

RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
3	Memo	Butterfield to Haldeman	5/16/1972	B
5	Letter	Chief Justice to Haldeman	8/5/1972	F
7	Report	Central Intelligence Bulletin [portion]	9/23/1972	B
8	Memo	Butterfield to the President	9/17/1969	B
11	Memo	Kissinger to the President	11/5/1970	B
12	Notes	"Let us talk..."	n.d.	B
13	Notes	1240 AM "Churchill..."	10/3/1972	B

COLLECTION TITLE

WHCF, SMOF, Alexander Butterfield

BOX NUMBER

17

FOLDER TITLE

[Miscellaneous Sensitive Materials] [2 of 3]

PRMPA RESTRICTION CODES:

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and returned private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DEED OF GIFT RESTRICTION CODES:

DOG Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

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15	Report	Vietnam and Cambodia	n.d.	B
22	Cable	Kissinger to the White House	10/22/1972	B
24	Notes	P Notes [photocopy]	11/27	B

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

Subject: Note from the President (Action Item)

An article in the latest issue of the "New Republic" discusses the recent hearings on the Office of Federal Contract Compliance and contrasts Senator Dirksen's "clowning performance" with Ted Kennedy's "cool and clever handling" of both himself and the situation. The article's author, TRB (Dick Strout), goes so far as to say (about Kennedy), "If we had been political scouts, and had never heard of his brothers, we'd have made note of him."

The President suggests that you and the 5 o'clock group get something out on how "very amateurish" Teddy was when he (the President) briefed the leaders on the Safeguard System.

W
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Keogh
Mr. Klein

June 10, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

The President read in a recent news summary that many of his critics complain about the Administration's not being "as open as promised." His only comment, addressed to you, appears below:

"John -- Tell Herb and Ron to ignore this kind of criticism. The fact of the matter is that we are far too open. If we treat the press with a little more contempt we'll probably get better treatment."

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Klein
Mr. Ziegler

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

April 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

Subject: Notes from the President (Action item)

The President would like for you to get together with the 5 o'clock group and come up with a way to put EMK "squarely on the spot". (For example, he favors student demonstrations yet opposes actions intended to deal with them.)

Additionally, the President wants the 5 o'clock group to see to it that Teddy's support of all-out integration and bussing is widely publicized.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Keogh

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
FROM: H.R. HALDEMAN
SUBJECT: Future Plans

The President has requested that you forward to him an indication of your personal plans or preferences regarding your possible service in the next Administration. This should be done by memorandum and forwarded directly to my office by no later than Friday, November 10. This should accompany your pro forma letter of resignation to become effective at the pleasure of the President.

Between now and December 15, please plan on remaining on the job, finishing first-term work, collecting and depositing Presidential papers, and making plans for next term. This should not be considered a vacation period.

Regardless of your future plans, you should put together a basic book about your current assignment. It should be divided into four sections as follows:

- A. How you define your current assignment. What is its objective?
- B. What is its current status? Where does it stand?
- C. Where should it go? What are the opportunities for improvement in accomplishing the objectives of your assignment?
- D. How should it get there? What are the steps to fulfilling the objectives?

This should be as comprehensive as possible -- and should cover the full range of your responsibilities. This project should be completed by December 15.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

no/5/4/69

June 19, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

There are 22,354,000 U. S. blacks in America,
which is 11.1% of our 200 million (plus) population.
(This comes from three reliable sources.)

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

January 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

RE: Sanitization of the EOB

Recalling your word of caution to me that a sweeping order to take down from EOB walls all pictures of past Presidents -- coming on the heels of your December 24th walk-through -- might well be taken as "Presidentially-directed", I did not move on this project until after your departure for San Clemente. However, on New Year's day I made my own inspection of EOB offices occupied by White House Support Staff personnel and less than a week later spoke to Bill Hopkins about general policy on the matter, his views, etc. I couched my pitch to Hopkins in terms of my surprise discovery ... i.e. learning that civilian government employees, unlike military personnel, do on occasion display pictures of past commanders or commanders-in-chief on (Federal) office walls. I took time to elaborate on the fact that the taking down of pictures of former chiefs, in offices or other official business environments, is only a gesture of common courtesy to new chiefs -- a gesture of "pledged loyalty" ... with no disrespect whatever intended for those who have served and moved on. Bill Hopkins knew all of this, of course, so was naturally understanding of the position I was taking. I asked him to make a detailed check (not telling him of my earlier check) ... which he did prior to your return to Washington. Here is a recapitulation of results:

- Of 35 large and small offices occupied by White House Support Staff personnel, 6 displayed photographs of one or more former Presidents ... in addition to your own.
- 27 offices (including the 6 mentioned above) displayed your picture.
- 8 offices displayed no pictures of U.S. Presidents.

-- The office which you mentioned to me specifically -- the one in which you noticed 2 pictures of President Kennedy -- is supervised by Edna Rosenberg, a civil servant at the GS-9 level, who has the distinction of having served on the White House Staff longer than anyone else 41 years this coming March 7th. I have checked her file very carefully and found that the House Committee on Un-American Activities, the Civil Service Commission's Bureau of Personnel Investigation, the State Department and its Passport Office, the CIA, the Secret Service, and the FBI have all rendered continual reports to the effect that she is a "completely loyal American whose character, reputation, and associations are above reproach." Born in 1902 here in Washington, D. C., she has remained single all of these years, and lives now with a sister (Miss Janette Rosenberg) in Silver Spring, Maryland.

-- One of the Kennedy pictures bore a personal inscription of good wishes to the personnel of that office, and undoubtedly for that reason had been retained and displayed by those who work there.

-- Using to best advantage the fact that your new official photographs have just been printed and made accessible to Federal offices and employees, I instructed Bill Hopkins to see to it that every office supervisor received one and in the process of hanging it on the wall took all others down ... "in accordance with normal policy".

-- On January 14th the project was completed and all 35 offices displayed only your photograph.

The second half of this project -- i.e. to ensure across-the-board loyalty of all White House Support Staff personnel even if we find it necessary to "abolish current office arrangements and start over from scratch" -- is underway; but I cannot yet report results. I am in the process of screening personnel records and within 2-3 days will be ready to suggest possible courses of action to Bob Haldeman.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 29, 1971

DAN RATHER

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

Rather has been a regular complainer that the White House correspondents, rather than anchor men, should be the ones doing the annual interview of the President. Further, he has been a "hawk" among the press corp arguing for more conferences and tougher questions. Hence, Rather will be under tremendous pressure to be tough on the President; and his questions likely may have a sharp edge to them. He will be further under scrutiny by his fellows who will hail him as their hero if he puts the President to a truly tough test. This, coupled with his normal disposition, makes me think that he will attempt to make this an adversary proceeding.

Working in the other direction is a) his awareness that he sometimes comes off as too aggressive and therefore badly, and b) surprisingly enough his wife's insistence that he not appear as aggressive and combative as he customarily does.

But a good deal more sharp exchange than the Smith show seems in the cards.

RADIO COMMENTARY -- Rather's thrice-weekly commentaries on radio generally cover the big story of the day. Since September the economy, the Presidential summits, and politics have gotten about equal time -- with Vietnam and various domestic matters generally close behind. Very often, Rather will take note of the political implications of a Presidential action or decision or visit, no matter what the subject. Presidential trips are called "non-political political trips." And on domestic runs, Rather will go out of his way to point up the motorcade timing and routes for the crowds, etc.

INDIA-PAKISTAN -- A likely area of questions. Rather indicated that the White House had favored Pakistan and that the President was irritated by the way the Soviets won, and then rubbed it in. He wondered why we did what we did. Was it pique at Indira? Perhaps Kissinger's affinity for the Pakistanis and disdain for Ghandi? Yahya's help in arranging the PRC mission?

This was called, claims Rather, by many US diplomats as the Administration's worst foreign policy defeat, one of the few under the President. (Overall, Rather has been quite positive on the Administration's foreign policy, saying that "the potential for brilliance is there.")

GENERAL ADMINISTRATION -- We get rapped regularly for our "inability to count", i.e. Court nominees, foreign aid, UN on Taiwan. The "errors" by the Attorney General, i.e., Court choices especially (were the "six" a smokescreen) are rapped by Rather, and the credibility damage to the nation's institutions.

Rather repeatedly refers to Kissinger as RN's West pocket Secretary of State -- and the President may be asked about the enhanced position of the National Security Adviser vis a vis the Secretary of State.

Rather also notes that the President is attracted to "strong men", i.e., AG, Connally, Yahya, De Gaulle, Franco, Tito.

Another possible question -- the President may be asked about Mr. Hoover's future. Will he be held on indefinitely?

CHINA-- Rather wondered if the President was so concerned about Taiwan's seat in the United Nations, why was Henry Kissinger in Peking when the vote was cast? Did the loss of that vote reduce the importance of the President's diplomatic victory in announcing the Peking trip?

INDOCHINA -- The President's strategy and Hanoi's effort to push public opinion against the President are at stake.

- What connection is there between the President's PRC trip and the NVA offensive in Laos and their increased air resistance?
- The achievements of Vietnam, if there are any, will be in what might have been, had we not fought there.
- Vietnam is the hardest war to understand in our history; and the verdict on RN's handling of it is still out.
- Would John F. Kennedy have received more credit had he done what RN has in Vietnam?

POLITICS -- Dan has talked about both the McCloskey challenge and the conservative opposition to the President. Several references have been made to the Republican Party's fund-raising ability. He has indicated that the President's campaign is already underway and building. The President's Chicago salute was seen as the opening gun of the campaign. The replacement of Hardin was "one of the oldest political games in town." RN is told every time he comes to the Midwest that the farm economy is hurting the GOP, although the WH is said to have ignored this through 1970. Thus, Democrats have usual leverage on the farm vote. Was Butz's confirmation a victory or "re-election campaign albatross?"

VICE PRESIDENT -- In my view a likely question here for these reasons. He has spoken of the weakness of the Vice President, used anecdotes to detail it; elevated Ed. Brooke as a potential choice. He is down on the Vice President's harsh tone, and anti-youth impression and anti-media approach -- as he sees it. Close friends of his say he approaches things like a liberal Democrat, is turned off by language such as that in RN's veto of Child Care and OEO, and RN's Welfare Amendments Statement of yesterday. He is concerned about polarizing rhetoric; and the President may get a "lower our voices" question, because of this particular concern of Rather's.

Since Rather has done the Brooke thing, and was there for RN's black V. P. comment, he may head in this direction with a question.

SUMMITS -- Rather wonders about RN's present summit policy compared with his past wariness about summits.

On the Pompidou visit, Rather made perhaps his most noticeable goof of the past several months. He portrayed the President as "sobered if not down-right shaken" after negotiating with the Frenchman; Pompidou on the other hand was "smiling, confident" after the French "victory" in the Azores. RN looked grim, glum. Had hard time talking straight. Looked nervous, fatigued, not at all like any sort of diplomatic victory was gained.

Heath reportedly was shocked by what the British saw as RN's "cavalier" attitude in international economics. Heath allegedly saw India-Pakistan as worst RN performance of them all.

ECONOMY -- Rather says the 1st Quarter of 1972 will be the best indicator of where the economy is going. Hypoed Christmas sales aren't enough. Thus, the uncertainty remains.

Also, the President may be asked, given Rather's reports about his charging inflation of 1968 to unbalanced budgets and huge deficits.

OTHER DOMESTIC ISSUES --

- RN's speech praising Hoover last July was the kind of speech the President and Wallace gave in 1968.
- Domestic programs are ambiguous, lack progress, why?
- Why does this nation, the most advanced of all, not have the best medical care available for all citizens? See potency in the health issue in the 1970s.
- Rather was first to report RN's upcoming June address on the drug problem, a "national emergency."

Of further interest -- a sign in Rather's office:

"Do your best to be correct and fair, and never forget how often you fail."

YEAR-END REPORT -- Final Note -- Amazingly, Rather found "fear" to be the dominant mood of the country at the end of 1971; boys "fear" being the last to die in Vietnam; others "fear" the high unemployment rates mean that their job may be next, etc.

As for the President, he said that there is no question but that RN's popularity is "thin," though higher than last year. RN has sustained himself with a bombshell a month, but he is treading on quicksand. Dan wonders if RN has any follow-through after this coming May. Incidentally, Mike Wallace pointed up the changes that had taken place since 1968 and got Rather to concede that casualties were down and troops home, although Dan wondered where the racial situation was quieter. In the same show, Cronkite accused the Administration of a "massive campaign...to undercut the media."

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

4. THE SECOND CHOICE IS FOR YOU TO GET IN TOUCH IMMEDIATELY WITH DOBRYNIN AND HAND HIM A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO BRESHNEV TO THE FOLLOWING EFFECT:

-- WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED NEARLY INSUPERABLE OBSTACLES IN SAIGON.

-- WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT WE WOULD NOT IMPOSE A SOLUTION ON OUR ALLIES. HERE YOU WOULD ADD ORALLY THAT, OF COURSE, THE NOVEMBER 7 CONSIDERATIONS MUST WEIGH VERY HEAVILY.

-- WE ARE HONOR BOUND TO PRESENT OUR ALLIES' OBJECTIONS TO THE OTHER SIDE.

-- IF THE OTHER SIDE PROVES UNABLE TO MEET THESE OBJECTIONS WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO WORK OUT A BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THEM ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT.

-- WE, THEREFORE, PROPOSE A MEETING WITH LE DUC THO IN PARIS AT ANY TIME OF HIS CHOOSING.

-- THE REST OF THE SCENARIO WITH THE DRV WOULD REMAIN THE SAME.

-- THE DE BORCHGRAVE INTERVIEW WAS A BREACH OF FAITH AND TERRIBLY EXACERBATED THE SITUATION.

-- IN ORDER TO SHOW OUR GOOD FAITH WE WILL STOP OUR BOMBING OF THE NORTH AND SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE AIR ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTH WHILE THIS SITUATION IS BEING WORKED OUT.

THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS COURSE ARE THAT IT MAKES US LEAST VULNERABLE TO PUBLIC PRESSURE, IS MOST HONORABLE TOWARD SAIGON, AND IS ONE WHICH WE CAN BEST SURFACE PUBLICLY. THE MAJOR DISADVANTAGE IS THAT IT MAY RUN US RIGHT UP AGAINST A DEADLINE, AND I HAVE NOT YET FIGURED OUT HOW TO KEEP HANOI QUIET LONG ENOUGH IN ORDER TO GET IT IMPLEMENTED. YOU WOULD GIVE THE SOLEMN ASSURANCE OF THE PRESIDENT TO BRESHNEV THAT THIS WAS NOT A STALLING MANEUVER AND THAT ALL PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT THAT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN BILATERAL FASHION WOULD BE DONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE MEETING WITH LE DUC THO. YOU WOULD ADD ORALLY TO DOBRYNIN IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE FASHION THE IMPERATIVE THAT THERE BE NO PUBLIC OUTCRY. IF NORTH VIET-NAM WERE TO GO PUBLIC WE WOULD HAVE TO STAND BY SAIGON'S OBJECTIONS, WHICH AS WE HAVE MENTIONED CONCERN PRIMARILY THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER ROUND OF WAR.

5. I KNOW THE PRESIDENT'S OBJECTION TO ENDING THE BOMBING, BUT I DO NOT THINK THEY APPLY TO THE PRESENT SITUATION. ENDING THE BOMBING WOULD SUPPORT THE PUBLIC OPPOSITION THAT AN AGREEMENT IS NEAR. FAILURE TO END IT WOULD ASK HANOI TO ENDURE SEVERAL MORE WEEKS OF PUNISHMENT BECAUSE OF A REFUSAL BY SAIGON TO GO ALONG WITH ANY AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE DRV MADE ALMOST UNBELIEVABLE CONCESSIONS.

OBVIOUSLY I FAVOR THE SECOND COURSE, BUT HAVE OFFERED THIS AS ONE FOR INTELLECTUAL COMPLETENESS.

WARM REGARDS.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

PER PAC 6/12/08

By MIA NARA, Date 8/8/16

Doc. 18533 [p. 1 of 1]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

file

CONFIDENTIAL

January 14, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR ALEX BUTTERFIELD

The President would like you to check to find out who the woman is in the EOB who has the two Kennedy pictures. What's her background ... is she new, old, someone we can trust, etc. Please get a report back to me on this quickly.

Thank you.

Dme

H

H. R. HALDEMAN

*This has now delayed
nearly a month —
And he asks about
it once a week —
at least.*

H

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: Pictures in the EOB

I have just received your January 14th memorandum concerning pictures in the EOB ... and my delay (for nearly a month) in getting certain information back to the President.

I remember precisely what the President said when he spoke to me about this and there was no request for a report back -- only a clear directive that action be taken. Whereas I am not in the habit of dragging my feet ever (especially on a matter of expressed priority interest to you or the President) I did in this case adhere to the President's word of caution that a sweeping order to bring down all pictures of past Presidents -- coming on the heels of his December 24th "walk-through" -- might well be taken as "Presidentially-directed".

There are 2 parts to the project: (1) Discreetly institute the proper "picture policy" ... and ensure that its merits (indeed its justification) are clearly understood by all personnel in the Executive Office of the President, especially GS employees on the White House Support Staff; and (2) Assign one of our own people to every support office, or in some other way set up a system which will ensure across-the-board loyalty of White House Support Staff personnel even if it is necessary to "abolish all offices and start over from scratch." The first half of the project -- admittedly the easiest half -- was begun with my own "walk-through" the EOB offices on January 1st, less than 48 hours after the President's departure for San Clemente. It was completed on January 14th, just 13 days later. The second half of the project is just beginning -- and will not be done overnight. I am looking at personnel files now, and when I finish I will recommend to you 1 or 2 possible courses of action that is, unless you want to stay out of it entirely and give me a full rein.

Finally, let me say that it was only this past Tuesday when I first learned from you that the President was asking for a progress report on this subject. On Wednesday I reported to you by memorandum that I would have a rundown for you today (January 16th). In that I did not hear from you, I assumed that schedule was satisfactory; then came your note expressing impatience, itself delayed by a day and a half.

A written report to the President is attached.

Attachment

They overlapped in the mail.
Had I seen your Weds. report, you
would not have gotten my "impatience"
note. Problem was, the P. was
bugging me - on "had I found out
who that person was & what was
her background." Anyhow - the
report to P. is exactly what is
needed to set all this to rest.
Thanks - and sorry for the
confusion. H. 1/16/70

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: ALEX BUTTERFIELD
FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN *H-*

The President thinks that he has discovered the key to our problem at State dinners and other social functions of bringing people up to chat with him. He found that Macomber is absolutely superb at this and the State Department types, who are trained in this type of procedure, are far better than our own staff or the military aides in handling it.

Therefore, he would like to have this responsibility taken over by Macomber specifically and the State Department types in general. It still will be your responsibility to develop the list of people to be brought up and to work out a system whereby the State Department types can have those people identified for them. Maybe you can have the social aides do this as you do now. But, use two State Department people, preferably Macomber and someone else, to actually move the people up to the President. They have the skill and training for this and should be given the responsibility.

Don

*Mos
Macomber
with memo
cag-boss*

Determined to be an
Administrative Marking
Not National Security Information
By MIH NARA Date 8/3/16

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 22, 1971

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ALEX BUTTERFIELD

FROM:

H. R. HALDEMAN *H.*

For the time being, hold up on Arthur Burns on any social invitations, just keep him off the list for a little while. Check with me in three or four weeks to see if he should be put back on for something or other. In the meantime keep him off of Church, etc.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Determined to be an
Administrative Marking
Not National Security Information
By W1H NARA Date 8/8/16

To Thien

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

On this day after my reelection I wish to reopen our dialogue about the draft agreement to end the war.

I must first of all express my deep disappointment over what I consider to be a dangerous drift in the relationship between our two countries, a tendency which can only undercut our mutual objectives and benefit the enemy. Your continuing distortions of the agreement and attacks upon it are unfair and self-defeating. These have persisted despite our numerous representations, including my October 29 letter to you. They have been disconcerting and highly embarrassing to me.

In my previous communications, and in the presentations of Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Bunker, we have repeatedly explained why we consider the draft agreement to be sound; we continue to believe that it reflects major concessions by the other side, protects the independence of South Vietnam, and leaves the political future to the South Vietnamese people themselves. You are fully informed as well about the massive resupply movement that is underway to strengthen your forces before a ceasefire. I have repeatedly given firm guarantees against the possibility that the agreement is violated. I have offered to meet with you soon after the agreement is signed to symbolize our continuing support. I will not recount here the numerous arguments, explanations, and undertakings that have been made. They all remain valid. In the light of this record, the charges made by some of your associates are becoming more and more incomprehensible.

We are in any event resolved to proceed on the basis of the draft agreement and the modifications which we are determined to obtain from the North Vietnamese which General Haig will discuss with you. With regard to these changes in the agreement, I wish to make clear what we can and cannot do:

-- With respect to the political provisions, we will weaken the Vietnamese translation of the phrase "administrative structure" to make even clearer the fact that the National Council is in no way a governmental body. As you know, we never agreed to the North Vietnamese use of the phrase "chinh quyen" and we will do our utmost to see that the phrase "hanh chanh" is substituted. In Article 9(f) we will also press for a sentence that makes clear that the membership of the Council is appointed equally by both sides. And in Article 9(g) we will attempt to dilute the already weak functions of the Council. In any event, as we have explained to you on numerous occasions, it is obvious that the Council has no governmental authority.

-- With respect to North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, we will treat this problem in two ways. First, we will press for the de facto unilateral withdrawal of some North Vietnamese divisions in the northern part of your country. Secondly, we will introduce wording at the end of Article 9 (h) which stipulates that troops should be demobilized on a one-to-one basis and that they should return to their homes.

-- With respect to the demilitarized zone, we will press in Chapter V for specific reference to Article 24 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954.

-- In Article 15(d) we will insist on deleting the inadvertent reference to "three Indochinese countries" and substituting "the Indochinese states."

-- In addition, we will do our best to obtain as many as possible of the changes in wording your government suggests which are of a more technical nature.

We will use our maximum efforts to effect these changes in the agreement. I wish to leave you under no illusion, however, that we can or will go beyond these changes in seeking to improve an agreement that we already consider to be excellent.

It seems to me you have two essential choices. You could use the public support your recent actions have mobilized to claim the military victory the agreement reflects and to work in

unity with your strongest ally to bring about a political victory for which the conditions exist. You could take the political and psychological initiative by hailing the settlement and carrying out its provisions in a positive fashion. In this case I repeat my invitation to meet with you shortly after the signature of the agreement, in order to underline our continued close cooperation.

The other alternative would be for you to pursue what appears to be your present course. In my view this would play into the hands of the enemy and would have extremely grave consequences for both our peoples and it would be disaster for yours.

Mr. President, I would like you to tell General Haig if we can confidently proceed on this basis. We are at the point where I need to know unambiguously whether you will join us in the effort General Haig is going to outline or whether we must contemplate alternative courses of action which I believe would be detrimental to the interests of both of our countries.


I hope that you and your government are prepared to cooperate with us. There is a great deal of preparatory work that needs to be done, and we believe joint US-GVN task forces should begin working together so that we will be in the best possible position to implement the settlement.

It is my firm conviction that your people, your armed forces, and you have achieved a major victory which the draft agreement would ratify. It is my intention to build on these accomplishments. I would like to work with you and your government in my second term to defend freedom in South Vietnam in peacetime as we have worked during my first term to defend it in conflict.

In four years you and I have been close personal and military allies. Our alliance has brought us to a position where the

enemy is agreeing to conditions which any objective observer said were impossible four years ago. Our alliance and its achievements have been based on mutual trust. If you will give me continued trust, together we shall succeed.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Richard Nixon", written in a cursive style.

His Excellency
Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the Republic of Vietnam
Saigon

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June 2, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

After reading a number of press reports (some which hint and some which state openly) that CIA is undercutting Secretary Laird and providing ammunition for ABM opponents, the President addressed, in the strongest terms, these comments to you:

"Henry -- (1) Give Helms unshirted hell for this!

(2) We know these reports are at least partly true (via his Georgetown underlings).

(3) Tell him to crack down ... and tell Cushman as well."

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

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Determined to be an
Administrative Marking
Not National Security Information
By WJH NARA Date 8/8/16

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