropriate measures of legitimate collective self-defense, and we have so reported to the United Nations, as required by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.^{22/}

^{21/} See note 8/ above.

^{22/} S/9781 (May 5, 1970).

Mr. Butterfield

- TEMP HOLD -

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: JDE

FR: BK *AK*

SUBJ: Legal Documents Re: Mobilization

Per our conversation this morning, attached you will find:

- (a) A memorandum of understanding between the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General specifying the chain of command in clear terms. The Attorney General assumes both general and specific command functions per this agreement.
- (b) A letter of transmittal from the AG to the President explaining the purposes of the attached proclamation and executive order.
- (c) A memorandum for the attorney general explaining the legal background of the proclamation and executive order.
- (d) Copies of the proclamation and executive order authorizing the President to federalize the national guard and to use such force as is necessary to restore order in D.C. These are identical to those in the football now.

Recommendation: You keep these in your desk throughout the festivities for immediate reference.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Re: Assistance to Civil Authorities in the Washington Metropolitan Area.

The Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense are in total and complete agreement that responsibility for maintaining law and order belongs to local law enforcement officials and, at the Federal level, to the Department of Justice. The Department of Defense, in turn, will assist, as requested, in helping to maintain law and order during emergencies.

On the basis of this fundamental understanding, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense agree that in carrying out (a) their obligations and responsibilities under the provisions of Executive Order 11485, and (b) any other applicable Executive Order or law pertaining to civil disturbance in the District of Columbia, the procedures outlined hereafter, where applicable, will supersede and supplement the Interdepartmental Action Plan dated April 1, 1969:


(1) The Secretary of Defense shall order out the National Guard under Title 39 of the District of Columbia Code, or order the employment of active armed forces to protect federal property and functions in aid of the civil authorities of the District of Columbia only when the Attorney General determines that the civil authorities are in need of such aid.


(2) The Secretary of Defense shall order the termination of the use of the District of Columbia National Guard or

of active armed forces only when the Attorney General determines that such civil authorities no longer are in need of their aid.

(3) Whenever the District of Columbia National Guard, or active armed forces, are employed pursuant to paragraph 1 of this memorandum, or when the President has authorized military operations pursuant to Chapter 15 of Title 10, U.S.C., the Attorney General shall prescribe the tasks and objectives, as authorized by law, that the military forces are expected to accomplish. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for designating officials of the Department of Defense who will be available at all times to receive instructions of the Attorney General, and who shall have the necessary authority to assure that the tasks and objectives prescribed by the Attorney General are achieved. The designated officials are responsible for transmitting through Department of Defense command channels all necessary orders and directives to achieve that purpose.

(4) The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General are authorized to delegate to subordinate officials of their respective departments any of the authority conferred on them by this memorandum. All such authority is subject to the direction of the President.


(Attorney General)


(Secretary of Defense)



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

NOV 12 1969

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I am transmitting herewith a proposed proclamation, "Law and Order in the Washington Metropolitan Area," and a proposed Executive order, "Providing for the Restoration of Law and Order in the Washington Metropolitan Area."

These documents are identical to those prepared and submitted in draft with the Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances of April 1, 1969, which was approved by you on May 19, 1969. The proposed proclamation and Executive order are for use in dealing with an outbreak of civil disorder in the District that is beyond the capacity of local police forces to bring promptly under control.*/


Your powers to use military force for the purpose of restoring law and order are based both upon the Constitution and upon Acts of Congress. The scope of the proposed proclamation and Executive order and the legal grounds on

*/ The D.C. National Guard in militia status may be used without the necessity of the proclamation, but the President need not first use the Guard in this manner before issuing the proclamation.

which they rest are further discussed in the enclosed memorandum of November 10, 1969.

The proposed proclamation and Executive order transmitted herewith are approved as to form and legality, assuming that the facts of the situation in which they may be issued will correspond to the facts as recited therein.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John A. Mitchell", is written over the typed name. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Attorney General

November 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Re: Proposed standby proclamation and Executive order concerning civil disorders in the Washington metropolitan area.

The enclosed standby proclamation and Executive order are for use in the event that serious civil disorders occur in the District of Columbia on a scale beyond the capacity of local police forces to bring under control. In such an eventuality, it may be necessary to use units of the D.C. National Guard and of the regular Armed Forces to restore law and order. The use of either of these resources in a military capacity to suppress civil disorder (as contrasted with the use of troops to protect Federal property and functions) 1/ would require the prior authorization of the President. The standby proclamation and Executive order are the instruments proposed for that purpose.

These documents are identical to those prepared and submitted in draft with the Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances of April 1, 1969, which was approved by the President on May 19, 1969.

1/ An OLC memorandum of October 4, 1967, entitled, "Use of Federal Troops to Protect Government Property and Functions at the Pentagon Against Anti-War Demonstrators," concluded that military force could be used, if necessary, to protect Federal property and functions against forcible interference, without issuance of a Presidential proclamation. The General Counsel of the Army concurred in that conclusion.

There are two separate statutory provisions authorizing the President to call the D.C. National Guard into action to suppress a civil disorder in the District of Columbia. The President could act under either or both of those provisions.

The first is 10 U.S.C. 332, which authorizes the President to call into Federal service such of the National Guard of any State, 2/ and to use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to remove unlawful obstructions to the enforcement or execution of Federal law. The President may act under section 332 without awaiting a request from the Commissioner of the District of Columbia or from any other official. However, Presidential action under section 332 does require issuance of a Presidential proclamation under 10 U.S.C. 334.

The other statutory provision is D.C. Code 39-603, which authorizes the President, as commander-in-chief of the D.C. National Guard, to order out such units or members of the Guard, in militia status, as he may deem necessary to suppress a civil disorder in the District of Columbia. Presidential action under section 603 must await a request from the D.C. Commissioner or from the U.S. Marshal for the District calling upon the President to aid in suppressing the disorder. No proclamation need be issued if the President acts only under section 603.

We have drafted the enclosed documents on the assumption that if a serious civil disorder occurs in the District of Columbia, the President is likely to receive from the D.C. Commissioner, or from some other official with law enforcement responsibilities in the Washington metropolitan area, a request for military aid substantially along the lines of the attached draft letter.

2/ An OLC memorandum of October 13, 1967 concludes that the District of Columbia is a "State" for purposes of section 332.

Although not legally required for Presidential action under 10 U.S.C. 332, it is believed that the President should, if circumstances permit, await a request from the D.C. Commissioner before authorizing the use of military force in the District of Columbia under that section. Accordingly, we have prepared the attached draft letter for his possible use in initiating the recommended procedure.^{3/}

It should be noted that the D.C. National Guard could be placed in a status of inactive duty training without specific Presidential authorization.^{4/} In such a status, Guardsmen could be used to perform static policing duties such as protecting Federal property and functions, and would be entitled to pay, insurance, and certain other benefits under Federal law. However, we believe that they could not be used in riot-control operations without being called out under either 10 U.S.C. 332 or D.C. Code 39-603.

We have drafted the enclosed documents with a view to minimizing the likelihood that more than one proclamation and one Executive order will be necessary to deal with a

^{3/} 10 U.S.C. 331 authorizes the President to use Federal troops, at the request of the governor of a State, to suppress an insurrection in that State. When the "Bonus Army" marched on Washington in 1932, President Hoover responded to a request for troops from the D.C. Commissioners, apparently on the theory that the Commissioners had the "same right of call as the Governor of any State." B.M. Rich, The Presidents and Civil Disorder, 174 (Brookings 1941).

^{4/} See Executive Order 11485, dated October 1, 1969, in which general administrative powers of the President over the D.C. National Guard in militia status were delegated to the Secretary of Defense. That order also specifically authorizes the Secretary, subject to the direction of the President, to call out the D.C. National Guard in militia status to aid D.C. civil authorities. It is contemplated that at least informal approval of the President will be obtained before the D.C. National Guard is used in its militia status pursuant to D.C. Code 39-603.

local disturbance. The proclamation is therefore somewhat more general in scope than circumstances may require, and the Executive order affords the Secretary of Defense a number of options for dealing with the situation. In this connection, the following features of the enclosed documents should be noted:

1. The proclamation notes that disturbances exist in the District of Columbia and threaten "the Washington metropolitan area." The Executive order incorporates the same formula by reference. In the event of disorders originating in the District and spreading to some extent beyond District boundaries, these documents would authorize hot pursuit or deployment of forces in the area adjacent to the District.

2. The proclamation states that the President has "been requested" to use troops, but does not state from whom the request comes. This language is broad enough to cover a request from the D.C. Commissioner, from other law enforcement officers in the Washington metropolitan area, or from the Governors of Maryland or Virginia in the event of a separate outbreak of violence in a Maryland or Virginia suburb.

3. The documents would authorize the deployment of forces to deal with a subsequent separate outbreak of violence in a Maryland or Virginia suburb. If such an outbreak does not primarily threaten functions or property of the Federal Government, however, the President should not dispatch armed forces to quell it until a request from the Governor of Maryland or of Virginia, similar to the enclosed draft request from the Commissioner, has been received by the President pursuant to the requirements of 10 U.S.C. 331. It would not be necessary in such case to issue an additional proclamation announcing that a request from either of these Governors has been received. Since the draft proclamation and Executive order refer to conditions "in the Washington metropolitan area," these documents as they now stand, together with a request from the Governor concerned, would be sufficient to deal with separate outbreaks of violence in the suburbs.

4. The Executive order would authorize the Secretary of Defense to employ both units of the National Guard and of the regular Armed Forces. Section 2(b) of the Executive order would permit the Secretary of Defense to employ the National Guard of the District in its militia status (pursuant to D.C. Code 39-603), as well as in a federalized status as part of the Armed Forces of the United States (pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 331-333).5/

Whatever combination of National Guard units and regular troops may be employed, and whether the D.C. Guard operates in federalized or militia status, the proposed Executive order would authorize the Secretary of Defense to exert unified control over the employment of all military forces being used. The proposed order requires the Secretary to observe law enforcement policies determined by the Attorney General. The Attorney General is charged with responsibility for coordinating the actions of all federal agencies assisting in the suppression of violence and administration of justice, and of coordinating the activities of these agencies with those of state and District of Columbia agencies similarly engaged.

The proposed proclamation and Executive order have the approval of this Office as to form and legality for the standby purpose set forth above. This presupposes, of course, that in the event of their use the facts of the situation will correspond to those recited in the documents.

William H. Rehnquist
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

5/ The Executive order also preserves the possibility of calling National Guard units from Maryland or Virginia into the District, although this course of action may not be advisable if it would deprive the surrounding States of forces they may need to put down their own disturbances.

DRAFT FORM

The President
The White House

My dear Mr. President:

I regret to inform you that serious civil disorders have erupted in the District and are beyond the capabilities of our police forces to bring under prompt and effective control. In my opinion, in which the Director of Public Safety concurs, additional law enforcement personnel are necessary to restore law and order and to minimize loss of life and property.

Accordingly, I hereby request you to employ such units of the National Guard and of regular Federal troops as may be necessary for those purposes. To facilitate coordinated efforts, we agree to placing the Metropolitan Police Force under the operational control of the military commanding officer who may be designated by your authority, to the extent feasible consistent with the obligation of the District Government to protect parts of the District outside the disturbance area.

Respectfully yours,

Commissioner of the District of Columbia

LAW AND ORDER IN THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION


WHEREAS I have been informed that conditions of domestic violence and disorder exist in the District of Columbia and threaten the Washington metropolitan area, endangering life and property and obstructing execution of the laws, and that local police forces are unable to bring about the prompt cessation of such acts of violence and restoration of law and order; and

WHEREAS I have been requested to use such units of the National Guard and of the Armed Forces of the United States as may be necessary for those purposes; and

WHEREAS in such circumstances it is also my duty as Chief Executive to take care that the property, personnel and functions of the Federal Government, of embassies of foreign governments, and of international organizations in the Washington metropolitan area are protected against violence or other interference:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, do command all persons engaged in such acts of violence to cease and desist therefrom and to disperse and retire peaceably forthwith.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this day of , in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-fourth.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, likely of Richard Nixon, is positioned at the bottom right of the document. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

PROVIDING FOR THE RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN
THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA

WHEREAS I have today issued Proclamation No. _____ pursuant in part to the provisions of Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the United States Code; and

WHEREAS the conditions of domestic violence and disorder described therein continue, and the persons engaging in such acts of violence have not dispersed:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the United States Code and Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and by virtue of the authority vested in me as Commander in Chief of the militia of the District of Columbia by the Act of March 1, 1889, as amended (D. C. Code, Title 39), it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. Units and members of the Armed Forces of the United States or of the National Guard of the District of Columbia, or both, will be used to suppress the violence described in the proclamation and to restore law and order in and about the Washington metropolitan area.

SECTION 2. (a) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to use such of the Armed Forces as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of Section 1 and to protect against unlawful interference the property, personnel and functions of the Federal and District Governments, of embassies of foreign governments, and of international organizations in the Washington metropolitan area. To these ends, he is authorized to call into the active military service of the United States units or members of the National Guard, and to order to active duty units of the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces, as authorized by law, to serve in an active duty status for an indefinite period and until relieved by appropriate orders. Units or members may be relieved subject to recall at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense.


(b) In addition, in carrying out the provisions of this order, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to exercise any of the powers vested in me by law as Commander in Chief of the militia of the District of Columbia, during such time as units or members of the Army National Guard or Air National Guard of the District shall not have been called into the active military service of the United States.

(c) In carrying out the provisions of this order, the Secretary of Defense shall observe such law enforcement policies as the Attorney General may determine.

SECTION 3. Until such time as military forces shall have been withdrawn pursuant to Section 4 of this order, the Attorney General is further authorized (1) to coordinate the activities of all Federal Government agencies assisting in the suppression of violence and in the administration of justice in the Washington metropolitan area, and (2) to coordinate the activities of all such agencies with those of State and District of Columbia agencies similarly engaged.

SECTION 4. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to determine when Federal or District military forces shall be withdrawn from the disturbance area and when federalized National Guard and other Reserve Component units and personnel shall be released from active Federal service. Such determinations shall be made in the light of the Attorney General's recommendations as to the ability of civilian authorities to resume full responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the affected area.

SECTION 5. The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General are authorized to delegate to subordinate officials of their respective Departments any of the authority conferred upon them by this order.



THE WHITE HOUSE,

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TREASURY DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20226

November 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE HONORABLE THADDEUS R. BEAL
Under Secretary of the Army
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.


Dear Mr. Secretary:

There is attached a memorandum requesting the assistance of the Army in connection with the demonstrations expected to take place during the period November 13-16, 1969 in the District of Columbia.


This memorandum was requested yesterday about 4:30 p.m. by Mr. Robert E. Jordan, III, General Counsel, Department of the Army. Representatives of Mr. Jordan's office participated in the drafting of the language of the document this morning.

The memorandum has been reviewed and cleared by The Honorable Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Operations, and Mr. Paul W. Eggers, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury.

Very truly yours,


James J. Rowley

bcc - Mr. Robert E. Jordan, III
General Counsel
Department of the Army
bcc - Mr. Eugene T. Rossides
Asst. Secretary for Enforcement & Operations
bcc - Mr. Paul W. Eggers
General Counsel
bcc - Mr. Elig Krogh
Staff Assistant
The White House



TREASURY DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20226

November 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR


THE HONORABLE THADDEUS R. BEAL
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Subject: Protective Assistance to the Secret Service
Pursuant to Public Law 90-331

Pursuant to provisions of Section 2 of Public Law 90-331, it is respectfully requested that the Department of the Army make available such military forces as you may deem necessary and appropriate to insure the security of the White House compound during the occurrence of the demonstrations which are expected to take place during the period November 13-16, 1969, and for such extension of this time as may be necessary.

You are specifically requested to assist the police in maintaining the White House exclusionary area that has been established for this period.

This request supplements procedures developed under the RESEM Plan: "Augment." The forces employed pursuant to this request will remain under your operational control.


James J. Rowley