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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 15, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

SUBJECT: May 19th Cabinet Meeting

The Cabinet Meeting scheduled for Tuesday, May 19th,
will begin at 9:30 a.m.

Alexander P. Butterfield
Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


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
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PERSONAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

A G E N D A

CABINET MEETING

Tuesday, May 19, 1970
10:00 A.M.

1. THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Honorable Paul W. McCracken
Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisers

2. THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN

Honorable Robert H. Finch
Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare

3. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Honorable Robert E. Hampton
Chairman, United States Civil
Service Commission

4. THE CAMBODIA OPERATION

Honorable William P. Rogers
Secretary of State

Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense

PERSONAL

May 15, 1970
8:30 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: Presidential Envoy

This is to confirm the message passed to your office by telephone early last evening -- that General Mark Clark, or whoever is selected in his place to represent the President at London funeral services for General Wladyslav Anders, not be given temporary Ambassadorial rank for the accomplishment of this assignment.

Thank you.

Chron

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1970
4:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD *AB*
RE: Designation of Presidential Representative

General Wladyslav Anders, one of Poland's greatest military heroes of World War II died in London yesterday. He commanded the Polish Corps and shared in the victory at Monte Cassino. (The New York Times story is attached.)

It is my understanding that the Polish mass will be held on Tuesday, May 19th, in London and that the international mass will be held on Thursday, May 21st, also in London, at Westminster Cathedral. Interment is to be at Monte Cassino, Italy.

The President would like someone to represent him at the appropriate service or services, and believes that General Mark Clark, U.S. Army, Ret. (currently Superintendent at the Citadel in Charleston) would be an excellent choice.

Coordinating your actions closely with the Department of State, please make whatever arrangements are necessary.

Thank you.

Attachment

cc: Mr. Ehrlichman
Mr. Timmons
Mr. Ziegler
Gen. Hughes
Mr. John Brown
Mr. Hopkins

GENERAL ANDERS, POLISH WAR HERO

Exile Commander in Chief
Dies—Took Monte Cassino

LONDON, May 12 (Reuters)—Gen. Wladyslaw Anders, who commanded Polish troops who fought with the Allies in World War II, died in a hospital here Tuesday after suffering an apparent heart attack. He was 77 years old.

The tall, lean, veteran of many campaigns, eight times decorated, led the Polish second corps in World War II. After the war ended he chose exile in Britain with thousands of other Poles rather than return to a Communist-ruled Poland.

Born of Polish parents in Lithuania, then a Russian province, in August, 1892, he was the son of a high official in the Russian Government. After studying mechanical engineering at Riga, he entered the Czar's Army and commanded a cavalry squadron at the outbreak of World War I, in which he was wounded five times.

After the war and Polish independence, he led a Polish cavalry squadron in the Polish-Russian fighting of 1919-20.

When Germany invaded Poland in 1939, he commanded a cavalry brigade. Nearly trapped in East Prussia, he was wounded once more in fighting his way out. Then, as Russian troops entered eastern Poland, he received his seventh and eighth wounds as his brigade tried to reach Hungary.

Captured, he spent 26 months in solitary confinement in prison in Moscow. In 1941, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, he was freed and appointed commander of the Polish forces in the Soviet.

He organized Polish prisoners of war freed from Soviet camps into units making up more than five divisions. Then he went to the Middle East with them.

(As he recruited his army, General Anders and his staff also compiled evidence of the conditions under which the Polish prisoners of war had been held, including the massacre of several thousand Polish soldiers in Katyn Forest, near Smolensk, by Soviet soldiers, which had been attributed to German troops by the Soviet Union.)

General Anders's "Free Polish" Army was strongly anti-Soviet, and a second, pro-Soviet army of Polish emigres was formed by Moscow, which then disowned General Anders's corps. After the war, he continued to hold the title of Commander in Chief of the Polish Forces in Exile.)

General Anders's name will long be linked with the bitter struggle for Monte Cassino during the 1944 Allied offensive in Italy, when crack German units entrenched on the mountain and in the monastery crowning it were barring the way to Rome.

His Polish second corps was given the task of capturing the stronghold. After days of bombardment and bombing the attack was started May 11, 1944. A week later, General Anders and his men stormed the last battlement to hoist the Union Jack and the Polish flag side by side on the summit.

Chron

May 14, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: A Tree for the White House Grounds

For some time now I have meant to get back to you on the California sequoia project. Here's what's transpired thus far:

I called Allen Hoover, Captain of Caveman Camp, to feel him out as to the kind of assistance I can expect from the Bohemian Grove group. He said, "Funny you should mention that subject. I've learned the hard way that it can't be done. On 2 separate occasions I planned sequoia transplants from California to the East Coast carefully and thoroughly and both times ^{they} failed. One of the trees was only 20 years old -- a gift from me to Admiral Strauss -- but it died in 5 or 6 years. I don't think any of them will last much beyond 7 or 8 years. The older they are, the sooner they die. They seem to thrive only in California's fog belts -- the one along the northern coast and the one at the higher levels in the Sierras. I understand they do all right in Lebanon, too. But, this is not to say that when you select something more appropriate we won't be glad to help you. We'll do all we can. Just let me know. "

Then (discreetly), through Fritz Behrens at Agriculture and the U.S. Forest Service, I sought confirmation of the Allen Hoover report and some alternative recommendations. I told Behrens to tell the forestry people to consider only trees unique to California -- those which bear "the California stamp" . . . and which can be safely transplanted to this area and expected to survive.

Here's what the forestry experts say about sequoias: There are 2 principal species -- the Semper Virens (200-275 ft. high with a diameter of 8-12 ft.), commonly called the Redwood, which grows along the northern California coast at altitudes from sea level to 3,000 ft. ... and the Gigantia (250-280 ft. high with a diameter of 10-15 ft.), commonly called "The Big Tree", which grows in the Sierras at altitudes of 5,000 to 8,000 ft. They agree with Hoover with regard to the Semper Virens, i.e. the Redwood, but assure me that the Gigantia will survive here in Washington if transplanted at an early age, preferably when 5-10 years old. Taking all of our criteria into consideration they recommend trees in the following order:

- (1) Sequoia (Dendron Gigantia)
... if transplanted when 5-10 years of age.

Note: Although it will probably grow to a height of 250-280 ft. by its hundredth year, it ^{will} stand only 2-3 ft. in height in its tenth year.

- (2) Jeffrey Pine
... grows only along the Sierras in California and southern Oregon; would easily survive on the U.S. East Coast; at maturity stands 75-90 ft. high and has a diameter of 2-3 feet.
- (3) Incense Cedar
... plentiful in California but they grow also in Washington, Oregon and Mexico; therefore, does not bear quite the "California stamp" that the Jeffrey Pine and Sequoia do.

Proceed with plan for careful transplant of:

5-10 year old Gigantia _____

Jeffrey Pine _____

Incense Cedar _____

Chron

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 14, 1970


MEMORANDUM FOR:

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

SUBJECT: Cabinet Meeting

This correspondence confirms the message passed to your office by telephone early last evening -- that there will be a Cabinet Meeting at 10:00 a.m. Tuesday, May 19th.

The meeting agenda will be dispatched later in the day.



Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Chow

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

May 14, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD *A*
RE: Agenda for May 19th Cabinet Meeting

Of the two proposals which follow, I recommend your approval of "A" because:

- Shultz plans to be in the Bahamas Tuesday ... on a short vacation; and many of the Cabinet members will hear his productivity briefing at today's CCEP meeting.
- You said in mid-March that a Cabinet presentation by Chairman Hampton would be appropriate. He would touch on unfilled vacancies, lack of communications between Cabinet officers and regional staffs, prevalent attitudes, and pending reforms of the personnel system.

Proposal A

Proposal B

10:00- Economic Outlook -- McCracken
10:15 (15 min. incl. discussion)

10:15- Family Assistance Plan -- Finch
10:40 (25 min. incl. discussion)

10:40- Civil Service Commission
10:55 Report -- Hampton
(15 min. incl. discussion)

Economic Outlook -- McCracken
(15 min. incl. discussion)

Family Assistance Plan -- Finch
(25 min. incl. discussion)

Productivity -- Shultz
(15 min. incl. discussion)

10:55-11:00 --- The President Departs ---

11:00- Cambodia Operation -- Rogers/Laird
11:30

11:30-- --- Executive Session ---

APPROVE "A" _____

APPROVE "B" _____

May 13, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. GARMENT
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: Memorandum for the President's File

Len:

Just a quick note to remind that a "Memorandum for the President's File" must be written on the President's noon meeting today with Roy Wilkins. I'm sure you know the format -- but if any question does arise, please call me.

Thanks.

Note: I'm attaching the briefing paper for that particular meeting.
It may be of some help.

Attachment

May 12, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JOHN BROWN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

The President has not seen the 3 memoranda enclosed. They pertain to considerably earlier stages of the Cambodian operation and should be returned through you to Dr. Kissinger.

Thank you.

Enclosures

Chron

May 12, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JOHN BROWN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: Preparation of Cover Memoranda

It is superfluous and therefore inappropriate to cite on cover memoranda to the President the names of members of "other staffs" who agree or disagree with a recommendation for action or signature. For example, a recent paper listed "C. D. Ward of the Vice President's staff" as one who concurred in the writer's recommendation to the President. Another paper named Fred Bergsten among those concurring.

Of course, when pertinent, the positions being taken by Executive departments should appear ... just as we cite the positions of the Budget Bureau (Mayo), the Congressional liaison people (Timmons), the Council of Economic Advisers (McCracken), etc. And I can see some advantages, at times, to the listing of the Ehrlichman deputies who concur -- assuming that the subject at issue is one for which they have some responsibility; but other persons should simply not be mentioned. We tend to lose sight of the fact that the Ehrlichman signature at the bottom tells the President, regardless of what appears elsewhere in these memos, that all viewpoints have been carefully considered and that staff coordination has been thorough.

This is personal opinion only. You should touch base with Ken Cole and John Campbell; they may have some valid reasons for doing things as they do. But if they don't, let's institute the change, as small as it is, now.

Thanks.

Chron

May 11, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: Major General John Stevenson,
USAF (Ret.)

Major General John D. Stevenson, USAF (Ret.) -- now serving as the Mission Operations Director, Office of Manned Space Flight in NASA's Washington office -- called the other day to inform me of his plans to work privately (completely on his own) "mostly through the French and Swedish governments" to bring about Hanoi's release of an accurate list of U. S. POWs. The prime purpose of Stevenson's call was to register his intentions with us.

You may want John Holdridge, or whoever it is on your staff who keeps in touch with Ross Perot, to contact and establish a liaison with Stevenson. He can be reached at Code 13, extension 25596.

May 11, 1970

Mr. Robert B. Gomulinski
National Commander, AMVETS
1710 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Mr. Gomulinski:

I am returning with this note the five Awards Banquet programs you left with me on the day of your recent visit to the Oval Office. As you will note, the President signed each of them on the front cover.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10:00 AM
May 10, 1970

CHRON

Memo for: Members of the Cabinet

Re: Briefing Material

Information on the attached sheet
pertains to U.S. Troop successes
against enemy supply areas along
the SVN-Cambodia border. Figures
date from 8 AM EDT, May 10.

A
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

8:00 a.m. May 10, 1970

Total Operations

Individual Weapons	5,441
Crew Served Weapons	811
Bunkers Destroyed	2,672
Small Arms Ammunition (Rounds)	5,850,196
Machine Gun Rounds	4,163,820
Rifle Rounds	1,686,376
Mortar Rounds	4,695
Large Rocket Rounds	751
Smaller Rocket Rounds	7,193
Rice (lbs)	3,552,000
Man Months	78,999
Vehicles	208
Enemy KIA	4,166
POWs (Includes Detainees)	1,095
US KIA	70
ARVN KIA	199

5 pm
May 9, 1970

CHRON

Memo for: Members of the Cabinet

Re: Briefing Material

I am attaching a copy of the latest statistics on our Cambodian operation.

~~A~~
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

04:00 p.m., May 9, 1970

Total Operations

Individual Weapons	5,158
Crew Served Weapons	788
Bunkers Destroyed	2,426
Small Arms Ammunition (rounds)	5,708,941
Machine Gun Rounds	4,153,820
Rifle Rounds	1,555,121
Mortar Rounds	4,679
Large Rocket Rounds	751
Smaller Rocket Rounds	6,795
Rice (lbs)	3,474,800
Man Months	75,222
Trucks	145
Enemy KIA	3,835
POWs (includes Detainees)	1,064
US KIA	63
ARVN KIA	184

9:30 AM
May 9, 1970

CHRON

Memo for: Members of the Cabinet

Re: Briefing Material

I am attaching a copy of the latest statistics on our Cambodian operation.

A

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

08:00 a.m., May 9, 1970

Total Operations

Individual Weapons	4,793
Crew Served Weapons	730
Bunkers Destroyed	1,710
Small Arms Ammunition (rounds)	3,254,963
Machine gun rounds	1,928,820
Rifle rounds	1,326,143
Mortar Rounds	3,904
Large Rocket Rounds	495
Smaller Rocket Rounds	6,790
Rice (lbs)	2,182,000
Man Months	48,475
Trucks	124
Enemy KIA	3,740
POWs (includes Detainees)	1,041
US KIA	60
ARVN KIA	184

May 8, 1970

Memo for:

From: Alexander P. Butterfield

I am attaching for your interest and convenience a personal copy of the guest list for the dinner at the White House on Monday evening, May 11th.

Attachment

Identical (original) memos
sent to:

Secretary Rogers
Secretary Kennedy
Dr. Moynihan
Dr. Kissinger

May 7, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: B/GENERAL HUGHES
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

I am attaching hereto a copy of a memorandum which Bud Wilkinson sent directly to Mel Laird -- on April 13th, before he knew that this kind of thing should be routed through your office.

To date Bud has heard nothing from DoD. Because the request is highly valid, we would appreciate your checking with Carl Wallace or B/General Pursley in an effort to generate some action.

Attachment

May 7, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JOHN BROWN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

General Hughes has informed me that the Staff Mess will be in "full operation" during this coming weekend, and that the White House Garage will be able to "operate at full capacity."

Will you please inquire as to precisely what services, over and above the normal, will be available -- then assume responsibility for getting the word out to all Staff personnel concerned.

Thank you.

Chrou

May 7, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

B/GENERAL HUGHES

FROM:

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

SEQUOIA should be made available for Secretary Kennedy on the evening of May 12th ... as originally planned.

Determined to be an
Administrative Marking
Not National Security Information
By JUS NARA Date 3/25/2016

May 7, 1970

PERSONAL/CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MISS TRUDY BROWN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Mr. Stephen Enke's security file has been carefully reviewed. You may pass his clearance on to Mr. Flemming, but with the understanding that it is only for membership on the President's Commission on Population Growth and the American Future and not for any subsequent appointments ... either more or less prestigious.

PERSONAL/CONFIDENTIAL

Chron

May 6, 1970

Honorable Lawrence H. Dunn
Assistant Secretary for Administration
Department of the Interior
Washington, D. C.

Dear Larry:

I am writing this note to acknowledge your May 1st correspondence requesting a White House pass for Under Secretary Fred Russell.

Despite the necessity of the Under Secretary's occasional visits to the White House-Executive Office Building complex, my favorable consideration of your request would be counter to sound and long-established policy. As a matter of fact, only one of the 24 Department heads and Under Secretaries has been issued a White House pass ... and that particular action was taken for rather special reasons early in the Administration's first year.

Additionally -- as you know from our recent telephone conversation -- we are making every attempt now to reduce the number of outstanding passes to the White House and the Executive Office Building. As a part of that endeavor we are asking by letter that all persons formerly assigned to the Executive Office of the President who are retaining old passes cooperate with the pass-recovery effort.

I am sure you can appreciate the position I must take in this matter.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

bcc: Mr. Al Wong
Miss Trudy Brown

**RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL SHEET**

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 17 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

Chris

May 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT ODLE
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

In the interest of our current project to reduce drastically the number of outstanding White House and EOB passes, I must disapprove your request for a White House pass for Charlie McWhorter.

The attached memorandum -- for your personal use only -- will provide some additional rationale for this decision.

Attachment

bcc: Mr. Al Wong
Miss Trudy Brown

Ekron

May 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT ODLE
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: Hy Gardner's Letter to Herb Klein

I cannot answer the questions posed by Hy Gardner in the first paragraph of his letter to Herb . . . nor would I presume to try. I will say, however, that I know to be true what has appeared in print many times -- that the President is disciplined and strong-willed, one who fully understands the importance of good health.

chm

May 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: B/GENERAL HUGHES

FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

You may proceed with your plan to use SEQUOIA on Monday evening,
May 11th.

May 6, 1970

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Walter J. Hickel
 Secretary of the Interior

This morning the President reconsidered your USSR travel plan. Whereas he again approved the idea of the trip, and appreciated fully the wide range of benefits which can be derived, he asked me to convey his very strong wish that you not finalize a near-future itinerary.

I might add, in a purely personal vein, that the President clearly expressed his regret that such a decision was necessary -- and his awareness of the disappointment you would feel upon receipt of this note. But he said, too, that in light of his recent announcement to send U. S. forces against enemy sanctuaries inside Cambodia, and the international tensions being generated by that announcement, he knew you would be understanding of the decision's overriding importance.

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

bcc: Dr. Kissinger
 Mr. William Watts

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1970

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HARLOW
MR. EHRLICHMAN

FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD *A/*

I do not have a record of a Memorandum for the President's File on each of 3 Bi-Partisan Leadership Meetings held last October. The dates were October 9th, 16th and 23rd and you two were the only Staff members who attended all 3 sessions. In order to fill these gaps in the President's file I would appreciate your jotting down whatever you might be able to recall in the way of business items and/or significant sidelights. Anything that you can come up with will be a help and don't worry about the format; just a few longhand notes will serve the purpose very well. I will put the memos in final form.

To help jog your memory I have listed below a few of the items which were discussed at 3 GOP Congressional Leadership Meetings during that same month.

October 7th (Agenda might have been similar to meeting on the 9th)

- Laird briefed on status of President's proposal to reform the draft system.
- President asked Harlow to outline this Administration's relationship with Congress and put same into historical perspective.
- Discussion of effectiveness of the Congress -- legislative programs -- use of Presidential power and other influences to move Bills -- trend towards straightout partisanship -- etc.
- Discussions of strategy
- Monologue by Moynihan re boldness of President's reform programs

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

- Bob Wilson mentioned importance of "imaginative tags and labels" on our programs.

October 14th (Agenda might have been similar to meeting on the 16th)

- Mollenhoff presented rebuttal of popular charges against Haynsworth
- Discussion of Haynsworth strategy
- President indicated his intention to veto the pay raise bill
- Discussion re inflation and monetary policies
- President spoke briefly of his planned November 3rd Vietnam speech

October 28th (Agenda might have been similar to meeting on the 23rd)

- President talked about his coming November 3rd speech and mentioned fact that that date was anniversary of bombing pause. ("There will be no advance text.")
- Kissinger gave long talk on strategic arms, speed of recent Soviet military and technological developments, MIRV rationale, ABM rationale, US vs. Soviet negotiating techniques, etc.
- President emphasized extent to which we are trying to stop the arms race.
- Kissinger discussed Vietnam situation and reviewed concessions made by U.S., Communist negotiating tactics, etc.
- President spoke again of November 3rd speech and said that he wanted no speculation on content.
- 20-minute talk re consumer affairs by Virginia Knauer
- Short talk by Director Mayo indicating probable consequences if we do not hold to our budget ceiling of \$192.9 billion.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

- President closed meeting with reminder to group that we should place the blame for delays on crime, postal and other legislation squarely on the backs of the members of Congress.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

May 5, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

RE: Midnight Demonstration in Front of the White House

As a result of some "inspirational" Rennie Davis soapbox rhetoric last night, a group of some 300 George Washington University students, and others no doubt, moved with fire in their eyes from the 20th Street area to the front of the White House ... along Pennsylvania Avenue. The time was about 11:00 p.m. Art Godfrey assured me that the Secret Service was aware of the situation and "on the alert" -- and Bud Krogh called to say that he was at the Northwest Gate and that "the kids" were being moved as they arrived to the north side of the Avenue. Bud said they looked angry and capable of violence, especially if provoked by the Police.

Around an hour later -- at 12:15 a.m. -- I went out to the vicinity of the Northwest Gate to view the situation. Within moments after I got there the group pared to a headcount of 90. An immense battery of "floods" on the north lawn bathed Lafayette Park in a brilliance reminiscent of high noon on a summer Sunday. About 20 policemen, in full battle gear, stood at even intervals along the sidewalk on the south side of Pennsylvania Avenue while those who comprised the silent but hairy vigil on the other side of the street stood motionless and stared back at them. A few held tiny flickering candles.

At approximately 1:00 a.m. Bud and I walked through the park to see if any splinter groups were hiding out there -- but the park was clear. That being the case, we decided to have the Secret Service shut off the floodlights and get all but 2 or 3 of the policemen away ... out of sight ... to hopefully convey the message that it was late and we were tired, and that we'd all like to go home.

Evidently the message got through because within 10 minutes only 19 young people remained. Because this was a small enough group to be easily handled by the police in the event its members resisted arrest, we had the security people go across the street and ask the protesters

to leave. (This action had to be taken at some point during the evening in that the demonstrators were in violation of the "15-day advance notice" law -- and because 73 persons had been arrested on Sunday for demonstrating in that same area.) With only mild resistance, the students moved back toward GWU. By 2:00 a. m. the Lafayette Park area was considered secure, and we departed for home.

Chow

May 5, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JOHN BROWN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: Tray Service Privilege for Miss Gertrude
Brown

Please contact the Naval Aide and ask him to add the name of Miss Gertrude Brown, Security Assistant, to the list of those currently enjoying the tray-service privilege.

Thank you.

Chris

May 5, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. MAGRUDER

FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

I am attaching a copy of a letter I have just written to Tom Meurer. It pretty well covers the facts pertinent to the human interest story I mentioned to you on the telephone yesterday afternoon.

Attachment

May 5, 1970

Mr. Thomas Meurer
Electronic Data Systems
200 Exchange Bank Building
Dallas, Texas 75235

Dear Tom:

Here are the letters I mentioned to you on the telephone Monday afternoon -- about 600 total. As you will note, about half of them are addressed to Xuan Thuy in Paris, the other half to the DRV President in Hanoi. In essence, they urge humane treatment and early release of U. S. prisoners of war.

The girl responsible for the writing of these letters is Miss Tad Tandler of 6924 Poppy Drive, McLean, Virginia. Although she is a junior at McLean High School and did go through the McLean faculty to the student body with her project outline and appeal for cooperation, she did not do any of this as part of a school or class project. It was strictly extracurricular.

One final item: Tad's father is not a POW. He is an Air Force Colonel (and pilot) now serving somewhere in Southeast Asia -- South Vietnam or Thailand. He is due home this June.

My thanks again for so generously accepting the responsibility for getting these letters to their destinations.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Enclosures

May 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director James Rowley
U. S. Secret Service

FROM: Alexander P. Butterfield

RE: Request for Literature on U. S. Secret
Service Procedures

I note that the request for literature on U. S. Secret Service procedures came originally from the officer in charge of security for the President of Brazil and not from the Brazilian government. This being the case, I leave the matter entirely in your hands; however, it is my personal opinion that a visit by a 3-man team is not at all necessary -- that a carefully put together package of materials would meet the requirement quite adequately.

cc: L. E. Boggs,
Assistant Director -
Protective Division

bcc: B/General Hughes

Chrow

May 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MRS. MARGITA WHITE

FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

RE: V. William Tompkins

This memorandum responds to your query of May 1st concerning Mr. V. William Tompkins. Yes, I do remember him -- and I'm sure that Jeb does too. He's the fellow from Ohio who kept calling and writing us about his huge letter of support for the President's November 3rd speech and Vietnam peace plan. In fact, he became so profuse in volunteering information about his local good deeds that he became a bit of a nuisance. He even had Buzz Lukens calling us from time to time to see what we planned to bestow upon him in the way of an award. It was all too obvious that Tompkins didn't want to settle for anything short of an opportunity to meet with the President and personally present the support petition. Jeb tried to make him understand that the President was indeed very grateful, but that he was just too tied up with other business to avail himself to every well meaning citizen who put together a scroll or petition in response to his appeal for unity on the Vietnam issue. As it happened, Tompkins did receive two Presidential letters (evidently not very well coordinated) and a note from me (attached).

Now he says that another big letter is on its way. (He must mean "another" letter, for the original petition was received here about mid-January.) In view of his mentioning how interested the Democrats might be in what he could tell them, it is imperative that we not involve the President in any way. As a matter of fact, I recommend nothing more in the way of a response than a short note of acknowledgment and thanks from you or Rob Odle.

Attachment

May 1, 1970

Butterfield's Final Report

Groups and Individuals in Veteran and Patriotic Categories

Completed calls to 12 "veteran and patriotic" leaders -- names unimportant -- and as expected, all voiced enthusiastic support. American Gold Star Mothers and American War Mothers were among organizations called. General comment was, "A very good move, and certainly the quickest way to end the war."

Relatively-Prominent Persons

Arthur M. Wood, President, Sears Roebuck Co., Chicago thought the talk was excellent -- liked the President's "reasonable approach" and said that he could be counted upon as a solid supporter.

Roy Ash - "The talk couldn't have been better. Anyone who had an open mind, and wanted to listen, had to see the reasoning was logical. I think it was the right thing to do and that the President will find that the majority of Americans will stand behind him."

Ross Perot - "I was enroute to Washington by plane, so didn't see the TV... but heard a taping after I arrived here in Washington. It is the right thing to do and I think it will generate some action on Hanoi's part with regard to the prisoner issue. I will give the decision my full support."

Clint Murchison - "Reaction here in the Dallas area will be favorable -- much along John Tower's line of thinking. Although I am opposed to any action which might tend to widen the war,

I support this decision so long as the military action proves to be short-term, i. e. a quick in-and-out maneuver. I couldn't have been more pleased than I was when the President recently announced the 150,000 withdrawal figure. That plan must go forward, and I think the majority of the American people feel the same way. The President has got to keep moving on the withdrawal plan. To the extent that this latest decision does not upset the general scaling down of the war, and the withdrawal program, I can live with it. I think, however, that the President will find that the anti-war sentiment will continue to grow. Incidentally, one of the things that is hurting the President most is the opposition to the war being voiced by many of the GOP Senators and Representatives. "

Bill Marriott, Sr. - "Good -- wonderful -- We're going to win this war. I just wrote the President a letter. You should get it today. "

Benjamin Oliver, Vice President - AT&T - "A fine speech. I'm all for the President, and all of our associates here at AT&T seem to feel the same way. The reaction has been very very favorable from what I've seen so far. "

Hobart Lewis - "I just talked to the President about 11 o'clock and told him how we felt here. It was really a great speech and I think the reaction will be pretty good all over. I have some reports here on some other people and their reactions. You may want to pass them on.

"Hanson Baldwin - 'A great stroke; we had to do it. An additional benefit to this action is that it will divert the attention of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese from the Cambodian government. I would like very much to get the intelligence data which led to the President's decision -- not the super-secret stuff, just the basic facts. I think it would make a great story and I'd like to write it. '

"Alice Longworth - 'It was simply wonderful. A great decision by a great President. '

"Joe Alsop - 'I think it was the best talk the President has given to date. He'll get the support he needs. I happened to be watching it at Teddy Kennedy's home, and Ethel was

there too. They were silent through it all and I know for a fact that if they had thought the speech were weak they'd have jumped all over it. But they didn't. I am sure they were impressed by the reasoning and logic, and jolted by the action. ' "

Unable to Contact

Could not reach Harllee Branch, Jr. (Chairman, Southern Company, Atlanta and Business Council member) or Bedford Wynne (Dallas Cowboys and other enterprises in Dallas).

Organizations

According to L. W. Lilley, Senior Associate at Schriever-McKee Associates, Inc. (Arlington), the entire Schriever-McKee organization is 100% behind the decision and will do all possible to promote support.

According to Jack Burke, Executive Secretary of the Business Council, the Business Council can be counted on. It is estimated that really solid support within the Council runs about 7 or 8 to 1, with those opposed admitting in the final analysis that they are not really too unfavorably disposed so long as the general winding down of the war continues.

Cabinet Members

I have called each Cabinet Member again this morning (all except Finch and Rumsfeld). Each has had a meeting of his top staff (or will have that meeting by the end of the day) ... to stress the importance of 100% departmental support -- in thought, word and deed -- and to review salient points of President's action.

Red Blount has called Governors Nunn, Kirk and Holton and reports that all 3 will support the President's action solidly. Moreover, all of them will put out statements playing up wisdom of decision and key points in rationale.

Wally Hickel called 4 Governors -- Cargo, Evans, Miller and Ray. All are in support of the decision and Miller is putting out a release right away.

Cliff Hardin called 3 Governors -- Tiemann, Farrar, and LeVander. All will support the President.

John Volpe is in the process of calling eight Democratic Governors.

Personal Comments in Summary

- Persons called favor the President's decision about 8 to 1 ... all fairly mature and fairly intelligent, so the picture is not really complete.

- Statement re President's disregard for political consideration, etc. was extremely effective. Almost everyone was impressed by it. On the other hand, the statement about our not letting America slip to "second rate" status, our not allowing ourselves to be humiliated (as strong as it is to the middle-aged and elderly, and those imbued with a genuine spirit of patriotism and love of country) will not sell too well to many of our young people, or to many women. That is unfortunate, but I believe true.

- What really comes through is the strong wish on everyone's part that the action be successful, and that it be done as the President outlined it would be done; that is, it must be a quick action -- something along the lines of the surprise attack the Israelis launched on the Egyptians -- a sharp, devastating blow, then a complete pulling out of the maneuver areas after 3-4 weeks. We must prove to those who are somewhat skeptical that the action is not going to serve as "an opening wedge" for "the generals" to continue military operations in Cambodian territory.

chron

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 2, 1970

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

SUBJECT: Briefing Materials

I am enclosing two papers on the combined US-ARVN operation against enemy supply areas in Cambodia:

- This morning's statistical report.
- A 4-week summary.

Alexander P. Butterfield
Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Enclosures

PERSONAL

8:00 a.m., June 2, 1970

<u>Total Operations</u>		<u>24-Hour Change</u>
Individual Weapons	15,199	+97
Crew-Served Weapons	2,106	+23
Bunkers/Structures Destroyed	8,193	+100
Machine Gun Rounds	3,267,752	+30,910
Rifle Rounds	<u>6,910,336</u>	+11,211
Total Small Arms Ammunition (Machine Gun & Rifle Rounds)	10,178,088	+42,121
Grenades	34,768	+101
Mines	3,925	+33
Satchel Charge	500	Unchanged
Miscellaneous Explosives (lbs)	72,000	Unchanged
Anti-Aircraft Rounds	133,721	Unchanged
Mortar Rounds	45,520	+48
Large Rocket Rounds	1,515	-39*
Smaller Rocket Rounds	25,435	+250
Recoilless Rifle Rounds	21,555	+5
Rice (lbs)	10,938,000	+50,000
Man Months	240,636	+1,100
Vehicles	358	+10
Boats	40	Unchanged
Generators	36	Unchanged
Radios	185	Unchanged
Medical Supplies (lbs)	39,600	Unchanged
Enemy KIA	9,006	+62
POWs (Includes Detainees)	1,900	+19
US KIA	246	+3
ARVN KIA	547	+8

*Field Adjustments

ALLIED OPERATIONS AGAINST COMMUNIST BASES
IN CAMBODIA

-- A Four-Week Report --

The Decision

Four weeks ago, President Nixon announced to the American people that allied forces had launched attacks to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodia-Vietnam border. The President explained that our purpose was not to occupy the sanctuary areas, but to quickly drive out the enemy forces and destroy their military supplies.

President Nixon laid out the compelling reasons for his decision:

- As Commander-in-Chief, to protect allied forces now in Vietnam and those remaining after our next withdrawal.
- To assure continued progress in our Vietnamization program and the pace of our withdrawals.
- To increase our chances of shortening the Vietnam war and our involvement in it.
- To make clear to the enemy that they cannot repeatedly ignore our warnings and escalate their attacks in Indochina as they have in Laos, Cambodia, and within Vietnam.
- To forestall miscalculations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere around the world which could lead to dangerous confrontations in the future.

This decision was taken against the background of relentless enemy challenges in Indochina in the face of American restraint and warnings.

By the time of the President's April 20 speech the situation in Cambodia was already serious. The President pointed to Communist escalation and warned against actions that would threaten the security of our forces. He nevertheless announced the further withdrawal of 150,000 Americans, and the U.S. continued to practice restraint along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border. The President also reiterated our continuing preference for a negotiated settlement fair to all parties.

Within several days of that speech, the Communist response was painfully obvious. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong moved further out of their Cambodian bases with the intent of linking them up. They were changing the border area from a series of isolated enclaves into a solid band of self-sustaining territory stretching to the sea.

We faced the prospect of Cambodia becoming one large base area for attacks on allied forces all along the 600 miles of the frontier with South Vietnam.

President Nixon moved forcefully and purposefully against these threats. The results are already impressive.

The Results to Date

After four weeks of these limited operations, it is abundantly clear that the enemy has been struck a heavy blow.

In just four weeks of our operations in Cambodia we have captured 26 percent of the total weapons which U.S. and South Vietnamese forces captured in South

Vietnam the entire year of 1969. We have seized 85 percent of the food and 75 percent of the ammunition captured in South Vietnam in 1969.

A breakdown on the latest available figures of arms, ammunition and supplies captured in Cambodia is:

- 50,000 mortar and rocket rounds
- 134,000 anti-aircraft rounds
- Nearly 10 million pounds of rice
- Nearly 12,000 individual weapons
- More than 2,100 crew-served weapons
- 300 vehicles
- 72,000 pounds of explosives, including dynamite and plastic charges
- 3,200 mines
- 500 satchel charges
- 20,000 grenades

The significance of the capture of these supplies is illustrated by the fact that the nearly 10 million pounds of rice would be sufficient to feed for two months all North Vietnamese forces that are estimated to be in South Vietnam. The 12,000 individual weapons and more than 2,100 crew-served weapons would be sufficient to equip 30 North Vietnamese infantry battalions at full strength.

While the purpose of this operation has been to destroy the enemy sanctuary bases and capture supplies, and not necessarily to engage the enemy in combat, they have taken a substantial loss of manpower. At the end of

four weeks, 8,200 of the enemy have been killed in action and 1,800 prisoners captured and detained. This amounts to more than 23 percent of the forces the enemy was estimated to have in the area.

The Implications

Some American forces already have withdrawn from Cambodia and all will be out of the sanctuaries by June 30. The future implications of these limited operations against Communist controlled territory already are taking shape.

We have disrupted the enemy's logistics network and lines of communication. With the rainy season beginning, it will be difficult for the Communists to start restoring their supplies for several months, even with no allied interdiction efforts.

We have thus struck hard at the enemy's offensive capability. We have reduced the capability of his main force units to threaten our forces in Vietnam. We have limited his ability to interfere with the progress of pacification in South Vietnam. And we have seen a tremendous boost in the morale and confidence of the South Vietnamese armed forces.

The most significant results of these operations will be measured in the course of the war and the prospects for peace in Southeast Asia.

The President could have avoided his difficult decision. He could have ignored enemy actions and avoided domestic dissent.

But he knew that inaction would have meant:

- higher American and allied casualties
- disruption of Vietnamization and our withdrawal schedule

- the prospect of longer American involvement and prolonged struggle in Southeast Asia
- a serious challenge to American leadership and steadfastness around the world.

Instead of this gloomy picture, the attacks on the Communist bases in Cambodia will:

- lower American and allied casualties over the coming months
- reinforce the President's announced Vietnamization program and withdrawal schedule
- hasten the day when all American forces can safely return home
- make clear to all adversaries that the U.S. will not hesitate to take firm action when its interests are at stake.

In conclusion, after four weeks, it is clear the operation has been a major tactical success, the most successful operation of its kind.

It is certain, also, that the mission will have been carried out with all troops removed by July 1, as stated.

Chron

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1970

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

SUBJECT: Briefing Material

I am enclosing this morning's statistical report concerning US-ARVN troop successes along the Cambodian frontier. The next such report will be sent to you on Tuesday, June 9th -- then every Tuesday and Thursday morning until the supply-raid operation is terminated and a final count is made of enemy materials confiscated.

Alexander P. Butterfield

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Enclosure

PERSONAL

<u>Total Operations</u>		<u>24-Hour Change</u>
Individual Weapons	15,260	+1*
Crew-Served Weapons	2,126	+12
Bunkers/Structures Destroyed	8,387	+94
Machine Gun Rounds	3,339,042	+71,090
Rifle Rounds	<u>7,875,680</u>	+965,304
Total Small Arms Ammunition (Machine Gun & Rifle Rounds)	11,214,722	+1,036,394
Grenades	39,851	+5,048
Mines	4,196	+236
Miscellaneous Explosives (lbs) (Includes Satchel Charges)	76,600	Unchanged
Anti-Aircraft Rounds	137,831	+5,137
Mortar Rounds	49,640	+1,442
Large Rocket Rounds	1,761	+176
Smaller Rocket Rounds	26,191	+12
Recoilless Rifle Rounds	22,292	+126
Rice (lbs)	11,146,000	+66,000
Man Months	245,212	+1,452
Vehicles	359	Unchanged
Boats	40	Unchanged
Generators	36	Unchanged
Radios	186	Unchanged
Medical Supplies (lbs)	50,800	Unchanged
Enemy KIA	9,179	+40
POWs (Includes Detainees)	1,919	+6
US KIA	253	+4
ARVN KIA	569	+11

Determined to be an
Administrative Marking
Not National Security Information
By JCS NARA Date 3/25/2016

June 4, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James Rowley
Director, U.S. Secret Service

FROM: Alexander P. Butterfield

RE: Danger Signals

Although I do not acknowledge each of your monthly reports, as perhaps I should, I want you to know that I do read the information forwarded and that I maintain an active interest in the subject matter.

This last report just received -- the monthly report of White House security data for the month of May -- elicited special interest, for it indicated significant increases in the number of threat cases received and the number of abusive and obscene messages received. If I have calculated correctly, the 101 threat cases exceeds by 29 the monthly "threat case" average over the past year and the 24 obscene notes exceeds by 21 the monthly average in that category.

Of course I realize that you have made note of the same figure increases, and that you are well on top of things. My only object is to express my own concern and to ask you to keep me abreast of whatever accelerated investigative and precautionary protective actions are taken as a result.

Many thanks.

bcc: ROBERT TAYLOR, S.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chen

June 17, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHAPIN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: You Tell Me(??)

I received an odd memorandum recently. It was addressed to The Honorable Messrs. Butterfield, Chapin and Higby, dated June 5th and it ended with a rather urgent plea for the addressees to join the efforts of the signatories to save their sanity. The remainder of the content had something to do with space, but it appeared as such a hodgepodge of incoherent babbling that I am not sure what. And, oh yes, the signatures (three of them, I believe ... obviously applied with a paintbrush) were illegible.

The purpose of this note of mine is simply to say that apart from the fact that I think it is much too late to help this desperate threesome with their sanity problems, I do think that we might be able to provide more space -- if that, indeed, is what they want. For instance, we could let them go. There's plenty of that space stuff on the outside. Moreover, that particular action would create more of it (space, that is) inside. What do you think?

P.S. Oh, incidentally, I understand that there is some thought being given to moving a summer intern into our secretarial office. If that is true, I am opposed. The room is much too crowded as it is -- and the additional area programmed for the northwest corner will not really do much to help the situation.

Chron

June 18, 1970

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHECKER FINN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Checker:

This is just a quick and very personal word concerning your recent memorandum to John Ehrlichman. I read it this morning -- not to pry but because it is one of my responsibilities to review all papers prior to their delivery to the President. Yours is with him now.

My message is simply this. The meeting with the President (to which you referred) did not go poorly and did not waste the President's time. I can assure you with all confidence that he was most interested, and that he gave the subject considerable thought afterward. If you believe this and realize that you too rethought the matter -- what the crux of the problem really is and what approaches and remedies might be most appropriate -- you should see clearly that the meeting was in fact quite fruitful.

Unquestionably there is a lot of meat to this campus unrest topic and you should view it as one which probably had to be hashed out once just as it was -- in the rough; a sort of chewing and swallowing process. Under such circumstances it was not unusual, or even unexpected, that certain of the more incisive points and/or recommendations were not brought home with force and clarity. That often occurs later on -- with the digestive process -- as indeed it did on June 9th; to wit, your memo to John.

Conclusion: Whereas your frustrations are understandable, they are not, in this case, warrantable.

Keep up the outstanding work.

PERSONAL

chron

June 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KLEIN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: Material for Distribution

I think the attached letter written by Lenin in 1905 would be quite an eye opener in some quarters. I pass it on to you for your general interest and for whatever kind of outside distribution you think might be appropriate ... either now or later.

Attachment

cc: Mr. Keogh
Mr. Magruder
Mr. Nofziger

H

June 19, 1970
9:50 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

RE: British Elections and Your Calls
 to Heath and Wilson

The Conservatives now have an absolute majority in the House. Although Wilson has not yet officially conceded, he has publicly requested an audience with the Queen ... presumably for the purpose of tendering his resignation.

On the basis of this information (just received), Ambassador Annenberg recommends that you place your calls now -- first to Heath, then to Wilson. It is mid-afternoon in England.

Henry's staff has prepared talking points which are attached.

Attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. HALDEMAN

FROM:

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

RE:

Secret Service Singing, Saluting
(would you believe Simultaneously?)

I have talked to Bob Taylor about this subject and he foresees no problems. Therefore, starting right away, Secret Service agents in proximity to the President will sing and salute (simultaneously) when the National Anthem is played at public events. Agents not in proximity to the President will follow the same procedure to the extent that they believe advisable under whatever conditions prevail.

It goes without saying, of course, that all agents on duty will continue their close surveillance of persons, and things occurring, around the President and the First Family members. If at any time anyone of them senses the need to divert his attention from the Flag or the band -- and in so doing depart from the desired National Anthem procedures -- he will do so.

I think that things should work out fairly well. If I am unable to observe the first few public events at which the National Anthem is played, I will be anxious to hear your report.

Oh, come on, Larry! You can do better than that. A A A A Great Great Great Great (And where's the exclamation mark, man?) H H. H. H H